19
ECE-6612 http://www.csc.gatech.edu/copeland/jac/6612/ Prof. John A. Copeland [email protected] 404 894-5177 fax 404 894-0035 Office: Klaus 3362 email or call for office visit, 404 894-5177 Chapter 10a - Firewalls 3/10/2013

ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/ Prof. John A. Copeland

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

ECE-6612 http://www.csc.gatech.edu/copeland/jac/6612/ Prof. John A. Copeland [email protected] 404 894-5177 fax 404 894-0035 Office: Klaus 3362 email or call for office visit, 404 894-5177 Chapter 10a - Firewalls. 3/10/2013. Computer System Evolution. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Citation preview

Page 1: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

ECE-6612http://www.csc.gatech.edu/copeland/jac/6612/

Prof. John A. [email protected]

404 894-5177fax 404 894-0035

Office: Klaus 3362email or call for office visit, 404 894-5177

Chapter 10a - Firewalls

3/10/2013

Page 2: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

2

Computer System Evolution

Central Data Processing System: - with directly attached peripherals (card reader, magnetic tapes, line printer).

Local Area Networks: - connects PC’s (in “terminal emulation” mode), remote terminals (next building) and mini-computers.

Premises Network: - connects LANs and LAN-attached devices to each other.

Enterprise-wide Network: - leased data lines (T1, DS-3) connect various offices.

Internet Connectivity: - initially for email, now for Web access, e-commerce, music and video downloads, social networking, tele-commuting, Web and video conferencing, distance learning, ... . Makes the world accessible, but now the world also has access to you.

Page 3: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

3

Agency VirtualPrivate Network

LANs at Agency

Offices across Georgia

State WWW GatewayState Internet

• Citizens

• Contractors

• City & CountyGovernments

Agency Gateway &Web Server

Non-AgencyState Server

Private VirtualConnection

AgencyServer

• Schools

• Libraries

• Kiosks

Connectivity Provided by theGeorgia Backbone Network

Other Agencies

WWW

Firewalls

Page 4: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Agency Firewall - Protects Agency Subnetsfrom Unwanted Connections

Agency Firewall - Protects Agency Subnetsfrom Unwanted Connections

Subnet 1 Subnet 2

Gate-way

WAN

Firewalls (and many routers) can reject:• Packets with certain source and destination addresses

• Packets with certain high-level protocols (UDP, Telnet)

Proxy Servers - for specific applications• Email messages assembled and inspected, then passed to

internal email server machine.

Prevent Cyber Loafing - Using the Internet for fun and personal business (not very effective).

Gate-way

4

Page 5: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

5

Application Layer (HTTP)

Transport Layer(TCP,UDP)

Network Layer (IP)

E'net DataLink Layer

Ethernet

Phys. Layer

Network Layer

E'net DataLink Layer

E'net Phys.Layer

Network Layer

Web Server Browser

Router-Firewallcan drop packets

based onsource or destination,ip address and/or port

Application Layer (HTTP)

Transport Layer(TCP,UDP)

Network Layer (IP)

Token Ring

Data-Link Layer

Token RingPhys. Layer

IP Address130.207.22.5

IP Address24.88.15.22

Port 80 Port 31337

Segment No. Segment No.

Token Ring

Data Link Layer

Token RingPhys. Layer

Page 6: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

ApplicationLayer (HTTP,FTP, TELNET,SMTP)

Transport Layer (TCP, UDP)

Network Layer (IP)

E'net DataLink Layer

E'net Phys.Layer

Transport

Layer

(TCP, UDP)

Network

Layer (IP)

E'net Data

Link

Layer

E'net Phys.

Layer

Process ProcessTransport or App.-Layer

Gateway, or ProxyApplicationLayer(HTTP(HTTP,FTP, TELNET,SMTP)

Transport Layer(TCP,UDP)

Network Layer (IP)

TR DataLink Layer

TR Phys.Layer

Transport

Layer

(TCP, UDP)

Network

Layer (IP)

TR Data

Link

Layer

TR Phys.

Layer

6

Page 7: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Policy

No outside Web access.

Outside connections to Public Web Server Only.

Prevent Web-Radios from eating up the available bandwidth.

Prevent your network from being used for a Smuft DoS attack.

Prevent your network from being tracerouted or Ping scanned.

Firewall Setting

Drop all outgoing packets to any IP, Port 80

Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130:207:244.203, port 80

Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and Router Broadcasts.

Drop all ICMP packets going to a “broadcast” address (130.207.255.255 or 130.207.0.0).

Drop all incoming ICMP, UDP, or TCP echo-request packets, drop all packets with TTL < 5.

7

Page 8: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Firewall Attacks

IP Internal-Address Spoofing

Source Routing (External Spoof)

Tiny Fragment Attacks

2nd-Fragment Probes

SYN-ACK Probes

Internal Outbound Hacking

Firewall Defense

Drop all incoming packets with local source address.

Drop all IP packets with Source-Routing Option.

Drop all incoming packet fragments with small size.

Assemble IP fragments (hard work), or at least *.

Be “Stateful” -keep track of TCP outgoing SYN

packets (start of all TCP connections).

Drop all outgoing packets which do not have an "internal" source IP address.

8

* Fragments after the first one have no transport header (no way to tell if it is TCP, UDP, ICMP, ... , or determine port numbers. Firewall must at least keep a temporary list of approved IP ID-Numbers based on the first fragment decision.

Page 9: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

A Network Firewall is a single point that a Network Administrator can control, even if individual computers are managed by workers or departments.

-------

Over half of corporate computer misfeasance is caused by employees who are already behind the main firewall.

Solution 1 - isolate subnets with firewalls (usually routers or Ethernet switches with “filter” capabilities). Protect Finance Department from Engineering Department [Problem: internal network is much higher bit rate, firewalls more expensive].

Solution 2 - implement host-based firewalls to limit access except on certain TCP/UDP ports from specific hosts or subnets. Must be centrally managed to be economical.

Solution 3 – Use a Intruder Detection System that divides the network into zones, and reports unauthorized cross-zone connections.

9

Page 10: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

StatefulFirewall

Local PCip1

External Hostip2

TCP SYN

establishes “state” (ip1,ip2,tcp, 33489,80)

TCP SYN-ACK or RESET or relatedICMP

established “state” (ip1,ip2,tcp, 33489,80)

TCP ACK’s

established “state” (ip1,ip2,tcp, 33489,80)

TCP or UDP or ICMP

Not part of an established “state”

10

Page 11: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

# iptables -L -n

Chain INPUT (policy DROP)target prot opt source destination ACCEPT tcp -- 143.218.132.0/25 0.0.0.0/0 ACCEPT tcp -- 130.207.225.0/24 0.0.0.0/0 ACCEPT all -- 79.76.0.0/16 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22 ACCEPT tcp -- 130.207.152.119 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22 ACCEPT tcp -- 143.215.151.0/24 0.0.0.0/0 ACCEPT udp -- 64.192.0.0/10 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22 ACCEPT tcp -- 69.59.0.0/16 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22 ACCEPT tcp -- 24.0.0.0/8 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22 DROP all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP)target prot opt source destination DROP all -- anywhere anywhere

Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP)target prot opt source destination ACCEPT icmp -- anywhere 10.0.0.0/24 ACCEPT icmp -- anywhere anywhere state RELATED,ESTABLISHED

11

A “-n” option speeds up iptables because it stops reverse lookups. Also beneficial for “route”, “netstat”, … .

Page 12: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

$ ufw status numberedStatus: active

To Action From -- ------ ----[ 1] 8822/tcp ALLOW IN 130.207.150.144[ 2] Anywhere ALLOW IN 143.215.138.0/25[ 3] 8822/tcp ALLOW IN 130.207.225.103[ 4] 8822/tcp ALLOW IN 78.88.0.0/16[ 5] 8822/tcp ALLOW IN 80.55.0.0/16[ 6] Anywhere DENY IN Anywhere

$ ufw insert 1 allow proto tcp from 130.207.0.0/16 to any port 8822Rule Inserted$ ufw activate (changes iptables configuration)

Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) for Ubuntu (LINUX)

12

Page 13: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Internet

Router 24.88.48.47 with NAT

Host 192.168.0.10

Web Client 192.168.0.20

13

Host 192.168.0.30

Host 192.168.0.40

Web Serverport 80

FTP Serverport 21

Web Server 130.27.8.35

To 130.27.8.35:80 from 192.168.0.20:x

To 130.27.8.35:80 from 24.88.48.47:y

To 24.88.48.47:y from 130.27.8.35:80

To 192.168.0.20:x from 130.27.8.35:80

1

4

3 2

Local Web client accessing an external Web server

x & y are high number ephemeral client ports. Simple NATs, use x=y

NAT - Network Address Translation

Page 14: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Internet

Router 24.88.48.47 with NAT

Host 192.168.0.10

Host 192.168.0.20

14

Host 192.168.0.30

Host 192.168.0.40

Web Serverport 80

FTP Serverport 21

FTP Client 130.27.8.35

To 130.27.8.35:y from 192.168.0.20:21

To 130.27.8.35: x from 24.88.48.47:21

To 24.88.48.47: 21 from 130.27.8.35:x

To 192.168.0.30:21 from 130.27.8.35:y

1 4

32

External FTP client accessing a local FTP server

Forwarding Table

Port 80 -> .10Port 21 -> .30

Page 15: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

15

Page 16: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

16

Home Routers allow incoming connections based on server port

New Home Routers also allow port translation (e.g., 2222 -> 22)

Page 17: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Combined Firewalls and IDS

(see also: IBM Proventia - www.iss.net) 17

Page 18: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Protocol Anomaly DetectionWatchGuard Transparent Application layer proxies examine entire connection data streams, identifying protocol anomalies and discarding harmful or questionable information.

In addition, WatchGuard firewalls perform:

* Packet Handling - prevents packets from entering the network until they are reassembled and examined. * Packet Reassembly - reassembles packet fragments to prevent fragment overlap attacks such as Teardrop and other Layer 3 protocol anomaly based attacks.

Signature Element AnalysisRather than using signatures that precisely identify specific attacks, WatchGuard systems look at what any attack of a certain type (e.g., e-mail) must do to succeed (e.g., auto-execute an attachment). With rule sets, you can choose to allow or deny traffic, or even deny all traffic from a source for a specific period.

In addition to rigorous rule sets, the firewall processes policy-based configurations, and management subsystems perform state and content analysis. These processes protect against entire known and unknown attack classes, and can narrow the vulnerability window without having to make you wait for updated attack-specific signatures.

Behavior-Based AnalysisAlthough behavior-based intrusion detection is a relatively new technology, WatchGuard has mechanisms in place within the firewall to identify known attack behaviors, such as:

* Port scans and probes * Spoofing * SYN flood attacks * DoS and DDoS attacks * The misuse of IP options such as source routing

from www.watchguard.com18

Page 19: ECE-6612 csc.gatech/copeland/jac/6612/  Prof. John A. Copeland

Network Operations

* Resolve network performance issues in minutes * Provides enterprise network visibility down to user level * Troubleshoots network incidents at 1/3 the time of point solutions * Analyzes NetFlow / sFlow to facilitate capacity planning and traffic engineering

Network Security

* Detects attacks that bypass signature based, perimeter defenses * Leverages flow data, including packet capture, to reduce security risks by 90% * Enforces policies and assures compliance with agent-free user identity tracking * Delivers scalable, robust security and risk management

from www.lancope.com

19(also see http://users.ece.gatech.edu/~copeland/jac/lancope/index.html)