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DETAIL DESCRIPTION OF EURO BONDS
Citation preview
Carl‐Erik Torgersen
LL.M. Program
April, 2012
International Finance: Seminar
Professor Hal Scott
EUROBONDS
LL.M. short paper
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3
II. Background ......................................................................................................................... 4
A. History of Eurobonds .......................................................................................................... 4
B. Eurobonds and the current European sovereign debt crisis .............................................. 6
C. Legal issues ......................................................................................................................... 7
III. Summary of different Eurobond proposals .................................................................... 9
A. Gros/Micossi .................................................................................................................... 9
B. De Grauwe/Mösen ........................................................................................................ 10
C. Hild/Herz/Bauer ............................................................................................................ 12
D. Muellbauer .................................................................................................................... 14
E. Delpla/von Weizsäcker .................................................................................................. 16
IV. An alternative Eurobond proposal ................................................................................ 19
V. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 23
VI. References ..................................................................................................................... 24
I. Introduction
This paper discusses the major Eurobond proposals put forth by politicians, scholars and
bankers. The paper analyzes the benefits and weaknesses of the various proposals, critically
assesses the concept of Eurobonds, and finally proposes a different Eurobond system.
The paper is structured in the following way: Following this brief introduction, the second
section presents a brief background on Eurobonds, explaining their history and their
implications for the current sovereign debt crisis. It then discusses the legal issues and myths
about Eurobonds.
The third section reviews different Eurobond proposals. Proceeding in chronological order,
the section starts with the first proposal, made by Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi in spring
2009. It then analyzes the proposal made by Paul De Grauwe and Wim Moesen later the
same year. Next, it considers the 2011 proposal by the German legal scholars Alexandra Hild,
Bernhard Herz and Christian Bauer, which uses modern financing instruments. It then turns
to John Muellbauer’s conditional Eurobond proposal in October 2011. The section concludes
by discussing the most elaborate proposal, made by the two economists Jacques Delpla and
Jacob von Weizsäcker.
The last section presents a new Eurobond proposal, which tries to solve the major
drawbacks of the various existing proposals.
II. Background
A. History of Eurobonds
Eurobonds are debt instruments or loans jointly and severally guaranteed by the 27 EU
member states or by the 17 member states of the European Monetary Union. The guarantee
means that if an issuing country cannot service its Eurobonds, the creditors can demand
payment from all other member states.
The concept of such bonds is not new. The first real Eurobond proposal was made by
Jacques Delors, the former president of the European Commission. Delors suggested issuing
Eurobonds to finance the budget of the European Union in 1993. Although this idea was
backed by Romano Prodi, another former president of the European Commission, the
majority of the member states feared an increase in their current debt level and opposed
the idea.1 In 2000, Giovannini Group issued a report that intensified the debate on the
integration of government bond market. However the report concluded that “co‐ordination
involving a joint or single debt instrument was not regarded as a practical option for the Euro
area as a whole.”2 Between 2000 and 2008, there were not any proposals about Eurobonds.
This changed, however, with the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis in late
2009. The crisis prompted many different proposals, which are discussed in detail below, in
section III.
Some scholars argue3 that despite this seemingly unresolved debate, Eurobonds already
exist. As an example, such scholars cite the “New Community Instruments,” which were
developed in the 1970s and 80s to help European member states recover from a natural
1 EURACTIV, EU bonds spark debate as recession hits. 2 Report of the Giovannini Group (2000), Co‐ordinated Public Debt Issuance in the Euro Area, November 3 E.g. CAHIER COMTE BOEL, The creation of a common European bond market § 14 (European League for Economic Cooperation ed., 2010).
disaster or fund projects.4 The New Community Instrument is secured by the European
budget.
Buiter and Rahbari5 describe the European Investment Bank bonds as being close to
Eurobonds. The European Investment Bank is a European institution created to finance long‐
term investment projects by issuing debt. Although the Bank’s founding documents statues
do not refer to joint and several guarantees, Buiter and Rahbari argue that “there is a clear
perception in the markets that the support provided by the 27 EU member states would go
beyond their contribution of the EIB’s subscribed capital.”6 This conclusion is clearly
supported by practice; as the S&P has reported, “[a]bout 90 percent of the loan portfolio [of
the European Investment Bank] was on projects within EU member countries, and nearly all
of the remainder was guaranteed by either the EU or EU member states.”7
Finally, some scholars argue that borrowing under the European Financial Stabilization
Mechanism (EFSM),8 whose object is to preserve financial stability of the European
monetary union, is essentially the same as issuing Eurobonds.9 Under the EFSM, the
Commission is allowed to borrow up to €60 billion in financial markets on behalf of the
Union under an implicit EU budget guarantee.10 This guarantee means that borrowing under
the EFSM is a direct and unconditional obligation, which is guaranteed jointly and severally
by the 27 member states of the European Union. Currently Ireland (with up to €22.5 billion)
4 EURACTIV. 5 BUITER WILLEM. & RAHBARI EBRAHIM., Global Economics View: The future of the euro area. (Citi Group 2011). 6 , 34. 7 BUTT LEILA., Ratings On European Investment Bank Affirmed At 'AAA/A‐1+'; Off Watch Neg; Outlook Negative, S&P (2012). 8 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism. 9 WILLEM. & EBRAHIM. 10 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism.
and Portugal (with up to €26 billion) are using money from the EFSM; if either country
defaults, the debt will be paid out of the European Union’s budget.
B. Eurobonds and the current European sovereign debt crisis
The most comprehensive solution to the current sovereign debt crisis would be a full fiscal
union for the Euro area, in which a central authority controls spending, taxes, and most
important debts. The political climate across Europe, however, means such a union would
face strong oppositions in almost all member states.11 Because the will to keep the Euro
intact is very strong, alternative, less sweeping solutions, such as Eurobonds, have drawn
increasing attention in the past months.
It is essential to note that Eurobonds would not solve the problems of the European Union.
While Eurobonds might help secure short term funding and liquidity, they would not address
the underlying fiscal problems. Specifically, Eurobonds would not increase fiscal discipline,
reduce the sovereign debt level, or help refinance European banks. These are crucial
considerations, and the most sensible approach would be to introduce Eurobonds only in
conjunction with laws that strengthen the enforcement of budgetary rules.12
Given the limits of Eurobonds, proposals should address the problem of fiscal discipline and
create incentives for member states to fulfill their obligations and have their government
finances fundamentally in order.13
11 Member states in the following article is defined as one of the 17 states which currently have the Euro as their currency, unless otherwise indicated. 12 BOONSTRA WIM., Can Eurobonds solve EMU's problems (European League for Economic Cooperation 2011). 13 Id. at
C. Legal issues
There is a great deal of debate among scholars and in the media whether Eurobonds would
be possible at all under the current legal framework of the European Union. One key
argument is that any provision for joint and several liability would contravene Art. 125 of the
Lisbon Treaty (ex Art. 103 TEC), which is commonly known as the “no bail‐out clause”:14
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. 2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.
Buiter and Rahbari argue that this article is often misread.15 Because Art. 125 of the Lisbon
Treaty states that neither the EU nor the individual member states are liable for or can
assume the commitments or public undertakings of any other member state, “without
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project,”16
Buiter and Rahbari conclude that mutual financial guarantees are permitted as long as it is
“for the joint execution of a specific project.”17 The Article does not define “specific project,”
and thus under paragraph 2, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament, can define the term.18 Buiter and Rahbari thus
suggest that Eurobonds could be a “project” to reinforce sovereign debt sustainability in the
14See e.g. GROS DANIEL., Eurobonds: Wrong solution for legal, political, and economic reasons. (Vox 2011). 15 WILLEM. & EBRAHIM. 16 Art. 125 of the Lisbon Treaty 17 Art. 125 of the Lisbon Treaty 18 WILLEM. & EBRAHIM.
Euro area or a “project” to recapitalize systemically important EU banks. As anything can be
declared a “specific project,” Art. 125 does not create any legal obstacles to Eurobonds.
On another reading, Art. 125 of the Lisbon Treaty might only prohibit situations in which
individual member states are made liable against their will. If Eurobonds were created
pursuant to a voluntary guarantee by some member states, then there would be no treaty
limitation.
Without going into too much detail in the legal discussion, it is safe to say that there are thus
at least different approaches to comply with the legal framework. Additionally,
notwithstanding the foregoing, it would certainly be possible to change Art. 125 of the
Lisbon Treaty if this should be the will of the European Union.
III. Summary of different Eurobond proposals
Regardless of any legal concerns — and notwithstanding Eurobonds’ inability to address the
full range of fiscal problems confronting Europe — the current sovereign debt crisis sparked
renewed interest in the concept of Eurobonds. This section reviews the major proposals and
critiques the drawbacks of each of them.
A. Gros/Micossi
In the spring of 2009, Gros and Micossi identified two factors of the crisis as particularly
concerning: the extreme volatility of financial markets, which leads companies to cut back on
investments, and the difficulties of the banking sector.19 They suggested that the EU set up a
massive European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) on the scale of the Troubled Assets Relief
Program in the US. Gros and Micossi argue that the EFSF should issue bonds “on the
international market with the explicit guarantee of member states, and as the rationale for
the EFSF would be crisis management, its operations should be wound down after a pre‐
determined period, perhaps of five years.”20 Under this proposal, the money from the EFSF
would be used either to recapitalize banks or to strengthen the existing EU instruments for
balance of payments assistance in the European region.21
Gros and Micossi conclude that there would be no risk for global investors, as these EFSF
bonds would be practically riskless. Further, they estimate that there would be a huge
demand, because investors everywhere have developed a strong preference for public debt.
19 GROS DANIEL. & MICOSSI STEFANO., A bond‐issuing EU stability fund could rescue Europe (2009). 20 Id. at 21 Id. at
This would develop a unified market for Eurobonds, guaranteed jointly by the EU member
states; with this development, the Euro could become a leading reserve currency like the
dollar.
The authors were aware of the moral hazard problem their proposal could generate and
address this concern by specifying that a common guarantee would not necessarily imply
that stronger member countries would have to pay for the mistakes of others. They explain
that losses could be distributed across member countries according to where they arose.
Under the proposal, the European Investment Bank would be used for issuing the bonds as it
has the necessary expertise and is an agency of EU government.
Gros and Micossi offered the first proposal after the crisis of 2008. Notably, they correctly
anticipated the EFSF, which was established more than a year later. However, they
recommend creating Eurobonds only temporarily to solve the crisis. To create a sustainable
and liquid Eurobond market, as they suggest, it is essential to issue Eurobonds not only
temporarily but permanently.
Further, the moral hazard problem is not addressed completely, as strong member states
would have to pay for weak member states in a default. In fact, weak member states would
also have no incentives for financial discipline.
B. De Grauwe/Mösen
De Grauwe and Mösen argue that the dramatic increase of credit spreads on certain
member states’ debt in the beginning of 2009 created distortions. A low response to fiscal
stimuli and a growing perception of likely default with negative externalities and spillover
made it impossible for the member states to find a way out of the recession22. To solve these
problems, the authors propose two different solutions.
First, they propose that the European Central Bank buy government bonds of distressed
states (quantitative easing). This would reduce the spreads in government bonds in the
Eurozone and would therefore reduce the distortions and the externalities that these
spreads created.
Second, the authors propose that member states replace national bonds with euro
denominated bonds guaranteed collectively by the governments of the Eurozone. The bonds
would be issued either by the European Investment Bank or by the member states
themselves.
The authors argue that the advantage of their plan is that countries facing high spreads
would have easier access to funding. In turn, this access should give those states more time
to implement new fiscal mechanisms to reduce their sovereign debt.
De Grauwe and Mösen address the free riding problem by adding several characteristics to
the issue of Eurobonds. In a first step, each member state would participate in the issue on
the basis of its equity share in the European Investment Bank. The coupon of the Eurobonds
would be a weighted average of the yields observed in each government bond market at the
moment of the issue. The resources from the Eurobonds then would be allocated to each
member state using the same weights. However, each member state would still pay the
yearly interest rate on its portion of the bond.23
22 DE GRAUWE PAUL. & MÖSEN WIM., Gains for all: A proposal for a common euro bond (May‐June 2009 ed. 2009). 23 Id. at
As an illustrative example, the authors use the February 2009 data and conclude that Greece
would pay a yearly interest rate of 5.7 percent on its portion of the hypothetical bond, while
Germany would pay only 3.1 percent. The only reason countries such as Greece would
participate in such a system would be if they could not sell their bonds and were completely
shut out from the market. On the other hand, strong countries like Germany would not have
to fear a free riding problem by weaker member states.
There are two limitations to this proposal: First, weak countries would only join if they could
not finance themselves on the capital market, which would mean that they were practically
insolvent. If such countries joined, there would be a high chance that they would default
soon afterwards, leaving the other countries with the joint liability.
Second, interest rates for countries such as Greece and Italy would be too high a five‐year
maturity bond would have a rate of over 7 percent. (Admittedly, at the time of the proposal
the interest rate would not have been so high.) In addition, fiscal reforms, which normally
would be reflected in the yearly interest rate on bonds, would not have any effect because
the rates would “frozen” to a certain level when the bonds were issued. Accordingly,
member states would have less incentive to implement them such reforms.
C. Hild/Herz/Bauer
The authors propose a Eurobond structure using asset‐backed securities.24 A special purpose
vehicle would buy a portfolio of member states’ debt instruments and then issue Eurobonds
with varying risk and rating. Once the Eurobonds were subdivided into different tranches by
24 ALEXANDRA. HILD, et al., Structured Eurobonds (11.07.2011 ed. 2011).
the SPV, investors could buy them according to risk level. Under this proposal, the different
Eurobonds are all claims against the pooled underlying portfolio (figure 1). The advantage of
such a system is that when different tranches are created, the default risk lies within the
lowest tranche, resulting in a large share of low risk shares. The reduction in risk leads to
lower interests and savings. In a simulation, the authors show that all member states,
regardless of credit rating, can benefit through interest savings.
The authors suggest that in order to secure the ABS‐structure, a trust fund should be
installed that covers the first losses if a country defaults. The trust fund should be financed
with around 10 percent of the initial cash that flows from the SPV to the countries.25
Figure 1: The structure from the ABS transaction26
The authors claim that there are two advantages from this structure: First, member states
have only partial liability instead of joint and several liability, ensuring that all countries
could benefit. Second, interest gains are distributed to all member states and not only weak
countries.
25 Id. at 26 Id. at
This proposal’s main focus is generating liquidity for member states that have difficulty
accessing the debt market. While all member states could benefit under this proposal, there
is unfortunately still no incentive for member states to keep their future budgets balanced.
As explained above, access to liquidity must be linked to fiscal reforms so that weak member
states have a strong incentive to reduce their debts.
D. Muellbauer
Muellbauer argues that “conditional Eurobonds, coordinated nominal wage cuts linked with
limited debt writedowns and bank recapitalization are the lynch‐pin of a successful
resolution”.27 He correctly identifies the need for strong incentives to adopt the fundamental
structural and financial reforms that have yet to move forward in the weak member states.
Conditional Eurobonds are defined as Eurobonds “with a collective underwriting guarantee
which limits the country risk faced by investors and where administratively set spreads
determine the annual side‐payments at below AAA rated countries pay to the AAA‐countries
currently Germany, France the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg. The spreads
would compensate the taxpayers in these countries for their risk in underwriting the bonds
of the riskier countries and would be paid in proportion to the outstanding government
bond issuance of the receiving countries.”28
Muellbauer further suggests that the spread should be set in accordance with the European
monetary and fiscal authority (EMFA), which would set a performance target for each
country.
27 JOHN MUELLBAUER, Resolving the Eurozone crisis: Time foe conditional eurobonds, 59 Policy Insight (2011). 28 Id. at
The EMFA would use a mix of fixed rules and discretionary judgment in a respective weight
of 80 percent to 20 percent. The fixed rules would be based on four indicators that
Muellbauer discusses in detail: (i) unit labor costs, (ii) the sovereign debt to GDP ratio, (iii)
the current account to GDP ratio, and (iv) the World Bank’s “Doing Business” indicator.
To illustrate the conditional Eurobonds proposal, Muellbauer describes a hypothetical 10
year government bond from Portugal that faces a spread of around 8 percent relative to
German treasury bonds. The EMFA would set the spread to 5 percent in the first year, but
only if Portugal committed itself to serious fiscal reforms. Additionally, there would be an
option to reduce Portugal’s spread if the country made satisfactory progress in its fiscal
reforms. The advantage of this plan is that Portugal can refinance itself at lower costs, while
strong incentives still encourage the country to implement fiscal reforms.
This combination of fiscal reform and cheaper debt for distressed states thus correctly
identifies one of the main problems facing Europe. However, since Muellbauer first made
the proposal, all member states except Germany lost their triple A credit ratings, which
could alter the scenario he describes.
Additionally, the EMFA might not be a suitable institution for deciding debt spreads and
supervising member states’ progress instituting fiscal reforms. First, the EMFA would need a
great deal of resources to oversee the performance indicators. Second, the EMFA likely
would need a much higher degree of discretionary decisionmaking authority than 20
percent. The problems in each member state are so different that a fix set of rules might be
too inflexible.
E. Delpla/von Weizsäcker
The “Blue” and “Red” Eurobond proposal by Jacques Delpla and Jacob von Weizsäcker is one
of the most discussed and elaborate proposals. 29 The proposal envisions dividing the
sovereign debt of each country into senior (Blue) and junior (Red) tranches. The senior
tranche of Blue bonds would represent up to 60 percent of a state’s GDP and would be
jointly and severally guaranteed by all participating countries to ensure that it was a very
safe asset (the authors like to call it “AAAA”). It is important to emphasize that this senior
tranche would have to be repaid before any other public debt except IMF bonds.
Delpla and von Weizsäcker propose that the annual allocation of Blue bonds be done by an
independent stability council. This council would consist of members with a degree of
professional independence similar to that of European Central Bank board members.
Following this council’s decision, its allocation would be voted on by each national
parliament of all the participating countries. If a parliament voted against the council’s
decision, the parliament’s member state would be barred from issuing its own Blue bonds
and excused from guaranteeing other state’s Blue bonds. As the authors explain, “full
participation in the Blue Bond scheme should not be regarded as an entitlement but as
something earned through enhanced fiscal credibility, by means of low debt levels or
credible institutional guarantees (credible national fiscal rules in particular) that put public
finances on a sustainable path”.30 The authors conclude that the Eurobond, because of its
size and the liquidity of its market (the Blue bond market could have size of round €5.6
29 JACQUES. DELPLA & JAKOB. VON WEIZSÄCKER, Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications (2010). 30 JACQUES. DELPLA & JAKOB. VON WEIZSÄCKER, Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications II (2011).
trillion) would have a significantly lower yield than the weighted average of the national
bond yields.31
Any debt beyond the 60 percent of GDP threshold for Blue bonds could be issued only as
Red bonds, which would have junior status and be guaranteed only nationally. The Red
bonds should help to guarantee fiscal discipline because they “would make borrowing more
expensive at the margin and strengthen market signals in the absence of a credible fiscal
stance, thereby complementing the Stability and Growth Pact rules.”32 The authors further
propose that in order to allow an orderly default of Red bonds, such bonds should be kept
out of the banking system. This should be achieved with two restrictions: First, Red bonds
should not be allowed for use refinancing ECB operations. Second, regulators should
demand high capital requirements for banks that wish to hold Red bonds.
This proposal actively enforces fiscal discipline as member states can only issue a certain
amount of Blue bonds. Member states are encouraged to stay below 60 percent debt to GDP
because borrowing is much cheaper. Moreover, strong states like Germany would also get
the benefit of lower rates. With the opt‐out option for the Blue bond allocation, there is a
further way to force high deficit states to keep their spending in balance.
One major drawback could be the implementation of the Blue bond proposal. Currently the
following member states have sovereign debts exceeding 60 percent of their GDP and
therefore are violating the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) criteria:
31 DELPLA & VON WEIZSÄCKER, Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications. 32 DELPLA & VON WEIZSÄCKER, Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications II.
Table 1: GDP of European Member states based on the World Economic Outlook from the International Monetary Fund, September 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_European_Union#cite_note‐8
If member states can only issue Blue bonds up to 60 percent of their GDP, the states listed in
table 1 would need to issue costly Red bonds. The authors suggest a transition period but do
not go into detail how this problem could be solved. The average European member state
has a sovereign debt to GDP ratio of 80.1 percent, and it could take years to reduce this
debt. In addition, it is still possible that in the next two or three years an increase in
sovereign debt could occur.
Such an increase would make it hard to implement the Blue bond proposal in the short run.
Strong member states would use the opt out option (or would not even join in the
beginning) once defaults of weak states like Greece, Portugal, and Spain began to seem
possible.
IV. An alternative Eurobond proposal
As explained above, it is important to establish Eurobonds only in a way that ensures true
fiscal discipline. The most effective solution is one that the existing proposals have
overlooked: all future debt issuance of each member state should be controlled at the EU
level to ensure that individual member states do not make any borrowing decisions alone. In
return of giving up the right to issue debt, member states should be allowed to issue
Eurobonds. All Eurozone member states would be jointly and severally liable for these
bonds. This guarantee would be preferable to proportional liability since it would ensure
that member states could meet their obligations even in fiscal straits.
Under such a system, any member state would have the right to issue as many Eurobonds as
it wanted up to the current SGP limit of 60 percent debt to GDP. There should be no
constraints in terms of how the money is spent. However, once the 60 percent limit is
reached, a member state should not be allowed to issue any further debt unless it received
approval from an EU body, such as the Council. The Council should use the EU qualified
majority voting procedures to avoid coalitions in which member states joint together to
approve each other’s debt. Under Article I‐25 of the Constitutional Treaty, a qualified
majority is defined as at least 55 percent of the members of the Council that together
represent at least 65 percent of the population of the Union. A blocking minority must
include at least four Council members.
The Council should only allow debt issuance above the 60 percent SGP limit if additional
debt is absolutely necessary. In such cases, the Council could condition its approval on the
debtor state meeting certain fiscal requirements. This system would not be a fiscal union
and therefore member states would still have the power to tax and make their own
budgeting decisions. However, it certainly would be possible – and indeed recommended –
to restrict these powers in exchange for additional money. Such outside controls on member
states’ fiscal policies already have been discussed; for example, Chancellor Merkel proposed
in late January 2012 that it might be useful to take over authority of the Greek budget.33
There are certainly some challenges facing this proposed Eurobond system and thus it is
essential to have a transition period. Member states with weak economies would be pleased
to join the system, as the EU‐wide guarantee would ensure they paid less interest on their
bonds. Strong member states, on the other hand, would have fewer incentives to join the
new Eurobond system; the risk of other member states defaulting would force the strong
states to pay more interest on Eurobonds than if they issued their own bonds.
Ultimately, however, it is important to keep the overall picture in mind: there is a strong
political will to keep the Eurozone and its members together. Further, it is far from clear how
much more small strong countries, like Finland, would have to pay to issue Eurobonds
instead of issuing their own bonds. There are some scholars34 who believe that the increased
liquidity of the Eurobond market would outweigh the risk premium for small strong
countries, leaving such countries without any increase in costs.
For Germany and France, there most likely would be an increase in debt costs. These key EU
members might accept such an increase for multiple reasons. First, the proposed Eurobond
system should be seen as a fiscal support for weak countries. Second, the Eurobond system
would decrease the risk of complete euro area to collapse – a catastrophe that would be
especially costly for Germany and France. Finally, the system would mean EU emergency
measures would no longer be needed. For example the EFSF, which has a EUR 440 billion
33 MARIA. MARGARONIS, European Summit: German Austerity Blues(2012). 34 CARLO. FAVERO & ALESSANDRO. MISSALE, EU public debt management and Eurobonds (European Parliament 2010).
lending capacity and is jointly and severally guaranteed by the Eurozone, could be phased
out, as could the EFSM, from which distressed member states can borrow up combined
loans up to €60 billion – with the EU budget as collateral.
With regard to the transition period, it is important to take the current situation into
account. This is a weakness of most of the published Eurobond proposals and therefore
merits close attention. As pointed out in table 1, the percentage of debt to GDP is far above
60 percent on average in the Eurozone. Therefore a transition period for the new Eurobond
system would need to allow member states to issue guaranteed debt over the 60 percent
limit without seeking E.U. approval in order to bring their budget in balance. Currently this
might be between 10 to 20 percent on top of the SGP’s 60 percent debt to GPD limit.
There would be no additional cost to this guarantee, unlike the EFSM and the EFSM, which
required raising capital, as all member states would simply be liable for the debt issued. A
transition period between 3 to 5 years should give member states time to fix their budgets
and significantly reduce their spending, which would not be converted to Eurobonds.
After this transition period, member states only would be allowed to issue Eurobonds up to
60 percent of GDP. If they need more debt, approval would be subject to qualified majority
voting in the Council. The same approval also would be required if member states needed
more debt during the transition period than the 10 to 20 percent above the 60 percent SGP
ceiling.
This Eurobond proposal would help weak member state gain access to cheaper debt while
ensuring that fiscal reforms are implemented. Furthermore, it would avoid creating
additional institutions either for issuing bonds or for supervising fiscal reforms. All decisions
could be made by the Council, and qualified majority voting would ensure that there were
no coalitions of smaller member states trying to expand their debt at the expense of
stronger member states.
Finally, if member states stay below the 60 percent debt to GDP ratio, issuing Eurobonds
does not affect their taxing or spending at all. Only if a member state violates the SGP and is
therefore a potential danger for the whole Eurozone would other member states have a
right to intervene in the issuance of Eurobonds.
V. Conclusion
It comes as no surprise that Eurobonds are an active topic of discussion since 2009. The
ongoing public debate reflects the pressure on weaker countries to finance their debt under
current conditions. Those weak member states, like Greece, could infect other member
states and therefore endanger the Euro.
As this paper has emphasized, Eurobonds do not release weak member states from their
obligation to keep their budgets in balance. However, there is an option that combines the
right incentives in a Eurobond system that gives weak member states time to put their
affairs in order without forcing the Eurozone into another crisis.
It is possible to create a Eurobond system which avoids the free riding problem while giving
weak member states the incentives to adopt much needed financial reforms. The idea is
simple: member states whose debt is below 60 percent to the GDP can issue Eurobonds
themselves, while any issuance above that ceiling would require an approval by the Council
according to the qualified majority voting. This would strengthen the Stability and Growth
Pact and does not require a fiscal union. Countries are free in taxing and spending as long as
they keep their budget in balance.
VI. References
EURACTIV, EU bonds spark debate as recession hits.
CAHIER COMTE BOEL, The creation of a common European bond market § 14 (European League
for Economic Cooperation ed., 2010).
BUITER WILLEM. & RAHBARI EBRAHIM., Global Economics View: The future of the euro area. (Citi
Group 2011).
BUTT LEILA., Ratings On European Investment Bank Affirmed At 'AAA/A‐1+'; Off Watch Neg;
Outlook Negative, S&P(2012).
BOONSTRA WIM., Can Eurobonds solve EMU's problems (European League for Economic
Cooperation 2011).
GROS DANIEL., Eurobonds: Wrong solution for legal, political, and economic reasons. (Vox
2011).
GROS DANIEL. & MICOSSI STEFANO., A bond‐issuing EU stability fund could rescue Europe (2009).
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