Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations

8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations

1/21

Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian RelationsAuthor(s): Lela Garner NobleSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May, 1975), pp. 453-472Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643257

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2/21

ETHNICITY

ND

PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN

ELATIONS

Lela

Garner

Noble*

THE

NORMALIZATION

OF RELATIONS

between the

Philip-

pines and Malaysia

n

December 969

made

possible

he

development

f

ASEAN-the Association f Southeast

Asian

Nations-into a

regional

r-

ganizationharacterizedy ncreasing ooperation.

et the normalization

coincidedwith

he

development

f

growingnsurgency

n

Muslim reas

of

the

outhern

hilippines,

n

insurgencyllegedly ncouraged y

Tun

Musta-

pha, ChiefMinister f

the

Malaysian

tate

f Sabah.

The purpose f his rticle

s

to discuss hese wo

developments,

he

on-

tinuing ooperation f Malaysia and thePhilippines n ASEAN and the

emergencef a secessionist

movementmong he Philippine

minority ho

share

ommon eligious onds

with

heMalaysianmajority. he

argument

is

that hese wo

developments

re related n such

a

way

as

to reflect bar-

gain,

mplicit r

explicit,

etween

he

policy-makers

f the two states.

The

policy-makers

ct as

if

they

have

agreed

that

Malaysia

will refrain

rom

supportinghilippine

Muslims ut

will

not

top

Tun

Mustapha's

ssistance

to

them;

he

Philippines

ill

ontinue

o

attack

he

Muslim

eparatistmove-

ment utwillrefrain

rom

ction

gainst

abah or from irect ublic riti-

cismofMalaysia;thePhilippines illnotpress ts claim toSabah butwill

assert ts

right o thewaters round

he

Sulu archipelago.

Succeeding

ections f he

aper xplain

ow his

bargain was arrived

at,

how

t has

worked,

nd

what

onclusions

t

suggests bout therelation-

ships

between

thnicity

nd

Philippine-Malaysian

elations

nd,

more

gen-

erally,

etween

thnicity

nd

international

elations

heory.

The

Origin

f

the

Bargain

The

bargain ppeared

o be

the

result

f almost decadeof regional

friction.orMalaysia heproblems eremost eriouswith ndonesia n the

1963-1966period.

But

problems

with

the

Philippines,

rimarily ver the

claim to

Sabah, preceded,exacerbated,

and

outlasted4confrontation.

There

were also tensions

n

relations with

Singapore

and

Thailand.

Throughout

*

This

paper

is a

condensation f a

paper prepared

forthe

Annual

Meeting

of

the

American

Political Science

Association,August 29-September ,

1974.

453


3/21

454

ETHNICITY N

THE

PHILIPPINES

these

experiences

Malaysian ecurity

was

dependentn military

rrange-

ments

with ritain,

ewZealand, nd

Australia,

utby

the ndof the1960s

it

was

clear that heBritish

military

resence

n the reawouldbe

reduced

drastically.

The ncreasedvidencef nternationalulnerabilityoincidedwith o-

mestic

trains hich ulminated

n

the 1969elections.

n peninsular

Malay-

sia, the

announcementf

election

esultswas followed

y Malay-Chinese

rioting, hich

n turn ed to thepostponement

f electionsn

the Bornean

states.

When lections

ere

finally eld n

Eastern

Malaysia n 1970, Tun

Mustaphadelivered abah's

votes

solidlyfor the

Alliance.

Sabah thus

emerged

s the

most table f all states-from

he tandpointf

theAlliance

leaders-and

Tun

Mustapha

s

the

most ndependent

f all state eaders.'

For the hilippines,

olicy n

Southeast sia between

962 and

1965was

dominated y

two ndeavors:

themakingnd prosecutionfthePhilippine

claim

to

Sabah

and the assumption

f a mediating

ole

n the confronta-

tion

between

Malaysiaand Indonesia.2

n both endeavors

thnic actors

wereof

minimalmportance:moreover,

oth endeavorswere

counterpro-

ductive.

AfterMarcos

became

resident

n

1966,

hePhilippines

moved

o re-es-

tablish elations ithMalaysia

and joined

Malaysia,Singapore,

ndonesia,

and

Thailand n

forming

SEAN.

Cooperation,

owever,

as shortlived.

t

was eopardized irst ythe Corregidorncident,whichpresumablye-

vealed he xistence f a

secret orce

fMuslims eing

rained y

thePhilip-

pines

o nfiltrate

abah.Then fter

hilippine

egislatorsassed

bill which

asserted

hilippine

overeigntyver Sabah

in the process

of redefining

Philippine

oundaries,

ctivediplomatic

elations etween he

Philippines

and

Malaysia

were

uspended.

Malaysia

brogated

he

nti-smuggling

gree-

mentwhich

t had

negotiated

ith

he

Philippines

ver

the

protests

f

Tun

Mustapha;

withdrew

ts

embassy

taff rom he

Philippines;

emanded

hat

thePhilippinesmplement

ts announcedwithdrawal

f

its own

staff;

nd

sharply urtailedts participationn international eetings. herewere

also reports

hat

abah,

f

not

Malaysia,

was

cultivating

ctive ontacts

with

Muslim

issidents

n the

outhern

hilippines.

Meanwhile omesticonditions

n the

Philippines

ere

worsening,

nd

protest

as becoming

more

widespread,

etter

rganized

nd

coordinated,

and more

xplicitly

urposeful.

iscontent

as

particularly

trong

mong

Muslims

n

Mindanao

nd Sulu.

The

Muslims

weredivided y

clan,

anguage,

nd

ocation,

nd also

by

themannern

which hey

had chosen

o

accommodate

hemselves

o a

na-

1It

s significanthat

while

Tun Mustaphawas

born

n a kampong n the

Kudat

Dis-

trict f

Sabah,

he claims

paternal ineage

from

he sultans

of Sulu, from

whose

claims

thePhilippine

government

erived

ts claim to

Sabah.

DuringWorld War

II lie made

contactswith

guerrillamovements

hrough

relatives n

Palawan.

Spotlight

on Sabah

(London:

The Diplomatist

Publications,

1972), pp. 4-5;

Tun Mustapha,

Houseboy,

Messenger,

lerk-and

Then

Came the War,

Malaysian

Business, October

1973,

pp.

33-36.

2There s

a more

detailed

treatment f Philippine-Malaysian

elations,

1962-1969,

in

Lela

G. Noble,

The National

nterest

nd theNational

Image: Philippine Policy

in

Asia,

Asian Survey,

XIII:6 (June

1973), pp.

560-576.


4/21

LELA

GARNER

NOBLE

455

-tional

ystem

which they

perceived

as being dominated

by Christians.

Some,

particularly

Maranao in

the Lanao

area,

perpetuated

raditionalpatterns

of

clan organization

nd sought to

avoid

contact with

any alien

influences,

n-

cluding

electricity,chools,

and government

fficials.When challenged

they

fought.Othersopted forintegration,whichwas defined primarilyby edu-

cation in

a public or private

university,

requentlywith financial

assistance

from the government's

Commission

on National

Integration.

The third

option

was an explicitly

slamic

one and involved

training

n local

schools,

frequently

nes established

by

Egyptian, Arabian,

or Indonesian

mission-

aries; education

overseas at universities

n Egypt or

Arabia;

and/orpartici-

pating

n

Islamic

organizations

n the

Philippines

and outside it. Many

of

these Muslims were

reformists

n their

orientation

oward

Philippine

Islam

and Muslim

society.

They might

or might

not be secessionist

in relation

to

the

Philippines,

but their higher oyaltieswere clearly to Islam ratherthan

to the Philippines.

The three

options

were not

exclusive.

Muslim politicians

represented

a

fusion

of the

three:

theyparticipated

fully

n the party

alignments

nd pork-

barrel arrangements f

the

national political

scene,

but frequently

did

so

with traditional

lan base which

they

extended by

Islamic

symbols,bene-

fits nd

organizations.

They

arranged pilgrimages

to Mecca,

for example;

sent

their

sons and godsons

to

Cairo University;

had contacts with

Malay-

sian, Egyptian,Arabian,

and Libyan

leaders.

Muslims

who tried

the inte-

grationist

oute

were sometimes

frustrated

nd hence

found

common cause

with

traditionalists

or

reformers.

Traditionalists

frequently

respected

the

Islamic credentials

and

connections

of the reformers

nd

accepted their

leadership.

Whatever

heir

rientation,

he 3.5

million

Philippine

Muslims

were

sub-

ject

to

many of

the same

problems

affecting

ther

Filipinos.

They

also

had

problems

relating to continuing

Christian

migration

ntoMindanao,

which

by

the ate

1960s

had

reached

a level threatening

Muslim

economic,

political,

and cultural nterests. he economicconflict entered n thefactthatMuslim

landholding practices

were rooted

in a relationship

between

datus

(clan

chiefs)

and

clansmen,

not

necessarily

in

Philippine

law. The

migrating

Christians ended

to assume

that

they

were dealing

with a legal

situation,

and

usually also

that

they

had both

the

law

and

governmental

gencies

on

their ide. Since

there

was no

agreement

on

legal

systems

or

judges,

as

mi-

gration

increased

fightingbetween

Christian

settlers,

largely

Christian

Philippine

Constabulary,

nd

Muslims

ncreased

in

frequency,

ntensity,

nd

organization.

Fightingworsenedin the years precedingelections because migration

also had

political implications.

Muslim

families

and

groups

had

frequently

fought

mong

themselves

or

political

followings

nd

positions.

As

Christian

newcomers

n

some provinces

began

to

outnumber

Muslims,

changes

in

regis-

tration

patterns

nevitably

not

only

intensified

he conflict

but also

added

new,unpredictable

actors.Christians

ometimes imply

voted for

an

old

Muslim

politician,

for

at

least some of the

same

reasons

Muslims

did-his

connection

with

the

Liberal or

Nacionalista

benefit

network.

Frequently,


5/21

456

ETHNICITY

N THE PHILIPPINES

however,

hifts

n

registration

roduced

new Christian

oliticians.

Under

these

onditions

here

was seldom

ny

reason

o

distinguish

etween

roups

organized

nd fighting

or conomic

easons

nd those

ighting

orpolitical

reasons.

Since

bothChristians

nd Muslims ad a tendencyoidentifyheir ife-

styles

s Christian

nd Muslim

espectively,

oth

dentifiedhilippine

ul-

ture s Christian,

nd

bothhad

a

tendency

o

regard

heir

wnreligion nd

lifestyles

s

superior,

he onflictppeared

o

be

irreconcilable.

hether

r

not

an Islamic

resurgence

as

inherently

ecessionist,

n the

context f

generally

orsening

onditions

nd

a

perceived

Christian

hreat,

rowing

Islamic

elf-consciousness

nd contacts ncouraged

alk

of

secession.

eces-

sionist

hreats

nd

organizations

ad

also

traditionally

een

part

of the

bargainingrocess etweenrovincialMuslimeaders ndnational hristian

ones:

Muslim

eaders

did not want

o

secede; they

wanted ewards or

not

seceding.

he formation

ftheMuslim

or

Mindanao) Independence

ove-

ment

y

Udtog,

atalam,

ormer

overnor

f

Cotabato,

n

1968

appeared

o

fit

he

old

model,

articularly

ince

he

seemed

emporarily

ollified

fter

Marcos

gave

him

a watch

nd

attention;

ut

the

Movement

apped

senti-

ments

which

went

eyond

Matalam's

ntentions

nd

control.

Thus

by-the

nd

of

the

1960s

Marcos

was

confronted

omestically ith

clear

evidence

f

deteriorating

ocio-economic

onditions,

idespread

is-

content,nd ncreasinglyrganizednd deological rotestroups. he evel

of

violence

hroughout

he

country

eemed

o

be

increasing.

here

were

reports

f outside

upport

orboth

he

New

People's

Army,

oncentrated

n

Luzon,

and

for

Muslim

dissidents,

oncentrated

n

Mindanao

and

Sulu.

There

was

also evidence

hat

foreign olicy,

articularly

olicy

oward he

claim

o

Sabah,

had

increased

he

possibility

hat nternal

roblems

would

be

worsened

y

external

nes.

For

Philippine

s well s

for

Malaysian

ead-

ers,

vulnerabilityotasictating

aution

n

foreign olicy

y

1969:

therefore

the

rationale

or he

Malaysian-Philippine

bargain

described arlier.

The Operation f the Bargain

During

he 1970s

the bargain

has been

tested

y

the

increase

n

the

level

and

scope

of

fighting

n

the southern

hilippines,

he

growing

vi-

dence

of

external

upport

or

he

Muslim

ctivists,

nd the

persistence

f

both

concern

nd

controversy

n Islamic

organizations

ver

treatmentf

Philippine

Muslims.

n March

1970

there

were

reports

n

the

Philippine

press

fthe

eturn

o

the

Philippines

f a

number

f Muslims

who

had

been

trained

broad.One

report,

ased

on

nformation

eceived

y

he

ommander

ofthePhilippine onstabularyP.C.) , was that120 Muslimyouth ad re-

turned

fter

eceiving

raining

nder

British

nd

British-trained

fficers.

second

ersion

eported

he

eturn

f

3475

Filipino

Muslims

rained

n

Mid-

dle Eastern

nd

nearby

ountries.

oth versions

inked he

trainees

with

secessionist

ovements

ike

heDarul

slam

and

M.I.M.

n

Cotabato,

amalip

in

Lanao,

the

Muslim

Brotherhood

f

Jolo,

nd the Green

Guards

of

Zam-

boanga

nd

Basilan.3

here

were lso

news tories

n

May

of

Muslim

youth

'Manila Bulletin,March 11, 15, 30, 1970;

Manila

Times,

March 26

and

27, 1970.


6/21

LELA

GARNER

NOBLE 457

meetings

n which ecession

was

discussed,

sually

s

a last resort

f

de-

mands forreform

ere

notmet

by

the

Philippine overnment.

Whenthe

evelof violence scalated

n

Mindanao

n

October

970,

it

was more

related o

the

1971 elections

or

enatorial,

rovincial,

nd

local

officershan o secession. y early 1971 fighting as fiercestn provinces

in

Mindanaowhere

opulation nd

hence voting

atios werechanging-

Lanao

del Norte nd

Cotabatodel Norte.

Reports

dentified

he

Muslim

combatantss

blackshirts

n

Cotabato nd barracudas

n Lanao

del

Norte. t

was

usually ssumed hat he blackshirts ere

inkedwith

Mata-

lam's

M.I.M. and

that he

barracudas

were

he

private rmy f

Ali

Dima-

poro, the

Muslim

Nationalista arty

congressman.

he

Christianswere

identifieds

Ilagas'9: the

translation as

rats,

he ethnic

roup longo.

In

Lanao

the

lagas were llegedlyed by

Governor

rsenio

A.

Quibranza,Dimaporo's hief ival.4

Muslim nd

Christian

roups aided

villages,

urned ouses,

nd killed.

Therewere eports

hat ome

Muslimmembers f the

Philippine

onstabu-

laryparticipated

n

attacks n

Christians,ut

t

was

widely

ssumed hat

the

P.C. units,

redominantly

hristian

nd headedby

an

Ilongo,

generally

intervenedn behalf

f

Christians.

ertainlyhe

evel

of violence

xpanded

with

ncreasesn

thenumber

f P.C.

personnelentnto he rea.

Moreover,

while

asualty nd

refugee igures ere

high for

bothMuslims nd Chris-

tians, heworstncidentsnvolved hristian ttacks nMuslims.

Thefirst

ccurredn June

971,when

group f23 armed

longos,

ome

reportedly

n

P.C.

uniforms,

orced bout

70 Muslims

nto

mosque,

hrew

a

grenade t

them, nd shotanyonewho

escaped.

They raided thebarrio

school

nd killed

moreMuslim hildren.5

he

second ncident ccurred n

November

3,

election

ay n

Lanao delNorte.A

group f200 Muslims ad

been

persuaded

with

promises f safe

conduct

nd

a

P.C. escort o

return

home

o

vote.

According oone report

heywere

dentifieds

flying oters

and

were

not

allowed o votewhen hey

rrived.

hen on thereturn rip,

contraryo the afe-conductgreement,heywere toppedtan army heck-

point.The army

harged hat

he first

hot

came from

he

Maranaos,

but

army

ersonnel

ad only fewminor

njurieswhile he

Muslimswere

both

shot

by armymen

and boloed

by the Christian

ivilians

ccompanyinghe

soldiers.6

The

two

incidents, set in the context

of

continual fighting, roused

major

protest rom

Muslimpolitical

leaders outside the

country.

Col. Moam-

mer

Kadaffiof

Libya accused the

Philippine

government

f

having

a delib-

erate

plan

to

exterminate

Philippine

Muslims

and threatened

to

assume

responsibility or them. In an interview,Rascid Lucman, Philippine con-

gressman

from

Lanao

del

Sur, said that Libya was

already

supplying aid

to

the

opposition

in

the

Philippines.7

Reuters

quoted

Tunku Abdul Rah-

man,

in

his

new

role

as

head

of

the

Islamic

Secretariat,

as

saying

that

the

'New

York

Times,

eptember ,

1971.

'Far

Eastern

Economic

Review,

July ,

1971,

p. 15.

'Far

Eastern

Economic

Review,

December

18,

1971,

p. 17.

'Arab

Report

nd

Record,

October

1-15,

1971,p.

533.


7/21

458 ETHNICITY N THE

PHILIPPINES

Secretariat

as considering

hemosquemassacre at

the

request

f

world-

wide

Muslims. 18

Claims that

the Philippines was persecutingMuslims

were

circulated t theUnited

Nations. n Septemberhe ndonesian ews gency

reported laims hatMuslim

eaders here ad made statements

xpressing

regret nd sympathyortheirPhilippine rothers nd appealing o the

Philippinegovernmentor

a peaceful ettlement.9n December, s

an

ASEAN foreign inisters

eeting as closing n Kuala

Lumpur,

heMalay-

sian primeministerondemned he killing f PhilippineMuslims.10

In

1972violence pread

nto ther reas of

Mindanao,

hough

he

verall

level ffightingppeared o

have subsided. n JuneRepresentative

alipada

Pendatun isitedMiddle

Eastern apitals nd reportedlyeceived promise

of aid forPhilippine

Muslims rom adat of Egypt.Meanwhile

adaffi e-

iterated harges f genocide

nd on June11 explicitly fferedrms

and

money o PhilippineMuslims. Marcos' reactionmarked significanthift

in

Philippine actics. arlier he Philippine esponse o statements

y out-

sidershad been to declare

hat he situationwas a purely nternal ispute

over

and claims nd that hepolicy nd practice f the Philippine

overn-

ment

were ohave a liberal

nd sympatheticttitude oward on-Christian

Filipinos.Kadaffi's

tatementsad been branded as mere

meddling. '2

Arrangements ade for

Muslim mbassadors n Manila to visit

the south-

ern

Philippines ad appeared o be a concession.

After

he statementsf

June,

owever,

Marcos nvited epresentatives

of theEgyptian nd Libyangovernmentso visitMindanao. He acted on

the

dviceof

SenatorMamintal amano a former ead of

the

Commission

on National

ntegration

nd

one of thefewMuslim

enators n

Philippine

history) nd over he

objections f othermembers f Congress.

His objec-

tivewas

clearly o demonstratehat riticismnd aid wereunwarranted.

Egypt nd Libya

responded y sending four-man elegation o the

Philippines n July -8.

Marcos,

who had earlier dentifiedheproblem

s

caused

partly y

a

struggle

orpolitical

power,

partly y contention ver

land

rights,

oldthem hathe believed

ommunists

nd other lements

ere

provoking iolence.Dissidents eeking o agitate and inflameMuslims

against heGovernmentndChristiansn general wereresponsibleor he

unrest;

ommunistsad

infiltratedhe lagas13

The

Egyptian pokesman's

conclusionswere that

the conflict ould

develop

nto religiouswar. He

cited

Philippine overnment

igures

f

1600

killed,

ncluding

ver

800

Muslims,

since

early

1971,

and

said,

We

will

follow our

mission

by

con-

vincing ur friends n thePhilippines o tryto do

theirbest

to

stop

the

massacre nd

establish rder.

A

Libyanofficialompared

he

situation

o

pre-1948 alestine.'4

8AsianResearchBulletin, (August 1-31,1971), p. 270.

9Asia Research Bulletin, (September 1-30, 1971), p.

352.

Far Eastern

Econo7mic

eview, December

11,

1971, p.

20.

Arab Report

nd

Record, June 16-30,1972, p. 297.

Arab Report and Record, October 1-15, 1971, p. 533; Asia Research Bulletin,

,

(October1-31, 971), p. 426.

Asia ResearchBulletin,

I

(July1-31, 972), p. 1099.

'4Asian Recorder,XVIII (September 16-22, 1972), p. 10988;

Arab

Report

and

Record,July -15, 972,p. 343.


8/21

LELA GARNER NOBLE 459

The Philippine

overnmentppeared atisfiedwithhaving

won

a re-

prieve rom enocide

harges.

n

any

event,

espite oth he ntensity

fthe

violence nd its

growingnternational

amifications,

hroughout971

and

1972 mostFilipinos

onsidered

ther vents

o be

of

greatermportance.

The 1971 electionampaignwas bitterlyought,nd theresultswere nter-

preted s a major

oss

forMarcos.Debates n theConstitutionalonvention

werealso bitter ndhad pro- or anti-Marcosmplications. ombings nd

shootouts

ccurred

n

the

Manila area. Marcos attributed

hem

o

commu-

nists;his opponents

harged is ownmenwithhaving tarted hem. loods

deluged reasof

Luzon and

threatened nation-wideice crisis.

Amid

the

furor elations ith

eighboringtates emained ordial.ASEAN continued

its

meetings

nd

statements.uring

he

floodsTun Razak expressed ym-

pathy nd offered

elp.

WhenMarcosdeclaredmartial aw in September972,hisearly usti-

fications

mphasizedhe ommunisthreat, rimarilys representedy the

activities f theNew

People's Army. ronically, y October

Muslim ather

than

N.P.A.-led ebellion

onstitutedhe most ignificanthallenge o

his

regime.

The

first

arge-scale ttackwas on a P.C. camp

n

Marawi City, anao

del Sur.

Fighting pread

hrough

asilan and

the

Sulu

Archipelago.

n

late

February major

offensive as aunched n Cotabato. y theend of March

theMuslim orces

ad control f mostof Basilan and

Sulu and

large por-

tionsof the Lanao, Zamboanga, nd Cotabatoprovinces. stimates s to

their

umbersanged onsiderably,ut therewereprobably bout 15,000.

The forces ppearedbetter oordinated, etter

ed,

and better rmed

than

arlier. n some

areas they eft eaflets nnouncing heirobjectives.

Aimed at least

partly t reassuring

hristians,

he leaflets dentified he

armedmen s

members f theMuslimRevolutionaryorces

n

Mindanao.

They aid thatChristiansad no reason o fear

hat

heywouldbeharmed;

the

fighting as directedgainst hearmy nd the

P.C.,

notthe people. 5

Other eportsaid that he eaders alledfortheouster f all old Muslim

feudal

eaders nd

provincial fficials.

A

manifesto

ublishedby the underground

ree

PhilippineNews

Service ontained

ineteen emands. he first emandswereforthe with-

drawal

f government

roops,

he

disbandment

f

ocal self-defenseorces,

the removal f all

governmentfficials ho were not natives f the area,

and the

rrest nd

prosecution f

the

personnel uilty

f the

killings

f

in-

nocent

Muslims.

Otherdemands, pparently

ssuming hatthe

firstwould

not

be

met,dealtwith ontrols

n the

behaviorof military ersonnel.

third roupofdemands entered n recognitionhat he M.R.F. activists

were not

communist ut

God-fearing eople ;

on freedom

o

practice

Islamic awsand

customs ithout estriction;nd on requests hat foreign

dignitaries,

specially epresentatives

f

world

odies,

be allowed

o

travel

freely

n

affected

reas.l6

New York

Times,March

24,1973.

6An

Asian Theology f

Liberation: The

Philippines (IDOC

Documentation artici-

pationProject,The

Futureof the

Missionary nterprise,

o. 5;

New York: IDOC/North

America, 973),

p.

63.


9/21

460

ETHNICITY IN THE

PHILIPPINES

What seemed o have emergedwas a looselyorganized

movementit

was

later

dentifieds

the

Moro National

Liberation

ront)

with core

of

young,university-traineduslim eaders.While

many

of

themhad

links

with he oldergeneration f Muslimpolitical eaders, hey ppeared

o be

renouncinghose inks nd callingforreform ithinMuslim ociety s well

as a change n therelationshipo Philippine ociety.

NurulHadji Misuari,

early dentifieds the main eader,had been

Lueman's

protege.Misuari's

wifewas thenieceofthewife f Salih Ututalum, ne of

the ong-timeoliti-

cal

contendersn Sulu. Nizam Abubakar, son of the

mayor f Jolo,

was

among herebels. ome reportedlyad doctoratesn

Islamic urisprudence

from airo University.erhaps mong he op eaders,

nd certainly ithin

the

movements a whole, herewere differences,articularly

n

defining

reform nd autonomy nd consequentlycceptable erms f settlement.

The external ontacts f themovement'seaderswerenotclear. Those

who wereeducated t Islamicuniversitiesbviously ad relationships ith

Muslims

n

other ountries. ews tories aid Misuariwas in Libya n 1972

and had

also spent ime n Sabah. It was reported hat

Libyanand Sabahan

aid went irsto Lucman, hen aterdirectlyo Misuari.

According o Philip-

pineofficials,apturedMuslims dmittedhat hey eceivedmilitaryraining

in

Malaysia. Libyans dmitted iving id; Malaysian

officials enied t.17

Within hePhilippines,n underground

ewspaper onnected ith he

N.P.A., the

Clenched ist,

eported NPA-MRF activities nd identified

the

Muslim ightings partof thecommon truggle. he Muslim

bjective,

the

paper alleged,was for autonomous ones

n

areas where

Muslimshave

85%

of thepopulation.18 ther eports uoted an

unnamed adical priest

as claiming

10% infiltrationf Muslimmovement

y

the

N.P.A.19

The

term

infiltration f course mplied hatfrom he

perspectivef

theMus-

lims

he ommonalityfthe trugglemight e less

clear.WhileMisuariwas

a

member

f

the

Kabataang Makabayan everalyears go,his friends

ave

said

that

e

left

t

becauseof

a

conviction

hat

heMaoists

n it

were

neither

understandingf nor sympathetico Muslims.Muslim spokesmen ave

denied hat

hey re communistr engaged n a

struggle o

overthrow

he

central

hilippine overnment.

In

Sulu, Cotabato,Zamboanga, nd Basilan, the

Front appeared to

includemostMuslimdissident roups nd to secure degree

of

coordina-

tion and discipline.Groups n Lanao appearedto remain

ndependent.

n

particular reas Muslim eizureof power was associated

with

peace

and

order:

price

ceilings

et

and

maintained, complete

an

on

liquor, roops

rigidly isciplined.

n

other

reas,

tactics

resembledmore

closely

he old

black shirt-barracuda-Sululanfeud tyle.

The martial aw regime's nalysis of

the

problem

distinguished

e-

17The ontrived

wording

f

some

of the

Malaysian

denials

suggests

hat

the

spokes-

men cannot

or

do

not

want

to

speak

for

Mustapha.

Both the

vagueness

and the contra-

dictions

ndicate

that,

whatever

Mustapha

is

doing,

he does

not want to

be

publicly

identified s giving

nything ther

han

refuge

o

Philippine

Muslims.

8See

Clenched

Fist,

I

(July 31,

1973 and

September 1, 1973)

and

II

(January15,

1974).

1;Asia Research

Bulletin,

II

(March 31,

1974), p.

2436.


10/21

LELA GARNER NOBLE 461

tween

ocioeconomic

nd military

spects,

etween

eadersand

followers,

and

between

omestic nd foreign amifications.

o

deal with

he

socio-

economic

spects,

he

administration

roposed xpansion

f

airports

nd

ports to encourage ourism ),newprogramso trainfishermen,rovi-

sions

for limited

mount f

barter

radebetween abah

and

Zamboanga

and

Jolo,

n

Amanah

ank (primarily

o make oans to

Muslims),

govern-

ment harteringf

ship

for he

Mecca

pilgrimagepassage

was

free r

sub-

sidized

f

gunswere

urrendered),

tc.

t

also established number f or-

ganizations

o

plan toimplement

he

programs

nd announced he

commit-

ment

f

significant

esources.20

At the same time, the

administrationssued

reminders hat no

socio-economic

rograms ould be begun

until

peace

and

orderwerere-

stored.By April1973,half of the62,000men n thePhilippineArmed

Forces

were stimatedo be in

Mindanao,

nd thearmed

orceswere

being

expanded

steadily.21

They were also

being bolstered by deliveries of

mili-

tary quipment rom

heU.S. and bypurchases lsewhere.

ilitary erson-

nel

n

the

outh poke

of sanitizing reas and search

nd destroy

mis-

sions.There were

reports f planes

daily strafingreas ofpresumed ebel

concentration.n March

1973 thegovernment

egan ssuing

rms

to

local

self-defensenits.The

effect as to increase heweapons vailable

to

the

Ilagas and to give

hem aramilitarytatus.Apparently

uslimsweregiven

armsonly n Sulu, and thereMuslimgovernmentupportersomplained

that heywerenot

given dequate

mmunition.

Marcosmoved

mmediatelyo win the

support-or

neutralize he

op-

position-of

establishedMuslim eaders.

He called abouttwo hundred f

them-Conogressmen,

elegates o the

Constitutionalonvention,overnors,

mayors,

eaders fprominentlans-to a

peace conference

n

earlyJanuary

1973.

He offered

elective

mnesty

or

fighters

ho

surrendered,

eiterated

hisprograms f

economic eform,nd

said government

roopswere n

the

southern

hilippines

not to fight

Muslimsbut to

identify

nd

segregate

foreignnsurgents,ifany. He said hehad informationhat oreign-trained

and

foreign-armedroopswereactive n

Mindanao.22

The datushad

little nfluence,ince

martial aw left

hem o power nd

the

ebels'

deology

eft hem o

authority.ther ffortsenteredn extend-

ingamnesty eriods nd

sending pecial

delegations o

negotiate. he

ad-

ministration

as dealing, ccording o Press

Secretary rancisco

Tatad,

with

combined

lementsfoutlaws, iratesndsecessionists

ed by

a

young

Maoist

leadership. 23

The

basic scheme

orundercuttinghe rebels, hen,was

to offer

hem

hope hrough romises f socio-economicrograms,onvince hem hrough

military

orce hat

hey ould notwin on their wnterms,

rovide mnesty

as a

transition,

nd

usemediatorso make

ure hey eceived

ll themessages

20The

New York

Times

reported

n

May 11, 1973

that

the reconstructionnd

de-

velopment

rogram or

Mindanao was

budgeted

t

$135

million

for

three

years;

on

Sep-

tember

,

1974,

t

citeda

figure f

$63

million

for

four

years.

2 Los

Angeles

Times,

April 9,

1973.

22New

York

Times,

January ,

1973.

23NewYork

Times,

March

17,1973.


11/21

462 ETHNICITY N THE PHILIPPINES

thegovernment anted ent.

For other

ilipinos hegovernment

estricted

information.ress ensorship as directed t minimizinghe

cale

of

fight-

ing,rebel

uccesses,

nd governmentasualties; and emphasizing

he

gov-

ernment's enerositynd rebel surrenders.

hose

who

surrendered

re.

turned o thefolds f he aw ; thosewho did notwere utlaws, andits, r

Maoists.

Some

of

these

actics

nd classifications

ad relevance

or he

foreign

audience f which hegovernmentas conscious. op governmentfficials

also deliberatelyefrainedrom aming ublicly heforeign ountries hey

suspected f iding he nsurgents. hile ecretaryfForeignAffairs arlos

Romulo nformedothSEATO and ASEAN that he governmentad evi-

denceofforeign

nvolvement,

e did notpress he ssue

n

either ase. Nor

did the governmentake the ssue to the UnitedNations, s it had done

regularly

ith he

claim to Sabah.

There

were ress eports

n

May and June 973 that hePhilippine

ov-

ernmentither irectlyr throughndonesiahad proposed o theMalaysian

government

hat t

wouldrenounce ubliclytsclaimto Sabah if theMalay-

sian

governmentouldgiveassurance hat abah wouldnot give sanctuary

to

Muslimdissidents.n response o questioning bout the reports, un

Razak,

the MalaysianPrime

Minister,

eniedthat the Philippine overn-

ment

ad made any formal roposal r that heMalaysiangovernmentad

any nvolvementith he insurgencyroblem. 24

The

government'sffortschieved omesuccesses. y December here

were

eports

n the

Manila papers fmass surrendersf rebels.Government

troops lso reoccupied reas

in

Basilan and Mindanao. The fighting e-

mained

egionalized;

heN.P.A. in Luzon was surprisinglyuiet.Some of

the ocioeconomic rograms erebegun.

Equally mportant ere ome nternationaluccesses. n late 1972 and

early 1973 a Libyan envoyvisited apitals of statesassociatedwiththe

Islamic ecretariat ith

message

rom adaffi

bout

he

ituation

f

Philip-

pineMuslims. resumablyheenvoywas trying o lobbyfor upport f the

proposals ibya

later made

at

the Islamic

Foreign

Ministers'

Gonference

held

n

Benghazi,

March24-26.Libya wanted

ll

Muslim tates

o

condemn

and severdiplomatic

nd

economicrelations

with

the Philippines.

he

Libyanproposals ost,and theproposals

passed,

after xtensive

ebate,

were

more

moderate.

The

conference

esolved to

appeal

to

peace-loving

tates,

eligious

nd

international

rganizations

o exert

heir

ood

offices ith

he Government

of thePhilippineso haltcampaigns f

violence

gainst

he

Muslim

om-

munity,oensureheirafetyndrealize heir asic iberties. t also named

a

five-man

eam o

visit

he

Philippines

n

three

months,

stablish

volun-

tary

und

o

help Philippine

Muslims,

nd

asked ndonesia

and

Malaysia

to

exert heir

ood

offices

ithinASEAN.25

Saudi

Arabia, ndonesia,

nd

Malaysia

were

redited

ith

aving uccessfullyrgued

he

dangers

f

nter-

fering

n

the nternal

ffairs f

a

sovereign

tate.

24ForeignAffairs

Malaysia,

VI (September

1973),

p. 41.

2'5Asia

Research

Bulletin,

I

(March

1-31,1973), p. 1699.


12/21

LELA GARNER

NOBLE 463

InApril 973

ASEAN foreign

ministers

et

n

Pattaya,

hailand.

ress

reports

ndicated hat he

foreign

ministers onsidered t in

theirmutual

interesto avoidpublicdiscussion

f

divisive

ssues.

After privatemeeting

of

he

Malaysian,

ndonesian,

nd

Philippine

fficials,

he

hree efusedo dis-

cusswhat hey adtalked bout.26 ccording o thefinal ommunique,the

Ministersooknoteof

thepresentationf factsby the

Philippine oreign

Minister

oncerningheMuslimminority

n the Southern

hilippines, s-

pecially he fforts

eing xerted to mprove he

onditionsn thearea.

They lso noted hePhilippine xpression

f gratitudeo

Malaysia and In-

donesia or heir

upport t Benghazi.27

InJune

delegation rom heWorld

slamicLeaguewent o Mindanao

and,according o theManila Daily

Express,

ound roof f

rapid develop-

ment nd heardMuslim eaderspraise

Marcosforhis

concern. he Expressquoted

hehead ofthe

delegations saying, Separation s

absolutely ut of

the

question nd s not

o your nterest. 28hen n

mid-Augusthe slamic

foreignministers'

elegation isited hePhilippines. he

Philippinenews

agency uoted he

delegates s saying hat heywere

onvinced hatMarcos

was

incere

n

solving roblems nd that

ilipinoMuslims

ould xpect ome

aid but houldnot

allow themselveso be

used by extremistsr communist

groups.

9

Finally,

n

November,

n

the ftermath

f

heMiddleEast

war

nd

n

the

midst f oil shortages, arcos publicly ondemnedsrael and calledfor a

withdrawal

f sraeliforces

rom ccupiedArabterritory.he Arabsummit

meeting

n

Algiers

hen

decided o spare

the Philippines rom

urther

uts

in

oil deliveries.

There

was,

however,

n

illusionary

uality o manyof

the

successes.

Reoccupation

f

territory

as

as

frequently

result f rebel tactics

s of

military uccess and as frequently

ssociated with the deterioration

f

law and order s with

ts restoration.

hile one

of theearliest

ctions

of

he

martial

aw

regime

was

to round

p

guns,

henetresult f the

govern-

ment's olicy farmingivilianswastoputmore ndprobably etter eap-

onry

nto

the area. Most of

the

people

armed were avowed

enemiesof

Muslims,

hetherr not

hey

were

dentified ith

ebel

groups.

he

fighting

and

rising

fear

and tensions

reated

n

enormous

umber

f

refugees-

estimates

anged rom

00,000

Marcos'

figure

n

August)

to

980,000-and

the

refugee roblem

was further

omplicated

y

food

shortages

nd con-

tinuing, erhaps

ncreasing,

Muslim

distrust f

government

gencies.

The

government's

rograms,hen,

ppeared

o result

n

more

devastation,

ore

hostility,

nd more

guns.

Thenature fthe ituation as most learly evealed ytherebel's ei-

zure

of

Jolo

n

February

974.

Many

of the

rebelswhom he

Manila

papers

reporteds having urrendered

n

December

973 camefrom ulu. One was

identified

s having een

rained

broad

nd

responsible

ithin

he

M.N.L.F.

Bangkok

Post, April 18, 1973.

27Foreign

ffairs

Malaysia,

VI (June

1973), pp. 30-31.

28Asia

ResearchBulletin, II (August 1-31,

973), p.

1918.

29AsiaResearch Bulletin, II (August

1-31, 1973), p.

2077.


13/21

464

ETHNICITY

N

THE

PHILIPPINES

for

ome

foreign-trained

roops.

everal

were

hadjis,

datus,

nd

imams,

titles

which

uggested

hat

hey

might

ot

fit hepattern

f

econd-generation

leadership.

Whatever

heir

ctual

positions,

hey

were flown o

Manila

to

meet

Marcos,

who

briefed

hem

n plans forthe socio-economic

rogram,

then lown

ack,

stensiblyowootheir ormerollowersnto urrendering.

Militaryeaders

aid that ormer

ebels

were aking he

nitiative

n

hunting

down

the Maoists,

stimated

o be

two or

threehundred

n

number.30

Some people

n

Jolo

believed

hat he

new role

of

these

returnees-armed

withgovernment

eapons

nd including

t least one

known

,outlaw -as

Marcos'

emissaries

t

leastpartially

rompted

he decision

o

seize

Jolo.

Descriptions

fwhat

happened

uring

he eizure

nd

subsequent

ight-

ing

differed,

ut

here

eemed

o be

a

consensus

hat

t east

half f

Jolo

City

wasdestroyed;bouthalfofthepopulationfJoloCity led oSabah,Basi-

lan,

or

Zamboanga;

oss

of

ifewas

high;

and

thegovernment

ontinued

o

use

massive

irepower

gainst

uspected

ebel

hideouts hroughout

he

sland.

These

facts,

lus

what

he

government

laimed

was

new nformation

bout

thenature

nd extent fforeign

nvolvement,

urther

eopardized

hilippine

relations

ith

Muslim ountries,

articularly

ithMalaysia.

n the

context

of

the

ontinuing

rab oil

boycott,

hese elations

were

critical.

The Philippines

ttempted

o deal

with

he

nternational

amifications

n

twoways.

t

tried

o

stop

Malaysia

from

iving

r permitting

hat

t

was

convinced asdirect ndcritical id totherebels, nd it tried o staveoff

condemnation

nd consequent

il

cuts.

About

80%

of

Philippine

il

came

from

Middle

Eastern ources, rimarily

audi

Arabia.31

A

widely

istributed

ssociated

ress dispatch

uoted

authoritatively

informed

iplomatic

ources

s saying

hat he

Philippine

overnment

ad

new

vidence

hatMalaysia

had supplied

raining,

rms

nd ammunition

or

therebels.

artially

ased

on

signed

tatements

rom

M.N.L.F.

captives,

he

informationas

that

Malaysian

raining

or

Muslim uerillas

egan

n

1969

when

ive atches

otaling

0

menwere

takento Pulau Pangkor,

ff

West

Malaysia, rtoLahad DatuandBangueysland, nSabah.NurMisuariwas

among

he 0

trained. ince

1972,

Malaysian

ources

ad

arranged

andings

to deliver

t east

200,000

rounds

f

ammunition

nd 5407 weapons.

Malay-

sian naval

boatsmade

their

astknown elivery

n December

1,

1973.

The

sources

lso

cited

n

intercepted

etter

ritten

y

Rascid

Lueman

on

June

,

1972;

it

said

that

un Mustapha

rovided

50,000

pesos

to Misuari nd

to

Dr. Saleh Loong,

whose

relatives

were dentified

s activist eaders.

The

money

was for ecruiting

00

men.32

An

article

n

the

Far

Eastern

EconomicReview

written

romManila

sources ontainedmuchofthe same nformation,ut said thatmoneywas

originally

hanneled hrough

lder

Mindanao

Muslims-including

ueman,

who

had

an

army

alled

Ansar

El

Islam. Misuari

nd his companions,

ho

had

formed

heM.N.L.F.

whileat

Pulau

Pangkor,

eturned

o work

with

8 Bulletin

oday,

Manila),

December

2, 6, 11,

1973.

81FarEastern

Economic

Review,

March 18, 1974,

p.

23.

2Asia

Research

Bulletin,

II (March

31, 1974), pp. 2535-2536;

Straits

Times,

March

11, 1974.


14/21


15/21

466

ETHNICITY N

THE PHILIPPINES

Indonesian

onvictionhatManila

shouldmake

every fforto talk to

the

activists'

eadership. he Philippine

tatements

tressed he friendly

ela-

tions etween

hePhilippines

nd Indonesia nd

themultinational

haracter

of ASEAN

but omitted

referencen an earlier

draft, o which

he

Indo-

nesianshad apparentlybjected, o Indonesia's ppreciationorManila's

effortso

upliftts Muslim

minority.38

Philippineolicies

n relation o

otherMuslim tates nvolved

fforts

t

de-Muslimizingherebel

eadership

y

persistentlydentifyinghe

ttackers

on

Jolo s Maoist.

The

governmentlso tried o

revise ownward

stimates

of

damage,

articularly

hat ausedby government

helling.

he

primary

targetwas

Arnold eitlin,AP correspondent

n

the Philippines, hosere-

ports rom

olo

had been

widely irculated. letter

o theforeign

ministers

of

Egypt,

audi Arabia,

nd Kuwait,

igned y Romulo, laimed

o clarify

the false tory y Zeitlin,suspectedo be a Jewishournalist, f alleged

continued

illing fMuslims

y Philippine overnment

roops.

eitlin

im-

selfwas summoned

efore

heMediaAdvisory ouncil

o answer

harges f

malicious,

alse and

erroneous

eporting;. 39

Theattack n Zeitlin

was counterproductive,

ut theMaoist

dentifica-

tion ampaign

pparently elped.

Whether r not

he

M.N.L.F.

leaderswere

Maoist-and

Manilapresentedo evidence

hat hey

were-theywere learly

radical nd

secessionist,

nd too manyMuslim tates

ad their

wn ounter-

parts o be enthusiasticbout ondemning anila.The Saudi Arabianfor-

eign minister

aid another isit o

Manila,

talked

withPhilippineeaders,

pledged

is governments

upportor hePhilippine

overnment's

ttempts

to solve he

problem,

nd promised

hat il would ontinue o

flow.40

Manila

was also anxious

bout

he slamic ummit

cheduled

or

ahore

in

Februarynd the slamic

foreign

ministers

eeting cheduled

or

Kuala

Lumpur n

June. he issue apparently

as not

discussed t

Lahore,

hough

the

report rom he four

foreign

ministers hovisited

he

Philippines

n

August 973

was circulated

nd a

decisionwasmadeto keep

t

secret.

Therewas,however,onsiderableiscussionttheKuala Lumpurmeet-

ings,

despiteMalaysia's

position hat he situation

f

Muslim

minorities

n

the

Philippines

as besthandled

y

ASEAN.41

The

Libyanforeign

minister

raised he ssue

n his

opening peech.

He characterized

he

misery

f

Philip-

pine

Muslims s no

less horrifying

han hat

faced

by

the

Arabs and

their

sacraments

n

Palestine nd

said

that

he

conference

hould

onsider

ind-

ing

a

political

olution or a problem

which

was

not social

but

political.42

In an interviewe admitted

hat ibya

and

other

tates

were

ctivelyiding

the fighting

hilippineMuslims.

He

refused

o

name

the other

tates,

ut

denied hatLibyanarmswerebeingchanneled hroughMalaysia.He also

maintainedhat ibyawould ontinue

ts

support

ntil

he

Philippine ov-

ernmentegotiated

political

ettlement,

hich

was

possible,

e

thought,

f

8Far

asternEconomicReview,

June

10, 1974,pp.

16-17.

39Philippine imes,March31,1974.

40AsiaResearch Bulletin, II (March 31, 1974), p.

2535.

4 FarEasternEconomic

Review,June

24, 1974, p. 18.

42Malaysia, ressrelease

(PEN. 6/74/153 Haluar),

Libyan

Leader

Replies

to Tun

Razak's Address,

June 1,

1974.


16/21

LELA GARNER NOBLE

467

Marcos wouldmeetwith

heFront eaders. If these eople re

listened

o,

they re reasonable nough orealize hat hey re part f hePhilippines

nd

will cooperatewithin he frameworkf the

Government,

e said.

But

he

notedthat hus

far,

rather han aking ny practical teps o improve

he

situation, he Philippines ad simply ncreased ts military orces n the

South.43

In contrast,he ndonesian

pening tatementeportedhat hePhilip-

pinegovernmentad accepted

he stablishmentf MuslimWelfare gency,

financed hroughhe slamicSecretariatn cooperation ith he

Philippine

government,nd that the inceritynd willingnessf PresidentMarcos

to

work oward n integratedhilippine

ociety n whichMuslims ould as-

sume heir ightfullace werenot o be

doubted.. 44

uring hedebate n-

donesia rgued hat call for just solution houldbe moderatedy the

phrase within he frame-work

f the national overeigntynd

territorial

integrity f the Philippines.

Malaysia reportedlywantedthe phrase

excised.45

Thefinal

ommunique

ontainedour oints. he firstalled

on

the

Phil-

ippinegovernmento stop all

actionsresultingn the killing f

Muslims

and destructionf heir roperties

nd placesofworship. hesecond

tated

the

conviction f the conference:

that he ocio-economiceasures roposed ythePhilippine overnment

to improve

he

condition

ftheMuslimswould

not

by

themselvesolve

the

problemndurged he

Philippine

overnment

o

find

political

nd

peacefulolutionhrough

egotiationithMuslimeaders

nd

particularly,

with

epresentatives

f heMoro

National

iberation

ront

n order o

ar-

rive

t

a

just

olutiono he light f he ilipino

Muslims ithin

he rame-

work f

he

national

overeignty

nd erritorial

ntegrity

f he

hilippines.

The

third ppealedto peace-lovingtates nd religious

nd

international

authorities, hile recognizing

he problem s an

internal

roblem

f

the

Philippines, ouse their ood officeso ensure he safetynd liberties f

PhilippineMuslims. he final

point nnounced decision

o

create

Fili-

pino

Muslim

Welfare nd Relief

Agency nd called

for contributions

o

supportts operation.46

After he

onferencewo

pokesmen

or heM.N.L.F.

n

Kuala

Lumpur

said

they

were

fullyn accord

with he etter nd spirit f

the

ommunique,

but

Marcos

wouldhave to take

the nitiative

n

starting egotiations.

is

43InMay Marcos announced that the manpowerof the PhilippineArmed Forces

would double in the next

year, going from

he current100,000 to 256,000.

Philippine

Times, May

5, 1974. An article n the

FEER

on May

20,

1974, contrasted

he

100,000

figurewith

60,000, he AFP

manpower t the time martial

aw was declared,

and

the

currentAFP

budget of $300

million,

22%

of the national

budget,

with the

1971

figure

of $90 million.

t said that

two-thirds f the

AFP's

maneuver

battalions

were

stationed

in Mindanao.

See also Far Eastern Economic

Review, July

1, 1974, pp.

12-13;

July

8,

1974,pp. 10-11; and Straits

Times,June

26,

1974;

New York

Times,June27,

1974.

Straits

Times,June 4,

1974.

New York Times,June

27,

1974.

StraitsTimes,June 6,

1974.


17/21

468

ETHNICITY

N

THE

PHILIPPINES

failure o

meet he

demand or

political

olution

would

mean

hat

we

will

continue

ur

struggleor

iberation

ntil

wecan

enjoythe

blessing f

na-

tional

freedom

nd

independence.

he

Libyan

foreign

minister,

nother

Libyandiplomat,nd theSaudi Arabianforeignminister ent o Sabah,

where he

wo

Libyans,

utnot

he

Saudi

Arabian,

were

eported

s

receiv-

ing

Datukships

from

abah's head

of

state.47

The

Lebanese

oreign

minister ent

o

Manila,

where

Marcos

gave

him

the

Sultan

Kuderat

Award

for

his

role n

protecting

he

sovereignty

nd

integrity f

the

Philippines

at

the

slamic

ministers'

onference.

Marcos

also

proclaimed

mnesty

or ll

Muslim

ebels,

uled

ut

military

olution o

the

Muslim

nsurgency,

ledged

ncreased

conomic

id,

and

promised

hat

ll

Filipino

minority

roups

would

be given

an

active

political

voice

in

the

country. 48n Mindanao,Muslim ttacks ad beentimed o coincidewith

the

Kuala

Lumpur

meetings,

nd

intense

ighting

ontinued.

In the

ollowing

onths

eace

moves nd

fighting

emained

uxtaposed.

When

Tun

Razak

offered

he

defense

ortfolioo

Tun

Mustapha

fter

he

September

974

Malaysian

elections)

most

nalysts

houghthat

the

offer

representedn

effort,

ictated

y

both

nternalnd

international

onsidera-

tions,

o

get

Mustapha

utof

Sabah.Tun

Mustapha, owever,

ostponed

c-

cepting he

position.n

early

January

975the

Philippine

overnment

aid

that

Hassan

Al

Tohamy,

he

Egyptian

ecretaryf

the

slamic

Conference,

was nManilaonthe hirdhuttlef a peaceeffortndthatMarcoswasop-

timistic

hat

eacewas

n

sight.

hen

he

government

nnounced

hat

Marcos

had

sent

top

evel

delegation

o

meet

Al

Tohamy n

Jeddah

with he

hope

of

having

alkswith

Misuari nd

other

nsurgent

eaders.

he

talks

wereheld

and

deadlocked

uickly.

hey

were

re-scheduledor

April,

before nother

Islamic

meetingn

May.

News

reports

aid

that

oth

Muslim nd

government

forces

were

ntensifying

heir

military

fforts

ndcited

ncreasing

igures

f

dead

and

wounded,

s

many s

1.7

million

eople

dislocated,

roowingolar-

ization

fthe

population,

nd

disruption

f

economic

ctivities

hroughout

Mindanao ndSulu.

Conclusions

The

argument

asbeen

that

he

xperiencef

the

1960s

convinced he

policy-makers

fboth

Malaysia

and

the

Philippineshat

heir

egimeswere

unstable

nd

vulnerable.

he

vulnerability

as

caused

in

partby

internal

conflicts,

hich

n

both

ountries

ere

elated

o

ethnic

actors.

n

Malaysia,

the

cleavage

between

hinese

nd

Malayswas

perceived s

primary,

nd

conflicts

ithin

oth

he

Chinese nd

Malay

communitiesver

radical,

mod.

erate,ndconservativeositionswere inked othebasic conflictfChinese-

Malay

relationships.

here

was

another

leavage-ethnic

as well

as

geo-

graphic,

istorical,nd

economic-betweenhe

peoples

of

mainland

Malay-

sia

and

those

f

Sarawak

nd

Sabah.

This

cleavage

retained

potential

or

conflict

nd for

ecession. oth

cleavages

reenforced

he

political

owerof

Tun

Mustapha.

Far

Eastern

Economic

Review,

July ,

1974.

San

Francisco

Chronicle,

une 9

and 30,1974.


18/21

LELA

GARNER

NOBLE

469

In the

Philippines

onflict as

defined

rimarily

n

socioeconomic,

political,

nd

ideological

erms.n

the southern

hilippines,

owever,

on-

flict

as

particularly

ntense,

as

defined

n

ethnic

or

religious)

erms,nd

had

clear

ethnic

manifestations.

A second esult f he 960swasthe ealizationhat elations ith eigh-

boring tateswere

mportant

orother

han

ymbolic

easons.

Malaysia

not

onlyhad

the

xperiencef

confrontation

ith

ndonesia,

with

ts

accom-

panying

nfiltrationf

guerrillas

nto he

Borneo

tates,

ut

also

the

aware-

ness hat

ritain

ould

notbe

counted

n

to

subsidize

second

uch

experi-

ence.

The

Philippines

ad

also had

some

ndonesian

nfiltration

uring

he

Sukarno

eriod,

nd

it

suspected hat

Malaysia,or

at least

Sabah,

had

re-

acted o

ts

pursuit

f

the laim

to

Sabah

by

supporting

uslim

dissidents.

The

lesson,

hen,

was that

nternational

onflict

ould

exacerbate

omesticconflict;heresultwas a major emphasisput on shared

cooperationn

ASEAN.

The maj

r

conflict

n

the

wo tates

fter heir

econciliationn

Decem-

ber

1969has been

the

Muslim

nsurgency

n the

Philippines.

espite

Malay-

sia's

self-conscious

dentifications a

Muslim

tate,Malaysian

olicy n

rela-

tion

o the

nsurgencyas

been

circumspect:

t has

denied

giving

upporto

the

ebels,

nd

n

slamic

meetings

thas

generally

nsisted

hat he

Philippine

situation

as an

internal

ffair f

the

Philippines nd

that

what

nterna-

tionalramificationshematter ad couldbestbe handledwithASEAN.

Sabah,

however,as continued

o

play

a

critical

ole

n

the

nsurgency,f t

has done

nothingmore han

provide

sanctuarynd

supply

depotfor he

rebels.

Philippine

fficial

pokesmen ave

refrained

rom

public

criticism

of

Malaysia

nd

also

worked o maintain

ooperation

n

ASEAN.

Bilaterally,

however,

he

wo tates

ave

had

significantly

ewer

irect

ontacts

ith

ach

other

han

ither as had

with

ny

other

tate n

ASEAN.

By 1974

therela-

tionship

as

showing

ncreasing

igns

f

train, hichwas

ikely o

continue

if

onflict

ontinued,

nd

certainly

f t

expanded,

n

the

outhern

hilippines.

Whetherrnotfightingxpandsdepends rimarilyn actions f the

Marcos dministration

nd theMuslim

ctivists.f

the

Marcos

regime

oes

what he slamic

oreign

ministers

uggested,

r

even

what

t

has

said it

will

do,

hen t

may

ucceed

n

stopping

he

nsurgency.

ost

observers,

owever,

doubt

he

apacity

f he

government

o

do

so,

whatever

heir

valuations

f

the

incerity

f ts

nnouncedntentions.

eservations

enter

n three

oints:

the

socio-economic

roposals,

olitical

power,

nd

implementation.

The

socioeconomic

roposals,

ritics

ay,

have

been

distressingly

uper-

ficial;

ome

fthem

ppear

o

have

the

potential

f

compounding

roblems,

particularlynMindanao.WhileMarcoshastalked f andreform-ofdis-

tributing

and not

only

o tenants ut also

to

non-landholding

uslims-he

has

allowed

oreign-backed

lantations

o

expand

heir

andholdings

n

Min-

danao.

Urging

ompanies

rom lsewhere

n

the

Philippines

o

expand

nto

Mindanao

eems ess

likely

o

increase

mployment,

ts

avowed

purpose,

than

o ncrease

urtherhe

nflux

f

Christians ith

ominatingositions

n

the

economy.

f

equal

importance

s

the

regime's

growing

ropensity

o

arrest

recisely

hose

people

whohave been

most

dentified

ith

fforts

o


19/21

470

ETHNICITY

N THE

PHILIPPINES

bring bout

genuinely

edistributive

conomic

hange:

members

ftheFed.

eration f

Free Farmers

nd Catholic

nd Protestant

lergy

ssociatedwith

them, or xample.

Meanwhileolitical

ower

as been

teadilyentralized.

t is focused

n

Marcosandhisfamilynd friends; haredwith echnocrats hoseemto

haveauthority

ithin

imited

ontexts;

nd supplemented

y

relics

from r

recruits

nto

theold clientelist

ystem,

ith eaders

bribing

r frightening

followersnto

quiescence

r participation

n public

meetings.

n this itua-

tion t is difficult

o find olesfor

Muslims.

omeof

them

ave beenfitted

into

technocratic,

r at least

bureaucratic,

lots,

s indicated

y announce-

ments

f

Muslim

ppointments.

he Muslim

Council

nnounced

n

May was

composed

f

Muslimswho

wereformer

members f

Congressnd

the Con-

stitutionalonvention,

etiredmbassadors,

nd retiredmilitary

menwith

at east he ank fcolonel. uccessful ractitionersf theold-styleolitics,

they an hardly

e

expected

o give

advice on socio-economic

hange;

nor

can Rascid

Lucman,

ecognized

arlier

s the Paramount

ultan

of

the

nineteenRoyal

Houses of

Mindanao

nd Sulu. Subdividing rovinces

o

create

new

ones

has

primarily

xpanded

political

opportunities

or

army

commanders,

nd

Muslimofficers

ave been

noticeably

ew n thesouth.

M.N.L.F.

eaders

have

explicitly

ejected

hese

kinds

of

arrangements.

t is

difficulto

conceive

f

anyarrangements

hichwill

appeal

to them

nd

to

Marcos, incethe ssence f themartialawregimes concentrationf

au-

thority

hile

he

ctivists'

minimum

emands all for

utonomy.

Concern

ver he

apacity

f he egimeo mplement

eforms

as

noted

that

t ocal

evels oth

ivilian

nd

military

ersonnel

ave shown

ittle

vi-

dence

f new

society

haracteristics.

oldiers

n

Mindanao

nd

Sulu

have

been

criticized

requently

or

drunkenness,

andom

firings,

nd

looting.

Theymay

well

be

frightened

nd

alienated,

ut

they

re making

ittle

on-

tribution

o

encouraging

uslim rust

n the

regime.

Marcos'

advisers

nd

military

ommanders

re themselvesivided

s to therelative

riority

o

be

givento purelymilitary s comparedwithpoliticaland socio-economic

actions

n

the outh.

he division eems

ufficient

o obstruct

mplementation

as

well

s

formationf

policy.

As

for he

nsurgents,

heyppear

ohave everal ptions.

hey

an

con-

tinue

strategy

imed

at secession

nd the

formation

f

a

Moro

People's

Republic.

hey

an

align

with ther

nti-Mtiarcos

roups

n the

Philippines

in

an

effort

t internal

evolution.

r

they

an

stop

or

reduce

ighting,

ith

orwithout

negotiated

easefire

nd/or

peace

settlement,

ntil

onditions

under

Marcos

re

clearly

etter r

worse.

Secessionwouldbe difficultecause of theadamant pposition fthe

Philippine

overnment,

hich

s based

at least

partially

n Sulu's

recently

confirmed

il

potential.

hristians

ominate

n

many

reas ofMindanao nd

are

now

armed

o

such

a

degree

s to constitute

major

obstacle.Major

fighting

ould

have

to

be subsidized

eavily y

Muslim

tates,nd it s

du-

bious

that

upport

t

that evelwould

be

risked.

The second option

would

not

necessarily

nvolve acrificing

uslim

identity,

rievances,

r

causes,

but

would

emphasize

rievances

nd objec-


20/21

LELA GARNER

NOBLE

471

tives

haredwith

ther

roups n the

Philippines. he

status fthe

National

Democratic ront

ndthe

elationshipmong

he

N.P.A. and thenow

argely

undergroundederation f

Free

Farmers nd

Christians or

National iber-

ation re

not lear t this

oint.

here

does,however,

eem o

be a basis

for

cooperation,ndcontinuingrrests freligiouseadersmaywell trengthen

that

asis.Needless o

say,

hiskind

of effort

as as much

otential or

vio-

lenceas

theothernd

considerably

orepotential or

hostile

utside

nter-

vention.

Whateverhe state

of

detentes

heUnited

States s

more ikely

o

provide

weapons or

ighting

communists hanfor

fighting

uslims.

ur-

rentMuslim id

might lso

be jeopardized.But if

the Muslim

eadership

chooses to

fight or

fundamental

hifts n

politicaland

socio-economic

power,

t

may find

moreallies

amongnon-Muslim

ilipinosthan

among

non-Filipinouslims.

Otherwiseeaders

ave

the

hoice

of

temporarily

r

permanently

ban-

doning he fight.

osses

like thosesufferedn

Jolo

might ncourage his

approach.

Pressure rom

Muslim tates nd

significant

oncessions rom

Marcos

might avethe ame

effect.

pecifically,

f

Marcosoffersoncessions

along

the

inesof the

proposals

n theKuala

Lumpur

ommunique,

nd

if

internationaluslim

eaders re

nvolved

n

negotiations

n a

way

that

on-

vinces

hem fMarcos'

intentions

oward nd

capability or their

mple-

mentation,

hen he ctivists'

eaders

may

have

o settle or

ess

than

ecession.

The subjectofethnicitynd internationalelations emands onclu-

sions

t another

evel.For

Malaysia

and the

Philippines,

nternationalon-

flictn

the1960s

appeared o have

the

potential or

exacerbating

omestic

conflict

nvolvingthnic

roups. n the

1970s,

domestic

onflict,

articularly

that

nvolving

hilippine

Muslims,

hreatened

o eopardize

deliberatelyul-

tivated

nternationalooperation.

Philippine-Malaysian

elationslso

suggest ther

onsiderations

hich

maybe

significant

ortheory

uilding.

hroughoutmostof the

period,

t

was more

mportantor

Philippine-Malaysianelations

hatboth tates

ad

plural ocietiesnd were n proximityo each other han hat heMuslims

in

the

Philippines ere

minority,

n

Malaysia majority. ut

more

trong-

ly,

the

dentity

f

the

ethnic roups

matteredess than

the factthat

here

were

thnic ivisions. he

fact hat

hetwostates

were djacent o one

an-

other nd

confronted

ommon egional

roblems

matteredmore

thanthat

they

had

common

opulations. he

decisive

factor ffecting

hilippine-

Malaysian

elations as

that heireadersfelt

mutually

ulnerable.

n

both

states

domesticnstability

as

accompanied y more

pragmatic

oreign

policies.

This is not to say that t was insignificanthat hePhilippine thnic

group

which

rganized or ecession

was

Muslim. t has been

argued

that

Islamic

heology

as distinctive

olitical

mplicationsnd has

linked

hose

implicationso the

nsistence f

twentieth

enturyndian

Muslims hat

hey

be

given

separate tate.49

Whether r not

the Islamic

resurgence

t-

49Wilfred

.

Smith,

slam

in

Modern

History

New

York:

The

New

American

Library,

nc.,

957).


21/21

472

ETHNICITY N

THE

PHILIPPINES

tributedo

the

Philippinesn

the1950s

and

1960shad

direct

eparatistm-

plications,

t seems

clear

thatyoung

PhilippineMuslims

who

studied n

schools n

predominately

uslim

ountries

nd

participatedn

Islamic or-

ganizations ecame o discontented ithconditionsn theirowncountry

that

hey

rovided he

nucleus or he

secessionist

ovement.

Certainlycommon

dentifications

Muslims,

ccentuated

y the

con-

centration

f the

Muslim

population n a

geographically

arginal

rea of

the

ountry,

rovided

hebond

which

inkedeaders

nd

followers.

hough

themselves

ivided nto

ub-groupso

distinct

hat hey

an be

classified s

ethnic

ntities,he

Muslim

dentity as

the

critical ne.

PhilippineMuslims

felt ifferent

rom

Filipinos

because

Filipinos

were

Christian:

hey elt

Filipinos

iscriminated

gainst hem

ecause

theywere

Muslim.

Whether

ornota separate tatewas a religiousmperative,t seemed obe a logical

one. In

relation

o

the

Philippine

overnment,

uslim-ness as the

ethnic

identification

hichmattered.

Moreover,

most

fthe

external

ssistance

o

the

ecessionists as

come

from

wo of the

most

self-consciously

slamic

leaders,

Kadaffi nd

Tun

Mustapha.

t is

possible

o

argue

that,

fter

orregidor,

un

Mustapha

had

enough

ostility

oward he

Philippine

overnment

nd a

closeenough

er-

ritoryo

provide

ncentive

nd

capability or

nvolvement

n

any

nsurgency

in

the

Philippines,

nd

that

Kadaffi's

nvolvements

ith

nsurgentroups

havenotbeen imited o thosewithMuslimparticipation.till there s no

evidenceinking

ither

with ther

nsurgentroups n

the

Philippines,

nd

public

tatementsy

Libyan

officials

dmitting

nd

advocating

upport ave

stressed

slamic

bonds.

If

concern

ather

han ctive

upports

considered,

he

mportance

f

the

ebels'

Muslim

dentifications

alsoevident.While

he

oncern

as

been

qualified

ythe

ctivists'

ecessionism

s well as

by their

adicalism,

t has

remained

trong

nough

o give

Marcos

genuine

ause for

anxiety. ince

not

simply he

country's

eputationut

ts

oil

supply s at

stake,

Documents

Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations