Field Artillery Journal - Apr 1946

7/28/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Apr 1946

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4/67

FROM HARLEM TO HITLER, with the compliments of the American negro! And very serious business it was, toothis is clear from the intent gleam in the eye of Pfc. Mose Brakin of the 578th Field Artillery Battalion as he loads apowder charge into the breech of an 8-inch howitzer somewhere near Prum, Germany. Negro artillery did a workmanlikejob in the war just won. See page 228 for a short article, this subject.


5/67

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

ContemporaryForeignGovernments

ByHERMAN BEUKEMAColonel, United States Army

WILLIAM M. GEERMajor, United States Army

and ASSOCIATES

Department of Economics, Government andHistory, United States Military Academy

HIS important, timely study is aprerequisite to the full understanding

of today's confused international scene.Only four years ago seven foreignnations could boast the classification of"great power." Today only the SovietUnion and the British Commonwealthretain this status. Here is unfolded the

pattern of development which hasbrought these seven countries to theirpresent political positionsas well astheir historical origins, philosophical

bases and constitutional structures.World stability efforts of recent years are

particularly emphasized, from theAtlantic Charter to the United NationsOrganization. With maps andillustrations. $3.50

See book review, page 249

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASS'N1218 Connecticut Avenue

Washington 6, D. C.

VOL. 36 APRIL 1946 NO. 4

Cover: Barrel of 8-inch gun is lowered into its cradle on carriage by truck-mounted crane, in preparation for firing on German positions beyond Reneling,France. The unitthe 243d Field Artillery Battalion of the Third Army.

EDITORIALFire for Effect .......................................................................................................... 196

ARTICLES

Air OP Was Very Young, by General Henry H. Araold ......................................... 198One Idea Plus $10,000, by T/4 Charles E. Adams ................................................ 201Atomic Mi li tary Theory, by Hoffman Nickerson ................................................... 204Loophol e, by Lt. Col. D. J. McDaniel, FA .............................................................. 208Arm y Ground Forces Boards, by Brig. Gen. Guy O. Kur tz .................................. 210Jap POW's View of Our Ar tillery, by Cpl. Reymond Carlson .............................. 211Boresight ing, by Col. William C. Huggins, FA...................................................... 212The Story of the Gun, Part V, by Lt. A. W. Wilson, FA ......................................... 223Negro Artillery in Worl d War II............................................................................... 228What About That Insurance? ................................................................................. 229Perimeters in Paragraphs, by Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd. .................................. 231The Principle of Universal Military Training, Part II, by Col. W. A. Graham, Rtd............. 242

ARTILLERY NOTESPost-War Plans for t he ORC.................................................................................. 218Voice of Experience ............................................................................................... 219Station List, Army Ground Forces ........................................................................ 246

OTHER FEATURESOf More Than Passing Interest .............................................................................. 222For Heroism and Service ....................................................................................... 227Letters to the Editor............................................................................................... 241

BOOKS .................................................................................................................. 248

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONGEditor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN LENNA PEDIGOAssociate Editor Business Manager

Published monthly by The United States Field Artillery Association. Publicationoffice: 3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md. Editorial and executive offices: 1218Connecticut Avenue, Washington 6, D. C. Address all communications to the Washingtonoffice. Entered as second class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore,Md. Accepted for mailing at the special rate of postage provided in Sec. 1103, Act ofOctober 3, 1917. Copyright, 1946, by The United States Field Artillery Association.Subscription rates: $3.00 a year: foreign, $3.50: single copies, 35 cents; additional singlecopies to subscribers, 25 cents. The Field Artillery Journal does not accept paidadvertising. It does pay for original articles accepted, but unsolicited manuscripts must beaccompanied by return postage if they are to be returned.

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6/67

ITH this issue, THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL takeson a new "face," new format, and new business venture.

Light and gay is my announcement of these changes on theback cover. Readers will understand and appreciate that littleburst of exuberance, I am sure, upon the accomplishment ofwhat has been a major effort for our very small staff.Artillerymen are assured, however, that these calculatedinnovations were neither conceived nor implemented in alighthearted spirit. And gaiety is not the mood of this editorial.This isfire for effect, written in sober objectivity and directedsquarely at every member of the Field Artillery Association.

COURSE OF ACTION

I sent out a "cry for help" to a sizable slice of ourmembership shortly after becoming Editor. In that circular,I explained the difficult financial circumstances of theAssociation resulting from the downward spiral of ourcirculation, outlined certain ideas for increasing the reader

appeal of our JOURNAL without jeopardy to our highprofessional standard, and enumerated ways and means formembership assistance. Reader reaction was prompt andvigorous and stimulating. Generally speaking, artillerymenexpressed sincere appreciation for the JOURNAL'S wartimerecord of service rendered. All agreed that artillery'sdecisive battle role past, present and future impelledmaintaining our JOURNAL on a monthly publication basis.However, a clear majority felt that changes were indicated changes that would reflect the dynamic character of the

changing present. Thinking long and carefully on theproblem and the recommendations received, I reached thedecision that the time had come for a clear break with thepast in so far as magazine tone and format were concerned.

TONE AND FORMATHaving determined to make a change, I went straight to

the first rule of gunnery and have come up with a boldchange. As in all things, artistic tastes vary widely amongindividuals; what pleases one may displease another. Ihope that most readers will like our new cover.Incidentally, a major credit for the new cover and thegenerally "easier" tone and format is due Sergeant Bert K.Silverman, who recently joined our staff and who will bewith us for a few more weeks before returning to anadvertising career in civil life.

A word on the three column style. Fast readersinvariably prefer the narrower measure; their eyes sweep

the full line at a glance. Three columns facilitate "make-up" and lend themselves to greater "eye appeal" in the useof cuts and art work. Reactionaries may charge, with adegree of soundness, that non-commercial "class type"journals have adhered generally to their traditional twocolumn style. I gave due consideration to this lingeringtradition, and then passed it by for the greater advantagesinherent in the three column style. The professionalstandard of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL will bemeasured hereafter, as it has been in the past, by the quality of

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1946 "FIRE FOR EFFECT"! 197

the words it prints and not by their style arrangement onthe printed page.

ARTILLERY MATCHES

Our venture into the match business is a calculatedrisk. I admit with all frankness that the venture is

undertaken with the sole purpose of making money foryour Association. This venture will prosper or fail, asyousee fit.

We offer two types of matches, "personal" and"organizational." The advantages of the organizationalmatches to active artillery units are obvious; however,there are many other possibilities not evident at firstglance. Take the case, for example, of the formercommander of a de-activated artillery battalion who hasavailable certain unofficial unit funds. If he chooses to doso, much warm battalion esprit can be maintained bydistributing our matches, each book bearing a "battalionstory" on the inside cover. Again, most de-activated

divisions are forming associations. A single thought willbring to mind numerous possibilities for utilizing ourmatches to further, among the artillerymen, the over-allpurposes of the division association.

As for the "personal" matches, I realize full well that acase of matches is a lotof matches, particularly for thosewho live in transient or crowded circumstances. But mostare not living that way, and many people use manymatches every day of every week of the year. In short,

your Association is offering you an opportunity to help, if

you will, by joining with it in a fair exchange of value.The price conscious should note, incidentally, that ourunit cost ( cent per book) is approximately eight timesless than the prevailing price for personalized matches

sold by the box of 50 books. To repeat, this matchventure will prosper or fail, asyou see fit.

APPROVED SOLUTION

I would be less than honest were I to suggest that, evenif successful, our match venture will cure the stubborn

and still-unsolved financial problems confronting ourAssociation. These stem primarily, as I have already said,from a sharply declining membership since war's end. Buta good match business can help, and help a lot, to awakenand to spread an increased Association consciousnesswhich is essential, I think, to broadening our membershipbase to the point of insuring a healthy future. Note, if youwill, that the dignified and pleasing seal on the backcover of each match book advertises our Associationevery time that one of them is handed back and forth or isgiven away. Such advertising can give an added lift to ourmutual effort in working out the "approved solution"abigger and stronger Field Artillery Association which will

contribute ever more positively as it grows "to the goodof our country." In pledging, as I do, the continuing bestefforts of our small staff to this, the highest purpose ofour Association, I would emphasize most forcefully to allwho read these words that ours is a collective problemthe solution of which lies outside and beyond the capacityof a few individuals.

Colonel, Field Artillery

THE FIELD

ARTILLERY

JOURNAL

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELDARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN1910 WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJ ECTS AS WORTHYNOW AS THEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of theefficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its besttraditions; the publishing of a J ournal for disseminatingprofessional knowledge and furnishing information as to thefield artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign;to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding ofthe powers and limitations of each: to foster a feeling ofinterdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between theregular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objectsare worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for thedissemination of War Department doctrine or administrativedirectives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinionsexpressed and conclusions reached in published articles.Consistent with the objects of our Association, however, theField Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for thefree expression of artillery ideas in the changing precent.

The UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

Organized J une 7, 1910LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMOND S. McLAIN, President

MAJOR GENERAL LOUIS E. HIBBS, Vice-PresidentCOLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG, Secretary-Editor and Treasurer

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain Brig. Gen. Edward S. OttMaj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey Colonel J ess LarsonMaj. Gen. Frank E. Lowe Colonel Malcolm R. CoxBrig. Gen. Harold R. Barker Lt. Col. Robert B. Neely

Lieutenant Colonel F. Gorham Brigham, J r.


8/67

AIR OP WAS

VERY YOUNG

Uncovered recently in the files of the Field Artillery Board, this report by (then)

Second Lieutenant Henry H. Arnold of the 29th Infantry, on a test of the aeroplane

in connection with artillery fire, will be of great interest to present day

artillerymen. In his foreword, General Arnold first reflects a bit and then projects

his thoughts to the future, in words that atomic-age artillerymen should note

well.EDITOR.

Accompanying Remark

by

HENRY H. ARNOLDGeneral of the Army

A lot of water has flowed under thebridge since November 6, 1912, and the

young airman who said that he"personally did not care to get in anymachine either as a passenger or pilotfor some time to come" has since flownmany hundreds of thousands of milesand the Air OP technique has developedinto a mustfor artillery firing.

The tests at Fort Riley in 1912 werethe first air-artillery radio contactsever made; the radio wassupplemented by smoke clouds in dotsand dashes and by dropping pasteboardcards through a stovepipe. All crudedevices but the forerunners of the

wonderful pieces of equipment wehave today. However, they all workedmore or less efficiently.

If Air OP was very young inNovember, 1912, so also was ourflyingall kinds of flying. For thereasons brought out in my report to theSignal Corps Aviation School on ourfirst test of the airplane as a medium forthe adjustment of artillery fire, whichfollows hereinafter, I was certainlyready on the afternoon of 5 November1912, to finish once-and-for-all withflying machines of all kinds, and came

very nearly finishing off both "Penny"Sands and myself at the same time!

Artillery liaison planes did a greatjob in the war just won. Some feel, andwith good reason, that the exploitationof the capabilities of the Air OP was theoutstanding artillery development ofWorld War II.

In these dynamic times, no man canforesee with any certainty the shape andform that artillery may take, if warcomes again. It seems to me, however,that regardless of the type of artillerymachines employed, the primary battlerole of the artillery will remainsubstantially unchanged namely, tosupport the foot soldier and to deepenthe battle area. In any event, I am

profoundly convinced noweven as Iwas in 1912that the airplane can, andwill, facilitate immeasurably thesuccessful accomplishment of theartillery mission.

Fort Riley, Kansas.November 6, 1912

From: 2d Lieut. H. H. Arnold,29th Infantry.

To: Commanding Officer,Signal Corps AviationSchool, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Report upon test ofaeroplane in connection

with artillery fire.

Due to the bad weather practicallyno flying was done from the 28thOctober to the 3rd November. On the28th October there was a 25-milewind blowing with gusts up to 50miles all day. On the 29th there was a20-mile wind blowing all day. On the30th there was a 12-mile wind up to8:00 o'clock and a 25-mile wind therest of the day; thermometer read 35at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Onthe 31st there was a snow and a 30-

mile wind blowing all day. On the 1stof November a 15-mile wind at 7:00in the morning and a 25-mile windwith the thermometer freezing the restof the day. On the 2nd November theweather was good all day. Machine

No. 10 went up with the wirelessequipment, Lt. Arnold pilot, Lt. Bradleyas wireless operator, made a 33-minute

flightwent to Ogden 6 miles fromthe post sending messages both goingto and returning from Ogden. Thesemessages were clearly heard byreceiving set on the ground. Flight wasmade at an altitude of about 1,000 feet.It was the intention of the pilot to gofarther but the cold was intense and hewas forced to return after reachingOgden. Flight was made between10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the

morning.No. 11, Lt. Milling as pilot, made

two short flights, both of which wereterminated by engine trouble. On the3rd November a 25-mile wind blowingall day.

The first test in connection withartillery took place on the 4th of

November; both machines took partin the test. There was no firing by the

battery; the flying was done for thepurpose of testing out different kindsof signals. There was a wirelessstation put up in the immediate

vicinity of the battery and No. 10with Lt. Arnold pilot, Lt. Bradleyoperator, sent the messages down tothe battery. No. 11 with Lt. Milling

pilot, Lt. Sands observer, wasequipped with a smoke signal devicemade at this place. No. 11 sentsignals from this device and alsodropped cards. The smoke signal device,

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1946 AIR OP WAS VERYYOUNG 199

although improvised, showed that sucha device could be used to signal fromthe aeroplane to the battery. However,on account of the manner in which itwas constructed the dot and dashsystem of signals could not be used. A

system of dots alone had to be used.On the 5th of November the

aeroplane was used for the first timewith the battery actually firing at atarget. The target was about 3200 yardsfrom the battery. It was a dark day, adark target and a dark background forthe target. In spite of this the target was

picked up by the aeroplane very easily.No. 10, equipped with wireless, sent

up first, sending back by wirelesslocation of target and afterwards the

position of the shots with reference tothe target. This data was sent back by

using the code, a copy of which isenclosed herewith.

These observations put the guns onthe target after about four volleys, thenthis machine returned to the ground and

No. 11 went up equipped with thesmoke signal and sufficient cards forsending back data. The observerrelocated the target and plotted positionfor the target and the battery on thecards; he then plotted the position ofeach salvo fired with reference to thetarget, range and deflection beingchanged in each case by the data

received from the aeroplane.It was found by using the wireless

that aeroplanes could be started out inrear of the battery, salvo being fired

just before they reached the battery.Return could be made by the machineas soon as they saw where the shotsstruck, the message sent back bywireless from the machine while it wasmaking its circle, in order to get to its

place to come up in rear of the batteryfor the second shot. When the machineused the card system it was foundnecessary for the machine to make a

figure 8 with the point of the crossingdirectly over the battery, the machinecoming up from the rear, the batteryfiring just before the machine reachedthe battery. After observing where theshots struck the machine turned,making a circle so as to come over the

battery. While the machine was makingthis turn the observer plotted the

position of the hits on the card withreference to the target and dropped it as

he passed over the battery. Then themachine made a second turn, in order toget to its place to come up from the rearto observe the second firing.

The above is the method ofprocedure at the present time, although

we expect to change it so the firing canbe done while the machine is in rear of

the battery, the observations beingmade and the location of hits beingplotted on the card in time to bedropped as the machine passes over the

battery on its first trip. In this way timecould be saved and it would only benecessary for the machine to make acircle instead of a figure 8.

The motors have been giving usconsiderable trouble. However, at the

present time they seem to be doing

fairly well. Yesterday while returningfrom the place of firing of the

bat tery, machine No. 10 with Lt.Arnold pilot and Lt. Sands passenger,had some trouble. The machine wasspiraling down to land near the camp

from a height of about 400 feet. Thespiral was not steep and was of a

very large diameter at that time. Theengine was fully throttled; suddenlythe machine turned a complete circle,360, in spite of the fact that therudder was turned hard over the otherdirection. Then for some unaccountablereason the machine plunged headforemost in a vertical line downtowards the earth. I was afraid myimagination made the drop steeperthan it actually was but at that time

Cuts show the planes used by General Arnold and the other intrepid airman in these, the

first experiments at Air OP, at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1912. These planes are Wright, Type

C. developed 50 hp. and had a maximum speed of approximately 50 mph. Their flimsy

charecter is evidenced by the care taken in supporting wing tips and tail sections, as well as

the covers over the propellers and the use of canvas strips staked down over wings.


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200 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL April

Lt. Mauborgne was on the opposite sideof the wireless tower and had themachine on a line with the tower and hestates that the machine plunged down ina vertical direction. In any event themachine was out of control from the

time it took its first turn of 360 until thebottom of the drop when I pulled it upand landed. There is no explanation forthis occurrence, for after landing I foundevery control wire intact and no wirescut or entangled in any manner. I amunable to account for it. At the presenttime my nervous system is in such acondition that I will not get in anymachine. That being the case, it appearsthat my work here must simply be amatter of supply officer. From the way I

feel now I do not see how I can get in amachine with safety for the next monthor two. I am, therefore, accompanyingthis report with request for a 20 days'leave of absence which I hope you willforward approved. I am requesting this

leave to take effect about the date of myreturn to College Park.

Today there was one machine withLt. Milling as operator and Lt. Sandsobserver used to observe fire. Thismachine used the dropping card systemwith good success. The target wasabout 3400 yards away from the

battery. The aeroplane located thetarget which was invisible from the

battery and at the 3rd volley had thebattery hitting the target.

The President of the Field ArtilleryBoard does not expect to get throughwith these tests until the 14th of thismonth, that is, if the weather is gooduntil that time. If the weather is not goodit will take much longer. I therefore

request information concerning theshipment of the aeroplanes from thisstation.

Lt. Milling does not care to fly No.10 to Leavenworth by himself. I

personally do not care to get in anymachine either as passenger or pilot forsome time to come. I therefore requestinstructions concerning the shipment ofthat machine.

/s/ HENRY H. ARNOLD2nd Lt., 29th Inf.

Small wonder that an uncontrolled dive in such a machine asthis shattered General Arnold's interest, for the time being, inany and all forms of flying! At the left rear of the engine canbe seen the radio generator, which was driven off thecrankshaft. Radio itself is in front of the engine, and was builtinto a soapbox. Clearly visible, at lower right, is the stovepipe(alternate communication means) through which weredropped pieces of cardboard bearing messages andweighted in such a manner that they spiraled, hence wereeasily seen, as they fell. One of the two seats can be seenbehind the left hand control lever.


11/67

By T/4 Charles E. Adams

Republished by courtesy of the ARMY TRANSPORTATION JOURNAL

WITH money supplied by the TC,im Brodie proved that you don't

need an airport to land a plane

ou can do it on a wire. Certainly,

the Brodie device falls in the

category of the "wonderful pieces o

equipment" referred to by General

rnold in his remark accompanying

the preceding article.

HIS is the story of how a young, air-minded lieutenant's idea plus

$10,000 provided by the TransportationCorps made possible the practicaldevelopment of a new technique inairplane take-offs and landings which

proved its worth in combat and whichnow is fast displaying valuable

peacetime uses. The lieutenant (nowcaptain) James H. Brodie, 29-year-old reserve officer and graduate of the

University of Minnesota; the time thewinter of 1942 and the spring of 1943;the place the New Orleans Port ofEmbarkation.

Jim Brodie was then on duty with theMaintenance and Repair Branch of

NOPE's Water Division. One of hisduties was to estimate the amount ofrepair work needed to be done on shipswhich, heavily loaded with war cargo,were lucky enough to limp back up theMississippi River after having beentorpedoed a few miles out. Many of theships never came back, and Brodie knew

it. It worried him, and started himthinking of how to beat the Nazi sub rapby means of off-shore flat tops whichwere scarce and badly needed for otherduty. Was there a way that an ordinarymerchant ship could be made to serve asa sort of floating airstrip for small

planes? Would it be possible to rig up adevice whereby a light plane fitted withan overhead hook could take off and land

on a cable suspended between poles orbooms extending out from a ship's side?

The more he thought about it themore sense it made. He drew up somesketches, tinkered with hooks and wires,and tried talking up his idea around the

port. On this latter score he encounteredlittle encouragement. The succinctconsensus of those in whom Brodieconfided was: "You're nuts." Maybe.Brodie wasn't sure, but he decided tofind outthe quick way. He decided totake a ten-day leave, go to Washington,and try to sell his idea to some of the

brass in the Pentagon.On the Southerner headed north he

bumped into a congenial Navy officer,a Commander George E. Taylor, wholistened sympathetically as Brodiedescribed his idea. Taylor, at the time,was serving as Navy liaison with theTransportation Corps. "Sounds swell,"he said, "and maybe I can help you sellthe idea." When the two of them hitPentagon, Taylor began spreadingBrodie's gospel. There was no

immediate enthusiasm. They persisted.After some months the go-ahead came,and with it a $10,000 appropriation forfurther experimentation and the

blessings of ex-Chief of TransportationMaj. Gen. C. P. Gross. Brodie went towork in earnest, and long before the$10,000 was all used up he was readyto put on a practical demonstration.

What Brodie came up with was alightweight, portable rig for landing and

launching small planes from a tight,overhead cableway suspended betweenmasts. Running along the cable was atrolley with a sling attached underneath.He designed an overhead hook at theend of a swivel arm to fit on top of a

plane. The operating theory, heexplained, was this: in landing, thehook on top of the plane engages thesling, and as the trolley rolls along thecableway the plane is brought to agradual stop by a brake line attached tothe trolley; in launching, the plane,suspended from a different trolley and

sling, accelerates under its own poweruntil flying speed is reached,whereupon it is released by the pilotfrom the sling and proceeds in normalflight. That was the theory.

HE first test of the theory wasscheduled to take place at the

Moisant Airport, Kenner, La., the thennew International Airport near New

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12/67


Orleans. Two masts were set up 500feet apart from which booms wereextended and a cable strung between.Permission was granted by the ArmyAir Force to modify an Army L-2(Taylorcraft) for use in the experiment.

On this plane Brodie installed the hookhe had designed.The immediate problem facing

Brodie, now that his rig was ready, wasa pilot to fly the plane and to test thecontraption. In his spare time he had

been taking flying lessons, and decidedto do the job himself if he couldn't getanyone else. But a call to the BachelorOfficers' Quarters at Jackson Barrackslocated an Air Corps pilot with thestaging area blues who was willing to tryanything once. Brodie gave him a quick

briefing, and took him off to the airport.

The pilot flew around under the rigonce to get the feel, deliberately flyinglow enough so as not to engage thehook. The spectators were notimpressed; they were waiting to beshown. Again the pilot flew in and thistime he hooked onto the cable. The

plane rolled to a stop about 300 feetdown the line. It had landed. Brodie

breathed easier. Now for a take-off. Theplane was pulled back to the starting endof the cable. The pilot revved up themotor, gave the signal to let go, and the

plane ran down the line. About 350 feet

out the pilot tripped the release lever.The plane took off, dipped to clear thecable, and then zoomed up. She wasoffshe had taken off and she hadlanded in mid-air. Brodie's rig was asuccess. But this was a ground test.What about take-offs and landings fromship-side? And would it work withheavier planes? Another type ofairplane, the heavier, faster, more

powerful Army L-5, was equipped withthe special hook. This plane was used inall subsequent tests and demonstrations.

After some persuading the War

Shipping Administration allocated afreight motor ship, the SS City ofDalhart, to the New Orleans port forexperimental purposes. Brodie installedhis rig on hernot without somedubious glances from the ship'sskipperand prepared for a test some40 miles down the Mississippi from

New Orleans. By this time Brodie hadobtained the services of an Air Corps

pilot and had him assigned to theproject. He was Raymond A. Gregory,

of Cleveland, a staff sergeant whowould fly anything and had a liking forliaison planes.

With a shipload of dignitariesaboard, the Dalhart set out. Gregoryflew alongside, and on the right signal

from Brodie hooked on to the cable atthe first try. To prove that this wasn't

just dumb luck, the ship sailed out inthe Gulf of Mexico, where, happily, astorm was in progress. As the vesselrolled and pitched in the swells 20miles offshore, Gregory did it again and again. He landed, and took off.Success of the demonstration sentBrodie to Washington, where he wasassigned to the OCT. There he madearrangements for the production ofadditional rigs, and devoted much timeto figuring out the adaptation of his rig

to uses other than the initial one ofoffshore anti-sub reconnaissance.

ORD of his success spreadquickly, and soon numerous

other branches of the service wereshowing keen interest. The late Gen.Leslie McNair, Army Ground Forces,witnessed a demonstration of the rig atFort Belvoir, asked: "Why wouldn'tthis be ideal for use with the artillery'sobservation planes?" A few monthslater at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, liaison

pilots were being trained to make use

of the new take-off and landingtechnique. Office of Strategic Serviceexamined the setup and decided that itwould be exceedingly useful in theChina and India-Burma theaters wheresupplies and men often had to bedropped behind Jap lines. Since thedevice could easily be set up and takendown in jungle areasand difficult tosee from an altitude of as little as 500feetOSS felt that it was the perfectanswer to the problem of getting menand supplies into and out of difficultspots. The war moved too fast,

however, and OSS didn't get a chanceto put the rig in operation. But soonBrodie was transferred to the AirForces, assigned to Wright Field,headquarters Air Technical ServiceCommand, and was given unlimitedfacilities for perfecting his rig. PilotGregory likewise was assigned to theATSC, and the two busied themselveswith further improvements. Brodie gothis captaincy, Gregory was made

flight officer, and both were awardedthe Legion of Merit.

By this time the rig was being usedin combat operations in the Pacific. Ithad been installed on an LST (whichfrom then on became known as the

Brodie LST 776), and had earned foritself the reputation of being "theanswer to an island-hopping liaison

pilot's dream." Aboard the 776 weremen of the 77th Infantry Divisionwhose mission was to secure theKerama Retto islands some 15 milessouthwest of Okinawa for ananchorage. Photographs revealed noairstrip sites. Air observation wasneeded. Artillery liaison pilots on theBrodie prepared to put the rig to gooduse. The LST was some 20,000 yardsfrom the target area, even farther out

than the flagship. But when orders totake off came through, the pilots shotoff the cable, reached the beachheadarea, and sat for hours at 1,500 feetgiving a blow-by-blow description ofthe landings to the flagship. At onetime some dive bombers, apparentlymis - timing their attack, dropped

bombs dangerously near the firstlanding wave. Prompt report to theflagship by the liaison pilots preventeda repeat performance. Closeobservation was made on results ofartillery fire, and immediate

adjustments were made whennecessary. All calls for air observationwere immediately carried out. Asubsequent report on the operationstated: "Tactically the Brodie LST

proved its worth." No planes were lostin landings or take-offs, and there wereno fatalities. In some 20 take-offs andlandings the only plane damagesuffered was two broken propellers.

HE end of hostilities brought nodiminution in Jim Brodie's efforts to

refine his rig and to adapt it for use in

many situations both military andcivilian which had not occurred to himin his early experiments. On land it can

be used wherever there is enough roomto set up the 500-foot cable. At sea, itcan be used wherever a ship may befitted to receive and discharge a plane.Its use is not necessarily limited to theaccommodation of light planes. It can

be built to take care of planes of thesize and weight of C-47s. In thisconnection the rig offers to commercial

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1946 1 IDEA + $10,000 203

airlines an interesting economic fact:planes equipped with Brodie'slightweight hooking device need nolanding gear. Brodie figures that theelimination of this weight and bulk willincrease a plane's payload by about

one-third. Moreover, the operation ofplanes so rigged is not hampered byhazardous ground conditions such asicy or snow-covered runways.

But proposed peacetime applicationsof the rig that seem to Brodie at themoment to have more immediate

potentialities concern largely direct-to-the-consumer services. He visualizes asuburban commuters' passenger servicefor communities beyond the convenientreach of regulation airports. He seessupplies being delivered withoutdifficulty to forest rangers in hard-to-

get-to places. The same goes forlighthouse crews in remote stations.Priority mail and passengers could berushed ashore via planes from ships atsea. Hunting, trapping, and exploration

parties would find the rig a greatconvenience. Brodie wouldn't besurprised if, in time, a lot of farmerswill find it profitable to set up his rigsin meadows for constant business and

personal use, and the idea of installinghis device between housetops in townsand cities or over railroad yards forquick air taxi transportation from rural

locations to train depots occurs to himas a possible near-term reality.

Meanwhile, he continues with hisexperimental and development work.Though the rig today is much moresimple and easy to operate and to set upthan it was at the beginning, there arecertain other refinements Brodie wantsto make. The element of cost is of someconcern to him when he thinks of his

potential consumer market. The wholerig can be turned out now forsomething like $5,000. Add a couplethousand dollars to this for a light plane

and the result may be somewhat out ofreach for the market Brodie has his eyeon. However, he figures that in time hecan work his costs down and puttogether a set which he can offer forless than $3,000.

"Why not?" asks Jim Brodie. "Itmay take a little work and some

patience, but I'm sure it will work."And today nobody is running the riskof saying: "You're nuts."

The loop of the sling i s caught a few feet above the pilot 's line of visi on.

Upon contact, speed is reduced to idling. Once hooked to sling, the plane is broughtto a gradual stop with no danger of ground looping or nosing over.


14/67

Some Reflections on Pre- and Post-Atomic Military Theory

byHOFFMAN NICKERSON

OWEVER abrupt, the turning pointsof history are, after all, points on a

continuing road. Atomic energy may be

the most important discovery in physicalscience since that of fire; it is neverthelessonly a step in a process which began

before written record, and will continuewhile man lives.

Author of Arms and Policy, Th

Armed Horde, and numerous othersplendid works on warfare andallied subjects, Hoffman Nickerson

needs no introduction to military

readers. Here he reflects, in his

usual penetrating and provocative

language and manner, on certain o

the military imponderables of this

atomic age.

Our difficulties in estimating themilitary future may be compared to theuncertainty of a traveler whose road hasalready twisted so often that he isuncertain which of the paths before himhe should take. As I write I have beforeme a book called "The Transformationsof War" by Commandant J. Colin of theEcole de Guerre, in an admirable

translation by the late Major GeneralPope-Hennessy of the British Army,dated 1912. Could we of the Americanvernacular imagine ourselves addressingthe distinguished French author as hewoke from a Rip Van Winkle sleep of atleast thirty-four years, we might betempted to say: "Brother, you ain't seennothin' yet." We have seen first thetrench deadlock of 1914-17a triumphof defensive fire power foreseen by theJewish banker Bloch but not by the HighCommands of the worldnext a vastincrease in offensive strength through

those mobile gun carriages, the tank andthe plane. After that again, we haveheard the Italian Douhet and our ownBilly Mitchell loudly prophesying thatthe bombing plane, the new flyingartillery of the air, would decide warsovernight, and have seen this prophecy,as far as pre-atomic bombs areconcerned, disproved as thoroughly asthat of the all-out-attack by unarmored

infantrymen in 1914. The Battle ofBritain in 1940 and the long resistanceof the Germans to the colossal Anglo-

American bombing effort seemed tohave settled the question. Now stillanother sudden change of direction is

promised by the atomic bomb.After all, however, man with his

fixity as a species since Cro-Magnondays, his inventiveness and his frequentchanges of idea and of mood withinhistoric times, is not new on earth. Letus, therefore, look for the general

principles which will govern the wars ofthe atomic age in relation to theseactions of fighting men in the past totransforming circumstances which have

at least some analogy to those of today.

HE military theory of every periodis a sort of bridge between the

existing technique, including weapons,discipline, etc., on the one side and theexisting political system with all itsramifications on the other.

Technically, Colin saw a growingreliance upon missile weapons ofincreasing range and power, also an

increasing ability to surmountobstacles: "Two or three centuries agothe smallest obstacle enabled us to

check the offensive . . . in our own daygreat water courses alone offer shelterfrom attack." Today the plane, the tankand the amphibious landing craft carrythe same tendency still further. On the

political side he notes a barbaricdominance of the higher conduct of war

by popular passion: "The passions thatwould animate most of the belligerents"(in a European war), "the interventionof peoples (in the conduct of war) . . . isdue to thoughtless passions . . . usuallyunreasonable. It imposes unreasonable

battles and shameless capitulations."

Thinking doubtless of Sedan, hecontinues, "The numerous andpassionate proletariats of great capitalssend armies to their ruin." The political

passions of 1939-45 and the ruinswhich they have left as their monumentare all too familiar. The devastation ofHiroshima and Nagasaki therefore fitinto a picture of which the general lineswere already clear before 1914.

That technical power has grownseems natural enough. The politicalfactor is harder to analyze. Intellectuallythe barbarism of an age which bombards

cities from the air has deep roots.Historians of ideas trace it to the great

prophet of revolutionary democracy andof modernism in general. Rousseau, withhis cult of the Noble Savage and hisglorification of the emotions and theinstinctive appetites which we share withthe animals, his dislike for theintellectual and spiritual disciplineswhich differentiate civilized man

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1946 ATOMIC MILITARY THEORY 205

Dispassionate judgment, however,could hardly have been had because the

policy of bombing German cities was sopopular. Hence the plausible argumentthat it would end the war with little lossof Anglo-American life was eagerlyheard, the number of aviators exposed toGerman fighter planes and anti-aircraftguns being small compared to that of the

glish-speaking ground forces.oreover the intimate connection

between contemporary industrialproduction and war has indeed blurred,although of course not abolished, the old,clear distinction between soldier andcivilian. At the same time probably few ifany readers in touch with civilianopinion will deny that a decisive factorwas that the English and Americanmasses were happy in the thought thatGerman townspeople were sufferingevils similar to and even greater thanthose which German aviators hadinflicted on English town-dwellers. There

EnM

Up to 1914, therefore, it was an axiomof military theory that the most effectivestrategy was to make your main effort

against rear areas but against yourenemy's organized forces. A civilized andhonorable by-product of this procedurewas that on the whole it permitted thesparing of civilians. There were of coursedvocates and practitioners of

"frightfulness" but they remainedexceptional.

the issue.

not

from barbarians. Since his time mostinfluential writers from Shelly and VictorHugo to Hemingway and Steinbeck haveattacked the necessary foundations of anycivilized society. Meanwhile

philosophers like Kant and WilliamJames have sought to empty the word"truth" of its meaning.

a

an

Turning from literary and philosophicto strategic barbarism, its mostconspicuously atrocious modern form has

been made possible by the plane with itsability to operate at great distances fromits relatively immobile bases.Consequently bombers can attack hostilerear areas, especially cities built withoutreference to the air threat and inhabited

by civilians. Douhet, the Italian founderof the cult of "strategic bombing," hopedthat civilian panics would help to

produce the rapidand therefore, in hisview, mercifuldecisions of which hedreamed.

Had pre-atomic air warfare continued,d been dispassionately judged on its

technical merits, its atrocious "strategicbombings" might have become lessfrequent. Their results might havedisgusted their authors, and at the sametime air cooperation with surface forcesmight have been judged more effective.We have already noted the great strengthof the pre-atomic air defensive, as shown

by the air Battle of Britain and by theprolonged German resistance to thegigantic Anglo-American bombing fleets.By contrast the comparative

bloodlessness to both sides of theGerman victories in Poland and in 1940in France when aircraft were used notindependently but cooperativelysuggests that a less bloody decisionmight have been gained over Germany ifthe vast Anglo-American air superiorityhad been used in closer cooperation withthe surface forces.

Now attacks on rear areas, by cavalryraiding on land and commerce destroyingat sea, have always been possible butnever previously decisive. At most theyhave been useful diversions, secondary tothe main strategic aim in defeating thehostile armies and fleets. When reliedupon as the principal means of victory, asin several of the old French naval warsagainst England, they have invariablyfailed. The superior battle-fleets and onland the superior armies, supplementedof course by appropriate measuresagainst the raiders, always determined

Among other places, atomic energy w asharnessed at the Hanford Engineer

Works, to become known as the city ofRichland, in the state of Washington.

As shown by p ic ture made from capturedJapanese film of Nagasaki, atomic bombannihilated everything within a radius of

many miles.

Smoke billows up over Nagasaki, afterbombing by atomic bomb.


16/67


were a few ineffective protests againstthe bombing policy with its inevitable

baby-killing, but roars of rage wouldhave rebuked the alleged weakness ofany English or American governmentwhich had deliberately restrained the

airmen.Before the first atomic bomb was

dropped on Hiroshima the U. S. aircommanders are said to have feared thatsuch a thing might disgust Americanopinion. If so, their anxiety provedgroundless.

ND now what? Will the logic ofmissile weapons of increasing

range and power make the decisivephase of future wars consist ofintercontinental atomic bombings ofhostile cities? If so, will the bombs be

dropped from planes or carried in long-range rockets? The latter course would

put no men at all into close contact withthe enemy. Or will the most effectiveway of planting such bombs be to fitthem with time fuses, conceal them insuitcases and have them checked byagents in railroad stations or the baggagerooms of hotels? In any case, if atomicexplosives are sufficiently damaging tothe country attacked, surface forceswould be reduced to the role ofmoppers-up and policemen.

Or will what Fuller aptly calls the

constant tactical factor, i.e., the perpetualdesire to strike without being struck, orat least without being too heavily struckin return, produce some defense?Always hitherto, the tactical center ofgravity has perpetually swung to and frolike a pendulum, as the effectiveness ofeach new device has presently beenmitigated by some appropriate counter-device. Before 1914 the effects of firewere being mitigated by skirmish lines,attacks by rushes and "artilleryformations" for infantry, and when thesedispersions and concealments proved

insufficient to reestablish offensivepower, the old device of directprotection through armor reappearedwith the tank. The effectiveness of the

pre-atomic bombing plane was passivelyreduced by shelters, camouflage and

partial evacuations of civilian towndwellers, and actively resisted by Fighter

planes, anti-aircraft guns and radiolocation. By still another swing of the

pendulum, radar was interfered with by"radar counter-measures" apparently

the mere dropping of strips of tinfoil.Strenuous efforts to reduce the effect ofthe new bombs will certainly be made.But to what extent will those effortssucceed?

Obviously the difficulties of defense

will be very great. As to passive defense,while atomic explosives remain scarce itwill be worth while to use them onlyagainst concentrated objectives such aslarge cities which cannot be eitherconcealed or given direct protection,although adequate protection might

perhaps be given to exceptionallyimportant localities therein, such as

power stations or headquarters for firefighters and damage control brigades. In

proportion as the bombs become easierto make, they could be more generallyused, in which case vital objectives

would have to be increasingly dispersedwhile, on the other hand, concealmentwould come more into play.

Means of counter-attack against thebomb carriers will depend upon thenature of those carriers. Against time

bombs planted by hostile secret agents,the only resources will be espionageand drastic police measures. Against

planes or rockets, a principal meansseems likely to be long range radiolocation. The high frequency directionfinder familiarly known to the U. S.Armed Services as "Huff-Duff" already

operates at great distances. In anAppendix to his recent book"Armament and History" Fuller hasimagined defensive rocketsaimedoriginally by some direction finder andfitted with devices something like theexisting "proximity fuse"meeting anddestroying offensive rockets in thestratosphere or even in pure space.Thus, he continues, the decisiveoperations in future wars will be foughtout ". . . . between manless machines . .. . destroying each other without fear or

pain." The fear and pain would begin

later when and as one side began to getthe better of the super-aerial duel.

How successful anti-atomic defensemight be, no one except physicalscientists can guess, and probably theyknow little.

Allowing for these technicaluncertainties, what might an atomic war

be like? Here we must resolutelycleanse our minds of the "materialisticfallacy" so common today.

Unthinking people are constantlysaying that instruments made of deadmatter "compel" us to do this or that. Inreality any instrument only permits us todo certain things if we choose, at thesame time forbidding us to use it in ways

to which it is not suited. Thus possessingan axe permits us to fell trees if we like,

but does not compel us to select anyparticular tree or to fell any at all.Further, axes are inefficient for diggingand cannot be used to bore a hole.

PPLYING this to the atomicbomb, the vast radius of its effect

makes it useful only for indiscriminateand widespread physical destruction.

Now such destruction cannot be theobject of war except when the conflictin question is in Clausewitz' phrase a

mere "venting of hatred." The totalmassacre of the defeated, or any sort of

physical destruction beyond a certainpoint, is a thing of pure passion,touched by reason only in wars of ideaswhen one or both sides believe theirenemies to be so wicked that inflictingthe utmost evils upon them is bothrighteous and necessary. "The onlygood Injun is a dead Injun"an ideamost imperfectly put into practiceexpresses the thought.

When anything short of wholesalemassacre is your political object, then

the less physical destruction you inflicton your enemy in decisively defeatinghim the better for yourself. If youintend permanent conquest you will notinjure your future provinces more thanyou must. If you want your conqueredenemies to work for you, then the moreof them you kill, the fewer your futureslaves. Insofar as your economyinterlocks with your temporaryopponent's you will impoverishyourself by ruining him. If he retainsany strength at all, your future peacewill be more secure if you do not

injure him so much that he will beinspired by lasting hate to watch hischance to attack you should you getinto difficultiesas the Prussians andAustrians attacked Napoleon after hisdefeat in Russia. Your victory will beeasier insofar as you can persuade himto a less desperate resistance by notthreatening him with the greatest evils.We should have had a bigger job onour hands in 1898 had our anger at realor alleged Spanish misrule in

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1946 ATOMIC MILITARY THEORY 207

Cuba led us to invade Spain and subvertthe Spanish government. In the sameway throughout history nearly all warshave deliberately stopped short of thewholesale massacre and devastationwhich could, when desired, be inflicted

with the most primitive weapons.Here I digress to note that the essence

of the stock military phrase "thedestruction of the enemy's forces" hasnothing to do with physical destruction,and means only the destruction of theirability to fight. An army put to sleep andtaken prisoner by means of some

permanently harmless gas would be asthoroughly "destroyed" in a militarysense as if its men had all been killed.

Returning from this digression, thetemptation to strike a heavy, perhapscrippling blow by means of atomic

attack without declaring war has alreadybeen noted by enough other writers sothat it need only be mentioned here.Similarly, the open threat of atomic

bombing would be useful in "wars ofnerves" only against weak opponentscertainly known to possess no such

bombs themselves. Other opponentswould probably reply by attacking atonce in order to get in the first blowthemselves. That the most promisingtargets for the new explosive will befound in cities goes without saying.

In a word atomic wars, if waged at

all, seem likely to be enormouslydestructive and at the same timetreacherous and savage in terms oftraditional morals.

ERE our world as sick ofslaughter as Rome of Augustus

after a century of civil massacres or asChristendom of 1648 when the ThirtyYears War, the climax of the ReligiousWars, had gone so far toward wiping outthe German-speaking peoples, then theatomic threat might improve the chancesfor some new and strict limitation of

armed conflict. Soldiers and students ofwar, however, must keep realityconstantly before their eyes.Consequently we cannot hide fromourselves that we live in an explosivetime, because the collective passionsnoted by Colin before 1912 now burnmore fiercely than ever. As yet noreligion or humanistic philosophy haseffectively restrained them, because nocommon standards of justice exist. Onthe contrary, schemes for forcibly

remodeling government and social life inways hostile to Christian morals and tothe Western tradition of civic liberty are

preached everywhere and practicedthroughout a large part of the planet. Totake a single example, in a clipping

before me a well known journalistattributes to an official in a certaindictatorial government the followingneat summary of the attitude of thosewho profess the "new morality" asfollows: "We who fight for the newright, for our right, cannot disturbourselves about the old right which wewant to destroy, any more than a soldieron the battlefield can bother about thelife of the foe he is facing." The

journalist calls this "a frank admission,having its own logic, its own moralcode, its own law of growth and

devastation, of life and death" and goeson to state that people living in astabilized code of morality, find it easierto apprehend the devastation and death(of such a creed) than the growth and thenew life. "Yes indeed!" comments theReview which prints the interview,"such a creed if followed out, justifiesthe action of the lowest criminal and theworst of the Nazi atrocities."

The language quoted abovereproduces the spirit of "The Koran orthe sword." It is substantially thelanguage of religious wars, the most

ferocious sort of war known to history.If we have not yet seen avowed wars ofreligion between traditionalists andmoral innovators, we have certainly seenwars of doctrine in Russia before theestablishment of the Soviet State andalso in Spain, not to speak of the ideal ordoctrinal terms so often used on bothsides in World War II. If the "newmorality" does not collapse from within,and if the Western world does notabandon its traditional ideas of justiceand liberty, and neither event seemslikely, the danger of a quasi-religious

war will remain to exasperate everydispute over strategic territories ornatural resources. Moderation, that greatsolvent of quarrels, is not a conspicuous

political virtue today, and must bepresent on both sides before differencescan be adjusted. Accordingly, noweverwe may hope for the best, we mustrecognize that an appropriate political

background exists for atomic wars ofwidespread physical destruction.

In such wars, the initial atomicbombardment may or may not bedecisive or nearly so. The chances of a

prompt decision will be greater inproportion to the degree of urbanizationand centralized economy in the

bombarded countries, less in proportionto the success of whatever active and

passive defense may be available.Should the degree of initial success behigh, then the remaining operations will

be little more than the suppression ofguerrilla resistancea job for whichatomic bombs are not adapted any morethan for ordinary policing. If on theother hand there be no immediatedecision, the belligerents will have thechoice between further attempts at long-range mutual destruction and thelaunching of an invasion.

In a continuing long-range duel,atomics might be supplemented by germwarfareprovided of course that meanscould be found to keep the resultingepidemics from spreading to those whohad produced them. The public has beenrecently told that some fifty millionswere spent on preparation for spreadingdiseases among our late enemies.

Should invasion be attempted, either tofollow up the effects of long-range

bombardment or to get at the sources ofthe bombing, a considerable advance

guard will probably be airborne. Whenthe airborne troops land, the atomicbarrage fired by their own side must liftlike other barrages over advancingassailants. If the airborne units make gooda lodgment against an enemy who is stillresisting with some strength, they in turnwill presumably be followed by seaborneinvasion. In any case, the first landingmust be strong and reenforcements rapid.Even if the mission be only to exploit a

presumably successful bombardment,reliable information as to the injury done

by an intercontinental bombing to a

defender's power of resistance may bedifficult to get.

INALLY, as in all militaryforecasting, we must remember that,

no matter how inclusive ourcalculations, some wholly unforeseentechnical or military development mayfalsify them. The one thing which seemsmost nearly certain is that the immediate

past will not reproduce itself unchanged.

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18/67

LOOPHOLE*her trials and redemptionProof positive, again, that "you can't be

licked if you won't be licked."

By Lt. Col. David J . McDaniel, FA

OteL

OPHOLE nearly flunked the AGFsts. A shaky week on the Ft.

Jackson range was culminated by aparticularly bad night during Test IIIwhen everything, or nearly everything,went wrong. The heavy eight-inchhowitzers had to occupy awkward

positions, the survey was slow, the

computers were nervous. Straining tocatch the bursts of the first rounds firedduring the night and before adjustment,the observers were compelled to report,"Lost!" This led to a prolonged checkon the computations and the survey,

which finally disclosed an embarrassingerror of 73 mils in the direction of theorienting lineat 12,000 yards, such anerror meant a substantial difference

between "did hit" and "should have hit."The XII Corps Artillery AugmentationGroup, under urbane Colonel Francis

Day and jovial Major Roy Trovinger,was polite, courteous, and almostfriendly; in fact, all in all, Loophole was

probably fortunate in passing the tests, letalone escaping with only a black markchecked against it in Test III.

Willing Workers. Loophole mendesired, above all, to do well. If thecommanding general liked saluting, theywould salute; if he detested flies, theywould perfect ingenious devices for theirannihilation; if night training was to beemphasized, they would endure the

blackest of nights and not light matchesin their pup tents. Consequently, thesoldiers took very much to heartLoophole's poor showing in the tests. Aslighting remark about orienting linesdropped by a transit man of anotherheavy battalion at the Skyline Club might

be resented physically, and heavy-handedwitticisms dropped by group staffofficers at the mess would be greetedwith frigid silence. And sister battalionsand groups being what they were,remarks and witticisms fell with suchregularity that Loophole men soon feltalone in a friendless world.

Despite the blot on its snow-whiteshield, Loophole proceeded down thestraight path prescribed by the AGF forcomplete training for combat. The rainand cold of Tennessee were endured as asort of atonement for the earliertransgression. The details connected with

preparation for an overseas movementwere accomplished meticulously, and thelast cook's helper qualified with thecarbine and threw a grenade. Finally, justas if its past harbored no secret shame,Loophole was alerted, moved to the port,and shipped forth to the dripping shoresof England.

Frustration. The stay in Englandwas brief, scarcely long enough togather together the minimum necessary

*Code name for 741st FA Bn (8 How).

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1946 THE REDEMPTION OFLOOPHOLE 209

equipment to enable Loophole toperform its primary mission. Then off itwent, in great haste, to the beaches ofFrance to Avranches to LeMans.There, the blow fell. It seems there wasno need for additional heavy artillery at

the time. Instead, unlucky Loopholewas to run a PW cage. This was thecrowning insult. To think that even the

powers, the higher-ups, knew ofLoophole's bad reputation with thestatisticians of the AGF, and haddecided that Loophole was fit only to

push prisoners! The men took up theirduties with heavy hearts.

As summer lengthened the paradethrough France slowed down. TheGermans stiffened and dug in and, asthe fighting became more intense,someone must have remarked that now

they could use some big guns for, atlong last, someone remembered ill-starred Loophole and assigned it

perhaps in ironyto the XII Corps.

Pick-up. Even along the muddy,bloody banks of the Moselle, ColonelDay and Major Trovinger, late of thetesting team, were still urbane, still

jovial. If either recalled the grim nightofLoophole's Test III in faraway SouthCarolina, neither gave any indication.Instead, they discussed the situation

briefly, assigned the battalion to a

goose-egg, recommended occupation ofposition under cover of darkness andregistration by high burst, and hopedthat the battalion could soon lend itsweight to the metal which was being

poured on the Germans at MontsToulon and St. Jean. "A Test III setup,"said Colonel Day, as he dismissed the

battalion staff officers and beganunfolding his sheets of capabilities.

Loophole moved fifty miles in threehours after dark and prepared for actionwithout a hitch. The survey officerobtained Corps control from the

observation battalion and located an OLand an OR for the high burst. The FDCtent went up with the precision acquiredin Tennessee, and the new GI generatorworked like a watch. Long before anyfires had been scheduled, the batteryexecutives reported their batteries wereready. Permission to register wasgranted and, with some ceremony,Loophole's first round of the war archedacross the Moselle into the German

lines. The observers bent over theirinstruments and took the instrumentreadings. The deviations announced byOL and OR were consistent, and allthree batteries were registered quickly.The computers bent over GFTs. . . .

Weary Worriers. The correctionswere stunning. The range Ks werereasonable enough, but the deflectioncorrections were fantastic: Left 68, Left72, Left 74! The S-3 said, in a shockedtone, "It's Test III, all over again!" Theyhad time to check the survey. Theywent over the plots of the HCO and theVCO, the measurements and thecomputations. They even fired a checkround or two to verify the orientation ofthe observers. The deflectioncorrections remained beyond belief.

There was some talk of calling theCorps Artillery FDC remote,dogmatic Idahoand telling the wholesad story, but that seemed like aconfession of incompetence. Thesurvey officer suggested, "We couldsimply report that we weren't ready tofire," but he didn't advocate that action.The Assistant S-3 was practical."Look," he said, "our corrections may

be good. There may be something aboutthese French maps that we don't knowyet. In any case, at the ranges at whichwe'll be firing our rounds will be

bursting behind the German lines and,at worst, will not endanger our owntroops. We may even kill a stray Kraut.Rather than jeopardize our reputationover here by doubting our own abilityat the very start, let's keep our mouthsshut and our fingers crossed and, firstthing in the morning, verify these funnycorrections with an adjustment by thecub plane." That was the decisionwhich was reached. With everyone atthe FDC holding his breath, the S-3 toldthe Idaho brass that Loophole wasready to fire.

Long Night. All that night the corpsartillery mediums and heavies poundedthe high ground on the east bank of theMoselle, and all that night thecannoneers ofLoophole floundered inthe mud of Lorraine and didn't miss aTOT. There was no sleep that night inthe FDC. Everyone waited for dawnand the chance to send up the liaison

plane. In the meantime, both shifts of

computers checked every mission withscrupulous care.

Just at dawn, even while the planewas warming up at the air strip, thetelephone rang. It was Colonel Day,himself, no less, and he was excited.

"I'm at a division OP," he said. "Thedoughboys want a tower across theriver knocked down. Be careful withyour first round because our people arevery close. Coordinates. . . ."

The S-3 looked at the Assistant S-3and the computers looked at each other;the HCO and VCO were busy plottingthe coordinates. "Well, let's go," saidthe S-3, after a long pause. "Firemission!" GFTs rattled, the routine ofshooting a mission went onuninterrupted. "Base piece ready,"reported Charley computer, and then, inresponse to a nod, "Fire!" A doorseemed to slam to the right rear. "I hopeit's at least out there where he can senseit," said the Assistant S-3. "I hope it'sfar enough out there," said the S-3.They waited.

There was a crackle at the other endof the telephone and, through fiveswitchboards, Colonel Day's voicecame through faint and clear: "Fivezero right, repeat range; give me threerounds," Charley computed looked upand grinned. "Give the man three

rounds," said the S-3. The base piecefired three rounds in time well withinthe maximum rate mentioned by FM 6-91. "Repeat range," called the augustobserver. "Those three rounds lit in thesame hole."

Nothing to It! Of course they lit inthe same hole! Of course they wereright in there! Had anyone entertainedthe slightest doubt that those roundswould not be right where they weresupposed to be? Perish the thoughtwasn't this Loophole, good old

Loophole, firing for effect? When thatoutfit went into action, the Krauts hadbetter dig! Those rounds made thebattalion. From there on, across theMoselle, the Seille, the Saar, the Rhine,and the Danube, the cannoneers ofLoophole made all TOTs and the FDCput them where they were called for.The jinx of AGF Test III was buried inthe ruins of a water tower somewherein Lorraine.


20/67

ARMY GROUNDFORCES BOARDSBy Brig. Gen. Guy O. Kurtz, USA President,

Army Ground Forces Board No. 1

HE recent consolidation of thebranch boards pertaining to Army

Ground Forces has resulted in theorganization of three boards, Boards

Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Board No. 1 has itsheadquarters at Fort Bragg, NorthCarolina, Board No. 2 at Fort Knox,Kentucky, and Board No. 3 at FortBenning, Georgia. Each board is chargedwith testing of related items ofequipment rather than the equipment

peculiar to one arm. By this change fromthe former policy of maintaining boardsfor each arm, the views and desires ofArmy Ground Forces as a whole can bemore completely accomplished andduplication of effort will be eliminated.

Board No. 1 will have jurisdictionover the following equipment andactivities:

Heavy Weapons (other than mancarried), Fire Control, andAccessory Equipment, except

where integral with armoredvehicles.

Communications and ElectronicsEquipment for all Ground Forces.

Special Airborne Equipment.Special Air Support Equipment.Ground Forces Aircraft.Maintenance Equipment for above.


Animal Equipment.Automotive Equipment for all

Ground Forces.Heavy Weapons and Fire Control

Equipment integral with armoredvehicles.

Amphibious Equipment.Ground Engineer Equipment.Maintenance Equipment for above.


Light Weapons (man carried) withAccessory Fire ControlEquipment.

Individual Clothing and Equipment.

Ground Chemical WarfareEquipment.

Maintenance Equipment for above.

Liaison officers are maintained byeach board with the other two

boards.

The President of Army GroundForces Board No. 1 is BrigadierGeneral Guy O. Kurtz, recentlyreturned from overseas, where heserved as Artillery Commander of the88th Division and later as ArtilleryOfficer of the Fifth Army.

The board is now organized with aHeadquarters and Control Staff and withservice test sections headed by directors,who are the former presidents of the old

test boards. The officers of theHeadquarters and Control Staff includeColonel William P. Ennis, Jr., FA,Colonel Alexander Graham, FA,Colonel James C. Bates, CAC, ColonelPerry W. Lewis, CAC, Colonel Guy S.Meloy, Inf, Colonel Peter S. Peca, CAC,Colonel John W. Hansborough, FA,Colonel George T. Powers, FA, ColonelH. W. O. Kinnard, Inf, and Lt. ColonelJack Marinelli, FA, and Col. G. S.Speidel, FA.

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AP POWS VIEW OFOUR ARTILLERY

By Cpl. Raymond Carlson, FA

TheAntiaircraftService Test Section,which is located at Fort Bliss, Texas, isheaded by Colonel Milo C. Cary, CAC.This test section is responsible for thetesting of all antiaircraft weapons, firecontrol and materiel. It is alsoresponsible for the testing of guidedmissiles and related equipment.

The Seacoast Service Test Section,formerly the Coast Artillery Board, islocated at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and isheaded by the Director, Colonel R. E.Dingeman, CAC. This section isresponsible for the testing of all seacoastartillery materiel including guns, firecontrol systems, searchlights andsubmarine mines.

The Field Artillery Service TestSection, formerly the Field ArtilleryBoard, Fort Bragg, is headed by theDirector, Colonel John P. Eckert, FA.This service test section is responsible

for the testing of all field artilleryweapons and associated fire controlequipment, rockets, survey andmeteorological equipment, and mortarsother than the portable types.

The Airborne Service Test Section,formerly the Airborne Board at CampMackall, now located at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, has as its DirectorColonel H. W. O. Kinnard. This sectionis responsible for the testing of allequipment used by airborne troops. Thisequipment includes parachutes, droppingequipment, loading and stowage of

equipment, and other equipment peculiarto the needs of airborne troops.

The Air SupportService Test Sectionis located at Orlando, Florida, and isheaded by Colonel James W. Clyburn,FA. This section is responsible for thetesting of equipment to be used in an airsupport role.

The Communications and ElectronicsService Test Section, which is a newsection, is located at Fort Bragg, NorthCarolina, and headed by Colonel RichardJ. Meyer, Signal Corps. This section isresponsible for the testing of all Army

Ground Forces Communication andElectronic Equipment.

The Ground Forces Aircraft ServiceTest Section, located at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, is headed by Lt. ColonelJack Marinelli. This section isresponsible for the testing of all groundforce aircraft which includes all types ofliaison aircraft.

ROM Japanese prisoners - of - wartaken in the Kiangan Valley in

northern Luzon came a lucid andvaluable evaluation of our FieldArtillery. Our own experts may writevolumes on the effectiveness of artilleryfire, but these POWs, by answering a fewquestions, tell the most convincing story

of all because they were on the receivingendwhich is the end that gets you.These POWs were taken under the

following circumstances. CommandingGeneral, XIV Corps, ordered a no-firing

period in the upper Kiangan sector on 24July 1945. In the preceding weeks the 6thInfantry Division had been wagingrelentless and continuous attack. From afew POWs who gave themselves up, andfrom written statements, it was apparentthat Jap morale in the sector was verylow. Illness, constant harassment byinfantry, tank, and artillery fire, lack of

supplies, and exposure to weather madelife for the Sons of Heaven neitherheavenly nor comfortable.

In the belief that the Japs were at thebreaking point, the no-firing truce wascalled to permit general surrender. Forseveral days before that date hundreds ofthousands of surrender leaflets wereshowered on Japanese installations byfriendly aircraft and artillery. Theseleaflets called to the attention of theenemy the hopelessness of their situationand informed the Japs that on the 24th ofJuly, from 0900 to 1600, the Americans

would refrain from firing a single shot,thereby giving the enemy ample and safeopportunities to surrender. Humanetreatment was assured them.

As the leaflets promised, the trucewent into effect. All American fireceased. But the expected surrender of amass group of Japs did not materialize.Instead, the Japanese took advantage ofthe truce by frantically digging

themselves in deeper than before,constructing new installations andstrengthening old ones. Forwardobservers, itching to fire, all day watchedthe Japs boldly come out in the open and

perform the defensive work.The truce was over at 1600. At 1603

all organic and attached artillery fired

TOT on objective. Thirty minutes later17 Japanese and Formosans who hadbeen on the objective surrendered toinfantry elements. Questioning byartillery officers elicited the followingPOWs'-view of Field Artillery:

What was the general effect of

artillery fire? It inflicted numerouscasualties when troops were outside ofcaves.

Was air burst or impact burst more

effective? Air bursts were much moreeffective.

On 23 July did you notice anything

different about the artillery fire?

*

Yes.Artillery was heavier, made more noise,caused the earth to tremble and there wasconsiderable concussion.

How effective was TOT firing? Thesurprise of this type of firing caught usoutside our holes and inflicted manycasualties.

What time during the day or night do

personnel leave their caves and

emplacements to cook, and to obtain

water and supplies? Usually around0500 and 1900.

Did the artillery fire have any effect

on your surrender? It influenced meconsiderably because it doesn't make anydifference whether you move forward, tothe rear, or remain stationary, the artilleryalways follows. Day or night you haveno rest or escape from it. The only wayto avoid it is to surrender.

________*8 howitzers were fired on ridge for

first time on this date.

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BORESIGHTINGBy Colonel William C. Huggins, FA

ORESIGHTING is the mechanical

process of alining the optical axesof the panoramic, straight, and elbowtelescopes parallel to the axis of the

bore. This process requires alinement inthe vertical plane for all telescopes andin the horizontal plane when thetelescope moves with the tube.Boresighting also requires the setting ofthe scales of the panoramic telescope toread zero when the optical axis is

parallel to the axis of the bore. Theparticular method of boresighting to beused should be that appropriate to theweapon and to the tactical situation.

In a letter accompanying hismanuscript Colonel Huggins, who was

formerly the Director of the Materiel

Department at the Field Artillery

School, observed that his views as

expressed herein did not necessarily

coincide with the official opinion of

the School. He did emphasize that (a)

the testing target and distant aiming

point methods of boresighting are well

known but the precautions for their

use do not seem to be generally

applied, and (b) the aiming circle and

standard angle methods of

boresighting are not so well known,

and have some dangers unless proper

preparations are made for their use.

Editor.Precise methods of boresightingrequire that the trunnions of a weapon beleveled. If, during boresighting and afterthe optical axis has been alined, the

panoramic telescope azimuth scales donot indicate exactly zero, set the azimuthscale to read zero and adjust the azimuthmicrometer to read zero. Then realinethe vertical hair with the aiming point byadjusting the tangent screws in thetelescope socket. If the error is too greatto be corrected in this manner, aline thevertical hair on the target by turning theazimuth worm knob, and adjust the

azimuth micrometer to read zero. Thenadjust the azimuth scale on the M1 orM12 series panoramic telescopes (or theazimuth scale window index on the M5and M6 series) to zero. Whenever thescrews in the azimuth scale or windowindex are to be loosened it is advisableto remove the telescope from its mountand work over a clean cloth or paulin sothat if the screws, which have a veryshort thread, drop out they can be found.Care must be exercised not to crossthread or strip the threads by undueforce.

On the 75-mm howitzers and the 105-mm howitzer, M3 series the tangentscrew is so located that changes in itsadjustment alter the alinement of theazimuth compensating mechanism. Toverify adjustment of the tangent screwon these weapons, accurately crosslevelthe piece, seat the support of the sightmount in the sight bracket. Twist themount slightly to the right to see that the

spring-loaded plunger in the sightbracket is free and is holding theprojecting lug of the support firmlyagainst the tangent screw. Center thecross level bubble of the mount. Elevateand depress the tube through its limits oftravel while observing the cross level

bubble. If the bubble stays centered, thetangent screw is in adjustment. If the

bubble displaces from center, loosen thejam nut on the tangent screw with awrench and adjust the tangent screwwith a screwdriver until the cross level

bubble will remain centered when thetube is elevated and depressed. Tightenthe jam nut and recheck that thetightening has not moved the tangentscrew. If it is not possible to adjust sothat the cross level bubble stays centeredit indicates that the sight support is bentand requires correction by Ordnance.

In starting boresighting operations,the elevation micrometer of the

panoramic telescope should be set at

zero. If during boresighting it is

necessary to turn the elevationmicrometer knob very far, great careshould be taken to avoid forcing themechanism beyond the extent of travel.

HE issue paper testing targetprovides aiming points for the

sights, the axis of the bore, and the axisof the subcaliber gun placed at thecorrect horizontal and verticaldisplacements. The trunnions of the

piece must be leveled. The testing targetshould be mounted smoothly on a flat

piece of wallboard, plywood, or likematerial, and placed from 50 to 100yards in front of the piece in line withthe leveled tube. Closer distancesexaggerate the effect of contraction andexpansion of the testing target and theeffect of parallax in the panoramictelescope. Greater distances causedifficulty in alining exactly the hairs ofthe muzzle bore sight with the aimingdiagram on the testing target. Existinglight conditions will govern the selectionof the proper distance.

The target must be alined with aplumb line so that the aiming diagramsare vertical and the face of the target is

perpendicular to the leveled axis of thebore. If, due to conditions of terrain, thetube is not leveled, the face of the testingtarget must be tilted until it is

perpendicular to the axis of the bore. Iffield conditions make it necessary to

bore sight with the trunnions not levelthe cant of the testing target to match theweapon can be determined by drawing adistinct vertical line from top to bottomof the target equidistant from the

butterflies of the sighting diagram of thetube bore sights. The target is canted toaline this vertical line with the verticalhair of the tube bore sights. Under thiscondition lateral positioning indexes onthe panoramic telescope mount asillustrated in Figure 7 are essential.Extreme care is necessary in alinement.

If the issue testing target is notavailable, one can be easily constructedusing the displacement values given inTable I.

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Figure 1. Scribed lines for positioning the

sight mount laterally.


23/67

1946 BORESIGHTING 213

DISTANT aiming point may beused instead of the testing target if

the testing target is unavailable or if thetactical situation makes its useimpracticable. This method should beused for all weapons for which testing

targets are not furnished or for which thetelescope displacement dismensionswith regard to the axis of the bore arenot known.

The bore sights and the optical sightsare alined on the same point. Thisintroduces a certain degree of error

because the lines of sight through thetelescope and the axis of the boreconverge on the distant point. Theshortest distance at which such a distantaiming point may be chosen dependsupon the angular error introduced by thedisplacement of the telescope from the

axis of the bore. The amount of error inmils may be determined by dividing thedisplacement of the telescope in yards, ifknown, by the distance to the point inthousands of yards. The maximumallowable error is one-quarter (0.25) mil.A suitable distant aiming point for asmall weapon on which the telescope ismounted close to the axis of the borewill not be a suitable point for a largerweapon on which the displacement ofthe telescope is greater. Accurate crossleveling of the trunnions is unnecessarywhen boresighting on a distant aiming

point because the lines of sight throughthe axis of the bore and the optical axesof the sights converge on a single point.Rotation of the telescope positionaround the axis of the bore introduces noadditional error beyond that inherent insighting on a single point.

AIMING CIRCLE METHOD

General. It is frequently impracticableto use a distant aiming point or a testingtarget for boresighting artillery pieces,especially those which cannot bedepressed to zero elevation. Weather andterrain conditions may also make itdifficult to use either of the foregoingmethods with other field artilleryweapons. For such pieces or at such timesthe aiming circle method may be used toaline the vertical hair of the panoramictelescope parallel to the vertical planecontaining the axis of the bore.

The aiming circle method requiresthat boresight marks be located on thetop surface of the tube at the muzzleend and on the upper rear surface of

TABLE IBORESIGHTING DATA FOR FA WEAPONS

Displacement of the Optical Axis of the Sight from the Axis of the Bore (in inches)

Panoramic Telescope

Weapon Model Horizontal Vertical1

75mm How Carr M8 (P)2

M1 8.425 9.60775mm How Carr M3A3 (F) M1 11.000 6.42075mm How Motor Carr M8 M12A5 20.182 16.62075mm Gun Carr M2A3 M12A1 15.400 13.2173 Gun Carr M1 M12A3 15.400 20.1503 Gun Motor Carr M10A1 M12A4 20.250 17.312105mm How Carr M2A2

3M12A2 15.155 12.150

105mm How Carr M34

M1 11.000105-mm How Motor Carr M7 M12A2 15.155 20.154.5 Gun Carr M1A1 M12 20.811 12.985155mm How Carr M1918A3 M6 15.699 7.457155mm How Carr M1A1 M12 20.811 12.985155mm Gun Motor Carr M12 M6 18.141 15.646155mm Gun Carr M1 M12 27.100 12.000

8 How Carr M1 M12 27.093 11.2008 Gun Carr M2 M12 34.124 13.0002

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Apr 1946