EMBARGOED Kicking the Tyres

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kicking the tyresChoosing a voting system for New Zealand

embargoed until 20 september 2011



contents

Kicking the Tyres. Choosing a voting system for New Zealand 1

Evaluating Voting Systems 2

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 7

First-Past-the-Post (FPP) 11

Preferential Voting (PV) 15

Single Transferable Vote (STV) 19

Supplementary Member (SM) 23

Conclusion 27

Endnotes 29

Embargoed until 20 September 2011



acknowledgements

We wish to acknowledge Ian McAllister, Graeme Edgeler and Malcolm Mackerras for offering advice

and thorough and insightful comments on draft versions of this paper. Responsibility for the nal

paper and the views expressed within rests with us.

about the author

Steve Thomas is a Researcher at Maxim Institute. He was educated at the

University of Canterbury, graduating with a Master of Arts with Distinction.

Steve’s background is in politics and history, and he has researched and

written in a number of areas including New Zealand politics, education

and taxation. He is the author of two of Maxim Institute’s Tax Discussion

Series papers, its Roll Play education report, which examined how access

to Christchurch schools could be improved for more families, as well as

two reports in the Institute’s award-winning series of Parent Factor reports:

Inormation or parents and Access to education. He also published his rst book in 2008, Cotonou

and Pacifc Regionalism.



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“New Zealanders have had to wait long enough for a chance to kick the tyres on MMP. So,

National will give them that chance by holding a binding referendum on MMP by no later

than 2011.

And, if a majority of voters decide MMP is not their preferred electoral system, we will offer

them a choice between a range of electoral systems to replace it.”

John Key, “Speech to the Annual National Party Conference,” Wellington, 3 August 20081

At the 2011 election in November, voters will get the chance to vote in a referendum on whether

New Zealand will keep its Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. Voters will also get the

chance to decide which voting system they would prefer if we do not keep MMP, out of four possible

alternatives. If a majority of voters decide that MMP ought to be kept, then parliament has said that

there will be a review of MMP to nd ways of improving it. The referendum is an opportunity to “kick

the tyres on MMP,” and see whether it should be kept or whether the voting system should change.

This should not be done without reasoned and considered national debate of all the options.

Every voting system operates within a specic political culture and party system and these factors

can inuence the way voters behave in using a particular voting system.2 This paper contributes to the

debate about which voting system New Zealand should have by evaluating the ve different voting

systems that voters will be asked to choose from at the 2011 referendum—MMP; First-Past-the-Post

(FPP); Preferential Voting (PV); Single Transferable Vote (STV); and Supplementary Member (SM).

We shall evaluate each system according to what we believe are criteria of effective representation.

We have limited ourselves to the questions which the referendum is asking about the voting system.

We therefore do not consider elements of the voting systems debate that are outside of this scope.

We hope that our evaluation will help voters to decide which system they will choose at

November’s referendum.

kicking the tyres

Choosing a voting system for New Zealand



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There is no perfect way of turning everyone’s votes into 120 politicians in parliament. Different voting

systems use different methods. This year, New Zealand is asking which system is best for our country.

What we decide will tangibly affect which MPs are elected, what parties get representation and how

governments are formed.1 For example, some systems (majoritarian ones) make it easier for major

parties to win most of the seats, while other systems (proportional ones) make it easier for minor

parties to win seats and normally mean parties have to share power.2

There are strengths and limitations to any system. Choosing a voting system involves making

trade-offs between each system’s strengths and limitations. So, how do we decide what’s important?3

Simply put, New Zealand should have a voting system that enables representative democracy

to ourish. That is, the voting system should enable our MPs and the government to have the

freedom to lead and to make decisions in the best interests of all New Zealanders, but it should

also encourage them to listen and be responsive to the interests of New Zealanders and their local

communities.4

Evaluation criteria

We have developed seven evaluation criteria and have organised them under two major headings:how voting systems enable quality representation; and how they affect the workings of parliament

and government.5 No system will get a tick against every criterion, and in fact, some of the criteria

might exclude each other. For example, there is often a trade-off between the government being able

to pass the laws that it wants, and making parliament more representative of society at large. Our

criteria cannot be used to produce a tally to decide which voting system is best. Instead they help us

to understand the systems, so that we can vote according to what we believe is most important for

quality representation.

evaluating voting

systems




Representation

Representation is the life-blood of democratic government. Instead of four million people trying todecide every law together, we have people acting on our behalf to do so—those people are our MPs.

When it comes to voting systems, the question becomes—which system can produce a parliament

that represents the different communities and interests in our country well?

There are two common ways to think about how representation can be provided for in

parliament—through MPs who are from our local, geographic communities (called electorate

representation); or through MPs who represent interest groups to which people belong or with whom

people agree (called representation of interests).

1. Electorate representation—how important are electorate MPs in the system?

Electorate MPs are connected to, and held accountable by, a community of people who live ina particular place. A community knows that an electorate MP will have their concerns in mind

in parliament.6 This concern provides for a relational connection and loyalty between MPs and

voters. When an MP represents an electorate, their responsibility is quite clear—they represent

the people who are from their area while they make decisions about what is good for the country

as a whole.7

Electorate representation means that all local areas, whether rural or urban, North Island

or South, are heard in parliament.

2. Representation of interests—how does the system provide for the representation of interest

and identity groups in parliament?

Identity is not just shaped by location. For example, people are also shaped by the social, ethnic

and religious communities to which they belong or with whom they identify, which may not be

located all within one electorate.8 In a diverse and complex society, there is a range of other

interests that need to be considered when deciding what is good for everyone. It is important

that parliament can reect the breadth of society so that minority voices have the chance to be

heard in parliament.

All voting systems provide the opportunity for the representation of interests in some

way, but some systems make it easier for people from minority interest groups to be elected

and for those views to be easily represented. Given that society is comprised of a diversity of

communities it is difcult for two or three major political parties to represent all of the different

identities and groups. Majority rule cannot always take into account the wide range of theseperspectives in the decisions which affect the community.9 This is why some countries use

proportional systems. They are intended to elect a parliament that reects a wide cross-section

of the different interest and identity groups.

It is impossible to measure exactly how a system does or does not cater for interest group

representation. This is because an interest group can be represented by someone who is not

part of that group themselves. For example, a non-Pasika MP can act on behalf of the Pasika

community in parliament. But systems that are proportional are typically seen to be best at




providing for interest groups to be represented. We will use the proportionality of parliament

as our measure for how well interest groups are represented. That is, whether the number

of seats each party has in parliament is roughly in proportion to the number of votes that it

receives. Proportionality is an imperfect measure because effective representation of interests

relies on more than the sheer number of people from different interest groups being elected to

parliament. However, it is the most helpful and concrete indicator available.

When it comes to voting systems, there is usually a theoretical tension between giving priority to

the representation of interests and giving priority to electorate representation. In practice, the two

do not need to be seen in opposition. In fact, they tend to operate together to produce effective

representation. Every MP comes from a particular ethnicity and might stand for that group’s interests

in parliament, but they can also represent the interests of their local electorate and the people who

they know of other ethnic groups, whose wishes and needs they consider as they think about whatis good for the country as a whole. The two styles of representation do not exclude each other—they

go hand-in-hand.

Effects on parliament and government

We also need to think about what the voting system means for how parliament functions in practice.

Voting systems inuence what sort of government is formed and how parliament does its job.

Particular criteria to consider are:

1. Accountability—does the voting system help voters hold the government and MPs to account

for their performance?

To quote the philosopher Karl Popper, “throwing out the rascals” ought to be easy if they are

not performing.10 In voting systems where people are chosen through party lists instead of an

electorate, this accountability can be reduced as MPs are reliant on their party’s success more

than the support of local voters.

2. Legitimacy—does the voting system deliver the electoral outcomes that voters, as a whole,

want and expect?

Voters should be condent that their vote counts towards the fair election of candidates and

parties. The voting system should not be biased but should assign all votes the same value

as much as possible.11 Voters should also be condent that their vote contributes towards the

outcome of an election and that they can accept the result as fair and reasonable—even if the

government which they did not prefer is elected.12

3. Stable government—does the voting system enable governments to form easily and do they

last for their term of ofce?

Stability helps the government to run smoothly, thereby helping people to have condence




in the government and its work. The voting system can affect how stable the government is.

For example, if a voting system makes coalition government more likely, so that a number of

different parties will have to work together, then the government may not be very stable.13

4. Effective government—how easy or difcult is it for the government to carry out what it has

promised?

Governments need to be able to function effectively. If the voting system produces fractious

parliaments then it can be difcult for governments to do what they pledged to do when they

were elected.14

5. Opposition and oversight—does the system promote the formation of an opposition that can

criticise and challenge the government?

An effective opposition is required so that the government’s work gets debated, considered and

evaluated.15 For this to happen, a viable opposition party, or parties, need to be elected. Having

an opposition will not guarantee that these things happen well, but they do make it more likely.

If parliament is fractious then this may affect how unied—and therefore how effective—the

opposition is.

It is important to remember that these criteria cannot all exist perfectly in any system. For example,

the criteria of “effective government” and “opposition and oversight” tend to compete. The best

systems will give some room to all the criteria and will balance these competing elements. We now

turn to our evaluation of the ve different systems that will be considered at the referendum in the

order in which they will appear on the ballot paper, beginning with MMP.16



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How does MMP work?

New Zealand has been using MMP as its voting system for fteen years since 1996. MMP blurs

the usual categories that voting systems fall into, by combining electorate representation with a

proportionally elected parliament.1

This combination happens by giving people two votes instead of one. One vote is for a local

candidate, and one vote is for a party. The second vote—the party vote—is the one that decides

each party’s total degree of representation in parliament. The idea is to make the allocation of seats

through all of parliament proportionate to the share of the party vote that each party receives. The

rst candidates to be given seats in parliament are the ones who win the most votes in their local

electorate. So each patch of New Zealand has their own MP who looks after their interests. Then

parties are allocated however many “top up” seats they need to get the overall proportion right.

These “top-up” seats are lled by MPs from a list of the party’s candidates that is drawn up before

the election.2

So, if a party wins ten percent of the votes, it gets roughly ten percent of the seats. If it wins

forty percent of the vote then it gets roughly forty percent of the seats, and so on. 3 But to get any

sort of representation, a party has to achieve one of two things. They either need to have a candidate

mixed memberproportional

The illustration opposite shows the key features of how MMP works.

M M P




voted into an electorate seat, or they have to win ve percent or more of the party vote. This is called

“crossing the threshold.”

One interesting curiosity in the system is that sometimes a party can also win more electorate

seats than it is entitled to according to its share of the party vote. So, theoretically, a party might

only win two percent of the nationwide party vote, but they might get ve people elected in local

electorates. When this happens “overhang” seats are created in parliament.4 The overhang seats

increase the total number of MPs in parliament by however many extra electorate MPs there are. This

is to ensure that the regular list seats are allocated proportionally. These “overhang seats” are the

reason we currently have 122 MPs in parliament instead of 120.

Like with every voting system, there are all sorts of details that can change under MMP. For

example, there could be more or fewer electorate seats or there could be different requirements for

how parties win seats. At this referendum we are being asked about MMP as it stands. If a majority

decide to keep MMP then parliament has said that the Electoral Commission will review MMP.5

Depending on whether the government acts on the review’s recommendations, the system could

change in the future.

The Electoral Commission says that there would be seven Maori seats under MMP.6

The continuum below shows that MMP produces more proportional electoral outcomes.

Electoral outcomes (Gallagher least squares index of disproportionality)*

More proportional

(the share of seats each party

has in parliament is close to its

share of the vote)

(the share of seats each party has in

parliament is not as proportionate to

its share of the vote)

More majoritarian

015

7.5

* Based on disporportionality scores calculated using the Gallagher least squares index provided by D.M. Farrell and I.

McAllister, The Australian Electoral System. Origins, variations and consequences (Sydney: University of New South

Wales Press, 2006), 8, table 1.1.7

MMP

Evaluating MMP

Representation

MMP combines electorate representation and the representation of interests. Electorate MPs are

retained, but parties’ representation in parliament is proportional which provides room for more

interest group representation. Local electorate MPs can represent the interests of specic geographic

communities and provide a human point of contact,8 while list MPs can concentrate on representing

non-local communities of interest, like minority and ethnic groups.9

In terms of sheer numbers, there are now more female MPs and a greater diversity of MPs

drawn from a variety of ethnic and cultural groups in parliament under MMP than there were under


M M P



FPP.10 This increase in diversity is partly because MMP has made it easier for major political parties

to stand a more diverse range of minority candidates within their lists, when these candidates might

have struggled to win an electorate seat.11 It is also because the proportional nature of MMP has

made it easier for the minor parties which represent different interest groups to be elected. New

Zealand’s experience concurs with other evidence that shows party list systems enhance interest

group representation.12

Overall, MMP provides well for both forms of representation, as both electorate and list MPs

have represented local communities and communities of interests. However, because government is

decided by the party vote rather than the electorate vote, MMP emphasises parties as the vehicle for

representation, rather than electorates.


MMP has had both positive and negative effects on the quality of New Zealand’s democracy. Against

predictions, it has led to increasingly stable governments. After a period of initial instability in the

mid-1990s, “multi-party governance” agreements have been created that have enabled minor parties

to maintain their points of difference in their core policy areas while having a say in government. 13

They have also helped various governments to pass legislation with relative ease.14

However, a serious problem with multi-party parliaments under MMP is that minor parties have

an incentive to prioritise the good of particular interests and minority groups in order to be elected.15

In this situation, it is more difcult for parties to work together to produce law that is in everyone’s

best interests because the focus can easily be on what is best for the particular group of people that

each party represents.16 This can easily take us into the murky ground of “identity politics” where

groups compete to promote their particular interests and ideas.

Another question-mark over MMP is to do with accountability. Those who originally supported

MMP argued that it would produce governments that were more accountable to voters. 17 But voters

do not vote directly for one political party to form a government under MMP; they vote for a range of

parties which bargain after election day.18 The indirect election of governments means that sometimes

parties that were part of a government which was voted out can stay in power as part of a newly

formed government. This is a threat to direct accountability. Another issue is that list MPs can owe

more loyalty to their parties than to voters so that they can receive a high list ranking.19

Under MMP we cannot conceive of the opposition as a collective entity that is entirely separate

from the government. Non-governing parties can do deals with the government to get their legislative

proposals on the agenda, and only oppose the government on certain issues.20

Summary: MMP

MMP provides well for electorate representation and the representation of interests, and can provide

for reasonably stable government.21 The strength of MMP is the ip-side of its drawbacks. It enables

more parties to be elected to parliament, which is great for the breadth of representation, but it also

gives parties a lot of power. It can also create bargaining instead of debate among parties, and a

weakened accountability of the government to voters. It can also encourage interest groups to act in

unhelpful ways.

M M P



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How does FPP work?

FPP is the voting system that New Zealand used up until 1996. Under FPP, voting is very simple.

Everyone casts one vote for one candidate from their local electorate and parliament is made up

entirely of those electorate MPs. All a candidate has to do to be elected under FPP is to win more

votes than any other candidate in their electorate.1

Voters put a mark beside the name of their preferred candidate on the ballot paper. The votes

can be counted quickly and by the end of election night it is usually certain which candidate has won

the most votes in each electorate and which party can form a government.2 Political parties win seats

in parliament by their candiates winning electorate seats. The party that wins the most electorate

seats has the mandate to form a government.Based on current census data, the Electoral Commission estimates that there would be twelve

Maori seats under FPP.3

F P P

The illustration opposite shows the key features of how FPP works.

frst-past-the-post




Evaluating FPP

Representation

FPP originates from a time before political parties became a common way of organising political

representation. Local MPs were responsible for representing the interests of everyone in a geographic

community.5 Historically, under FPP in New Zealand, there was a close relationship between MPs and

their electorates. MPs returned to their electorates from parliament to meet with and live among

their constituents.6 The idea of electorate representation was that local MPs ought to exercise their

judgement according to their conscience, with one eye to local interests and another to national

interests.7 If the situation warranted, national interests were put rst. Electorate representation

under FPP and other similar systems encourages MPs and candidates to form a deep connection with

their local electorate.

However, a drawback of electorate representation under FPP (and other systems which elect

just one MP from each electorate), is that the system makes it harder for minority voices to be heard.8

This is usually because even if minor parties—which often represent minorities and specic interest

groups—win a high percentage of the vote from across the country they nd it hard to win electorate

seats because their share of the vote is not concentrated in one place.9 Interest group representation

under FPP mainly relies on the major parties representing a broad cross-section of interests in society,

but there is not much incentive for them to do so.10 The major parties tend to represent the interests of

the average, median voter at the centre of the political spectrum.11 It is difcult for minority interests

to enjoy formal avenues of parliamentary representation under FPP.

The quality of the representation under FPP is therefore lop-sided. Whether we get a good

balance depends on whether major parties choose to stand a diverse range of candidates in local

electorates, whether local MPs and major parties choose to act on behalf of different communities of

interest,12 and whether major parties pay heed to the good of everyone whom they represent—not

just those who voted for them.


More proportional



share of the vote)




More majoritarian

157.5




FPP

The continuum below shows that FPP produces more majoritarian electoral outcomes.

F P P





FPP is biased towards candidates standing for major parties, because minor parties’ supporters arelikely to be spread nation-wide and not concentrated in one electorate. This means the most common

outcome under FPP is a two-party system in parliament, where one party wins the largest number of

the seats in parliament and forms a government, and an opposition holds the second largest number

of seats.

“Marginal seats” are crucial under FPP, as those seats, which swing back and forth between

parties at different elections, are the ones that can decide the overall outcome. Parties and candidates

have an incentive to focus their campaigns on these seats, and they end up being driven by what is

important to voters in those electorates.13

One big criticism of FPP is that election results are often disproportionate at the national level—

that is, there is a legitimacy problem because the share of seats that parties win in parliament does

not always closely match their share of the vote.14 This happened in New Zealand under FPP. Between

1935 and 1993, the winning party won an average of 58 percent of the seats in parliament with only

an average of 46 percent of the vote, whereas minor parties averaged 12 percent of the vote but

only 0.1 percent of the seats.15 The last FPP election in 1993 is another example of the distortion

that can occur with FPP. The National Party was elected with 35 percent of the vote, while the

Labour Party, the Alliance, and the New Zealand First Party together won 61 percent. 16 These sorts

of disproportionate electoral outcomes and acute instances of “wrong winner” elections were

two important reasons why many New Zealanders grew disillusioned with FPP and voted against it

in the 1992 referendum.17 It can be hard for the government to claim that it has a strong mandate if

it does not have the support of a large proportion of voters.

The stability of a strong two-party system can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand,electoral outcomes are predictable—one political party is likely to form a government and to

implement its policies, and it is clear who the opposition is.18 On the other hand, strong single-

party majority governments can pass legislation with little interference, which can leave voters with

uncertainty about how responsive and accountable the government is. In New Zealand, FPP was

blamed for “manufacturing” dictatorial single-party governments.19

Summary: FPP

FPP is simple to understand and it usually produces clear results. FPP delivers strong, stable, single-

party majority government most of the time, and there is usually no confusion about which party

can form a government. It is easy for voters to dump a government and elect a new one since partiesgenerally do not negotiate together to form a government.20 But, as New Zealand’s experience

indicates, instances of highly disproportionate election results weakened the legitimacy of electoral

outcomes and the Cabinet’s tight control over legislation and parliament weakened the public’s trust

in government.21 It can also be difcult for minorities to be represented, either because safe seats

make it difcult to dislodge a popular candidate or because it is difcult for minority candidates to

win enough concentrated support in one electorate.

F P P



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How does PV work?

Under PV, parliament is only made up of electorate MPs. Everyone gets one vote to elect one candidate

from their electorate. To be elected, a candidate has to win an absolute majority of the vote—that

is, more than 50 percent.1 Instead of just ticking a box, voters rank the candidates which they prefer.

Voters put a ‘1’ next to the name of their preferred candidate, followed by a ‘2’ next to their second

choice, a ‘3’ next to their third choice, and so on.2 The purpose of rank-ordering candidates is to

enable votes to be “transferred from one candidate to another.”3 If one candidate fails to win an

absolute majority during the rst round of counting votes then the preferences of the least popular

candidate are transferred to the other candidates. This process continues until a candidate wins an

absolute majority.

4

PV is a bit like a knock-out system in this respect.Depending on the PV system’s design, in some cases voters are required to indicate a

preference for every candidate on the ballot paper; while in others voters only have to indicate as

many preferences as they want. It is not clear yet which design New Zealand would choose if PV were

used in New Zealand.5

Political parties win their seats by their candidates winning in electorates. Typically, PV makes

it easy for one major party to form a government.

preerential

voting

P V

The illustration opposite shows the key features of how PV works.




Evaluating PV

Representation

Because PV’s basis is electorate representation, it provides a strong connection point between local

communities and parliament. Yet, because voters can indicate a list of preferences, those voters who

could otherwise be discouraged from voting for a minor party candidate can do so in the knowledge

that their latter preferences will count, even if their rst choice is eliminated. This gives minor parties a

ghting chance, unlike FPP. Some argue, however, that this is one of PV’s most serious shortcomings

since only the subsequent preferences of those who have supported the least popular candidate(s)

are taken into account when rst preferences are redistributed. 8 It is still difcult for minor party

candidates to challenge strong candidates in safe seats, yet PV is certainly an improvement on simple

majoritarian voting systems because voters can select their preferred candidate without worrying

about wasting their vote as happens with FPP.

Some also claim that PV can provide well for the representation of interests in divided societies

because it produces more moderate outcomes compared to FPP.9

Generally, however, PV tends to belimited at providing for the representation of interests in parliament.


Overall, PV’s performance against the criterion of legitimacy is mixed. Generally, the fact that voters

can allocate preferences is an advantage. But sometimes PV delivers results that are different to what

voters expect. For instance, if second and subsequent preferences are required to elect an MP, then

sometimes the highest polling candidate on rst preferences may not be the one that is elected. 10


More proportional



share of the vote)




More majoritarian

0 157.5




PV

Based on current census data, the Electoral Commission estimates that there would be twelve

Maori seats under PV.6

The continuum below shows that PV produces more majoritarian electoral outcomes.

P V




Whether or not this is a good thing is contestable.

Like with other single-member electorate systems, sometimes a party’s share of seats is also

disproportionate to its vote share.11 For example, Australian PV elections have produced high levels

of distortion between the share of the vote and the share of the seats that parties have won. 12 In

three recent federal elections the winning party has won more seats but fewer votes than its rivals

according to nal preferences (1969, 1990 and 1998). In two more instances this happened on the

basis of rst preferences (1987 and 2010).13 This distortion drops PV’s legitimacy score.

The election of fewer political parties under PV ought to produce fairly predictable electoral

outcomes. PV tends to provide for a clear government and opposition since PV makes it difcult for

minor parties to be elected.14 If electoral outcomes are predictable then generally parliament and

government ought to be stable; although some of the stability observed in Australian elections is due

to compulsory voting and because there are two strong, well-organised parties.

A nal issue with PV concerns the party deals that can take place regarding voters’ preferences.

In Australia, for example, both the Liberal-National Coalition and the Labor Party try to beat each

other by “swapping preferences” to arrange the order in which preferences ow. 15 Because voting

is compulsory, the parties put a lot of energy into producing “how to vote” cards in each electorate

to maximise their own advantage over the opposition. This can unhelpfully affect the way that

parties campaign as political tactics can end up dominating discussion of the issues. Voters may

stop thinking about which candidates they would like to be their MP—which is the point of PV—and

accept a party’s choices.

Summary: PV

PV provides for strong electorate representation, through the election of local MPs, which usuallyleads to the election of single-party majority governments. That said, PV gives minor party candidates

a ghting chance of winning a seat when second and subsequent preferences are used to help elect

a candidate. However, it is still harder for minority candidates and parties to be represented in

parliament under PV because it is not a proportional system. Further, PV can sometimes produce

electoral outcomes that might not be considered entirely legitimate if the most popular candidate

on rst preferences does not win—although this point is debatable. While PV would enable voters to

more clearly express their preferences for certain candidates it could also introduce some new ways

for parties and candidates to engineer electoral outcomes, as parties would advise supportive voters

how to vote to give them the best advantage.16

P V



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How does STV work?

STV may be familiar to voters who have participated in local body elections. All candidates are elected

from local electorates. But instead of electing just one candidate, each electorate typically elects

between three and seven candidates because the electorates are bigger but there are fewer of them.

If New Zealand used STV there could be between 24 and 30 electorates. Based on current census

data, the Electoral Commission estimates that there would probably be about four Maori electorates

and twelve Maori seats altogether.1 Everybody ranks their favourite candidates, like they do in PV.

A candidate secures a seat when they reach a particular quota of votes.2 If a candidate is elected at

the rst round of counting votes, any votes that they have in excess of the quota are transferred—

often proportionally—according to second preferences, to elect the next candidate.3 If seats are stillunlled after the surplus votes have been transferred, then the candidate with the lowest number of

votes is excluded and their votes are transferred according to voters’ second preferences.4 This two-

step process continues until all the seats in the electorate are lled.

If STV were introduced in New Zealand, voters would also be able to vote for a ranking chosen

by a party, instead of ranking all the candidates by themselves.5 This is called voting “above-the-

line.”6 Voting above-the-line is meant to make voting simpler for people. But voters who choose to

singletranserable vote S T

V

The illustration opposite shows the key features of how STV works.




Evaluating STV

Representation

Because all MPs come from electorates, local representation is strong under STV.8 Every voter is

represented by more than one MP. Theoretically, constituents can have access to a variety of MPs

who can listen and act on their behalf, although given that electorates would have to increase insize it could be difcult for MPs to have much contact with all of the people in their electorate. For

example, Christchurch or central Auckland might become single electorates electing ve MPs each.

On the other hand, electorate representation could be strengthened if some MPs served certain

localised communities within their electorate to increase their chances of election. As the system

remains untried nationally in New Zealand, it is difcult to know how this issue would play out.

STV could help to increase the ethnic and social diversity of MPs in parliament as multi-member

electorates would make it easier for minor parties to win seats. 9 Major parties might also choose to

stand a wider cross-section of candidates who could represent different national interest or social

groups.10 Thus, STV could provide for a high level of representation of interests.


Sometimes STV can encourage candidates who represent the same party to compete against one

another when they stand in the same electorate.11 In Ireland, for instance, STV has contributed to

a strong focus on local issues in elections as candidates tap into local political concerns to garner

votes. However, national issues can be sidelined in local candidates’ election campaigns.12

STV can produce coalition government because of how minor parties’ candidates stand a better

chance of being elected. Strangely, one of the puzzles of how STV works in practice is that, in the

countries where it is used, large numbers of minor parties have not been elected to parliament.13 For


More proportional



share of the vote)




More majoritarian

157.5




STV

vote this way would have to accept a default ranking of candidates decided by their preferred party

(which would be published prior to the election).

The continuum below shows that STV produces more proportional electoral outcomes.

S T

V




example, both Australia (at the federal senate level) and Malta use STV and have strong two-party

systems. This would not necessarily be a negative outcome if STV were used in New Zealand, since a

two-party system is likely to produce stable parliaments, governments which can more easily enact

legislation, and a clearly dened opposition.

Even though STV is not primarily designed to distribute seats in parliament proportionally,

examination of STV election results worldwide has shown that it still produces proportional

outcomes.14 The degree of proportionality depends on such design factors as how low the electoral

quota is and whether political parties stand a greater or lesser number of candidates “than they can

expect to get elected.”15 If STV were used in New Zealand the system would probably not produce

disproportionate election results, and “wrong winner” elections could be avoided.

Voting above-the-line however creates problematic issues for accountability and legitimacy.

This is because voting above-the-line essentially turns STV into a party vote system. 16 By voting

above-the-line, voters would not be choosing which candidates are elected—they would be choosingto accept the parties’ choice of candidates and the order in which they would be elected. The latter

point is important if parties make agreements to swap preferences to give an electoral advantage to

a potential coalition partner.17 In Australia, where voting above-the-line is used in federal senate and

state STV elections, between 85 and 95 percent of voters have been found to use it. 18 The option is

used by such a high proportion of voters because the alternative is the more time consuming and

potentially laborious task of rank-ordering literally dozens of candidates on the ballot paper.19

We do not know for certain whether New Zealand voters would prefer voting above-the-line to

indicating their own preferences for candidates.20 There is evidence that the majority of voters who

voted in New Zealand District Health Board STV elections listed their preferences for candidates in

alphabetical order. This behaviour might indicate that voters misunderstood that they had a single

transferable vote and not seven individual votes,21 or maybe that voters found voting under STV too

time consuming. While the evidence from New Zealand local body elections is helpful for illustrating

voter behaviour, it is still difcult to say denitely whether New Zealand would experience the same

accountability and legitimacy issues as Australia has if STV were used for parliamentary elections

because we cannot predict exactly how candidates, parties and voters would respond.

Summary: STV

STV is an attractive system in principle since it enables voters to indicate exactly which candidates

they would like in multi-member electorates. STV enables voters to choose both between and within

parties, meaning that parliament ought to reect a wider diversity of opinions within society.22 The

use of multi-member electorates also means that electoral outcomes will be more proportional.

The theoretical advantages of STV have to be weighed carefully against the practical issues

with using it and the way voters tend to interact with this relatively complex system. For example,

it could undermine the cohesiveness of political parties as candidates from the same party would

compete against each other for election. The option of voting above-the-line can also give parties

more control over which candidates are elected and in which order. In this case, many voters would

not actually end up individually choosing their local MPs. In short, the advantages offered by STV

could be eroded by measures to make it easier for voters to understand and use.

S T

V



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How does SM work?

SM is from the same family of voting systems as MMP. It is also a mixed system that tries to combine

electorate representation with some proportionality. Under SM, like MMP, everyone has two votes—

one for a candidate from their local electorate and one for a party. However, under SM the party vote

is not as important as under MMP because it is not used to allocate all of the seats in parliament

proportionally. In New Zealand, it would be used to determine the allocation of just 30 of the 120

seats to candidates drawn from party lists that parties would decide and publish before the election.1

The other 90 seats would go to the candidates who win the most votes in each electorate. 2 This is

the key difference between SM and MMP. The electorate vote and the party vote are independent of

each other. They work alongside each other, but are not fused as they are under MMP.3

The electionresults produced by SM are more majoritarian.4

If New Zealand chooses SM, then the way we vote would look similar to how we currently do,

even though the results and the outcome of elections would change. The electorate MPs would

be chosen in the same way as under MMP, while the party list MPs would be elected by everyone

ticking a box for a party as we do now. 5 Each party’s total number of seats in parliament would be

determinedby its combined number of electorate seats and list seats.

supplementary

member S M

The illustration opposite shows the key features of how SM works.




Evaluating SM

Representation

SM would increase the number of local electorate MPs from the current number of 70 to 90.8 MPs and

candidates would have an incentive to represent their electorate’s interests as well as their parties’.9

The problems which New Zealand’s list MPs have encountered under MMP would still remain. Thepopular perception that they are “faceless” MPs who are selected by party bosses, 10 or the issue of

split loyalty—do they primarily represent a party or voters—would not be xed. However, because

there would be more electorate MPs under SM, some of the punch would be taken out of those

issues.

Because three-quarters of the seats under SM would be electorate seats, the electorate seats

will become more important to how parties and candidates campaign. Some evidence suggests that

when political parties stand candidates in local electorates under mixed systems it helps them to

boost their share of the list vote.11 Hence, the prospect of receiving a boost in the list vote—however

great or small—might encourage more party competition in local electorates under SM than under

FPP, for example.12 On the other hand, parties might choose to coordinate their electorate nominations

as part of their electoral strategy, which could reduce the number of candidates contesting a seat. Itis hard to predict exactly what would happen, but it is thought that the latter effect could be stronger

in mixed systems in which electorate elections are more important—like SM. 13 There also might be

a stronger tendency for parties to coordinate their campaigns given New Zealand’s history of voter

choice being inuenced strongly by parties and that candidates only seem to have a limited effect on

the parties’ party vote because of the high instances of split voting.14

SM also differs from pure single-member electorate systems like FPP because it provides

specically for the representation of interests through the list system. Like the MMP party list system,

under SM party lists would encourage the major parties to put candidates on their list who do not


More proportional



share of the vote)




More majoritarian

0 157.5




SM

Based on current census data, the Electoral Commission estimates that there would be nine

Maori seats under SM.6

The continuum below shows that SM produces more majoritarian outcomes.

S M




necessarily have broad enough appeal to win an electorate seat, but who could represent minority

interest groups.15 The 30 list seats would make it possible for minor parties to win seats in parliament.

The effect would be more muted than under MMP, since there would be fewer list seats, and because

the party vote would only determine the share of the 30 list seats.16 Like MMP, SM allows for elements

of both electorate representation and representation of interests, but it is ultimately weighted

towards electorate representation because the party vote does not determine the allocation of all the

seats in parliament.


If New Zealand adopted SM, the outcome of elections would usually be more majoritarian because

of the smaller number of list MPs that would be elected compared to electorate MPs. 17 New Zealand

research has shown that SM would not have enough of an impact on the shape of parliament to make

it highly proportional.18 Single-party majority or majority coalition governments would be the most

likely ones to form.

The same legitimacy problems that exist with single member electorate systems would exist

with SM, although to a slightly lesser extent. For example, “marginal seats” would be important

for election results, meaning that some local areas might get prioritised over others. If a coalition

government formed, it would be more difcult for voters to hold it directly to account than a single-

party majority government.19

While there are potential legitimacy and accountability issues with SM, it can encourage

an effective opposition. Being a more majoritarian system, it can be expected over time not to

produce highly fragmented parliaments that have, say, more than ve parties. 20 If SM were used

in New Zealand, initially there would probably be about the same number of parties represented inparliament as there are now under MMP, due to the number of minor parties currently represented

which hold one electorate seat.21 But over time the smaller number of list seats would reduce minor

parties’ number of MPs and it could be harder for minor parties to win electorate seats. Generally

we could expect parliament would operate more like it did under FPP, with a clear government and

opposition, and with the government perhaps supported by a handful of minor parties.

Summary: SM

In trying to blend two styles of voting system, SM has some of the benets and some of the drawbacks

of both. It is neither a completely proportional system, nor does it guarantee that one party will win a

large enough majority to be able to govern alone.In terms of representation, SM has the potential to achieve a good balance between national

and local representation of interests.22 Electorate representation would be strong, creating good ties

between parliament and voters, but a quarter of parliament would also be made up of list MPs who

tend to be able to represent minority interest groups well.

Because there would be more electorate MPs under SM than under MMP the major parties

would benet, but there is also a chance coalitions would be needed to form a government and that

minor parties would have more representation than they typically do under single-member electorate

systems, like FPP.

S M S M





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conclusion

New Zealand should have a voting system that would enable our MPs and the government to have

the freedom to lead and to make decisions in the best interests of all New Zealanders, but it should

also require them to listen and be responsive to the interests of New Zealanders and their local

communities.

In November, we will have a chance to vote on which system we think could do this best. When

voting, there are a range of factors to consider, including:

Representation

– electorate representation;

– representation of interests;


– accountability;

– legitimacy;

– stable government;

– effective government; and

– opposition and oversight.



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By looking at these criteria, we have been able to think about the implications of the different voting

systems. We found that more proportional systems (such as MMP and STV) can contribute to healthy

representative democracy by improving the representation of interests without unduly inhibiting

either parliament’s role or the government’s freedom to govern. However, we also found that

negatively they can give political parties a lot of inuence, as candidates have to rely on their party’s

favour to be selected and then elected. Given the likelihood of multi-party parliaments under these

systems, there are greater incentives for political parties to do pre-election deals with each other

so that the successful ones can more easily form a coalition government. By giving political parties

greater inuence, these systems can weaken the degree of direct connection between parliament,

the government, and voters in local communities, as parties focus more on serving sectional interests

to win votes throughout the country. Inter-party bargaining can also mean it is difcult to know what

you’re voting for when you choose a party.

On the positive side, interest groups get a voice. On the downside, that voice can be too loud—if an interest group becomes politically important, it can dominate policy and law-making. Interest

group politics can make it difcult for MPs to govern with what is in everyone’s best interests in mind.

Voting systems which come from the majoritarian family can also provide for healthy

representative democracy. These systems provide well for electorate representation, which enables

the interests and views of local communities to be represented in parliament, and mean that voters

can hold MPs and the government more directly to account for their performance. Voters can also be

condent that electoral outcomes will be what they expect. But majoritarian systems are not so good

at providing for the representation of interests, because the composition of MPs in parliament tends

not to reect so closely different interest groups’ share of the population. Majoritarian voting systems

can also have other negative effects. For example, electoral outcomes are not as proportionate. Some

voters’ votes can count substantially more than the votes of others, depending on, for instance,

whether they live in a marginal or a safe seat. There is also the strong possibility of “wrong winner”

electoral outcomes where a party wins lots of seats but does not win a large majority of the vote

across the whole country.

Mixed voting systems, like SM or MMP use elements of both proportional and majoritarian

systems. They represent a trade-off between proportional representation and the direct accountability

of MPs to voters. Mixed systems do not eliminate the problems in either style of system but rather

smooth some of the rough edges of each and try to combine their benets.

Our evaluation has shown that there is no such thing as a perfect voting system—there are

aspects of each system which would be positive for representative democracy and aspects which

would be negative. When thinking about which system represents the best balance of positive andnegative features, voters will have to trade-off the features which they like by prioritising them

according to the kind of representative democracy that they believe is in New Zealand’s best interests.

We hope that each and every voter will decide their preferred system after thinking carefully about

what provides for effective representation, and with an awareness of each system’s implications.



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1 See, for example, works such as Pippa Norris’ Electoral

Engineering. Voting rules and political behaviour

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7-16. This

work highlights how different voting systems affect the

electoral incentives of candidates and parties and how

voters choose to exercise their vote depending on the

options available to them.

2 The following sources discuss the concepts of majoritarian

and proportional representation. S. Hix, R. Johnston and

A. Cummine, “Choosing an Electoral System” (London:

The British Academy Policy Centre, 2010), 21; M.B.

Vieira and D. Runciman, Representation (Cambridge,

United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2008), 74-79; G. Newman

and S. Bennett, “Electoral Systems,” Research Brie ,

10 (Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services,

Parliament of Australia, 2006), 15; G.B. Powell, Elections

as Instruments o Democracy: Majoritarian and

proportional visions (New Haven, CT: Yale Univeristy

Press, 2000), 7, 9; M. Pinto-Duschinsky, “Send the Rascals

Packing: Defects of Proportional Representation and the

Virtues of the Westminster Model,” Representation 36

(1999): 117-126.

3 S. Hix, R. Johnston and A. Cummine, “Choosing an

Electoral System,” 20-24.

4 Previous Maxim Institute publications which discuss the

value of parliament’s deliberative role and representative

government’s role in protecting the common good include:

R. Ekins, “A Government for the People. The value of

representative democracy,” Guest Paper (Auckland:

Maxim Institute, 2009); and J. Waldron, “Parliamentary

Recklessness: Why we need to legislate more carefully,”

Annual John Graham Lecture (Auckland: Maxim Institute,

2008).

5 It is important to note that while the research which

we consider indicates general trends in terms of the

electoral outcomes associated with each system, they are

predictions, not an exact science. It is a best guess at what

might happen with each system, especially where some

systems are untried in New Zealand. S. Hix, R. Johnston

and A. Cummine, “Choosing an Electoral System,” 15.

Cf. E. McLeay and J. Vowles, “Redening Constituency

Representation: The roles of New Zealand MPs under

MMP,” Regional and Federal Studies 17, no. 1 (2007): 72;

L. Malpass and O.M. Hartwich, “Superseding MMP: Real

electoral reform for New Zealand,” Policy Monograph, 109

(St Leonard’s, NSW: Centre for Independent Studies (CIS),

2010), 6-7.

6 Cf. H.F. Pitkin, The Concept o Representation (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1967), 155-156.

7 We value the community link because we believe that

the role of the state, which includes institutions like

our parliament, is to serve and protect the good of its

members. Elsewhere we have described what is good

for the members of society as the “common good.” We

think that what is good for people, this common good, is

revealed and realised as it is lived out in community. This

common good is indicated by the community’s history,

customs and traditions, ranging from its laws, music,

art or literature, to the patterns of everyday life, such as

work, study or play. The common good is also indicated

by reasoned deliberation about what the intrinsic basic

ends of a good life are, such as life, play, friendship, and

knowledge. These goods are not mutually exclusive;

each can be considered necessary for living a good life. A

representative’s job is to defend the common good. How

we conceive of the common good is discussed in more

detail in S. Thomas, “Governing for the Good: What does

it really mean?” Tax Discussion Series, 1 (Auckland: Maxim

Institute, 2008), 75-76. Also see R. Ekins, “A Government

for the People. The value of representative democracy,” 2.

8 M.B. Vieira and D. Runciman, Representation, 80-81.

9 See, for example, A. Lijphart, Patterns o Democracy:

1 J. Key, “National’s Blueprint for Change.” Speech to the

Annual National Party Conference, Wellington, 3 August”

(2008), pledge ten.

2 S. Hix, R. Johnston and A. Cummine, “Choosing an

Electoral System” (London: The British Academy Policy

Centre, 2010), 20; International Institute for Democracy

and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral System Design:

The new international IDEA handbook” (Stockholm: 2005),

4-5; M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-member

Electoral Systems: The best o both worlds? (Oxford, UK;

New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 592; R.S. Katz,

Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1997), 4-6.

kicking the tyres. choosing a voting system for new zealand

evaluating voting systems

endnotes




1 A more formal, if broad, denition of such mixed voting

systems is that an “electoral system is ‘mixed’ if more than

one formula is employed to distribute legislative seats.”

F. Ferrara, E.S. Herron and M. Nishikawa, Mixed ElectoralSystems. Contamination and its consequences (New York:

Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 17. Two political scientists who

have studied mixed voting systems, Matthew Shugart and

Martin Wattenberg, explain why they think mixed systems

represent the best of both worlds in the following way: “Our

general point is that MM systems permit myriad variations

that can suit a specic political context, while still holding

out the promise of providing the best of both worlds—i.e. the

best of both identiable governing blocs and proportionality,

and the best of both local accountability and cohesive and

programmatic national parties.” M.S. Shugart and M.P.

Wattenberg, Mixed-member Electoral Systems: The best o

both worlds? (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press,

2001), 1, 591-595.

2 This feature of MMP illustrates how the two votes are linkedtogether and why the system is proportional. S. Hix, R.

Johnston and A. Cummine, “Choosing an Electoral System,”

(London: The British Academy Policy Centre, 2010), 87;

F. Ferrara, E.S. Herron and M. Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral

Systems. Contamination and its consequences, 19; M.S.

Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-member Electoral

Systems: The best o both worlds? , 18-19.

3 Once the votes are counted and it is known which parties

have crossed either or both of the thresholds, the 120 seats

in parliament are allocated to parties roughly in proportion to

their vote share according to a mathematical formula called

Goverment orms and perormance in thirty-six countries

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

10 J. Vowles, S.A. Banducci and J.A. Karp, “Forecasting and

Evaluating the Consequences of Electoral Change in New

Zealand,” Acta Politica 41 (2006): 270, citing K. Popper,

“On the Theory of Democracy,” in All Lie is Problem-

solving (London: Routledge, 1987); and K. Popper, “The

Open Society and Its Enemies Revisited,” The Economist

28, no. 25 (1988): 28. Also see G.B. Powell, Elections as

Instruments o Democracy: Majoritarian and proportional

visions, 9; M. Pinto-Duschinsky, “Send the Rascals Packing:

Defects of proportional representation and the virtues of the

Westminster model,” 117-126.

11 P. McCarvill, “Devising an Electoral System for the 21st

Century: The case for AMS” (London: Institute for Public

Policy Research (IPPR), 2010), 5.

12 New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System

and J.H. Wallace, Report o the Royal Commission on the

Electoral System: Towards a better democracy (Wellington:

Government Printer, 1986), 12. The legitimacy of election

results is therefore closely associated with the performance

of our democratic institutions, such as parliament or list

MPs. If our democratic institutions are believed to be failing

to provide the kind of representative democracy that voters

expect, then it can reect badly on the voting system.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

(IDEA), “Electoral System Design: The new international IDEA

handbook” (Stockholm: 2005), 10.

13 Cf. J. Boston, S. Church and T. Bale, “The Impact of

Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness:

The New Zealand experience,” Australian Journal o Public Administration 62, no. 4 (2003): 10, citing M. Gallagher, M.

Laver and P. Mair, Representative Government in Modern

Europe (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 365, who “found that of

14 European countries during 1945-98, single-party majority

governments lasted an average of 953 days, coalitions

638 days and minority governments 505 days (or less than

one-and-a-half years).” Boston, Church and Bale also cite

W. Muller and K. Strøm, Coalition Governments in Western

Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); A. Lijphart,

Patterns of Democracy: Goverment forms and performance

in thirty-six countries; K. Strøm, Minority Government and

Majority Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1990); and M. Taylor and V. Herman, “Party Systems and

Government Stability,” American Political Science Review

65, no. 1 (1971): 28-37 in support of the point that coalition

or minority governments are not as durable as single-party

majority governments. Also see J. Wallace, Report o the

Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a better

democracy , (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986), 12.

14 J. Boston, S. Church and T. Bale, “The Impact of Proportional

Representation on Government Effectiveness: The New

Zealand experience,” 9, citing R. Weaver and B. Rockman,

“Assessing the Effects of Institutions,” in Do Institutions

Matter? Government capabilities in the United States and

abroad , eds. R. Weaver and B. Rockman (Washinton D.C.:

The Brookings Institute, 1993), 6; J. Wallace, Report o the


democracy , 12. Cf. S. Levine, N.S. Roberts and R. Salmond, “A

Wider View: MMP ten years on,” in The Baubles o Ofce. The

New Zealand General Election o 2005, eds. S. Levine and N.

S. Roberts (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 460.

15 Cf. A. Kaiser, “MMP, Minority Governments and Parliamentary

Opposition,” New Zealand Journal o Public and International

Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 86. On the deliberative role of parliament,

see: J. Waldron, “Parliamentary Recklessness: Why we need

to legislate more carefully,” 13, 29, 33; and E. Burke, “Speechto the Electors of Bristol on Being Elected. November 1774,”

in The Political Philosophy o Edmund Burke, ed. I. Hampsher

Monk (London: Longman, 1987), 110.

16 Cf. Electoral Referendum Act 2010, sch (1).

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)

evaluating voting systems continued




Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) cont.

the Sainte Laguë electoral formula. The system allows for a

whole number of seats to be allocated to parties. The system

also makes it harder for parties to win each additional seat.

G. Newman and S. Bennett, “Electoral Systems,” Research

Brie , 10 (Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services,

Parliament of Australia, 2006), 18.

4 Scotland and Wales use a form of MMP but their systems do

not provide for “overhang” seats.

5 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, Part 4, 75(2).

6 Electoral Commission, “The MMP Voting System. Mixed

Member Proportional, Fact Sheet (Wellington: 2011), 1.

7 Also see disproportionality scores for 82 elections in 23

countries between 1979 and 1989. Source: M. Gallagher,

“Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral

Systems,” Electoral Studies 10, no. 1 (1991): 45-46. The

disproportionality index measures “the difference between

parties’ shares of the votes and their shares of the seats.” M.

Gallagher and P. Mitchell, The Politics o Electoral Systems,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 602. Levine and

Roberts also cite an average disproportionality gure of 2.9

for the ve New Zealand MMP elections between 1996 and

2008. S. Levine and N.S. Roberts, “MMP and the Future:

Political challenges and proposed reforms,” New Zealand

Journal o Public and International Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 146.

8 E. McLeay and J. Vowles, “Redening Constituency

Representation: The roles of New Zealand MPs under MMP,”

Regional and Federal Studies 17, no. 1 (2007): 72, citing

J.T. Anagnoson, “Home Style in New Zealand,” Legislative

Studies Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1983): 160. Anagnoson theorised

that the disciplined two-party system and the small size

of constituencies (between 20,000 to 35,000 residents)contributed to local MPs devoting a large share of their time

to electorate work.

9 List MPs who belong to minor parties, like ACT or the Green

Party, for example, have a greater incentive to represent

interest groups, national issues or their party’s policy

programme because contesting electorates is not a viable

electoral strategy for them. E. McLeay and J. Vowles,

“Redening Constituency Representation: The roles of

New Zealand MPs under MMP,” 87. New Zealand Royal

Commission on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace, Report

o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a

better democracy (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986), 53.

Also see R. Miller and J. Vowles, “Public Attitudes Towards

MMP and Coalition Government,” New Zealand Journal o

Public and International Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 97; J. Vowles,S.A. Banducci and J.A. Karp, “Forecasting and Evaluating the

Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand,” Acta

Politica 41 (2006): 275; and P. Brook Cowen, T. Cowen and

A. Tabarrok, “An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional

Change in New Zealand” (Wellington: New Zealand Business

Roundtable, 1992), 3.17. MMP’s supporters even argue that

MMP is better than other electorate systems at providing

strong local representation because voters do not have to

be concerned about how their electorate vote will inuence

which government is formed. This means that they can

choose who they think will be the best person for their

electorate and the best party for the nation. Under FPP, PV,

SM and STV, voters who want to elect a particular party to

form a government have an incentive to support that party’s

local candidate(s). This motivation may outweigh their

desire for strong electorate representation. Graeme Edgeler,

Personal Communication, 6 May 2011.

10 In the case of women, the list seats have contributed to the

overall increase in women’s representation. For example, in

1987, 14 percent of MPs were women. In 1996, the total share

increased to 29 percent, with 45 percent of list MPs being

women. By 2005, the total share of women MPs increased

moderately to 33 percent and the list share had recovered to

1996 levels, at 46 percent. Forty-one women were elected to

parliament at the 2008 election. Four women have resigned

since then, so the total share of women in parliament is

currently about the same as in 2005, at 32 percent. However,

we should also bear in mind that women’s representation

was improving before MMP was introduced due to the Labour

Party standing more women in winnable electorates. We

should therefore not neglect to acknowledge how electorate

seats—and parties’ candidate selection strategies—have

contributed to the increase in women’s representation.

E. McLeay and J. Vowles, “Redening Constituency


88. Cf. S. Levine, N.S. Roberts and R. Salmond, “A Wider

View: MMP ten years on,” in The Baubles o Ofce. The New

Zealand General Election o 2005 , eds. S. Levine and N. S.

Roberts (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 458-

459. Parliamentary Library, “Final Results for the 2008 New

Zealand General Election,” Parliamentary Library ResearchPaper (Wellington: 2008), 9. J. Vowles, S.A. Banducci and

J.A. Karp, “Forecasting and Evaluating the Consequences

of Electoral Change in New Zealand,” 274, citing New

Zealand Electoral Commission data. In terms of ethnic group

representation, Maori representation beneted from the

switch from FPP to MMP. In 1987, Maori made up about 5

percent of the MPs in parliament. At the rst MMP election

in 1996 their share increased to about 13 percent and the

proportion of MPs claiming Maori descent more than doubled

over the period from 1993 to 2005. Today, their share sits

at 17 percent of the seats (that is, there were 20 Maori MPs

elected at the 2008 election). After the 2005 election, Maori

representation had improved to the point that for the rst

time Maori were now slightly over-represented in parliament

in relation to their share of the population. Removing theseven Maori seats from the equation, Maori were represented

almost exactly in proportion to their population share.

The improvement is partly due to higher constituency

representation, with the increase in the number of Maori

seats from four to seven. However, as the gures illustrate,

the proportional list vote has also made a big difference.

An exception to the rule that the list system improved

representation for ethnic minority groups is that it did not

make a very big difference to the representation of Pacic

Islanders. Their overall share of parliamentary seats did not




increase between 1993 and 2005. In 2008, ve Pacic Island

MPs were elected to parliament, whereas none were in 1990.

P.A. Joseph, “The Maori Seats in Parliament,” Te Oranga o

te Iwi Maori: A study o Maori economic and social progress

(Wellington: New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT),

2008). Parliamentary Library, “The Origins of the Maori

Seats,” Parliamentary Library Research Paper (Wellington:

2009), 29. S. Levine, N.S. Roberts, and R. Salmond, “A Wider

View: MMP ten years on,” 457.

11 For instance, nearly all of the Asian MPs in parliament have

been elected from party lists. E. McLeay and J. Vowles,

“Redening Constituency Representation: The roles of New

Zealand MPs under MMP,” 88.

12 See J. Vowles, S.A. Banducci and J.A. Karp, “Forecasting and


Zealand,” 274.

13 J. Boston, “Innovative Political Management: Multi-party

governance in New Zealand,” Policy Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2009):

56. A longer treatment of New Zealand’s experience of multi-

party governance may be found in J. Boston and D. Bullock,

“Experiments in Executive Government Under MMP in New

Zealand: Contrasting approaches to multi-party governance,”

New Zealand Journal o Public and International Law 7, no. 1

(2009): 39-76.

14 S. Levine, N.S. Roberts, and R. Salmond, “A Wider View: MMP

ten years on,” 462.

15 Political and legal analysts Penelope Brooke Cowen, Tyler

Cowen and Alexander Tabarrok note that government can

be inuenced by special interest and minority groups under

mixed voting systems like MMP. This is easier when those

interest and minority groups can appeal to a minor party thatcan speak for them rather than having to work through the

channels of a major party which will tend to reect the views

of the majority. As Cowen, Cowen and Tabarrok say, “Partial

list systems channel interest group pressures through multi-

party coalitions instead.” P. Brook Cowen, T. Cowen and A.

Tabarrok, “An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Change

in New Zealand,” 3.4.

16 American economist and social scientist Mancur Olsen’s work

on collective action and group theory is also relevant to this

discussion. Olsen argued that small, concentrated special

interest groups can be more inuential in politics than groups

that are more numerous but less cohesive and organised

together. Further, the government—or in our case the major

governing party under MMP—has an incentive to listen to

what minority interest groups, lobby groups and minorityparties want and the policies which they demand in return for

their support in government. Olsen argued that minorities’

policies are not necessarily good for “the nation as a whole.”

See, for example, M. Olson, The Logic o Collective Action

and the Theory o Groups (New York: Shocken Books, 1971);

M. Olson, The Rise and Decline o Nations: Economic growth,

stagation and social rigidities (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1982), cited in P. Brook Cowen, T. Cowen and A.


in New Zealand,” 1.5. While this will not be the case for

every interest or issue supported by minorities, sometimes

their interests can be harmful because they prioritise some

goods over others. For example, a redistributive policy that

favours one group could, if it were expensive, be a big cost for

every taxpayer and therefore a cost for the entire productive

economy.

17 J. Vowles, S.A. Banducci and J.A. Karp, “Forecasting and


Zealand,” 270; J. Boston, S. Church and T. Bale, “The Impact

of Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness:

The New Zealand experience,” Australian Journal o Public

Administration 62, no. 4 (2003): 18.

18 P.A. Joseph, “MMP and the Constitution,” New Zealand

Journal o Public and International Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 115.

19 Having said that, party selection rules might also be a factor

in whether candidates are nominated to stand for parties

in other voting systems. For example, MPs may not get

re-selected for an FPP electorate contest if they challenge

the party hierarchy. Further, in some cases under MMP,

electorate MPs might stand a better chance of winning

or holding an electorate seat because voters do not have

to vote for their favourite party when they vote for their

preferred candidate. Most of the other alternative systems

that are being considered at the referendum require voters

to vote for their party’s preferred candidate to vote for their

favourite party. We should also remember that even under

New Zealand’s old FPP voting system there was an equally, if

not more, tightly-disciplined party system than there is under

MMP. For example, voters’ choice of electoral candidate

tended to be inuenced by which parties voters supported

than by strong preferences for a particular candidates

(although the effect of candidate preferences have still

been detected). J.A. Karp, “Candidate Effects and Spill-overin Mixed Systems: Evidence from New Zealand,” Electoral

Studies 28 (2009): 42, citing J. Vowles et al., Toward’s

Consensus? The 1993 general election in New Zealand and the

transition to proportional representation (Auckland: Auckland

University Press, 1995), 161; D. Denemark, “Choosing MMP in

New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 electoral reform,” in Mixed-

Member Electoral Systems. The best o both worlds? eds. M.

S. Shugart and M. P. Wattenberg (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2001), 71.

20 A. Kaiser, “MMP, Minority Governments and Parliamentary

Opposition,” New Zealand Journal o Public and International

Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 79, 90. P.A. Joseph, “MMP and the

Constitution,” 121. Political analysts Claudia Geiringer, Polly

Higbee and Elizabeth McLeay note that the condence and

supply agreements entered into by the minor parties whichsupport the National Party have clauses that require the

minor parties to offer procedural support, such as for urgency

motions. C. Geiringer, P. Higbee and E. McLeay, “Standing

Orders Review 49th Parliament. Submission to Standing

Orders Committee” (Victoria University Wellington: The

Urgency Project, 2011), 8. These clauses could make it more

difcult for a minor party to oppose the major governing

party.

21 E. McLeay and J. Vowles, “Redening Constituency


72.

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) cont.




1 S. Hix, R. Johnston and A. Cummine, “Choosing an Electoral

System” (London: The British Academy Policy Centre, 2010),

37; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral System Design: The new

international IDEA handbook” (Stockholm: 2005), 35.

2 P.A. Joseph, “MMP and the Constitution,” New Zealand Journal

o Public and International Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 117.

3 Electoral Commission, “The FPP Voting System. First Past the

Post, Fact Sheet (Wellington: 2011), 1.



“Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems,”

Electoral Studies 10, no. 1 (1991): 45-46. The disproportionality

index measures “the difference between parties’ shares of

the votes and their shares of the seats.” M. Gallagher and P.

Mitchell, The Politics o Electoral Systems (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005), 602. According to Gallagher, New

Zealand’s average score was 14.0 for three FPP elections

between 1979 and 1989.

5 B. Manin, The Principles o Representative Government

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 95-98,

193ff; H.F. Pitkin, The Concept o Representation (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1967), 168ff.

6 One 1983 study showed that MPs on average spent about

30 percent of their time on electorate work. Voters therefore

came to see MPs’ local work—ofciating at public functions,

dealing with housing and welfare issues, attending sporting

events, and more—as one of their main jobs. E. McLeay and

J. Vowles, “Redening Constituency Representation: The

roles of New Zealand MPs under MMP,” Regional and Federal

Studies 17, no. 1 (2007): 72, citing J.T. Anagnoson, “Home

Style in New Zealand,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 8, no. 2

(1983): 160.

7 M.B. Vieira and D. Runciman, Representation (Cambridge,

United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2008), x; B. Manin, The

Principles o Representative Government , 184-187; J. Coniff,

“Burke, Bristol and the Concept of Representation,” Western

Political Quarterly 30 (1977): 339; H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of

Representation, 168, 175, 184.

8 Cf. D. Denemark, “Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining

the 1993 electoral reform,” in Mixed-Member Electoral

Systems. The best o both worlds? eds. M. S. Shugart and M.

P. Wattenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 78-81.

9 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance


handbook,” 6.

10 L. Malpass and O.M. Hartwich, “Superseding MMP: Real

electoral reform for New Zealand,” Policy Monograph, 109 (St

Leonard’s, NSW: Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), 2010), 5.

11 L. Malpass and O.M. Hartwich, “Superseding MMP: Real

electoral reform for New Zealand,” 5. P. Brook Cowen,

T. Cowen and A. Tabarrok, “An Analysis of Proposals for

Constitutional Change in New Zealand” (Wellington: New

Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992), 1.3-1.4, 3.4, citing D.

Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge University Press, 1989)

and A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:

Harper and Row, 1957).

12 P. Brook Cowen, T. Cowen and A. Tabarrok, “An Analysis of

Proposals for Constitutional Change in New Zealand,” 1.3-

1.4, 3.4. This point is made in the 1986 Royal Commission’s

discussion of the Supplementary Member (SM) voting system

where they comment that SM would enable political parties

to represent minority interest groups by standing a more

diverse range of candidates. New Zealand Royal Commission

on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace, Report o the


democracy (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986), 40-41.

Also see H. Catt, P. Harris and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s Choice.

Electoral change in New Zealand (Palmerston North: The

Dunmore Press, 1992), 39-40.


System,” 45-46; P. Norris, Electoral Engineering. Voting rulesand political behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2004), 12. A similar point is made that FPP can

encourage ethnic cleavages, too. International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral System

Design: The new international IDEA handbook,” 43.


System,” 15-16; H. Catt, P. Harris and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s

Choice. Electoral change in New Zealand , 19-23; New Zealand

Royal Commission on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace,

Report o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System:

Towards a better democracy , 13-16. The result in each

electorate seat is a snapshot of a particular community’s

preferences. Provided that a community elects the candidate

which they prefer it may not matter very much if election

results are disproportionate.

15 D. Denemark, “Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the

1993 electoral reform,” 75.

16 Electoral Commission, General Elections 1890-1993 - Seats

Won by Party (2011), http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/

resultsdata/fpp-seats-won.html (accessed 10 May 2011).



18 On the ease and clarity of policy implementation, see:

L. Malpass and O.M. Hartwich, “Superseding MMP: Real

electoral reform for New Zealand,” 5; New Zealand Business

Roundtable, “Submission to the MMP Review Committee”

(Wellington: 2000), ii, 3-5, 8; P. Brook Cowen, T. Cowen and A.


in New Zealand,” 6.3-6.4.

19 The high level of retrospective accountability of governments

to voters, which FPP was supposed to provide at each

election, appeared to have disappeared by the 1980s with

the growing disproportionality of election results and acute

wrong-winner elections. D. Denemark, “Choosing MMP in New

Zealand: Explaining the 1993 electoral reform,” 72.

20 Strictly speaking, under FPP voters can only dump—that is

directly vote out—their local MP, not the government. This is

because under FPP voters elect candidates to parliament and

the government is formed by the party which has a majority

of MPs. But, because voters have direct control over which

First-Past-the-Post (FPP)




candidates are elected from each electorate, it is still true to

say that it is easy for them to elect or dump a government

at the election. Graeme Edgeler, Personal Communication, 6

May 2011.



1 D.M. Farrell and I. McAllister, The Australian Electoral System.

Origins, variations and consequences (Sydney: University of

New South Wales Press, 2006), 3-4; International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral System

Design: The new international IDEA handbook” (Stockholm:

2005), 48.

2 H. Catt, P. Harris and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s Choice. Electoral

change in New Zealand (Palmerston North: The DunmorePress, 1992), 83.

3 STV Taskforce, “Choosing Electoral Systems in Local

Government. A resource document” (Wellington: The

Department of Internal Affairs, 2002), 12.

4 PV therefore creates certain electoral incentives for voters,

candidates and political parties with implications for election

results and the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Political

scientists David Farrell and Ian McAlister argue that PV ought

to be cursorily categorised as a non-proportional voting

system. However, their ndings suggest that preferential

voting produces different sorts of electoral behaviour among

candidates and voters, such as plumping for one candidate

and preference swapping among political parties. This means

that election results, and sometimes electoral outcomes,

can be different to what is expected of most single-member

electorate majoritarian voting systems. On this basis, they

argue that PV—and its cousin STV—ought to be thought of

differently as examples of a family of ordinal voting systems.

D.M. Farrell and I. McAllister, The Australian Electoral System.

Origins, variations and consequences, 171-173.

5 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, sch 2(5). It should be noted

that New Zealand already has a preferential system in STV,

which operates the same way as PV, for mayoral elections.

The form of STV used does not require voters to indicate

a preference for all candidates. Given that ranking every

candidate has not been a requirement at local body level, it is

probable that voters would not have to rank every candidate

if PV were used in general elections.

6 Electoral Commission, “The PV Voting System. Preferential

Voting, Fact Sheet (Wellington: 2011), 1.

7 Also see disproportionality scores calculated using the

Gallagher least squares index for 82 elections in 23

countries between 1979 and 1989. Source: 45-46. The



Gallagher and P. Mitchell, The Politics o Electoral Systems

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 602.

8 Lord Alexander, of Britain’s Jenkins Commission on the

Electoral System, found this scenario “wholly illogical,” as he

thought that it made more sense for the preferences of those

who supported the strongest candidates to be considered

when subsequent preferences were allocated to candidates.

McCarvill, citing Lord Alexander’s dissenting position in the

1998 Jenkins Commission Report. P. McCarvill, “Devising an

Electoral System for the 21st Century: The case for AMS”

(London: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), 2010), 8.

9 Political scientist Ben Reilly writes that, “Political scientists

have long theorized that the use of preferential election

systems can help promote successful conict managementin divided societies. As it turns out, evidence … supports

this conclusion.” B. Reilly, “Electoral Systems for Divided

Societies,” Journal o Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 156-70.

Two divided societies which are nearby to New Zealand that

have used PV are Papua New Guinea, which uses a limited

preferential voting system based on the Alternative Vote,

and Fiji, where the 1998 constitution introduced instant

run-off voting. PV has worked with a mixture of success in

Papua New Guinea, such as in terms of participation, but

more attention is required to improve voters’ education

levels about PV’s implications. Fiji has experienced instances

of preference swapping, with parties attempting to exploit

the rules to gain an electoral advantage—and it has in fact

decided to change from its instant run-off PV system to

a proportional representation system. R. McIlveen, “The

Alternative Vote - The system that no-one wants,” Research

Note (London: Policy Exchange, 2010), 1, 5; A. Ladley and

J. Williams, “’Electoral Education’ in PNG: A survey of

existing literature and reports” (Wellington: Institute of

Policy Studies, School of Government, Victoria University of

Wellington, 2007), 57; J. Fraenkel, “A Note on the Fiji Electoral

System,” in From Election to Coup in Fiji. The 2006 campaign

and its atermath, ed. Jon and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU

E-Press; Asia Pacic Press, 2007), xxiv-xxviii.




Government Printer, 1986), 31.

11 Cf. D.M. Farrell and I. McAllister, The Australian Electoral

System. Origins, variations and consequences, 81; S. Hix, R.

Johnston and A. Cummine, “Choosing an Electoral System”

(London: The British Academy Policy Centre, 2010), 56.


Origins, variations and consequences, 81. In Australia,

compulsory voting and the prevailing use of full preferential

voting—where voters must mark a preference for every

candidate bar one on the ballot paper—undoubtedly

contribute to the strength of the major parties and the difculty

that minor parties face in winning electorate seats (and

therefore the high distortion between parties’ share of the vote

Preferential Voting (PV)

First-Past-the-Post (FPP) cont.




and their share of parliamentary seats). Only New South Wales

and Queensland use optional preferential voting along the

lines of what New Zealand might use if PV were introduced.

13 R. McIlveen, “The Alternative Vote - The system that no-one

wants,” 9. This outcome also occurred in the 1940, 1954 and

1961 elections.

14 New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System and

J.H. Wallace, Report o the Royal Commission on the Electoral

System: Towards a better democracy , 31.


Origins, variations and consequences, 82-83, and more

generally chapter 6.

16 The 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System

was also hesitant to recommend PV as a voting system

for New Zealand. It thought that PV “might represent

some improvement over plurality [that is, FPP] in single-

member constituencies; however, we do not consider this

improvement would be signicant and do not regard it as the

best alternative to our present system [FPP].” New Zealand

Royal Commission on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace,

Report o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System:

Towards a better democracy, 31. Further, Farrell and McAlister

remark that “Its [PV’s] preferential nature has [electoral]

consequences, and there is evidence that this is of increasing

signicance in recent elections.” D.M. Farrell and I. McAllister,

The Australian Electoral System. Origins, variations and

consequences, 171.

1 Electoral Commission, “The STV Voting System. Single

Transferable Vote,” Fact Sheet (Wellington: 2011), 1.

2 The electoral quota is determined by dividing the total

number of valid votes cast by the number of seats to be

lled in each electorate, plus one and then adding a whole

number, often “one,” or a fraction to the quotient. That is:

the electoral quota = (valid votes/(available seats + 1)) + 1.



handbook,” 71, 76; H. Catt, P. Harris and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s

Choice. Electoral change in New Zealand , 47-49.

3 The votes are often distributed on a pro rata basis. D.M.

Farrell and I. McAllister, The Australian Electoral System.Origins, variations and consequences, (Sydney: University of

New South Wales Press, 2006), 63ff, 94ff; H. Catt, P. Harris

and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s Choice. Electoral change in New

Zealand, (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1992), 49.

In New Zealand local body elections, the Meek method is

used to distribute the votes. This method ensures that the

“count, as far as possible, reects the voting preferences

of each voter and the number of wasted votes is kept to a

minimum.” STV Taskforce, “Choosing Electoral Systems in

Local Government. A resource document,” (Wellington: The

Department of Internal Affairs, 2002), 15, 35-39; B. Meek,

“A New Approach to the Single Transferable Vote,” Voting

Matters 1 (1994): 1-11.


change in New Zealand , 49.

5 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, sch 2(6)(3).


change in New Zealand, 49-50.








(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 602.




Government Printer, 1986), 53.



System: Towards a better democracy , 48.



System: Towards a better democracy, 50-51.

11 S. Bowler and B. Grofman, Elections in Australia, Ireland

and Malta Under the Single Transerable Vote. Reectionson an embedded institution (Ann Arbor: The University of

Michigan Press, 2000), 9; New Zealand Royal Commission

on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace, Report o the


democracy, 54.

12 M. Marsh, “Candidate-centred but Party Wrapped:

Campaigning in Ireland under STV,” in Elections in Australia,

Ireland, Malta under the Single Transerable Vote. Reections

on an embedded institution, eds. S. Bowler and B. Grofman

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 129-130.

13 S. Bowler and B. Grofman, Elections in Australia, Ireland and

Malta Under the Single Transerable Vote. Reections on an

embedded institution, 9-10.

14 Political scientist David Farrell cites a Gallagher least squares

index of disproportionality score for of 5.4 for STV and 3.8

for MMP. D.M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A comparative

introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2001), xiii, 241, cited in


Origins, variations and consequences, 8. The proportionality

of STV in the case of Australian state elections is discussed in


Origins, variations and consequences, 83-91.



System: Towards a better democracy, 48.

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Preferential Voting (PV) continued




16 Cf. D.M. Farrell and I. McAllister, The Australian Electoral

System. Origins, variations and consequences, 172.

17 P. Brent, “Time to Scrap the Ticket Vote for the Senate,” 11

(Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia; Political Science

Programme, Research School of Social Sciences, Australia

National University, 2004), 1-4.

18 P. Brent, “Time to Scrap the Ticket Vote for the Senate,” 1.

Political scientists Ben Reilly and Michael Maley also provide

percentage gures for ticket voting use in the Australian

states for elections from 1984 to 1998. They show gures

of between 85 and 95 percent in total from elections in the

different Australian states. The share since 1990 has been

between 90 and 95 percent, indicating ticket voting’s high

popularity. B. Reilly and M. Maley, “The Single Transferable

Vote and the Alternative Vote Compared,” in Elections in

Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the Single Transerable

Vote. Reections on an embedded institution, eds. S. Bowler

and B. Grofman (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,

2000), 52.

19 B. Reilly and M. Maley, “The Single Transferable Vote and the

Alternative Vote Compared,” 52.




21 Evidence cited in S. Levine and N.S. Roberts, “MMP and the

Future: Political challenges and proposed reforms,” New

Zealand Journal o Public and International Law 7, no. 1

(2009): 139.

22 S. Bowler and B. Grofman, Elections in Australia, Ireland and

Malta Under the Single Transerable Vote. Reections on an

embedded institution, 1ff.

1 The Electoral Referendum Act 2010 does not state either

which formula would be used to distribute the 30 list seats

among the political parties which cross the party vote

threshold or what the party vote threshold would be if SM

were used. The 1986 Royal Commission proposed that a

modied version of the Sainte Laguë electoral formula

ought to be used to distribute the list seats under SM so

that it would be more difcult for the major parties to win

their rst list seat in parliament. This formula or the regular

Sainte Laguë system that is used with MMP could be usedto allocate the list seats under SM. Further, the 1986 Royal

Commission did not specify a threshold for the list seats

but noted that an effective threshold of about ve percent

of the party vote would exist in an election of about two

million voters voting for a parliament of 120 MPs with 30

supplementary seats. Without a legal threshold the effective

threshold will of course vary according to how many votes

are cast at each election. A statutory ve percent threshold

party vote could be used with SM to solve this problem.

Electoral Referendum Act 2010, sch 2(7); New Zealand Royal


o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards

a better democracy, (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986),

38-39, 71-73.

2 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, 10, sch 2(7)(2).

3 The terminology used to describe mixed voting systems like

this varies from Supplementary Member, to Mixed-Member

Majoritarian (MMM), to parallel systems (because the two

votes operate side-by-side, much how like parallel lines do

not touch). SM is often called Mixed-Member Majoritarian

outside of New Zealand because under such a system it is

likely that a single party would win an absolute majority of

seats in parliament. S. Hix, R. Johnston and A. Cummine,

“Choosing an Electoral System” (London: The British

Academy Policy Centre, 2010), 104-105; International Institute

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral

System Design: The new international IDEA handbook”

(Stockholm: 2005), 104.

4 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance


handbook,” 104, 112.

5 Note, the Electoral Referendum Act 2010 does not say how

the ballot paper would be designed—that is, whether there

would still be one ballot paper, just like with MMP, or whether

there would be two separate ballot papers. Ballot paperdesign can have an important effect on electoral outcomes.

As political scientist Jeffrey Karp indicates, “A number of

studies have found that the position of candidates on a ballot

can inuence electoral outcomes though the magnitude of

these effects varies. … Little is known, however, whether

these effects would extend from voting for candidates to

parties.” For instance, see J.G.S. Koppel and J. Steen, “The

Effects of Ballot Position on Election Outcomes,” Journal

o Politics 66, no. 267 (2004): 281 and J.M. Miller and J.A.

Krosnick, “The Impact of Candidate Name Order on Election

Outcomes,” Public Opinion Quarterly 62 (1998): 291-330,

cited in J.A. Karp, “Candidate Effects and Spill-over in Mixed

Systems: Evidence from New Zealand,” Electoral Studies 28

(2009): 42. In New Zealand, a minor party’s party vote in an

MMP election can benet from being associated with a local

candidate’s name if candidates’ names are printed side-by-

side with parties’ names on the ballot paper. This is important

because if no candidate stands in an electorate then the

party’s name is printed in alphabetical order below the names

of the parties which do stand candidates. Thus, minor parties

that contest fewer electorates have an electoral disadvantage

since their party name is printed further to the bottom of the

ballot paper, where some voters might not read. J.A. Karp,

“Candidate Effects and Spill-over in Mixed Systems: Evidence

from New Zealand,” 42-44.

Single Transferable Vote (STV) cont.

Supplementary Member (SM)




6 Electoral Commission, “The SM Voting System.

Supplementary Member, Fact Sheet (Wellington: 2011), 1.








(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 602. Levine and

Roberts also cite an average disproportionality gure of 9.5

for ve New Zealand MMP elections between 1996 and 2008

re-run under SM rules. S. Levine and N.S. Roberts, “MMP

and the Future: Political challenges and proposed reforms,”

New Zealand Journal o Public and International Law 7, no. 1

(2009): 146.


change in New Zealand (Palmerston North: The Dunmore

Press, 1992), 38.




10 R. Miller and J. Vowles, “Public Attitudes Towards MMP and

Coalition Government,” New Zealand Journal o Public and

International Law 7, no. 1 (2009): 97. International Institute

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Electoral

System Design: The new international IDEA handbook,” 112;

M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-member Electoral

Systems: The best o both worlds? (Oxford, UK; New York:

Oxford University Press, 2001), 593-594; cf. New Zealand

Royal Commission on the Electoral System and J.H. Wallace,Report o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System:

Towards a better democracy, 42.

11 F. Ferrara, E.S. Herron and M. Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral

Systems. Contamination and its consequences (New York:

Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 48, 63, 139-141; J.A. Karp,


from New Zealand,” 42.

12 In this respect, the style of politics and campaigning at the

electorate level might be more similar to the situation under

MMP. The assumption is that there is “contamination”

between the two electoral tiers; that is, parties which stand

electorate candidates will receive a boost to their party

vote even if they do not win an electorate seat. J.A. Karp,


from New Zealand,” 42, 45-46.13 F. Ferrara, E.S. Herron and M. Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral

Systems. Contamination and its consequences, 140.

Some analysis produced by political scientist Jeffrey Karp

nonetheless offers some clues. Using data from the 2005 and

2002 MMP elections, Karp nds that the impact of electorate

candidates on parties’ list votes is quite small. According to

Karp, parties “appear to matter more in New Zealand politics

even though districts are relatively small and MPs are likely

to invest a great deal of effort in constituency service.” Karp’s

ndings indicate that the inuence of electorate elections

over the party vote election might not be as important in New

Zealand under MMP, and in other mixed systems, as Ferrara

and others have stated. J.A. Karp, “Candidate Effects and

Spill-over in Mixed Systems: Evidence from New Zealand,”

49. However, we do not know for certain whether the result

would be the same with SM.

14 Jeffrey Karp nds only modest evidence that in New Zealand

electorate candidates have helped to increase their parties’

list vote. New Zealand’s high incidence of split voting—

between 29 and 39 percent of voters have split their vote

between the electorate and the list vote in MMP elections—

might explain some of the modest results. J.A. Karp,


from New Zealand,” 49.



System: Towards a better democracy, 40. Cf. International

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),

“Electoral System Design: The new international IDEA

handbook,” 112; H. Catt, P. Harris and N.S. Roberts, Voter’s

Choice. Electoral change in New Zealand, 39-40.



System: Towards a better democracy, 39-42.


System,” 97; M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-

member Electoral Systems: The best o both worlds? 13ff.



handbook,” 104.

18 New Zealand political scientists Stephen Levine and NigelRoberts re-ran New Zealand’s ve MMP election results,

between 1996 and 2008, using SM rules. Their ndings

showed that at three of the elections a single-party majority

government would have been elected and that overall

the election results would have been “three times more

disproportionate” than they were with MMP. S. Levine and

N.S. Roberts, “MMP and the Future: Political challenges and

proposed reforms,” 135, 142-146.

19 S. Levine and N.S. Roberts, “MMP and the Future: Political

challenges and proposed reforms,” 145; New Zealand Royal


o the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a

better democracy, 39-42.

20 F. Ferrara, E.S. Herron and M. Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral

Systems. Contamination and its consequences, 139-141;International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance


handbook,” 112.

21 See tables 2 to 6 in S. Levine and N.S. Roberts, “MMP and

the Future: Political challenges and proposed reforms,” 143-

144. Cf. M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-member

Electoral Systems: The best o both worlds? 592.

22 M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg, Mixed-member Electoral

Systems: The best o both worlds? 591-592.

Supplementary Member (SM) cont.




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