External Intervention in Africa || U.S. Mercenaries in Southern Africa: The Recruiting Network and U.S. Policy

U.S. Mercenaries in Southern Africa: The Recruiting Network and U.S. PolicyAuthor(s): Ward ChurchillSource: Africa Today, Vol. 27, No. 2, External Intervention in Africa (2nd Qtr., 1980), pp. 21-46Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185921 .Accessed: 16/06/2014 14:46

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U.S. Mereenaries In Southern Africa:

The Recruiting Network and U.S. Policy

Ward Churchill

Most of the somewhat muted publicity given to the presence of U.S. mercenary soldiers in Africa has focused in the recent past on Angola and Zimbabwe. Following the 1976 defeat of the FNLA in northern Angola, where most mercenaries in that country were concentrated, and the cessation of hostilities and the transition to independence in Zimbabwe under a Patriotic Front government with a resounding popular mandate, it would be easy, but inaccurate, to assume the issue has faded away.

However, a recent news story out of Salisbury reminds us that such is not likely to be the case. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in early July 1980 informed the press that the South African diplomatic mission in Salisbury had been operating a recruiting network for both white and black soldiers to fight with the South African army in Namibia and Angola which resulted in his government's decision on June 27th to break diplomatic ties except at the trade and communications level. The scheme involved prospective recruits using a code word at the mission given to them by the recruiting agent.' Although Mugabe emphasized the recruiting of Zimbabwean nationals, it is safe to assume that resident aliens were also targeted by the recruiters.

Additional evidence of this movement appears in a story in the June issue of Anti-Apartheid News, which reports that several hundred members of the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Special Air Service have been offered one year contracts by the South African Defense Force to form a counterinsurgency unit on the Northern Namibia border, or have joined the Recce Commando or been sent to join Savimbi's UNITA. Included in this number are the former commanders of the Selous Scouts and the SAS - Lt. Cols. Pat Armstrong and Garth Barrett. 'ia

In the light of this evidence it is clear that the mercenary issue is very much alive and calls for closer examination.

1. Rocky Mountain News, Denver, Colorado, July 6, 1980, p. 25. la. Anti-Apartheid News, London, June 1980, p. 5.

Ward Churchill is Associate Director of the American Indian Educational Opportunity Program at the University of Colorado in Boulder. He worked within the Soldier of Fortune organization in 1976 and 1977.

2nd Quarter, 1980 21


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U.S. Mercenary Presence in Southern Africa

The presence of U.S. nationals in mercenary troops in Southern Africa during the past decade has been the cause for a certain amount of confusion and a good deal of consternation among Africanists and other concerned groups in this country (and abroad). It is an issue of not inconsiderable dimensions. Estimates of foreign nationals involved have run as high as 50% of the gross combatant strength of the Rhodesian National Army, some 2,000 of these being U.S. imports.2 Estimates for the entire region reached 14,000 mercenaries in 1976.3

Cynthia Enloe cites South African military strength in 1977 at 55,000 up from 46,000 in 1973) and Rhodesian National Army strength at 9,600 (up from 4,700 in 1973).4 The significance of the mercenary segment of the Rhodesian National Army has already been indicated. If the 14,000 figure for all mercenaries and the 2,000 figure for the U.S. portion of the total are reasonably accurate indicators of the mercenary pool available for recruitment by South Africa for activity in Namibia and southern Angola, it is clear that it could have an impact of up to 20% of the effective personnel strength of South Africa's fighting forces. In previous situations, the bulk of the combat expertise has been channeled into front line activity, thus the percentages of mercenaries as "engaged" troops could run even higher.

In the light of the evidence that U.S. mercenaries have played a significant role in past Southern Africa conflicts and that recruitment for Namibia and Angola seems now to be underway it is reasonable to examine existing legislation which relates to U.S. nationals serving as mercenaries. In a body of law generally referred to as "The Neutrality Act," there is a section [Title 8, U.S.C. Sec. 1481 ((a)) ((3))] which reads in part ". . . any citizen of the United States who enters the armed forces of a foreign state, without the written authorization of the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall lose his citizenship." To date, no U.S. national has lost his/her citizenship for bearing arms under the flag of any Southern African state. This could be due to the appropriate U.S. agencies electing, as a matter of implicit policy, not to prosecute, or because all U.S. mercenaries

2. The estimate is from the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as reported by the Zimbabwe Support Committee (U.S.). See Guns for Hire: How the CIA and U.S. Army Recruit Mercenaries for White Rhodesia, Chicago, 1978. The figures were challenged by Mr. Jean Tartter, on leave from the ambassadorial staff in Pretoria, South Africa, during the presentation of a version of this paper at the 1980 annual conference of the Western Association of Afrioanists (Colorado Springs, Colorado). Tartter indicated, somewhat vaguely, that State Department estimates of U.S. nationals serving as mercenaries in Southern Africa run "into the high hundreds." If so, Tartter's estimate is only the second time, to the author's knowledge, that State has broken its more consistent pattern of denial to even acknowledge that the mercenaries exist. The other instance occurred in 1977.

3. The estimates are again from ZANU, as reported by the Southern Africa Anti-Mercenary Coalition, San Francisco, 1979. They are generally corroborated by United Nations statistics.

4. The numbers were derived from "Mercenarization," Cynthia Enloe, U.S. Military Involvement In Southern Africa, Westem Massachusetts Association of Concemed African Scholars, ed., South End Press, Boston, 1979.

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possess the requisite authorization from the designated secretaries.5 However, the official governmental position seems to have been to deny all knowledge of mercenary activity, as in a statement by Mr. Temple G. Cole, representing the State Department, ". . . we do not know of anybody who is over there yet (in Southern Africa)."6, or a statement by Congressman Donald Frazier while representing the U.S. before the United Nations:

If there is any specific evidence that Americans are serving . . . under Ian Smith, my government wishes to be made aware of it in detail so that appropriate legal action may be considered under our laws . . . My government does not approve a participation by any citizen in the forces of the Ian Smith regime. Our laws provide that any citizen enlisting in the armed forces of any country runs the risk of losing his citizenship. In addition, he could be subjected to criminal prosecution under existing U.S. laws which provide fines and prison terms for those found guilty.'

Given that U.S. mercenary presence in Southern Africa has been widely reported to and sometimes in the press," one must go beyond these protestations of ignorance to ask if there not be some other reason for the absence of prosecutions under this law in the 1970s. The answer may begin to emerge through an examination of the performance of the U.S. government relative to another relevant bit of legality, the arms embargo, as well as to military and economic considerations in the Southern Africa region.

Other U.S. Involvement in Southern Africa

Breaking the Arms Embargo Since 1963 the United States has, by international agreement,

officially embargoed sales of military hardware to South Africa. The embargo includes sales by "third country" licensed manufacturers, as well

5. In certain instances at least, the written authorization possibility may not be as far-fetched as it initially sounds. Consider the example of Michael Echanis, a U.S. mercenary who secured employment as (tactical) head of Somoza's National Guard in Nicaragua during 1978. On station during fighting against Sandinista guerrillas in Managua, Echanis received a cable from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requesting he "not violate human rights" nor "kill noncombatants." At any rate it would be difficult, to say the least, for the State Department to feign ignorance of Echanis' activities. He did not lose his U.S. citizenship. He did, however, lose his life in an explosion aboard his personal aircraft; the blast also claimed the life of his second-in-command, another U.S. mercenary named Charles Sanders, a Vietnamese ("green card alien") mercenary named Nguyen van Nguyen, and Brig. Gen. Jose Ivan Alegrett Perez, National Guard Operations Chief. See "A Tribute to a Professional Warrior," N.E. MacDougald (Robert Himber), Soldier of Fortune, Boulder, Colorado, Feb., 1979.

6. New York Times, June 22, 1975.

7. Africa Report, November-December, 1975.

8. At the very least, a widespread world awareness of the generalities involved is indicated by the fact that ZANU news conferences are attended by world press syndicates such as Reuters. The U.N. has been concerned for years, and there is a growing literature from this source. Only U.S. officialdom seems determined to profess ignorance in the matter - as if U.S. intelligence agencies were incapable of discovering the obvious.




as direct sales. Thus, American military technology was to be denied to South Africa, a position consistent with the U.S. government's stated opposition to Apartheid rule.

This 1977 statement is representative of U.S. protestations over the years that the embargo has, in fact, been honored:

I would like to state that we have observed this embargo faithfully since we announced it in 1963. Allegations heard last week by this subcommittee (House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on South Africa) that the United States has assisted South Africa in building a stockpile of sophisticated weapons including aircraft, tanks and artillery are utterly false.9

The quotation is from William Lewis, of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, who went on to say:

In order for an American firm to export technology required for a weapon to be manufactured abroad, it must first receive a license from the Office of Muni- tions Control of the Department of State or export such technology pursuant to a Government-to-Government agreement. The license and agreements contain conditions that the weapons will not be sold to a third country without the explicit agreement of the United States Government . . . Permission to sell such weapons to South Africa is never granted."'

Recently retired State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III made a similar denial when he stated, "There have been no licenses issued for the sale of arms or military equipment to South Africa in violation of United States laws and regulations implementing the arms embargo."'" This would be commendable if it were true. However, there is ample evidence that it is not. Since 1963, U.S. military equipment worth $465 million had, according to Sean Gervasi, been provided to South Africa, mostly through licenses in Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal.'2 The full importance of this equipment for the South African government's ability to conduct counterinsurgency' operations (that is, to perpetuate itself against the will of the indigenous population) is revealed when the figures above are compared to South Africa's total military inventory. 3 In making this comparison we discover that, far from

9 House Committee on International Relations Document, 20 July, 1977, p. 1.

10. Ibid

11. Associated Press Wire, Washington, 14 July, 1977, (AM-US-South Africa, 260, a 302).

12. This total included 350 airplanes of various types, mostly Lockheed and COIN designs, 25 helicopters, 104 tanks, 734 armored personnel carriers, and 92 large guns. See "U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa in Violation of the United Nations Voluntary Arms Embargo: 1963-1977," Sean Gervasi, Notes and Documents, 27/28, Center Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1978. For a fuller accounting of all this, see U.S. Arms Deliveries to South Africa, Michael T. Klare, Transnational Institute, Washington, 1977, and Arsenal for Democracy, T. Gervasi, Grove Press, NY, 1978. An additional excellent source on "third-country" transfers may be found in Gervasi's "Breakdown of the U.S. Arms Embargo" U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, South End Press, Boston. 1979 In terms of Italy being a star performer in its own right, as well as the input in England and France, see The Arms Bazaar, Anthoney Sampson, Viking Press, New York, 1977. Interesting coverage on a tangent of a more-or-less specifically French role may be found in "France's Role in South Africa's Nuclear Build-Up," Bernard Boudauresque, Notes and Documents, 33/78, October, 1978.

13. Figures for the latter can be found in Military Balance, 1975-1976, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1976.

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embargoing South Africa since 1963, the U.S. has directly or indirectly provided 56% of its in-service combat aircraft, 11.6% of its helicopters, 19.8% of its tanks, all of its serviceable armored personnel carriers, and 24% of its artillery; although some allowance may need to be made for equipment supplied but no longer in service. Further, a substantial portion of the U.S. arms deliveries to South Africa prior to 1963 are also still in service; spare parts for this military equipment, although also embargoed, do not seem to present an overwhelming problem.'4

In sum, it seems clear that the U.S. has been a mainstay supporter of South Africa both before and during the U.N. embargo prompted by the latter government's massacre of its own citizentry at Sharpesville in 1960. The Pretoria regime has been and remains significantly dependent on U.S. military support for its survival."5 State department denials of arms transfers must be viewed in the same context as denials of knowledge of U.S . mercenary presence.

Military Interests The strategic position of Southern Africa is seldom discussed openly

in U.S. official circles,16 but it is evident upon examination. After the 1956 British withdrawal from the Suez region the possibility of a "Soviet inspired" Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal had to be addressed by U.S. military contingency planners, and this became a reality after the 1967 war. Proceeding from a multi-polar global strategy for "containment of communism" (that is, essentially NATO and SEATO countries in combination with the U.S.), the Pentagon determined that the logical secondary linkage between our European and Asian allies lay in the sealanes around the horn of Southern Africa. A loss of both the Suez region and Southern Africa to governments sympathetic to Soviet interests was and is envisioned as being catastrophic to the U.S. global position. This was articulated with abundant clarity by Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, in 1974:

"(We) feel that the circumstances that prevailed during the (October, 1967)

14. For a full listing see Sean Gervasi's "U.S. Arms Transfers to Southem Africa in Violation of the United States Voluntary Arms Embargo: 1963-1977," Notes and Documents, 27/28, Center Against Apartheid, United Nations, New York, 1978. He further recommends reference to Almanac of World Military Power, T.N. Dupuy and Associates, New York, 1974; Foreign Military Markets, South Africa Air Force Structure, 1976, Defense Marketing Services, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1976; Jane's Weapons Systems, London, 1977; and Arsenal of Democracy, T. Gervasi, Grove Press, New York, 1978. On the question of spare parts, see "South Africa's Military and Nuclear Build-Up," Abdul S. Minty, Notes and Documents, 41/71, Center Against Apartheid, United Nations, New York, Sept., 1978, p. 6.

15. This is not an unorthodox or exaggerated view. For instance, see "Secret Collaboration of the West with South Africa," Sean McBride, Notes and Documents, 32/78, Center Against Apartheid, United Nations, New York, Sept,, 1978; and "For an Effective Arms Embargo Against Apartheid South Africa," same publisher, Aug., 1978.

16. However it is mentioned from time to time in spheres of relative public access. See, for example, The Henry Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, M.A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, Laurence Hill, West Port, Connecticut, 1976.




War are of sufficient importance to have us restudy this entire situation and bring it to your attention. The Suez Canal will be open shortly, the Soviet presence in this area will be enhanced without any question, and the lines of supply both to ourselves and to our allies in Europe and Japan will certainly be threatened to a degree that they have not been heretofore. Under these circumstances, we feel that (the Diego Garcia) program should be put on a priority basis."'7

Diego Garcia is an atoll in the Chagos Archipelago designed, since being leased by the U.S., as a forward communications base in the Southern African area, an interlocking component to the southern reach of MIDEASTFOR (Middle East Force), the coordinating body for the Southern Africa "Rapid Reaction Strike Force" (once alerted for outright intervention in Zaire).18 In other words, the Pentagon perceives an "acute national interest" in Southern Africa's sea lanes (and, therefore, its territory), maintains an active presence there, and is ready and willing to develop a much more massive presence if U.S. hegemony is threatened.

After 1969, however, "The Nixon Doctrine" dictated that a direct U.S. military presence (ie: combat troops and advisors) was not desir- able."9 Therefore, development of the internal military capabilities of "friendly" regimes was critical. In view of growing public reaction to the disaster in Vietnam, this policy constituted little more than recognition of political necessity. In light of the 1963 embargo (as public posture), it was a longstanding U.S. policy relative to South Africa in any event. Questions of moral principal interfering with "military necessity" may be dismissed by pointing to U.S. willingness to materially support Indonesian slaughter of East Timoreans as a means of insuring strategic sea lanes between the Philippines and the Indian Ocean.20

A military rationale for U.S. interventionist activities in Southern Africa (both overt and covert) therefore exists.21 The question might be posed as to whether this military imperative is sufficient to warrant illegal arms transfers as a matter of policy and the tacit official acceptance of significant U.S. mercenary involvement in regional conflicts. Historically,

17. Senate Armed Services Committee, "Hearings on Fiscal Year 1974 Supplementary Military Procurement," 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

18. The Rapid Reaction Strike Force is a substantial assault amalgamation consisting of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division and a Marine Division. It is a well blooded group, long seasoned in Vietnam, and was formed for deployment in counterinsurgency situations when guerrillas threaten one or another U.S. "vital interest." With an eye toward Africa, a battalion of the 82nd.is forward based in Italy.

19. For an interesting elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine in both theory and practice, see William Shawcross' Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979.

20. For details on the fate of the East Timorese people, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. 1, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979.

21. A fuller discussion of U.S. strategic policy relative to Southern Africa may be found in the essays "Western Strategy in Southern Africa" by Courtland Cox, and "Sealanes, Western Strategy and Southern Africa" by John h'-ados. Both are published in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit.

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given the precedents of Cambodia (Kampuchea), Laos, and elsewhere,22 the answer must clearly be, "yes, it is sufficient." However, it need not be; there is another primary reason for the policies of the U.S. government.

Economic Interface Economically, Southern Africa is of major interest to the United

States. South Africa is rich in gold, copper, platinum, diamonds, and uranium. It is also a significant source of iron, aluminum and coal. Zimbabwe yields gold, copper, phosphates, tin, chrome (of major strategic importance, given world distribution), asbestos, coal, iron, magnesium and uranium. Neighboring Namibia, still under firm South African control, possesses copper, tin, diamonds, zinc, lead and uranium.23 Clearly then, it would represent a major loss in raw materials to "the free world" if indigenous forces hostile to U.S. interests were to remove "friendly" white supremacist domination of the region.

Mineral resources aside, the area also provides a source of cheap labor and existing and potential markets for U.S. economic penetration. The arms transfers noted above have in themselves proven quite lucrative to U.S. transnational corporations:

"The recent intensification of cooperation with Israel, whose arms industry faces severe problems because of overcapacities, seems to be a logical step for two reasons. Both governments are very much isolated within the United Nations. Israel has preferential access to American arms technology and qualified manpower available to assist South Africa. Subsidiaries in Israel provide for quite a few manufacturers in the U.S.A. and elsewhere a good cover for exports and sales vetoed by the government of their origin. South Africa in turn can provide a number of essential raw materials (metals) to the Israeli arms industry."24

and further: "It should also be mentioned that in the present situation of white-minority rule, many items, usually considered non-military, are of vital importance to the (South African) government. As an example (we might refer to) small aircraft and trucks, all subject to requisitioning in case of emergency in order to support the mobility of South African forces."'25

22. For an exceient overview of the evolution In Laos, the reader is referred to the anthology, Laos: War and Revolution, Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., Harper and Row, New York, 1970. On Cambodia/Kampuchea, see Shawcross, op. cit. On Cambodia and "elsewhere," see Chomaky and Herman. The Poltical Economy and Human Rights, vol. 2, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconatruction of Imperial Ideology, South End Press, Boston, 1979.

23. Resources found in individual countries are listed with appropriate topographic references in "Roots of Conflict," David Afesi. U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit. The essay provides a succinct overview of the historical economic exploitation suffered by Black Africans in the region.

24. Peter Locke and Herbert Wulfe, Register of Arms Production in Developing Countries, March, 1977.

25. Ibid.




Thus, lucrative sales and profits accrue to U.S. corporations through the present structure in South Africa while an unseen form ("legal" under embargo terms) of support accrues to the apparatus of Apartheid. During 1977-78 alone, this particular business sector grossed some $1.9 billion in South Africa.26

As much as 40% of all investment in South African manufacturing itself derives from transnational corporations (many of the largest and most important of U.S. origin) which also provide the technological basis for South African industrial development. Transnational banks (many with U.S. linkages - Chase Manhattan and Citibank are notable examples) control approximately 65% of the assets of the 20 top South African banks.27

U.S. economic ties to Southern Africa are therefore highly significant. In tandem with military/strategic implications, the case for increasing involvement in this region must seem compelling - if not, in fact, overwhelming - to U.S. policy makers. It is not then a question of why the U.S. has been and is involved (often clandestinely) in support of white supremacist regimes in Southern Africa, but why this involvement has taken the particular form that it has.

The Rationale for Mercenaries

The methodologies of intervention employed by the U.S. during the 1970s must be viewed as a byproduct of the context of foreign policy since the Second World War, and more specifically since 1960. The checkered performance of containment policy during the 1950s, including the French defeats (ie: Indochina, Algeria), the loss of Cuba and the eventual Bay of Pigs disaster, led to a reformulation of approach. Kennedy administration strategy in the early '60s brought about the formation of Special Forces (theoretically, to replace the bungling CIA Clandestine Services section). Special Forces was to represent a highly trained but limited application (as "advisors") of direct U.S. military presence combined with relatively massive arms a ssistance and political support (ie: secret police, police training, propaganda, etc.) to "friendly" regimes exhibiting "hot spot" characteristics. This was labeled, innocuously enough, "counterinsur-

26. South African Ministry of Information, South African Digest, Pretoria, South Africa, Sept. 30, 1977.

27. For details of U.S. multinational involvement see "U.S. Transnational Corporation's Involvement in South Africa's Military-industrial Complex," Neva Seidman Makgetla and Ann Seidman, U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, South End Press, Boston, 197. Useful further evidence is available in Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., August, 1977. Additional information can be found in "United States Corporate Interests in South Africa," U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977. See also "Resource Development in South Africa," 94th Congress, 2nd Session, United States House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976. See atso, U.S. Export- Import Bank, Discount Loan Statement, April, 1977.

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gency."28 The trial by fire of this concept occurred, of course, in Vietnam.

Whether it might, in fact, have worked there remains a matter of some controversy among "irregular" warfare buffs,29 but by late 1965 the Department of Defense had decided that limited presence had failed. The 9th Marines thereupon landed as the spearhead of what was ultimately to become a 500,000 plus troop commitment supported by massive firepower.30 This strategy also failed; Vietnam was "lost" entirely, as were Laos and Kampuchea pursuant to secret wars there.

U.S. policy on intervention was in turmoil. Endless B-52 strikes and the flower of America's conventional maneuver divisions had been deployed against a minor power, and to no avail. The emerging Nixon Doctrine - the sending of weapons, but not troops, to "danger areas" - was a recognition that troops can fail spectacularly (leaving the Commander-in-Chief well out on a political limb), and that the U.S. public was no longer willing to absorb the consequences of such costly adventures. But arms alone cannot put down a rebellion. Expert personnel are necessary to operate them at all levels.3"

An alternative to all previous approaches was necessary. Special Forces operations of the sort utilized during the early 1960s in Vietnam were not a practical option because, a) they were deemed to have failed in Vietnam, and b) they were suggestive, if discovered, of a commitment not unlike that which had escalated directly into the later Vietnam embroilment (not a politically expedient method for an electoral candidate in an anti-war environment). Older style CIA type techniques were also considered inappropriate because, at the very least, the agency could not muster sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to be viable in the capacity and to the extent needed.

However, a combination of these approaches could be repackaged as the tnethod for the 1970s; a means to provide the weapons and tactics technicians required to fuel Nixon Doctrine policy in practice. During the

28. For an excellent analysis of this formative period, see Cold War and Counter-Revolution, Richard J. Walton, Viking Press, New York, 1972.

29. One of those who seems adamantly convinced that such "methods" would eventually have succeeded is Col. (ret.) Fred Ladd, former overall Special Forces commander in Vietnam. See Shawcross, op. cit. Regardless of the final merit of Ladd's belief, oqe must at least grant him that his operations would have yielded lower body counts among Vietnamese civilians than did massive intervention.

30. As is well known, the Gavel edition of The Pentagon Papers is probably the definitive study of this transition in Vietnam, as well as its background and political scope. For those who prefer a briefer and more manageable insight, The New York Times edition of The Pentagon Papers has obvious advantages. Also highly recommended in this connection are Washington Plans an Aggressive War, Ralph Stavens, Richard J. Barnet and Marcus Raskin, Random House, New York, 1971, and Papers on the War, Daniel Ellsberg, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972.

31. This holds true from the level of infantry weapons (ie: their effective deployment, tactics, etc.) to sophisticated "weapons systems" requiring data programmers, highly trained maintenance people, etc.




1960s the U.S. had experimented with the use of mercenary troops, most notably the Khmer Serei and h'Mongs (perjoratively called Meos), as a means to enhance the war effort. While results had been mixed, the concept of mercenarization was in the open.32 Given the pool of battle tested civilian talent accruing to the U.S. as a result of the Southeast Asia experience (both from U.S. personnel and refugees from former South Vietnamese units), given the various political factors militating against direct intervention by U.S. military units during the immediate postwar period, given the lack of viability within the (real and potential) realm of CIA activities, and given the need nonetheless to maintain a counterinsurgency function in the Third World, the concept of mercenarization of American intervention takes on a certain logic.33

A formulation of the ingredients of this trend follows: 1) The U.S. provides appropriate weapons assistance to designated regimes through direct aid or through loans or credits designed to facilitate weapons purchases by the client (usually from U.S. firms or their licensed agents). These weapons are designed for counterinsurgency repression; they are generally of minimal use for repelling external aggression. 2) The CIA provides political and liaison cadres which handle intelligence functions, "contingencies," and serve as funding conduits with a secrecy protected by the mantle of "national security." 3) Combatant support manpower consists of "freelance" U.S. nationals or "green card" aliens, usually blooded in Vietnam, and possessing no formal ties to the U.S. government (at least openly). They provide training cadres for the national armies, expertise in weapons usage, and established core or model units around which the national forces may be organized (not to mention forming a veteran combat buffer during the organizational period) . 4) The State and Defense Departments, in behalf of the executive, deny every- thing from the extent of arms assistance to mercenary presence.

It should be noted that this formulation does not constitute stated or otherwise "formal" U.S. governmental policy. It does, however, sketch a practice born of expediency. Thus, the distinction, while valid, is largely irrelevant.

The initial test of this tidy package was intended to be Angola. However, as things developed, the Angolan revolution was much too far advanced to allow for successful intervention along such lines, a factor enhanced by the armed intervention of Cuba on the side of the M.P.L.A. As U.S. plans crumbled, CIA Intelligence Star winner cum mercenary George W. Bacon III was killed in action.34 Daniel Gearhart, a Special

32. It may weD be argued that "Vietnamizatlon" Itself constituted a high level form of mercenarization.

33. For a tangential, but nonetheless supporting elaboration, see In Search of Enemies, John Stockwell, New York, 1978.

34. See "George W. Bacon III: A 20th Century Crusader," LTC Robert K. Brown and Robert Himber, Soldier of Fortune, Boulder. Colorado, Fall, 1976. Other U.S. nationals serving as mercenaries in Angola are known to include Gary Acker, David Bufkin, "Lobo," Gustavo Manuelo Grillo and Doug Newby. See also, Stockwell, op cit.

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Forces veteran serving as a mercenary, was captured and later executed after a trial. Other U.S. mercenaries, as well as their British, French and Portugese counterparts were captured or scattered to the winds. All indications are that the U.S. mercenary effort was barely underway when the end came.35 This is, perhaps, what saved the method: it had not received adequate testing, and few open options were available with which to replace it.

Although U.S. mercenary involvement in Angola was relatively minor in terms of overall numbers, there is evidence that it constituted an "ad- vance guard" operation, and the U.S. (or the CIA, at least) never intended to cut the combatants adrift. This is borne out by agency arms shipments to Angola during the period of mercenary activity.3'

In terms of regional strategy, the fall of Angola raised the spectre of an outright military loss of the Southern Africa area to united Black guerrilla activity and Cuban direct support, a prospect already shown to be completely unacceptable to the U.S. for both military and economic reasons. The question posed to U.S. strategists after 1976 was therefore an almost purely military one (albeit in unconventional terms): how best to preserve the status quo in the region, thus insuring white anti-communist dominance in South Africa itself. In time honored military tradition, a new strategic buffer zone was sought. The name of this zone was Rhodeisa (now Zimbabwe).

As the U.S. had long followed a course of protecting its South African investments by supplying that country with the tools of counterinsurgency, South Africa could be expected to defend itself against guerrilla activity."3 Rhodesia on the other hand, had not been the recipient of significant U.S. military assistance, possessed no developed military tradition, and was

35. For further information on Angola, see Stockwell, op. cit. Also see Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War, Ernest Hausch and Tony Thomas, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1976.

36. Details can be found in an unclassified (perhaps declassified in the more appropriate term) document published by John Stockwell in In Search of Enemies, New York, 1978, pp.

37. South Africa, by 1976, constituted a solid middle level military power. Sean Gervasi, in The United States and the Arms Embargo: Evidence, Denial and Refutation, (State University of New York, Binghamton, New York, 1978) lists the following comparative strengths of military equipment of armed forces in this grouping at the end of 1976:

Iran Brazil Egypt Japan South Afilca

Combat Aircraft 450 190 600 500 + 625 Helicopters 125 50 + 160 n.a. 215 Tanks 1,990 350 + 1,975 750 525 Armored Cars n.a. 120 100 n.a. 1,430 APC's 1,960 500 2,500 460 960 Self-propelled guns n.a. n.a. 200 660 294 However, South Africa as a war zone hardly constitutes an appealing vision to economic investors. The Rhodesian buffer, keeping the war northward, thus may be viewed as the emergent post-Angola strategic crux to a Southern Africa "anti- domino" therapy. Namibia, to the northwest of South Africa (and bordering Angola) is not unimportant, but is a secondary pivot and has been left primarily to South African attention.




experiencing the effects of a determined guerrilla war of liberation.38 It was ripe for mercenarization and had been actively enlisting foreign nationals in its forces for some time. The conditions denoted in Section I (above) were actualized.39 But this opens another question: how does mercenary recruitment in the U.S. occur?

Recruitment of Mercenaries

There is a law (Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 959) in the United States which comes under the general term, "Neutrality Act." It reads in part:

"Whoever, within the United States . . . retains another . . . to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people as a soldier or as a marine . . . shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both."

Prior to his employment in Angola, Daniel Gearhart placed an dvertisement in the first issue of a new glossy magazine. It read:

"WANTED: EMPLOYMENT AS MERCENARY on Full-Time or Job-Contract basis. Preferably in South or Central America, but anywhere in the world, if you pay transportaffon. Contact Gearhart, Box 1457, Wheaton, MD 20902."

The glossy magazine was entitled Soldier of Fortune: The Journal of Professional Adventurers and the first issue appeared in the summer fo 1975. Its publisher, apparent owner, and primary editor was and is Lt. Col. (ret.) Robert K. Brown, author of, among other items: "How Does an American Become a Mercenary in Africa"40 and "SOF Recon: Action in Southern Africa."'41 Brown had also distinguished himself by placing advertisements of his own during 1975, in publications such as Gun World, advertising "mercenary recruitment packets" (Rhodesian National Army packets, actually) for sale through another organization he heads, Phoenix Associates.

Brown has published material in Soldier of Fortune such as interviews with Major Nick Lamprecht, officer in charge of recruitment for the Rhodesian National Army. Lamprecht, for his part, has dealt not only with Brown, but with one Frank Sweeny who placed the following ad in

38. In a 1977 conversation with the author, Robert K. Brown, whose mercenary credentials are discussed in the next two sections, remarked, "It's a good thing the guerrillas are so disorganized. If the Rhodesians had to face the V.C. (Viet Cong), they'd be in some pretty deep shit by now." This was corroborated by another peripheral mercenary type, Tom Cunningham, when he commented that he was singularly unimpressed, during a stay in the Zimbabwe war zone, by such "elite" units as the Selous and Grey's Scouts.

39. See Guns For Hire, op. cit.

40. Soldier of Fortune, Boulder, Spring, 1975.

41.Soldier of Fortune, Spring, 1977.

42. Ibid.

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Shotgun News on October 15, 1975: "The Rhodesian Army offers excitement and adventure. I know. I've been there. Young Americans of European ancestry write me for free details pertaining to recruiting.

Frank Abbot Sweeny 72 Creston Avenue

Tenafly, New Jersey 07670"43 Sweeny apparently acted upon the express urging of Lamprecht through the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C.44 This is a clear violation, not only of the above law, but also of 22 U.S.C. Sec. 611, et seq., the "Foreign Agents Registration Act" (the Rhodesian Information Office was registered as a foreign agent).

All this would seem a clearcut case for prosecution, especially since the only U.S. mercenary executed in Angola had "applied for work" through Soldier of Fortune and its publisher, Robert K. Brown. (George Bacon, the CIA man turned mercenary, also just happened to be a practicing member of the magazine's editorial staff.) But, according to Temple G. Cole of the State Department, the same Mr. Cole who could not locate evidence of a U.S. mercenary presence in Southern Africa even as Bacon's body was being shipped home, "Apparently he (Brown) has been reasonably careful in what he's done so far" and the matter was being "investigated."45

Brown, then a reserve major, forthwith received a promotion to Lt. Colonel and a 1976 invitation to address the United States Army War College, the national center for training promising U.S. officer cadres in strategic matters.46 It should be noted that War College lecturing is often a prelude to General Officer status in the military. Clearly, suspicion of violation of the Neutrality Act caused nothing like disruption to Brown's military career trajectory (although numerous promising military careers have been blighted by much less than criminal investigation; consider the case of Anthony Herbert, author of Soldier, as but one example).47 Whatever "investigation" Mr. Cole was referring to must still be going on in 1980; there has yet to be anything like a prosecution.48 Currently, Soldier of Fortune continues to publish ads such as:

"INDIVIDUAL DESIRES EMPLOYMENT in high risk situation. Eight years

43. The ad also ran in Gun Week, the same week.

44. Christian Science Monitor, November 18, 1975.

45. New York Times, June 22, 1975.

46. The author drove Brown to Stapleton International Airport to catch his flight to the War College in 1976.

47. Anthony B. Herbert with James T. Wooten, Soldier, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

48. Colorado Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder called, on behalf of a concerned citizen's group, for a Justice Department investigation of Brown's activities in 1979. She was informed that a Justice Department investigation had been underway since 1975.




military experience. Can travel anywhere. College educated. 150 IQ. Familiar with small arms and armor, ex-racing driver. Box-holder, Box 166, Stirrat, WV 25645."49

and .EX ARMY VET, Viet 65-66, 2/7 Cav., 31 yrs. old, seeks job as merc or security. Combat experience. Good physical condition. Will travel worldwide. You pay expenses. Ralph Freese, 9958 So. Melvina, Oaklawn, IL 60453."5?

The magazine has grown from approximately 30,000 copies quarterly at the time the "investigation" began to a circulation of over 100,000 per month in 1979.5'

The performance of Brown and Sweeny relative to Southern Africa would seem to constitute a clear case for (unforthcoming) legal action under U.S. laws. Consider next the case of David Bufkin, the self- proclaimed recruiter who arranged transportation for both Bacon and Gearhart to Angola, accompanied them, then reputedly bailed out with their remaining cash reserves when the going got rough.52 Bufkin publicly admitted to having planned to field some 300 U.S. mercenaries in Angola (although he remains close-mouthed about the numbers who actually did go) for whom he was to receive $400 per head; he was quite disgruntled when his employers (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) collapsed before he was paid. Neither he nor his partner at the time, another U.S. national known only as "Lobo," was indicted or prosecuted in the matter.53

Nor did Bufkin's career in mercenary activities end with the Angolan misadventure. He immediately shifted into recruitment operations on behalf of the Rhodesian National Army and appears to have accepted simultaneous employment by the CIA, Cuban intelligence, and Rhodesian intelligence. This triple blind game ultimately ended in a Cuban intelligence ring being deported from Toronto (Canada), the cover of certain other U.S. operatives being blown in Southern Africa, and Bufkin being deported from Rhodesia (the Smith regime apparently disapproved of its operatives moonlighting). 4 Despite a momentary furor in the U.S. relative to Bufkin's activities in this instance (probably because of the jeopardy in which he placed Southern African CIA activities), he has never been prosecuted.

It seems evident from the above (and these examples could be

49. Soldier of Fortune, February, 1979; similar ads continue to run in the magazine through the present date.

50. Ibid.

51. Trans-America and Export News Co., circulation returns, 1976; Capitol Distribution Co., circulation returns, 1979.

52. See "Bacon," Soldier of Fortune, op. cit.

53. A lucid, though quite glamorized, account of this phase of Bufkin's activities may be found in "Killing Time With the War

Dreamers," Richard Woodley, Esquire, August, 1976.

54. Soldier of Fortune, Spring, 1977.

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elaborated much more extensively) that the apparatus of mercenary recruitment for Southern Africa - and elsewhere - within the United States is hardly secretive. Rather, it is a boldly public procedure relying on a glossy trade magazine which runs official Rhodesian National Army recruiting posters as its back cover. It maintains a hierarchy like any other business, ranging from Robert K. Brown (who acknowledges his position by sporting a T-shirt emblazoned "King of the Mercenaries"), down through middle-level functionaries, to secretarial support.55 There are various consultants, assorted peripheral marketing enterprises and the utilization of national distribution/subscription services. Such a public posture seems to present no problems (legal or otherwise) to those involved. The government has opted to turn its head in the matter, pleading lack of evidence, while the ads and articles run monthly - just as it pleaded inability to locate U.S. mercenaries in Angola until body shipments and public trials in that country began, and just as it insisted that it was tightly embargoing military gear for South Africa while Pretoria was importing almost half a billion dollars worth of U.S. made or licensed equipment. Clearly, this is not a matter of official ignorance and confusion, but involves at least tacit official complicity.

In addition to strategic and policy considerations, there is also the possibility that the officially condemned but still lively racism endemic to white American society plays a part in the shaping of Southern African policy. It undoubtedly plays a role in mercenary recruitment. Mercenary Ralph Edens expressed what many of his cohorts seem to feel when he remarked. "I frankly don't give that much of a shit about Angola. I just don't like niggers. But, I'd fight like hell in Rhodesia or South Africa to keep white minority rule."56

Loopholes in the Law

Although most of the violations of the Neutrality Act cited above seem clearcut enough to have warranted prosecution as the law is presently drafted, it is unfortunately true that the changed circumstances of modern warfare that have developed since the law was originally drafted leave many loopholes of interpretation which can be used as excuses for non- prosecution in particular cases. Perhaps the clearest mandate to enforce the Act which Congress might offer the Executive would be the systematic

55. Most of the "nuts and bolts" operation of Soldier of Fortune has, oddly enough, been conducted by women. Prominent among these was Kathy Webb, formerly of Sail Magazine, Mary Jane Webb, and (currently) Mary Scrimgeour- Jenkins.

56. "Killing Time With the War Dreamers," op. cit.




address of such legal deficiencies. A preliminary agenda of matters for legislative consideration in this context might be offered as follows:

1) Relative to provisions pertaining to recruitment of U.S. nationals to serve as mercenaries in armies of foreign nations: does the reprinting of official recruiting posters of these armies while they are still In current usage by these armies, and with such reprinting represented as advertising (ie: placed so as to appear as ads to readers) constitute recruitment? 2) In the same connection, does the sale and/or distribution of the posters themselves, while in current usage by the armies in question, constitute recruitment? 3) Do 1st Amendment guarantees protect the paid or unpaid advertisement of and by individuals seeking employment as mercenaries - whether in fact or in jest - in breach of the terms and intent of the Neutrality Act as it is presently constituted? 4) What constitutes "written permission" to serve as a mercenary from the Secretaries of State and Defense? Does a cable such as that received by Michael Echanis from Secretary of State Vance (see footnote 5) qualify as such permission? If so, is the issuance of such cables standard practice? If it is not standard practice, what special circumstances warrant such issuance? 5) If Echanis' interpretation of Vance's cable as a request "only to kill combatants" while engaging guerrilla (technically civilian) forces is correct, who defines a combatant? Given that irregular warfare as taught at the U.S. Army War College (and elsewhere) and as practiced by U.S. Special Forces (among other units) recognizes the "civilian" guerrilla as the primary combatant opposition, does not the same rule of thumb apply to irregular forces serving in behalf of the status quo in affected regions as well? In other words, is formal enlistment in national armies a realisfic standard for determing mercenary activity in the age of irregular war? Is not bearing arms in behalf of either the status quo or insurgent forces in any capacity a more reasonable definition? 6) By the same token, given modern weapons systems technology (as supplied by the U.S. around the world), are not U.S. nationals serving as technicians maintaining the servicability of military technology (helicopters, radar, computer systems on parts inventory or missile guidance systems, etc.) really a functional military presence? They are technically civilians within conventional definition, but hold no civilian function within the nations wherein they find employment. Are they mercenaries? 7) Is it fair to assume that the intent of the Neutrality Act was/is to keep the U.S. free from mercenary involvements? If so, would it not preclude the recruitment/employment of foreign nationals to serve as mercenaries in third countries. This would cover both acts by private adventurers and, perhaps more importantly, matters such as CIA operations in Angola in which U.S. tax dollars were utilized to employ several hundred British mercenaries, the so- called French Hoods, and attempts were made to reimport Portugese mercenaries into a former Portugese colony which had recently won independence through armed revolt. 8) What is the status of "green card aliens" within the U.S. relative to existing terms and provisions of the Act? 9) If the Neutrality Act cannot be used to effectively address such questions, what is the merit of its continuation other than as a relatively transparent "humanitarian propaganda" device? 10) Similarly, if the Act is not be enforced, what is the merit to having it on the

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books."7

It might be suggested that only through addressing such issues of substance can Congress (and, in a real sense, the society it represents) begin to mitigate the U.S. record of mercenarization in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

Profile of a "Mercenary"

Personally, Robert K. Brown has a rather interesting history. A Chicago boy gone west in search of adventure (and refuge from a domineering mother who later helped financially seed Soldier of Fortune, according to Brown himself), he graduated from the University of Colorado at Boulder with an MA in Political Science. Oddly, in view of his later career, his thesis was a sympathetic study of the Cuban labor movement, supportive of Castro (prior to the revolution he actually went to Cuba in a vain attempt to contact the guerrillas).58 However, once Castro "went commie," Brown abruptly switched allegiance and entered the CIA infested nether-world of Florida's anti-Castro exiles. While training "guerrillas" in the Everglades, he became associated with the somewhat legendary American mercenary, Ralph Edens.59 A number of small missions to attack Cuba were staged (usually ill-fated), but Brown kept his distance from such real action. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco,60 he drifted back to Boulder, to marriage to an aspiring high school teacher (who reputedly introduced him to such "macho" activities as parachuting and rock scaling) and the birth of a daughter.

Brown's editorial career began with the formation (c. 1963) of Panther Press (later Paladin Press) in collaboration with Peder Lund (a Dutch immigrant residing, appropriately enough, in Nederland, Colorado); publications consisted, and still consist, primarily of recyclings of army training and field manuals. The editors gained a certain national

57. This agenda for legislative consideration was submitted, in expanded form, to Rob Schware of the concerned Colorado citizens anti-mercenary group for inclusion in a packet to be submitted to Congress in late summer, 1980.

58. R.K. Brown, unpublished Master's thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1961.

59. Edens is perhaps best known for his 1969 "bomnbing mission" against the palace of Haitian dictator "Poppa Doc" Duvalier. The "mission" consisted of dumping twenty-eight 55 gallon barrels filled with home-made napalm from the door of an aging DC-3 airplane. None of the "bombs" struck its ostensible target, although several of Port-au-Prince's slum dwellers were burned alive by the misses. Edens and his crew promptly became lost and were forced to crashland in Ihe Bahamas. They were arrested and detained at Elgin Airforce Base (Miami), but were never prosecuted for violation of the Neutrality Act, or any other law.

60. An unpublished book manuscript was produced by Brown as a result of this period, Ripped Cloak, Rusty Dagger: JFK, LBJ and the ClA's Secret War Against Castro. Its author maintains it is still available to "the right publisher." Meanwhile, he has combined with UPI stringer, Jay Mallin, to author Merc!, released by McMillan, New York, 1979.




notoriety through an unsuccessful suit filed against the compilers of The Anarchist Cookbook (supposedly, the anarchists had plagiarized the illustrations and texts Brown and Lund had lifted from the government). Brown reentered the limelight to some extent a short time later when the House Internal Security Committee assumed Panther Press to be an organ of the Black Panther Party. He was duly subpoenaed, but to no visible detriment when it was discovered he was a caucasian right-winger producing demolitions manuals for commercial profit rather than a Black leftist fomenting revolution.

The catalyst for Brown's active military career seems to have been the breakup of his marriage. He and his wife separated; she was allegedly involved in the slaying of a (reputed) American Nazi Party member in Boulder and then killed in a motorcycle accident (a possible suicide). Brown drifted through a number of manual occupations, including a stint as a Brinks truck guard and a period as a ranch-hand. He then entered active army service in the early 1970s (he'd been a reserve since his Florida days), emerging as a Special Forces captain heading an intelligence unit monitoring A-Team/CIA missions into Kampuchea. He was eventually wounded by a stray mortar round, awarded the Purple Heart and Bronze Star, and discharged (a congenital and partially disabling back disorder combined with quite poor vision may have facilitated the discharge; his shrapnel wounds were not serious). He thereupon returned to Colorado to resume activities of the sort already described, a career trajectory which led somewhat naturally to his reestablishment of irregular military contacts (from the Florida days) and the founding of Soldier of Fortune.

The galaxy of other individuals directly associated with the magazine's operations since 1974 is an interesting study in itself. There is Robert Himber (AKA N.E. McDougald), a former U.S. Army intelligence N.C.O., and refugee from the debris of the CIA's Phoenix Program in Vietnam. Tom Cunningham (AKA Thomas McGregor), a former Special Forces trooper who lost a leg while running CIA sponsored Cambodian border operations, has run Phoenix Associates and has made several trips to Zimbabwe and South Africa. Brown's assistant, Barney Barco, pulled a "tour" as a "ranch security guard" in Zimbabwe during 1977 and is quite taken with running about Boulder in a set of camouflage fatigues. John Crawford, a Nederland resident like Peder Lund, is reputedly a former member of the Transjordanian Camel Corps (as well as the U.S. Navy) and, at least until the Zimbabwe elections, served as an officer in the Rhodesian National Army. Ludwig Nicholas Laddis III, a remnant associate from Brown's CIA days in the Everglades, is a staff editor who specializes in training SWAT teams in Florida (and retains an involvement with Edens). John Donovan, a former Special Forces trooper, is Soldier of Fortune demolitions editor, runs a down-state Illinois underwater

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demolitions firm (also specializing in above-the-surface building removal), trains SWAT teams in cities such as Springfield and Peoria, and is a frequent traveler to Southern Africa. Michael Echanis, esoteric martial artist, trainer in hand-to-hand techniques of the Special Forces Groups, Ranger Groups and SEAL Teams and (deceased) mercenary commander of Somoza's National Guard, served as the magazine's martial arts editor until his death. As has been noted, George Bacon also remained on the editorial board until he was killed in Angola.

In a more journalistic vein, there is Al J. Venter, a Reuters stringer in South Africa and author of such epic books as The Zambezi Salient (McMillan, 1975), who was once captured and nearly executed by combatants during the war in Angola. Ted Dentay, a Canadian national, was a publisher of a tabloid entitled Canada Gun Sport and collaborated on production of the first volume of The Merc's Manual, marketed through Phoenix Associates. Dentay is said to be a trafficker in automatic weapons (legal, by Canadian standards). Most unlikely, in this context, is the professional editorial advice consistently extended (gratis) by "liberal" Boulder city council member, Paul Danish, one of Brown's University of Colorado graduate school cohorts. Despite his close personal/professional association with this assortment of "officer and gentleman" types, Brown retains his military reserve status and ostensibly inactive attachment to the 12th Special Forces Group (based in Chicago) .61

Less direct, but implied through his "line of work" and public posture, is Brown's association with the clientele who advertise in the pages of his magazine. For example, there is Brooks Enzor, another former Special Forces veteran, who claims to have been captured (while on an illegal A- Team mission into Kampuchea) by communist Chinese troops during August, 1973 and tortured. How he escaped his captors with, by his own recounting, his toenails and fingernails ripped off, his teeth extracted with pliers, and "the majority" of his bones broken is a bit unclear; but the story would seem to explain his later career.

What is clear is that Enzor publicly claims to have served as a mercenary variously in Kampuchea (again), Iran, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mexico since January, 1975. He also is willing to be rather specific concerning the details of his activities. Among other things, he claims to have served in the Rhodesian National Army, to have engineered the escape of a wealthy Houston doctor's son from a Mexican jail, performed an assassination in Southeast Asia, and to have worked on the CIA payroll in Angola eliminating "terrorists"-". . . they said a terrorist was a black 61. Foot traffic in and out of Soldier of Fortune offices by Special Forces personnel in uniform was not at all uncommon during 1976-77. The practice seems to have subsided since, but whether this is due to the troopers simply changing into civilian attire is difficult to establish.




crossing the border . . ." - at the rate of $1,600 per kill. His body-count was 33 "terrorists" confirmed. According to Enzor, the Iranian mission occurred during February, 1979 at the behest (and on the payroll) of Texas computer magnate H. Ross Perot. As part of a 15 man commando team, Enzor assisted in extracting two of Perot's employees being held by the Revolutionary Government, and he was paid $15,000 for his services.62

Asked what would turn a man with his horrible personal experiences in combat to a life of "freelance" voluntary soldiering, Enzor replied, "I can't say that I didn't enjoy killing people, but what I particularly enjoy today is fighting for a cause, particularly against communism. The Red Chinese did a good job on me when they captured me. Any chance I get to fight them, I'll be in that war, regardless of the price."63 One wonders how many Red Chinese Enzor located in Mexico, Iran and Zimbabwe. But his statement is hardly out of line with Brown's response to a question concerning his own motivations:

"It would have to be ideology. .. But (ideology) is not the only factor . . . There are interrelated variables that affect different people different- ly - home problems, lack of a job, desire for adventure, to prove themselves, to utilize their military training, to do things that they have proven to themselves that they can do well . . . (but) ideology is a significant factor."64

Aside from a virulent anticommunism and white supremist militarism, Brown and Enzor would seem to share other commonalities. First, neither has suffered persecution as a result of either overt or covert activities. Rather, each has profited mightily. Enzor claims a $125,000 beachfront home in South Carolina, three cars and over $100,000 in liquidity.65 Brown boasts a home in Boulder which is probably worth more66, ownership of a booming and valuable magazine title, and has begun to exhibit considerable travel mobility. Each should agree they share a symbiotic relationship: Brown needs and profits from Enzor (as representative of "mercenaries") in terms of magazine content, newsstand and subscription sales, and advertising revenues; and, as Enzor put it, Soldier of Fortune has long proven to be his best source of general "trade" information and job leads.67 Perhaps, most of all, both would subscribe to the sentiment of Brown's statement, "I plan to go away for while. I feel I,

62. The information concerning Brooks Enzor is derived from "Killing Is Ultimate High,' " Michael H. Rudeen. Denver Monthly, April. 1979.

63. Ibid.

64. "Boulder's Intemational Soldier of Fortune," Michael H. Rudeen, Denver Monthly, April, 1979.

65. "Killing Is'Ultimate High,' " op. cit.

66. As with a portion of the seed money for Soldier of Fortune itself, Brown's mother put up the initial financing for his house purchase, according to conversations with the author.

67. "Killing Is 'Ultimate High,' " op. cit.

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have one more war left in me."68

The Role of the 'Mainstream' Media

On the whole, the mass media in the United States have done little to expose the mercenarization process, or the circumstances surrounding it. Since the arms embargo was imposed in 1963 no comprehensive effort to examine its effectiveness has to my knowledge appeared in the U.S. media. Examinations of U.S. corporate investment, when they have on rare occasions appeared, have tended to support the application of the Sullivan code or other devices intended to meliorate rather than change the system. Occasional exposes of Apartheid have appeared, mainly on public television or, from time to time, as background articles or programs in the commercial sector in connection with specific crises - Sharpeville, Soweto, Steve Biko's death, etc. - but these have been in no way comparable to the focus given conditions under "communist" regimes.

Although a recent (June 1980) tough interview with Robert K. Brown on NBC's "Today" show appears to have been an exception, the U.S. media, when they have covered mercenaries at all, have tended to glamorize them in the way Frederick Forsythe does in his novel The Dogs of War. This book is soon to become another movie spectacular in the same genre as Wild Geese, which starred Richard Burton. An interview with Robert K. Brown on Tom Snyder's "Tomorrow Show" in the spring of 1976 was typical. Brown was given free rein to promote his own view of his activities. In these treatments mercenaries are portrayed as "rugged individualists," self-motivated warriors who stubbornly refuse to relinquish the ideals of "freedom."

Worse, information has been distorted, even when the truth is already public knowledge. George Bacon, for example, was portrayed in Esquire as having been a former Special Forces trooper. To the contrary, he was a former CIA man in Laos, and died a mercenary in an area of quite heavy CIA clandestine activity.70 The implications of the two depictions are dramatically different. The choice involved in casting him as a soldier rather than an intelligence operative should carry with it the basis for legitimate concern on the part of the public. This choice has been the overriding tendency on the part of U.S. media relative to the issue of mercenarization in broadest terms: the germane is omitted, glamorization

68. "Boulder's International Soldier of Fortune," op. cit.

69. "Killing Time With the War Dreamers," op. cit.

70. "George W. Bacon III: A 20th Century Crusader," op. cit.




and mythologizing are integral to the "reporting process," and whatever facts simply must be reported suffer serious distortion. It is, after all, rather hard to hide the bodies altogether, once the "enemy" has seen them.

Such performance is not out of keeping with more generalized media performance, which may be capsulized as converting reality into officially "'approvable" reflections. By any rational assessment this constitutes propaganda, pure and simple.7' A rationale for this may be found in the fact that the mass media is big business. As such, it shares certain basic interests (such as profit rates) with other big corporate business (such as primary advertisers like General Motors, Exxon, etc.). Often enough there is direct financial interlock between these corporate entities; commonly, directoral interlock as well. Thus, policies or conditions which enhance economic penetration overseas by U.S. corporations serve the interests of the media as well as the more directly involved businesses. The result, too often, is to freeze accuracy out of the U.S. information distribution system. Effectively, in terms of publicly usable data, there has been and continues to be a long term media blackout relative to Southern Africa. In terms of mercenarization, blackout is functionally transcended by lies.

Conclusion It seems reasonable to conclude that there has been a substantial U.S.

mercenary presence in Southern Africa during the past five years. It is not clear that this constitutes a formal governmental policy; that is, mercenarization may not be an articulated position. However, tangential patterns of action on the part of the government, from nonenforcement of the Neutrality Act through sidestepping of formal arms sanctions against South Africa, imply at least tacit acceptance, if not outright underwriting, of mercenaries. Mercenarization seems not antithetical to known U.S. aims and objectives in the region, in both economic and strategic terms.

The practitioners of mercenarism have achieved rather varied success. Some, like Robert K. Brown, have prospered. Others like Michael Echanis, George Bacon, and Daniel Gearhart have died violent deaths. Still others, like David Bufkin and Ralph Edens seem to have dissolved into the mists of their own paranoid fantasies. The possibility of their re-emergence, either abroad or at home, is impossible to dismiss. If not them, then others. Many others.

In all probability, the process of mercenarization has only begun. In a grim twist of irony, the very failure of mercenary troops in Angola and Zimbabwe (and Nicaragua) has served to underscore the need for them. Substantial numbers of counterinsurgency technicians will be required to

71. For a comprehensive overview, see Chomsky/Herman, op. cit.

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shore up the sagging regional strategy underpinning the South African status quo. Namibia is a likely focus for attention in the immediate future. South Africa, it seems likely, will recruit whites from anywhere (outside of the communist block nations).

Beyond Southern Africa, additional areas for effective application of mercenaries continue to open up. Barring outright war (likely to include the Soviets as opponents, and therefore unlikely to occur), the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan seems a likely location. Ethiopia holds potential. Activities in Southeast Asia, usually based from Thailand, have never really ceased. And, as always, there is a steady demand for highly skilled personnel to serve as "advisors" south of Mexico. Perhaps even Iran and contiguous areas should not be ruled out under certain circumstances.

It seems clear that, given the current favorable context for recruitment activities- within the U.S. combined with a wide range of employment options abroad, the appeal of mercenarism will increase. This is particularly true in circumstances of economic downturn and upsurging "patriotism." On balance, the dimensions of the problem - both in its present configuration and in its potential - is appalling. Worse, there seems little which may immediately be done about it.

Philosopher J.G. Merchior has written: Neither literate conspicuousness nor doctrinal coalescence is a sine qua condition of ideological occurrence. Ideologies are as often as not conveyed by several kinds of unwritten gospels - 'secular scriptures' (sometimes even unavowed 'codes' of manners) underlying the cognitive, practical or

expressional conduct of a given group." While both "literate conspicuousness" and "doctrinal coalescence" (policy) may indeed be lacking relative to the process of mercenarization, neither is "a sine qua condition of ideological occurrence." It would seem in this instance that the bindings of ideology are shared (perhaps subconsciously in many cases) by the mercenaries, their hangers-on, governmental functionaries, and the public at large. Such bindings include the conceptions that anti-communism is a moral imperative, that anti- communist governments are thus by definition our allies, that U.S. business has assumed a "vanguard" anti-communist role in foreign policy (thus, what's good for business is good for us and "the free world"), and that anyone resisting either business or "friendly" governments must be communist. That such a world-view is wide of an accurate assessment of reality, is quite irrelevant. The media can be relied upon to interpret reality in conformance with ideological requirements without ever directly articulating ideological assumptions. The condition is essentially seamless 72. J.G. Merquior, The Veil and the Mask, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.




insofar as it constitutes an act of faith within the context of late capitalism; it is psychologically possible within such an ideological framework to simultaneously abhor mercenarism and offer de facto support (through avoidance, if nothing else) of specific mercenary activities.

Work produced by U.S. academics in this connection is scanty. More must be done, and quickly. If nothing else, the Vietnam and Watergate experiences should have demonstrated the power of ideology within contemporary American life, and that only a prolonged, consistent and amplified airing of contrary fact can hope to penetrate the mystification induced through pervasive ideological conditioning. Only such penetration, and resultant public reaction, can budge the mass media into even a semblance of its reporting potential. The same experiences should show that only through media exposure of ideological distortion can Congress be provoked into acting. And only through direct Congressional action can State and Defense be brought in line with their own public postures. At least, such a trajectory is the only option the author can perceive as effective against mercenarization short of revolution within the U.S.; and that, to put it mildly, seems extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Such hopes for airing of the facts may well prove naive. However, it is to be hoped that they are not. The alternative would seem to be to provide the mercenaries a free reign. And, as the mercenaries say, "Killing is our business, and business is good."

Postscript

Additional information, supplemental to the preceding essay, has emerged at a date too late to allow for direct inclusion in the main text. The August, 1980 edition of Soldier of Fortune includes a pair of articles under the title "Contact! SOF's First and Probably Last Rhodesian Firefight." In the first of the two pieces, Robert K. Brown informs the reader (in an editor's note) that his staff feels ". . . we owe it to our readers to be goers and doers as well as writers and editors about what others go and do."

He then goes on to offer a graphic depiction of a formal Rhodesian military operation, staged less than 48 hours before the elections, and ensuing firefight, both of which were directly participated in by Brown and several other magazine staff members. These include Associate Editor N.E. McDougald (Rbt. Himber; covered in the main text), Contributing Editor Joe Tragger (another of Brown's proliferation of ex-Green Berets), Art Director Craig Nunn, and Explosives/Demolitions Editor John Donovan (covered in the main text; Donovan's picture appears as a 44 AFRICA TODAY



Ward Churchill

participant although his role is not defined in the written material). The "Rhodesian Connection" specified by Brown as having allowed the direct participation by self-proclaimed US mercenaries in official Rhodesian Army operations is another US national, one Daryl Winkler, who has served in the Rhodesian National Army as Officer in Charge of a special armored car unit called the Black Devils since at least as early as October, 1978 (see Soldier of Fortune, "Black Devils," January, 1979). At the time of the elections, Winkler had been transferred to commissioner status in the Rhodesian African Rifles; his current whereabouts are unclear.

Brown's brief exposition is followed by a second, slightly longer article by Tragger which adds depth to the nature of the operation, names another participating US mercenary as being Michael ("Reb"; "Rebel") Pierce, and goes on to describe another "mission" directly participated in the day after the elections. In this brief foray Nunn and Tragger accompanied a heavily armed motorized unit of the (former) Rhodesian National Army in breaking up Popular Front demonstrations in villages near Que Que. Tragger and friends then promptly departed for ". . . the states, England, Belgium - anywhere but here," because "What I did not realize before coming to Rhodesia is how many Brits, Aussies, Yanks, Irish, Belgians, Kiwi and many others are in the Rhodesian Army. If they leave, the gap cannot be filled." Nor could it ever have been.

As Tragger observes, "Hell - it was a Washington*/London/Mos- cow war anyway . . . He speculates that Zimbabwe's whites, "and even many of the blacks are to join in a massive column and fight their way to the Beit Bridge on the South African border where they will be welcomed by South Africa's government." The struggle to maintain Apartheid in Southern Africa is clearly not perceived as a lost cause by US freelance soldiers. The gap in South Africa must be filled.

Nor is this the end of the most current Soldier of Fortune revelations. The same issue contains an article by Editor Bob Poos, "Night Ambush in Southern Africa," which describes his personal participation in yet another formal military operation. Poos, unlike the preceeding two authors, refuses to divulge the name of the country in which he conducted his activities. This clearly leaves the reader to speculate as to which country utilized Poos' services; even if he were active in Rhodesia, the impression of possible South African "opportunities" is distinctly left with the reader. The PR stage is being set for action in South Africa/Namibia.

Finally, the same issue contains an article entitled "Do Not - Repeat - Do Not Fire! Rhodesia Prepares to Become Zimbabwe" by E.L. "Mike" Williams. The text itself is not of particular interest. What is riveting is the 'Italics mine-Ward Churchill.




description of Williams offered by the editor: Maj. Lewis H. "Mike" Williams is one of SOF's military affairs editors. His own military affairs started with a 1942 enlistment and a subsequent stroll through Italy. He was one of the first officers assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group when it was activated in 1952. In 1953 he went to Korea for 18 months as a commander of the 7th Bn, 3d Partisan Infantry Regiment, UN Partisan Forces Korea, made up of almost 1500 North Korean and Chinese defectors. He was discharged as a captain in 1960.

His ability to work in faraway places with unusual outfits led him to serve with Michael Hoare in Katanga in 1964. Twelve years later, he was back in Africa, this time as tactical commanding officer of Rhodesia's Squadron, Grey's Scouts. Recent exploits include short-lived employment as a counterinsurgency advisor to the Romera government in El Salvadore. He maintains he has one more war to go.

What is remarkable about this particular issue of Soldier of Fortune is that all pretense has been dropped. The overt and direct mercenary histories of staffers such as Williams are spelled out rather than alluded to. Direct military involvement, never mind recruitment towards such involvement, on the part of SOF staffers and other US nationals is clearly articulated. Brown is even advertising a gala convention establishing "the Brigade of Professionals" at $25 per head, set for September in Columbia, Missouri. The gathering is to be addressed by "a keynote speaker of great reputation among us mercenaries and adventurers. . ."

It seems evident that government inaction relative to the Neutrality Act has reaped its due. The US mercenary network is making it abundantly clear it feels it has nothing at all to fear in terms of prosecution and that it may now conduct any activities it chooses within the glare of public scrutiny. It is promoting and advertising itself blatantly, pulling no punches in the process. Perhaps the State and Justice Departments are still "investigating" the "possibility" of US mercenary activities. Perhaps they still cannot find evidence with which to build a case. Poor things. One can certainly not accuse Robert K. Brown and his cohorts of attempting to conceal the evidence.

As a major essay in Africa Today put it in the last issue, the Zimbabwe elections were won by the Popular Front against a "stacked deck." US mercenaries involved in the stacking are currently taking great pains to reveal just how accurate that assessment was. And given the judicial response (none) in this country to their activities, as well as their own transparent intentions to continue "business as usual," the deck promises to become even more stacked in favor of white supremicism in the rest of Southern Africa. A demand for justice under the terms of the Neutrality Act on the part of an informed US citizenry is clearly becoming more, rather than less, crucial.

'Italics mine - Ward Churchill.

46 AFRICA TODAY



Article Contentsp. 21p. 22p. 23p. 24p. 25p. 26p. 27p. 28p. 29p. 30p. 31p. 32p. 33p. 34p. 35p. 36p. 37p. 38p. 39p. 40p. 41p. 42p. 43p. 44p. 45p. 46

Issue Table of ContentsAfrica Today, Vol. 27, No. 2, External Intervention in Africa (2nd Qtr., 1980), pp. 1-80Front Matter [pp. 1-70]Editor's Note [p. 4]French Intervention in Africa: Dependency or Decolonization [pp. 5-20]U.S. Mercenaries in Southern Africa: The Recruiting Network and U.S. Policy [pp. 21-46]A Look at BooksReview: Women in Two African Countries [pp. 47-49]Review: Focus on Rural Women in Africa [p. 50]Review: A Crashing Leap for Tanzanian Socialism [pp. 51-53]Review: Socialist Transformation in Mozambique [pp. 55-57]Review: A Sources Guide on African Ecology [p. 58]Review: Applying Theory and Research to African Agriculture [pp. 59-61]Review: African History Re-Mapped [p. 62]Review: Geographers Survey Africa [pp. 63-64]Review: A Look at Religions in Africa [pp. 64-65]Review: International Co-operation in the African Context [p. 66]Review: Sobhuza and the Swazi: An Official Biography [pp. 67-68]Review: South African Criticism of South African Novels [pp. 68-69]

Publications [pp. 71-76]Books Received [pp. 77-80]Back Matter