European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-right Anti-Muslim Narrative

8/13/2019 European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-right Anti-Muslim Narrative

1/56

European

Muslim

Youth

&the Rise of the Far-rightAnti-Muslim Narrative


2/56

Acknowledgements 3

Foreword 4

Executive Summary 5

Recommendations 8

About FEMYSO 10

Introduction 12

Definitions 15

Research Aims 16

Research Questions 17

Methods 18

Sample 20Case Studies 21

France 21

United Kingdom 27

Belgium 32

Germany 35

Sweden 39

The Netherlands 43

Europe 46

Conclusions 49

Glossary 52

Useful Contacts 52

References 53

contents


3/56

AcknowledgementsThe report research team would like to take the opportunity to thank FEMYSO and itsmembers, particularly the executive committee, the FEMYSO president Intissar Kherigi,and the numerous volunteers, including Layla Azzouzi and Najatte Kaoiss. In addition, we

would like to thank our partners at the European Network Against Racism, especially JuliePascot for her invaluable support and advice. We would also like to thank our colleagues atthe Collectif Contre lIslamophobie en France for their help. Similarly, we would like to takethe opportunity to thank our funders the European Youth Foundation and the Open SocietyFoundation for investing in the research. Finally, we would like to thank the interviewees,whilst we cannot acknowledge you personally; we recognise that we are indebted to youfor taking the time to share your opinions and experiences with us.

Amina Easat-Daas is a final year PhD student at Aston University, within the school oflanguages and social sciences. Her PhD research focuses on political participation amongstMuslim women in France and francophone Belgium, with particular emphasis on themotivations, opportunities and barriers to Muslim womens political participation. Aminasmore general research interests include Muslim womens dress, secularism, European Islam,European Muslim political participation and the far-right in Western Europe. Amina is theauthor of this report.

Saida Ounissi is a PhD Student at Panthon-Sorbonne University, within the sociologydepartment. Her PhD research focuses on the link between the implementation of socialpolicies and authoritarian political power in Tunisia. Saida is engaged with FEMYSO since2009. She was in charge of citizenship and identity matters, as well as youth services andresearch. Saida was responsible for the data collection within this report.

The views and opinions expressed on this research report are soley those of the original authorsand other contributors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Youth Foundation, Open

Society Foundation and European Network against Racism.

To cite this report: EASAT-DAAS, A. & OUNISSI, S. 2013. European Muslim Youth and theRise of the Far-Right Anti-Muslim Narrative. Brussels: Forum of European Muslim Youth andStudent Organisations.

Photo credit: Gnration-identitaire.comDesign: Heizenberg-Agency.com

European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-right Anti-Muslim Narrative 3


4/56

Through ourwork with youngEuropean Muslims,we at FEMYSO havebuilt relationshipswith a range ofEuropean Muslimyouth, from Ireland

Foreword

Intissar KherigiFEMYSO President

In the midst of the discussions andanalyses of this phenomenon and itspolitical ramifications, we have barelyturned to look at its impact on dailyhuman lives. What does an electoralgain of 20% for a far-right party meanfor a young citizen watching thesepolitical movements? How does thespread of far-right discourse affect his

or her wellbeing, identity, self-imageand perception of politics? How does itimpact the activities he or she engagesin and the way he or she participatesin political and social life? Coverage ofthe rise of the far-right rarely, if ever,explores the tangible impact it is havingon the lives and wellbeing of millionsof European Muslim youth and on their

organisations, shaping their identity,experiences and engagement.This unique research report seeks to do

just that. We hope through this projectto promote a more empirical approachto discussions of the rise of the far-rightand to better understand its impact ona category of young Europeans. We seek

through these conversations to uncoverthe human realities behind this politicalphenomenon and to put forwardpractical recommendations from thoseaffected to address its impact on thecohesion, contribution and wellbeing ofEuropean Muslim youth.

through to Albania, representing a

broad range of backgrounds, interests,concerns and perspectives. EuropeanMuslim youth largely have the sameconcerns as other young Europeans education, employment, and buildinga better life by making the most ofthe opportunities available to them.Yet there are other concerns facingEuropean Muslim youth over and above

other young Europeans and which haveincreasingly manifested themselves inthe conversations and discussions wehave with young European Muslims inparticular the rise of a threatening, hate-filled rhetoric by the far-right whichincreasingly target and single them outas a demonized other. This worryingtrend has gained attention particularly

through the electoral successes andpublic manifestations of far-rightmovements, which have carved theirway through political taboos andestablished themselves as seriouspolitical contenders in many countriesacross Europe.

4 European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-right Anti-Muslim Narrative


5/56

Executive Summary

takeover of Europe. Muslims are alsoconstructed as presenting an economicthreat, and are seen to be taking financialsources that belong to the indigenouspopulation.

Furthermore, Muslim communitiesare argued to pose a threat of physicalviolence and delinquency. Similarly,

Muslim women are seen as oppressed,their oppression is argued to bemanifest in their dress. Muslim womensdress is also seen as symbolic of theMuslim takeover of Europe. Generally,stereotypes presented in the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative frame Muslimsas diametrically opposed to Westernsocietys normative values.

Via the anti-Muslim narrative, far-right organisations externalise theirxenophobic and discriminatorypositions and frame Muslims as thesource of problems. They thus frametheir anti-Muslim stance as a necessaryresponse to the perceived threatposed by Muslims in Europe and seethemselves as defenders of Europeansociety and culture.

In spite of the differing trajectoriesof far-right organisations across thesix case studies within this report, weobserve a convergence around the anti-Muslim narrative. In addition, we note

a lack of empirical consideration of theEuropean Muslim youth experience ofthe increasingly popular far-right anti-Muslim narrative.

Far-right organisations across Europeare enjoying increasing popularityand electoral support, and thus nolonger represent fringe movements. Inmany cases across Europe the far-rightpresents a diverse political discourseand campaigns on themes related topopulism, nativism, anti-immigration,anti-Roma, in some cases anti-Semitism,

and general Euroscepticism. In addition,the anti-Muslim narrative has come tobe recognised as a central feature ofthe far-right discourse in Europe. Whilstthe far-right is not the sole source of theanti-Muslim narrative, the far-right isincreasingly linked to the normalisationof the anti-Muslim discourse.

Through a review of literature andpolitical sources, this report identifiesthat the far-right anti-Muslim narrativeis based on several arguments. Namely,the visible presence of Islam in the Westis framed as constituting a threat toWestern civilisation, since Muslims areperceived as retrogressive and generallyat odds with Western normative values,and therefore unable to integrate intoWestern societies. In lieu of integrating,the far-right anti-Muslim narrative positsthat Muslims want to Islamise Europeand impose Sharia law throughout thecontinent.

In addition, the far-right anti-Muslim

narrative frames Muslims as posing ademographic threat. This perceivedthreat is seen as a tool for the Muslim

Introduction



6/56

A total of 20 Muslims aged between 18and 29 were interviewed by a desig-nated member of the research team.The sample was made up of 9 female re-spondents and 11 males. With regards toethnic background, 9 interviewees were

from a North African background, 6 werefrom a Middle Eastern background anda further 5 participants were of an Asianbackground. Respondents were all eitherpursuing or had achieved university leveleducation. In addition, all respondentsdiscussed their civic, political and com-munity engagement. Interviewees werecommonly active in local and national

Islamic organisations, anti-discriminationorganisations, or volunteered within thelocal community.

Conclusions

The report notes that European Mus-

lim youth interviewed have high levelsof awareness and understanding of thefar-right in their respective countries.Moreover interviewees had a significant-ly higher awareness of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative than of the far-rightgeneral policies. Respondents were lessaware of the far-right across Europe whencompared to awareness of the respective

national case. However, some interview-ees point to the European convergenceof various national far-right organisationsaround the anti-Muslim narrative.

For the respondents within this report,the far-right anti-Muslim narrative pro-voked a strong emotional response. In-terviewees describe how the far-right

anti-Muslim narrative has made themfeel shock, fear, upset, hurt, rejection bysociety, revulsion, ostracized, frustration,anxiety, concern, and worry.

Research Aims and Objectives

This report seeks to develop a greaterunderstanding of European Muslimyouth awareness and experiencesof the far-right and its anti-Muslimnarrative in both the national andEuropean contexts. The report alsoaims to highlight how European Muslimyouth currently respond to the far-right anti-Muslim narrative in both thenational and European contexts. Thereport endeavours to explore the waysEuropean Muslim youth might respondto the far-right anti-Muslim narrative in

the future. In the long term the reportaims to document European Muslimyouth experiences, inform and improveEuropean policy and understanding,and to encourage on-going researchinto the European Muslim experience.

Method

In order to assess European Muslimyouth experiences of the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative, an unstructuredfocus group was initially conducted toorient the study and assess its viability.Subsequently, 20 young Muslims wererecruited from across France, Germany,the UK, Belgium, the Netherlandsand Sweden. FEMYSO members and

volunteers in each country enabledthe recruitment of a diverse rangeof participants. Semi-structuredqualitative interviews with youngMuslims from the six countries weresubsequently undertaken, betweenFebruary and August 2013. Semi-structured interviewing was basedon the research questions defined

within the main body of the report andenabled us to elicit analytically richand detailed information relating tothe lived experiences of participants.



7/56

However, respondents within this reportare keen to cast off an attitude of victim-hood, and suggest that the anti-Muslimnarrative served as a catalyst for youngMuslims to increase their already highlevels of community engagement, and

challenge the negative public percep-tion of Muslims in Europe. Nonetheless,it is important to highlight that not allyoung Muslims in Europe have such highlevels of community engagement.For young Muslims within this reportthe media also play a central role in bothfuelling and conveying the detrimentalfar-right anti-Muslim narrative. Across

the board, interviewees felt that nationalmedia outlets sensationalise stories relat-ing to Muslims, and therefore contributeto the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. Inaddition, for interviewees the media areseen to be fuelling the anti-Muslim nar-rative through affording far-right activ-ists time to air their divisive anti-Muslimviews.

Through the course of the report, re-spondents in each of the six case studiesattribute the increasing successfulnessof the far-right anti-Muslim narrative toa general lack of awareness of Muslimsin each of the national cases, and Europeon the whole. For the young Muslims in-terviewed within the report, through en-

gaging in dialogue with the wider localand national community, young Muslimsfelt that they were able to proactivelycombat the negative image of Muslimsbrought about by the far-right anti-Mus-lim narrative.

Participants within this report also feltthat the concept of Islamophobia was

commonly negated by influential figures,such as politicians. Respondents felt thatdenying the existence of discriminationof Muslim communities in Europe firstly

silenced any discussion on the matter,and therefore allows the far-right anti-Muslim narrative to go unchallenged.

Similarly in order to tackle the issuesraised by the far-right anti-Muslim nar-

rative, young European Muslims in-terviewed within this report stress theneed for political participation by Mus-lims. The nature of political participationurged ranged from lobbying local poli-ticians to respond to and condemn thefar-right anti-Muslim narrative, to callingfor political representation of Muslimsby Muslims. Young Muslims interviewed

believed that by participating in politicsthey would be able to shape the politicaldiscourse relating to Muslims and voicethe concerns of the European Muslimcommunity. In addition, participantswithin this report, particularly those inFrance and Sweden, stressed that theanti-Muslim narrative is not confined tothe far-right and instead permeates the

wider political sphere.

Young Muslims interviewed within thereport also discussed the need to tacklethe anti-Muslim narrative through col-laborating with other local and nationalanti-discrimination networks. Respon-dents believed that collaboration andcooperation with anti-discrimination or-

ganisations would enable Muslims sub-ject to the anti-Muslim narrative to drawon positive experiences and practices ofother organisations.

Furthermore, collaboration with anti-discrimination networks was believed tobe a useful tool in legitimising and giv-ing credibility to the fight against the far-

right anti-Muslim narrative, and wouldalso enable Muslims to combat all formsof discrimination that exist within soci-ety, whilst protecting their rights.



8/56

RecommendationsMedia:The report recommends that media institutions apply caution when reportingMuslims and engaging with far-right spokespeople. We draw on an examplehighlighted by Nielsen relating to a Danish national newspaper:

A Danish national newspaper editor, for example, introduceda policy for reporting on Muslim affairs that she called the Jewtest. It required that anyone writing about Islam and Muslimsshould test the appropriateness of what they were writing by re-placing Muslim with Jew. (Nielsen, 2009)

The suggestion cited above draws on the example of the Jewish community,who were once and are still subject to anti-Semitism in the media. However,through years of positive campaigning by the Jewish community, there is anincreasing sensitivity to the ills of anti-Semitism, and thus media and public dis-course has been challenged.

In addition, the media should exercise caution and verify sources relating toMuslim media coverage. In recommending the implementation of a similar test

whereby media outlets test the appropriateness of media reports pertainingto Muslims by replacing the term Muslim with Jewish, thus media profession-als may begin to employ sensitivity and understand the serious nature of, andcounter the anti- Muslim narrative.

Normalising Muslim Presence:The report also recommends that Muslim organisations continue to facilitatedialogue between Muslims and diverse non-Muslim communities across Europe

in order to overcome prejudices and achieve better mutual understanding.

Islamophobia:We call on European and national authorities to recognise the prevalence of Is-lamophobia in Europe, by effectively and publically defining and condemning it.Whilst there are varying definitions and understandings of Islamophobia, basedon interview responses within this report, a European working definition of Is-lamophobia, based on the example of anti-Semitism, and better legal protec-

tion against it, may enable young Muslims to effectively tackle the anti-Muslimnarrative and discrimination against Muslims in general.



9/56

We also call on national authorities to collect data on Islamophobic incidentsas a separate category of discrimination and hate crime, in order to understand

the scale and nature of the problem, and to provide better support to victims ofIslamophobia. We also call on influential public figures, such as politicians, intel-lectuals and celebrities, to publicly stand up against Islamophobia and the anti-Muslim discourse to send a strong signal that it is unacceptable.

Political participation:Drawing on best practice, the report highlights the UK-based organisation En-gage. The organisation recognises the low rates of political engagement andparticipation by Muslims in the UK, and thus seeks to encourage Muslim politi-cal engagement in the UK, through providing information and organising freeworkshops aimed at Muslims.

Thus based on research findings, it is recommended that EU and national au-thorities look to implement a similar strategy across the European countriesconsidered within the report by facilitating equal political participation as animportant facet of citizenship and a vital means of creating dialogue on impor-

tant issues.

Tackling the Anti-Muslim Narrative in Politics:The report also recommends that politicians exercise sensitivity when discuss-ing issues pertaining to Muslims and not fall into racialising or Islamicising allsocio-economic issues pertaining to communities of Muslim background. Fur-thermore, politicians should show greater courage in condemning the anti-Muslim narrative regardless of political affiliation.

Cooperation and Collaboration:In addition, Muslim organisations, other minority organisations and wider an-ti-discrimination organisations should collaborate in the fight against the an-ti-Muslim narrative and general prejudice. Activism by Muslim organisationsshould also be recognised by national authorities as an important means of pro-viding an outlet for European Muslim youth to voice their concerns and engagewith and gain trust in local and national institutions.



10/56

About FEMYSOconducting research, hosting seminars,study sessions and training programs for

Muslim youth organisations, FEMYSOseeks to equip Muslim youth with theawareness, confidence and skills tocreatively tackle Islamophobia.

In addition, FEMYSO recognises thecentral importance of human rights.FEMYSO endeavours to promotedevelopment, understanding, respectfor and enjoyment of human rights inEurope. Similarly through partnershipwith numerous human rights non-governmental organisations, FEMYSOhas organised numerous educationalactivities at both the national andEuropean levels, produced educationalpublications and continuouslyencourages the promotion of humanrights as a key focus of memberorganisations activities.

Within todays European diverse societyand in the face of rising misunderstandingand hostility towards Islam and Muslims,FEMYSO also works to promoteinterfaith and intercultural dialogue. In

doing so, FEMYSO encourages youngpeople to actively engage in dialogueacross all levels of European society.Drawing on Islamic and human rightssources, FEMYSO highlights the value ofracial and religious pluralism.

The organisation believes thatintercultural and interfaith dialogue

provides a platform for youth of varyingbackgrounds to promote mutualunderstanding and cooperation.

In 1995, a number of national Muslimyouth organisations met in Sweden,

brought together at a Swedishgovernment conference on Islamin Europe. Through this encounter,they saw the need for building a pan-European platform to bring togetherEuropean Muslim youth, and the Forumof European Muslim Youth and StudentOrganisations (FEMYSO) was born.

Today, as a non-governmentalorganisation based in Brussels, FEMYSOis made up of 34 national memberorganisations across 23 countries, andis recognised as the voice of EuropeanMuslim youth.

FEMYSO seeks to build the capacity ofits member organisations to enablethem to reach their full potentialwithin European society, so thatthey can effectively contribute tobuilding a diverse, prosperous andcohesive Europe. FEMYSO promotesnetworking and cooperation acrossEuropean Muslim youth organisationsand between European youth of all

backgrounds, in order to facilitatemutual understanding and overcomeprejudice on all sides.

FEMYSO actively campaigns againstIslamophobia, and the economic, social,political and cultural discrimination thatit brings about. FEMYSO recognises thatIslamophobia is a complex and multi-

faceted problem that limits the potentialof the young Muslim communityin particular. Therefore, through



11/56

Finally, FEMYSO believes it isparamount to encourage active

citizenship amongst young EuropeanMuslims. Through seminars, debates,conferences and publications FEMYSOdraws on the European Muslimexperience to better understand andreflect on the meaning of Europeancitizenship for Europes young Muslimsand to address the obstacles thatEuropean Muslims may face in realisingactive citizenship. Furthermore,FEMYSO highlights the social,economic, and cultural contributionmade by European Muslim youth.



12/56

Introductionthe research. We then provide acontextualisation of the far-right in

each of the national case studies andthe current responses of young Muslimsin each of the cases. Finally, the reportputs forward the concluding remarksand recommendations based on theinterviews conducted with EuropeanMuslim Youth.

After the second world war and until

the 1980s, the far-right, as defined inthis report, was commonly associatedwith neo-fascism and was generallypolitically weak across Western Europe(Ignazi, 2003). Historically, the far-right narrative focused on colouredimmigration (Streiff-Frnart, 2012).However, research indicates that thefar-right in Western Europe no longer

represents a fringe movement (Fekete,2006) and is becoming increasinglypopular across Europe (Wilson andHainsworth, 2012). In the UnitedKingdom, for example, Goodwin (2013)cites an upsurge in support for far-right political parties in recent years.Similarly, Shields (2010) notes a growingand sustained support for the French

far-right party the Front National (FN) inrecent years. Furthermore, the growingpopularity of the far-right throughoutEurope is linked to the rightward shiftin the European political scene (Savage,2010, Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012).

In many cases, the far-right presentsa diverse discourse which includes

elements of populism, nativism, anti-immigration, anti-Roma, in somecases anti-Semitism, and general Euro-scepticism (Wilson and Hainsworth,

This report seeks to highlight theEuropean Muslim youth awareness and

experiences of the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative in both the national andEuropean contexts. The report considersthe far-right anti-Muslim narrative withinthe wider frame of Islamophobia andanti-Muslim discrimination. However,in applying the specific lens of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative the reportmay begin to contribute to the wider

understanding of Islamophobia and itsmany facets. This report does not seek toexplain the rise the far-rights popularityacross Europe, nor does it seek to explainthe reasons behind the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. It is acknowledgedthat the anti-Muslim narrative hasmultiple sources that extend beyondthe far-right. However, the increasingly

prevalent and normalised nature of thefar-right anti-Muslim narrative provokesconcern for FEMYSO, and serves as astarting point for this report. In spite ofthe overt anti-Muslim campaign led byfar-right organisations across Europe,a review of literature demonstratesan apparent limited consideration ofthe impact that such a narrative may

have on Muslims, and Muslim youth inparticular.

The report begins by providing abrief background to the far-rightin Europe and the increasing anti-Muslim narrative. Subsequently, thereport discusses the research aims andobjectives of the report. Subsequently

the report provides an overview ofthe data collection methods utilisedwithin the project, a discussion ofthe nature of the respondents within



13/56

2012). However, currently there is aproliferation of the anti-Muslim andanti-Islam discourse amongst the far-right in Europe (Slade, 2010, Wilson andHainsworth, 2012).

Anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe hasbeen intensified by terrorist eventssuch as 9/11 in New York and 7/7 inLondon (Allen, 2011). Nonetheless,presently anti-Muslim sentiment hascome to be recognised as a key featureof the current far-right discourse acrossEurope, particularly post-2000 (Zquete,2008). Notable examples of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative can be seenin the British National Partys (BNP)2002 campaign Islam out of Britain(Allen, 2011), in the highly mediatisedcomparison of Muslim prayer in thestreets to the Nazi occupation in Franceby the FN, or in the Belgian VlaamsBelang (VB) mobilisation against thealleged Muslim invasion of Belgium(Betz and Menet, 2009).

In addition to increasing prevalenceof the anti-Muslim narrative, there isalso an increasing normalisation of thefar-right anti-Muslim narrative acrossEurope (Zquete, 2008). For example,in the British context, Slade (2010)posits that the increasing anti-Muslimdiscourse has come to be seen as lamode and largely acceptable in publicand political discourse. In the UK, thenormalisation of this narrative has beenobserved by organisations and Muslimpoliticians alike (Warsi, 2011, ForumAgainst Islamophobia and Racism,2002).Through a review of literature andpolitical sources, we have identifiedthat the far-right anti-Muslim narrativefunctions at several levels, as detailed

below in figure 1.

These stereotypes of Muslims visiblydraw on tropes of Orientalism (Said,1978) and Huntingtons Clash of theCivilisations (1993) since they create the

impression of diametric opposition ofWestern and Islamic cultures. As Wilsonand Hainsworth (2012) observe, the far-right anti-Muslim narrative has enabledfar-right organisations to externalisetheir inherent xenophobia, and in turnconstruct Muslims in Europe as thesource of problems and intolerance,and thus enables these organisations

to position themselves as necessarydefenders of European society andcultural heritage (Betz and Menet, 2009).

In addition to the increasing far-rightanti-Muslim narrative in nationalcontexts, and in spite of the traditionallynationalist and anti-EU stance of thefar-right, there are surprising calls for

the unification of European populistmovements (Betz and Menet, 2009), inthe defence of European culture againstthe alleged threat posed by the Muslimpresence in Europe. An example ofthe unification of European far-rightorganisations in their anti-Muslimnarrative can be seen in the group Citiesagainst Islamisation (CAI) (Cities against

Islamisation, 2013).

Like many national far-rightorganisations considered withinthis report, CAI state that given theJudeo-Christian Western Europeanenlightenment, and normative valuesof freedom of speech, gender equalityand secularism, Islam is largely at odds

with Europe. Similar to anti-Muslimclaims made the national level, CAI offeran oversimplified understanding of



14/56

Islam, suggesting unassimilated Muslimcommunities across Western Europefavour the Sharia in lieu of local laws andthus remain in opposition to Westerncivilisation. Furthermore, CAI seesmosques as catalysts for the Islamisationof local neighbourhoods. Mosques are

Far-rightAnti-Muslim Claim

Details Selected references

Muslims constitute a

demographic threatto Europeancivilisation.

Muslims populations are seen to be ex-panding, given Muslim birth rates and

Muslim immigration to Europe. GrowingMuslim populations are seen as a tool

for the Muslim takeover of Europe.

(British National Party, 2001, Cit-ies against Islamisation, 2013)

Muslims pose ideologi-cal threat to Europe-

an civilisation.

Islamic values are framed as beingbackwards and in opposition to Eu-ropean Judeo-Christian normative

values.

(British National Party, 2001Wilders, Goodwin et al. ENAR,Wilders, 2011, Goodwin et al.,2013, Wilson and Hainsworth,

2012)

Muslims pose threatof physical violence,

and crime.

Muslims are seen as prone to violence,and are commonly regarded as delin-

quents.

(British National Party, 2001NPD, Wilson and Hainsworth,2012, Nationaldemokratische

Partei Deutschlands, 2013)

Muslims poseeconomic threat.

Muslims are seen to pose financial bur-den, and regarded as taking moneyand jobs that belong to the native

population.

(British National Party, 2001)

Muslims want toIslamise Europe

Muslims want to make Europe an Is-lamic society, through the imposition ofIslamic legal structures, such as Sharia

law, and Islamic social structures.Mosques are seen as the space thatallows for the Islamisation of Europe.

(Cities against Islamisation,2013 Pro NRW, Vellenga, Pro

NRW, 2013, Vellenga and Wieg-ers, 2013)

Muslims do not favourgender

equality

Muslims are seen to oppress and sexu-ally exploit women. Oppression of Mus-lim women is argued to be apparent in

Muslim womens dress.

(British National Party, 2001Betz, Erk, Erk, 2005, Betz and

Menet, 2009)

figure 1

also argued to intensify strict Islamicobservance, prevent Muslim integrationinto Western society and promote theIslamification of Europe. The CAI alsohas a specific womens page for womenopposed to Islam in Western Europe(Cities against Islamisation, 2013).



15/56

DefinitionsThis section of the report seeks to definethe terms employed within the report.Firstly, given the remit of the report

focuses on France, Germany, the UK, theNetherlands, Belgium and Sweden anduse this as a basis for our conclusions thatbroadly discuss European Muslim youth.These countries were selected based onthe rise of the far right in terms of electoralsuccess and visibility in recent years.Furthermore, in each of the 6 countriesthere are significant Muslim populations

amongst which which FEMYSO has awide network. We also recognise thatMuslim minorities in Eastern Europe havea different history and thus the discourseon Islam and Muslims in those countriesrequires separate analysis.

At FEMYSO, we note the remarkableheterogeneity of the Muslim community

(Gest, 2010). Whilst most often the termMuslim relates to those engaged inIslamic religious practice, Muslim mayalso mean those that are identified asMuslim based on their cultural andethnic heritage (Frgosi, 2013). Muslimsin Europe also have diverse ethnicbackgrounds (Cesari, 2004). Therefore, inthe context of this report when discussing

Muslims interviewed, we apply thedefinition coined by Sinno, who doesnot consider Muslim to necessarilymean a religious identity, but instead anidentity that may have religious, racial,political or cultural dimensions (Sinno,2009:2). In applying the above broaddefinition of Muslim we have sought toincorporate and reflect the diversity ofEuropean Muslim youth.

With regards to youth, the reportemploys the criteria as defined by

FEMYSO, therefore in the context of thereport youth generally refers to thoseaged 14 to 35, and thus the report sought

to recruit participants for the study fromacross this age range. The final sampleof participants in this report were agedbetween 18 and 29.

Far-right organisations across Europehave diverging histories and differingagendas. Prior to undertaking thefieldwork we investigated the various

far-right organisations active in eachof the countries to be studied. A moredetailed exploration of such far-rightorganisations can be found below.The report identifies in particular theEnglish Defence League (EDL), theBritish National Party (BNP), and the UKIndependence Party (UKIP) in the UnitedKingdom, the Front National (FN) in

France, Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium,Pro NRW and NationaldemokratischePartei Deutschlands (NPD) in Germany,the Sverigesdemokraterna (SD) inSweden, and finally the Partij Voor Vrijeid(PVV) in the Netherlands as notableand influential for young Muslims inEurope. The examples cited are by nomeans a complete list of the far-right

organisations present in each of the casestudies in this report.

Finally, to define the anti-Muslimnarrative, far-right party policy andacademic articles relating to Muslims andfar-right parties mentioned above wereexplored. Although the report providesdiscussion of national cases individuallybelow, we note that the common themesof the far-right anti-Muslim narrativewere identified in the cases studiedwithin this report, as detailed in Figure 1.



16/56

Research Aims

In researching the influence of the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative on European Muslim youth, FEMYSO aims to:

1. Develop a greater understanding of European Muslim youthawarenessof the far-right, and its anti-Muslim narrative in both thenational and European contexts.

2. To understand how European Muslim youth experiencethe far-rightanti-Muslim narrative.

3. To highlight how European Muslim youth currently respond to thefar-right anti-Muslim narrative in both the national and Europeancontexts. The report also sought to explore the ways EuropeanMuslim youth might respond to the far-right anti-Muslim narrative inthe future.

More generally the research and research findings seek to:

1. Document the experiences of European Muslim youth in relation tothe far-right anti-Muslim narrative.

2. Inform policy makers about the experiences of European Muslimyouth with regards to the far-right anti-Muslim narrative.

3. Influence government, media, policy makers and public attitudesand thereby contribute to generating new solutions.

4. Set the groundwork for building rigorous and independentmeasurement of the situation of Muslim youth in European countries.



17/56

Research Questions

The research was centred on the following researchquestions:

1. How does the far-right anti-Muslim narrative influence theunderstanding, the response and experience of European Muslimyouth in France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands andSweden?

How do European Muslim youth understand the far-right anti-

Muslim narrative nationally?

How do European Muslim youth understand the far-right anti-Muslim narrative on the European level?

How have European Muslim youth experienced the far-right anti-Muslim narrative in both the national and European contexts?

What is the actual and suggested response of European Muslimyouth to the far-right anti-Muslim narrative in both the national andEuropean level?



18/56

Methodssuitable. Initially, individuals fromthe FEMYSO network were identified

in each of the six countries to bestudied. In order to participate in thestudy, individuals had to be fromFrance, Germany, Belgium, the UK, theNetherlands or Sweden. In addition,eligible participants also needed to beidentified or self-identify as Muslim,and be aged between 14 and 35. Theimportance of recruiting a diverse

range of participants was stressed, thuswe sought to interview both male andfemale Muslims, Muslims from varyingethnic and social backgrounds, andalso include both cultural Muslims andpracticing Muslim youth.

In purposefully recruiting a diversesample of European Muslim youth, thereport seeks to maximise the validityand generalizability of the researchfindings (Barbour, 2008). However, aswith most qualitative research involvingsmall samples generalizability maybe an issue, nonetheless issues ofgeneralizability are countered with theunique in-depth and detailed insightthat this report offers into the European

Muslim youth experience of the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative.

Once participants were recruited,semi-structured qualitative interviewswere conducted by a designatedmember of the research team. A soleinterviewer conducted the interviewswith participants to the study, in orderto minimise the influence of individual

differences on the delivery of theinterview. Interviews were conducted

Given the qualitative focus of theresearch questions, data within

this report was gathered throughconducting 20 semi-structuredqualitative interviews with youngMuslims from France, Germany, the UK,Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden.Data collection for the report tookplace between February and August2013.

In order to orient the study, an initial

informal focus group was conductedin Brussels in February 2013. The focusgroup was conducted in English, andinterpretation was undertaken byparticipants as necessary, in order tofacilitate participation by all. The focusgroup was made up of volunteersinvolved in FEMYSO from Belgium,France, Germany, Switzerland, Italyand the United Kingdom. The focusgroup was largely unstructured, butloosely framed around the issue and thepertinence of studying the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. In this instance, anunstructured discussion was beneficial,since the purpose of the focus groupwas to orient and test the viability of

researching the European Muslim youthexperience of the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative.

Following the focus group, 20participants were recruited via theFEMYSO network. Given that FEMYSOhas contact with Muslim youthorganisations across Europe, coupledwith FEMYSOs recognised position,

recruitment of participants via theFEMYSO network was deemed most



19/56

in either French or English, andsubsequently transcribed in English for

analysis. However, in three instanceswhilst the prospective participant waskeen to contribute to the research andvoice their opinions on the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative, they did notfeel comfortable with undertaking anoral interview, therefore in these casesthe participants completed a writtenresponse based on the interviewschedule used in the oral interviews.

Semi-structured interviews wereselected since it is commonly recogniseda gold standard in qualitative research(Barbour, 2008) and are seen asproviding unique insight into thelived experiences of individuals (Kvale,2007). Thus, through utilising semi-

structured interviews we were ableto elicit valuable and analytically richdata (Barbour, 2008). Semi-structuredqualitative interviews were based on aninterview schedule, formulated aroundthe research questions in the report.The interview schedule sought toinclude open-ended questions in orderto facilitate discussion, but also allowed

opportunities for the interviewerto clarify or obtain further detailedinformation from the interviewees.Given the diverse sample, the sameinterview schedule elicited varied anddiverse responses from interviewees(Barbour, 2008).

Also, prior to conducting the interviews,the interviewer discussed ethicalconsiderations within the research,including anonymity, confidentiality and

right to withdraw. Drawing on the BritishSociological Associations guidelines

(British Sociological Association, 2004),we sought to protect the participantand the interviewer during the interviewprocess.



20/56

Sample

All respondents also noted their

professional and academic backgroundsduring the interview. Within the report,12 of the 20 respondents were inuniversity level education. Out of the 12respondents that were in education, 5were pursuing postgraduate level study.The remaining 8 participants were allemployed in graduate level jobs or self-employed.

In addition, all respondents discussedtheir civic, political and communityengagement. Interviewees werecommonly active in local andnational Islamic organisations,anti-discrimination movements, orvolunteered within the local community,we recognise that not all Muslim youthhave such high levels of engagement.

As noted the sample interviewed

within this report comprised a totalof 20 respondents, 5 from France, 4from the UK, 3 from Belgium, Germanyand Sweden respectively, and finally 2respondents from the Netherlands. Thesample was made up of 9 females and11 males.

Where specified, participants agesranged from 18 to 29 years of age,averaging 24.2 years of age. Within thesample, all participants specified theirethnic background upon introducingthemselves - 9 interviewees were from aNorth African background, 6 were MiddleEastern and a further 5 participants wereof an Asian background.

In addition to specifying their ethnic

background, respondents commonlyidentified themselves in relation totheir respective national identity andeither ethnic background or as Muslims,so for example a British intervieweeself-identified as British Muslim, or aFrench respondent self-identified asFrench Tunisian, thus demonstratingidentification with their respective

nations.



21/56

Case Studiesright voters are increasingly likely tovote for the FN. However it should benoted that the economic situation andwidespread political dissatisfaction withcentre parties also contributes to therise in support of the FN. Fekete (2006)

recognises the somewhat paradoxicalfeminist ideological convergence withthe far-right, in support of the ban ofIslamic headscarves. However, it mustbe noted that in the case of Muslimwomens dress in France, the debateis not limited to the far-right, sincethe entire political spectrum is ofteninvolved in the debate.

In France the Islamic headscarf has beenbanned in schools since 2004 under theLoi Stasi, and the Islamic full-face veil orniqab has been banned nationally sinceApril 2011. Nonetheless, for the far-right, the Islamic headscarf is seen as thesymbol of the Muslim invasion of France,thus in the national debate against theheadscarf in France has played in thefavour of the far-right (Betz and Menet,2009).

Initially, the FN did not mobiliseon Muslim-related issues (Betz andMenet, 2009). However, in the wakeof the 1989 headscarf controversiesin France, FN candidate Marie-FranceStirbois framed her legislative election

campaign on an anti-Islamic platform,and experienced significant success(Shields, 2007). Similarly in 1991, the FNas a whole began to campaign againstthe Implantation of Islam in France(Betz and Menet, 2009). The FN is nowgenerally recognised for their toughon Islam rhetoric (Poller, 2013). The FNframe Muslim identity as a hindrance tointegration and suggest that Muslimsare less willing to integrate into the widerFrench society (Streiff-Frnart, 2012).

The Far-Right in France

The French far-right political party theFront National (FN) was formed, withJean-Marie Le Pen as party president, inOctober 1972 (Shields, 2007). Formerlya very minor fringe movement, the FNsbreakthrough in the 1984 Europeanelection is recognised as the turningpoint for the FN (Shields, 2010, Ignazi,2003). The FN traditionally mobilisedon anti-European and anti-immigrationissues. Whilst France on the whole isgenerally in favour of ethnic minorityassimilation and sees ethnic identityas a barrier to emancipation (Streiff-Frnart, 2012), the FNs previous successis attributed to the way in which theydiscuss issues relating to immigration,unemployment and delinquency (Ignazi,

2003). The French far-right discourse hasled to the problematisation of immigrantcommunities in France (Streiff-Frnart,2012).

Under its new leadership, the daughterof Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Penis seen as changing the former hardline style of the FN (Shields, 2013).Marine Le Pen has recently attractedsignificant media attention based onher comparison of Muslim prayers onthe streets to the Nazi occupation ofFrance, thus creating the image of aMuslim invasion of France.

Previously FN supporters werecommonly male and blue collar.However, there is a now more wide-

ranging demographic of FN voter acrossboth rural and urbanised France. Poller(2013) argues that due to the Muslimpresence in France dissatisfied centre

France



22/56

Notably, in 2008 Jean-Marie Le Penwas involved in efforts to establisha Europe-wide anti-Islamic patrioticparty, which saw the unification ofEuropean far-right organisations inresponse to a perceived threat posed

by the presence of Islam in the West(Betz and Menet, 2009).

French Muslim Youth andthe Far-Right Anti-MuslimNarrative

French Muslim youth respondentsdemonstrated a high level of

awareness of the presence of the FNin France, particularly when comparedto respondents interviewed in theother case studies presented in thisreport. Interviewees commented onthe change of leadership in the FN,from Jean-Marie Le Pen to MarineLe Pen. Furthermore, respondentsreflected on the ways in which Marine

Le Pens leadership style was differentto that of her father. Respondentsregarded Marine Le Pen as being morepragmatic, less controversial and moreconciliatory, as discussed below:

Whilst Jean-Marie Le Pen wasknown for his tough stance,Marine Le Pen tries to be moreconciliatory she wants theFront National to be part of theFrench political power at thelocal and national level.

For some respondents, the stylisticchange brought about by Marine LePens leadership evoked fear, sinceit was believed that the reduced

controversy that surrounded the FNunder the leadership of Marine LePen enabled the FN to position itself

as a legitimate political player withinthe wider French political arena. Thusbased on the interview responses, it isapparent that young Muslims in Franceare also keenly aware of the stylisticchange brought about by Marine Le

Pens leadership of the FN as discussedby Shields (2013) and the perceivedconsequences that this may bring about.

Young Muslims interviewed in Francealso note the increasing popularity ofthe FN in France. Whilst the electoralsuccess of the FN is exaggerated,interviewees note the FN is not a

political outlier in France. A respondentstates the following:

In France the far-rightrepresents 20% of the electoralbody, so we cant say its a blacksheep.

The interviewees also suggest that the FN

tends to attract disaffected and workingclass communities in France. In addition,young Muslims interviewed also remarkthe increasing popularity of the FN inrural areas of France. Interviewees partlyattribute the FNs increasing electoralsuccess to the current economic crisisfaced in France. Participants in Francedemonstrate awareness of the wider

FN policy, noting the FNs generalanti-immigration, anti-European andnationalist agenda. More interestingly, aparticipant also notes:

...theres a part which istempting to the point we wish thatit was said by another party

the FN has logical argumentssometimes.



23/56

Whilst the response is arguablysomewhat controversial, the youngMuslim respondent is able to highlightelements within the FNs wider policythat he feels possess some merit, andnotes how in spite of his difference of

opinion he is able to objectively discussFN policy.

Furthermore, an interviewee discussesthe centrality of the FN in the widerFrench political arena:

What I think is dangerous isthe fact that everybody tends

to take a position dependingon far-right posture. It meansthat they became central andessential to the French politicalsystem.

The suggestion put forward regardingthe centrality of the FN in France reflectsthe perceived importance of the FN as felt

by young French Muslims. This thereforedemonstrates that young Muslimrespondents in France discuss the FN asa general political party rather than asextreme outliers. This may be attributedto the noted institutionalisation of theFN in France, rather than a nationalpolitical rejection of the FN in France(Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012).

Upon discussing the anti-Muslimnarrative as presented by the far-rightin France, young Muslim intervieweesnoted that they felt targeting Muslimswas central to the FNs political agenda:

Their speech is all about thedemonization of Muslims.

Whilst another respondent added:

The core of their politicalideology at the moment isIslamophobia

Respondents felt that the FN positionedIslam as a foreign religion in France and

that Islam and its beliefs were opposedto France and its values. The way inwhich the FN positioned Muslims inFrance evoked feelings of ostracizationamongst Muslims interviewed withinthe report. Therefore, whilst weobserve that the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative across Europe frames Muslimpopulations as unwilling to integrate

and that Muslims self-select isolation,based on data from the French samplewe would argue that in part the far-right anti-Muslim narrative ostracisesand results in the potential isolation ofMuslim communities in France.

Furthermore, for young Muslimsinterviewed in France the far-right anti-Muslim narrative evoked feelings of

fear, concern and revulsion. In addition,respondents felt that the FNs anti-Muslim narrative was influential inFrance in general. For young Muslims inFrance, the FNs anti-Muslim narrativewas seen to be most influential on thewider political spectrum and seen toresult in subsequent violent hate crimesagainst Muslims:

The events clearly show thatit is the normalization of sucha narrative in the media, andamong other political partiesthat participate in the rise ofIslamophobic and xenophobicpublic statements andunfortunately more and more

are committed as an outcomeof it.



24/56

Also:

...there is a direct link betweenextreme hate speech ideasand the rise of Islamophobic

acts, such as the many assaultsthat have been directed againstMuslims, the main victims of theassaults being women.

Therefore young French Muslimsinterviewed associate the far-right anti-Muslim narrative with violent attackscommitted against Muslims in France,particularly attacks against Muslim

women.

In addition, young French Muslimsinterviewed highlight the role of theFrench political left wing in articulatingthe anti-Muslim narrative:

Thats undeniable. Thepolitical speech, even of the

extreme-left, has changedbecause of the far-right positions.It was surprising to see that itwas actually the extreme-leftwho asked for a new law againstwearing hijab in private spacesfollowing the controversy aboutthe Muslim nanny in the Baby-Loup kindergarten.

Another respondent added:

Today, the left harms theMuslim community more thanthe far-right. They first evoketheir humanist values and theneed for a strong secularizationof society, secondly theyuse their identity profile andexclusion to promote the fightagainst a Muslim presence

In my opinion, the far-right isdealing with the dirty work, butthe left is taking advantage of it.I think that the ideology which isharming Muslims today in Franceisnt only the far-right one, but

it is mainly the secularist onedefended by the left.

Thus for young French Muslimsinterviewed within this report, it is clearthat in France the left wing is also seenas key in promoting the anti-Muslimnarrative. Whilst this may be seen as anexample of political convergence on

Muslim-related issues (Allen, 2010), theperceived significance of the left in thedemonization of Muslims may also beattributed to respondents living in leftwing political strongholds, thereforeany issues encountered are attributedto the left. For FEMYSO, this suggests theneed for further research into the role ofthe wider political anti-Muslim narrative

as voiced by mainstream parties and itsinfluence on European Muslim youth,particularly in France. Similarly, youngMuslim respondents see the media ascentral in the proliferation of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative, which thensubsequently influences the widerFrench population:

it is often people who havenever been in touch with Muslimpopulation who are the mostsensitive to these theories, likethose living in rural areas andwho see violence linked toMuslims through TV.

However, in comparison to other cases

studied within this report, the role of themedia in the portrayal of the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative is not expressedas strongly in France.



25/56

Interviewees in France were alreadykeenly engaged in measures tocombat the proliferation of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. Activism byinterviewees included signing petitions,protesting against the far-right anti-

Muslim narrative and supportingorganisations in France that work totackle hate crimes and hate speechagainst Muslims in France, such asthe Collectif Contre lIslamophobie enFrance (CCIF).

Respondents also saw engaging indialogue with far-right supporters and

candidates as a means of understandingwhy people might vote for the FN, andsubsequently combatting the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative.

With regards to future means ofcombatting the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative, interviewees saw multipleavenues for Muslim youth response. Ona local level, a respondent highlighted

the value of dialogue between Muslimand non-Muslim groups. Furthermoreinterviewees highlighted theimportance of Muslims moving beyondwhat they felt was commonly conveyedas a dialectic of pain and negativity,and therefore casting off an attitudeof victimhood in order to pursue moreproactive engagement.

Respondents also stressed theimportance of political engagementand representation for Muslims andby Muslims. An interviewee felt that,apart from the CCIF, there was no oneto represent the political interests ofthe Muslim community in France. Therespondents highlighted that political

engagement by Muslims in France wasa legitimate means of highlightingand addressing Muslim concerns

surrounding the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative.

Interviewees also suggested that therole of the mainstream political partiesin the promotion of the anti-Muslim

narrative must be explored and takenseriously. When discussing possiblesolutions to the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative a respondent emphasised thatthe problems faced by Muslim youth inFrance did not solely arise from the far-right and that the left wing was largelyinfluential in promoting the politicalanti-Muslim narrative in France.

French respondents also noted thatthe left wing questioning and denial ofIslamophobia put into question theirrights and undermined their abilityto denounce hate speech and hatecrimes committed against the Muslimcommunity.

To deny to someone theirrights, you have first to deny theright to name things. If you denythem the right to define issues,you dont give them the tools todefend their rights; you dont givethem the opportunity to bring theconcept to the public sphere. Ifthe concept doesnt exist, so the

problem doesnt exist. You donthave any word to describe whatis happening, so everythingwhich could be related to whatis happening becomes sporadicacts and not a whole movementof something.

Therefore it would appear that foryoung Muslims in France, it is of centralimportance to create a framework fordefining and combating Islamophobia,in order to combat both the far-right



26/56


27/56

United Kingdom been limited, in 2001 the BNP fielded350 seats and won 35 (Allen, 2011). TheBNP reached its highest level of electoralsuccess in 2010 (Goodwin, 2013), and issubsequently experiencing a decliningelectoral support (Ignazi, 2003, Goodwin,

2013). BNP supporters are often older,male proletariat (Goodwin and Evans,2012), and were shown to be morelikely than other far-right supporters toengage in violence to protect their ideas(Goodwin and Evans, 2012).

The UK Independence Party (UKIP)distances itself from the far-right, but

unlike the BNP it does not see itself asa far-right organisation. However, it isargued that UKIP also presents an anti-Islam narrative (Goodwin and Evans,2012), apparent in their inviting Dutchfar-right politician Geert Wilders, ofthe Partij Voor Vrijeid (PVV), to the UKHouse of Lords to screen his anti-Islamfilm Fitna (Goodwin and Evans, 2012). In

addition, UKIP also advocates supportfor the implementation of a burqa banin the UK (Goodwin and Evans, 2012).

UKIP is often framed as a far-right politealternative to the BNP (Goodwin andEvans, 2012). Recent research suggestUKIP supporters are less likely thanother far-right supporters in the UKto engage in violence to protect their

ideas (Goodwin and Evans, 2012). UKIPsupporters are largely professionals(Goodwin and Evans, 2012). Also, unlikethe BNP, UKIP experienced an upsurgein electoral support in 2013 (Goodwin,2013).

Finally, the English Defence League(EDL) formed in 2009, and sees itself asa direct and necessary response to the

alleged threat posed by Muslims andthe supposed Islamification of Britain(Allen, 2011). The EDL has subsequently

The Far-Right in the UK

The main British far-right organisationsconsidered within this report are the

British National Party (BNP), the socio-political movement the English DefenceLeague (EDL), and finally to a certainextent, the political party, the UKIndependence Party (UKIP).

The BNP emerged in 1982 as a splintergroup of the UK nationalist party theNational Front (Allen, 2011). Initially, theBNP framed itself as a whites only political

party, and advocated anti-Semitic andsubsequently anti-coloured immigrationpolicies. However, in October 2002 partyleader Nick Griffin launched the BNPsanti-Islam campaign, entitled Islam outof Britain (Allen, 2011). Subsequentlythe BNP released a promotional leafletentitled The Truth About Islam (BNP,2001). The leaflet is based on an acronym

for Islam Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting,Arson, Molestation of Women, anddetails inflammatory allegations againstMuslims, including the selective use ofQuranic versus that the BNP considers

justification behind alleged anti-WesternMuslim practices, thus drawing on thevisceral emotions of supporters, such asanger, fear, bitterness and hatred (Slade,

2010).In addition to the BNPs recent anti-Islamnarrative the BNP has also adopted andemphasised its British Christian heritage(Zquete, 2008), which it argues isbeing compromised by the presence ofMuslims in the UK. This in turn acts as acloak of respectability or reputationalshield for the BNP in the face of criticism

(Slade, 2010).

Whilst in the grand scheme of Britishpolitics, the BNPs electoral success has



28/56

experienced a dramatic increase in theirpublic profile. It is also experiencingan upsurge in support. Allen (2011)suggests that the EDL has a large baseof armchair warriors who express theirsympathy with the EDL through socialmedia. Allen (2011) identified that theEDL had 85,000 online Facebook fans inApril 2011. Given that the EDL Facebookpage is publicly available on the internet,on 19th June 2013, FEMYSO identifiedthat a total of 144,601 Facebook usershad liked the EDL page; howeverFacebook statistics must be treatedwith caution. They also demonstratethat the majority of people that haveliked the EDL page were aged 18 to 34,and that the week beginning 19th May2013 was the most popular week forthe EDL Facebook page. Notably thisweek coincides with the tragic murderof British soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich.Tell MAMA, a UK-based support groupthat aims to monitor anti-Muslim

attacks, also noted a significant upsurgein anti-Muslim hate crimes in the sameweek (Copsey et al., 2013).

Unlike both the BNP and UKIP, the EDL isnot a political party but a socio-politicalmovement (Allen, 2011). Generally EDLsupporters are generally young workingclass males (Goodwin and Evans,2012). Supporters of the EDL expressidentification with the EDLs anti-Islamnarrative (Goodwin and Evans, 2012).Unlike the BNPs whites only policy, theEDL welcomes a range of individualsunder the banner of anti-Islamicextremism. The EDL is recognised asemploying divisive tactics to recruitindividuals from across the British faithcommunities (Lane, 2012). The EDLspecifically targets Hindus and Sikhs aspotential supporters thus provokingintra-Asian tensions. Similarly, the EDL

also frequently marches under theIsraeli flag and the Star of David (Allen,2011, Lane, 2012) and seeks to attractJewish supporters (Lane, 2012), thusantagonising Muslim-Jewish tensions.It must be noted that the support thatthe EDL receives from members of faithcommunities is generally limited (Lane,2012).

British Muslim Youth and theFar-Right Anti-Muslim Narrative

Muslims within the sample cite the BNPand the EDL as far-right organisationsin the UK. Interestingly the youngBritish Muslims interviewed do notmention UKIP as a far-right party. Unlikethe French case, interviewees do notdiscuss the far-right leadership in theUK. However, the differences that arisehere can be attributed to the reducedfocus on the far-right leadership in theUK when compared to France. British

Muslim youth do not discuss thegeneral policies of the British far-right,but primarily see the far-right in the UKthrough the prism of its anti-Muslimrhetoric.

Respondents also recognise that theBritish far-right no longer seeks to attractsupport merely from the indigenouspopulation, but also from diverse

minority groups within British society:

But it not just the whiteworking class that they targetin the UK; the EDL even has Sikh,Hindu, gay, womens and Jewishsections within their movement.To me this shows that they are

not just a xenophobic far-rightmovement that we might haveseen in the past, but it is a fascist



29/56

movement specifically aimed attargeting Muslims

The respondent goes on to add:

From what they say, it is mostly

targeted towards Muslims;they dont tend to target otherethnic minority backgrounds.They make claims that we arebarbaric and backwards. Theymake false claims; they all saythat we are taking over thecountry, that Muslim women are

oppressed by covering becausethey equate freedom with theability to expose your body.They say that we are takingbenefits. They also erroneouslygeneralise all Muslims as beingradical extremists and proneto violence. They always goon about Muslims wanting to

impose Sharia law in the UK,which is totally not true.

For respondents the specific anti-Muslimstance of the EDL in the UK createsa sense of demonization of Muslims.Thus interviewees felt that the EDL anti-Muslim narrative contradicts Britainstradition of multiculturalism and framesMuslims as outsiders, and as different

from other minority communities inthe UK. As in the French case, the far-right framing of Muslims as outsiders tosociety creates a sense of ostracizationfor British Muslim youth. Furthermore,the anti-Muslim narrative promotedby the EDL in the UK is seen as a falsenarrative and not a true reflection of theBritish Muslim community.

A respondent links the far-right anti-Muslim narrative to the subsequentdemonization of Muslims and perceivedotherness of Muslims in Britain:

So they are against peoplewho are not like them forexample the Muslims, theydont see them as being British,as being like them, they see adifference in their values andtheir look, then they are able tolabel them, to dehumanize themand to attack them. They feel

conformable doing that.

For others the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative in the UK evokes frustration,particularly far-right calls for Muslims toleave the UK:

It can be very frustrating;technically, this is our country

just as much as its theirs. I wasborn here, Ive spent my entirelife here, Ive volunteered for thecommunity, Ive worked with thepeople here; this place is myhome too.

Overall, young Muslim respondentswere keen to highlight that in spite

of the far-right framing of the BritishMuslim community, Muslims are athome in the UK and make a significantcontribution to British society. Thesefindings reflect an earlier empiricalstudy, as undertaken by Hopkins (2007)in Scotland, whereby young ScottishMuslim males, when interviewed aboutthe BNP, highlighted the British Muslim

and Asian contribution to the UK.For young Muslims surveyed in theUK, the far-right anti-Muslim narrative



30/56

evoked a clear emotional response.Respondents described feelings ofanxiety, upset and fear of physicalattack by far-right supporters and thoseinfluenced by the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative, particularly on vulnerable

members of the British Muslim societysuch as women, children and the elderly.

Young Muslims in the UK also suggestthat the far-right anti-Muslim narrativeinfluences the wider political spectrum inthe UK. Furthermore, the normalisationof the far-right anti-Muslim narrative inBritish politics creates scepticism anddistrust of British politicians. Therefore,the normalisation of the anti-Muslimnarrative in UK politics risks alienatingBritish Muslim youth. However, thenormalisation of the narrative is felt to alesser extent than in the case of France,where the left is strongly linked to theproliferation and normalisation of theanti-Muslim narrative.

In addition to the role of politics,young British Muslim respondentsall highlighted the perceived highlysignificant influence of the British mediain fuelling and disseminating the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. The mediawas seen to be perpetuating the far-right anti-Muslim narrative throughgiving the far-right airtime to voice their

counter-cohesive and divisive views. Inaddition, young Muslims interviewedsee Muslim engagement with the mediaas a tool for combatting the anti-Muslimnarrative in the media.

The media appear to beconstantly fuelling the far-rightanti-Muslim narrativeI feel that

we should do more to engage inpolitics and news reporting, inorder to counter the anti-Muslim

narrative that we see in bothpolitics and the media.

The media have a tendencyto depict Muslims in a negative

light; they twist everything to putMuslims in the wrong, even if theindividual is innocent. If theresever a story in the news about acriminal or a suspect that mightinvolve a Muslim individual, youcan guarantee that the wordMuslim shall be heard in thefirst sentence of the report. The

media definitely exaggerate,which just makes society morehesitant towards Muslims.

Another respondent perceives the mediaportrayal of the anti-Muslim narrative aspotentially dangerous and determinativeof public perception, since those whodo not know Muslims are likely to takestatements at face value and see them astrue.

In addition, young British Muslimsinterviewed within this report note thatthey experience prejudice in society andlink the prejudice faced to the prevalenceof the far-right anti-Muslim narrative.However interviewees highlight that theyare easily able to counter the negative

perception of Muslims that is broughtabout by the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative through engaging in positivedialogue with others. Participants notethat they are able to discuss the positiveelements of Islam and thus counter thenegative stereotypes of Muslims held byothers.

British Muslim interviewees highlight the

importance of taking proactive measuresto counter the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative in the UK. Like young Muslims



31/56

in France, British interviewees suggestthe importance of political engagementby Muslims as a means of combattingthe far-right anti-Muslim narrative.

In addition to political engagement

by Muslims in the UK, young BritishMuslim respondents discuss the valueof collaborating with anti-fascistmovements in the UK in order to combatthe far-right anti-Muslim narrative. Aparticipant notes:

I have heard about Uniteagainst Fascism, and I have

seen them at a rally in London.They seem to stand up againstall forms of racial hatred andthe fact that they are not justone ethnic or religious groupof people, it actually givesthem more credibility whenthey speak against the far-rightstance on Muslims. UAF appearto have more credibility whenthey engage with the widerpublic. I think it is a good wayfor Muslims to be engaged andto respond to this problem. Itmight actually be better, ratherthan Muslims to speak up aloneagainst the far-right anti-Muslim

narrative, for us to be engagedwith groups like UAF.

Therefore in combining efforts with otherorganisations in the UK, young BritishMuslims feel that their campaign againstthe far-right anti-Muslim narrative willhave increased credibility and legitimacy.Indeed, for young British Muslimscollaboration would enable Muslims to

draw on best practice and potentiallyincrease the efficacy of their campaigns.Furthermore, it is apparent that youngMuslims in the UK feel that the anti-Muslim

narrative and associated hate speech andhate crimes should be tackled within thewider frame of anti-discrimination.

In summary, like young French Muslims,British Muslim youth are also keenly

aware of far-right organisations in theirnational context. However, for the youngMuslims surveyed in the UK, the far-rightis perceived as having an agenda thatis constructed entirely around an anti-Muslim narrative. Arguably this is due tothe increased prevalence of the purelyanti-Islamist EDL at present in the UK. Foryoung British Muslims the far-right anti-

Muslim narrative creates an experienceof prejudice and feelings of upset,frustration, concern and fear of physicalattack.

Muslim youth interviewed in Britain alsoreport the normalisation of the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative in British politicsand highlight the role of the Britishmedia in fuelling and portraying the far-right anti-Muslim narrative. Intervieweeshighlight the contribution made by theMuslim community to the UK. At presentthe young Muslims interviewed in theUK respond to the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative by engaging in dialogue withthose that do not know a great dealabout Muslims and seek to challenge the

negative stereotypes of Muslims broughtabout by the prevalence of the anti-Muslim narrative. Respondents highlightthe need for proactive engagementby the young Muslim community, inboth the political and media sphereas well as suggesting that Muslimscollaborate with existing anti-fascistand anti-discrimination organisations

in their campaign against the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative, and tackle thenarrative within the wider frame of anti-discrimination.



32/56

The Far-Right in Belgium

Belgiums far-right political movementoriginates in the Flemish north of

Belgium, with Vlaams Belang (VB) orFlemish Interest. The Vlaams Belang wasformerly known as the Vlaams Blok, orFlemish Block, until 2005. The VlaamsBlok was formed in the 1970s. A courtruling in 2005 meant that the partywas forced to change its name, since itwas found to be in violation of Belgiananti-racism laws. However, VB used the

name change as a means of wideningits appeal and to generate publicity (Erk,2005).

More generally, the VB is argued to havecreated a rightward shift in Belgianpolitics (Erk, 2005). Like the far-rightorganisations in France and the UK, VBalso promotes an anti-Muslim narrative.VB mobilises against the perceived threatposed by the alleged Muslim invasionof Belgium (Betz and Menet, 2009). TheVB frames Muslims in Belgium as beingin opposition to Belgian cultural values(Erk, 2005) and thus claims the VB aredefenders of the Belgian Euro-Christianheritage (Betz and Menet, 2009). Theleader of VB, Filip Dewinter, regards Islamas the Trojan horse of fundamentalism(Betz and Menet, 2009), thus creating animage of a covert invasion of Belgiumby Muslims.

Similarly, Dewinter notably suggestedthat Muslim women in Belgium who wearthe Islamic headscarf have effectivelysigned an agreement for deportation(Erk, 2005), therefore negating the

compatibility of Muslim and Belgianidentity. Controversially, Filip Dewintersdaughter An-Sofie Dewinter posed in a

burqa, left open to show her wearinga bikini. The image carried the sloganFreedom or Islam? You choose inFlemish across her body, thus equatingIslam and Muslim womens dress with alack of freedom.

Within the Flemish region, VB hasenjoyed considerable levels of electoralsuccess since the 1990s (Thijssenand de Lange, 2005). Such electoralsupport has been strongest in areaswith large immigrant and impoverishedcommunities (Thijssen and de Lange,2005).

On the European level, in 2008 FilipDewinter invited far-right leaders toform a project against the Islamisation ofEuropean cities (Betz and Menet, 2009).The Belgian far-right also appears to beactive in the Cities against IslamisationMovement (Cities against Islamisation,2013).

Belgian Muslim Youth and theFar-Right Anti-Muslim Narrative

Interviewees in Belgium cited VB as themain far-right movement in Belgiumand were aware of the VBs leadership.Respondents in Belgium noted VBsincreasing electoral success. In addition,interviewees also demonstratedawareness of the VB general politicalagenda, commenting that it includedanti-immigration, anti-foreign andnationalist policies.

Respondents also felt that the anti-Muslim narrative was central to the VBpolitical agenda:

I feel like the far-right is just

about the hate and fear of Islam.

Belgium



33/56

report suggest a wider French politicalinfluence on Belgium, specifically inthis case with the French anti-Muslimnarrative influencing Belgium.

Like the young Muslims interviewed

in France and the UK, young BelgianMuslims also noted an increasingnormalisation of the anti-Muslimnarrative across the wider politicalspectrum in Belgium. They felt it wasnot uncommon for politicians fromliberal political parties to participate inthe far-right anti-Muslim narrative. Aninterviewee also suggests that left wing

politicians who express anti-Muslimstatements are less likely to be subject tothe same degree of scrutiny experiencedby the far-right, and therefore liberalpoliticians are able to voice the anti-Muslim narrative with relative impunity.

Similarly to British respondents, Belgianinterviewees note the pivotal role playedby the media in conveying the far-rightanti-Muslim narrative. Intervieweesdescribe the media as sensationalist, andtherefore see this portrayal of Muslimsas fuelling the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative. The normalisation of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative within thepolitical sphere and media was seen asinfluencing the perception of Muslims

in the wider Belgian society. Muslimsfelt that the normalisation of the anti-Muslim narrative more generally inBelgian society was very concerning:

What I think is worrying is thefact that their ideas are moreand more widespread andconsidered to be acceptable.

Belgian respondents also noted the far-right denial of Islamophobia:

Similarly:

The far-right in Belgium has avery Islamophobic position.

Therefore, for the young Belgian

respondents the anti-Muslim narrativewas inherent to the Belgian far-rightmovement. Furthermore, for the youngMuslims interviewed in Belgium thefar-right anti-Muslim narrative evokedfeelings of worry, shock, revulsion andthe experience of animosity from thewider Belgian community.

Furthermore, like British Muslim youth,young Muslims in Belgium attributedthe widespread nature of the far-right anti-Muslim narrative to a lackof dialogue with the general Belgianpopulation and felt that the lack ofdialogue resulted in a limited awarenessof Muslims in Belgium. Therefore, basedon the interview responses, it is apparent

that young Muslims in Belgium note theneed for promotion of a positive imageof Muslims, and see this as a means ofovercoming the far-right anti-Muslimnarrative.

In addition to a perceived lack ofawareness of Muslim populationsin Belgium and lack of dialogue,interviewees also see the French far-right anti-Muslim narrative as influentialin Belgian debate:

I feel like the narrative in Francehas a big influence in Belgium,and we are also inheriting theFrench public debates.

Whilst existing literature highlightsthe influence of French secularism onfrancophone Belgium (Mielants, 2006),the responses by interviewees in this



34/56

...theres a politician from thefar-right in Belgium who says thatwe cant consider Islamophobiaas a form of racism becauseIslam isnt a racethis shows

how the political class react to it.

Through the far-right denial ofIslamophobia, young Belgian Muslimsfelt less able to tackle the far-right anti-Muslim narrative and other forms ofdiscrimination. In response to the far-right position on Islamophobia, youngBelgian Muslims interviewed stress

the importance of defining and takingmeasures against Islamophobia so thatsubsequent anti-Muslim incidences canbe dealt with effectively.

In addition to a framework for thedefinition of Islamophobia, likerespondents in the UK and Franceinterviewees also stress the importanceof political participation by Muslims. They

felt that Muslim political participationshould extend across the politicalspectrum. In addition to Muslim politicalparticipation, respondents also suggestthat any anti-Muslim narrative should becondemned by politicians on the whole.Along with condemnation by politicians,respondents pointed out the role ofinfluential figures in Belgian society inspeaking out against discrimination.For example, an interviewee cites how arugby team came forward to condemnhomophobia and that this has beeneffective in combatting homophobicattitudes in Belgian society.

Similarly, young Belgian Muslimshighlight the value of collaboration with

other marginalised groups in Belgiansociety. Respondents felt that workingwith other groups that face prejudice

would allow for a mutual exchange ofeffective strategies and the creationof support networks. The promotionof collaborative working echoes thesuggestions put forward by the BritishMuslim youth sample.

In summary, Belgian respondentsdemonstrate an awareness of the far-right, its general policies and increasingelectoral popularity. Moreover,participants are also aware of theanti-Muslim narrative presented byVB; in addition they cite an increasingnormalisation and acceptance of

this narrative. However, as wasdemonstrated in the French and Britishcases, respondents do not feel that theanti-Muslim narrative is confined to thefar-right alone and observe that the anti-Muslim narrative is often promoted andfuelled by the media, and expressed bypoliticians across the political spectrum.

Interviewees stress the importanceof political engagement by BelgianMuslims as an effective means ofcombatting the anti-Muslim narrative.Young Muslims interviewed also notethat condemnation of the anti-Muslimnarrative by Muslims, politicians andinfluential figures would help to tacklethe anti-Muslim narrative. In addition,

interviewees also suggest the efficacy ofcollaboration with other marginalisedgroups in the fight against the anti-Muslim narrative and other forms ofdiscrimination.



35/56

GermanyThe German Far-Right

The German far-right is noted as beingthe least successful in Western Europe,

given its generally limited electoralsuccess (Backes and Mudde, 2000).The limited political success of the far-right in Germany is attributed to theNazi association with the far-right,mainstream rejection of the far-rightand state surveillance of far-rightorganisations (Backes and Mudde,2000). Typically, far-right voters in

Germany express greatest levels ofpolitical dissatisfaction, nostalgia forthe past, xenophobia, anti-Semitismand ethnocentrism (Ignazi, 2003).Traditionally, far-right voters in Germanywere usually blue collar, older males,however more recently far-right votersare identified as being younger andnon-religious (Ignazi, 2003).

Far-right organisations inGermany include Pro-NRW, andNationaldemokratische ParteiDeutschlands (NPD). However, theGerman far-right is recognised asbeing non-unified (Backes and Mudde,2000), thus highlighting that there aremany far-right organisations active in

Germany.The NPD was established in the 1960sand has had fluctuating electoral successover the years. It has been subject toseveral attempts to ban the organisation(Backes and Mudde, 2000). Morerecently, in addition to its more generalextreme right policies, the NPD arguesthe Turkish Muslim and Arab Muslim

presence in Germany poses a threat toGermany (Nationaldemokratische ParteiDeutschlands, 2013). The NPD cite an

unstoppable Islamisation of Germanydue to a perceived Muslim inabilityto integrate (NationaldemokratischePartei Deutschlands, 2013). The NPDalso make links between crime ratesand Muslim presence in Germany(Nationaldemokratische ParteiDeutschlands, 2013).

In addition to the NPD, the Cologne-based far-right movement Pro NRWwas established in 1996, specificallyagainst the construction of a mosquein Cologne. The Pro NRW explicitlycampaign against the Islamisation of

Germany (NRW, 2013, Pro NRW, 2013).The Pro NRW has enjoyed some electoralsuccess. Currently the Pro NRW arecampaigning against the establishmentof a Moroccan Mosque in Leverkussen(NRW, 2013, Pro NRW, 2013) and invitevisitors to their website to sign thepetition against the mosque, thussuggesting that the Pro NRW opposes

the visible presence of Islam in Germany.Like other national far-right movementscited in this report, Pro NRW show signsof the European far-right unificationaround an anti-Muslim stance.Specifically the Pro NRW website carriesthe logos of the Swedish far-right party,the Swedish Democrats, the Europeanmovement Cities against Islamisation,and the Belgian VB (NRW, 2013, ProNRW, 2013).

German Muslim Youth and theFar-Right Anti-Muslim Narrative

Interviewees in the German contextcite numerous far-right organisations,including Pro-NRW and NPD. However,

respondents feel given its non-unifiednature and the legal restrictions it is subjectto, the German far-right differs to that seenwithin the wider European context:



36/56

In my opinion there is adifferent type of far-right inGermany.

Nonetheless, respondents discuss thegeneral far-right

Documents

European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-right Anti-Muslim Narrative