Examen Pragmatism

7/27/2019 Examen Pragmatism

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TEMA 1: Characteristics of classical American philosophy before the birth of pragmatism:

1. The damnation of Renee Descartes (Renatus Carthesius in Latin, died in 164)the American philosophy started by denoun

his philosophy. He was considered the first modern philosopher. All the basic premises of Cartesian philosophy were rejec

The first thesis of his rejected was the thesis of the separation between faculties of knowledge. According to Descartes,

instance the activity of our sensibility (a faculty of knowledge) is completely separate/distinct form the activity of reason or o

intellect. In modern philosophy there are 3 main faculties of knowledge; sensibility, imagination and intellect/reason, thro

which we can know something. Sensibility works through our senses, the imagination works through representations and re

works through concepts/ideas/thoughts. This distinction between faculties was rejected. American philosophers considered

we can have no genuine knowledge according to this division. In other words, we can have no genuine knowledge about an o

by separating our sensibility towards it from the intellect. There are no distinctions between these. Another thesis rejected wa

distinction between body and mind. American philosophers considered that the body and the mind are organically connected

cannot be separated. Descartes said that experiencing a physical contact is a part of how our body works and has nothing t

with our mind. (pain for example) Our mind simply operates on our sensation. Descartes didnt genuinely think body

separated from the mind. To have the consciousness of humans allows experiencing the pain and understanding it in the same

with our brains. Americans thought that experiencing the pain and understanding it is one and the same act which hap

simultaneously. They considered that this separation is artificial, with no validity in practice, only theoretical.

2. The naturalization of the spirit: in classical tradition, the glorious There are two main worlds, what Plato called

sensiblr eotld, the world of teresttal action, the world. American philosophers discarded these distinctions. Metaphysi

separation between the spiritual worlds and the world of experience stood at the basis of metaphysics. Americans rejected alltradition in metaphysics/ the metaphysical tradition. They considered it to be highly speculative, fiction. American philosop

considered that for a better understanding of what is spiritual, it is necessary to naturalize values and ideas to put them to w

What is spiritual should be manifested in nature, manifesting experience. These ideas have no value when approached abstrac

theoretically. Their essential meaning is exactly their role in experience. There is no form without content so they rejected

existence of the spiritual world SEPARATELY from the natural world.

3. The mentalization of nature: European philosophy (Hegel, Plato, Aristotle, Plotin, Augustine, St. Thomas, Descartes, K

considered that nature is of a minor value for the mind. Nature is nothing else than the domain of our experiences. In other w

it has a poor rational significance (or spiritual significance). That is what for instance the transcendentalists contested (R

Emerson). Emerson considered that nature is essentially spiritual. Its role for our life is not minor as European philosop

considered, but our experiences are the very condition for a better understanding of ourselves. This was commonly the opinio


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classical American philosophers. Nature has a spiritual value and is not simply the domain of our experience. This mean

mentalization of natureconsidering nature from a spiritual standpoint.

4. The focus on processes instead of substances : in European tradition our existence, God, truth, the good, beautyall of thes

substances (something existing in and by itself). For instance (in Plato) a beautiful woman is the instantiation in reality of

abstract substance of beauty which lives independently in our soul thus our souls have the capacity of recognizing somet

beautiful when seeing it, because beauty is implanted in our soul. Our soul is co-generated with the forms of truth, beauty or g

Thats why substances exist by themselves. American philosophers considered that operating or using substances is irreleva

no use for our experience. They questioned the meaning of the Platonic idea that forms are imprinted in our souls. Instead of u

substances, whats relevant is to see how for instance the idea of truth works in experience how is it possible for somethin

become true. They contested the idea that there are essential and eternal truths. Instead they considered that what is true

processit BECOMES true. They insisted on the process of something becoming true.

5. The substitution of yesterday with tomorrow: in European tradition what was meaningful was related to accomplishmen

the past. European philosophers considered that to know something is equivalent with knowing the past of that someth

American philosophers didnt deny the role of the past, but they put an accent on the role of the fu ture. Namely, somethin

meaningful only if it is relevant for future experiences.

6. Thought is not a substance, but something revealing a certain goal/something oriented towards results : in Euro

tradition, thought was important because it was the only way of understanding what happened through concepts/ideas. Ameri

rejected the idea that theories and concepts alone are sufficient for explaining the true meaning of our experience. They consid

that the most important role of our thought is that of changing the world not that of understanding itof transforming reality.

7. The importance of language: in European tradition, the meaning of our statements was established in terms of a correspond

between our ideas and facts, so that language was of a minor importanceit didnt really matter how you said it or what lang

you say it in. whats important is the accuracy of our ideas in confrontation with facts. American philosophers considered

language is central in experience, because they considered ideas to be abstract, they thought that there was no way of verifyin

presupposed correspondence between ideas and facts so that language became contextual/essential in the way in w

understand and communicate experiences or facts.

8. Science is no more a singular and contemplative accomplishment but a cooperative one: science was no longer conceive

a purely singular activity but a cooperative one. Example: Newton constructed his world according to his own rationa


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following certain laws and axioms. His mechanics was a result of his solitary thinking upon what are the laws governing na

and our experience. According to Americans, the progress of science and technology in late modernity makes it impossible f

solitary mind to conceive and to explain the entire experience. Thats why science is or should be conceived as a coopera

investigation - a collaboration of scholars, researchers. The simplistic mechanicism of the world according to Newton wa

longer sufficient to explain the realities of our contemporary world. Thus science is not the product of a single mind nor

prerogative, it cannot explain the mysteries of the world.

9. The primacy of method: our knowledge was founded, according to the European tradition, upon speculative theories/se

concepts constructed by the mind. According to Americans, in the absence of a specified methodology of research there i

possibility of achieving theoretical results. So method is not only desirable, but also necessary. Their question was: how do

achieve your results? Thats why they insisted on the role of experiments, testing our theoretical assumptions according

transparent methodology.

10.Science can no longer be separated from society: science is not abstract, no longer independent of the world. The meaning

our scientific results should be tested in order to get to their validation. Science is no longer speculative, but applicativ e. T

why probably the most developed sciences and most popular ones are applied sciences. Namely, sciences that prove their re

in experience.

11.The substitution of the individual with the community: in the European tradition the center of our universe was the indivi

Men and women were conceived generically under the label; they didnt speak about distinct human habitudes, they spoke ins

of how generically the human mind works. Americans, starting in the 2nd

half of the 19th

century, started to abandon the ide

the central importance of the individual and to stress upon the importance of communities of individuals. Because they d

think that the human potentialities are the same. They are different from a culture to another, from a period of time to another

It is better to think about individuals as parts of communities. The concept of the individual by itself cannot tell someth

relevant about the world we live in. so individuals should not be conceived isolated but living in communities. This assump

had a decisive role in the development of philosophy, behavioral sciences, etc.

TEMA 2:General considerations on the philosophy of Ch. Peirce

Charles S. Peirce , some-times called the founder of pragmatism, was influenced by Kant and Hegel. Peirce considered

problems, including those of metaphysics, could be solved if one gave careful attention to the practical conse-quenc

adherence to various ideas. Pragmatism is sometimes said to have originated in 1878, when Peirce published the article


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To Make Our Ideas Clear.3

The philosophical writings of Peirce consist of essays and manuscripts, many of which are fragmentary or incomplete. Although he never wr

book in philosophy or organized his thoughts into systematic or final form, his liter-ary activity covered many years. With the publi-cation o

papers in recent decades, interest in Peirces philosophy is increasing, and he is com-ing to be recognized as an intellectual genius of outstan

originality. He was the rare combi-nation of a natural scientist with a laboratory habit of mind, a careful student of philosophy, and a man

strong moral convictions. He is sometimes referred to as a philosophers philos-opher, rather than a public or popular philoso-pher, such as James

Peirce was primarily a logician concerned with the more technical problems of logic and epistemology, and the methods of the labor

sciences. He was interested in deductive systems, methodology in the empirical sciences, and the philosophy behind the various methods

techniques. His logic included a theory of signs and symbols, a field in which he did pioneer work. He viewed logic as a means of communi-c

and a cooperative or public venture. His approach was to invite critical examination and seek aid from others in a continuous quest for the clarific

of ideas. Peirce wished to estab-lish philosophy on a scientific basis and to treat theories as working hypotheses. He called his ap-pr

pragmaticism.One of Peirces main contributions to phi-losophy is his theory of meaning. He coined the word pragmatism from the Greek word pragma(ac

deed) to emphasize the fact that words derive their meanings from actions. He set forth one of the first modern theories of mean-ing by propos

technique for the clarification of ideas. The meaning of many ideas, Peirce said, is best discovered by putting them to an experi-mental tes

observing the results. His crite-rion of meaningfulness was to appeal to the way an object wouldbehave if it had a certain charac-ter or were

certain kind. If an object were hard it would scratch other objects; if it were volatile, it would evaporate rapidly, and the like. Peirce argued

thinking always occurs in a context, not in isolation. Meanings are derived not by intuition but by experience or experi-ment. For these reas

meanings are not indi-vidual or private but are social and public. If there is no way of testing an idea by its effects or public consequences,

meaningless. To be able to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless is particularly important, Peirce thought, when you are conside

opposing systems of thought.Peirces empiricism is intellectualistic rather than voluntaristic; that is, emphasis is on the intellect and understanding rather than on wil

activity. The irritation of doubt leads to the struggle to attain belief. The end of this inquiry, which aims to dispel doubt, is knowledge. Thus he

not stress sensation or volition as much as do later forms of popular pragmatism. Peirce is critical of positivism and mechanistic deter-minism, onone hand, and intuitionism and a priori principles, on the other hand. Although he shares some of the positivists views, he does not share with

the idea that empiricism re-quires a denial of the possibility of metaphysics. In the field of metaphysics as well as in all other areas of discourse

must avoid the belief that we have attained finality. Peirce supports falli-bilism; even the most intelligent people are apt to be mistaken. Progre

inquiry leads to constant modification. There is chance (tychism) because, Peirce maintained, although nature be-haves in a lawlike way,

regularity is never ex-act. Chance, as well as habit, plays a real part in the occurrence of events in the world. Fallibilism and an open future rep

skepticism and abso-lutism, and pragmatism replaces fixed systems of belief in philosophy and in science. Although Peirce gave his major attenti

logic and methodology, his writings make clear that he left a place for an evolutionary idealism that stresses the need for a principle of love opp

to any narrow individualism in human affairs.


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TEMA 3: William James's pragmatism as radical empiricism

RADICAL EMPIRICISM

James defines the term radical empiricismthis way: I say empiricism because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concer

matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modi-fication in the course of future experience. James includes relations, such asgreater than, among the

(directly experienced) elements. Pragmatism, as we have seen, is the practice of looking toward results and facts instead of to-ward first principle

categories. It accepts the experiences and facts of everyday life as fun-damental. Reality is just what it is experienced as beingflux or ch

Because experience is fragmentary, pragmatists find things partly joined and partly disjoined, and accept them as they are. Consequently, they

that reality is pluralistic rather than monistic or dualistic. There is the giventhe data of the senseswhich is brought in as stimuli from the re

beyond us. Added to this is the interpretativeelement, which the conscious being supplies.The creative whole of experience, which in-cludes both the given and the interpretative el-ement, i

one reality we know. Knowledge is thus based directly on sense perception, or ex-perience, which constitutes the continuous, flowing strea

consciousness.

James theory of truth

William James said, Truth happens to an idea. What was so startling about this statement was that the more traditional theo ries of truth

virtually the opposite viewnamely, that truth was a fixed or static relation. When James exam-ined the traditional theories of truth, he de-mand

know what truth means in opera-tion. Truth must be the cash value of an idea. What other motive could there be for saying that something is tr

not than to provide guides for practical behavior? James would ask, What concrete difference will it make in life? A dif-ference that mak

difference is no differ-ence, but only a matter of words. An idea be-comes true or is made true by events. An idea is true if it works or if i

satisfactory conse-quences. Truth is relative; it also grows. The true is the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is the expedi

the way of our behaving. Ideas, doctrines, and theories be-come instruments to help us meet life situations; doctrines are not answers to riddletheory is created to suit some human purpose, and the only satisfactory criterion of the truth of a theory is that it leads to beneficial res

Workability,satisfactions, consequences, and results are the keywords in the pragmatic conception of truth.

Pragmatic view on moralityWithin Jamess view, morality, like truth, is not fixed but grows out of present life situations. The source and authority fo r beliefs and conduc

found in human experience. The good is that which makes for a more satisfactory life; the evil is that which tends to destroy life. James was a st

defender of moral freedom and indeter-minism; he believed that determinism is an in-tellectualistic falsification of experience. He sup-porte

doctrine ofmeliorism, which holds that the world is neither completely evil nor com-pletely good but is capable of being improved. Human effo

improve the world is worth-while and fruitful, and the trend of biological and social evolution is toward such improvement.


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The will to believeJames devoted considerable attention to reli-gion. The doctrines of pluralism and meliorism, as well as the doctrine of the will to believ

contributed to his views of religion and of God. He acknowledged later that the will to believe might have been called the right to believe.Let us consider first Jamess doctrine of the will to believe. We have pointed out that radical empiricism ceases to look bey ond experienc

supposed necessities and metaphysical entities and stresses the present stream of consciousness. Consciousness displays interest, desire, an

tention; it is volitional as well as sensory, and the will rather than the intellect is determinative. The will determines how and what we expe-ri

thus thinking is empirically secondary to willing. What is selected and emphasized is thereby made vital and real; thus, the world we experien

largely of our own making.As with our sensory perceptions, so with our ideas. Those ideas that interest us and engage our attention tend to exclude others and to dominate

scene; and these ideas tend to find expression in our actions. In life, individuals have to make numerous decisions. How are they to make

decisions and formulate their beliefs? In some situations the evidence is reasonably certain and clear, and in these circumstances they need to a

accordance with the evidence. In other situations, in which a choice between the proposed lines of action either is not forced or is trivial, they

postpone their decisions or even refrain from choosing at all. There are still other situations, however, in which individuals facing some crucial

must choose and act, because failure to decide will commit them to one of the alternatives. If such issues are living, forced, and momentous,p

need to act even though theydo not have all the evidence on the basis of which they would like to make their decisions. James doctrine of the w

believe applies to this third type of situation, where some decision is demanded by the structure of the situation. For example, shall I marry

woman (or man) or shall I wait until I know for certain how the marriage will turn out? I cannot know for certain that the marriage will be harmo

and suc-cessful. All the facts are not known and I cannot wait until all the evidence is in, yet the issue is liv-ing, forced, and momentous. To fail t

is in itself a decisionnot to marry this person at this time. When the will to believe leads to decision and action, it leads to discovery and convic

or to truth and value simply through the fact that the will exists. Lifes values are empirical and are found and tested in the process of living.According to James, in many of lifes experi-ences, we have contact with a More. We feel that which is sympathetic and gives us sup-p

We rely on it in worship and in prayer. This sense of the More brings comfort, happi-ness, and peace; furthermore, it is an almost uni-v

experience. In the religious sense, God is the name of this ideal tendency or encompassing support in human experience.

James, as we have seen, was impressed by the novelty, freedom, individuality, and diversity in-herent in our world. Consequently, he insistedGod is finite. There are real possibilities for evil as well as for good in our world; no good, all-powerful God could have created the world as we k

it. God is, however, moral and friendly, and we can cooperate with God in cre-ating a better world.

TEMA 4: Pragmatic view on democracy in J. Dewey

The continued growth and strength of prag-matism can be attrib-uted to John Deweys (see biography and ex-cerpt, pp. 296297) prolific writings and his application of the principles of the movement to all ph

of life and thought. Dewey achieved prominence in logic, epistemology, ethics, aes-thetics, and political, economic, and educational philosophies

Dewey and his many followers, the term instrumentalism is preferred to the termpragmatism, but both are used.Dewey was a keen and a constant critic of the classical or traditional types of philosophies, with their search for ultimate reality and their at-tem

find the immutable. Such philosophies, Dewey claimed, attempt to minimize or tran-scend human experience. In The Quest for Cer-tainty, D


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says that we have used two meth-ods to escape dangers and gain security. One is to appease or conciliate the powers around us by ceremonial r

sacrifices, supplication, and so on. The second is to invent tools to control the forces of nature to our advantage. This is the way of science, indu

and the arts, and it is the way Dewey approves. The aim of philosophy is the better organization of human life and activ-ity here and now. Interes

shifts from tradi-tional metaphysical problems to the methods, at-titudes, and techniques for scientific and social progress. The method is th

experimental in-quiry as guided by empirical research in the area of values.Experience is one of the key words in Deweyspragmatic theory. Deweys philosophy is ofandfordaily experience. In his essay The Need

Recovery of Philosophy, Dewey sets down his criticisms of the traditional or inherited view of experience as found in empiricism and off

substitute interpretation. The orthodox empiri-cal view regards experience primarily as a knowl-edge affair (see Chapter 9). Dewey prefers to

experience as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its social and physical environ-ment.7

Experience for Dewey is primaril

perimental and is not tied to what has been or what is given; experience involves an effort to change the given by reaching forward int

unknown. Dewey refuses to attempt to tran-scend human experience or to believe that any-one else has ever succeeded in doing so. In the

philosophers attempted to discover some theoretical superexperience on the basis of which they might build a secure and meaningful life. D

insists that experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is the only means we have of penetrating further into the se-crets of nature.

This present world of men and women, of fields and factories, of plants and animals, of bustling cities and struggling nations, is the world of our

experience. We should try to understand it and then attempt to construct a society in which all can grow in freedom and intelligence.Dewey takes evolution, relativity, and the time process seriously. The world is in the mak-ing; it is constantly moving forward. This view o

world stands in marked contrast to that of a fixed and permanent reality, which dominated Greek and medieval thinking and has character-ized m

areas of modern science.Dewey was born in 1859, the year Darwin published Origin of Species. Not since Aristotle has any philosopher built his or her thought so compl

on biological foundations. The vi-sion of human beings as always changing and de-veloping in the midst of an environment that fosters and a

same time threatens their lives was decisive for Dewey. Organism and environ-ment, development and struggle, precariousness and stability

are the basic elements that humans face. Dewey put these elements together in the unifying idea ofexperience.

According to Dewey, we live in an unfin-ished world. Deweys attitude can best be un-derstood by an examination of three aspects of what we cainstrumentalism. First, the no-tion of temporalism means that there is real movement and progress in time. We can no longer hold a spectator vie

reality. Our knowledge does not merely mirror the world; it reshapes and changes it. Second, the notion of futurism bids us to look mainly to

future and not to the past. The future, which is growing out of the past, will not be a repetition but will be in some sense novel. Third, meliorism

view that the world can be made better by our efforts, a view also held by William James.Basic to Deweys philosophy is the instrumental theory of ideas, the use of intelligence as a method. Thinking is biological; it is concernedwith the adjustment between an organism and its environment. All thinking and all con cepts, doctrines, logics, and philosophies are, in Dew

words, part of the protective equip-ment of the race in its struggle for existence.Reflective thinking occurs when we face a problem or when our habits are blocked in par-ticular crises. Intelligence is an instrument for the indiv

or society to gain some goal. There is no separate mind stuff gifted with a faculty for thinking. Mind is manifested in ou r capacity to respo

what is doubtfulorprob-lematic in experience. Knowing and acting arecontinuous. Knowing occurs within nature, and sensory and rational fa

cease to be competi-tors and are both parts of a unifying process. Ideas are plans of action. Scientific theories, like other tools and instrument

created by us in pursuit of particular interests and goals. The aim of thinking is to remake experienced reality through the use of experim


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techniques. According to Deweys pragmatic outlook, hu-mans and nature always are interdependent. We are not part body and part mind; w

natural-ized within nature, and nature is so interpreted as to take account of us. Nature in humans is na-ture grown intelligent. Nature is ne

rational nor irrational; it is intelligible and understand-able. Nature is not something merely to be ac-cepted and enjoyed; it is something to be m

fied and experimentally controlled.Dewey and the modern instrumentalists have been staunch defenders of freedom and de-mocracy. Dewey was a defender of moral free-dom

freedom of choiceof intellectual freedom, and of the political and civil liberties, including freedom of speech, of press, and of as-sembly

advocated an extension of the demo-cratic principles in the political and social realms to all races and classes.Nothing is more important than education in remolding a society. If we are creatures of habit, education should provide the conditions for develo

our most useful and creative habits. Instead of some catastrophic upheaval, such as a revolution, changing the habits of a culture, ed-ucation

provide a more controlled approach to change. Instead of revolution, Dewey believed that those habits may be altered by educAtion, but educati

the sort that is available to every man in every walk of life. Thus he believed in universal education, which should extend over the entire culturepenetrate to its founda-tions. The demand that education be universal isbound up with Deweys conviction that there is a need to find a way to reorient society as a whole.

The spirit of education should be experi-mental. The mind is basically a problem-solving instrument and needs to try alternative means for so

problems. However, Dewey never said that education ought simply to cater to the needs and whims of the child. In one of his e ar-liest writing

education, The Child and the Curriculum, he criticizes the child-oriented the-ory of education by noting that it contains an empty concep

development. Children are ex-pected to work things out for themselves without receiving proper guidance. According to Dewey, advoc

complete freedom for the child reflects a sentimental idealization of the childs naive caprices and performances and in -evitably resu

indulgence and spoiling.8

When unlimited free expression is allowed, chil-dren gradually tend to become listless and fi-nally bored. D

argues instead for the ne-cessity of deliberate guidance, direction, and order. Education is, or ought to be, systematic and ordered, and thu

intelligent guidance of the teacher is necessary.Dewey insisted that there be clear objec-tives in promoting the art of critical thinking. Though there is widespread belief that Amer

education has suffered from Deweys influ-ence, it would be more accurate to say that inso-far as it has failed to develop the tough-minded habiintelligence, it has failed to be influ-enced by what is most basic for Dewey.

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Dewey and many of his supporters reject all supernaturalism and ground both ethical and re-ligious values solely in the natural relations of hum

The values of life are capable of verifi-cation by the methods through which other facts are established.Dewey was critical of the traditional institu-tional church, with its stress on fixed ritual and authoritarian dogma. He uses the adjective reli-

to describe those values through whichones personality is integrated and enriched. Thus any activity pursued on behalf of an ideal, because

abiding conviction of its genuine value, is religious. The term Godmay be used if it refers to the unity of all ideal ends in their ten-dency to arou

to desire and action.

TEMA 5. R. Rorty's neopragmatism

Neopragmatism, sometimes called linguistic pragmatism is a recent philosophical term for philosophy that reintroduces many conc

frompragmatism. Neopragmatism is defined as: Apostmodernversion of pragmatism developed by the American philosopherRichard Rort
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rortyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rortyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rortyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism


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drawing inspiration fromJohn Dewey.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Much of Rorty's philosophy is directed against various 'traditional' assumpti

that the mind 'mirrors' nature, and that it is possible to discover by means of 'pure', non-empirical methods

essences, 'foundations' of epistemology, absolute values, meanings, a human nature, and the like; that our percepti

images, ideas are accurate representations of reality, and that true propositions in some way 'correspond' to

reality . Previous philosophers, he says, have been unable to justify their claims, or to provide criteria

distinguishing between genuine and false representations. He is therefore critical of all kinds of a priori metaphy

such as Platonism, rationalism, Kantian transcendentalism, though he recognises that many philosophers belongin

these traditions have nevertheless attempted to jettison the metaphor of mirroring. In his rejection of all kinds

realism he is also critical of linguistic/ analytic philosophywhich he himself had initially promoted.

Rorty's own positive approach is to make use of hermeneutic and pragmatic models with a view to developing

forms of discourse. The test of such forms will no longer be whether they provide us with insight into truth, goodn

or beauty. Instead we should consider whether a 'practice' has been accomplished successfully or whether a fo

achieves satisfactory self-description. His concept of truth is thus pragmatic. He argues that thought canno

properly examined if divorced from the cultural conditions in which it is embedded. Our knowledge and the langu

we use to articulate our experience are inseparable from our concerns and purposes. Even the criteria we appeal to

judging our arguments can change. What we must seek to achieve through our analysis of different forms of disco

and cultural practices are better ways of talking and acting. Philosophy in studying the advantages and disadvanta

of these ways is thus to be concerned with what he calls 'edification' and not with a systematic quest for 'truth'.

must be concerned not to seek any positive 'nature' but to remain content with what we can make of ourselves.

In his later workContingency, Irony, and Solidarity andPhilosophical Papers, I he extends this broad approach

consideration of the self, subjectivity, and ethics. We do indeed have a sense of the 'self', he says paradoxically,

this essentially has been created by ourselves. As such we are what he terms 'liberal ironists'. He is, howeve

passionate advocate of the liberty of the individual even though the concept of selfhood is a pragmatic one. Th

being no appeal to absolute moral values, Rorty invokes the notion of 'solidarity' which is grounded in man's comm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deweyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deweyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deweyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dewey


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experience of sufferingand argues that literature may offer greater insight into the human condition than abst

philosophizing.

Rorty presents a highly controversial thesis which, if correct, must radically change our perception of the nature afunction of philosophy. Rejecting philosophy as a 'mirror' of nature and as a search for 'truth', he sees it as becomi

but one more kind of 'conversation' in our cultural life. He thus seems to be committed to some kind of culturalrelativism: there are no absolute standards, only 'better' ways of talking and acting. Realist philosophers argue th

'better' ways are just those which are more successful in revealing truth and providing knowledge about the world,

which can be assessed by reference to the viability and progress of, for example, the natural sciences and our abilitcope with the world. It has also been objected against Rorty that the idea of criteria for linguistic usage as being

culturally embedded is incoherent. Language has evolved as a means for us humans to understand and livesuccessfully within the actual world; and this is common to all cultures.

TEMA 6 : The pragmatic view on science in Th. Kuhn and Henson

Pe foaie!!!

TEMA 7: Contemporary sources of relativism PAUZA

TEMA 8:Ch. Peirce's, The Fixation of BeliefIn this essay Peirce examines some of the different methods that he thinks people use to determine what beliefs they are going to buy and w

ones they are going to reject. You, for example, may believe that human beings do in fact have free will, or that there is a life after death, orsharks are mammals, or that Republicans are the best political party. How did you settle on those beliefs you have? What processes do peoplthrough to decide (often unconsciously) what beliefs they are going to accept and which they are going to reject? Peirce says that there are

basically four different methods that people use to settle on which beliefs they are going to hold, i.e., which beliefs they are going to "fix on" their own. (Hence his title, "The Fixation of Belief.")

he question Peirce wants us to look at -- after some long introductory comments that he makes us wade through -- is what method people ufix, or settle on, their beliefs. He says there are four basic methods people use.

1. The first method used for settling on a belief is the method of tenacity. All this means is that when a person uses this method they simplytenaciously hold onto whatever beliefs they already hold, and reject whatever beliefs they already reject. So if you already believed that thiscourse is notthe first ever of its kind, you will continue to believe that, and vice versa, if you use this method. For people who use this metho


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the gold standard of truth is what they already believe. So when someone proposes a belief to them, as I have just done for you, they simplyhold that proposed belief up against their gold standard -- viz., the beliefs they already have. If it's a belief they already have, they think "Ye

that's true." If it's something they do not already believe they think "No, that's not true." This is a very simple method for deciding what tobelieve and doesn't require much thinking, Peirce says, so it's pretty handy. Unfortunately it can cause some problems. (What are some of thproblems Peirce sees with using this method?) So some people use another method, the method of authority.

2. People who use the method of authority also have a fairly easy time of it. They determine which beliefs they are going to accept by justturning to a person or institution they hold as their authority. This may be their mother, or their priest or rabbi or minister or mullah, or it ma

their party leader or their favorite talk show host. They put the question to that authority and whatever that authority says determines wheth

they will accept the belief as their own or not. This method too is a simple one, but it has some enormous advantages over the method oftenacity. (What are some advantages Peirce thinks this method has over the method of tenacity?)

3. A third method that some people use is what Peirce calls the a priorimethod, or what might better be called the method of taste. If one uthis method they choose what to believe based on what "sounds good" to them, or what suits them. So if you hear this proposed belief -- theabout this class being absolutely unique, for example -- and if you're using the a priorimethod, you might think "Hey, that sounds cool. I likethat. So, ummmm, Yeah, I guess it's true." Or maybe you think "Ooooh, I don't like that; that doesn't sound good at all. I wouldn't like being

brand new class. So, ummmmm, No, I don't think that's true." So using this method you get to believe what "sounds about right" to you, i.e.

what suits you and your feelings and your belief system. So we can also call this method, the method of intellectual taste -- you get to believwhat sounds or tastes good to you, and you can reject what doesn't sound good to you. Peirce, though, calls it the a priorimethod. (That's tw

words, pronounced "ah" and "pree-OH-ree.") This method has some big advantages, of course (what are some that Peirce describes?), but asome disadvantages (what are they?).

4. A fourth method for fixing belief Peirce refers to as the method of science. I'll let you figure out from the essay what he means by thismethod, but I will tell you that Peirce says this method is based on some very basic assumptions. He emphasizes that these are assumptionthat is, they are not provable, but they do (he thinks) sound pretty reasonable. The first is the assumption that there is a real world out thereexisting on its own, independently of what you or I happen to think about it. It really is out there. The second assumption is that the physical

world out there has certain real characteristics, that it works according to certain real and regular laws, and that it affects our senses in certa

real and regular ways. The third assumption is that if we understood the regular ways that the world affects our senses, then we could figure what that world out there is truly like. We could discern the truth about the real world out there.

So these are the four methods that Peirce thinks people use for settling on what beliefs they are going to accept and reject. Each method hasgold standard too, i.e., a kind of official ruler or standard, against which it measures each new belief to decide if that belief should be kept orthrown out. You'll have to figure out from the reading what the gold standard, or official ruler, is for each of the methods Peirce outlines.

TEMA 9: The democratic conception in education, Dewey

Dewey has underpinned his chapter with one premise: education serves the purpose of improving society. He has claimed that educators mustpredicate this purpose with an understanding of societies and with an ideal society. As a result, in this chapter, Dewey has examined variousnotions of society to identify an ideal one. Then, he reviewed three historic philosophies of education to indicate briefly what educators will h


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individualistic and social educations necessitates taking into account the various contexts. More importantly, his analysis has led him to highligthe problem for education in and for a democratic society of the conflict between nationalistic principles and wider social aims. He has thoughthat nationalistic goals entail obscuring social aims. He has propounded that the solution to this issue involves changing school curricula andteaching methods and ensuring that no class would exploit any other. Then, he proposed that educators start emphasizing on what binds peoptogether.

TEMA 10 R. Rorty, The World Well Lost

Pauza

Tema 11. Rorty's, Edification and Naturalism

Notions you need to know:

Edification: moral, intellectual or spiritual enlightenment or improvement by uplifting actions

-Art edifies the space it is Placed in

-Comprehension edifies the world around

Naturalism: in the universe, Laws of nature exist and function Exclusively, the belief That nature governs the

structure and behavior of the universe, nothing exists beyond nature, But if it does, it does not Affect the natural

world.


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-Ghosts, spirits, supernatural Entities do not exist

-There is no purpose in nature

Epistemology: the theory of knowledge, with concern Towards methods, validity and purpose, questions what

knowledge is and how it CAN be obtained, how much of year object or entity CAN be truly known and how much

Remains Unknown

- How knowledge relates to truth, belief and justification (of actions, thoughts, Propositions, etc..)

- There is a difference between "Knowing That", "knowing how" and "acquaintance-knowledge"

Hermeneutics: a branch of knowledge That deals with interpretation of things, Entities and notions, mostly text

interpretation Concerns

Metaphysics: Concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and Existence, it studies what is outside of object

experience, structure and constitution of reality


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Pour-kind: abstract, of being That has feelings, being for itself

En-kind material, a being with no feelings, being in Itself

Edification and naturalism

Rorty's essay deals with the methodology of resolving Philosophical Issues Such as the distinction between spirit

and nature, transcendental hermeneutics and the search for objective knowledge

He evokes works of Many Philosophers in His rhetoric and Works His Way Towards the Conclusion of His Own

about how we objectivize ourselves by reflection, Changing our opinions, vocabulary and behavior through time

Phenomenology and Hermeneutics both suggest ways in Which we might create a transcendental standpoint,

refusing the Notion That change in behavior results from change in self-description Which in turn brings forth the

objectivization of Human Beings

Rorty believes we SHOULD not Expect That philosophy to answer questions left unanswered by science


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Transcendental hermeneutics promises to see nature and advocates freedom as normal discourse as year element

edification

Habermas: transcendental philosophy CAN analyze what knowledge has the practical functions

- If cognitive Interests has Analyzed through inquiry in natural and cognitive sciences, They are transcendental in

nature

- If Analyzed in the Contexts of Anthropology, Empirical They are in nature

Rorty feels it unnecessary to find a general way to analyze These roles, advocating the use of cultural anthropolo

as enough

Habermas' transcendental corroboration Criticize year Overly self-confident self-understanding of Itself Because

comes up with a theory make subjective Conditions That Possible and limited at the same time "

Overconfidence: Thinking That there is truthfulness to reality in Philosophical realism


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Normal scientific discourse Can be seen in two ways:

January. Successful search for objective truth

February. One among other discourse we engage in Which

Error in systematic philosophy: answering the above questions with "new" discourse, Which is the philosopher's

"bad faith", substituting pseudo-cognition for moral choice

Made Possible to see Kant as scientific truth Something Unable to supply a point, the justification and to claim th

our moral Decisions are based on knowledge of the nature of the world by destroying the traditional conception of

reason

He Called this "the discovery of inevitable subjective Conditions, Which Would be Revealed by reflection upon

scientific inquiry."


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Tries to recast distinctions Rorty (nature & spirit & reflection objectivizing science, epistemology & hermeneutic

in terms of historical and temporary & unfamiliar and familiar distinctions between normal & abnormal.

allowing us to see Them as the distinction between inquiry and the questioning out of Which May or May not

emerge inquiries

Combining Advantages of normality with abnormality

Epistemology is connected to moral Commitment (reality, truth, Objectivity, reason)

Behaviorism Within epistemology is to look at normal discourse in the bifocal way:

- As for historical patterns ADOPTED Reasons

- As achievement of objective truth, or the best explanation we have so far


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TEMA 12. W. James, What pragmatism means Lecture no 2

Here, James introduces the pragmatic method, and it is on this that I want to focus. It seems to me

that there is a difference between the two general formulations of the pragmaticmethod, and an

important one. One formulation goes:

The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective

practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than

that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean

practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able

to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right.

This is the first part of James formulation. The other (as is often echoed by neo-pragmatists such as

Rorty) is as follows:

'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very

near to saying 'what we OUGHT to believe': and in THAT definition none of you would find anyoddity. Ought we ever not to believe what it is BETTER FOR US to believe?

This addition to pragmatism is, in my opinion, more problematic than the first, because it seems to

introduce the highly subjective notion of usefulness... which appears to be a straightforwardly

question-begging concept. Better for whom? For what purposes? Is truth to be simply the conclusion

of a hypothetical syllogism

P Agent X wants Y

P If X wants Y, she must believe Z

C Therefore, Z is true?

How might X convince another person who does not share the want/need for Y, or especially

another person who does notwant Y, that Z is true? This formulation of is extremely problematic,

because it severely weakens the notion of truth, making it (somewhat ironically) far less useful.

Truth is used, principally, as a way of settling disputes. Two people disagree, and one is

occasionally able to demonstrate that his beliefs/propositions possess that elusive but extremely

potent property of truth. The disagreement is resolved. If we relativize truth to the

wants/needs/projects of agents, it loses this potency.

We might see the second formulation as an expansion of the first: We get to truth by determining

the practical difference between options, AND the correct one is the one that is the most useful. But

let us not confuse the two: the latter is a much stronger statement, and much more difficult to justify.

To clarify, I think I understand the general relevance of James squirrel example. He claims that it is

a paradigm case of the application of the pragmatic method (which, as we have seen, is to examine

what practical consequence each option has). But we must note: the squirrel-dispute is not resolved,

it is dissolved. Both sides are right, depending on what is meant by the phrase going round. This

may be an admirable trick, but someone may still ask: what is the correctway to use the phrase


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going round? James would seem to be suggesting that there isnt one, that the question itself is

nonsensical. Thus, we see how the method dissolves old philosophical problems. Does free will

exist? Well, if free will is to denote a general experience of freedom in action, then yes. If it it is to

mean total freedom from any deterministic influences whatsoever, then no. There is no final

answer for James, only a question of meanings and consequences.

Tema 13: Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism

According to Quine, Modern empericism has been functioning based on two dogmas,

the first being a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, and the second being

the idea of reductionism, that meaningful statements can be reduced or made equivalent

to logical constructs based on terms which refer to immediate experience. Quine then

goes onto the flesh out these two dogmas beginning with the first (analyticity).

So Quine begins by giving a background on the idea of analyticity and where it comes

from philosophically. According to Quine, Kants idea of distinguishing the difference

between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed by Hume (Relation between

ideas and matters of facts) and Liebniz (Truths of reason and truths of fact). Analytic

truths, according to Quine, are grounded in meanings and independent in facts while

synthetic truths are grounded in facts. And analytic truth, as I understand it (not

mentioned by Quine) would be 1+1 = 2, which is reason tells us to be true, and can be

found in experience. Quine states, that modern empiricists claim that to deny analytictruths would be self contradictory, and he (Quine) further claims that self-

contradictoriness, just like analytic truths, are 2 sides of the same coin.

According to Quine, Kant conceived of analytic truth statements as one that attributes

to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject.. It is

difficult to understand what Kant means by this, but I take it to mean, the subject is

whole in itself. For example, 1+1 = 2 can be written as one plus one is two, and the

subjects (one, and two) are wholly contained in themselves, they have precise complete

ideas, at least in my understanding. Quine points out that there are problems already

when defining analytical truths because, to define it would mean to come up with a

metaphorical equivalent, which takes us nowhere. Quine also wonders whether the

limitation that analytic statements are in subject-predicate form, although Im not sure

what other alternatives he had in mind. For simplicity, Quine defines Analytic

statements as true by virtue of meaning (reason), and independent of facts. Remember,


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that synthetic statements are true by virtue of facts (experience) only. So by default,

analytic statements must be true to use by virtue of reason (meaning). Are meaning and

reason interchangeable, as Quine wants us to believe, I am not sure. Nevertheless, now

Quine wants us to get to the aspect of meaning.

Quine adopts Freges statement that Meaning is not to be found in names or in

references. He gives the famous example by Frege of the Morning Star and Evening Star.

The morning star and evening star were revered by ancients, and understood to mean

two different things. However, by virtue of astronomical observation, we later found out

that they (the morning star and evening star) both referred to the same object. We found

this out by experience (facts). What Frege is trying to show is that an object can have

multiple names (denotations), and mean distinctly different things (senses) while

refering to the same object. Quine also gives the example from Bertrand Russel ofScott and the author of waverly, again while referring to the same object, have

distinct meanings. According to Frege, we can only know that Scott is the author of

waverly if we go into the world and determine if there is a scott that is the author of

waverly, or that the morning star and evening star are the same. In other words, these

statements are synthetic by nature.

Quine notes that so far we have been dealing with singular terms and the case is

somewhat different albeit parallel to singular terms. According to Quine, while a

singular term names a concept, abstract or concrete, a general term does not purport to

do this, a general term is true of an entity,orof each of many, or of non. In other

words, general entities are truth claims being made about the way the world is, for

example in the case of x = 5, x does not refer to any concept, it is general (or blank).

However, if we make the claim that x is = 5 then we have to go into the world and

confirm that there is indeed a 5 and it is X. A clearer example would be this, there is

someone who designed the US Flag. Someone does not refer to anybody in particular,

but if we make a claim about the world, then to know if it is true or not we would have to

go into the world and find out if someone did design the flag. Quine makes a furtherdistinction when he says the class of all entities of which a general term is true is called

the extension of the term. So for example, all the class of entities that make the claim

true that someone designed the flag, e.g Mark, the son of Jacob, the Father of Lilly, The

accountant on main street, are all entities that refer to the same object and are

extensions of the general term. Although, as we found out already, they may mean


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different things, and as such we have to go out in the world to verify, hence they are

synthetic statements.

Quine then goes on to make the claim that in philosophy there is a more commonplace

notion of an opposition or contrast between meaning (or what Quine calls intention)

and Extension. Quine then gives the example of Aristotle who made the claim that

meaning was the essence or rather essence was the fore runner to meaning. Quine

shows an example by Aristotle, where the later claims that it is essential for man to be

rational, but accidental for man to be two-legged. I take it that what Aristotle means

here is that there are other two legged mammals that can be conflated with man, if it

was his essence, but then rationality is the distinct and essential feature that seperates

man from other bipeds. On the other hand, Quine notes that Aristotle is flawed in

drawing a difference, because man happens to be both biped and rational, (bothqualities referring to the same object = man) thus how can he claim that one is more

essential than another, when rationality does not influence biped-ness or vice versa. In

other words, Quine is saying that the biped-ness of man is an extension, an entity that is

true of man just like rationality. While accidental may be the wrong choice of words

from Aristotle, and Quine does him no favors, but the reality is that Aristotle is making

the claim that while other animals may have biped-ness like the kangaroo for example,

or birds, what distinguishes man from animals is essentially his rationality (some would

claim the level of rationality/abstraction). Quine goes on to show Aristotles views on the

difference between essence and meaning, in that Things had essences, for Aristotle, but

only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is

divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.

So Quine goes on to ask, what sorts of things are meanings?. This is Quines response

to this question: They are evidently intended to be ideas, somehow mental ideas for

some semanticists, Platonic ideas for others. Objects of either sort are so elusive, not to

say debatable, that there seems little hope of erecting a fruitful science about them..

Quine dismisses the notion of meanings to be ideas gotten from objects of experiencebecause of their elusiveness. I mean, how does one get meaning without experience? We

need experience, to draw out meanings from essences is it not? Anyways back to Quine,

he goes on to say its not clear when we have two meanings or one, or when linguistic

forms should be regarded as synonymous or alike in meaning. Quine then makes the

claim that if a standard for synonymy, or what is alike in meaning is found in the future,

the appeal to meanings as entities would not have played a useful part. So Quine is


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rejecting the notion that meanings are entities (ideas either platonic or mental). Quine

goes on to show that a need for meanings to be entities may come from a failed

appreciation at understanding that meaning is divorced from references, and that once

fully appreciated a short step is necessary showing us that meaning is simply

synonymity or analyticity of statements, and that we should abandon meaning as what

he calls obscure intermediary entities or what he initially called ideas.

However, Quine shows us that we are now confronted with the new problem of

analyticity. Quine goes to show two classes of analytic statements, the first being

logically true (No unmarried man is married). This logically true class is true for present

and all future reinterpretations of either the word married or man. It is true

independent of experience. The second class is a synonymous interchange (No bachelor

is married). Here the word bachelor replaces the word unmarried and as such is true,although it is true by synonymy which Quine posits is in need of clarification.

Quine also mentions that Carnap has tried to explain analyticity as state-descriptions

basically which shows that a statement can be true in every possible world, similar to

Leibniz. But for Quine, this doesnt really get at the heart of the issue, analyticity,

although it helps simply probability, which Carnap was interested in. For Quine, the

main issue for him was the second class, synonymy, as opposed to the first class or

logically true statements.

So Quine begins with the second class of analyticity, front to back tossing out one of its

criticisms, that the bachelor reduces by definition to being unmarried. He claims that no

one defined it as such, mocking the powers of a lexicographer, saying that they are

synonymous is all we know about it (even though we have to explain what that means),

and that we cannot even claim that one defines another. Quine then claims that while

philosophers, like philologists, define terms using more familiar words, definitions like

that of the lexicographer are just relations of synonymy, and while we do not know what

the connections are between terms to make them synonymous, we know that they aregrounded in usage. This for me is a big step. Again there is no mention to experience.

Quine does make room for some definitions not to fit into a mold, because they explain

by refining the meaning of a term, but while the definitions words may not be based on

synonymy, the context to be understood between the term and its definition are

synonymous.


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Quine then digresses unto what definitions are, which according to him can be either

three things: A definition paraphrase a term, or gives it a new refined meaning, or

provides a new term that is synonymous with the original term.

But Quine gets back to the issue of synonymy. Synonymy is according to Quine the

interchangeability (of a linguistic form) in all contexts without change of truth value.

Quine goes on to show that bachelor and unmarried are not synonmyous in all cases,

showing cases of bachelors of arts, or bachelor has 8 letters. However, Quine says we

can get around that by calling these separate phrases indivisible words and then

stipulating that the interchangeabilitysalva veritatewhich is to be the touchstone of

synonymy is not supposed to apply to fragmentary occurrences inside of a

word although Quine recognizes now that word has its own difficulties.

Nevertheless he leaves that aside to get back to synonymy. Quine asks, isinterchangeabilitysalva veritate (apart from occurrences within words) a strong

enough condition for synonymy? or can some non-synonymous expressions be

interchangeable? Quine explains that it is not poetic or pyschological associations that is

being looked for in synonymy but what he calls cognitive synonymy or as he explains,

that all and only bachelors are unmarried is an analytic statement. In other words,

cognitive synonymy is concerned with equivalence in meaning and not psychological

appreciations of different expressions. So the question is Is interchangeability is a

sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. Quine claims it is sufficient, citing the

example of Necessarily all and only mean are bachelors, and if one could replace

bachelors with unmarried men, then it was cognitively synonymous with all and only

bachelors are unmarried. But as Quine notes this is a circular argument. It is circular

because it accepts that we understand what the word, necessarily is supposed to mean,

which means constrained to analytic statements,s something trying to be proven. It is

begging the question basically. So Quine posits that Interchangeabilitysalva veritate is

meaningless until relativized to a language whose extent is specified in relevant

respects Quine goes on to talk about languages that have a lot of predicates such as

(F*x, where x is man and F is the predicate). Basically, Quine goes to show that languageis extensional when any two predicates are true of the same object. So Quine shows that

extensional language is NOT an assurance of cognitive synonymy, because while it may

be true, the fact that it is cognitively synonymous maybe accidental, take the example of

he has aheart, and he has a kidney. And we cannot take for granted that while we

use words like necessarily they already refer to presupposed notion that we are

inquiring about, analyticity, and would make no sense to someone with no


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understanding of analyticity. As such, interchangeability is not a sufficient condition for

analyticity. Quine then goes on to discuss Analyticity.

Again Quine goes back to front, tackling supposed solutions of analyticity via semantic

rules which, as he points out just repeat themselves in these artificial languages. If we

dont understand what it means to be analytic, there are no rules that can mask that we

dont understand what it means to be analytic. As Quine puts eloquently, Let us

suppose, to begin with, an artificial language L0 whose semantical rules have the form

explicitly of a specification, by recursion or otherwise, of all the analytic statements of

L0. The rules tell us that such and such statements, and only those, are the analytic

statements of L0. Now here the difficulty is simply that the rules contain the word

analytic, which we do not understand! We understand what expressions the rules

attribute analyticity to, but we do not understand what the rules attribute to those

expressions. In short, before we can understand a rule which begins A statement S isanalytic for language L0if and only if . . . , we must understand the general relative term

analytic for; we must understand S is analytic for L where S and L are variables.

Alternatively, Quine notes another supposed semantic remedy, whereby a new simple

symbol analytic-for-L0, which might better be written untendentiously as K so as not

to seem to throw light on the interesting word analytic. Obviously any number of

classes K, M, N, etc., of statements of L0 can be specified for various purposes or for no

purpose; what does it mean to say that K, as against M, N, etc., is the class of the

analytic statements of L0? By saying what statements are analytic for L0 we explain

analytic-for L0but not analytic for. We do not begin to explain the idiom S is analytic

for L with variable S and L, even though we be content to limit the range of L to the

realm of artificial languages. It is clear the semantic rules only mask the problem of

analyticity.

Quine states what amounts to his thoughts on the issue here: It is obvious that truth in

general depends on both language and extra-linguistic fact. The statement Brutus killed

Caesar would be false if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would also

be false if the word killed happened rather to have the sense of begat.( This is just not

true. Truth depends exclusively on experience. There is no linguistic fact. Begat here isfrom experience. What are the facts when we make up new words. ) But he goes on to

look at the verificationist argument.

Quine goes on to explain verificationism, the idea that the meaning of a statement is

the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. An analytic statement is that

limiting case which is confirmed no matter what. Quine classes people that believe that


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every meaningful statement translates into an immediate experience. Quine places

Locke and Hume in that category, and shows how Carnap attempted to categorize every

experience in a notation, although he (carnap) ended up with what he recognized as a

fragmentary result. Quine notes that this momentous effort, was flawed even in

principle because the connective is at was undefined. Quine says that it is difficult to

show that synthetic statements are found in nature, and that it is a dogma which Quines

calls nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and

a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.. Quine mentions how

Russell came up with use as a way to get over the term-by-term problem of empiricists,

and that the statement should be taken as a unit not the term itself, but Quine says that

in fact the statement should NOT be taken as a unit, in fact that we should reject this

notion of empiricism.

So Quines view, or empiricism without dogma as he calls it, is a recognition of the fact

that a majority of what we believe are myths, with facts tangentially related to

experience. Quine puts it more eloquently here: The totality of our so-called

knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the

profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-

made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edge Myths are man made,

and according to Quine, sometimes they serve a purpose, to help our conceptual

systems. Quine goes on Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force

whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery

occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed

over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of

others, because of their logical interconnections the logical laws being in turn simply

certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-

evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements

logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of logical

connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary

conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are

linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly

through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.. This is amazing

and frankly ridiculous. Every statement has a truth/false notion. But according to

Quine, Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough

adjustments elsewhere in the system. Isnt this relativism? Quine goes on Even a


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statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant

experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind

called logical laws If we change logical laws to make a statement convenient, we have to

change it in our every experience. We cant just make logical laws willy nilly? Quine goes

on further Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed

as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle

between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein

Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? But the problem he makes is forgetting that all these

revisions were BASED on better methods of evaluating experience, and not some

conceptual mental models for convenience. Quine goes on A recalcitrant experience

can, I have already urged, be accommodated by any of various alternative re-evaluations

in various alternative quarters of the total system; but, in the cases which we are now

imagining, our natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as possible wouldlead us to focus our revisions upon these specific statements concerning brick houses or

centaurs. These statements are felt, therefore, to have a sharper empirical reference

than highly theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology. The latter statements

may be thought of as relatively centrally located within the total network, meaning

merely that little preferential connection with any particular sense data obtrudes itself.

The later are abstract statements are get their origin in experience but are built up by

logical extensions. While no particular sense data intrudes, you cannot deny they are

borne of experience? Quine then compares physical objects to the gods of homer, albeit

stating he believes in the former, showing that they are intermediaries that do not exist,

sort of like irrational numbers, but are allowed to be used in language because of their

convenience in a logical system. I think Mathematicians will tell you that irrational

numbers are abstractions borne out of experience, not sensory data. Quine goes on

Science is a continuation of common sense, and it continues the common-sense

expedient of swelling ontology to simplify theory. Is Ontology borne out of experience,

Yes. Is Science borne out of experience, Yes. But is there an equivalency, NO. Because

science is not just experience, but a testability of what we know from experience, of our

beliefs or system. Ontology is not testable, and thus is speculative. But Quine finds themequivalent as shown here : Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with

questions of natural science This is simply not true. Quine ends the discussion. And so

too I bid goodnight. Pragmatism is dangerous my friends.


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Examen Pragmatism