Emergency Service Response and Costs in British Floods

Emergency Service Response and Costs in British Floods

DENNIS J. PARKER

The costs of emergency response to flood disasters has received little attention. This paper presents and discusses a method for estimating the economic costs incurred through the use of the emergency services during flood events in Britain. First, a model of British emergency service response to flood events is presented. Secondly, cost evaluation principles relevant to each emergency service are discussed. Thirdly, a set of “standard” emergency service cost datn are presented - these data are deriuedfrom ;search based upon the model of response and the eualuation principles. Finally, the ”standard” data are applied to the case of the York and Selbyfloods of 1982 where datafrom research on the reported actions and costs of each emergency service are comwred with those predicted through the use of the “standard” data.

INTRODUCTION

The economic costs which the community bears through the deployment and response of emergency services, such as the police and fire services, ,during floods are largely hidden costs of flooding. Previous studies of emergency service costs in British floods are limited (Local Government Operational Research Unit, 1971; Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 1977; Fearns, 1978), yet the availability of the emergency services is now almost taken for granted. Through prepara- tion and “flood fighting”, the emergency services are typically employed to minimise the adverse effects of floods on property, activities and people; and to aid the process of recovery and rehabilitation.

This paper presents generalised “standard” predictive data on the economic costs of emergency services employed in floods (Table 1) in Britain. Secondly, the costs of a serious flood emergency in York and Selby in January 1982 are estimated. The research was undertaken to provide flood alleviation agencies with methods for estimating the

potential economic costs of emergency services during floods. These costs may be reduced by centrally-funded flood alleviation measures and are thus equal to a flood alleviation benefit. Direct physical damage to properties and their contents, and the poten- tially serious stress and health costs of flooding (Green et al., 1983), are not here regarded as a cost of the emergency services: these are limited to the costs of service response to a flood event.

THE FLOOD HAZARD IN BRITAIN

About 4.8 per cent, or approximately 2.4 million of Britain’s population, live in flood hazard zones (Handmer, 1987). Inland river- ine flooding is a widespread hazard and most ,urban centres are flood prone. Pro- perty damage from flooding is high but loss of life in inland floods is unusual (Parker, 1985). British rivers are comparatively non- aggressive and the ratio of normal river channel capacity to the discharge of large floods is generally much less, than else-

DISASTERS VOLUME 12 NUMBER 1

Emergency Service Reponse and Costs in British Floods 51

/ / / / ~ \\\\\\ FLOOD PLAIN

\ \\\' USER //YA%R L * POLICE\- /AU T H OR IT / / / / / I -

where. But the recent record of low loss of life is also due to comparatively well organ- ised flood warnings and emergency services.

Sea flooding presents the major risk to life especially in the south-east. This risk is alleviated by sea defences but these are prone to failure or overtopping by long return period, catastrophic events, such as in 1953 when over 300 people died on the east coast (Steers, 1953). Both inland and on coasts Britain's flood mitigation strategy represents a mix of structural "control" measures, typically flood embankments, and non-structural flood measures including flood plain development controls and flood warning systems (Parker, 1985).

THE EMERGENCY SERVICES EMPLOYED IN BRITISH FLOOD EVENTS

The emergency services are statutory and voluntary services employed immediately before a flood event, assuming that there is warning of an event; during an event; and immediately following an event (Table 2). The responses, and therefore the costs, of the emergency services are determined by statutory requirements; their efficiency; the resources allocated to the services by government and other agencies; and the prevail- ing attitude of government to public expenditure.

Table 2 represents the typical generalised response patterns of the principal emergency services to flood events in Britain, although for local reasons the response to specific incidents or disasters may depart from the generalised model. A practical difficulty is disseminating flood warnings. The water authorities have a strong flood forecasting capability but British rivers are typically short and "flashy" and the time for disseminating flood warnings is limited. On larger river systems and along the east coast, the flood warning dissemination "lead time" for the water authorities may approach 12 hours or more, although widespread warning must be left until 2 to 4 hours prior to flooding, otherwise errors are likely. In heavily urbanised catchments the flood warning lead time is reduced to between l/2 and 2 hours only. Because of their general duties to protect life and property, but also because of their superior communications capability, the police are the principal flood warning dissemination agency (Figure 1). Thus, potential flood victims usually hear of flood warnings from the police, although local authorities are usually informed direct- ly by water authorities (Parker, 1985). Flood warning dissemination involves a chain of communications between a variety of organisations before individuals receive a flood warning, and the inter-organisational com-

FLOOD FORECASTING AGENCY

FLOOD WARNING DISSEMINATION AGENCIES

FIGURE 1. Siinplifed organisational structure for food warning dissenrination in Britain


52 Dennis j . Parker

munication problem (Penning-Rowsell et al., 1983) is a severe one which reduces the potential effectiveness of flood warnings (Penning-Rowsell et al., 1978).

ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF FLOOD EMERGENCIES

Evaluation Principles

The resources which are used in a flood emergency are diverted away from alterna- tive uses and are therefore sometimes termed “opportunity costs” because of the opportunities lost thereby. Such opportunity costs to the nation are also termed “economic costs”. For a number of reasons the nation’s economic costs of flooding are usually less than the “financial costs” incurred by flooded individuals and organisations. One reason for this is that the financial costs of flooding, incurred say by individuals, often include tax elements. This happens, for example, when a car driver uses more fuel than would have otherwise been the case, because of the need to travel further to work because of a detour around a flooded area. In Britain the cost of the extra fuel used includes a substantial tax element including excise duty and value added tax. However, within the nation such taxes are “transfer payments” - they are born by one sector of the community in order that another sector benefits - and their loss does not amount to an economic cost to the nation: i.e. resources are not used up. Therefore, to correctly calculate “economic costs” we must deduct transfer payments, such as taxes or subsidies, from the “financial costs” incurred. Thus, the economic cost to the nation of the extra fuel used in road traffic detours is the price of the fuel to the driver less the excise duty and value added tax: i.e. substantially less than the cost to the individual (Parker et al., 1987: 24, 113-114).

Also to determine the national economic costs of flooding it is necessary to decide whether the average or marginal costs of the emergency service should be counted. Aver-

age costs reflect all the costs incurred by a service including fixed costs such as the capital cost of vehicles and the rent paid on premises as well as the cost of the fuel and labour used in an emergency. However, the normal running cost elements of the average costs of emergency services will be incurred whether or not a particular flood emergency occurs. Full-time emergency services must be able to respond to many types of emergency of which flooding is just one. These services therefore have fixed sets of resources and manpower. For example, the number of fire service vehicles does not change because there is one extra fire in a year. The resources consumed solely in a particular emergency, and which are additional to the normal running costs, are termed “marginal costs” and it is usually only these costs which must be counted in determining the economic costs to the nation of a particular flood emergency. Thus, the costs of the additional fuel, vehicle deprecia- tion, and overtime payments as well as the additional costs of materials consumed in the particular flood emergency - i.e. those solely attributable to that flood - are these ”marginal” costs (Parker et al., 1987: 113-114). Usually the marginal cost is less than the average cost unless the service is ill- prepared for a flood emergency.

However, each emergency service (Table 1) presents different cost evaluation problems and judgements are necessary about the extent to which a particular service is manned and equipped specifically for emergencies - and it is here that it may sometimes be appropriate to count average costs, rather than marginal costs. Where a service is a full-time emergency service, as in the case of fire and ambulance services in Britain, then the marginal costs of providing a service during a flood represents the true economic cost. However, where a service is not geared specifically for emergencies - and is not therefore a full-time emergency service- but exists primarily for other purposes so that personnel are fully employed on other func- tions, then the opportunity cost of that service becoming involved in a flood is the average



cost. Generally in Britain local authority personnel, except for the County Emergency Planning Officers, fall into this category.

Full-time firemen called upon during their normal hours are doing what they are paid for and thus no opportunity cost is involved in their labour. However, retained fire-men - who are paid per attendance rather than being entitled to a fixed salary - forego opportunities worth the attendance fee - their wages are a loss due to the flood emergency. The labour of armed forces personnel is not costed as a lost opportunity, since in Britain they are only released for a flood emergency if there is no more pressing call upon them. Thus, only the costs of equipment and resources actually used in a flood emergency by armed forces personnel are counted as economic costs.

The costs of deploying police and water authority personnel present the greatest cost evaluation difficulties. It may be argued that the police exist to deal with emergencies and therefore their deployment should be costed at marginal cost rates. Here it is accepted that using the police to issue flood warnings diverts them from their "normal" crime prevention work: thus their average or overtime wage costs are the economic costs. The same reasoning is accepted below for water authority personnel employed in flood emergencies (Parker et al., 1987 109-122).

Methods of Data Collection

Generalised economic cost data for each emergency service were compiled by detail- ed communication with each service using a scenario survey methodology (Table 3) (Parker et al., 1987). The flood scenarios are designed to reflect broadly the types of flood events in Britain - ranging from the minor "nuisance" flood through to the large scale flood disaster. Thus, each service was asked to predict the scale and extent of its probable response to the four hypothetical flood events, based upon its recent experience of such events; and to provide information on the marginal or average costs, as appropriate, of the response in each case.

Examples of Assessed Costs

The reported costs of twelve district councils vary between approximately €14 and €105 (mean of €51) per residence flooded (January 1985 prices). Some councils included the cost of ex-gratia payments to householders or payments from a special publicly subscribed flood relief fund - both of which are examples of lump sum transfer payments which are excluded in calculating standard economic costs data (Table 4). In one case these transfer payments amounted to €332,000 at the time of the flood. Using standard listings of resources likely to be deployed in each flood scenario and local authority wage rate and resource cost data adjusted to remove tax elements, standard costings were determined for each flood scenario (Table 4).

Police involvement is considerable during flood emergencies. Accepting the ration- ale for assessing police costs at their wage cost, as explained above, then police costs are significant. With the valuable assistance of Essex Police, costs (Table 4) were estimated using this principle, and by adding the costs of fuel (less tax), vehicle wear and tear, and equipment costs (Parker et al., 1987).

The actual costs of fire services depend on whether fulltime or retained firemen are deployed. In Britain full-time crews exist in large urban areas and retained crews cover small towns and rural areas, but retained crews may be called in major emergencies in large urban centres. Surveys of county fire services reveal that the number of calls received during flood events is almost always far greater than the number attended: checking frequently reveals that no action (e.g. pumping) can be taken until flooding subsides, and then help is often no longer required. Also the proportion of properties flooded which are attended by the fire service typically varies between 10 and 20 per cent. Estimated fire service costs per flooded residential property (Table 4) are based on these assumptions. The manpower demands on Water Authorities are consider-


54 Dennis 1. Parker

able during flood emergencies. Compara- tively large numbers of workmen and salaried staff may be deployed in collecting information, communications work, strengthening flood defences and in pumping operations. Standard cost data for each flood scenario are based on data from Water Authorities, excluding transfer payments (Table 4).

In Britain, under the MACC scheme (Military Aid to Civil Communities) the armed forces may be called upon by civil authorities to assist during flood emergencies. The armed forces are used to extend the capability of overstretched district councils. However, the armed services may only undertake work if it has social value to the community; if the work is undertaken on invitation and written agreement of the local authority; and if the work is of training value. The armed services are not available if an emergency occurs at the same time as other military committments regarded as more important (Ministry of Defence, 1978). There is a long history of military aid in flood emergencies in Britain, especially following the severe floods of 1947, 1953 and 1968, but military aid is only likely in some scenario 3 floods and scenario 4 floods (Table 3). Standard costings (Table 4) are based upon data supplied by the armed forces on their likely response to an invitation to assist during a flood emergency.

In Britain voluntary organisations generally assist the regular emergency services in numerous ways; including providing food, clothing and personal support for flood victims; attending to cases of shock and exposure; removing casualties; and manning rest centres and providing hot meals. Since the voluntary services exist primarily for emergencies, it is appropriate to attribute to a particular flood emergency, only those costs additional to their normal running costs. Standard costs for the voluntary services (Table 4) are based upon information supplied by the British Red Cross Society and St John’s Ambulance.

STANDARD EMERGENCY SERVICE COST DATA

Standard emergency service cost data for urban flooding in Britain are in the form of E cost per property flooded (Table 4). Given the number of properties likely to be flooded at a location by a flood of a given magni- tude, these data enable the estimation of the potential economic costs of the emergency services. Standard cost data are first, for locations where flooding affects predominantly residential areas and secondly, where commercial properties dominate. The predominantly commercial areas data exclude those costs which are largely inapplicable to commercial areas. Research reveals no large differences between the costs likely to be incurred by the emergency services in inland and coastal locations. The standard cost data are also available for long duration flood emergencies (Table 4). The additional costs likely to be associated with longer duration floods are calculated by extending, where appropriate, the time period over which costs are likely to be incurred.

EMERGENCY SERVICE COSTS IN THE YORK AND SELBY FLOODS OF 2-13 JANUARY 1982

In January 1982 Yorkshire suffered severe floods of a return period variously estimated at between 30 and 70 years. Both York and Selby were flooded from the river Ouse (Figure 2). Snowfall and freezing temperatures in December 1981 were followed by a rapid rise in temperature on 2 January 1982 and heavy rainfall. In the York area total precipitation (including snowfall equiva- lents) between 13 December 1981 and 6 January 1982 was 60mm, rising to 200m in neighbouring uplands. At York the Ouse began to rise at midnight on 2 January and reached its peak at 3.OOam on 6 January. River levels in Selby began to fall late on 6 January, but flooding remained there until 13 January. Difficulties in evacuating floodwaters and freezing temperatures compli- cated conditions for both the emergency services and flood victims as floodwater


Emergency Sentice Reponse and Costs in British Floods 55

FIGURE 2. Extent of the River Ouse floods, 2-13 lunuary 2982, showing number of properties jZooded

froze and, in some cases, expanded to demolish boundary walls.

The Scale of Flood Effects

In York 308 houses and 98 commercial and industrial premises were flooded to depths ranging up to one metre over a period of three days. Only eighty-seven homes were evacuated - in Britain many families evacuate successfully to the second floors of their


homes during floods. The social services only had to find homes for four families. All main roads except one into York were flooded and the police advised motorists against travelling to the city. Early closure of non-flooded commercial premises in the city centre was advised. Many roads remained impassable up to 13 January since silt and water deposited on the roads froze. Down- stream of York villages became isolated as floodwaters rose causing families to be

56 Dennis 1. Parker

evacuated. In the Selby district 297 properties were flooded of which 134, mainly houses, were in Selby. Here, 60 people were evacuated to a community centre, although almost all subsequently found overnight accommodation in neighbouring villagers’ homes. Also in Selby a geriatric hospital with about 40 patients was evacuated.

Surveys of the Response of the Emergency Services

Each emergency service organisation was contacted following the floods to determine their committment immediately before, during and immediately after the floods; and the identifiable costs of their emergency work (Table 5). During the 1982 floods both the York and Selby Councils brought into operation their flood emergency plans. The tasks listed in Table 2 typify the actions undertaken by the councils which deployed considerable numbers of staff during the emergency in sandbagging and in clearing mud and debris. The environmental health department deployed four teams comprising 10-20 persons to disinfect and dry out houses, to jet drains and sewers, to remove damaged property and to test for contamin- ated food.

County council resources including schools and social services were also employed. Social workers operated mainly from their homes, since their offices were them- selves flooded in York. The social services supervised evacuation of flood victims and coordinated an emergency meals service. The normal work of the social services department was disrupted and day centres for the handicapped were temporarily closed. Three elderly people were taken into care as a consequence of the 1982 flood.

The fire service received only 16 calls for assistance in the 1982 floods. This contrasts markedly with the 1978 floods when the fire service received many calls for assistance. However by 1982 many had learned from their experience four years earlier that floodwaters would naturally recede and that therefore the fire service could offer little

effective assistance. The ambulance service was required to evacuate the geriatric hospital in Selby. Ambulances were also deployed during five days and nights in York and Selby specifically for the flood emergency. The police were heavily involved in disseminating flood warnings throughout the area. Twenty-five police officers were committed immediately before the flood to monitoring river levels and informing residents of dan- ger. During the flood event 140 officers were deployed and twenty officers were committed to traffic control during clean up operations. Forty police vehicles were utilised and about 5000 additional miles were travelled during the emergency.

Between 3 and 5 January Yorkshire Water Authority deployed 14 staff and 55 workmen; between 6 and 8 January this increased to 17 staff and 90 workmen; and between 9 and 26 January 10 staff and 40 workmen were committed - a total of 8600 man hours including 3200 hours of overtime. These men were primarily involved in strengthening flood embankments and pumping floodwater from behind over- topped defences. York and Selby are fortun- ate in having army regiments located near- by. The army supplied a labour force of 200 men in York. Helicopters were used to supply food to farms and 30 men were located in Cawood (Figure 2) to take food to flood victims by boat. In Selby 400-500 men were deployed for about 7 days to help with sandbagging and clearing up operations. A local Royal Air Force station supplied space heaters to help in house drying, the costs of which were charged to the district council.

Several voluntary services were employed in York but most assistance was required and given in Selby. Here the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) was placed on standby on 5 January and provided blankets and portable beds but their main involvement came when the floodwaters subsided and houses needed cleaning up. This cleaning up continued into April. The WRVS was also involved in administering the flood relief fund including the delivery and collection of application



forms. In York the Salvation Army visited elderly people and helped with evacuation. They also supplied food to other emergency service personnel. The British Red Cross Society estimated that 100 man hours were worked by their personnel in York.

The reported costs of the emergency service represent their financial costs associated with the 1982 floods (Table 5). Not surprisingly economic costs are less than financial costs, since the former exclude transfer payments. The economic costs attributable to each of the district council areas - York and Selby - are separated out in Table 6.

Comparison with Predicted Costs

The reported economic costs of the emergency services may be compared (Tables 5 and 6) with the economic costs predicted by employing the standard emergency service cost data (Table 7). To calculate the predicted costs using standard data, the predominantly residential areas data are appropriate. With 308 residences flooded, York conforms almost exactly to a scenario 3 flood event (Table 3). Long duration standard data are used since the flood emergency in York lasted for 6 days. Therefore, for York the appropriate interpolated € cost per residence flooded is €510. Thus, the total emergency service costs for York are predicted at f157,OBO (i.e. €510 x 308 residences) compared with the f157,397 reported economic costs (adjusted to January 1985 prices) (Table 7).

Similarly Selby approximates a scenario 3 flood event (264 residences were flooded) with a long duration flood emergency. The appropriate interpolated € cost per residence in this case is f504. Thus, the total predicted costs for Selby are f133,056 (€504 X 264 residences) which should be compared with the €183,183 reported economic costs (adjusted to January 1985 prices) (Table 7).

Thus, in the case of York the standard emergency service cost data provide an almost perfect match with reported costs. However, caution should be exercised because for Selby the standard data underesti- mate reported costs by approximately

€50,000. Some of this difference relates to the difficulty of deducting transfer payments from reported costs, and there are other local reasons. Apart from Selby town, the Selby district council area is a large rural area in which a number of villages and hamlets were flooded (Figure 2). In such cases emergency service costs escalate since the services must travel further incurring higher labour and transport costs. In addition in Selby the flood emergency was exceptionally long for Britain (9 days compared with the 4 days envisaged in devising the standard long duration data).

C 0 N C L U S I 0 N S

The standard emergency service cost data (Table 4) by no means provide a precise means of estimating the potential costs of a flood emergency but these data do enable the elusive costs of flooding attributable to emergency response to be approximated. With further testing and refinement of the data, these hitherto largely hidden costs can now be estimated and included within benefit-cost appraisals of flood alleviation proposals. One problem with the cost data is that they assume an efficient response from the emergency services which may not occur, in which case actual costs might be higher than predicted.

The information above, especially in Tables 2 and 4, is also useful in planning the resources required to respond to flood emergencies and in demonstrating to political masters what level of capability and resources should be maintained for flood emergencies. In Britain this is important during the present period of public expenditure con- straint since some of the resources available for civil disaster response are under pres- sure. In the 1947 and 1953 flood disasters, the strength of the armed forces - used in both disasters - was much greater than today. A recurrence of such disastrous flooding is unlikely to receive the same level of response from the armed forces. On the other hand other organisations such as local authorities including the social services have


58 Dennis 1. Parker

larger resources than 30 or 40 years ago and would presumably be capable of a more comprehensive response to flooding than previously.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Paul Thompson and Colin Green in the above research and to John Handmer for his comments on a draft of this paper. The research was undertaken with the financial support of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

References

Fearns, R. (1978) The response of Cambridgeshire Social Services Department to the Wisbech flood of lanuary 11, 1978 - an assessment of the operation and lessons for future planning. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Essex.

Green, C.H., Parker, D.J. and Emery, P.J. (1983) The real costs of flooding to households: the intangible costs, Middlesex Polytechnic Flood Hazard Research Centre, Enfield.

Handmer, J. (Ed) (1987) Flood hazard management: British and international perspectives, Geobooks, Norwich.

Local Government Operational Research Unit (1971) Cost-benefit analysis of Towcester flood relief scheme, LGORU: Reading.

Ministry of Defence (1978) Military aid to civil communities: a pamphlet for the guidance of civil authorities and organisations, 2nd edition, HMSO: London.

Parker, D.J. (1985) British structural flood rniti- gation experience: a critical look at response to coastal flood disasters, Paper presented at The International Symposium on Housing and Urban Redevelopment After Natural Disasters: Mitigating Future Losses, Miami, Florida.

Parker, D.J., Green, C.H., and Thompson, P.M. (1987) Urban flood protection benefits: n project appraisal guide, Gower Technical Press, Aldershot.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. and Chatterton, J.B. (1977) The benefits of flood alleviation: a manual of assessment techniques, Saxon House, Farnborough.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C., Chatterton, J.B., and Parker, D.J. (1978) The ef/ect of flood warning on flood damage reduction. Report for the Central Water Planning Unit.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C., Parker, D.J., Crease, D., and Mattison, C.R. (1983) Flood warning dissemination: an evaluation of some current practices in the Severn Trent Water Authority area, Middle- sex Polytechnic Flood Hazard Research Centre: Enfield.

Steers, J. (1953) The east coast floods, January 31- February 1, 1953, Geographical journal, 119, 280-98.



TABLE 1 The principal services employed in flood emergencies in Britain

Statutory services Local authorities

District Councils

County Councils

Area Health Authority Armed Services Water Authorities

Chief executive Engineers’ Department Environmental Health Police Fire service Emergency planning (i.e. civil defence) Social services Education Department Highways Department

Ambulance service MACC scheme* Drainage engineers

Voluntary service

British Red Cross Society Women’s Royal Volunteer Service Salvation Army Others (e.g. Lions Club)

* Military Aid to Civil Communities


60 Dennis 1. Parker

TABLE 2 A generalised model of the phased response of

emergency services to a major urban flood

Phase County andlor Pol ice Fire Service Other District Council

Preparatory Establish Emergency Working Group (inc. Flood Emergency Group)

Identify high risk and occupancies (e.g. the elderly and hospitals).

Prepare flood emergency Prepare police plan including action to be taken at each stage of warning.

Set up flood warden scheme. Print and distribute leaflets to householders on flood warnings and responses. List of suppliers of emergency equipment (e.g. pumps, small boats). Purchase and store supplies (disinfectant, sand, sandbags, polythene etc.) List equipment and plant held by authority. Match normal purchases to flood emergency specifications (e. g. high wheel base vehicles). Prepare road signs, work out diversion roads. Set up and equip flood control room inc. maps ex directory telephone numbers, radio room etc. Purchase portable radios. Prepare documents and equipment needed by council offices. Establish ex directory telephone numbers to relevant LA departments. Collate out-of-hours telephone nos. for staff and agencies likely to be involved. Arrange standby contracts with external contractors. Arrange “on call” contracts with own staff, rota system and communication facilities.

flood emergency plan

Water Authority flood warning service set up/opera tional



TABLE 2 Continued

Phase County andlor Pol ice Fire Service Other District Council

Phase 1 - alert advance warning that conditions have arisen which may result in a flood

Phase 2 - warning - flooding possible in specified areas

Phase 3 - situation worsening high probability of severe flooding in specified locations

Flooding occurs - seepage and localised ponding

Conduct annual exercise to test plan and communicate in conjunction with emergency services, County Council, WA, voluntary services and utilities

Convene Flood Emergency GroupIControl Centre. Check communications and contact numbers. Check flood control room documents. Make up filled sandbag stock. Liaise with gas and electricity boards and voluntary services.

Man control room. Call out duty crews and engineer. Warn relevant Council Department officers (housing, recreation leisure, direct labour). Duty crew distribute sandbags, monitor water levels. Prepare duty roster.

Man switchboard. Man radio room. Call out RAYNET. Call out crews, patrol threatened areas. Close penstocks according to preset schedule. Floodproof council property, emergency sandbagging elsewhere. Call out contractors to standby. Inform relevant Councillors.

Crews and contractors sandbag locally, pumping, engineers inspect. Establish RAYNET base.

Set up rest centres

Annual exercise Annual exercise Annual exercise

Pass warning to DC

Check flood emergency plan

Deploy extra manpower in flood prone area

Pass warning to DUCC, public in areas threatened, media, keyholders of specified premises

Pass on warning to DC, CC, media, public, utilities

Traffic re-routing plans put into action

Call out WRVSI Salvation Army to prepare food and drink

Water Authority flood warning service

Monitor river levels etc.


Monitor river levels

Deploy extra staff


Monitor river levels

Deployed staff checking defences, clearances etc.

Local pumping Water Authority flood warning service and emergency “flood fighting” Social Services prepare emergency

Cont’d over


62 Dennis j . Parker

TABLE 2 Continued ~ ~~

Phase County andlor District Council

~~~ ~

Pol ice Fire Service Other

Police evacuate high risk residents

Military aid may be invoked

Flooding: Patrol, map and report overtopping or flood extent. Emergency breach repair of flood defences.

Open information centre. Order additional disinfectant, arrange supply of skips, refuse sacks, tankers. Arrange for driers to be hired and from RAF. Establish Housing Department Inquiry Centre

Set up traffic diversion.

Prevent sightseeing.

Rescue trapped residents.

Identify casualties. Organise volunteers, rescue, call out small boats. Organise evacuation of residents who wish to leave

accommoda tionl rest centres Education close schools in flood risk areas and those necessary for evacuation centres WRVSiSalvation Army supply hot drinks to crews Ambulance Service transports non-ambulant evacuees Utilities prepare to shut down electricity/ gas supply to area at risk, then shut down

Military emergency sandbagging

Extinguish any Water Authority electrical fires. flood warning

service and emergency "flood fighting" County Council

Search and Engineers rescue determine traffic

diversions Social Semices establish rest and evacuation centres EducationiWRVS emergency feeding; man rest centres County Engineers check state of bridges Military rescue trapped residents


Emergency Service Reponse and Costs in British Floods

TABLE 2 Continued

63

Phase County andlor Police Fire Service Other District Council

Recovery Dispatch teams to aid recovery

Advise Lions, Rotary and other voluntary groups as to extent of flood

Co-ordinate voluntary groups

Arrange pumping of ponded water as necessary

Supply skips, rubbish bags, disinfectant to residents

Set up drying centres

Co-ordinate military driers and cleaning crews Environmen tal health Officers to inspect and condemn foodstuffs, inspect property

Engineers and surveyors to check any endangered buildings. Crews to remove sandbags. Clean roads, gulleys and sewers. Co-ordinate electricity and gas board crews checking and re-connecting household supplies. Rehouse any homeless. Inspect flooded council houses and other property: initiate pumping of sub floors and emergency repair. Distribute leaflets to residents on drying and repair of property. Establish flood relief fund.

Patrol against Pump out looters etc basements and

sub floors Check condition of householders still present, notify control centre of those in need

Water Autliorify flood warning/ monitoring service.

Pumping etc

Voluritary Groups cleaning/ washing of victims' curtains, clothes, houses etc. Assist in insurance and other claims by elder1 yhnfirm

Mil i tary dry out and clean out housing

Social Services inspect at risk house holds: notify DHSS of financial assistance required

DC = District Council CC = County Council RAYNET = Local radio communications network


64 Dennis 1. Parker

TABLE 3 Summaries of flood scenarios

Scenario Description of Flood

3

4

Sudden thunderstorm event, storm sewer surcharge floods 11 properties with minor road flooding. In coastal locations limited sea wall overtopping produces the same effect.

Persistent rainfall during December leading to saturated catchment. River overtops banks and floods 50 houses plus other properties to a maximum depth of 46 cm. Traffic diversion required for a short period. Sea inundation produces similar effects in coastal location in addition to some structural damage along sea front.

Serious overbank flooding following heavy rainfall. Over 300 houses, shops and factories flooded in some places to 1.22m. major road impassable. Considerable amount of debris remains after the event. In coastal location, spring tides and gale force winds bring high tides and a storm tide warning. Similar flooding effects occur in coastal locations.

November and December are the wettest months on record and are followed by prolonged rain. A major flood disaster occurs affecting 1400 homes to almost l m depths. Some narrow escapes are reported. The business community is severely affected as over 50 stores are flooded in addition to 35 factories. People are trapped and chemical hazards require attention. Cold weather exacerbates problems. In the coastal location, evacuation occurs following a storm tide warning. The sea wall and shingle bank are breached. Similar numbers of properties are affected and numerous roads are impassable. In both the inland and coastal cases, this flooding is part of a region-wide flood disaster in which several other major urban areas, and dozens of towns and villages are similarly affected. Parliament declares the region a disaster area.



TABLE 4 Standard potential emergency service costs* (January 1985 prices)

~~ ________~ ~~ ~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~

Costs per residential property flooded for predominantly residential areas

Flood Scenario (Residences Flooded) Flood

Duration l(10) 2 (50) 3(300) 4(1400)

cost Source

District Council

1 2

77.4 154.8

122.1 244.2

77.2 154.5

45.5 82.7

2.0 12.0

13.0 113.0

County Council

1 2

2.0 12.0

18.0 168.0

8.4 8.4

8.4 8.4

8.4 8.4

8.4 8.4

Fire Service

1 2

8.9 17.8

19.4 38.8

15.7 31.4

12.5 22.7

Police 1 2

20.0 45.0

20.0 45.0

Military 1 2

65.0 97.5

104.0 156.0

74.2 148.4

41.1 74.7

Water Authority

1 2

Ambulance Service

0.3 0.3

0.3 0.3

1 2

1 2

5.0 5.0

5.0 5.0

5.0 10.0

2.0 3.6

Voluntary Services

~~ ____

Total 1 166.7 260.9 213.8 147.8

2 295.5 464.4 511.0 405.4

Cont’d over


66 Dennis 1. Parker

TABLE 4 Continued

Costs per commercial property flooded for predominantly commercial areas

Cost Source

Flood Flood Scenario (Residences flooded) Duration

1 U O ) 2(50) 3(300) 4(1400)

Costs per commercial property flooded for predominantly commercial areast

District Council

Police

Water Authority

1 77.4 122.1 77.2 45.5 2 154.8 244.2 154.5 82.7

1 8.9 19.4 15.7 12.5 2 17.8 38.8 31.4 22.7

1 65.0 104.0 74.2 41.1 2 97.5 156.0 148.4 74.7

Total 1 151.3 245.5 167.1 99.1 ~

2 270.1 439.0 334.3 180.1

* t 1 Short duration flood emergency 2 Long duration flood emergency

Additional (marginal) costs of flooding in urban areas These values should not be added to predominantly residential areas

~ ~~

DISASTERS VOLUME 12 NUMBER I


TABLE 5 Reported and estimated admissible costs of emergency services:

January 2-13, 1982 floods in York-Selby area (February 1982 prices)

Service organisationldetails Reported costs Admissable costslcomments f f

York City Council 1. Heaters, transport, paraffin

excl. manpower 4500 2. Manpower/honararium paid to

salaried staff deployed 30496 3. Armed forces: charges for

assistance 10379 4. Flood relief fund 21643

Selby District Council 1. Basic costs 59320 2. Compensation payments: EC 4307 3. Armed forces: charges for

assistance 12517 4. Accommodation for military 1185 5. Flood relief fund 26110

North Yorkshire County Council 1. Social Services 2428 2. Fire service -

3. Emergency planning team Negligible 4. Education 130 5. Highways 21500

North Yorkshire Police 1. Man hours 2. Vehicles 3. Misc.

57889

North Yorkshire Ambulance Service 1048

Yorkshire Water Authority 85700

4500

30496

Zero (counted below) Zero (transfer payment)

59320 Zero (transfer payment)

Zero (counted below)

Zero (transfer payment) 1185

2428 213 estimatedt -

130 21500

57889

1048

85700

Cont’d over


68 Dennis 1. Parker

TABLE 5 Continued

Service organisationldetails Reported costs Admissable costslcomments € E

Armed forces Additional costs incurred in York 1. Transport 2. Stores 3. Helicopter 4. Civilian overtime 5. Laundry 6. Telephone 7. Lost stores 8. Food and accommodation 9. Engineers stores

Sub-total

Additional costs incurred in the

1. Transport 2. Stores 3. Helicopter 4. Civilian overtime 5. Laundry 6. Telephone 7. Lost stores 8. Food and accommodation 9. Engineers stores

Sub-total

Selby District

Voluntary services 1. Salvation Army 2. St. Johns Ambulance Brigade

4200 3400 400 100 50

4330

12500*

4700 4200 800 200 50 35

5015

15000*

- -

4200 3400 400 100 50

4300

12500

4700 4200 800 200 50 35

5015

15000

- 2750 estimated

TOTALS 366652 294659 (80.4%)

t Four calls from households at €53.25 per house. Armed forces estimates differ from charges reported by the Councils.

EC = European Community



TABLE 6 York and Selby floods 1982: apportioned emergency service costs

(February 1982 prices)

Emergency service York Selby Comments € f

City council/District Council County Council

Social Services Department Education Department Fire Service Department Highways Department

Police Ambulance Service Water Authority Armed Forces Voluntary Services

Totals

Totals adjusted to January 1985 prices

34996

607 65

106 10750 47423

410 28567 12500

750

136174

157397

60505

1821 65

106 10750 10466

638 57133 15000 2000

158484

183183

t

t Apportionment verified by service * Apportionment not identifiable: 50:50 allocation assumed

TABLE 7 Reported and predicted economic costs of the emergency services

for the York and Selby floods of 1982 (January 1985 prices)

York €

Selby f

Reported costs 157397 183183 Predicted costs 157080 133056

Dennis J. Parker Middlesex Polytechnic Queensway Enfield, EN3 4SF U K


Documents

Emergency Service Response and Costs in British Floods