Field Artillery Journal - Aug 1946

7/28/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Aug 1946

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THE ONLYBOOK OF ITS

KIND!

HARD

POUNDINGBy Lt. Col. G. D. W. COURT, R.A.

HERE IS A

DEFINITIVE

BOOK ON TANK

KILLING, THE

TACTICS AND

TECHNIQUE OF

ANTITANK

WARFARE.$2.50

Published by

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSN.

1218 Connecticut Avenue

Washington 6, D. C.


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New

Commandant

at the Field

Artillery

School

THE MEANINGFUL PHRASE, "the battle is the pay-off," applieswithout reserve to Major General Clift Andrus, who relieved General Hibbslate in June to become the 20th Commandant of the Field Artillery School.

Joining the 1st Infantry Division as Artillery Commander in May, 1942, General

Andrus was with the division throughout its glorious campaigns, which spanned

the entire period of European-Mediterranean operations, and included the historic

landings on D-day at Oran in October, 1942, at Gela, Sicily, the following

summer, and at Omaha beach on June 6, 1944. General Andrus succeeded

General Heubner in command of the division in January, 1945, and remained in

command until his recent return to the United States. General Andrus' decorations

bear striking testimony to his brilliant record; he wears the Distinguished ServiceCross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with

cluster, the Soldier's Medal, and the Bronze Star with cluster. He has also been

honored by the award of eight foreign decorations.

General Andrus was elected Vice-President of the United States Field Artillery

Association at a recent special meeting of the Executive Council.


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OF MORE THANPASSING INTEREST

Happy Birthday. August 1st has beendesignated Air Force Day. The USAAF is 39years old.

Colors Return. Simultaneousnationwide ceremonies for the return to theStates of colors brought into the FederalService by National Guard units will be heldon 11 November 46.

What Price Security? One out of four ofthe nation's 13,000,000 World War IIveterans has already filed a disability claimwith the Veterans Administration.

Division Associations. More than 40divisions of World War II now have activeassociations and societies. Hq, AGF, has asection devoted to assisting these worthyactivities.

OCS Training. To standardize trainingin the future, all ground force OCScandidates will attend a 24 weeks' course atFort Benning. Commissioned upongraduation, officers then attend the basiccourse of their arm.

Oldsters to Fly. Due to the criticalshortage of trained pilots among officers inthe higher grades, selected RA officers ofthe ground combat arms will be given a 16weeks' course at the AGFATS at Fort Sill.Age restrictionnot over 42.

Artilleryman's Bank. Concurrent with

the closing of the wartime TreasuryDepartment banking facility, the new FortSill National Bank opened for business atFort Sill on July 1st. Authorized as anational bank, all deposits are protectedunder the FDIC. Maj. Gen. R. McT. Pennell,Rtd., former FAS Commandant, isPresident.

Inf-Arty Team. Few realize the relativeweight of doughboys and artillerymen inmodern battle. Actually there were 2artillerymen for every 5 infantrymen in FirstArmy during the decisive Battle of theBulge.

Overseas Cemeteries. American WorldWar II war dead (including both service

personnel and civilians) rest on a total of209 cemeteries outside the continentallimits of the U. S.

Additional Regulars. On or about 20Aug, the WD will recommend some 800additional officers for permanentcommission in the RA, to bring totalstrength to 25,000. These appointments arenot related to the recent Congressionalauthorization for 25,000 additional RAofficers.

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 36 AUGUST 1946 NO. 8

Cover: Peace is one year old this month; at least, most of the shooting stopped ayear ago. Symbolic of our victory over Japan is this shot of a 105mm howitzerbeing landed by LCM somewhere in Alaska.

Frontispiece: Major General Clift Andrus, U.S.A., new Commandant at the FieldArtillery School.

EDITORIAL

Call Them What You Will..................................................................................... 468

ARTICLES

The Last World War, by Col. Christiancy Pickett, FA ....................................... 452Let's Pull Together, by Lt. Col. R. M. Brewer, FA.............................................. 455Target Getting, by Col. Robert F. Hallock, FA ................................................... 458Ethics of Surrender, by Capt. Willis C. Rowe, Inf. ............................................ 460Employment of Radar by the XV Corps Artillery, by Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ott............................................................................................................................... 462Artillery in Street Fighting, by Maj. G. Menshikov ............................................ 471Perimeters in Paragraphs, by Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd. ............................... 475

ARTILLERY NOTES

Probable Error Chart ........................................................................................... 471

OTHER FEATURES

Of More Than Passing Interest ........................................................................... 451For Heroism and Service .................................................................................... 473Letters to the Editor............................................................................................. 482Writing You're Reading ....................................................................................... 493

BOOKS ........................................................................................................................ 488

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG

EditorMAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN LENNA PEDIGO

Associate Editor Business Manager

Published monthly by The United States Field Artillery Association. Publicationoffice: 3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md. Editorial and executive offices; 1218Connecticut Avenue, Washington 6, D. C. Address all communications to theWashington office. Entered as second class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office atBaltimore, Md. Accepted for mailing at the special rate of postage provided in Sec. 1103.Act of October 3, 1917. Copyright, 1946, by The United States Field Artillery Association.Subscription rates: $3.00 a year; foreign, $3.50; single copies, 35 cents; additional singlecopies to subscribers, 25 cents. The Field Artillery Journal does not accept paidadvertising. It does pay for original articles accepted, but unsolicited manuscripts mustbe accompanied by return postage if they are to be returned.


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A report made to the War Department on

22d April, A.D. 2064, by General Gibbon A. Yew, following the

awful tragedy which took place in that year. All characters in this

narrative are fictional (or certainly ought to be) and any

resemblance to real persons, dead persons, or persons yet to be

born, is purely coincidental.

S I TOLD reporters who visitedmy cell yesterday, I have had a

raw deal in this matter, even from thePress, which printed my explanationsonly in part, and with nastyinsinuations to the effect that mystory might be slightly colored byself-justification. They used the word"alibi" too often. As a matter of fact, Ifollowed accepted doctrinethroughout. My only mistakea

slight onewas my inability toconceive that a war could last over afew hours. But I will begin at thebeginning, for I want posterity toknow the whole story, including thehistorical events leading up to thiswar.

Lebensraum. It is just a hundredyears ago that Professor AntonCzrkwicz, while toiling away in hislaboratory at Riegesdorf (a tiny statecreated by the United Nations afterthe second World War), suddenly

stumbled upon the secret ofprolonging human lifeto

what extent we do not even yet know,since millions of people are now over100 years of age and some threethousand or so who were living inRiegensdorf in 1964 had alreadycelebrated their 170th birthdays. Thelatter group includes very fewoutsiders, for the National Partyleaders of Riegensdorf kept ProfessorCzrkwicz a virtual prisoner until hetook his own life in the year 2031,

and they watched him closely toprevent him from giving his secret tothe rest of the world.

With its death rate virtually at astandstill, the once tiny Riegensdorfwas soon packed with large famiilesand began to demand "lebensraum"as it provoked quarrels with itssmaller neighbors and gobbled themup one by one. At first, theRiegensdorf population's increaseincluded a top-heavy proportion ofaged people, but as it became clear

that Professor Czrkwicz's discoveries

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1946 THE LAST WORLD WAR 453

not only prolonged life but alsoprepetuated youth and middle age, theworld became alarmed at the increasingsize of that nation's armed forces,which by the turn of the centuryincluded vigorous military men of theage of seventy or above.

The Master Race. At about this timethe World Council* took action tocoerce Riegensfuehrer KonradSchmutzig into checking the territorialaggrandizement of his people. TheCouncil also demanded that the secretingredients of the annual inoculationsgiven all Riegensdorf people to prolongtheir lives be revealed to the rest of theworld. Schmutzig's reply was to invitethe World Council Delegates to aconference.

For a week the delegates weretreated to magnificent entertainments

and led from one demonstration toanother. They were astounded by thecultural and scientific advances of theRiegensdorf people. In former times,Schmutzig explained, great thinkershad barely reached maturity and begunto make contributions to science whensenility and disease swept them way;

but now they went on indefinitely inthe full vigor of life to produce marvelsof invention undreamed of before. Thus,said Schmutzig, Riegensdorfers hadtruly become the master race. At this

point, delegates who had read the history

of World Wars II and III grew pale andwhispered uneasily to each other.

Enlightenment. Delegates fromGreat Britain, the United States andRussia had gotten together andcompared the reports which their spieshad been gathering during the previousweek. The conclusions reached left themall wondering, for apparentlyRiegensdorf had been progressivelyreducing the size of its army for the pastthree years. Enlightenment came duringthe second week of the conference.

"We are through now with our

accomplishments in the arts of peace,"Herr Schmutzig announced to them,"so we will proceed to the fielddemonstrations of our latest equipmentfor waging war. In this we have not

been idle, especially in the field of

electronics."As in the previous exhibitions, the

officials in charge of the militarydemonstrations revealed absolutelynothing concerning the principles ordetailed theory of the engines broughtforth for brief inspection; but they

permitted the delegates to see them inaction, or where this was unsafe, tohear the blasts from fifty miles awayand to visit the ruins of mock-up citieslaid flat with atomic missiles carried tothe target area by rocket propulsion anddirected to the vicinity of the objective

by radio control."As you have no doubt learned

through your intelligence agencies,"Herr Schmutzig remarked with a smile,"we have been able to reduce the sizeof our army considerably; we have noneed either for a large force to operate

our engines of destruction or to occupythe areas devastated by them. The

bewildered survivors, if any, willmerely have to be rounded up. Wehope, of course, that we will never haveto employ these forces; we want to liveat peace with the world."

At the final banquet given in honor ofthe World Council Delegates to theconference at Riegensdorf, the PrimeMinister of England broached the subjectof sharing with mankind in general thesecret of prolonging human life.

"If this were done," Schmutzig

explained, "a serious world problem ofoverpopulation might result. It isquestionable whether all races in theworld are worthy of perpetuation.Individuals of proven worthiness can,of course, enroll under our leadership,and as citizens of our great land, theywill become entitled to the annualtreatments."

The "great land" to whichSchmutzig referred already consisted inthe year 2000 of all of Poland, EastPrussia, the Baltic States, White Russia,Slovakia, and all of the Balkan States

east of the Danube.As all know, the next twenty years

saw the spread of Riegensdorfdomination all over Europe and Asia,though the masters did not share thesecret of prolonged life with theirconquered peoples. The nations of thewestern hemisphere formed an allianceand entered an armament race with themasters of Europe, but they were

always far behind in newdevelopments, and were forcedrepeatedly to adopt humiliating policiesof appeasement.

Then, in 2026, people inRiegensdorf began to die. At first it wasconfined to the very oldest people

men who had been at the threshold ofdeath when Professor Czrkwicz

perfected his serum. They seemedsuddenly to wither within the course ofa year or two. Then many younger onesdied. Dictator Schmutzig, himself thenin his 107th year, became alarmed andcalled in Professor Czrkwicz,threatening him with violent measuresif something were not done. Thescientist merely explained that the limitof the powers of the rejuvenating serumhad been reached. After all, he said,was it not sufficient for a man to live

well over 130 years? The answer,Schmutzig warned him, was no, andCzrkwicz had better get busy and dosomething about it.

Truth Will Out. It was not until2031, however, that the facts wererevealed: Czrkwicz and his fellowconspirators had been weakening thedoses of active ingredients in the life-

prolonging serum; that issued for theuse of the party leaders had actually

been reduced to plain, sterile liquid,with the result that several highgovernment officials had weakened,

aged, and succumbed to illnessesduring the past two years.

The scientists fled just ahead of therevelation, hotly pursued by agents ofthe dreaded Polzooko (contraction of"Politischeuntersuchungsburo") andtook refuge in America. But not forlong. Knowing his hour was at hand,Professor Czrkwicz turned over hissecret to the American MedicalAssociation together with a writtenconfession of his sorrow and remorseover the results of his invention. Hethen took his own life a few minutes

before the avenging assassins of thePolzooko were able to reach him.

I was then a youth of twenty, astudent of electronics at HarvardUniversity. Today I am fifty-three,though still able to do the hundredyard dash in nine and two-fifthsseconds, thanks to the serum ofProfessor Czrkwicz, which is nowavailable for administration

*An organization of victorious nations setup after World War III and successor,substantially, to the Holy Alliance, the Leagueof Nations and the United Nations.


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454 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL August

to everyone except felons and theinsane. Unfortunately, it is stillavailable in Riegensdorf, too, whereSchmutzig still rules and secretly plansto annihilate all human beings exceptthose who bow to the yoke of theMaster Race.

Ionosphering. From 2031 to 2064the United States made great strides inscience. I am proud to have been anapprentice in the study of developments

perfected by that great scientist, Dr.Liebschutz, a refugee from the wrath ofSchmutzig and now in his 163d year.He had reached the prime of life, as itwas then known, when he first begantaking Professor Czrkwicz's serum in1964. Liebschutz's pilotless ionosphere

jet ships have been kept under controlby ground instruments at altitudes of 90

miles above sea level for as long as 31days, and are far superior to anything

produced by Riegensdorf. Hisachievement in launching a missile thatreached the moon has surpassed anydevelopment yet perfected by science,though he modestly admits that it hadno practical value except as a step inthe progress toward interplanetarycommerce. After all, he depreciated,the moon is rather a large target andrelatively only a short distance from us.

Dr. Liebschutz taught me everythingI know concerning the operation of

directors for the ground control ofpilotless space ships. It was he whorecently induced the War Departmentto entrust to me the operation of thegreat radar coordinating unit at BarHarbor, Maine.

Pair of "Youth Juicers." The WarDepartment, however, has beenexcessively conservative in acceptingnew devices, and it was through itsinfluence, not to say coercion, that Iwas obliged to consent to the presencein my control station of those two

cantankerous old die-hards, ColonelGunnar E. Scharke and ColonelChristiancy Pickett. Both thesegentlemen were retired from the Armyfor age in 1960, and would no doubthave been long rotted away in theirgraves in Arlington Cemetery had theynot happened to be spending thesummer of 1964 in Riegensdorf. Yes,they were already back numbers ahundred years ago, senile and shorn of

all powers except the gastronomical.But having won a villa on the DniesterRiver in a poker game with a wealthyRiegensdorfer, they were constructivelyeligible to citizenship in that country,and through the oversight of theRiegensdorf Government, they were

able to get their annual inoculations andhalt the advance of biological decay atthe 68 year stage. They remained loyalto the United States, of course, butnever failed to travel each year toRiegensdorf to get their ration of the"youth juice" as they loved to call it. Ina discreet sort of way, they were spiesfor our War Department, bringinghome information on every trip. Itcould only be the Polzooko's convictionthat they were in their secondchildhood, and therefore harmless,which enabled them to get away with

this. However, the War Departmentwas well satisfied with Colonel GunnarE. Scharke's detailed reports onRiegensdorf's newer developments, allof which he carried in his head, a

perfectly safe place for them, while hiscolleague, Colonel Pickett, threw thePolzooko agents off the track with hisabsurdly amusing vagaries concerninghundred mil errors. At any rate, thesetwo old timers (each as well preservedas a fruit cake at 168) have quite a"drag" with the War Department, whichhas come to their defense on the many

occasions when some weary taxpayerhas written a hot letter to theWashington Post demandinginformation as to how much longer theTreasury proposes to pay these oldofficers their retired pay. You canunderstand this well enough. Betweenthem, these two old buzzards havedrawn close to a million dollars in paychecks since they were laid on the shelfin 1960. Figure it out for yourself.

But I digress. Sufficient to state thatthe War Department deemed these oldcolonels a sort of counterweight who

prevented the scientists from swingingoff too far in radical developments. Iwill admit that Scharke has had somerather pertinent and practicalsuggestions for the employment ormodification of our control machinery;and whenever I become too impatientwith their persistent arguments forretaining some armed ground forces, Ihave to admit that they just as oftenhave raised the spirits and morale of

our director operators with their highlyamusing stories about World Wars Iand II, as well as the yarns theyremember hearing as children about theconflicts on the once barren western

plains between the semi-civilizedsettlers and the wholly barbarous red

men. Particularly fascinating to mewere their tales about a legendarycharacter known as Buffalo Bill. Thewhoppers got bigger every year but wenever tired of them. When they askedquestions, we'd always humor themwith patient explanations. For example,whenever we showed old ColonelPickett a new piece of equipment he'dinvariably pipe out, "What's the

probable error of that thing?""Pick, old Boy," I'd explain, "Our

locator devices have maximum errorsof only about one ten-thousandth of the

range, which is negligible except fortargets on another continent. But as I'vetold you before, the rest of our devicesare perfect pieces of machinery; theycan't make an error."

"I will sing you a song fromReginald DeKoven's great opera 'RobinHood,' " said Pickett one day, grabbingup his battered old guitar.

'I am the Sheriff of NottinghamA truly most remarkable manI never have yet made one mistakeI'd like to for variety's sakeIn fact infallible ere I am

The Sheriff of Not-ting-ham!'"Suppose," he continued insistently,

"suppose somebody presses the wrongbutton?"

"Well, naturally, a machine willonly do what you tell it to."

"And suppose you want to bring anionosphere ship down onto a target byremote control. What is the probableerror in that case?"

"Ionosphere ships cost over twelvemillion dollars apiece," I explained."We can't throw them down by thedozens on the desert proving ground

just to find the center of impact andmeasure the extent of the dispersion.But I am confident that they are as

perfect a device as ever man built.""Gibby," he replied solemnly, "if

man ever builds anything that can'tmake errors, I'll eat it."

Once we had actually tested the fallof two ionosphere ships with dummyloads in the desert of New Mexico. The

(Continued on page 484)


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LET'S PULL TOGETHER Coordination of Supporting Arms

in Amphibious Operations

Lt. Col. R. M. Brewer, FA

URING the recent war tremendousadvances were made in the

employment of supporting arms inamphibious warfare. Techniques wereimproved and ammunition expendituresincreased to the point that frequently theenemy was forced to abandon his beachdefenses and withdraw inland prior tothe actual assault landing. Naval gunfire,

Navy and Army air, field artillery,amphibian and land tanks, and chemicalmortars all combined to ease thedoughboy's task.

Commissioned in 1940 upongraduation from the Military Academy,Lieutenant Colonel Brewer's combatservice included tank destroyerexperience with the 1st TD Group inNorth Africa and Italy before joiningthe VII Corps staff in England in thespring of 1944. As corps antitank

officer and assistant corps artillery S-3, he participated in the VII Corpsplanning for the cross-channel assaultand subsequent operations until latein the spring of 1945. Colonel Breweris now serving as an instructor at theCommand and Staff College.

The statistics on ammunitionexpenditure in recent operations arestaggering. More important, due toimproved intelligence and operationaltechniques, a high percentage of

bullets, bombs, and shells wereaccurately directed on specific targets.Yet in spite of the tremendous advancesachieved, there remains at least onefield in which there is considerableroom for improvement. Reports ofrecent operations indicate that, whileair strikes and naval gunfire were usedon an unprecedented scale and with

great effectiveness, there was still needfor more effective coordination

between the supporting arms.Described in this article is a system of

liaison and communication which Ibelieve would insure the necessary degreeof coordination between the supportingarms. The exact system described has

probably never been employed.Howeverand by no accidentitfollows closely the doctrine and practiceof the Tenth Army. It is limited to thecorps level and below.

COORDINATING AGENTS

It is fairly obvious thatrepresentatives of the supporting armsmust be on hand at corps, division, andlower echelons to advise thecommanders and to handle requests forand delivery of the support desired.Herein lies the first difficulty: there isno standard agreement as to whoshould furnish these coordinatingagents (liaison officers), nor is there

any standard nomenclature for themamong the arms and services. Tocircumvent this latter difficulty, theywill be referred to as liaison officers inthis article.

Essentially the liaison system of the

field artillery should remain unchangedin an amphibious operation. Briefly the

principle is for the supporting unit tomaintain liaison with the supportedunit. The basic unit of artillery supportis the direct support (or combat team)

battalion. This battalion maintains

liaison officers not only at thecommand post of the supportedinfantry regiment but also at thecommand post of each infantry

battalion of the regiment.Experience has shown that naval

gunfire liaison officers and air liaisonofficers (either Army or Navy,depending on which service isfurnishing close support to the groundtroops at the time) should also be

present at the infantry battalioncommand post during the early stagesof an amphibious operation. This

requirement has been met by theorganization of joint assault signalcompanies designed for attachment toassault divisions in amphibiousoperations. The company includes 13shore fire control parties and the samenumber of air liaison parties. Thisnumber is sufficient to provide one ofeach type of party for the division, thethree regimental, and the nine infantry

battalion command posts of thedivision.

The shore fire control party is a jointorganization including a Navy officerfor liaison purposes and an Armyofficer (usually a field artilleryman) forforward observation. (Actually theseofficers exchange duties from time to

time.) The latter, who is called a"spotter" in Navy lingo, generally hasdirect radio communication with adirect support firing ship. It iscustomary, whenever sufficient firingships are available, to give each assaultinfantry battalion the direct support of adestroyer or cruiser. All naval liaisonofficers within a corps and all ships ofthe supporting fire support group are ina radio net controlled by thecommander of the fire support group.This setup permits quick response torequests for fire (by the direct support

ships) plus great flexibility and, whenrequired, complete centralization underthe command of the fire support group.

The air liaison parties are made up ofair personnel and are provided primarilyto perform liaison functions, but they arealso capable of directing air strikes ontoclose-in targets. However, naval airstrikes are usually directed by anairborne "coordinator" or by the leaderof the striking group rather than by aground station. Therefore, the primarymission of the air liaison officer is toadvise the commander and transmit

requests for strikes.RESPONSIBILITY FOR

COORDINATIONWe have seen that each of the major

supporting arms air, naval gunfire,and artilleryhas adequate liaison andcontrol systems. But as yet we see noorganization to coordinate theiractivities. There is no guarantee thattwo weapons will not attack the sametarget while other vital targets remainuntouched. Obviously, somecoordinating individual or agency isrequired at each ground force echelon.

The most common practice at thedivision level and the almost universal

practice at corps and higher levels is togive this job to the artillery officer.This appears to be the best solution.

I think this doctrine should beexpanded to include every ground forceechelon, for I believe that the artillerymanis in the best position to handle the job ofcoordination. In the first place

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he is accustomed to thinking and actingin a supporting role. Also he knows therelative effectiveness of the variouscalibers of bombs and shells. Thenagain he already has in operation anefficient agency which, with aminimum of augmentation, can handle

the added burden. He is familiar withthe organization of the ground forcesand the personality of the variouscommanders. Lastly, since it isgenerally conceded that the supportingarms should be used in the orderartillery, naval gunfire, and air, it seemsreasonable that the artillery shouldcoordinate activities to preventemployment of other, more expensive,weapons on missions that artillery canhandle. Quoting from a recent TenthArmy report: "Fixing on the artilleryofficer in each echelon the

responsibility for coordination ofartillery, naval gunfire, and air supportworked well on Okinawa."

PLANNING THE OPERATIONMany major decisions must be

reached at the highest echelonstheaterand joint task force headquarters

before any of the detailed planning canbe carried out logically within the corps.Among these decisions are organizationof participating land, sea, and air forces;assignment of objectives and areas ofresponsibility; and selection of the targetdate.

The burden of detailed fire planningprior to the operation generally fallsupon the corps. Corps artillery mustassemble all target information. Thecorps artillery commander will

probably confer with the gunneryofficer of the naval fire support group

and a representative of the supportingair forces, and together they will workup a general plan for support.

Following this conference staffrepresentatives of the supporting arms,including probably the artillery S-3,must get together and, in a series of

lengthy sessions, actually work out thedetails of the fire support plan.

Complete coverage of the subject ofprior planning would require a volume;I merely touch on it here as backgroundfor what follows. After all, the planningfor an amphibious operation takes placeover a period of months, and there is

plenty of time to work up a reasonablefire support plan even if our staffs arenot too well organized. But when thetroops hit the beach and start calling forhigh explosive on an enemy weaponthat's hurting them, there is no time for

trial and error methods; no time to calltogether the artilleryman, the Navy manand the airman. They must already betogether. They must know each otherand know how to work together.

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATIONTo quote again from the same Tenth

Army report, "for efficient operation,the coordination agents of all supportarms must be closely associated, both

physically and mentally. The artillerycoordinating agent in each echelonshould be responsible for and haveauthority over the other agents to insurecoordination."

I feel that if the liaison officers arekept together, both afloat and ashore,coordination will approach theautomatic, requiring not more than afew seconds. On the other hand, if theseliaison officers are permitted to establish

themselves wherever they please,coordination will become difficult. Forthis reason I feel that at each echelon theartilleryman should be responsible forsetting up an establishment in which allliaison officers from supporting armswork together on common situation and

operation maps. The installation mightwell be called a supporting arms centeror SAC for short. On Iwo Jima onemarine division established such aninstallation at the division headquartersand dubbed it the "supporting armstent."

To get a better picture of how thissystem would actually function, let'slook first at the situation which wouldexist immediately after a landingthatis, assault battalions ashore butregimental command posts still afloat.This situation is shown schematically

in Figure 1. Note that naval air isrepresented in both Figures 1 and 2. IfArmy rather than Navy air iscooperating, the ASCU (air supportcontrol unit) should be replaced by anAGIC (air-ground information center)and a TCC (tactical control center),since the ASCU combines the functionsof both. Also a forward control teamwould be found in the forward area ifArmy air is participating.

After the establishment ashore of theregimental command post, there is nogreat need for the air and naval gunfire

liaison officers at the battalioncommand posts; therefore they may bewithdrawn. However, the spottershould remain.

After the direct support artillerybattallion is operating ashoreand hereis the most controversial point of allthe air and naval gunfire liaison officersformerly at the regimental command

post should move to the artillerybattalion fire direction center. Thiswould then become the lowestsupporting arms center at whichrequests for support would be

processed. If the artillery battalioncannot satisfy a request and it isapparent that it is beyond thecapabilities of division and corpsartillery, this supporting arms centercan call direct for naval gunfire or anair strike. Division and corps centersmonitor such requests and candisapprove them if they desire.

The final picture is indicatedschematically


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1946 LET'S PULL TOGETHER 457

in Figure 2. This diagram, although itappears complicated at first glance, hasactually been reduced to the simplest

possible form. For one thing, only oneartillery forward observer is shownwith each infantry battalion, where in

practice there would be two or three.

Also the infantry and artillerycommand posts are shown in the samelocation. This is the exception ratherthan the rule, but inasmuch as they arelinked together closely by radio, wire,and liaison, I have shown them togetherfor simplicity. Also missing from thediagram is the general support artilleryof division and corps as well as anumber of general support ships thatwould be present in addition to the oneshown. Note that solid lines with tickmarks indicate artillery channels; solidlines with bubbles, air channels; and

dotted lines, naval gunfire channels.I believe this system would insure

coordination and at the same timeprovide flexibility. It achievescentralized control without sacrificingthe speed of delivery vital to thesuccess of close support missions.

AMPHIBIAN TANKSRapidly developed during the latter

stages of the war was the technique ofemploying the amphibian tank [LVT (A)(4)] as an artillery piece. This cameabout because the amphibian tank didnot prove successful as a land tank. The

weapon proved so successful in theartillery role on Leyte that it wasthereafter considered primarily anartillery piece, despite the fact that it wascontinued in use as the first assaultwave.

As was done by some units in thePacific, the "amtank" battalion should betrained and equipped so that aftercrossing the beach and being passedthrough by the infantry it canimmediately assume an indirect fire role.The battalion, with its four amphibiantank companies, can develop the

firepower of four battalions of 75mmartillery. Initially the companies shouldfunction in the role of direct supportartillery, responding directly to calls forfire from artillery forward observers. Assoon as the organic divisional directsupport artillery is ashore, the amphibiantank companies should be assignedreinforcing missions. This is desirablesince companies are not organized or

equipped to handle observation andliaison or to lay extensive wire nets. Thereinforcing company should befurnished a radio to operate on the firecontrol channel of the reinforcedartillery battalion.

SUMMARY

The points that I think worthy ofemphasis are:

1. Careful, detailed planning isessential as in all military operations.

2. Liaison officers from eachsupporting arm should be furnished toeach ground force echelon down to theinfantry battalion.

3. At each echelon these liaisonofficers should be combined to form aninstallation ("supporting arms center")under the direction of the artilleryofficer.

4. After establishment of the

regimental command posts ashore,liaison officers from supporting arms,except artillery, are no longer requiredat battalion command posts.

5. After establishment of the directsupport artillery battalion ashore, itsfire direction center should become the

lowest operational "supporting armscenter," thus eliminating the need forliaison officers, except artillery, at theregimental command post.

6. All requests for support shouldclear through a "supporting armscenter."

7. Coordination should be achievedat the lowest possible center.

8. Any center may call directly onany supporting arm for support, but allhigher centers monitor requests anddisapprove them when the situationdictates.


12/51

TARGET

GETTING. . . We need less theory

and more practice

By Col.Robert F. Hallock, FA*

RTILLERY exists to shoot. Itshoots effectively only when

targets are known and known

completely. Colonel Bill Bartlett usedto hammer this home to his studentsyears ago at Fort Sill: "We have longtrained artillerymen in the three basicdepartmentsmoving, communicatingand shooting. All three are valuelessunless we know what to shoot at. Wemust add the fourth departmenttargetgetting." The soundness of this doctrinewas proved over and over again incombat, from Casablanca to theArdennes and from Pearl Harbor to theatomic bomb. The Seventh ArmyArtillery Officers' Conference report hit

the point squarely with the words,"Continuous search for targets, withsimultaneous efforts to increase theaccuracy of their locations . . . is thegreatest single factor in determining theeffect of fires."

Lacked "Know-how." Examples ofour shortcomings in the field of targetgetting may be listed without end. Myown headquarters, that of a corpsartillery unit, entered combat in thefall of 1943. We had never heard ofthe phrase "shell report." Our S-2

section and records consisted of onemajor, one sergeant, a map with a fewgrease pencil notations thereon, and ascratch pad with a few entries ofsuspected enemy batteries. A yearlater the same section included six

officers, seven enlisted men, maps,charts, files, and gadgets of manykinds, the whole occupying threerooms. And each person and each itemhad been added to meet a specificneed.

I once listened to an artillery staffplanning fires to support an attack.They worked from an unmarked map.

"Here's a main road junction; lookslike a good place to interdict. Thisravine is probably a reserve assemblyarea. Put a battalion on it. Thatreverse slope would be a good placefor artillery. Let's hit that hard." Andso on. Known targets? Practicallynone.

Training Dilemma. Before weattempt the solution of the problem ofintelligence training, let us consider theunderlying reason that S-2 training has

been less adequate than S-3 training.

To me, it's simple. S-3 training inpeacetime is primarily objective andpractical, S-2 training is primarilysubjective and theoretical. The S-3'smaterial exists. His troops, hisequipment, his ammunition, his

position areas, are materialized andvisible. His fire commands are received

by flesh and blood soldiers, his guns

thunder, his shells crash. And whetherthey burst at the right point or not isdefinitely determinable. The S-2'straining material is "the enemy." Butthere is no enemy in time of peace, norcould the S-2 even designate one, fortraining purposes. Utterly meaningless,therefore, are such things as "theenemy's" national characteristics, his

tactical doctrines, his weapons,organization, and state of training andmorale. Yet, in combat these are thethings that the S-2 lives with anddreams about for weeks and months onend. Little wonder that our S-2s wereweak at the outset. I wonder if the S-3swould have done any better, had aslittle imagination been shown in their

pre-combat training.Consider the relative combat

importance of the work of the S-2and the S-3. So far as the shootingend of the business is concerned,

surely the individual who knows thetarget is the key man. A trained

private can assign, and frequently hasassigned, a fire mission to a unit, butthe man who knows a target, andfurnishes information of it to anartillery unit which fires on thattarget, does for the moment commandthat unit, whether he be an infantry

*Director, Department of Combined Arms,

458

A


13/51

1946 TARGET GETTING 459

private, an air force lieutenant, or thecorps commander. The S-2 and hisagencies tell the S-3 what to do. v.What are we going to do about it? Havewe actually set up that fourthdepartment the department ofgetting targets in our TO's, in our

training programs, and most importantof all, in our thinking? Such a set-upmust be the basis of our solution.

The S-3 "Complex." Peculiarlyunfortunate is our subconscious thoughtthat the "line of promotion" runs: batteryexecutive battery commander

battalion S-3 battalion executive battalion commander. (Incidentally, this"S-3 complex" carries over, with similarand equally unfortunate results, to a "G-3 complex" at the higher staff levels.) Ifa battery reconnaissance officer is very

capable he may get to be an executive,and a battalion S-2 may occasionallymetamorphose into the S-3, and so getinto the line of promotion. We must ridourselves of such complexes. Theofficer who knows what we're shootingat and why must be assumed to beavailable for, and competent to,command.

Responsibility and rank go hand inhand. If we propose to put greaterresponsibility on our S-2's, and torequire bigger and better results fromthem, their rank should be in

proportion. If, as I believe, the target-getter and target-shooters are equallyimportant members of one team, thenthey should be of equal rank. In anyevent, S-2's must be carefully selectedfor general efficiency, all-aroundcapability, and aptitude for the duty,and must not be assigned to that dutysolely because they are neither expertgunner officers nor expertcommunications officers.

Clarifying Functions.Reconnaissance and survey of terrain

under our control is a pure S-3function, and the S-2 should be relievedfrom these duties. I suspect that theseduties were originally handed the S-2for the same reason that he sofrequently drew the jobs of messofficer, claims officer, post exchangeofficer, liquor supply officer, and socialcommittee chairman; namely, that hedidn't have any enemy to work on. Ifyou see fit to send the S-2 to lead a

patrol through the enemy lines to locate

a hostile battery, or to survey an OP onMonte Cassino, well and good, but letthe S-3 worry about position areas andorienting lines.

S-2's should be required actively tocoordinate and supervise the training ofall observation and intelligence

personnel in their own headquartersand subordinate units, especiallyincluding forward observers and their

parties. It is generally agreed that moreforward observers must be supplied.

There is a considerable body ofopinion to the effect that thedesignation of S-2's and S-3's should bedropped, and that their functions should

be combined in one consolidatedsection known as the operationssection. This decision is a relativelyunimportant one, but it is certain thatthe S-2 and S-3 personnel must work as

a close-knit team, and be readilyinterchangeable.

Integrated Emphasis. Officertraining on all levels from basic coursesto refresher courses for general officersshould include integrated intelligencetraining, to the end that all commanders

become indoctrinated with theimportance of intelligence training andas familiar with the details ofintelligence operations as they have

been with the details of S-3 operations.Infantry and artillery intelligence

training must also be integrated at alllevels from army to company and

between the Command and StaffCollege and the Field Artillery School,so that the various arms may workmore closely together on the battlefield.

The well known AGF tests for fieldartillery units have been much maligned,

but served a valuable purpose inchecking the functioning of units. Theytotally disregarded intelligence training.An effort has been made to cover thislack in the Tests prescribed by AGFletter 15 Jun 1944, Subject: Combat

Intelligence Training Tests. These testsmark a long stride forward, but areelementary, stressing map reading,reconnaissance, scouting and patrolling,and reporting of observations. Theyshould be expanded to cover thefunctioning of an intelligence system asa whole rather than merely thefunctioning of individuals.

Field manuals for S-2's are not yetsatisfactory. FM 6-130, Field Artillery

Intelligence, is a long step in the rightdirection. But much of it and most ofthe 30 series on Military Intelligenceare in generalities and are written forcommanders and staffs in general. TheS-2 needs a detailed manual for hisown work, comparable to the S-3's FM

6-40, Field Artillery Gunnery.Incidentally, it appears to be a fact

that most of the practicing S-2's incombat units during this past war wereother than Regular Army officers.Combat is a hard teacher, and theylearned their lessons fast andthoroughly, but much of these lessonshas never been reduced to writing.They are rapidly returning to civil life,and much of their practical "know-how" will be lost to the service unlessaction is taken to record and codifytheir valuable knowledge.

Field exercises and maneuvers,regardless of scale, invariably should

be two sided. A single battery on amorning's RSOP should detach a

portion, perhaps 25%, of its personnelto represent the enemy and to receivetraining in observation. If firing isinvolved, maximum range lines protectthe observers, or they may operate on aflank. The battalion should operatesimilarly. Two units may operateagainst each other in the same manner.The observation battalion shouldalways operate as the enemy.

To fill in the "no enemy" void, weshould designate one foreign army,arbitrarily and in turn, as our supposedenemy for the day, or for the month, or

better, for the year. If this isundiplomatic, word it, "organized,equipped, and trained in a mannersimilar to . . ." The nomination may bemade at any level from WarDepartment to battalion. Such a studyin pre-war years of the British, theGerman, the French, the Japanese, theBrazilian, the Canadian Armies wouldhave been invaluable in this war.

In sum, let us demonstrate that wemean it when we say that intelligencetraining is important. Let us give the S-2 complete and practical instruction inhis duties, let us materialize his job,give him authority, time, and facilitieswith which to perform it, and requiredefinite and practical results. Let ushave done with the loose theory andloose talktarget getting is vital to theArtillery.


14/51

ETHICS OF SURRENDERBy Captain Willis C. Rowe

Reprinted by courtesy of THE INFANTRY JOURNAL

I stood, arms upraised, in the streetof a flaming village while a Germansoldier searched my pockets. I felt anindescribable mixture of relief andshame that the war, for me, was overfor a while. I hadn't given the order tosurrendermy battalion commanderhadbut I felt a certain responsibility

just the same. During those lastmoments, when grenades were crashingaround the cellar door and men beganwhisperingsurrender, something insideme rebelled. I could have yelled forthem to follow and rushed out into the

street. They might have followed. But Iwaited too long and the battalioncommander passed the word tosurrender. Then it was too late. Thewill to fight was gone. True, furtherresistance probably would have beenuseless (the Krauts had a burp guntrained on the door) but still, there wasa chanceand we had let it pass.Standing in the darkness my face

burned with shame and disgust. I hatedmy CO and hated myself.

Primarily an infantry problem,

nonetheless there are many times

when artillerymen find themselvesdefending their gun positions with

small arms.

Later, while shivering and starvingin Germany, I thought the whole thing

over. My resentment toward thebattalion commander vanished. He hadfought well and bravely while hethought there was any chance forsuccess. Surrounded and overrun, withwounded men lying unattended, it hadappeared to him that continuedresistance could only result in ourdeaths without a chance to inflictfurther casualties on the enemy. So hesurrenderedas simply as that.

But had it been that simple? As wemarched out of the gutted village in thegray dawn, I had heard American

machine guns firing in the far end ofthe town. Some of those kids, whohadn't thought of surrendering, werestill holding outselling their livesdearly, while, unknown to them, thesurviving remnants of their outfit weremarching off to captivity.

Here, then, is my question. When issurrender honorable? Whatcombination of conditions and

circumstances must exist before youcan throw down your arms in the faceof the enemy? I can find no answer inany military writingsofficial orotherwise. It is a complex and delicatesubject. One who has never faced the

problem of surrender cannot speaktruthfully and freely on the matter. Fewof those who have surrendered havetalked about it. Many of those who

didn't surrender failed to live to see aday when they could talk.

But history provides many examplesof men who refused to quit. There wasthe "lost battalion" of 1918, the

beleaguered forces at Bastogne, thedefenders of the Alamo, Little BigHorn, and Thermopylae, the British atArnhem. We honor their courage and

sacrificial spirit; yet because the Japspreferred death to surrender we callthem fanatics, because they were ourenemies.

However, we have highly honoredsome troops who surrendered: thedefenders of Wake and Corregidor. Weeven awarded the nation's highestmedal for valor to a commander whosurrendered. How can wesimultaneously honor those whosurrendered and those who refused? Imaintain either that we whosurrendered were cowards or that those

who died at their posts whensurrounded and outnumbered weremurdered through omissions in theirtraining.

We went into combat with theattitude that we would never surrenderand that we would take damn few

prisoners. We usually looked onGerman prisoners with hostility andcontempt. Germans who surrendered

without a fight were spared, althoughwe despised them. Those who fought tothe end were usually killed, especiallyif they had killed any of us.

The Germans, on the other hand,treated us courteously after wesurrendered even though we steppedover their own dead and wounded as

we came out of our cellar. They evendisplayed a certain camaraderie towardus as fellow front-line sufferers. This

brings up another question, alsoapparently never thoroughlyconsidered. When is it proper to allowan enemy to surrender?

The only argument that makes muchsense to front-line fighters is that taking

prisoners saves lives by averting last-ditch stands. The argument that mercytoward the enemy may save their ownlives if they are ever caught in a similar

position usually doesn't mean much. If

they are good troops, they usually donot contemplate surrender until thesituation actually exists.

Civilians are shocked at the idea ofkilling enemy soldiers after they havesurrendered. Yet, how can anyone

judge who has never seen his buddiesmangled or been shot at himself? Imyself hate to see rear area troopsmistreat prisoners. The front-linesoldier considers prisoners his propertyand believes that noncombatants haveno business either fraternizing with ormistreating them.

Both English and German civiliansfelt a bitter hatred of enemy fliers whohad to bail out during a bombingmission and there were many instanceson both sides of such airmen beinglynched or beaten by civilians. Only theintervention of the military saved manyof them.

But how can we censure a man, whohas just seen his child blinded or hiswife crippled, if he seeks vengeanceagainst the individuals whom he feelsto be responsible? Is the argument thatthese individuals are only instruments

performing their duty to their statesufficient under the circumstances?And what of the sons of these samecivilians who may be similarly shotdown in enemy country?

The general attitude toward our ownmen who surrendered is vague andindefinite. Everyone, including the ex-captives themselves, studiously avoidsthe word "surrender." Instead they were

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15/51

1946 ETHICS OF SURRENDER 461

captured, caught, picked up, bagged,and so on, as though it were possible to

be captured without surrendering.Many ground force officers inGermany began saying "when did yougo down?" in imitation of the AirForces officers prisoners. Once, in

Paris, I wearied of all this beatingaround the bush and told a rear echelonmajor that I wasn't "picked up" as he

puts it. "I surrenderedunconditionally!"

An English girl is the only personwho ever made any insinuating remarksto me about my capture but I notice oddlooks of appraisal from most peoplewhen they hear that I was a prisoner.The bolder ask how it happened, in anembarrassed sort of way, but most

persons just keep their mouths shut andwonderbut you can see them

wondering.Is surrender, then, shameful or is it

not? If it depends on circumstancesthen what are these circumstances?There are some instances where thereseems to be no choice. These might be:when a man is wounded anddefenseless; when he is surrounded,unarmed and outnumbered; when anairman is shot down in enemy territory;when a seaman's ship is sunk in hostilewaters. Tankers seem to think they are

justified in surrendering when theirvehicles are knocked out and they are

cut off. Perhaps surrender might bejustified when a position is untenableand there is no possibility ofaccomplishing the mission or whenfurther resistance can only meancasualties without opportunity to inflictappreciable loss upon the enemy.However, these are vague generalitiesand offer little solace to the individual.

As a specific example let us take thecase of a rifleman defending a position.He crouches in his foxhole, shells

bursting all around him. The shellingstops and he peers over the rim of his

hole. Enemy soldiers are rushing hispositionrifles and machine gunsblazing, bayonets fixed, grenades inhand. He looks around. The other menin his squad have been killed orwounded. There is no leader. He thinksof escape but there are enemy soldiersin his rear. Up to now he hasn't fireda shotonly occupied a hole for the

enemy to shoot at. What should he do?What is he expected to do? He hasnever been told. If he fires on theadvancing enemy they surely will haveno mercy on him.

One man might fire on the enemyeven meet them with the bayonetin

which case his parents get a telegram.Another might throw down his armsand surrenderin which case he will

probably go home eventually, alive andapparently with honor. Which man wasright? Was the first man simplyfoolhardy? He did what he thought washis dutywhat he was expected to do.Was his position "untenable" or couldhe have "accomplished his mission?"Could he have inflicted "appreciableloss" on the enemy? Was his position"tactically hopeless"?

And if our rifleman goes down

fighting, what of the general and hisstaff who surrender a few hours later

because their defenses have crumbledand their position has become"tactically hopeless?" Is a general

justified in saving his life after a mereprivate has sacrificed his on theperimeter of the defense? There issomething radically wrong with

training which leaves it to theindividual to decide when surrendermay or not not be appropriate andhonorable. Is any soldier (private orgeneral) incapable of inflicting loss onthe enemy and thereby contributingtoward final victory so long as he isunwounded and has weapons andammunition? On the other hand, canwe preclude the possibility of surrenderwhen the only alternative is death?

I maintain that these questionsshould and must eventually beansweredofficially and in black and

white for the instruction of troops andofficers.


16/51

Employment of Radar byXV Corps ArtilleryBy Brigadier General Edward S. Off, USA

THE BACKGROUNDECOGNITION of the value ofradar as a means of locating

targets for field artillery came to theXV Corps as early as 1 March 1944,when the corps commander, LieutenantGeneral Wade H. Haislip, and I wereen route from Anzio to Naples aboardan American destroyer.

The skipper invited us to make atour of the ship during which we visitedthe radar station. There I noticedseveral closely grouped echoes on the

horizon and asked about them. Thecommander said they were reflectionsfrom objects upon a small island whichwe were passing. It occurred to me thatit might be possible for a radar to pickup targets on a battlefield. This

possibility lingered in my mind despitediscouragement from some sources andfinally, early in October 1944,Brigadier General James F.Brittingham, Artillery Officer of theSeventh Army, furnished the XV CorpsArtillery with an SCR 584 for grounduse, together with an officer who

believed that we might be able to pickup ground targets. I jumped at theopportunity to try the experiment.

Major John W. Green, CAC,handled most of the technical problemsin person. Early in November, whenanother corps rejected the idea, GeneralBrittingham gave us an additional set,operated by Lieutenant John W. Post,Radar Officer, 68th AA Gun Battalion.Though skeptical at first as to thecapabilities of the equipment in thisunexplored field, he soon became anenthusiastic convert.

*See Coast Artillery Journal, March-April,1946. See FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, January,

1946;Infantry Journal, November, 1945.

Brig. Gen. Edward S. Off is now serving

as Deputy G-3. Headquarters, Army

Ground Forces. During the war General Off

served initially as the Artillery Commander

of the 91st Infantry Division, moving on tobecome the XV Corps Artillery Commander

in September, 1943. He remained with the

XV Corps throughout its lengthy and varied

period of combat in Europe, which included

the campaigns of Normandy, Northern

France, the Rhineland and Central Europe.

General Off wears the Distinguished Service

Medal in addition to numerous other

awards for service and valor in combat.

Much credit for the success of thesubsequent tests must go to LieutenantGeneral Haislip and Colonel Joseph B.Frazer, who was the XV CorpsAntiaircraft Officer. Recognition also isdue the Sixth Army Group, commanded

by General Jacob L. Devers, and theSeventh Army, commanded by the lateGeneral Alexander M. Patch.

Our tests progressed in actual battleunder various conditions of weather

and terrain from October 1944 untilApril 1945. Primarily, they concernedthe employment of radar for generalfield artillery use, rather than forcountermortar missions. The SCR-584was used to provide battlefieldintelligence, to locate moving and fixedground targets for corps artillery, and toadjust friendly artillery fire. In February1945, nine per cent of the corps artillerymissions were based on radar.

Since the completion of the XVCorps battle tests, reports in service

journals have noted the success of radarfor field artillery work, and in oneinstance ascribed credit for this

pioneering effort to the Field ArtillerySchool.* The purpose of this article isto assist in completing the record uponthese significant and interestingexperiments.

Both radar sets of the XV Corpswere kept in operation until the end ofthe war. When we started, the Corpsfront was along the La Vesouze Rivernear Luneville, France. The last actualmission, fired as a result of radar

intelligence, was at the crossing of theDanube River in the Donauworth area,on the 26th of April 1945.

STATISTICAL DATA

The chart tabulates statistics for theperiod October 1944 - April 1945, astaken from my diary. These figures arenot complete, since they include only themissions fired by artillery under thedirect control of XV Corps Artillery;that is, the many radar missions fired byartillery organic to or attached to thedivisions are not included. Furthermore,these are missions which the tacticalsituation and the ammunition supplymade it possible to fire; none of themultitudinous reports by radar whichgave us intelligence, but which led to noimmediate firing, are included. BrigadierGeneral Beiderlinden, 44th InfantryDivision Artillery Commander, concursin my belief that during January,February, and the first half of March,1945, at least twoand perhaps threetimes as many radar missions were fired

by division artillery than were fired bycorps artillery. Furthermore, no effortwas made by me to get allcorps artilleryradar missions entered in my diary untilFebruary, '45.

Some explanation of these chartedresults is necessary in order for thedeductions to be sound. In October, theammunition supply was limited.Although I was anxious to fire missionsreported by the radar in order to keepup interest of the individuals concernedtherewith, it was necessary to balancecarefully the use of ammunition duringthis static period in order to support afuture offensive then being prepared.

In November, the same situationcontinued until the 12th of the month.We began a great offensive from theLuneville area on the 13th and after fourdays of furious fighting, achieved a

462

R


17/51

1946 EMPLOYMENT OF RADAR BY XV CORPS ARTILLERY 463

COMPARISON OF AIROP, GROUND OP AND RADARMISSIONS, WITH PERCENTAGE OF TOTALMISSIONS OF XV CORPS ARTILLERY, OCTOBER, 1944, TO APRIL, 1945, INCLUSIVE

Month (1944)Total

MissionsAir OP

MissionsGround OPMissions

RadarMissions

October 3095 711 (22.94%) 284 (9.17%) 23 (.74%)November 4441 300 (6.76%) 257 (5.79%) 76 (1.71%)December 5507 367 (6.67%) 562 (10.21%) 7 (.12%)January ('45) 5307 302 (5.69%) 399 (7.52%) 75 (1.41%)February 5165 381 (7.37%) 684 (13.24%) 471 (9.1%)March 5064 407 (8.03%) 276 (5.45%) 330 (6.51%)April 1584 259 (16.35%) 136 (8.58%) 7 (.44%)

Totals 30163 2727 (9.04%) 2598 (8.61%) 989 (3.27%)

complete breakthrough and had a fluidbattle which lasted the remainder of themonth and into December a battlewhich took the 2nd French ArmoredDivision and the XV Corps to theRhine River and Strassburg.

We continued to have a fluid

situation during the first part ofDecember, and here again usedavailable shells to hammer the greatMaginot Line forts in the Bitche area.During the latter part of the month wewere on a very wide corps front, on thedefensive, and again with theammunition situation so tight that

practically all of our availableammunition had to be expended inobserved close support of our front linetroops. The radar was not in positionuntil the 27th of the month.

The same type fighting prevailed to a

large extent in January. It will be notedthat in this defensive period, divisionartillery did much radar firing. However,the front became stabilized and incertain critical areas we used the radar togive us some effective results inhampering the supply of enemy troops.

The radar fired more missions inFebruary than were fired by air OP's.Flying weather was bad, the front wasstill stabilized as it had been in January,and we had worked out a moreeffective application of artillery fire toa moving radar target. This was

achieved by having a section of the firedirection center physically at the radarset with authority to use certainamounts of ammunition on thesemissions and with a communicationsystem (often direct to a corps or adivision battalion) to make quick firing

possible. The terrain on the right of thecorps front was mountainous (LowVosges), but elsewhere was broken androlling.

During March, XV Corps passed tothe offensive on the 15th of the month,

broke through the Siegfried Line, andturned the Germans completely out of

position. By careful pre-planning wehad the radar sets where they couldcheck upon the rearward movements of

the Germans and we capitalized on thisform of intelligence with some amazingresults, including intelligence missionsaround 40,000 yards (although normalradar intelligence extended from ourfront lines out to about 25,000 yards).The situation was fluid the latter part ofMarch. We crossed the Rhine.

During all of April, the situationremained fluid and although the radarwas in position much of the time,extensive use was neither possible norvital. This is reflected in the small totalnumber of missions fired for this month

as well as in the small number of airand ground observed missions.

The results of using radar on theground role were checked from manysources, especially from prisoners ofwar and from examination of targetswhich had been overrun. General Deverswas present on one occasion andobserved the destruction of a battalion ofGerman artillery along a road runningnorthwest from Zweibrucken, caused bya 240mm howitzer and based on radarinformation. Many other individualsfrom the supported divisions and from

corps artillery units made observationsof the results. Most of these were notrecorded in my diary and verification isimpracticable now except by a searchthrough voluminous after-action reports.On one occasion, I took steps to have thetwo radars in widely separated locationsobserve a given portion of a road. The

picking up and evaluation of targets bythe two sets completely confirmed thereliability of radar in the ground role.

SPECIFIC INSTANCESAmong the interesting experiences

afforded by referring to my memoryand that of Brigadier General WilliamA. Beiderlinden, Artillery Commander,44th Infantry Division (whose unitsfired a great many radar missions not

shown in the tabulation above) and thatof Colonel John A. Berry, Jr.,Executive Officer, XV Corps Artillery,the following are typical:

Futile Search. In late October andNovember, on the La Vezouze front, aGerman main supply road passedthrough a village named Leintreywhich was located on a prominent hill.Time and again the radar picked upmovements on the road at or near thisvillage and we fired on the targets witha gun, a battery or a battalion. After wecaptured Leintrey, French civilians told

an officer of the 173d FA Group thatthe Germans had searched every housein the village in an effort to find aconcealed radio set which they thoughtwas giving the Americans informationof movement on the road.

* * * * *

Abandon Plan. In the Gros-Rederchering area the radar picked upwhat appeared to be a considerable tankconcentration moving down the roadtowards the 44th Infantry Division.This target was plastered by bothdivision and corps artillery weapons.Prisoners of war later stated that thiswas a movement of tanks in preparationfor a counterattack, but that the artilleryfire had been so destructive the planhad to be canceled.

* * * * *

The Game of War. On anotheroccasion in the Gros-Redercheringarea, the radar picked up what appearedto be a horse-drawn vehicle on the frontof the 44th Infantry Division. Thistarget was given a "cat and mouse"treatment by a single gun. If the wagon

stopped, fire would stop. If the vehiclestarted forward or turned around andstarted back, a single round was

plunked down in front of the vehicle.This went on for some time. The

personnel at the radar set certainly hadrelief from the monotony of warthrough cogitating as to what theGerman driver must be thinking!

* * * * *

Stalking Stalkers. On a semi-dark


18/51


Interior view of SCR 584, showing radar operators at their posts of duty.

night the radar picked up a patrol in"No Man's Land" and reported it to theinfantry regiment on that front. It wasfound at regiment that this was afriendly patrol (dispatch of which hadnot been reported to the radar). Theinfantry requested that the patrol's

progress be tracked. In the course oftracking, radar picked up whatappeared to be a stalking German

patrol. Alerted by radio, the friendly

patrol leader attacked the enemy patroland captured some prisoners, inaddition to inflicting other casualties.

* * * * *

Neutralization Plus. In theSarreguemines area, the radar pickedup what was evaluated as a battalionforming to attack the 63d InfantryDivision. Heavy artillery fire was

placed on this concentration, and it waslearned later from prisoners of war thata counterattack had been forming butthat the artillery fire had been so

devastating that it was never launched.In the same area, photographicinterpretation showed that the Germanswere using a road leading north fromSarreguemines extensively during thenight. A radar was shifted to take thisroad under observation. The first nightmany "juicy targets" were attacked as aresult of the radar; the second night thetargets were fewer; and the third nightthey were almost nonexistent. A few

days later another photograph, takenafter snow had fallen, showed that thisroad was no longer being used by theGermans.

* * * * *

Out-of-Bounds. During a "silent"period of artillery fire, while preparingto cross the Rhine River, one of the XVCorps radars picked up some extensivemovement of what appeared to be

armor on a road well back from theriver and on the extreme left of theCorps zone of action. The officer at theradar set correctly deduced that thiswas American armor, since it was inmuch greater quantity than any Germanarmored movement which had beennoted for some time, and that it was

probably from an American element ofGeneral Patton's Army which hadforced a crossing earlier. This radarintelligence resulted in getting theThird Army units moved back into

bounds so that our artillery support and

our attack of enemy targets between theriver and the road on which the armorhad been moving would not result indamage to friendly troops.

DIARY SPEAKS

A few excerpts from my diary mightbe interesting:

27 October 1945: "It is possible thatthe counterbattery fire received duringthe night was in retaliation for the

effective fire the 182nd FA Bn had justbeen placing on radar-detected trafficon roads."

"Radar entered the field ofcounterbattery during the night 28-29October when the 214th AA Gun BnRadar Station picked up an object at the

same location as Hostile Battery E3X atcoordinates Q27980196. The 772nd FABn was adjusted effectively by radar onthe target. Radar picked up all roundsfor effect and reported them 'right inthere.' " (Note: It will be noted also thatat this time the radar was also involvedin adjusting artillery fire.)

29 October: "The radar againsucceeded in detecting a 'mass of metal'at (27289909) during the night. The208th FA Bn was adjusted on the point

by use of the radar and covered the areavery well."

1 November: "During the night theradar picked up five different instancesof enemy activity. Most of this wasalong roads, but one location was a'mass of metal' in the vicinity ofLeintrey suspected of being a soundtruck which was harassing our frontline troops."

4 November: "During the night XVCorps Artillery fired prepared fires ontwelve fixed locations furnished by theradar of the 214th AAA Gun Bn. Onelocation plotted in exactly the samelocation as one of the CBIO's enemy

batteries; another radar location fell inan area from which the sound base hadobtained three plots; and a thirdlocation was verified by another sound

plot. The remaining locations furnishedwere points at which metallic objectswere not picked up on previous nights.Twice during the night traffic wasdetected moving on the road and BBattery, 214th AAA Gun Bn, coveredthe area with fire."

28 December: "The radar station,214th AAA Gun Bn, which had been inoperation in the Luneville area, was set

up in the zone of the 44th InfantryDivision. The radar had 'line of sight' tothe road north of Sarreguemines, andsupplied the artillery with several

profitable targets during the night."April 26 (at the crossing of the

Danube): "The radar went into operationand during the night was the source ofseven missions on enemy personnel andvehicles moving south." (Note: I

personally inspected some of these targets


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seldom occurred in this sector. All told,the situation was very discouraging tothe radar operators, who were spendinglong hours at the oscilloscopes,detecting and tracking numeroustargets, and getting no (or very little)fire on any of the targets.

"The situation soon improved,however, when a second set wasemplaced north of the Rohrbach-Les-Bitche behind a Maginot Line Fort.Battalion officers were detailed byCorps Artillery to set up a small FireDirection Center in the radar set itself.A 'sniping gun' was provided, and wirelines were laid direct from the radar tothe gun position. With this arrangementfew targets were detected which werenot fired upon. The radar operatorslearned to sense shell bursts rapidly andaccurately. The Field Artillery officers

learned what the machine would andwould not do, and soon were thinkingup new ways to adapt Field Artillerymethods to the capabilities of themachine. All in all, the least satisfactory

phase of operations of the radar sectionrapidly cured itself once the newness ofthe technique had worn off, and theradars were integrated into the FieldArtillery tactical setup." (Radar Sectionattached to 3d FA Obsn Bn.)

* * * * *On Clear Nights. "Registration by

radar left much to be desired. A point

must be selected on the map within thebeam of the instrument, but even theninitial rounds were often most difficultto locate. However, by firing WP andusing the telescope on the fan, on clearnights rounds could be brought visibleto the line of the beam so that theycould be sensed for range. K'sdeflection corrections were excessive

but transfers generally conformed, oncethe corrections were determined.Further study by comparison of radarand visual means is necessary beforeradar can be trusted. Radar effect

should be checked on the groundwhenever possible." (182d FA Bn.)

* * * * *Slow and Ungainly. "The least

satisfactory operation with the radar OPoccurred in the vicinity of Worms,Germany, at the XV Corps crossing ofthe Rhine. With no advance notice, theradar OP was ordered into position andour battalion was called up and told tooperate it. This was an AA radar unit, a

very ungainly tractor-trailer affair. Bythe time they were set up, many

precious hours had gone. By the timewire communications were in to thisdistant point, two more hours werewasted. When we were finally ready tofire, we received 'March Order.'

"This pointed out two major defects inthat particular radar equipment. First, itwas not designed for tactical work withfield artillery. Secondly, no provisionhad been made for a quick and simplemeans of communication for the unit."(957th FA Bn.)

* * * * *MOST INTERESTING

Numerical Error. "The mostinteresting operation in the use of radaris the machine's uncanny ability torecord events happening in the dead ofnight. One incident can show how

accurate the machine is. Radar pickedup a twenty-one man enemy patrolmaking its way toward our lines. Ourelements were alerted and the radarobserver tracked the enemy while aregimental S-2 kept our front lineelements informed by telephone of the

patrol's progress. The doughs preparedan ambush, and when the shooting wasover there were about twelve dead andeight prisoners. Radar had miscounted

by only one man! No wonder everyoperation increases both our respectand interest in this machine." (182d FA

Bn.)* * * * *

Awesome Accuracy. "The mostinteresting phase of the radar unit was itsinstantaneous and precision methods.The burst of the projectile, miles away inthe target area, would registerimmediately on the viewing screen andit was awesome to realize that you couldread the range to within ten yards. Whenan enemy vehicle would enter our beam,it was thrilling to follow him and plot hisevery turn, even though he might betwenty-five or thirty thousand yards

away, and out of artillery range. Thoughit might be dark and raining outside theradar truck, it was comforting to knowthat you could keep such accurate checkon the enemy, and on your own artilleryfire." (975th FA Bn.)

* * * * *MOST DIFFICULT

Long Night. "The most difficulttasks encountered by the radar sectionduring operations from 12 November

1944 to 8 May 1945 were those inconnection with occupation of position.The radar set used (SCR-584) was notdesigned for nor intended to be used inexposed forward positions. The setitself consists of a semi-trailer and 4-5ton 44 tractor approximately 40 feet

long and 11 feet high. The trailerweighs 11 tons.

"On the night of 12 November 1944,in Luneville Sector, one radar sectionwas ordered into position in the vicinityof Hablainville, France. The attack wasto jump off on 13 November and it wasdesired that the radar be prepared tosupport it. Reconnaissance of the areashowed that there was only one positionthat would give the desired coverage.This was a bare hill approximately 2000yards from the front lines. Theemplacement had to be dug at night and

because of the press of time the set hadto be put into the hole the same night. Itwas the dark of the moon and theweather was typical for November inthis part of Francerain and light snow,with the ground well soaked with water.The top of the hill was packed with shelland bomb craters. A large bulldozer was

borrowed from the Engineers for thetask of digging the emplacementahole 50 feet long, 12 feet wide, and 11feet deep! The dozer started work atdusk; by six o'clock it was pitch dark.With the aid of white tape, much

shouting and some sixth sense, the dozeroperator continued work and had thehole completed by midnight. By thistime the top of the hill was a quagmire.The equipment was dragged 200 yardsthrough the mud and squared away sothat it could be backed into the hole.Once in the hole, considerable blockingand jacking were required to get the setanywhere near level. The power planttrailer was likewise dragged through themud and leveled up in the same holewith the radar. The emplacement wascamouflaged with nets, and a light

snowfall effectively erased all signs ofdigging.

"When an attempt was made to putthe set into action, it was found that therough handling and the unstable footingof the leveling jacks had sprung thetrailer frame so that it was impossible toraise the antenna elevator. Three hourswork in the snow and rain was requiredto fix the elevator so that it could be runup. The job was completed


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1946 EMPLOYMENT OF RADAR BY XV CORPS ARTILLERY 467

at about 7 o'clock the next morning."This night's work brought out one

important fact. Unless working underideal conditions (i.e., firm soil and

bright moonlight), the emplacementfor an SCR-584 in a forward positionshould be dug by bulldozer one night,

improved and readied for occupationduring daylight (if conditions

permit), and the set itself emplacedthe second night. This allows time forthe hole to be cleaned out, and stablefootings for the leveling jacks to be

built. " (Radar Section attached to 3dFA Obsn Bn.) * * * * *

Care and Imagination. "The use ofradar for observation of our artilleryfire during the hours of darkness orduring fog is to say the least an entirelynew type of technique. In theemployment of radar, I believe the

most difficult task is the originalregistration. After a successfulregistration, transfers, except on targetsat extreme ranges can be easily madeand good effect obtained on the target.The difficulty of registration lies in theeffort to locate the original round. Forsome reason usually the corrections asdetermined by our FDC onlyoccasionally gave us rounds that fellwithin the beam which is thirty mileswide. As the angle T grows larger thedifficulty increased because themachine will only tell whether the

round is over or short of the OT line. Itwill tell nothing as to deflection

because its final solution is a target. Aslight error in judgment of the factorswill throw the round outside of the

beam and the machine will give noindication of a burst. With a littleimagination, careful computation offactors from map data, and confidencein the radar unit a satisfactoryregistration can be obtained.

"Incidentally, one of the mostdifficult tasks in relation to radar onground targets is the assessing of the

effect of artillery fire by interpretingthe indicators. At times evidence

pointed to very excellent effect, but itwas never conclusively proved." (182dFA Bn.)

* * * * *

Heavy Load. "The greatest difficultyin connection with running a radar unitas an artillery observation post was the

process of fitting radar's specialties toour normal artillery operations. Radar-

located targets were usually isolatedenemy units, and not worthy of massedammunitionespecially whenammunition was being allocated at therate of eight rounds per gun per day!Further, since these targets wereusually moving and speed was also

essential. A wire direct to the gunshelped, except that it adds to the heavyload on the artillery officer and hisrecorder at the radar observation post.They had to plot the target, decidewhether to fire, measure the range anddeflection, compute 'site,' operatetelephones, fill computers pad and keepammunition recordsall in addition tomaking inteligence reports to higherheadquarters. This is an exceptionallyheavy load, and over long periods,would probably lead to errors or aslowdown in operation." (975th FA

Bn.)FROM DOUBT TO DEPENDABILITY

The obstacles met and overcome byMajor Green, Lieutenant Post and theveteran crews of the 584 radio setswere incredibly great, particularly inthe early days when the project wasstill purely experimental. Great credit isdue the ability of this group toovercome these obstacles, not least ofwhich must have been a lowering ofmorale because so frequently there wasno ammunition available to expend ontargets which they knew for certainwere lucrative. The radar equipmentwas very heavy, having been designedfor an entirely different purpose, andthe exceedingly muddy conditionscoupled with the necessity to get theequipment on high ground, wheresuitable roads were not available,caused many a headache to the officersand men engaged on the work. Radarrequires "line of sight." Exposureduring daylight in most locations wastoo risky, so locations had to beevacuated before daylight andreoccupied after dark. The task ofinterpreting the echoes developedconstantly from the beginning, and

presented many interesting situations.For example, echoes did not show up infamiliar terrain which had never beenthere before simply because rain hadfallen and a piece of wooded ground ora house produced reflections. In theearlier part of the work, we fired onseveral targets detected by the radarand suspected of being weapons or

vehicular concentration areas. After theretrain on which these targets werelocated was overrun, investigations

proved that occasionally the echoesthought to be from targets were in somecases apparently from terrain featuresmade more sensitive by wet weather. It

was found that the radar would operatethrough dry snow quite successfully.One night the officer at the radarstation picked up enough echoes to givethe appearance of tremendous Germanactivity taking place on our front.Wisely, he continued observation andanalysis and deduced that hismultitudinous echoes were beingcaused from wet snow. Laterexperience proved that wet snow cangive a radar considerable difficulty. Inview of the heavy equipment involvedand the fact that all occupation had to

be done at night, it appeared that itwould not be feasible to keep the radarin supporting positions as the troopsadvanced. However, by careful mapstudy and prior planning we found itentirely possible to keep one radar seton each of the two main roads beingemployed in the Corps advance, readyto operate shortly after nightfall, nomatter how fluid the battle.

The emergence of radar in theground role from a "screwballexperimental dream" to an accepted,dependable, and much desired

intelligence agency was amazinglyrapid and widespread in the divisions ofthe XV Corps. So great was the needfor an agency that could see the enemyduring periods of low visibility andcomplete darkness, so urgent was thenecessity to find a means with which towarn the front line infantryman thatsomething was approaching him from"No Man's Land," and so quickly werefactual results from radar disseminated,that almost overnight there was a clamorfrom the divisions for radar coverage ontheir fronts. From all sides I was offered

assistance in laying communications tomy radar sets. Brigadier GeneralBeiderlinden of the 44th DivisionArtillery, Brigadier General Murphy ofthe 100th Division Artillery, BrigadierGeneral McGaw of the 63d DivisionArtillery and many others told me that ifI would tell them where the radar setwas to be emplaced they would lay anylines I needed to tie it in with theirartillery units or with their infantry.


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1946 EDITORIAL 469

enemy thought. To quote one German POW: "We could see

the American planes in time to dive into a ditch. We had a

chance to hit American tanks with our 88's. But when our

positions were smothered, without warning, by an American

artillery concentrationthen, not even the birds or rabbits

could escape. Artillery caused most of our casualties, and the

shell fragment wounds were twice as deadly as bullet

wounds."

Artillerymen know further that nothing anywhere-in-the-

book ties our dual battle role (to support the Infantry by fire

and to give depth to combat) to rifled barrels. As clear as these

printed words is the fact that the artillery function will be

greater and broader, if war comes again. Take counterbattery

as an illustration. It will extend outward and, with one

Artillery arm a foregone conclusion, upward to hitherto

inconceivable ranges in neutralizing new pilotless weapons

not yet off the drafting boards.

Thus, to the first point of this editorial. Equally logical isthe Artilleryman's query, "What is going to happen to the

Artillery?" Delete the words about casualties in the quotation

from Call It Infantry, above, and substitute "Artillery" for

"Infantry." The result makes equal sense. In other words,

suppose we do put many branches together. What would we

call that part that does what now the Artillery does? That's

simple enough. Call It Artillery.

THE DEEPER QUESTION

But this JOURNAL is not content to drop the point here.

This JOURNAL has gone on record several times, and here

repeats, that it not only doubts the soundness of the one-big-happy-family idea but also feels deeply that the present

organizational structure does not adequately provide for the

integrated artillery guidance found necessary by experience

in two great wars. But even these are relatively unimportant.

This JOURNAL is prepared to push far deeper into the ground

soldier's concern than mere worry over the naming of the

respective functions o

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Aug 1946