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AARON TURNER Embodied ethnography. Doing culture Over recent years there has been serious research and debate within the social sciences focused on the constitution of knowledge in various settings and contexts. This work has raised issues that seem to have become central to discussions about anthropologi- cal research and writing. In this paper I will be arguing that although anthropology has engaged with these issues it has not applied the insights of recent theory to this process. In addition, where these theoretical developments have been applied to anthropological investigation there has been no recognition of the issues raised by critical examinations of the research process. I will go on to argue that applying recent theoretical perspectives of our examination of the research process as well as to analy- sis of the results will create further potential for research, analysis and theory. Critical examinations of research, epistemology and the constitution of knowl- edge have highlighted that ‘facts’, and knowledge about them, are actively constituted rather than being pre-existing and discovered (for example, see Haraway 1991a). The analysis of ‘facts’ as constructed in turn problematises the idea of the objective detached observer recording pre-existing facts. It has also been suggested that far from being value-free and disinterested, objectivity itself is not only a value-laden cultural artefact but also a political artefact built on, and upholding, certain relations of power. Not only has the unquestioned legitimacy and authority of positivism been brought into question but it has also been pointed out that all people – observers and partici- pants – occupy inherently subjective and limited positionings. Consequently, it is claimed that all positionings and perspectives are inherently partial and that claims to objectivity are merely a means to privilege and extend the authority and status of cer- tain positioned and partial perspectives. These points significantly question any person’s ability to gain objective knowledge as all knowledge is inherently subjective and partial (Haraway 1991b). Implicit in this point is a critique of the privilege of objectivity and scientific professionalism and the suggestion that all perspectives, while unique, cannot be seen to be inherently inferior or superior. All of these points have raised serious issues for the process and possibilities of anthropological research. In relation to ethnographic fieldwork, it is now widely accepted that the anthropologist can no longer be seen as an observer recording social facts and processes but must be seen as an active, situated, participant in the construc- tion of accounts and representations. It has been suggested that these accounts be acknowledged as partial fictions because they have been actively constructed through the use of techniques that include omissions and rhetoric. ‘Even the best ethnographic texts – serious, true fictions – are systems, or economies, of truth’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 7). There has also been a concern with the anthropologist’s ability to Social Anthropology (2000), 8, 1, 51–60. © 2000 European Association of Social Anthropologists 51

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A A R O N T U R N E R

Embodied ethnography.Doing culture

Over recent years there has been serious research and debate within the social sciencesfocused on the constitution of knowledge in various settings and contexts. This workhas raised issues that seem to have become central to discussions about anthropologi-cal research and writing. In this paper I will be arguing that although anthropology hasengaged with these issues it has not applied the insights of recent theory to thisprocess. In addition, where these theoretical developments have been applied toanthropological investigation there has been no recognition of the issues raised bycritical examinations of the research process. I will go on to argue that applying recenttheoretical perspectives of our examination of the research process as well as to analy-sis of the results will create further potential for research, analysis and theory.

Critical examinations of research, epistemology and the constitution of knowl-edge have highlighted that ‘facts’, and knowledge about them, are actively constitutedrather than being pre-existing and discovered (for example, see Haraway 1991a). Theanalysis of ‘facts’ as constructed in turn problematises the idea of the objectivedetached observer recording pre-existing facts. It has also been suggested that far frombeing value-free and disinterested, objectivity itself is not only a value-laden culturalartefact but also a political artefact built on, and upholding, certain relations of power.Not only has the unquestioned legitimacy and authority of positivism been broughtinto question but it has also been pointed out that all people – observers and partici-pants – occupy inherently subjective and limited positionings. Consequently, it isclaimed that all positionings and perspectives are inherently partial and that claims toobjectivity are merely a means to privilege and extend the authority and status of cer-tain positioned and partial perspectives. These points significantly question anyperson’s ability to gain objective knowledge as all knowledge is inherently subjectiveand partial (Haraway 1991b). Implicit in this point is a critique of the privilege ofobjectivity and scientific professionalism and the suggestion that all perspectives,while unique, cannot be seen to be inherently inferior or superior.

All of these points have raised serious issues for the process and possibilities ofanthropological research. In relation to ethnographic fieldwork, it is now widelyaccepted that the anthropologist can no longer be seen as an observer recording socialfacts and processes but must be seen as an active, situated, participant in the construc-tion of accounts and representations. It has been suggested that these accounts beacknowledged as partial fictions because they have been actively constructed throughthe use of techniques that include omissions and rhetoric. ‘Even the best ethnographictexts – serious, true fictions – are systems, or economies, of truth’ (Clifford andMarcus 1986: 7). There has also been a concern with the anthropologist’s ability to

Social Anthropology (2000), 8, 1, 51–60. © 2000 European Association of Social Anthropologists 51

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privilege their own knowledge and perspectives above those of the people they haveworked with. Because of these issues, it is argued that the anthropologist has to be vis-ibly reinserted into the research and the representations that come from it. To do this,it is proposed that the anthropologist must reflexively interrogate the processes bywhich they themselves contributed to the construction of the information and repre-sentations constructed through the research. For the most part, this seems to be seenas an issue of presenting the research process and the influences on it as clearly as poss-ible. Consequently, these concerns have led to a heightened critical focus on theprocess of constructing representations in text (Clifford and Marcus 1986).

As well as a critical examination of writing as the part the anthropologist plays inthe construction of representations, there have been attempts to turn the research gazeon to anthropologists themselves (for example, for the proposition that autobiographybe used as a tool, see Okely and Callaway 1992). While I agree that the anthropologistis an integral and influential part of the research process and the representations pro-duced as part of it, I will argue that the ways that people have attempted to engagewith these points seem to be to restricted and limited, relying on some of the key dis-tinctions that they intended to overcome, like the observer and the observed, the intel-lectual work of thinking and writing (of anthropologists) and the work of daily life (ofthe subjects in the field). Much examination of anthropologists themselves, and indeedcritical reflection on anthropologists’ writing, focuses on anthropologists separatedfrom the field of research, either after they have left it and are writing up or as indi-viduals with internal cultural values of their own.

This pattern in the engagement with reflexivity has two important points for theargument of this paper. Firstly, the focus on analysis, writing and the anthropologist’shistory and values maintains a distinction between the anthropologist and the contextof fieldwork leaving the anthropologist’s participation in the field unconsidered.Secondly, the main analysed and considered attributes and activities of the anthropol-ogist are intellectual in terms of thinking, writing or cultural values. So while I agreethat the logic of the argument for greater reflexivity is sound in theory and intention,the practice of reflexivity has often done little to reinsert the anthropologist in repre-sentations of the field and the construction of knowledge about it. In some casesattempts at reflexivity have kept consideration of anthropologists and their activitiesseparate from discussions of the process operating in the field of their research. I willargue that one of the reasons for this is that the reflexive anthropologist has all toooften been constructed as a sentient consciousness reflecting on fieldwork without anyconsideration of the implications of his or her physical presence in the field. (For anaccount in which the presence of the anthropologist is taken as an essential startingpoint, see Pool 1994; however, Pool uses a concept of dialogue that implies the priorityof verbal communication rather than embodiment implying the intersubjective sig-nificance of mutual physical presence.)

The significance of the actual physical presence, disposition, and practices ofpeople in the field has been highlighted by much recent anthropology – particularlymedical anthropology – on embodiment (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987; Csordas1990). Csordas (1990: 5) has suggested the value of seeing embodiment as ‘the existen-tial ground of culture’ through which realities, relationships and social order are con-stituted for people in the processes of ongoing social interaction. This perspective onwhat we see in the field has been used to shift the anthropologist’s attention away fromthe study of an enduring society or culture in itself to the ways culture is lived, and in

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the living of it, constituted. Embodiment seems to shift the study of society and cul-ture to an examination of processes at work in everyday experience and interaction. Acentral point for this paper arising from this perspective is the shift from seeing cul-ture as principally located in people’s minds in concepts and values to a perspective onculture as the embodied and enacted result of continually coming to terms with theworld in which one lives. Consequently, culture can be understood to be embodiedand sustained and developed in practice, interaction and disposition. This perspectivelinks with ideas of bodily practice as mindful (Scheper Hughes and Lock 1987), cul-turally informed (Bourdieu 1977) and as a mnemonic of tradition (Connerton 1989).Arising from these perspectives is the idea that culture only exists and persists in theform in which it is lived and that this form is itself constituted in ongoing intersubjec-tive interaction.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the opportunity that embodiment presentsboth to our examination of the part we play in our own research and to the object ofthat research more generally. If we intend to include a consideration of the part wehave played in the research process and the representations constructed from it, itwould seem that we should include as an embodied subject the whole anthropologistin the form in which he or she was present in the research process. However, thereflexive anthropologist has remained present as an analytical consciousness but not asan embodied, sensing, acting, socially situated participant. A focus on embodimentwithin anthropology has generally involved a focus on the embodied experience andpractice of others, while the anthropologist is once again distanced from the account.My aim in this paper is to highlight some of the implications of the absence of theembodied reflexive anthropologist and to suggest some of the possibilities that arisefrom placing them at the centre of analysis.

The anthropologist in the research process

In this section I aim to examine the implications of applying the theoretical insights ofwork on embodiment to the anthropologist’s role in the research process. To do this,I will draw on my field work amongst younger people in an area of West London.

Participant observation involves, at least to some extent, the anthropologist’s pres-ence, activity and interaction in a social field; this in turn involves developing relation-ships. It is interesting to note in view of my present argument how these relationshipsare often not described as shifting social relationships that have constantly to be nego-tiated, but are covered by the blanket-term ‘informants’, implying a fixed role andfixed relationship that seems to appear from nowhere. It is also interesting to note thatinformants are often seen to belong to the anthropologist – ‘my informants’ – and notthe social context in question. The distinction often made between anthropologistsand the social field in which they are researching is an important issue that I will ques-tion later in the paper. My main point at this stage is that the anthropologist cannot bepresent in a social field without participating and becoming a significant author ofevents, practices and political configurations, thereby effecting what happens and thesignificance it has for the constructions that emerge for participants. I would like toillustrate this by reference in my own research.

The bulk of my fieldwork until now has consisted of becoming involved in thedaily lives of young white guys in Southall and nearby areas of west London. Myinvolvement has been very active and has consisted of a lot more participation than

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observation. Most of the time spent together has involved ‘doing things’. On meetingor arranging to meet most talk is asking what guys ‘feel like doing’ or what ‘we coulddo’. This discussion is pursued until something is decided on. Even if the conversationtopic is changed I will occasionally be asked: ‘So, what do you want to do?’. I havebeen wary of this process because I want to do what they want to do, so I do not wantto make the decisions and try to express enthusiasm for doing something while insist-ing that I do not mind what. I have no idea what happens when I am absent or even ifthe issue of what to do arises in the same way or is dealt with in the same way when Iam not there. They try ideas out on me and then decide on something that I agree on.Despite my attempts to let natural cultural processes take their course it is evident thatI am actively participating in deciding what we will do. Firstly, during some periods Ihave had a car and am willing to contribute to the cost of activities (as a participant).Secondly, as I have suggested, I am present. When I am absent, I suspect that theprocess and dynamic of the way choices are made is different in some way. Forexample, I have sometimes noticed the hesitancy of others to express an opinion. Thismay be because I was reluctant to state a preference or it may be because they areunsure of expressing themselves openly when I am there. I have also noticed that theyoung man who I have been closest to and who brought me into the collective has attimes used me to create a decision that has gone unchallenged by others. Whether thisyoung man often makes the decisions in the group or not, it is clear that I am affect-ing the dynamics of the process and the resources and balance of power by whichthese processes are engaged in. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, I can not helpbut be actively involved in the decision-making process. By trying not to affect theprocess I endorse choices as they are run by me and in the end endorse the final choice.They are watching the way I act to see my preference and I am doing the same, so ourdemeanour and actions are affecting the process and understandings of it. It seemsclear to me that I am a significant participant in affecting the practices we engage inand how we come to do them.

I am also a significant participant in affecting the way practices are engaged in andcarried out as well as the meanings that are constituted from them. Most of the thingswe decide to do are leisure activities and many of these are games that are usually, ifnot always, structured around competition. I also participate in these. At first I wasstruck by an awareness of the significance of the appearance of competence and theability to compete effectively; even old ice cream sticks are turned into something todo and a means to compete. If I tried to just emulate what others were doing and goalong with things I would be endorsing and promoting a certain way of doing things.I have never refused to compete in a game and this may have contributed to competi-tion being the main form of play when we are together. Further, I noticed the import-ance of winning when I played one young man at pool and won. Each time I noticedhim become more intent and less relaxed, quickly racking up the balls for a chance towin again. I thought I should throw a game to help the research but when it came tothe shot I did not. In fact, when this young man improved at pool my playing inten-sified. So I did more than just go along with competition, to my own surprise I activelyengaged in it. In my effort to participate I attempt to play football competently andnot exceed my competence, but not show it to be as limited as it seems compared totheir competence. At the same time I endorsed and furthered the competition and con-firmed the importance and natural taken-for-grantedness of competence at football (Iwill come to my negation of that later). Even in speech, quite naturally saying

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‘unlucky’ after a missed pool shot or missed goal, or giving a smile or laugh after a slipor outrageous miss of the ball actively confirm and claim the importance of compe-tence, competition and success.

In view of my participation in these processes it would be a violent misrepresen-tation to state or even construct a representation along the lines of ‘young white malesoften play football, and much of their interaction is around competition’. This rep-resentation, although parallelling many anthropological representations of ‘cultures’,misses an essential fact through which these activities were pursued. I was an activeparticipant in the processes whereby these practices were engaged in and in the pro-cesses in which their significance was found. Consequently, this is not a representationthat can be attributed to ‘their culture’ or to things ‘they do’. We have learned nothingof ‘them’. What I have learned about is ‘we’ as a negotiating social configuration. Toextract the anthropologist as separate from the cultural subjects involved would be tomisrepresent the social configuration in which the practices and meanings thatemerged was negotiated. Consequently, the anthropologist must be seen as an insideparticipant in the negotiation of culture, and this negotiation then becomes an import-ant focus of the analysis of embodied interaction from a position of involvement andexperience.

The point I am trying to make does not in any way relate to debates about theability of anthropologists to become cultural ‘insiders’. I am not suggesting that theanthropologist is gaining the knowledge and understanding to become an ‘insider’ inan existing culture in which they were previously an ‘outsider’. I am putting aside theconsideration of insider and outsidership, and the boundary and continuity it implies,in order to consider from a different perspective the anthropologist’s position in asocial context. Debates about anthropologists as insiders or outsiders depend on theidea of a culture existing before the anthropologist arrives, and persisting during andafter their stay, to which the anthropologist may or may not be able to gain ‘insider-ship’. The anthropologist is a significant participant, an insider to the social processesby which practices are developed and gain meaning. The part that the anthropologistcan play in these negotiations, and on what terms, is an important consideration forobservation and analysis. But to extract the anthropologist as a participant in thisprocess would be to present a unfounded fiction. This raises issues about concepts ofsocial and cultural identity in relation to both the concept of insiderness and otherconcepts of identity that rely on reference to ‘us–them’ distinctions. I will come backto these issues later.

The focus on processes that the anthropologist is directly involved in also allowsher/him to interrogate processes from the position of experience of embodied nego-tiation in which reality and social order are discovered and constituted. Consequently,the anthropologist’s participation becomes the object of study rather than a variable tobe controlled for through analytic reflexivity.

Traditionally, the examination of embodied interaction as a constitutive processseems to rely heavily on interpretation of uses of other bodies and of the significanceand outcomes of interactions. As implied here, there is a distance between theobserved actions of embodied subjects and the representations of these. Acceptinginvolvement as the basis of interpretation adds to the possibilities of analysing theseprocesses. Considering the anthropologist as an embodied participant also allows theproblematisation of the anthropologist’s own experience as a serious object of analy-sis. I will give a few examples from my own research. During fieldwork I have con-

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stantly been surprised at the things my body does quite naturally that I never wouldhave expected. In terms of competition when playing pool or running, although Iagreed with myself that it was a good idea not to play to win, I still did so. This led meto observe my approach to playing pool in other contexts. Although I thought Iplayed for fun, I only did this when I was sure I could win if I wanted to; on otheroccasion I played to win and the winning was the enjoyment. So embodied experiencein the field can also inform us about our own embodiment and what we take forgranted and do without reflection. This seems to offer further possibilities for employ-ing anthropology as cultural critique by making the familiar strange (Marcus andFischer 1986).

When it came to football, when we went out to play the other young men I waswith immediately displayed all their flash footwork and ball-handling skills. At first, Iplayed casually, missing the ball a couple of times and smiling at my mistake. One ofthe guys muttered something to another. I caught the end of the reply that followedthe short laugh: ‘He is a bit odd but you’ll get used to him’. The comment implied alink between performance on the pitch and the kind of consideration I would be givenas a person generally. This led me to be more serious about the way I played whiletrying not to look as if this was the case; I began watching myself trying to look com-petent but not show the limits of my competence. This incident shows more than melearning their value of competence; it shows me embodying it, legitimating and pro-moting it in a bid to develop my ability to persevere in the field. Playing with otherplayers who were not so good and also noticing the way small boys kicked the ballback to us I noticed how carefully boys seemed to be about kicking a ball right when trying to kick it back. Even smaller boys who would kick the ball back into playif it went too far seemed both to relish the chance of kicking the ball, and kicking itcarefully as if aware of a degree of attention and scrutiny. Football began to seem asmuch about appearance and showing oneself playing as it was about the actual gameitself. This observation, which started with my own experience, has opened upavenues for the analysis of the ‘kick around’ for experience, social positioning andpersonhood.

Interrogation of the anthropologists’ experience may also allow for the develop-ment of understanding of the relationship between experience and social practices andprocesses. Playing football or tenpin bowling, I was struck by the intense feeling whenall ten pins went down or when the ball hit the post or was saved. These experiencessuggest that the feat of achieving a set of prescribed outcomes through manipulationof bodily practice is more than just a meaning-making process or a means of estab-lishing social position. It shows a strong relation to sensory experience. The anthro-pologist’s experience provides some basis, although not a necessarily comparable one,for analysis of these relationships.

The socially constituting configuration

So far I have suggested the importance of recognising the anthropologist as a partici-pant in social processes and grounding research and analysis at this point; to build onthis idea I will be using the concept of the ‘socially constituting configuration’. Whatthis term refers to is the configuration of subjects who are present, and are thereforeactively involved in negotiating cultural practices and the meanings drawn from them.Since the anthropologist will generally be examining processes among configurations

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in which they themselves are present, this socially constituting configuration shouldbe seen as a socially constituting ‘we’ or ‘us’ rather than socially constituting ‘them’.At any one time and place this collective constitutes the embodied subjects doing cul-ture. I am using the term to examine the use of focusing on configurations of peopleactually present in social interactions, but it can be widened out to include the influ-ence of people not present and – in view of network theory – objects.

It seems to me, however, that in doing so the ways that these other influences arebrought to bear on negotiations must be examined rather than assumed. For example,when I was using it, my car became a significant ‘actor’, influencing the practices thatwe engaged in. However, in analysing the significance of the car as a participant Iwould suggest that we examine how its significance was constituted by the participantspresent. When I had the car it was usually suggested that we go and do things that hadto be driven to. It is important to note that I participated in this process by trying togo along with what the other wanted to do and being eager to contribute in some way.It is also important to note that other factors and people were brought to bear in themaking of these decisions. Often it was said that there was ‘nothing to do’ in the areaand this was often linked to the kinds of people around the area. In these cases boththe nature of the area and its facilities, together with other absent residents, were con-stituted as significant participants influencing what we did and where we did it.

The concept of the ‘socially constituting configuration’ is useful as it does notnecessitate the assumption of the boundaries and extension of culture or community.The concept also has the benefit of not assuming membership; it is completely depend-ent on who is present or brought to significance by the people present. Examining theprocesses within a socially constituting configuration that is constantly in flux andchanging in constitution disallows the assumption of ‘community’ as a necessarily sig-nificant unit of social constitution. Culture as embodied practice, disposition andinteraction is constituted in the intersubjective interaction of socially constituting con-figurations, as are the nature, significance and terms of social relationships and socialnetworks. If we see the socially constituting configuration as the context of the con-stitution of culture and social relationships, the idea and concept of communitybecomes problematic. How is it possible for people to assume community or society?In other words, how is it possible for people to assume that the basis for social life isshared and can be left unsaid? This is especially the case where there is an anthropol-ogist present who does not belong to what may be an assumed community, anddemonstrates this fact. In my case I am not within the age range of people that theseyoung people normally hang out with; this raises the question of how inclusion is constituted. To examine the occasions on which it becomes impossible to assume community and a sharing of some common reality is extremely important for under-standing how notions of ‘us’, and ‘community’ and ‘society’ remain important con-structs in the face of constant assault.

I have become increasingly attentive to the occasions on which I am kept withinthe range of acceptable by my age being overlooked, by being seen as a little odd butsomething ‘you will get used to’ when my incompetence at football causes observersto laugh. On one occasion a man who was watching me play darts with the sameincompetence as the young women I was playing with, gave me a wink and muttered‘You got to give them a chance’. I decided to let him know that I really could not playdarts and was doing my best. Halfway through telling him, his expression changed; helooked distinctly uncomfortable and I also felt uncomfortable, as if some breach had

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occurred between us. His expression changed again, and he shrugged: ‘Never mind,it’s just a game’. To me, these signal the moments at which society becomes possibleto resume and the principles by which it is seen to operate come to be reinstated byslights of definition. I interpreted this occasion as an instance in which the assumptionof male superiority in competence in certain activities that allows them to patronisewomen was displaced, as was the ability of us as two males to collude in this fiction.His reaction was to redefine darts, not as a site for the establishment of social positionand assumptions about its basis, but as just a game of fun.

In my research it has become clear that certain ‘communities’ are implicitly orexplicitly constituted and brought to bear in certain instances but are absent or denied inothers within the interactions of a socially constituting configuration. I have spent a lotof time among a group of ‘mates’. They see themselves as mates and have often describedthemselves as ‘us lot’ and talked about possibilities for action that constitute them assome kind of group or community. For example, in discussions about people or eventsat the pub at which the are regulars, they will say: ‘You know what we should do? Weshould all . . .’. In these suggestions it seems clear who is being talked about. It also seemsto be assumed that it can be taken for granted that everyone will act together. It is alsoassumed that they will stand up for each other’s interests and fight on each other’s behalf.

It is relevant to note here that they seem to agree that they all have different eth-nicities. Don is agreed to be black; Tom is seen to be English with gypsy blood; Timis seen to be Australian (despite a cockney accent and an English upbringing inLondon); and Rich is understood to be Indian. Al is seen to be of Irish background,but has a cockney accent, as do Tom and Don. When I have been there I have beenunderstood to be Jewish. Most of the time I have been with these ‘mates’ they havebeen together. They see their community as the centre of their life in the area. As Alsaid when we were all in his living room, ‘This is it. You are in the centre of Southall’.They all laughed and agreed.

However, they also have networks that extent to other mates. These networks areoften ‘cut’ (Strathern 1996) as these other friendships are not always extended to all the‘mates’, and if they are, they are not always accepted. It was Al who invited me tospend time with him and his mates in the pub, at their houses and going out to otherpeople’s house and blues parties. Al also has other friends that the others know, butwith whom he often goes out with separately. Don and Tom and the others seem clearthat when Al is invited out by his other mates, they are not necessarily invited.However, Al invited me out with his mate, Joe, to go to a party in another area ofLondon. Gesturing with his head towards a passing Asian-looking young man, Joeremarked on his presence in the pub, using the term ‘nig nog’. Joe smiled, wonderingat what he was doing, saying that he was the only ‘blacky’ there; he joked that he mustbe lost. His comments implied that the young man had no reason to be in the pubbecause of his skin colour, implying that the white people in the pub were welcomeand in some way belonged. His comments implied ideas about insiderness, outsider-ness and community, on this night in the area we were in.

This way of talking, while providing a basis for the three of us to be together thatextended to a wider ‘community’ of whites, also discredited the community of matesthat Al and I spent time with at other times. Later that evening another guy was sup-posed to turn up. Al was not keen to met him because he was ‘an idiot’. Al expressedan unwillingness to accept community with this guy who used to be a friend, while Joetried to convince Al that Jake was ‘all right’ and a ‘good bloke’. Here again the terms

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Natalie Radmall-Quirke
Am I now outside the community? Will I be treated as such in interviews?
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‘Other’汆
Natalie Radmall-Quirke
‘Muggles’�
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of ‘community’ have changed, only admitting people that one liked or knew were‘alright’. It could even be argued that no specific community was brought to bear inthis instance; relations bore no reference to any community and were wholly based onpersonal feelings and choice without relation to a wider population. At the party Jake,who was white, turned up with three mates of his own to whom we were introduced.We all smiled and laughed and sat on the two couches in the party. We talked and inter-acted as a group. Drinks were passed round and shared. This was a community: ‘yourfriends are my friends’. Interestingly enough, one of Jake’s friends was Asian-lookingbut this was not commented on at the time or after. As we made our way back toSouthall, Al declared: ‘Jake’s mates were all right’, and Joe agreed.

This example shows how different ‘communities’ are constituted and denied,extending to different people and populations on varying terms and at different times.In relation to these kind of social processes it does not make sense to consider peopleas part of any community or group. It makes more sense to ask how it is that groupsand communities are constituted as significant at different times and what the signifi-cance and participation of different people and practices in these processes implies.This focus on social constituting configurations shifts our examination from local con-texts and people as examples that can allow us to understand wider cultures or com-munities to an examination of the ways in which culture and social relationships areconstituted. Considering the anthropologist as a participant forces us to reconstructthe terms on which we view other participants. We have to move from seeing partici-pants as unproblematic members of a society or culture to examining the methods bywhich society is constantly remade as a possibility against its own inconsistencies.

As I have argued, the mood of reflexivity within anthropology has been engagedwith mainly as intellectual subjects. By not situating research and analysis in the embod-ied participating anthropologist many opportunities for theory and analysis are beingmissed. These opportunities are based on accepting the anthropologist as a participantin various and varying constituting configurations. The problematisations this perspec-tive raises about society, culture and identity are central for a more processual and criti-cally informed theorisation of social processes. I have also argued that perspectives onembodiment suggest that by being present in the field the anthropologist becomes a sig-nificant participant in the intersubjective constitution of culture. Consequently, toignore the participation of the anthropologist in the processes of the development ofcultural practice among varying socially constituting configurations seems to miss theopportunity of developing a comprehensive analysis of these processes.

Aaron TurnerCentre for the Study of Health Sickness and DisablementDepartment of Human SciencesBrunel UniversityUxbridge UD8 3PHUnited Kingdom

Email: [email protected]

ReferencesBourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Clifford, J. 1986. ‘Introduction. Partial truths’, in (eds.) J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus, Writing culture.

The poetics and politics of ethnography, 1–26. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. E. (eds.). 1986. Writing culture. The poetics and politics of ethnography.Berkeley: University of California Press.

Connerton, P. 1989. How societies remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Csordas, T. J. 1990. ‘Embodiment as a paradigm for anthropology’, Ethnos 18: 5–47.Haraway, D. J. 1991a. Simians, cyborgs and women. the reinvention of nature. London: Free

Association Books.1991b. ‘Situated knowledges. The science question in feminism and the privilege of the partial per-

spective’, in Simians, cyborgs and women. The reinvention of nature, 183–201. London: FreeAssociation Books.

Marcus, G. E. and Fischer M. M. J. 1986. Anthropology as cultural critique. An experimental momentin the human sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Okely, J., and Callaway, H. (eds.). 1992. Anthropology and autobiography. London: Routledge.Pool, R. 1994. Dialogue and the interpretation of illness. Conversations in a Cameroon village. Oxford:

Berg.Scheper-Hughes, N. and Lock, M. 1987. ‘The mindful body. A prolegomenon to future work in medi-

cal anthropology’, Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1: 16–41.Strathern, M. 1996. ‘Cutting the network’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2: 517–35.

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