Duckworth, Douglas Samuel - Buddha Nature in the works of Mi-pham.pdf

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Table of ContentsTable of ContentsTable of ContentsTable of Contents

Abstract..................................................................................................................iAcknowledgements.............................................................................................. iiiIntroduction ...........................................................................................................1

Historical Context ..............................................................................................1Monastic Colleges and Buddhist Education ......................................................9Epistemology and Negative Dialectics ............................................................13Buddha-Nature................................................................................................15Summary of Contents......................................................................................18Interpretive Context .........................................................................................24

Chapter 1: Buddha-Nature and the Unity of the Two Truths...............................27Introduction......................................................................................................27Mi-pham’s Synthesis .......................................................................................31Two Truths ......................................................................................................35Buddha-Nature as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness ...........................45Buddha-Nature as the Definitive Meaning.......................................................56

Conclusion.......................................................................................................63Chapter 2: Yogācāra, Prāsaṅgika, and the Middle Way .....................................64

Introduction......................................................................................................64Middle Way and Mind-Only .............................................................................64Foundations of Yogācāra ................................................................................67Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika ...................................................................................73Dialectical Ascent ............................................................................................90

Conclusion.......................................................................................................99Chapter 3: The Present Absence......................................................................101

Introduction....................................................................................................101Other-Emptiness in the Jo-nang....................................................................102Other-Emptiness and the Nying-ma: Lo-chen Dharma Śrī ............................115


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Another Emptiness? Emptiness of Self/Other ...............................................122Delineating Phenomena and Suchness ........................................................125Delineating Emptiness...................................................................................135

Emptiness as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness.................................141Conclusion.....................................................................................................149

Chapter 4: Buddha-Nature and the Indivisible Ground and Fruition..................151Introduction....................................................................................................151Delineating the Views on Buddha-Nature......................................................151Buddha-Nature as Heritage, Buddha-Nature as the Ground.........................160Delineating Appearance and Reality .............................................................170Establishing Buddha-Nature: The Immanent Buddha ...................................180Establishing Appearances as Divine .............................................................189Buddha-Nature and a Difference Between Sūtra and Mantra .......................200Buddha-Nature as the Ground of the Great Perfection .................................212Conclusion.....................................................................................................214

Concluding Remarks.........................................................................................216Document 1 ......................................................................................................221

Introduction....................................................................................................221Lion’s Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature ........................................................221

1. Stating Other Traditions ............................................................................2242. Presenting Our Own Authentic Tradition...................................................228

1. The Meaning of the First Verse “Because the body of the perfect Buddhais radiant” ...................................................................................................2282. The Meaning of the Second Verse “Because suchness is indivisible”...2353. The Meaning of the Third Verse “Because of possessing heritage” ......239

1. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is Truly Established and NotEmpty ............................................................................................................2452. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is a Void Emptiness ...............2473. Refuting the Apprehension of [the Basic Element] as Impermanent andConditioned ...................................................................................................248


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Document 2 ......................................................................................................261Introduction....................................................................................................261

Notes on the Essential Points of [Mi-pham’s] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature] ...261

Document 3 ......................................................................................................272Introduction....................................................................................................272

Excerpt from Roar of the Fearless Lion [48.2-97.4] ..........................................2721. The Subject of the Extensive Discussion Here, an Explanation of theProgression of Profound Points of the Ground, Path, and Fruition of the SūtraPerfection Vehicle .........................................................................................2731. The Manner of the Teaching of the Profound Abiding Reality of the DefinitiveMeaning of the Perfection Vehicle.................................................................2741. The Progression of the Wheels of Doctrine which are the Means of Teachingthe Definitive Meaning of the Abiding Reality................................................274

1. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in theSaṃdhinirmocanasūtra ..........2741. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................2742. Establishing the Reason for That Being the Way It Is ........................279

2. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in theDhāraṇīśvararājaparipṛcchā ...2891. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................2892. Establishing [the Reason for That Being] the Way It Is ......................293

3. In Accord with That, the Way They are Indicated in theNirvāṇa [sūtra ] andso forth [75.5].............................................................................................296

1. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................2961. Presenting Scripture from theNirvāṇasūtra ....................................2962. Presenting Scripture from theAṅgulimālīyasūtr a............................298

2. Establishing through Reasoning That Being the Way It Is..................300

3. An Appended Identification of the Scriptural Collections of DefinitiveMeaning .................................................................................................306

2. The Way that These Commentaries on Buddha’s Viewpoint are Supreme......................................................................................................................307

Bibliography ......................................................................................................313


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Tibetan Sources ............................................................................................313Non-Tibetan Sources ....................................................................................318


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i

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract

This dissertation addresses the relationship between metaphysicalpresence and absence (emptiness) in Buddhism through a focus on theNying-ma tradition as articulated in the works of Mi-pham (’ju mi phamrgya mtsho , 1846-1912), a great synthesizer of Buddhist doctrine andNying-ma philosophy. I draw widely from his writings on Yogācāra,Madhyamaka, and tantra to discuss the significance of an ontological“ground” (gzhi ), or Buddha-nature, as the central theme in his overallinterpretative scheme. Mi-pham was a prolific writer on a variety of topics,and had a remarkable ability to synthesize diverse strands of thought.

The tradition of the Nying-ma is a complex one, and there are manydivergent and competing voices that lay claim to the tradition. I will try topresent important facets of this central theme in Mi-pham’s philosophy ofNying-ma, and show how he uses a dialectic of presence and absencearound which he discusses a unified ground.

Mi-pham was a prominent figure in the Tibetan non-sectarian (rismed ) movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hemost notably brought esoteric Nying-ma doctrines into conversation withthe exoteric scholastic discourses of his day. Mi-pham formulates theNying-ma tradition of his predecessors Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab’byam , 1308-1364) and Rong-zom (rong zom chos kyi bzang po , ca. 11th c.) in response to traditions of “other-emptiness,” through which hedistinguishes his Nying-ma tradition.

Buddha-nature is a theme in Mi-pham’s work that has a strongassociation with tantra in the Nying-ma tradition. His affirmation of thepresence of Buddha-nature as intrinsic within the ground of existenceshares predominant characteristics of the discourses of tantra in theNying-ma tradition and, in particular, the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen ).The Great Perfection is an antischolastic textual and meditative traditionthat consistently evades systematic analysis, and in a fundamental way isantithetical to abstract conceptual determination. Mi-pham creatively


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formulates the esoteric discourses that have defined the Nying-matradition—the Great Perfection and the tantric tradition of theGuhyagarbha— in terms of central exoteric discourses of Buddhism:Buddha-nature, the Middle Way, and Buddhist epistemological systems.This dissertation explores a range of topics within Mi-pham’s thought tounderscore Buddha-nature and a dialectic of presence and absence as acentral thread that runs through his interpretative system.


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AcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgements

While I was studying in graduate school, I had the fortune ofsharing a house for some time with Khen-po Ye-shey-trin-ley, who wasinstrumental in fostering my appreciation for the works of Mi-pham. I alsolived for one semester in Charlottesville with a Jo-nang scholar, Khen-poTsul-trim-dar-gyey, and spent my first two years of coursework living intwo separate houses each with a Ge-luk scholar, Ge-shey Tar-dö and Ge-shey Ten-zin-dar-gyey. Additionally, while I was writing mycomprehensive exams, I had the opportunity to study with Tulku Nyi-ma-gyal-tsen while he was in residence at the University of Virginia for onesemester. I was very fortunate to have had close contact with thesescholars while doing my academic studies.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Chökyi NyimaRinpoche, and his late father, Tulku Urgyen, without whom I would nothave had the inspiration to take on such a study. Also, I would like tothank my advisor, Professor Jeffrey Hopkins, whose legacy of academicscholarship of Buddhism is difficult to fathom. Professor David Germano

has also helped me over the years in many significant ways. ProfessorsHopkins and Germano have both consistently challenged me to further myunderstanding of texts and traditions in critical and creative ways. I wouldalso like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee,Professors Karen Lang and Robert Hueckstedt, each of whom has kindlyshared their expertise and gave me valuable advice.

My studies were made possible due to many learned Tibetan

scholars who I would like to thank in the order that I met them (by sect forease of identification): Nying-ma scholars—the late Nyo-shul Khen-poJam-yang-dor-jey, Khen-po Chö-dzöd, the late Khen-po Cha-dral, the lateKhen-po Pen-tsey, Khen-po Nyi-ma-tön-drup, Khen-po Shey-rap-zang-po,Khen-po Cham-pa-lo-drö, Khen-po Nam-dröl, Khen-po Shey-rap-dor-jey,Khen-po Pe-ma-shey-rap, Khen-po Kātyāyana, Khen-po Wang-chuk-sö-


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nam, and Khen-po Ye-shey-dor-jey; Jo-nang scholars—A-ku Rap-gyey,the late Khen-po Yön-ten-zang-po, Khen-po Nga-wang-dor-jey, and Khen-po Shey-rap; Sa-kya scholars—Khen-po Chö-ying-lhün-drup, Khen-poCham-pa-tön-ten, and Khen-po A-pey; Ka-gyüd scholars—ThranguRinpoche, Khen-po Pe-ma-gyal-tsen, Khen-po Tup-ten-ye-shey, andKhen-po Shey-rap-ö-zer. All these teachers, and others not mentioned,shared with me their vast learning with great kindness.

My interest in the academic study of Buddha-nature was sparkedby my undergraduate professor, Sallie King, who I would like to thank as ateacher, friend, and mentor. I would also like to thank Robert Pryor andTara Doyle, with whom I first encountered Buddhist Studies on an abroadprogram they developed in Bodh Gaya with Antioch College. I would liketo express my appreciation for the Rangjung Yeshe Institute, the Centrefor Buddhist Studies at Kathmandu University, for providing an institutionthat offered me the invaluable opportunity to study Buddhismsimultaneously with traditional Buddhist and academic scholars. I wouldalso like to thank my students whom I taught the Tibetan language tothere, who stimultated me to deepen my knowledge of the language. I

owe a special thanks to Professor John Dunne, who tutored me in Tibetanwhen I was first traveling in India after college. Also, I owe thanks toAdam Pearcy and Thomas Doctor, with whom I benefited from numerousconversations about Mi-pham. Also, Thomas along with Erik Schmidt, aretwo Danish translators who taught me Tibetan while I was in Nepal, andwho have tirelessly provided translations into English over the years. Iwould also like to thank Professors Tom Tillemans and John Makransky

for their excellent advice to me. Additionally, I thank Professor KarmaPhuntsho, whose correspondences have helped my understanding of Mi-pham.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my collegues at theUniversity of Virginia, to Jann Ronis and James Gentry in particular, who


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read early drafts of this dissertation and have given me excellent supportas scholars and friends. I would also like to thank Nawang Thokmey, aSouth Asian librarian at the University of Virginia, for helping me locateTibetan texts; Gene Smith, who introduced me to Jo-nang teachers andtexts; and Paul Hackett for his help with digital Tibetan texts.

I am grateful to Fulbright-Hays for providing me with the researchgrant to do fieldwork in Nepal and India for this dissertation. Also, FLASAwards, Ellen Bayard Weedon Travel Awards, and funding from the Deanof the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Virginiahave supported my research at Virginia and in Tibet. I would also like tothank the Yinshun Foundation for contributing funding during mycoursework.

Last but not least, I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude tomy parents, without whom none of this would be possible, and my wife,Jasmine, whose love and patience has guided me through it all.


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To my parents, my wife, and to anyone whose hair stands on end upon hearingabout emptiness


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Introduction

HistoricalHistoricalHistoricalHistorical Context Context Context ContextIn the nineteenth century a remarkable “non-sectarian” (ris med )

movement developed in the southeastern Tibetan province of Kham(khams ). Alliances of a ritual, intellectual, literary, and institutionalcharacter formed among the traditions of the Ka-gyüd (bka’ brgyud ), Sa-kya (sa skya ), and Nying-ma (rnying ma ) following the politicalascendancy of the Ge-luk (dge lugs ) tradition in Central Tibet. The non-sectarian movement engendered an intellectual and literary renaissancedriven by a wave of creative doctrinal syntheses and new institutional

movements towards formalized monastic education. The Nying-matradition came to play a particularly influential role in the movement, and acentral figure and primary architect of the time was Mi-pham (’ju mi phamrgya mtsho , 1846-1912), whose works will be discussed in thisdissertation.

The Nying-ma identifies its origins within the dynastic period of theeighth century, although a self-conscious Nying-ma tradition, known as the“old school,” actually developed in response to attacks on the legitimacy ofits translations by the Sar-ma tradition, the “new schools,” which began todevelop in Tibet from the activities of the famous translator Rin-chen-zang-po (rin chen bzang po , 958-1055) in the eleventh century. Theefforts to affirm the legitimacy, and superiority, of the Nying-ma traditioncan be seen from early on, such as in the works of Rong-zom (rong zomchos kyi bzang po , ca. 11th c.) and Nyang-ral (myang ral nyi ma’i ’od gzer ,1124-1192).

The Nying-ma, with a textual tradition of translations dating back tothe early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet, claim a distinctiveconnection with the imperial age of Tibet—a theocratic polity populated bythe enlightened figures of the Dharma King Tri-song-de-tsen (khri sronglde’u btsan ), Padmasambhava—and translators who had a privilegedaccess to a living tradition of Buddhism from India before it was curtailed


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by the Muslim invasions in the eleventh century. The Nying-ma havebeen able to periodically reinvigorate their tradition over the years to servethe contingencies of history through their “close lineage” (nye brgyud ) ofrevealed teachings. In the “close lineage,” Buddhist canonical teachingsare not limited to a specific set of texts, nor a specific individual in history,but remain within a tradition of an ongoing revelation, that in principle isopen to anyone, at anytime.

Before Mi-pham, the Nying-ma tradition was largely defined by theiresoteric transmissions, particularly those of theGuhyagarbhatantra , atantra that was not included in the Buddhist canon compiled in Tibet in thefourteenth century by proponents of the “new schools” of translations.

While many scholars of the Nying-ma tradition certainly studied theexoteric texts of Buddhist sūtras and śāstras, they did not commonly writecommentaries that focused on such exoteric texts. This was an importantpart of Mi-pham’s contribution to the Nying-ma tradition.

Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa are Mi-pham’s main Tibetan sourcesfor his works. Rong-zom composed a commentary on the main tantra ofthe Nying-ma tradition, theGuhyagarbhatantra ,1 and in his EstablishingAppearances as Divine ,2 he notably uses Buddhist logic, exemplifying aunique relationship between tantra and Buddhist logic in Nying-maexegesis. Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab 'byam , 1308-1364) also wrote acommentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra ,3 and is renowned for his writingson the Great Perfection, such as the “Seven Treasuries” (mdzod bdun ).Mi-pham wrote catalogues (dkar chag ) for the publications of the collectedworks of Rong-zom and the “Seven Treasuries” of Long-chen-pa.4 The

1 Rong-zom, rgyud rgyal gsang ba’i snying po dkon cog ’grel , Rong-zom’s CollectedWorks vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 33-253.

2 Rong-zom, gsang snags rdo rje theg pa’i tshul las snang ba lhar bsgrub pa , Rong-zom’sCollected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 557-568.3 Long-chen-pa, phyogs bcu mun sel , (reproduced froma ’dzom zylographic edition),(Paro: Ngodup, 1975).4 Kün-zang-chö-drak (sa manta bhadra dharma kirti ), Mi-pham’s Essential Hagiographyand Catalogue of Works (gangs ri’i khrod kyi smra ba’i seng ge gcig po ’jam dgon mi


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influences of Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa are prominently reflected in Mi-pham’s works, particularly Long-chen-pa and the tradition of the GreatPerfection. In many ways, his works can be seen as an extendedcommentary upon the writings of Long-chen-pa.5

Another important figure in the Nying-ma tradition was Lo-chenDharma Śrī (lo chen dharma śrī , 1654-1717). Lo-chen and his brother,Ter-dak-ling-pa (gter bdag gling pa ’gyur med rdo rje,1646-1714), both ofwhom took ordination from the fifth Dalai Lama, were important figures inthe transmission of the Nying-ma canon (bka’ ma ).6 Ter-dak-ling-pafounded the Nying-ma monastery of Min-dröl-ling (o rgyan smin sgrolgling ) in the Iron-dog year (1670).7 Lo-chen also wrote texts on the

Guhyagarbhatantra ,8 as well as a commentary on the three vows by Nga-ri Paṇ-chen (nga ri paṇ chen padma dbang rgyal , 1487-1542),9 which we

pham rgya mtsho’i rnam thar snying po bsdus pa dang gsung rab kyi dkar chag snga’gyur bsan pa’i mdzes rgyan ), Mi-pham’s Collected Works, vol. 8 (hung ), 672.2-672.5.John Pettit translates a portion of this hagiography inBeacon of Certainty , 23-39. Theauthor of this text is unclear. Pettit attributes the author to Khen-po Kün-pal, Mi-pham’s

student; however, he states that there is some doubt that Khen-po Kün-pal is in fact theauthor. See John Pettit, Beacon of Certainty (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 27;467n.59.5 Throughout Mi-pham’s works, we find references to Long-chen-pa’s writings. Mi-phamalso wrote texts that were explicit commentaries on Long-chen-pa’s texts: three shorttexts that include commentaries on the twelfth and eighteenth chapters of the yid bzhinmdzod , and an “overview” (spyi don ) of Long-chen-pa’s commentary on theGuhyagarbhatantra .6 Dud-jom Rin-po-chey (bdud ’joms ’jigs bral ye shes rdo rje,1904-1988), bdud ’jomschos ’byung(Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1996), 399-410; 497.7 Nyo-shul Khen-po (smyo shul mkhan po ’jam dbyangs rdo rje , 1931-1999), nor bubaidurya’i phreng ba (rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po’i chos ’byung rig ’dzin brgyud pa’i

rnam thar ngo mtshar nor bu baidurya’i phreng ba ), vol. 2 (Thimbu: Indraprastha Press,1996), 504.1-504.2.8 Lo-chen Dharma Śrī,gsang bdag zhal lung and gsang bdag dgongs rgyan .9 Lo-chen Dharma Śrī,dpag bsam snye ma (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pa’i ’grel palegs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma ), (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur NyingmaInstitute).


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will address in the context of discussing the view of “other-emptiness”(gzhan stong ) in contrast to Mi-pham’s representation of emptiness.

A central issue concerning the status of other-emptiness is arecurring dialectical tension between presence and absence, which inBuddhist terms gets expressed in various ways such as appearance andemptiness, conventional and ultimate truth, Buddha-nature and emptiness,and other-emptiness and self-emptiness. This issue can be seen to havea history extending back to India in the competing depictions of a qualified(saguṇa ) or unqualified (nirguṇa ) absolute. A major tension in Tibetanthought is found between the positions that the ultimate truth must be asimple emptiness—a negation—in contrast to the positively-framed

depictions of ultimate reality as a divine presence existing at the heart ofall, the Buddha-nature. Across this spectrum we find a wide array ofpositions.

The most famous proponents of other-emptiness are found withinthe Jo-nang ( jo nang ) tradition, and Dol-po-pa (dol po pa shes rab rgyalmtshan , 1292-1361) in particular.10 We will discuss Dol-po-pa’s view ofother-emptiness in chapter 3, as well as look into a Jo-nang scholar of thelast century, Khen-po Lo-drö-drak-pa (’dzam thang mkhan po blo grosgrags pa , 1920-1975). Khen-po Lo-drö-drak-pa is from Dzam-thang(’dzam thang ) in Eastern Tibet, where a prominent Jo-nang monastery hasremained active to the present day.

Tsong-kha-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa , 1357-1419) andhis Ge-luk followers had been major critics of the Jo-nang, the emblematictradition of other-emptiness. Tsong-kha-pa, in contrast to the Jo-nangdepiction of emptiness, consistently held to the notion that the ultimate

10 An excellent source for the life and works of Dol-po-pa is found in Cyrus Stearns,TheBuddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master SherabGyaltsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).


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truth is necessarily a mere absence.11 We will see how other discourseson emptiness offer a less delimited portrayal of ultimate reality.

A central concern here is the nature of philosophical reasoning andintellectual inquiry into Buddhist scriptural traditions, within both esotericand exoteric discourses. Mi-pham articulated a distinctive Nying-ma viewon a variety of exoteric topics through his interpretative framework drawingon the Nying-ma’s own esoteric tradition of the Great Perfection (rdzogschen ). He incorporated esoteric discourses of Mantra (sngags )characteristic of his Nying-ma predecessors, particularly themes foundwithin the Guhyagarbhatantra , into his commentaries on Indian śāstras.An important part of Mi-pham’s works is found within the relationship

between the Great Perfection and the exoteric discourses of epistemology(tshad ma, pramāṇa ), the Middle Way (dbu ma, madhyamaka ), andBuddha-nature in particular.

Mi-pham integrated aspects of the Buddhist epistemologicaltradition with a view of Mantra, and portrayed the view of the GreatPerfection as compatible with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. The GreatPerfection is the Nying-ma tradition’s highest esoteric teaching andPrāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka is the philosophy commonly accepted in Tibetas the highest exoteric view. Through this, Mi-pham affirms the Nying-maas not only a tradition of tantric exegesis and ritual practice, but also asgrounded within the rigorous intellectual traditions of Buddhist exotericphilosophy.

Kong-trul (kong sprul yon tan rgya mtsho,1813-1899), one of Mi-pham’s teachers, was another important figure in the non-sectarianmovement. In particular, hisEncyclopedia of Knowledge (shes bya kunkhyab ) is a tremendous resource on different views and systems ofthought in Tibet. Gene Smith credits Kong-trul’sEncyclopedia of

11 See for instance Tsong-kha-pa statement that: “The ultimate truth is posited as solelythe negation of truth [that is, inherent existence] upon a subject that is a basis ofnegation...” Tsong-kha-pa, lam rim chung ba , 396.6: don dam bden pa ni dgag gzhi choscan la bden pa bkag pa tsam la ’jog pa’i phyir .


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Knowledge as likely “the earliest statement of nonsectarian thought.”12 Kong-trul played an important role in bringing together variouscompilations of numerous scholars in Tibet.

Mi-pham is a unique figure in the non-sectarian movement becausehe was not endorsed as an incarnate lama ( sprul sku ), at least not whilealive. Also, unlike many prominent figures of his day, such as Kong-trul,Jam-yang-khyen-tsey-wang-po (’jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse dbang po ,1820-1892), and Chok-gyur-ling-pa (mchog gyur bde chen gling pa , 1829 – 1870), Mi-pham neither discovered earth treasure texts (sa gter ), norwrote commentaries on them.13 Rather, he wrote numerous commentarieson a variety of diverse topics, ranging from logic, poetics, the Middle Way,

Yogācāra, medicine, astrology, including a sex-manual (’dod pa’i bstanbcos , kāmaśāstra ); he was a prolific Tibetan monk to say the least.14 Healso wrote on Tibetan translations of Indian texts, including tantras fromthe “new schools” (gsar ma ),15 the Guhyagarbhatantra of his own Nying-

12 Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 237.13 Mi-pham did write a topical outline (sa bcad ) for a treasure text of Chok-gyur-ling-pa,the lam rim ye shes snying po’i bsdus don ldeb,Mi-pham’s Collected Works, vol. 8

(hung ), (sde dge ed.). Another short text Mi-pham wrote concerning the treasure traditiondescribes how to tell good treasure revealers from charlatans. See Mi-pham,gter stonbrtag ba chu dwangs nor bu , Mi-pham’s Collected works, vol. 14, 475-487. For a criticaledition, translation, and analysis of this text, see Andreas Doctor’s dissertation, “TheTibetan Treasure Literature: A Study of the Revelations of the Visionary Master Mchoggyur bde chen gling pa (1829 – 1870),” (University of Calgary, 2003). It is noteworthythat Mi-pham states: “I also have no hope for the fortune of a new treasure doctrinebecause I know that there is not the slightest thing missing (ma chog pa rdul rtsam med )from sūtras, tantras, and commentarial treatises.” Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed (gzhan byis brtsad pa’i lan mdor bsdus pa rigs lam rab gsal de nyid snang byed ),

published inspyod ’jug sher ’grel ke ta ka(Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1993), 339:gsardu gter gyi chos skal la re ba’ang med de/ mdo rgyud dgongs ’grel dang bcas pa ’di daggis ma chog pa rdul tsam med par shes pa lags.14 For detailed description of the breadth of Mi-pham’s writings, see Karma Phuntsho,Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005),13-19. See also Smith, Among Tibetan Texts , 229-233.15 For instance, his massive two-volume commentary on theKālacakra , as well his othercompositions on Hevajra, Guhyasamāja, Cakrasaṃvara , et al.


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interpreting Buddhist thought, and cites a danger in overly generalizingthese categories. As an alternative, he suggests that it is important todocument the precise usages of such terms as they are used by theindigenous traditions.21 In chapter 3, I have tried to document some waysin which “other-emptiness” and “self-emptiness” have been used by thespecific Jo-nang and Nying-ma authors I address, in order to further theunderstanding of how emptiness is represented in these traditions ingeneral, and Mi-pham’s position in particular.

There has been little written concerning the explicit topic ofBuddha-nature in the Nying-ma tradition, particularly in Mi-pham’s works.I aim to clarify this central topic in his works. In this dissertation, I discussthe fundamental role of Buddha-nature in Mi-pham’s interpretation of avariety of Buddhist discourses. In particular, I present how he shows thecompatibility of esoteric discourses, such as the Great Perfection, with theexoteric discourses of valid cognition (tshad ma , pramāṇa ) and the MiddleWay within his exegesis of Buddha-nature. By addressing a wide range ofthese issues, I frame the topic of Buddha-nature in a way that can help usbetter understand its central place in Mi-pham’s works.

We will also discuss Pöd-pa Tulku (bod sprul mdo sngags bstanpa’i nyi ma,1900/1907-1959), a scholar from the eastern region of CentralTibet called Dak-po (dwags po ), who commented on Mi-pham’s works.Pöd-pa Tulku was a student of Khen-po Kün-pal (kun bzang dpal ldan ,1870/2-1943) from Ge-gong (ge gong ) monastery, who was Mi-pham’sdirect disciple.22 Khen-po Kün-pal was the first professor (mkhan po )appointed to the monastic college at Kaḥ-tok (kaḥ thog ) monastery, theNor-bu-lhün-po monastic college (bshad grwa nor bu lhun po ), or “the

tantric college of one hundred scriptures” (rgyud sde bshad grwa gzhungbrgya ma ) founded by Mi-pham, along with Kaḥ-tok Situ (kaḥ thog si tu

21 Matthew Kapstein, “Are We All Gzhan stong pas?”Journal of Buddhist Ethics , 7(2000), 121.22 Nyo-shul Khen-po,nor bu baidurya’i phreng ba , vol. 2, 354.4-356.2.


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chos kyi rgya mtsho , 1880-1923/5) in the Fire-horse year (1906).23 Extending from this monastic college at Kaḥ-tok, twenty-five monasticcolleges were subsequently founded through Kaḥ-tok Situ’s work.24

Pöd-pa Tulku taught at the monastic college at She-chenmonastery. Among his students were the recently deceased Khen-po Da-zer (mkhan zla zer ), and Khen-po Pen-tsey (padma tshe dbang lhungrub ). Khen-po Da-zer came to teach in the monastic college of the Pal-yul (dpal yul ) tradition in Mysore, India (the Nyagyur Nyingma Institute)before he returned to teach at the Śrī Singha monastic college (shri singhabshad grwa ) at Dzok-chen (rdzogs chen ) monastery in Tibet.25 Khen-poPen-tsey also taught at the Śrī Singha monastic college and in India and

Nepal.26 Before we turn to the roles of valid cognition, the Middle Way, and

the Great Perfection in relation to Buddha-nature, we will first discuss Mi-pham’s contributions to Nying-ma exegesis within the context of the non-sectarian movement. In particular, we will look at his work within thecontext of the development of monastic education in Kham in the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Monastic Colleges Monastic Colleges Monastic Colleges Monastic Colleges and Buddhist Education and Buddhist Education and Buddhist Education and Buddhist EducationSeveral monastic colleges (bshad grwa ) were constructed during

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Kham region of EasternTibet, which was the strongest monastic presence and the epicenter of thenon-sectarian movement’s activity. Śrī Singha college, constructed atDzok-chen monastery by Gyal-sey Shen-pen-tha-yey (rgyal sras gzhanphen mtha’ yas , 1800-1855?), was particularly influential. Gyal-sey Shen-pen-tha-yey rebuilt Dzok-chen monastery with the support of the rulers of

23 Ibid., 225.2-225.3; 263.3-263.5; 352.4-352.6.24 Ibid., 263.3-265.3.25 Ibid., 356.2-357.5.26 Ibid., 359.6-360.4.


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Der-gey, among others, after it was destroyed by an earthquake in theWater-tiger year (1842).27

Khen-po Shen-ga (mkhan po gzhan dga’, gzhan phan chos kyisnang ba, 1871-1927), who was recognized as a reincarnation of Gyal-seyShen-pen-tha-yey, taught at the monastic college at Dzok-chen. He alsofounded eighteen monastic colleges such as the colleges of Kham-jey(khams bye ) below Dzong-sar (rdzong gsar ) monastery, at Pal-pung (dpalspungs ), Dri-kung (’bri gung ), and Kye-gu-do (skye dgu mdo ).28 Khen-poShen-ga compiled textbooks for monastic colleges comprising interlinearcommentaries (mchan ’grel ) on “the thirteen great scriptures” (gzhungchen mo bcu gsum ), Indian treatises that were considered to be the

important texts representing the spectrum of major Buddhist discourses— namely, madhyamaka , vinaya , abhidharma , and the five treatises ofMaitreya (byams chos sde lnga ).29 In these works, he concerns himselfwith an exposition upon Indian sources, not the Tibetan layers ofcommentary, in an attempt to interpret the Indian texts on their ownterms.30 Khen-po Shen-ga’s commentaries can be seen as a means tocircumvent sectarian disputes by appealing to Indian originals rather thansome specific strand of over one thousand years of Tibetancommentary.31

27 Gyal-wang Chö-kyi-nyi-ma (rgyal dbang chos kyi nyi ma ), History of Dzok-chenMonastery (mdo khams rdzogs chen dgon gyi lo rgyus nor bu’i phreng ba ), (Delhi:Konchhog Lhadrepa, 1986), 138.3-142.2. See also Tulku Thondup,Masters of Meditationand Miracles (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), 177; 198-199.28 Nyo-shul Khen-po, nor bu baidurya’i phreng ba, vol. 2, 395.2-395.5.29 See Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping,129-130. Dreyfus,however, misidentifies the thirteen texts by including Dharmakīrti’sPramāṇavārttika ,

which is not one of the thirteen, instead of Śāntideva’sBodhicaryāvatāra , which is. 30 In his colophon of his interlinear commentary of theMadhyamakāvatāra , Khen-poShen-ga states that he wrote his commentary “without mixing even a hair of the individualopinions of the Tibetan masters” (bod gyi slob dpon so so’i ’dod pa dang spu tsam yangma bsres par ), and in his commentary on theUttaratantra , that he “did not make anythingup himself” (rang bso med par ). Cited from Master’s thesis of Achim Bayer, “The Life andWorks of mKhan-po gZhan-dga’ (1871-1927),” (University of Hamburg, 2000), 57.31 See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts,232-233.


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did not have an authoritative commentarial corpus on the central exotericBuddhist treatises from India before Mi-pham. Mi-pham invigorated thenon-sectarian movement, and his Nying-ma tradition in particular, by notonly restating the textual traditions of the past, but through activelyappropriating his own Nying-ma tradition. He encouraged followers of theNying-ma tradition to study and contemplate the texts of their own traditionand not blindly follow hearsay.35 Such a self-conscious approach to theBuddhist textual tradition can be seen as a general characteristic of thenon-sectarian movement.

In contrast to the uniquely Nying-ma identity concerning exotericscholasticism that Mi-pham forged for Nying-ma monasteries in Kham,

several Nying-ma monasteries in Am-do (a mdo ), including the Do-drup(rdo-grub ) tradition, adopted a Ge-luk sūtra exegesis for their exotericcurriculum while maintaining Nying-ma tantric studies as their esotericbase.36 The reliance upon Ge-luk sūtra exegesis, however, became atarget of Mi-pham’s polemical works. Although Mi-pham promoted aninclusivist agenda characteristic of the “non-sectarian movement,” heaffirmed a strong Nying-ma identity.

Many of Mi-pham’s works came to be adopted within the curriculumof Nying-ma monastic colleges. For instance, the curriculum of theNgagyur Nyingma Institute in Mysore, India, which is currently the largestNying-ma monastic college in exile, includes Mi-pham’s commentaries onIndian treatises such as the Abhidharmakośa , the Madhyamakālaṃkāra ,the Pramāṇavārttika , the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra , the ninth chapter of the

su grags pa de nyid kyis/ rgya bod kyi ’grel pa’i yig cha rnams gnang nas zhib tu ltos la

’brel bshad cig gyis zhes .35 Ibid., 446:mkhan slob chos gsum gyi rjes ’jug snga ’gyur pa rnams/ rgyal ba’i bka’ drimed dang/ rgyan drug rjes ’brangs dang bcas pa’i gzhung bzang po snga ’gyur ’di tsamgda’ bas/ thos bsam de la byas pa chog gi gzhan zer rjes brjod la dga’ ba tsam gyis cibya.36 Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a TibetanBuddhist Monk(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 148; Anne Klein,Meeting the BlissQueen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 150; 262n.2.


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Bodhicaryāvatāra , and the Kāvyādarśa . Also, their curriculum includes hiscommentaries on Long-chen-pa’s Wish-Fulfilling Treasury ( yid bzhinmdzod ) and Guhyagarbha commentary, as well Mi-pham’s compositionssuch as Gateway to the Scholars (mkhas ’jug ), Sword of SupremeKnowledge(shes rab ral gri ), Beacon of Certainty(nges shes sgron me ),and Lion’s Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature(stong thun seng ge’i ngaro ), among others.37 His works have come to play a prominent role inNying-ma monastic education.

Epistemology Epistemology Epistemology Epistemology andandandand Negative Dialectics Negative Dialectics Negative Dialectics Negative DialecticsWe will now turn to the Indian heritage of the Buddhist traditions of

Tibet. Representations of exoteric Buddhist discourse in Tibet have beendominated by the commentaries of Dharmakīrti (600-660) and Candrakīrti(540-600). It is important to not only recognize this fact, but also toacknowledge its implications for how Buddhism is interpreted in Tibet. InTibet, the negative dialectics of the Middle Way are typically identified withCandrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology isassociated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to beauthoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. DespiteCandrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in hisPrasannapadā ,38 Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of

37 The curriculum of the Nyagyur Nyingma Institute is printed in a pamphlet published atthe monastery that I got there, entitled snga ’gyur mtho slob mdo sngags rig pa’i ’byunggnas gling gi sgrig gzhi rtsa khrims chen po , 19-33. See also Dreyfus, The Sound of Two

Hands Clapping , 128-132.38 Nāgārjuna also targets the epistemological systems of pramāṇa in hisVigrahavyāvartanīv.30-51. See Sanskrit edition and Engish translation of these versesin Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna(Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 1990), 15-21; 114-124. For a discussion of Candrakīrti’s critiques ofepistemology, see Dan Arnold’s dissertation, “Mīmāṃsikās and Mādhyamikas against theBuddhist Epistemologists: A Comparative Study to Two Indian Answers to the Questionof Justification” (University of Chicago, 2002).


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Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways.39 Within this integration, thereis a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand,and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration ofan epistemological system within the Middle Way is an important part ofMi-pham’s philosophical edifice. He calls the integration of these twosystems “the intertwined necks of the lions of the Middle Way and validcognition” (dbu tshad seng ge mjing bsnol ).40

Along with Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti, another important Indianfigure for Mi-pham is Śāntarakṣita (ca. 8th c.), who synthesizedcomponents of epistemology with the Middle Way in a system ofYogācāra-Madhyamaka. Mi-pham explains that Śāntarakṣita’s

Madhyamakālaṃkāra is a treatise that demonstrates the essential point ofall Mahāyāna, sūtra and tantra.41 He states:42

Such a scripture as this is the universal path of the Mahāyāna,integrating the viewpoints of the scriptures of the two chariottraditions like water mixed with water. In particular, both (1)ultimate valid cognition in the way that Nāgārjuna asserts and (2)conventional valid cognition in the way that Dharmakīrti asserts arecombined as one taste in the great ocean of reason.

39 Dreyfus cites three ways in which Tibetan commentators have integrated Candrakīrtiand Dharmakīrti: (1) those who see Dharmakīrti’s view as inferior to Candrakīrti’s, (2)those who view Dharmakīrti as a Proponent of the Middle Way, and (3) those whosynthesize Dharmakīrti’s Yogācāra with Candrakīrti’s Middle Way. Dreyfus,RecognizingReality , 428.40 Mi-pham,dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel , 77. My translation follows Karma Phuntsho’ssuggestion of “two lions intertwining their necks,” but I have not seen a pictorial image ofthis. Karma Phuntsho, Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness , 18. See alsoKhen-po Pal-den-shey-rap (dpal ldan shes rab ), don rnam nges ’grel pa shes rab ral gri’i

’grel pa shes rab nyi zla ’bar ba’i sgron me(Varanasi: Nyingmapa Students’ WelfareCommittee, 2000), 26.41 Ibid., 75: theg chen mdo sngags mtha’ dag gi bzhed pa’i rtsa bar ’gyur ba’i gnad stonpa ni gzhung ’di yin. 42 Ibid., 76: ’di lta bu’i gzhung ni theg chen spyi’i lam po che yin te/ shing rta rnam pagnyis kyi gzhung dgongs pa chu bo gcig ’dres su sbyar zhing/ khyad par don dam pa’itshad ma dpal ldan klu yis ji ltar bzhed pa dang/ tha snyad kyi tshad ma dpal chos kyigrags pas ji ltar bzhed pa gnyis rigs pa’i rgya mtsho chen po ro gcig tu skyil .


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Śāntarakṣita’s system of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is important for Mi-phamin significant ways: not only does Yogācāra play a fundamental role in hissystematic presentation of exoteric Buddhism, but it plays an importantrole in the narrative structure of the Buddhist path—providing a foundationof wisdom as the ground and fruition of the Buddhist path. Moreover, thesynthetic approach of Yogacara is instrumental in the way that Mi-phamincorporates various systems of Buddhist thought in Tibet.

Buddha Buddha Buddha Buddha- -- -Nature Nature Nature NatureWe will now turn to the topic of Buddha-nature by exploring its

meanings and history within Indian texts and academic studies. An

etymology of the term “Buddha-nature” (tathāgatagarbha )43 reflects thevariable status and complexity of the subject-matter. The Sanskritcompound tathā + gata, meaning “the thus gone one” (i.e., Buddha), is thesame spelling as the compound tathā + āgata , meaning “the thus come one”; the term reveals the dual-quality of a transcendent Buddha thusgone, and an immanent Buddha thus come. Also, “garbha ” can mean“embryo,” “womb,” and “essence.” On the one hand, as an embryonicseed, it denotes a latent potentiality to bedeveloped , and the subsequentconsummation in the attainment of Buddhahood. As a womb, it connotesa comprehensive matrix, or an all-embracing divine presence in the worldto be discovered .

Academic scholars have described Buddha-nature in a number ofways. David Ruegg addresses a dual-function of Buddha-nature in adialectic between a soteriological point of view, in which the absolute isimmanent in all beings, and a gnoseological point of view, in which it isaltogether transcendent.44 In this way, Buddha-nature is at once a future

43 The term sugatagarbha “the essence ( garbha ) of the one gone well (sugata )” is alsoused as a synonym for the tathāgatagarbha . “Tathāgata,” “Sugata,” are synonymous with“Buddha.”44 David Seyfort Ruegg, “On the Knowability and Expressibility of Absolute Reality inBuddhism,” (IBK 20, no. 1, 1971).


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potential for transcendence, and at the same time immanently present.Buddha-nature thus functions as a mediating principle spanning both theabsolute and phenomenal worlds.

Another term for the Buddha-nature is “heritage” (gotra ). Rueggcites three main meanings of the term heritage in Buddhist usage: (1)mine, matrix; (2) family, clan, lineage; (3) germ, seed. He also mentionsthat the term gotra is designated extensionally as a soteriological orgnoseological category, and intensionally as the spiritual factor thatdetermines the classification into that category.45 The topic of Buddha-nature also is a basis for promoting “one vehicle” (ekayāna ) of theBuddha, an inclusivist system of the Mahāyāna that incorporates all

Buddhist traditions. The role of Buddha-nature as the single heritage of allbeings distinguishes the Buddha-nature from Vijñānavāda (Mind-Only)traditions that accept five distinct heritages within three final vehicles(śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva ).

Florin Sutton delineates three other roles of Buddha-nature: from atheoretical point of view, Buddha-nature is an extension of the Self/no-self debate, “providing the Yogācāras with a positive platform of defenseagainst both the Hindu Eternalists and the Buddhist Nihilists”; from adidactic (or practical ) point of view, it functions as an intermediate stepbetween a narrowly defined notion of Self (ātman ) and a more thoroughunderstanding of no-self (anātman ); and from an ethical point of view, itprovides a philosophical basis for altruism in the Mahāyāna.46 Sutton alsoexplains Buddha-nature to function in three ways: (1) as an essence, an“underlying ontological Reality, or essential nature behind phenomena”;(2) as an “embryo” or “seed”—a dynamic, evolving potential; and (3) as a“matrix” or “womb,” an “intermediate” meaning (between the first two

45 David Seyfort Ruegg, “The TermGotra and the Textual History of Ratnagotravibhāga ,”(BSOAS 39, 1976: 341-363), 341-342.46 Floirin Giripescu Sutton,Existence and Enlightenment in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: AStudy in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogācāra School of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 76-78.


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meanings), equated with the universal ground consciousness(ālayavijñāna ).47

Buddha-nature, as a pure essence abiding in temporarily obscuredliving beings, is a considerable diversion from the negative languagefound in many other Buddhist texts, and as well is a language that isstrikingly similar to the very positions that Buddhists often argue against.The unchanging, permanent status attributed to Buddha-nature is certainlya radical departure from the language emphasizing impermanence withinthe discourses of early Buddhism. Such language demonstrates adecisive break from the early Buddhist triad of impermanence (anitya ),suffering (duḥkha ), and selflessness (anātman ). The Uttaratantra ,48 the

first known commentarial treatise to deal explicitly with this topic, states:“The qualities of purity (śubha ), self (ātman ), bliss (sukha ), andpermanence (nitya ) are the transcendent results…”49 Such affirmationsare conspicuously absent in many other Buddhist texts. However, theseterms are found in sūtras such as the Laṅkāvatāra , Gaṇḍavyūha ,Aṅgulimālīya , Śrīmālā , and the Mahāparinirvāṇa , where they are used todescribe the Buddha (tathāgata ), the Truth Body (dharmakāya ) and theBuddha-nature.50 Furthermore, the Laṅkāvatāra uses the term “supremeBrahman” to describe the ultimate state of existence (niṣṭhābhāvaḥ paraṃbrahma ).51

47 Ibid., 52; 76.48 The major Buddha-nature Sūtras were translated into Tibetan around the ninth-century,during the early dissemination period. TheUttaratantra was not translated into Tibetanuntil the eleventh-century, by Ngok Lo-den-shey-rap (ngog blo ldan shes rab , 1059-

1109).49 Uttaratantra 1.35: gtsang bdag bde dang rtag nyid kyi/ /yon tan pha rol phyin pa ’bras .In theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos , published in rgyud bla ma rtsa ’grel(Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1997), 6.50 Cyrus Stearns, The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the TibetanMaster Sherab Gyaltsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 49.51 Cited from Hajime Nakamura,A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy(Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 1983), 154.


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The reconciliation of such statements in the Uttaratantra withdepictions of emptiness in Candrakīrti’sMadhyamakāvatāra is a centralpart of Mi-pham’s exegesis. Mi-pham weaves together aspects ofDharmakīrti, Candrakīrti, and theUttarantantra in an interpretation throughwhich he offers his exegesis of Buddhist doctrine.

While the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā ) Sūtras can beseen to function as an overturning of early Buddhist literature in itsdepictions of all phenomena being empty, Buddha-nature Sūtras markanother radical inversion with the use ofātman in its depictions. Thislanguage has been said to have soteriological “shock value,” to uprootreified conceptions of emptiness.52 Nathan Katz has fittingly termed this

phenomenon of contradictory claims as “hermeneutical shock.”53 Thetension between the discourses of presence, as in the Buddha-natureSūtras, and emptiness, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, is a richsource from which divergent interpretations grew, and one that has a longhistory in the developments of Buddhist discourse. In this light, opposedopinions and sectarian debates can be seen as creating and maintainingthe dynamic vitality of Buddhist traditions.

Summary Summary Summary Summary of Contents of Contents of Contents of ContentsThis dissertation discusses the tension between affirmations and

denials of ultimate reality. It focuses on the status of Buddha-nature, aground of being that may be said to be at once the domain ofmetaphysics, theology, and philosophical anthropology. I gather Mi-pham’s writings on Buddha-nature from a variety of sources to more fullyaddress the role of Buddha-nature in his works. In doing so, I aim to showthat Buddha-nature plays a fundamental role in his works, and fill a gap in

52 Sallie King,Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 104-107.53 Nathan Katz, "Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yāna Controversy," inContributions onTibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy , E. Steinkeller and H. Tauscher (eds.),(Wein: Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983), 110.


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academic scholarship on the study of Buddha-nature in the Nying-matradition.

Chapter 1 discusses Mi-pham’s interpretation of Buddhist sūtras interms of the “wheels of doctrine” (chos ’khor, dharmacākra ) and twotruths. The chapter begins by looking at how Long-chen-pa representsthe three wheels of doctrine, and then turns to how Mi-pham integrates themiddle wheel and the last wheel of doctrines through his interpretation ofBuddha-nature. This chapter introduces Mi-pham’s depiction of twomodels for the two truths. One two-truth model is in terms of appearanceand emptiness (snang stong bden gnyis ), and the other is in terms ofauthentic and inauthentic experience (gnas snang bden gnyis )—whether

or not appearances accord with reality. The first model can be seen asdealing with ontology, or what is, and the latter model can be seen asdealing with epistemology, or the way we know. Through these twomodels of the two truths, Mi-pham shows the compatibility of emptinessand Buddha-nature.

The chapter also discusses theories of interpretation based on thecategories of “definitive meaning” (nges don ) and “provisional meaning”(drang don ). We will see how Pöd-pa Tulku describes the two-truth modelaccording to Candrakīrti’sMadhyamakāvatāra , as concerning appearanceand emptiness. He aligns this model with the middle wheel of doctrine, forwhich the explicit teaching is emptiness; as such, any appearance isnecessarily a relative truth. In contrast, he depicts the two truthsaccording to the Uttaratantra as the model of authentic/inauthenticexperience, in accord with the two truths in Buddha Nature Sūtras of thelast wheel of doctrine. In this case, the ultimate truth is not only emptinessbecause appearances that accord with reality are the ultimate truth, as isthe subject that experiences reality authentically. Conversely, inauthenticexperience and distorted modes of being are relative. Through integratingboth models of two truths from the Madhyamakāvatāra and theUttaratantra , appearance/emptiness and authentic/inauthentic experiencerespectively, we will see how Buddha-nature is the ultimate truth as


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authentic experience and the unity of the two truths ofappearance/emptiness.

Chapter 2 discusses the Middle Way in contrasting depictions ofYogācāra and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. It begins by introducing somefundamental themes in Yogācāra discourse, such as the three natures(mtshan nyid gsum ) and the five principles (chos lnga ). We will see howin Yogācāra, wisdom ( ye shes ) is held to be the ultimate truth, in contrastto consciousness (rnam shes ). We then look at Prāsaṅgika and see howMi-pham delineates Prāsaṅgika from Svātantrika. In his delineation, hemakes a distinction between two types of ultimate truth: the “categorizedultimate” (rnam grangs pa’i don dam ) and the “uncategorized ultimate”

(rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam ). The categorized ulimate is emptinessthat is known conceptually and the uncategorized ultimate is emptinessthat is beyond language and thought.

In the contexts of language and thought, the two truths are distinct;however, the two truths are not distinguished in the context of non-conceptual meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag ). Mi-pham delineates thePrāsaṅgika as a discourse emphasizing the uncategorized ultimate, inaccord with the perspective of wisdom in meditative equipoise. Incontrast, he depicts the Svātantrika as a discourse emphasizing thecategorized ultimate, in the context of post-meditation (rjes thob ) wherethe two truths are divided and the ulimate truth can only be conceptuallyknown. We come to see how he makes a distinction between wisdom, asthe context emphasized by Prāsaṅgika, and ordinary consciousness, asthe context emphasized by Svātantrika.

Mi-pham also depicts Prāsaṅgika as a sudden means to eliminateconceptual constructs, in contrast to the progressive path emphasized inSvātantrika. Other than different means for understanding the ultimatetruth, however, he does not delineate a distinct view for Prāsaṅgika that isdifferent from Svātantrika. He emphasizes the compatibility of Prāsaṅgikaand Svātantrika by stating that the unique object of negation for thePrāsaṅgika is only the conception of the two truths as distinct. In this way,


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Mi-pham emphasizes the unity of the two truths as a characteristic ofPrāsaṅgika discourse.

Chapter 3 explores Mi-pham’s depiction of emptiness in moredetail. In particular, it addresses the categories of “self-emptiness” (rangstong ) and “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong ). The chapter begins byintroducing depictions of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in the worksof two Jo-nang scholars: Dol-po-pa and Khen-po Lo-drö-drak-pa. Then itlooks into the representations of self-emptiness and other-emptiness inthe works of a Nying-ma author, Lo-chen Dharma Śrī. By discussingthese different depictions of emptiness, we are able to provide somecontrast with Mi-pham’s descriptions of emptiness and ultimate reality.

This chapter concludes that Mi-pham is a proponent of self-emptiness interms of the way he defines himself.

We will see that Mi-pham emphasizes the unity of emptiness andappearance without accepting an appearance that is not empty, or anemptiness that does not appear. He also consistently emphasizes thatemptiness is beyond any conceptual or linguistic reference. Mi-phamargues that any conception of emptiness is not the genuine emptiness. Herepresents genuine emptiness as beyond dichotomies such as existenceand non-existence, or substrate and quality. He also makes an importantdistinction between conventional assertions—where things appear to bedistinct and are said to exist as such—and assertions concerning theultimate in which no divisions are made.

Chapter 4 addresses the explicit topic of Buddha-nature. We cometo see how Mi-pham depicts Buddha-nature as the suchness (chos nyid )of mind and reality. Buddha-nature, like emptiness, is the unity ofappearance and emptiness. Mi-pham contrasts his view of Buddha-naturefrom other views and adopts a view of Buddha-nature that reflects Long-chen-pa’s depiction of the ground (gzhi ) of the Great Perfection. Buddha-nature thus represents the ground of indivisible truth—“primordially pure”(ka dag ) and “spontaneously present” (lhun grub ).


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This chapter discusses Mi-pham’s use of reasoning to establish theexistence of Buddha-nature. We see how the reasoning that he usesdraws upon the epistemological tradition of valid cognition. His use ofreasoning to establish the presence of Buddha-nature is similar to thereasoning he uses to establish the purity and divine nature ofappearances in the “Resultant Vehicle” (’bras bu’i theg pa ) of Mantra. Theuse of valid cognition to establish appearances as divine is a uniquequality of the Nying-ma tradition, as Mi-pham states, which he attributes tothe works of Rong-zom.

In chapter 4, we also explore how Mi-pham delineates two types ofconventional valid cognition, based on “confined perception” (tshur

mthong ) and “pure vision” (dag gzigs ), respectively. His two conventionalvalid cognitions are similar to his two ultimate valid cognitions, those thatconcern the categorized and uncategorized ultimate, in that the division isgrounded in two distinct modes of understanding: (1) a delimited,conceptual mode of mind and (2) an inconceivable mode of wisdom. Wesee again how he juxtaposes conceptual mind and non-conceptualwisdom. In this way, Mi-pham integrates an epistemological system ofvalid cognition with what is beyond conceptual frameworks. Heincorporates valid cognition into his exegesis of the Great Perfection. Inthis integration, ordinary reason is only a provisional means of knowledgewhereas wisdom is acknowledged to be present from the beginning.


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In the course of the chapters, we will see that the monistic54 resolution of duality is central to Mi-pham’s exegetical system. A commontheme in his exegesis is a two-fold schema, with an ultimately falsedichotomy of two opposed factors and a third element that emerges fromtheir dissolution. Two provisionally opposed factors, such as the twotruths, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, subject and object, appearance andemptiness, etc., are resolved in a synthesis in which each of the twodistinctions are ultimately untrue, because they are actually indivisiblefrom the beginning. The process of recognizing the indivisible reality,however, goes through a virtual “detour” of a dichotomy, and thus such asystem is not a simple monism but is better described as a dialectical

monism .55 The detour through ultimately unreal dichotomies is a processthat involves everything that falls under the rubric of conventional truth— all that can be physically acted upon, verbally spoken of, and mentallythought about. In Mi-pham’s depictions of the indivisible reality, theseprovisional divisions are part of a process towards the complete realizationof the single ultimate truth of indivisible reality.

54 Caveat: I use the term “monism” to describe an important aspect of Mi-pham’s view;however, we should bear in mind a distinction between monism and non-dualism. Seefor instance, Sallie King,Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 99-115. Monismis an affirmation of a single reality (closure) and non-dualism is a negation of the entireframework of single/plural (open-ended) without affirming either/or/both/neither. We canthus say that the “non” in non-dualism is an existential negation, or an illocutionary denial.Although Mi-pham’s view certainly has such a non-dual character, I use the term“monism” to evoke the important aspect of his emphasis on unity (zung ’jug ). Mi-pham

states: “The meaning of unity is the single sphere of equal taste of all dualisticphenomena.” Mi-pham,gnyug sems book 3, 743.4: gnyis chos thams cad ro gcig ni zung’jug gi don .55 This term is used in a different context by Jean Paul Sartre in Critique de la RaisonDialectique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960); English edition translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith in Critique of Dialectical Reasoning (London: NLB, 1976), 1. To my knowledge,this term was first used in the context of Buddhism by Robert Magolia inDerrida on theMend (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1984).


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Interpretive ContextInterpretive ContextInterpretive ContextInterpretive ContextI have found the tradition of hermeneutics a fruitful avenue to

approach Mi-pham’s Buddhist discourse. Paul Ricoeur’s characterizationof a post-critical hermeneutics, as the reconciliation of criticalconsciousness with the notion of a sacred cosmos, is of particularinterest:56

Thus, hermeneutics, an acquisition of “modernity,” is one of themodes by which that “modernity” transcends itself, insofar as it isforgetfulness of the sacred. I believe that being can still speak tome—no longer, of course, under the precritical form of immediatebelief, but as the second immediacy aimed at by hermeneutics.This second naïveté aims to be the postcritical equivalent to the

precritical hierophany.The possibility of a post-critical approach to being is a fruitful subject tobring into conversation with Buddhism. Critical consciousness, as aprovisional means by which modernity transcends itself, potentially canbring religious meaning into new light—the aim of a post-critical “secondnaïveté.” Through such an approach, critical consciousness and religiousmeaning do not necessarily have to be polarized into a dichotomous

relationship of mutual incompatibility.Explanatory procedures such as science, logic, grammar, etc. allinvolve a process of distanciation that abstracts meaning from itsnecessary context as a unique moment of human experience. Such amethodology allows for a critical perspective that is useful as anexplanatory procedure to provide a level of accountability to descriptions.However, left to itself, as in the case of theobject of the reductivelyscientific “modern” consciousness, such procedures falsely delimit the

extent of semantic possibility to something that necessarily remains apartfrom a subjective mode of being (including the potential relationship withthe sacred) in an event of understanding. Without the component of

56 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil , translated by Emerson Buchanan (New York:Harper and Row, 1967), 352.


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understanding, explanatory procedures by themselves ignore thesemantic grounding in subjectivity, and restrict the potential for meaning tothe limits of the model.57 Thus, the potential for evoking an enrichedunderstanding of oneself and one’s relationships with others and the worldare barren in an enterprise that does not take into account the concreteact of participation—thesine qua non for the possibility of meaning.

I suggest that Buddha-nature can be seen as a topic orientated inboth the objective and subjective domains of meaning, or in other words,as not only the domain of philosophy (or science), or religion. Suchdistinctions are bounded up with modern (Northwest European) culturaltraditions and are not always helpful in a dialogue with another cultural

tradition. An alternative approach to interpretation beyond suchdichotomous discourses as religion and philosophy,mythos and logos , thepremodern and the modern, etc., aims to allow for another kind ofmeaningful discourse to unfold; it aims to put the discourses of (post-)modernity and Buddhism into conversation.

In any case, a dissertation on a topic that may have otherwise beenmore elegantly indicated in a short poetic verse, stated by someone whoembodies its meaning, can be seen as an interrogation of Buddha-nature.Buddha-nature has been traditionally explained as an ineffable sacredpresence, disclosed in narrative and poetic forms in the volumes ofscriptures and oral instructions of living Buddhist traditions. With this inmind, the nature of the genre of dissertation, the form of discourse, is insome way at odds with its content. Nevertheless, I see Buddha-nature asa topic that speaks to meaningful, significant issues and find that such asystematic analysis in an academic paper can serve as a valuable tool topromote understanding.

57 A point of comparison here is with John Searle’s distinction between syntax andsemantics within the philosophy of mind, and how syntax alone cannot account forsemantics. See John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” published inThe Mind’s I ,Daniel Dennet and Douglas Hofstadter (eds.), (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 353-382;originally published inBehavioral and Brain Sciences , 3 (1980): 417-424.


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Aspects of Buddha-nature that I discuss broach topics that certainadvocates of the Buddhist tradition consider esoteric and inappropriate forthe causal consumption of the uninitiated. For this, please forgive myaudacity and any misrepresentations that result from my failure to conveysuch topics that may have otherwise resonated with deeper significance inthe words of an accomplished scholar. However, I feel that to avoidimportant aspects of Buddha-nature out of respect for the secrecy of theesoteric tradition would not have done justice to the integrity of myrepresentation of the significance of Buddha-nature in Mi-pham’s works.Moreover, his interpretation of Buddha-nature is quite fluid across exotericand esoteric discourses, and the esoteric/exoteric distinction is not rigidly

pronounced. Furthermore, by raising issues from esoteric texts I do notwish to express a lack of concern for tradition, but I aim to move forward adialogue between cultures—academics and Buddhists—a real possibilityonly when both traditions have unhindered voices (and perhaps moreimportantly, open ears) to fully participate in the conversation.

In conclusion, I will try to present Buddha-nature in a scholarly waythat allows for a meaningful encounter with what is arguably the mostcentral topic of Buddhism. My agenda is to present an interpretation ofBuddha-nature that can be considered in a light of understanding thatavoids the pitfalls of a naïve nostalgia for a premodern vision of sacredunity, as well as a cool-objectivity of disembodied reason in a modernworld of dispassionate truths. I approach the study of Buddhism groundedin what may be called a “postmodern” subjectivity, in terms of how Iapproach the relationship between a critical consciousness and aparticipation in a meaningful existence within a sacred cosmos. Thus, Ileave this as a product of my academic endeavor in Buddhist Studies, in avoice that may (not) be located some place in between the objectiveperspective of a scholar and a subjective perspective of an insider.


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ChapterChapterChapterChapter 1111:::: BuddhaBuddhaBuddhaBuddha----Nature and the Unity of the TwoNature and the Unity of the TwoNature and the Unity of the TwoNature and the Unity of the TwoTruthsTruthsTruthsTruths

Introduction Introduction Introduction IntroductionA central concern for Buddhists, in Tibet and elsewhere, is the

nature of ultimate reality. Conflicting depictions of ultimate reality, andhow the ultimate should be best expressed—through negation oraffirmation—is a contested issue in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In particular,this issue concerns the relationship between the affirmations of a truepresence of wisdom on the one hand, and the negating discourse ofemptiness, as evinced in scriptures such as the Perfection of Wisdom

Sūtras, on the other. The competing interpretations of the relationshipbetween descriptions of ultimate reality—as a presence and an absence— are fueled by the polysemy of Buddhist scriptures and the agenda tosystematize them into a comprehensive whole.58 This is clearly evident inhow traditions in Tibet interpret Buddhist sūtras in terms of three wheels ofdoctrine, and in particular, how they distinguish between the “middlewheel” and the “last wheel.”

An influential scripture for interpreting scriptures for Buddhists inTibet is the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra ,59 “the scripture explaining the intent,”within which the Buddha gives guidelines for interpreting scriptures. Asection of this text outlines three distinct “wheels of doctrine,” offering aresolution to the conflicting literal statements of Buddhist teachings. Thefollowing citation from this text is a common source for the delineation ofBuddha's teaching into three sections:60

58 The Peking edition of the Tibetan canon of Buddha’s Word in translation (bka ’gyur ) is108 volumes, and the translated commentaries (bstan ’gyur ) contain 3626 texts in 224volumes!59 P.774 (Peking ed.), vol. 29.60 Tibetan and English editions printed in John Powers,Wisdom of the Buddha: theSaṃdhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra(Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 138-141.Above translation, and all subsequent translations unless otherwise noted, are mine.


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Thereupon, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to theBlessed One (bcom ldan ’das ), “Initially, the Blessed One at DeerPark, in the region of Vārāṇasī, taught the four noble truths to theones who fully engage in the vehicle of the Auditors (nyan thos ).He fully turned the miraculous and amazing wheel of doctrine in away unlike anything that had been turned in this world before byanyone, human or deity. Furthermore, this wheel of doctrine thatthe Blessed One turned is surpassed, affords an occasion [ofrefutation], is the provisional meaning, and is the subject of dispute.

Based on the essencelessness of phenomena, and basedon non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, and naturallycomplete nirvāṇa, the Blessed One turned the greatly miraculousand amazing second wheel of doctrine, with the feature of thediscourse of emptiness, for those who fully engage in theMahāyāna. Furthermore, this wheel of doctrine that the Blessed

One turned is surpassed, affords an occasion [of refutation], is theprovisional meaning, and is the subject of dispute.However, based on the essencelessness of phenomena,

and based on non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, andnaturally complete nirvāṇa, for those who fully engage in all of thevehicles, the Blessed One taught the completely amazing andmiraculous third wheel endowed with the excellent differentiation.This wheel of doctrine turned by the Blessed One is unsurpassed,affords no occasion [of refutation], is the definitive meaning, and isnot the subject of dispute.

Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab 'byam , 1308-1364), an important figure inshaping the Nying-ma tradition, characterizes the first two wheels ofdoctrine as involving what is to be abandoned, and the last wheel asaffirming what is:61

61 Long-chen-pa, sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan , 377.5-378.5: dka’ dang po bden pa bzhi’i

chos kyi rnam grangs las/ /gtso bor las dang po pa dang blo cung zad dman pa rnams’jug pa la dgongs te/ spang gnyen gyi rim pas nyams su len pa’i thabs gsal bar gsungsshing/ /bka’ bar pa mtshan nyid med pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs las/ /gtso bor cung zadsbyang pa dang dbang po ’bring po rnams ’jug pa’i rim pa la dgongs te/ /ngo bo nyid medpa’i rnam grangs kyi gnyen po la bdag tu ’dzin pa rnams skye ba med par gsungs la/ /bka’ tha ma nges pa don gyi chos kyi rnam grangs las/ gtso bor yongs su rdzogs pa’itheg pa rnams dang dbang po rnon po rnams ’jug pa’i rim pas gshis la ji ltar gnas pa’irnam grangs rgya cher gsungs te/ dang pos ’khor ba’i mtshan nyid spang bya las ldog


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The first Word, the category of the doctrine of the four truths (bdenpa bzhi’i chos ), is mainly intended for the application of novices andfor those with slightly inferior intellects; it clearly teaches themethods of practicing the stages of abandonment and remedy.The middle Word, the category of the doctrine of signlessness(mtshan nyid med pa’i chos ), is mainly intended for the stages ofapplication of those who have trained slightly and have mediocrefaculties; it teaches the antidote of the category of naturelessnessand the apprehensions of self as non-arising. The last Word, thecategory of the doctrine of the definitive meaning (nges pa don gyichos ), is mainly [intended] for the stages of application of thosewho fully [train in all] vehicles and for those of sharp faculties; itextensively teaches the category of the basic nature as it is (gshisla ji ltar gnas pa ). The first [Word] shows the path that counteractswhat is to be abandoned—the character of saṃsāra. The middle

[Word] shows, from what is to be abandoned, the abandonment ofcognitive obscurations (shes sgrib ) through the nature ofapprehension lacking essence. The last [Word] shows theessential nature (snying po ) as it is.

In this way, he shows a progression of the three wheels of doctrine inwhich the first two wheels show what is to be abandoned—the characterof saṃsāra and cognitive obscurations—and the last wheel shows what is,the essential nature. Similarly, in his auto-commentary of hisResting in

the Nature of Mind , Long-chen-pa also states that the three wheels ofdoctrine are intended for those of differing capacities: the first wheel isintended for those of inferior faculties (dbang po dman pa ), the middlewheel is intended for those of mediocre faculties (dbang po ’bring po ), andthe last wheel is intended for those of sharp faculties (dbang po rnonpo ).62 Long-chen-pa again shows the preeminence of the last wheel in hisauto-commentary of hisTreasury of Words and Meanings :63

pa’i lam bstan/ bar bas spang bya las ’dzin pa’i rang bzhin ngo bo med pas shes sgribspang bar bstan/ tha mas yin lugs snying por bstan te .62 Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gso’i ’grel pa , 330.3-330.5.63 Long-chen-pa, tshig don mdzod , 897.1-897.4: bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ ’khor lo gsumdu gsungs pa las gnas ’di ni tha ma don dam rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi ’khor lorgsungs pa yang khyod kyis ma shes/ stong nyid rkyang pa don dam yin na/ ’khor lo gsumla tha dad du bstan pa’ang ji ltar ’thad de/ stong nyid drang don du gsungs kyi de yang


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From the three wheels of doctrine taught by the Victorious One, thistopic was taught in the last wheel that ascertains the ultimate, yetyou have failed to understand this. If solely emptiness were theultimate, then what sense does it make that the Buddha taughtthree wheels separately? He taught emptiness as a provisionalmeaning, with the intention of merely negating fear of the abidingreality, and apprehension of self by novices.

Long-chen-pa argues that solely emptiness, a mere absence, is not theultimate. He states here that the topic of the last wheel of doctrine is theultimate and that emptiness is a provisional meaning. Distinguishing thecategory of “the definitive meaning,” (nges don ) as opposed to “provisionalmeanings” (drang don ), is a common way Buddhists differentiate what is

really true from what is onlyprovisionally , or heuristically , true. In his auto-commentary of hisResting in the Nature of Mind , Long-chen-pa says thatemptiness is not the definitive meaning:64

Although you fixate upon no-self and emptiness, these are merelyantidotes to the self and the non-empty; they are not the definitivemeaning.

Also, in theTreasury of Philosophies , Long-chen-pa states:65

Seeing the nature of that which is the expanse (dbyings ) of theultimate truth is called “seeing the ultimate truth,” the ultimate truthis not an emptiness that is nothing whatsoever. That [emptiness] istaught to immature beings and to novices as an antidote to ego-clinging, etc. In actuality, it should be known that the luminous and

gnas lugs kyis skrag pa dang/ las dang po pas bdag tu ’dzin pa dgag tsam la dgongs paste . See also David Germano, Treasury of Words and Meanings , (unpublishedmanuscript), 66.64

Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gso’i ’grel pa , 330.6-331.1: khyed kyi bdag med padang/ stong pa nyid la zhen pa’ang bdag dang mi stong pa’i gnyen po tsam yin gyi ngespa’i don ni ma yin te .65 Long-chen-pa, grub mtha’ mdzod , 898.2-898.5: de’ang don dam pa’i bden pa dbyings yin la/ ’di’i rang bzhin mthong bas don dam bden pa mthong zhes bya’i/ cir yang med pa’istong nyid kyang don dam bden pa ma yin no/ de’ang byis pa so so skye bo dang/ lasdang po dag bdag tu zhen pa’i gnyen por bdag med pa la sogs pa bstan pa yin gyi/ donla dbyings ’od gsal ba ’dus ma byas shing lhun grub tu yod pa shes par bya ste .


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clear expanse exists as unconditioned and spontaneously present(lhun grub ).

In these texts, Long-chen-pa explicitly states thatsolely emptiness is notthe ultimate truth.

Mi Mi Mi Mi- -- -pham’s Synthesis pham’s Synthesis pham’s Synthesis pham’s SynthesisMi-pham takes Long-chen-pa’s explanations as a foundation for his

interpretation that integrates the middle and last wheels of doctrine. Mi-pham does not relegate the status of either emptiness in the middle wheelor wisdom in the last wheel of doctrine as a provisional meaning. Rather,he argues that both are definitive:66

Therefore, the emptiness taught in the middle wheel and the[Buddha-]body and wisdom67 taught in the last wheel should beintegrated as a unity of emptiness and appearance. Withoutdividing or excluding the definitive meaning subject matters (skorrnams ) of the middle and last wheels, both should be held to be thedefinitive meaning in the way of just this assertion by theomniscient Long-chen-pa.

66 Mi-pham,bde gshegs snying po’i stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro, in Mi-pham’s

Collected Works (sde dge ed.), vol.4, 586.2-586.4: ’khor lo bar bar bstan pa’i stong panyid dang / tha mar bstan pa’i sku dang ye shes dag snang stong zung du chud par byadgos pas/ bar ba dang tha ma’i nges don gyi skor rnams dbye gsal [readbsal ] med pargnyis ka nges don du kun mkhyen klong chen pas bzhed pa ’di kho na ltar bzung barbya . The same text is found in Mi-pham’sUttaratantra commentary compiled by hisstudents (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi mchan ’grel mi pham zhal lung ),Mi-pham’s Collected Works, vol. 4, 382.1-382.2.67 I use the singular for “body” (sku ) and “wisdom” ( ye shes ) because I feel that it conveysMi-pham’s interpretation better than the plural. The singular represents the quality thatthe multiple wisdoms and bodies (2 or 5 wisdoms and 2, 3, or 4 bodies) are internal

divisions based on aspectual features of what is essentially indivisible. Mi-pham statesregarding wisdom(s) as follows: “Although the consummate wisdom is the identity of theunity of the expanse and awareness, free from duality and conceptuality...divided from itscontradistinctive aspects (ldog chas phye ), there are said to be the enumeration of fivewisdoms.” Mi-pham,rab gsal de nyid snang byed , 354-355: mthar thug gi ye shes nidbyings rig zung du ’jug pa’i bdag nyid gzung ’dzin rnam rtog dang bral yang…ldog chasphye na ye shes rnam pa lngas rnam grangs su gsungs . See also Mi-pham, le’u bcobrgyad pa’i tshig ’grel , 570.2-570.3.


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Mi-pham cites Long-chen-pa as a source to support his interpretation ofthe unity of emptiness and wisdom as the definitive meaning of the middleand last wheels.68 Mi-pham explains that the last wheel’s s

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