Field Artillery Journal - Jan 1939

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Jan 1939

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January-February, 1939CONTENTS

PageForty Years Ago This Month........................................................................Frontispiece

Wounded KneeA Look at the Record................................................................... 5By Brig. Gen. E. D. Scott, USA-Ret.

Sound-Flash Survey ................................................................................................. 25By Captain Millard Pierson, FA

Ballade...................................................................................................................... 26By J. N. G.

Twelfth Field Artillery Loses Horses ....................................................................... 27

The German Artillery in Combat.............................................................................. 29A translation fromRevue d'ArtillerieBy Colonel R. McT. Pennell, FA

The 1938 Knox Trophy Battery ............................................................................... 41By Captain E. T. Williams, FA

Commencing a Modern War .................................................................................... 43By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA

Hollywood Fights a War .......................................................................................... 59By Lieutenant Harvey S. Ford, FA-Res

Dirty Field of Glory.................................................................................................. 62By Peter B. Kyne

The Convergence Problem ....................................................................................... 72By First Lieutenant James L. Frink, Jr., FA

Service Practice of the 387th Field Artillery ............................................................ 75By Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Means, FA-Res

The Underslung Truck Winch .................................................................................. 79By Major C. R. Taylor and 2d Lieutenant C. B. Dear, 160th FA

National Guard & Reserve Officers' Class (Fall, 1938) ........................................... 82By 1st Lieutenant M. H. Weisman, FA-Res

Here's How! from the Seventh Field Artillery.......................................................... 84By Captain H. C. Larter, Jr.

United States Field Artillery Association................................................................. 85

Reviews .................................................................................................................... 88The Ramparts We WatchLord Roberts

The Spaulding Lecture Series................................................................................... 93

Some Forward Observations .................................................................................... 94

Military Books.......................................................................................................... 96

AUTHORS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR ARTICLES


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29TH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

VOL. 29 NO. 1

JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1939

THE

FIELD ARTILLERY

JOURNALCopyright, 1939, by

The United States Field Artillery Association

A PUBLICATION FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE REGULARARMY, NATIONAL GUARD, AND ORGANIZED RESERVE

Patron Saint of Artillery

PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY FOR

THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

BY MONUMENTAL PRINTING COMPANY32D STREET AND ELM AVENUE

BALTIMORE, MD.

Editorial Office, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.Michael V. Gannon, Captain, Field Artillery, Editor

Entered as second-class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office atBaltimore, Md., under the Act of March 3, 1879

Published without expense to the government

The Field Artillery Journal pays for original articles accepted


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THE U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Please enroll me as a member of the Association and as a subscriber to TheField Artillery Journal. I inclose $3 for subscription and dues.

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ARTICLE II OF CONSTITUTION

"The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of theField Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journalfor

disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the fieldartillery's progress, development, and best use in campaign; to cultivate, withthe other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each;to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular andmilitia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute tothe good of our country."

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FORTYYEARSAGOTHISMONTH

ThisisagroupfromaplatoonofBatteryD.SixthFieldArtillery,commandedby1st

Lieut.E.D.Scott(nowBrigadierGeneralRetired),whosearticleonWo

undedKnee

appearsinthis

issue.Thephotoshowstheplatoon

atSanPedroMacateduringthePhilippineInsurrection.Onthegateatrighttheyhaveinscribed"CampScott,"unknown

totheircommander,whowasabsentonreconnaissance.Thephotoispublishedbythe

courtesyofamemberoftheAssociation,Mr.A.A.Hoffman,Arlington,Va.,whowas

asectionchiefinthe

batteryatthetime.


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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

VOLUME 29 JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1939 NUMBER 1

WOUNDED KNEEA Look at the Record

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL E. D. SCOTT, USA-RET.

During the spring and summer of 1938, newspaper headlines, introducing articles on theclaims of certain Indians against the United States Government, referred to the Battle ofWounded Knee as a "massacre" by United States troops.

The troops involved were the famous Seventh Cavalry, and the equally famous "Capron'sBattery." Light Battery E. First Artillery. Present at the action, commanding a platoon of the

latter, was a distinguished field artilleryman, now Colonel Harry LeRoy Hawthorne. USA-Ret., wearer, with seventeen others, of the Congressional Medal of Honor for conduct at theengagement, "above and beyond the call of duty, in action against the armed enemies of theUnited States." Furthermore, he bears to this day another distinction of that battlethe scarof a severe wound.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL joined with the Cavalry Journal in asking one of hislater battery-mates, Brigadier General E. D. Scott, to examine the official records of theengagement, and to write an article therefrom, summarizing the events leading up to theaction, and dwelling particularly upon such related matters, before and after, as may illustratethe intents and purposes of the participants. THUS

RIOR to the Civil War the territoryof the great Sioux nation extendedfrom the Platte to the Canadian

border, and from the Mississippi on theeast to the Rocky Mountains on the west.Settlers poured into the eastern part ofthis region; a bloody war broke out whichended in the Indians being driven to thewest of the Missouri.

The Union Pacific built along the

southern border of their lands; gold andsilver was found in what is now southernMontana, and the nearest route thereto layacross the Sioux country from the railroadsettlements in what is now Wyoming.The miners and settlers took that route,the Indians resented the encroachment,and the '50's and '60's were marked bymore than fifty hostile demonstrationsand much bloodshed.

In 1868 a new treaty was entered intowith the Sioux, replacing that of 1851which had fixed their limits as abovedescribed, and this moved their western

limit to the east of the Big HornMountains, thus clearing the routes toMontana. It also guaranteed to the Siouxthe country east of the Big Horns as ahunting country in perpetuity. But goldwas discovered in the Black Hills and1874 and 1875 saw another rush ofsettlers into the heart of the Siouxcountry that the Government seemedunable to prevent. In 1876 a great part of

the Sioux went on the warpath, thetrouble culminating in the slaughter ofmost of the 7th Cavalry in the Battle ofthe Little Big Horn, in Montana.Another treaty limited the Sioux to whatis now South Dakota west of theMissouri, and ceded to the Governmentthe major part of the Black Hills region,which was then formally opened tosettlers.

In 1887 another treaty threw open tosettlement the whole region betweenthe Big Cheyenne and White Rivers,and north of the Black Hills to the

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North Dakota line, reducing the Indiancountry by half. This was more generally

resented by the Indians than anything thathad gone before. It not only took awaytheir best lands, but split them in twogroups separated by sixty miles of whiteman's land. Moreover, it was neveradmitted that theIndians who

participated inmaking this treatyhad authority to doso from the tribes.

The Indians wereslow to vacate theirlands, the settlerscautious aboutmoving in to occupythem.

The wholesalereductions of theIndians' lands wereno doubt an injustice

to them andoccasioned manyhardships. But thereis another side to the

picture. The day ofthe buffalo wasover; deer, elk. andantelope were few.In other words,meat, the principaldiet of the Indians, could no longer behad by hunting. And with the game wentthe materials for clothing, bedding,tepees. These needs would have to be met

by farming and stock raising, and thelands still left were vastly more thannecessary for the purpose. TheGovernment had not been slow torecognize that the Indian must be trainedto be self-supporting under a new habitof life, and the later treaties had

provided for the sustenance of theIndians while they were becomingadjusted. The policy of aid was very

comprehensive; lands were allotted,brood cattle, horses, and sheep supplied,

farming machinery, seed grain, and thelike. Farmer instructors were scatteredabout freely. That the policy had in time ameasurable success is shown by the factthat in 1910 half the Indians in South

Dakota weretaxpayers.

But the transition

period was a hard

one. The agencies

were few and farbetween and the

Indian bands were

widely scattered. In a

quite eloquent

statement of

grievances a chief

said that ninety miles

was too far to go for

rations. One mustagree with him!

Issues of clothing and

bedding were quite

inadequate for the

climate. The Sioux

actually had a farmer

traditionvegetables

and corn but that

was in their old home of Minnesota andeastern Dakota, not on the 3,000-foot

tableland they now occupied.

Awards of the

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OFHONOR

for acts performed atWounded Knee Creek,

December 29, 1890

William G. Austin, sergeant, CavalryJohn E. Clancy, musician, ArtilleryMosheim Feaster, private, CavalryErnest A. Garlington, first lieutenant,

ArtilleryJohn C. Gresham, first lieutenant,

CavalryMatthew H. Hamilton, private, CavalryJoshua B. Hertzog, private, ArtilleryHarry L. Hawthorne, second lieutenant,

ArtilleryMarvin C. Hillock, private, Cavalry

George Hobday, private, CavalryGeorge Loyd, sergeant, CavalryAlbert W. McMillan, sergeant, CavalryThomas Sullivan, private, CavalryFrederick E. Toy, first sergeant,

CavalryJacob Trautman, first sergeant,

CavalryJames Ward, sergeant, CavalryPaul H. Weinert, corporal, ArtilleryHerman Ziegner, private, Cavalry

But their principal grievance was inconnection with rations. Beef wassupplied on the hoof; the Indians werewasteful; the days after issue were days offeasting followed by famine before thenext issue. Sometimes beeves were issuedto carry over for the winter; a 1,000-pound

beef in November became a 600-poundbeef by Februaryif he lived that long.The entrails of animals were always a

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WOUNDED KNEE

dainty to the Indian palate, but thethought of it was repugnant to some of

the authorities in Washingtona formalorder was issued forbidding their use asfood, and directing that they be destroyed

by fire. The agents and their Indian Policedid what they could to enforce what musthave seemed to their charges the mostwhimsical of requirements. There was

plenty of opportunity for graft amongagents, contractors, and traders, and nodoubt that it existed, the Indian being theloser. The Government sought to insure

justice to the Indians by having an Armyofficer present to witness issues, in eachcase to make written report. Some ofthem are remarkable indictments ofconditions; few are indorsements. Somestate (1890), that the issue witnessedamounted to about half that of the Armyration. The years 1889 and 1890 werevery dry and crops failed in consequence.But late in the fall of the latter year, the

Congress had failed to make the allotmentof funds for feeding the Indians thatshould have been available on July 1st.That meant months of semi-starvation,and the Indians could hardly be blamedfor eating ponies and farm stockor evenfor helping themselves to a few from thesettlers herds. That second summer ofdrought and suffering must have built upin Indian psychology a condition fertilefor troublejust such a condition asfound expression in the FrenchRevolution.

The missionaries had long been activeamong the Indians and doubtless the latterhad discussed at length the Messiah whocame to earth to bring peace and goodwillto all menfriend of the poor anddowntrodden. And then, out in theRockies, there arose a Medicine Man, oneof their own race, who proclaimed the

coming of an Indian Messiah who wouldsend the white man back whence hecame, and restore the buffalo to the range

and the Indians to their ancestral homesand customs. The news spread to the east

and the idea took hold on the Indianimagination. Dancing was a form ofworship common to all Indiansas to

primitive peoples the world overand anew dance was devised to honor the newMessiah. It was called by the whites,"The Ghost Dance." Its practice spread allover the Sioux country and caused graveapprehension to the authorities. All Indiandances are religious and for a purposeto bring rain, to cure an epidemic, to

insure good crops, to insure successfulwar, and so on. And every Indian has hismind on the object of the dancequiteobsessed by it, he may dance till he drops.But before that he may develop a spiritualexaltation that renders him dangerousshould anyone slip him the idea of a shortcut to the objective by sudden and violentaction against some person or persons.Herein lay the danger, and the authorities

sought to thwart it by forbidding thedance. Of course the order could not beenforced, except in the vicinity of theAgencies, where the Indian Police hadsome authority. It was ignored by the

bands scattered over an immenseterritory. Some Indian agents and Armyofficers thought and said that the crazewould soon wear itself out, but they werea minority.

On October 29, 1890, Mr. P. P. Palmer,

Indian Agent at the Cheyenne River

Agency, reported to the Indian Bureau on

the activities of two minor chiefs, Big Foot

and Hump, and again on November 10.

Both reports were to the effect that these

Indians were selling their cattle and

buying Winchesters and ammunition with

the proceeds, were doing much Ghost

dancing, and that his police were

powerless. Later the agent at Pine Ridge

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Agency, Mr. Royer, made a similar reportas to his Indians, saying they "are dancing

in the snow," and asked militaryassistance. About November 2 a petitionsigned by 102 Sioux Indians, setting forththeir grievances, was forwarded to the"Great White Father." And from then onthe wires to Washington were hot withalarming reports.

General Nelson A. Miles was then incommand of the Division of the Missouri,his headquarters at Chicago. The Divisioncomprised the Department of the Dakotas

(General Ruger) at St. Paul, and theDepartment of the Platte (GeneralBrooke) at Omaha. The latter comprisedthe Sioux country.

The Pine Ridge Indian Agency was,and is, about 20 miles north of Rushville,

Nebraska. It is a few miles north of thesouthern line of South Dakota. About 90miles east by northeast is the RosebudIndian Agency. Each is the administrative

seat of a large reservation of the samename, which were the principal scenes ofthe Indian troubles of 1890. Pine RidgeReservation has an average elevation of3,000 feet above sea level. Its maintopographical feature is an east-westridge from 3,000 to 3,500 feet elevationalong its center, from which several smallstreams flow north, northwest, and westinto the White River. The latter rises in

Nebraska, flows north about 40 mileswest of Pine Ridge Agency, and northeastand east to the Missouri. It is aconsiderable stream with occasional

practicable crossings. West of it are theBad Lands, thirty miles from east to west,more than a hundred from south to north.At their western base is the south fork ofthe Cheyenne, roughly paralleling theWhite. Beyond that, less rugged countryrises gradually into the Black Hills.

The Bad Lands were the nearest andabout the only refuge for disaffected orcriminal Indians, and the policy of the

Government was to keep all Indians eastof the White River, whose crossings

could be easily watched. Pursuit ofIndians in the Bad Lands was unlikely tobe successful. The country is exceedinglyrugged.

The reservation terrain is in generalrolling, with many sharp ridges; grassy,with scrub pine on the ridges and brush inthe ravines. The streams are generallysmall, with mud bottoms and soft banks,

passable only in places. Roads weremerely dirt trails, following the lines of

least resistance.When disaffection began in the fall of

1890 troops were disposed with a view toprotecting the agencies and preventingthe Indians leaving their reservations.Reenforcements were sent from otherDepartments; Nebraska and South Dakota

placed their militia where they could bestprotect their own settlements. Among thereenforcements were the 7th Cavalry (less

4 troops), and Light Battery E. 1stArtillery. These arrived by rail atRushville, and on the night of November25-26 marched to Pine Ridge Agency,where part of the 9th Cavalry and 2dInfantry had preceded them.

Early in December the battery receivedsix 1.65-inch Hotchkiss guns (2-

pounders) with packs, mules, etc., andunder the direction of Lt. Harry L.Hawthorne, quickly prepared itself forservice with the cavalry.

On December 14 an attempt to arrestSitting Bull near Standing Rock Agencyon the Missouri resulted in a fight inwhich he was killed with several of hisfollowers and an equal number of IndianPolice. One of his followers, the Big Footreferred to above, immediately movedaway from there, with his band, bag and

baggage. Hump's band joined him. He

was located about December 22, andsurrendered to General Sumner. But thatnight he quietly slipped away again.

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WOUNDED KNEE

It was believed that he was heading forthe Bad Lands. The 9th Cavalry and one

platoon Battery E, 1st Artillery (Lieut.John L. Hayden) was sent from PineRidge Agency to the mouth of theWounded Knee Creek to watch thecrossings of the White River, and MajorWhitside, 7th Cavalry, was sent withTroops A, B, I, and K, one platoon ofBattery E. 1st Artillery (Lieut. H. L.Hawthorne), and Troop A. Indian Scouts,to the crossing of Wounded Knee Creekabout fourteen miles northeast of Pine

Ridge Agency. He established camp withheavy tentage a few hundred yards southof the crossing, and sent Indian scouts tosearch the country to the north and east.

On December 28 this detachment wassitting about waiting for dinner when anIndian scout. Little Bat, came in with theinformation that Big Foot's band was onthe march west, on the Porcupine Creek,off to the northeast. The command

mounted and marched at once. A rapidmarch of about seven miles brought the

band into view. Its wagon and pack trainhalted at once, the warriors formed lineand moved towards the troops as thoughto attack. Their advance was at a walk,as half the Indians were on foot,alternating in the line with the mountedones.

Major Whitside dismounted andformed line on a low crest. Lt.Hawthorne wished to place his guns on aknoll nearby whence he could commandthe cavalry position, the approachingIndians, and their trains, but he wasoverruled; Major Whitside required himto place them in front of the center of hisline of cavalrymen.

When the Indians had come withinhailing distance. Major Whitside wentforward a little with another officer and

an interpreter. The Indian line halted andseveral approached the Major, one ofthem stating he was Big Foot's

representative. The Major refused to dealwith a representative, and insisted on Big

Foot appearing. It seems that warrior wassick and in a wagon. He was brought, andin answer to the Major's demand as towhether he meant war or surrender, hesaid the latter. Meantime a party ofmounted Indians started around the flankof the cavalry, and the Major demandedthat he recall them, which he did. Moretalk ensued as to the arrangements for themarch back, and Big Foot sent for histrains. While they were coming up some

of the Indians left their line and crowdedaround the gunssomething new in theirexperience, and with which they seemeddelighted. Perhaps those guns hadsomething to do with the friendly andreasonable spirit displayed. But theIndians were probably quite willing to becapturedthey were without food of anysort, and a fight with superior numbers ofsoldiers did not promise to secure any.

Indians on the reservations habituallywore ordinary civilian clothing; theseIndians were stripped to breech cloutsand leggins, were painted, and carriedWinchester rifles with plenty ofammunition. Major Whitside wouldhave liked to disarm them on the spot

but this might have brought on a fight.He did well to induce the Indians tomarch back with him to his camp onWounded Knee.

The march was uneventful. Indianscouts and part of the cavalry led, theIndians with their trains followed, therest of the cavalry and guns brought upthe rear. The Indians seemed in highgood humor, talked and laughed,smoked cigarettes. They were assignedan area near the cavalry camp,counted120 men, 230 women andchildrenrations were issued to them,

and they proceeded to settle down incamp. They had few of the conventionaltepees; most of their shelter

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was in the form of wickiups, a few lightstakes covered with brush or pieces of old

canvas. The area, as shown on the mapsmade at the time, was kidney-shaped,about 200 yards long and 100 wide. Itmust have been very crowded. Theyturned their ponies, about 150 in number,loose to the west, but they were held in aherd by a military guard during the night.The Indians said they did not haveenough shelter, and some Sibley tentswere given them, but when the camp wassearched the following morning there was

no indication that they had been used. Awall tent was set up at the end of the lineof Scouts' tents for Big Foot, who wasreally sick with pneumonia. The surgeon,John van R. Hoff, gave him professionalservices in the night and the followingmorning.

Major Whitside had sent word fromthe scene of the surrender to ColonelForsythe, commanding the 7th Cavalry,

at Pine Ridge Agency, and that officermarched with the remainder of hiscommand, Troops C, D, E, and G, andthe remainder of Light Battery E, 1stArtillery, to the camp. The approach wasmade after dark and in such manner asnot to advise or alarm the Indians.

Between nine and midnight the operationwas completed. Captain Capron had his

battery together on a small knoll only 200yards from the center of the camp area,and overlooking it.

Captain Myles Moylan, Troop A, wascharged with the guard of the Indians,Troop I being added to his command. Heestablished a line of sentinel posts, twentyin all, along the east, west, and southsides of the Indian camp area. The postson the south side were across the ravinethat limited the area in that direction.

There was constant patrolling of the lineduring the night, and in the early morningthe posts were reenforced by the men ofthe other reliefs. Security on the northside was provided by the camp and

picket-line guards.

There had been no snow that winter;

the weather had been still and cold, but

clear; the moon was at the full on

December 25. The sky may have been

overcast, but even then visibility would

have been good for some distance,

making the guard duty relatively easy.Wounded Knee Creek, at the scene

of the battle, is small, and at the timehad ice an inch thick. Its direction

GENERAL VIEW OF THE BATTLEFIELD

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WOUNDED KNEE

is northwesterly. The principal trail orroad from Pine Ridge Agency to

Rosebud comes in from the southwest,crossing it, and then takes a moreeasterly direction. Near the crossingstood the trader's store, post office, and afew other buildings, and about 300 yardsdownstream, the church. A road passingthe latter continues to the mouth of thestream. About 300 yards south of thecrossing "Fast Horse Road" comes intothe Agency road from the northwest.The Agency road divides a short

distance south of this junction, descendsby coulees into a ravine and out again,reuniting on the other side.

Between the Agency road and thestream the terrain is flat and not veryhigh above the level of the latter. Westof the road the terrain rises quickly intoridges and spurs from the ridge two tothree miles west that is the divide

between the Wounded Knee and the

White Clay creeks. The ravine abovereferred to heads about two miles westof the road, runs almost due east, hasnumerous lateral branches, especially onthe north side, and all contained much

brush and scrub trees. A characteristic ofthe prairie coulee or ravines is theirsudden beginning by a vertical drop ofone or several feet, directly from the

prairie. Such places were made-to-orderrifle pits, and were so used by theIndians.

The creek itself had a border of fair-sized trees and brush; and hills ingeneral carried a thinly scattered growthof scrub pine and cedar.

The ravine figured so prominently inthe events of December 29, in alltestimony relating thereto, and in alltales told, that it will be simply referredto in this narrative as "the ravine"no

chance of mistaken identity.The plan for the disarmament was to

assemble the bucks in the open space

scarcely a hundred yards squarebetween their camp and that of the

cavalry, and there induce them to giveup their arms peaceably. To convincethem of the futility of any resistance,Troops B and K were formed updismounted across the north side of thespace; Troop G was formed up mounted,east of the space and little more than ahundred yards from it; on the south thesentinel line was in position across theravine, with Troop A, Indian Scouts, inline, mounted, behind them, and Troops

C and D still further back, in line,mounted. West of the Indian camp thesentinel line was still in position, whileabout two hundred yards to thenorthwest, on a small knoll, the fourguns of Capron's battery were in

position, flanked by Troop E, mounted,on the right and one-third of Troops Aand I on the left, also mounted.

All of these troops were in full view

from the Indian camp, and within threehundred yards. What the Indians thoughtof it all will never be known; perhapsamong them were some bright enough tosee that if trouble started a breakthroughwas not wholly impossible, fear ofkilling comrades across the circle mightmake the fire of the soldiers desultoryand ineffective. Certainly the squawsworked hard and persistently up to thetime the firing began, to saddle the

ponies and load the pack ponies, travoisand wagonsthey expected to gosomewhere, and soon.

The men of the guard were in a veryprecarious position should any fightingbegin, and this was reflected in theirlosses: Troop A, five killed and fivewounded; Troop I, four killed and sixwounded.

Paralleling the south side of the

cavalry camp was a line of Sibleys, thecamp of Troop A. Indian Scouts. At thewest end of this was the wall

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tent, erected by the troops for the use ofBig Foot.

Just south of this tent ColonelForsyth. Major Whitside and one or twoothers gathered, with two interpreters.The Indians, all in sheets or blankets,came from their camp and formed anirregular quarter-circle before them,facing east and north. The bucks soassembled numbered 106. The missing14 were probably in camp, and wouldaccount for the firing there during andafter the melee. They could hardly have

escaped through the cordon of sentinelsduring the night. This was about eighto'clock on the morning of December 29,1890.

Colonel Forsyth talked to the Indiansat some length, through an interpreter,explaining to them that they mustsurrender their arms. They talked thisover among themselves but appeared toarrive at no decision. At last twenty

were told off to go into the camp andbring their arms. Some went part waybut circled back and mingled with thecrowd; most of them went to the camp,returning with two broken carbines, andsaid these were all the arms they had.They could not have been under theimpression that only Government armswere meant, for more carbines werefound in the camp when it was searched.

Colonel Forsythe and Major Whitsidetalked the situation over, decidednothing could be accomplished this way,and had Big Foot brought out of his tentto talk to his people. He was supported

by an Indian and the hospital steward.Big Foot talked with his bucks andfinally stated that they had no arms, thatthe latter had been destroyed on theCheyenne, where they had been somedays before. This was an astonishing

statement in view of the fact that thewhole band had marched into camp fullyarmed the evening before. The Chief

was very sick; his mind may have beenwandering; his bucks were obdurate and

perhaps thinking of his leadership asbeing about at an end anywayanyanswer was good enough.

Bucks were constantly passingbetween the council and the camp andseemed to be exciting the squaws, whichmay have had some connection withtheir efforts to get the pony herd readyfor the road. It was decided to stop thiscirculation and to search the camp.Troop B deployed from its right on a

line facing east and about half-waybetween the Indians and their camp;Troop K passed to the east of thegathering and deployed on the south insimilar position, facing north. The menwere at intervals of two yards, and therewas a gap of about twenty yards

between the troops. Curiously. SurgeonJohn van R. Hoff gave the only detaileddescription of this movement, and he

noted that in Troop K there was an"involuntary" closing in to the left, butthe men on the right maintained thefrontage with wider intervals.

Captain Wallace (K) took six or eightmen and began at the southeast end tosearch the camp; Captain Varnum (B)took a similar party and began to searchfrom the north end. The squaws did allthey could to hide weaponsin theirclothing, under them as they sat on theground; one was too sick to move, but anew Winchester was taken from underher. One of the parties took onlyfirearms, the other took bows andarrows, knives, hatchets as well. CaptainWallace picked up a stone warclub andcarried it during the search. It was foundnear his body after the fight and was thefoundation for the story that he was killed

by it. He was killed by a bullet through

the stomach. Part of the arms were carriedto the battery position by men sent byCaptain Moylan from the "One-third

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WOUNDED KNEE

A & I" shown on the map, part werecarried to a wagon near the cavalry

camp, placed there for the purpose byLt. Guy Preston. He had received 29,mostly oldsome of them carbines fromthe Custer fightwhen the firing brokeout.

All this must have taken up a lot oftime; it is curious that no question oftime was asked by the Board in itsinvestigation, and no mention made bywitnesses except as to the eight o'clockformation, and as to the attack on Troops

C and D two miles west of thebattlefield, at eleven o'clock. ColonelForsythe in his formal report writtenDecember 31, states that the fighting

began at 9:15. "twenty minutes hotfight," and forty minutes "skirmishing."This refers to the fighting about thecamp only.

It was now decided to search thebucks, many of whom had by this time

settled down on the ground. MajorWhitside and Captain Varnum began

passing them between them, one at atime. Search of the first three or fouryielded one Winchester and manycartridges. The Major directed that thelatter be collected; someone handedCaptain Varnum an old hat; he and hisfirst sergeant held it while it was filled;the Captain turned his head away andcalled to one of his men to bring a grainsack. Then, as he stated. " * * they allseemed to rise with a purpose of passingthrough to be searched, when I saw fiveor six bucks throw off their blankets and

bring up their rifles. I turned to MajorWhitside saying, "By God, they have

broken," and the Indians faced my troopand began firing." Major Whitsidestates. "One shot was fired by an Indian,instantly followed by a volley from the

others, who had jumped to their feet andthrown off their blankets." On thehillside across the ravine to the south.

Lt. Charles W. Taylor, commanding theIndian Scouts, was watching the scene

from a distance of about 200 yards. "Abuck threw off his blanket and fired arifle, apparently at the group whereGeneral Forsyth was standing. Othershots were fired and the Indians threwoff their blankets. Then there was a lullfor a second or two, and the soldiers

began firing."Surgeon John van R. Hoff was near

Big Foot. "At this moment a shot wasfired while I was walking toward

General Forsythe, with my back towardthe Indians. I turned instantly and sawthese Indians breaking from their centerapparently in the direction of the gap

between B and K Troops, firingcontinuous volleys as they advanced."

Lt. James D. Mann, Troop K, assistedCaptain Wallace in the search of thecamp. The next day he was mortallywounded in a brush with Indians, and on

his death bed dictated to his brother hisstory of the fight. Surely full credenceshould be given it. The following is anextract:

"In front of me were four bucksthree armed with rifles and one with

bow and arrows. I drew my revolver andstepped through the line to my placewith my detachment. The Indians raisedtheir weapons over their heads as if invotive offering, then brought them downto bear on us, the one with the bow andarrow aiming directly at me. Theyseemed to wait an instant. The MedicineMan threw a handful of dust into the air,

put on his war bonnet, and then I heard agun fired near him. This seemed to bethe signal they were waiting for, and thefire immediately began. I ordered mymen to fire and the reports were almostsimultaneous."

Lt. Mann was on the opposite side ofthe Indian mass from the group aboutColonel Forsythe, and when the

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first shot was fired the Indians werealreadyin part at leastfaced toward

the troops between them and the camp.The Medicine Man had beenharanguing the Indians for some time anddancing. The interpreters said he wasstirring them up, telling them they were

proof against the bullets of the white men,that their own bullets would go true to themark. One close-by witness describes thetenseness that grew up, * * "the duskyfaces of the interpreters were ashy gray."There can be no doubt whatever that the

firing was begun by the Indians, nor canthere be any doubt that it was whollyunexpected by the troops.

One of the party with ColonelForsythe was Father Francis M. J. Craft,a Catholic missionary priest, who had

been ten years with the Indians of theNorthwest. He happened to be at PineRidge Agency on a tour of visits toCatholic missions and schools, knew Big

Foot and his band well, and went over toWounded Knee in the hope of beinghelpful. "Malicious whites on and nearall Agencies, during the presentexcitement, have by misrepresenting theintentions of the Army, caused such astate of alarm and suspicion among theIndians as to make it possible for theleast excitement or misunderstanding to

precipitate serious trouble."His description of events is pretty

much like that of others, and he reasonedwith some of the Indians himself, notingamong them some of the worstcharacters in the Sioux reservation.When some Indians raised their rifles hespoke to them, but "no one seemed tolisten"; one, said to be a son of Big Foot,fired, and others followed his example.

Father Craft was severely woundedalmost immediatelystabbed in the

back by an Indian.One of the interpreters, P. F. Wells, a

half-breed, was also attacked by an

Indian with a knife. He knocked theIndian over with his rifle and then shot

him, but not before he had lost the endof his nose by the knife.The other interpreter, Ward, was also

attacked by an Indian with a knife, andwas unable to use his gun. Theygrappled and went down, the Indian ontop. A soldier killed the Indian with hisrevolver.

Wounded Indians who continuedfiring were, of course, despatched; thosewho ceased firing were cared for. One

such asked an interpreter just after themelee ended, the identity of a body lyingnear. Being told it was that of theMedicine Man he spoke as though to thecorpse"If I could be taken to you Iwould stab you." Then to the interpreter,"He is our murderer; only for himinciting our other young men we wouldall have been alive and happy." Hisstatement was taken later in the hospital

and embodied in the proceedings of theBoard.

An old squaw said, "The treacherousones are of Big Foot's band; we ofHump's band honestly wanted peace."

Apparently the Indians made themistake of trying to shoot it out with thesoldiersthey could have dashedthrough that thin line and reached theircamp before the soldiers could havegotten in a second shot. It was less thanfifty yards. Had there been no firing andthe Indians simply made a dash for theircamp and the shelter of the ravine

beyond, probably not a soldier wouldhave fired a shotthere would have beenno time for orders and they had none. Inthe space of a minute the Indians couldhave been in some sort of cover, ready tofight. Perhaps they were too sure of theirrepeating rifles; perhaps they were firmly

imbued with what their medicine manhad been telling them for an hour ormorethat the white soldiers' bullets

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SCALE: One inch equals 137.5 yards, approximately

NOTES: The line of tents closest to the "Council" was that of the Indian Scouts.Between it and the Cavalry Camp proper was the initial position of Troops B and K,respectively from left to right, and in line abreast. The line of dots indicating "2/3 Aand I Troops Dismounted" actually did not extend as far to the west as shown, duringthe engagement, although it may have done so when posted the night before. Lt.Garlington's report shows this line was close to the west side of the camp. His troopersmade an effort to prevent the Indian women from preparing for the road by throwingoff the saddles and packs they had made up.

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could not harm them. Whatever it wasthey paid dearly; their heaviest losses

were right there.This first phase of the fight was uniquefor modern times; soldiers and Indiansstood on their feet and shot it out face toface. The soldiers had the advantage of

position, being at intervals of two or moreyards on a quarter-circle. The Indianswere within that curve and closelycrowded. The soldiers had thedisadvantage of the single-shot carbine,the Indians the advantage of the seven-

shot repeating rifle. But the latteradvantage ends with the emptying of themagazine; it is difficult to use the rifle asa single-loader and a soldier handy withthe carbine could get in several shots inthe time necessary to fill the magazine.

There is much uncertainty as to howlong this first phase lasted, estimatesvarying from "a few minutes" to "eight orten minutes." It would seem that the

repeating rifle furnishes a fair yard-stick.The Indians were in a crowd and couldnot all fire at once; they expected their

bullets to kill the soldiers, but most ofthem stayed on their feet and continuedfiring; they believed themselves immuneto the soldiers' bullets, but foundthemselves being killed fast; attempts toreload their new Winchesters must have

been fumbling at best; one mayreasonably conclude that fighting wasover for the Indians when they hademptied their magazines, perhaps in twoor three minutes. Bewildered,disillusioned, the remaining Indiansmore than halfrushed through the lineof soldiers toward the only refuge insight, the brushy ravine beyond their owncamp. Some few wounded continued tofire from the ground until killed; one keptup a hot fire from a tepee, a soldier ran

across to it with the remark that he wouldbring him out, slashed an opening in thetepee with a knife, and was promptly shot

and killed. The battery then disposed ofthe Indian by two or three shells fired into

the tepee. A number of Indians fired fromconcealment elsewhere in camp but weresoon killed.

Things happened fast when this meleebegan. On the north, Lt. Nicholson, astaff officer, "made a break and wentaround in rear of E Troop, and watchedthe fight from the battery." ColonelForsythe also made his way to the

battery. On the east, Troop G broke inthe center; the right platoon led by Lt. T.

Q. Donaldson went to the rear and"around the wire fence," dismounted,and returned to the field to fight on foot.The rest of the troop went to the left rearinto the ravine and also dismounted tofight on foot. This troop was the onlyone in the line of fire of Troops B andK during the melee, and it did not havea single casualty. On the south, flying

bullets caused the sentinel line to run

forward down the slopes of the ravine,the nearest shelter. The Indian Scoutsscattered, part following the sentinelline into the ravine, part going furtherto the right where Troop G was

preparing to fight on foot, part going tothe rear and left seeking shelter in thesmall ravines. When bullets reached theline of Troops C and D they began arearward movement which wasaccelerated when a 1.65-inch shell fellclose. Captain Godfrey said. "I orderedthe troop to rally behind a hill to ourleft rear." Troop C conformed and thetwo formed a dismounted line on thecrest of the hill. Squaws and childrenrushed out of camp to the west,southwest and south, seeking shelter inthe ravines Quite a number of squaws,and some bucks, managed to start the

pony herd off to the northwest along

the Fast Horse Road. They passedTroop E in a cloud of dust, into whichthat troop, now dismounted, fired in an

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WOUNDED KNEE

effort to stop them. Some Indians firedback, one of them a squawand Lt.

Sedgwick Rice prevented his men fromshooting her. The battery fired a fewshots ahead of the herd and it came to ahalt less than a mile from where itstarted.

Some of the Indians who fled to theravines hid at once, but many kept on upthe big ravine and many crossed it andcontinued their flight up the slopes to thesouth through the sentinel line. Some ofthese groups were fired on by the battery

and by Troops C and Dbucks beinghardly distinguishable, and there weresome of the latter.

Captain H. J. Nowlan, Troop I, hadcommand of what was left of the sentinelline on the south side of the ravine, and histestimony gives a clear picture: "Indiansrushed down in the ravine, up and down it;not a shot was fired at them but they wereallowed to escape. But right behind them

came the bucks and the cry went up fromofficers and men. 'Here come the bucks, letthem have it,' and our fire was returned bythe bucks." Which goes far to establishwhat is said above about the Indians tryingto shoot it out and then making their dashfor shelter; the women and children hadgot clear of the camp before they did. Andcertainly most of these found dead orwounded in camp must have been thevictims of Indian bullets, since the Indianfire directed against the men of Troops Band Kwhich was practically all of itnecessarily passed through the Indiancamp, directly behind the soldiers.

Major Whitside had gone to thesouth side of the ravine, to the second

position of Troops C and D. There hedirected Captain Jackson (C) to take histroop up the hills "and round upanything I found there," and bring in

the Indians' pony herd, which hepointed out, then "a couple of miles tothe northwest." Jackson started due

west "up the bluffs" with his troop andhad to go two miles to reach the head

of the ravine. There he found someIndians well protected in the sharpbreaks of the ravine's edge. Hedismounted and attacked on foot. Thefire fight lasted some time and onesoldier was killed. Lt. Taylor came upwith two of his Indian Scouts, and thesecrept near enough to open conversationwith the Sioux. "It took a half hour'stalk and I had to withdraw my men

before they would come out." There

were eight bucks, of whom five werewounded, and seventeen women andchildren, about half of them wounded.Jackson at once sent a request toColonel Forsyth for an ambulance and awagon for the wounded. Meantime firstaid was given to all.

Before the arrival of Major Whitsideon the position, Captain Godfrey hadsent Lt. S. R. H. Tompkins with 12 men

toward his left front to prevent Indiansmaking their way up the ravine into thehills. Before he got in position the partyJackson found at the head of the ravinemust have gotten by, and also a larger

party that took up a position in one ofthe lateral ravines and had to bedislodged by artillery fire. But therewere still armed Indians coming up andLt. Tompkins' party had someskirmishing which resulted in three

bucks being killed.Major Whitside directed Captain

Godfrey to pursue, with the remainderof his troop, some Indians seen goingup the hills to their rear. He did so butsaw only one Indian, far off. Hecontinued on to the Dividea coupleof miles from his starting pointanddown the opposite slopes for somedistance. It was on this scout that an

incident occurred that was the cause ofa special investigation. Godfrey startedon foot with two or three men to search

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THE INDIAN SCOUTS

a brushy ravine head, and suddenlyglimpsed blankets quite close, andopened fire. No reply coming, they wentin and found a squaw, a boy, and twosmall children, dead. Captain Godfreyand his men were exonerated of thecharge of wanton killing.

Returning toward camp he sawCaptain Jackson's troop off to the northand joined him. Jackson was waiting forthe transportation for his wounded

prisoners. Jackson was the senior, and hesuggested that Godfrey return to camp,scouting the big ravine as he went.Godfrey detailed a few men to follow the

bottom of the ravine, he, with the others,to follow them on the high ground. Theywere just starting off when four or fivemounted Indians approached from thedirection of the Agency (west), andwaited to see what this might portend.

These Indians were armed and one worethe badge of the Indian Police. They rodeup with words of friendly greeting andshook hands with the two officers. One

gave Captain Godfrey's hand such a pullas nearly unhorsed him. He asked thepoliceman what the man meant by it,and received the peculiar reply, "I don'tknow; he is my father." Then they rodeoff in the direction from which theycame, turned at about a hundred yardsand firedexcept the policeman, whowas waving his arms and appeared to betrying to stop them. These Indians thengalloped off and disappeared but

presently some fifty or sixty came insight from that direction, deployed inline and at the gallop. Others appearedapproaching on either flank. The Indians

began firing; one of the soldiers waswounded; Captain Jackson mountedquickly, abandoned his prisoners, andretired to a better defensive positionabout a quarter of a mile to the rear andnorth of the ravine, where he again

dismounted to fight on foot. He had thirty-four men, Godfrey fourteenallowingfor the minimum of horse-holders, aboutforty soldiers awaited the attack of

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WOUNDED KNEE

mounted Indians whose numbers hadnow increased to about one hundred and

fifty. But the attack was not made;Troops E and G were in sight, "comingup on the jump" and most of Troop A.Indian Scouts, and the hostile lines facedto the rear and galloped off.

It was learned later that these wereBrule Sioux from Pine Ridge Agency.Of course all Indians thereabout musthave known of Big Foot's surrender, and

been greatly stirred up about it. Thenews of the fighting might have reached

them, but that seems scarcely probablein the time available. It was thought, andwith good reason, that no particular bandwas involved; that this was a gatheringof hotheads who started off with someidea of a relief expedition. There is a

possibility that some contact was madewith Big Foot's band during the nightand that the latter expected some suchrelief party, which might explain the

long delay about the surrender of armsand the frantic efforts of the squaws toget the train packed and ready to move.

Immediately after the melee Edgerly(G) and Taylor (Indian Scouts) hadassembled their commands and

proceeded to the vicinity of the battery.There Colonel Forsyth directed Edgerlyto proceed with these two troops andTroop E to the west, to round up theIndian herd and look for hostile Indians.He quickly did the former, left somesoldiers and scouts in charge and wenton, arriving in time to save Jackson andGodfrey from their precarious situation,as described above.

One batch of Indians had establishedthemselves in the head of a small ravine,about half a mile up the big ravine, and alively fight went on for some time.Finally Colonel Forsyth sent one gun

under Harry L. Hawthorne to dislodgethem. He went into action at 500 yardsand the Indians were soon finished off.

Hawthorne was severely wounded earlyin this action.

Besides the small engagements abovedescribed there were many smallerexchanges of shots on or in the vicinityof the battlefield. It must be rememberedthat smokeless powder had not beenheard of at that time. When an Indianfired from concealment a large puff ofsmoke betrayed his position, and

brought shots from all who saw it.Should the soldiers have waited andtried to learn if any women and children

were in the vicinity of that smoke? Theidea is absurd. There was an armed buckat that smoke, trying to kill one of themand he might succeed if there was anydelay in despatching him.

During this mopping-up officers gaverepeated warnings to their men againstshooting women and children, and it ishighly improbable that a single one wasintentionally shot. There was one case of

intentional shooting of a wounded buckby a very young soldier. His troopcommander gave him a savage rating onthe spot. The boy burst into tears andsaid he understood a wounded Indianwas as dangerous as any.

From the testimony of severalwitnesses it is possible to give a fair

picture of what happened at the campafter the melee. The mass of the Indiansrushed through Troop K, through theIndian camp, to the ravine, but some hidin the camp and continued firing fromconcealment there. Troop K fell back onthe cavalry camp, thus clearing the wayfor the artillery to end the activities ofan Indian in a tepee, as related above.The men of Troop K were now, ofcourse, facing south and southwest andtheir fire against these Indians was forthe first time in the direction of other

troopsthe sentinel line from A andIthe Indian Scouts, and Troops C andD. Lt. Garlington was in charge of

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the sentinel line on the west and with themen near him, dropped into a sunken

road. He was wounded by an Indianfiring from the ravine after the rushthrough, and the hospital steward waskilled near him. The action by thesentinel line on the south is describedelsewhere. Just when or how the heavylosses by the sentinel line occurredcannot be determined, but when theIndians opened fire those men werestanding in groups of three, along the areof a circle over which the fire swept, and

from 100 to 150 yards from the rifles. Itis much more likely that their losseswere greater then than during thesubsequent intermittent firing.

Troop B suffered heavily in themelee, but the rush of the Indiansthrough Troop K freed them of pressure,and Captain Varnum led them to their

picket line, mounted up, and reported toColonel Forsythe, who directed him to

"cover the hospital," and some hourslater, to clear up a portion of the ravine.

He found many dead and woundedIndians and brought out nineteenunwounded women and children.

The losses suffered by these twotroopsnearly one half the totalandthose inflicted by them on the Indians,were almost wholly during the progressof the melee.

Two-thirds of Troops A and I, ingroups of three or four, formed thesentinel line behind the Indian camp,wholly in the field of fire of the Indiansduring the melee. Their casualties nearlyequalled those of B and K.

After the melee, in the mopping up ofthe camp, the fire of these lines into itendangered both, but it was not heavyand was soon ended. None of the othertroops fired into the camp area.

Captain Capron "opened fire with allfour guns as soon as the field wassufficiently cleared as to allow us to

shoot without injury to our own men."His first target"for my own two

guns"was at a "bunch of Indians firingon our troops," about 300 or 400 yardsaway. He fired at groups here and thereover the field, but could not distinguishsquaws from bucks. After the fight hesaw a group of two bucks and onesquaw, that had been killed by artilleryfire, "2,000 or 2,500 yards from the

battery."The fire from scattered Indians

finally ceased, with one notable

exception; a lone buck in the head of acoulee kept up the fight until the troopshad marched for Pine Ridge Agency!Colonel Forsythe stated this in hisformal report of December 31; fire hadfailed to get or dislodge the buck andthe Colonel considered him not worththe casualties that might follow anattempt to rush him.

Charges of inhumanity by the troops

were refuted by every witness. SurgeonJohn Van R. Hoff was emphatic. "I sawnone. All the field which was the centerof active operations came under myobservation * * * a considerable numberof wounded bucks and squaws broughtin had had their wounds dressed bycompany bearers." As to whether anysoldiers were victims of the fire of thetroops, "I have not the slightest reason toknow or think so; it was possible, but Ihave no reason to believe it." And in hiscapacity of surgeon of the command hemust have known the nature of all thegunshot wounds.

The fighting at an end, the troopsgathered up the wounded Indians andtheir own dead and wounded, andmarched to Pine Ridge Agency. Theyhad one officer and twenty-six men andan Indian Scout dead; four officers and

thirty enlisted men wounded. Sixty-twowomen and children and eighty-three

bucks were buried in a common

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WOUNDED KNEE

grave a few days later. Some of thewounded died later.

Some writers have chosen toanimadvert on this abandonment of theIndian dead. But the troops hadsuffered a heavy loss, collecting thewounded and getting them ready for themarch required some time; the marchwould require four hours, it wasnecessary that the command return tothe Agency as soon as possible, notonly to get proper medical attention forthe wounded but to escape possible

attack by the thousands of Indianswithin a few hours' march. There wasonly a short winter afternoonavailablethey made the best possibleuse of it. And actually, severalthousand Indians decamped that nightand were only returned to thereservation after several skirmishes.

On the following day. December 30,six of these troops of the 7th Cavalry

were ordered out and before evening hadscored another victory in a skirmish atWhite Clay Creek. Each had one or morecasualties, the total being one killed andseven wounded, Lt. James D. Mann beingamong the latter.

There is nothing to conceal orapologize for in the Wounded Knee

battlebeyond the killing of a woundedbuck by an hysterical recruit. The firingwas begun by the Indians and continueduntil they stopped itwith the oneexception noted above. That women andchildren were casualties was unfortunate

but unavoidable, and most must havebeen from Indian bullets.

Looking back from this distance intime, it seems curious that so littleapprehension of danger was felt by thetroops. Most of Whitside's officers spentthe evening of December 28 in a Sibley

tent, listening to Lt. Garlington's narrativeof the Arctic Relief Expedition of whichhe had been a member. Had there been

any thought of danger, each would havebeen with his men.

Assistant Surgeon Charles B. Ewing,from Pine Ridge Agency, was with thegroup near Colonel Forsythe, and had gotin his wagon to return when the first shotwas fired.

The hospital steward and theregimental sergeant major, certain to bemen of intelligence and common sense,had wandered into the camp during thesearch and were both killed.

The troops were at a strength of about

50 men. For the formation the cooks and afew others would normally have been leftin camp, but it would seem that some, atleast, of the troop commanders did notconsider it necessary to turn out allavailable men. Captain Jackson had 34 andCaptain Godfrey 14 men in their fight withthe Brul; each troop had had one casualtyand Godfrey had detached Lt. Tompkinswith 12 men. So the actual numbers of

men present in ranks were 35 and 27.Definite figures cannot be had, butapparently A and I, the two guard troops,were the only ones in near full strength.

Father Craft, with ten years'experience among these Indians and wellacquainted with this particular band, didnot believe a break would come until itactually did.

The formation was one well designedto impress the Indians, but not at allsuited for fighting themwould an oldand experienced soldier like ColonelForsythe have ordered it, had he evendreamed of armed resistance?

Not since the Battle of the Little BigHorn in 1876 had anything comparablehappened. Then, most of the 7th Cavalrywas killed, including its Colonel; atWounded Knee most of a band of Indianswas killed including its Chiefand by

the 7th Cavalry.No newspaper men witnessed the

fight but they soon began arriving,

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WOUNDED KNEE

to camp at Wounded Knee."Again he gets mixed up, as witness,

"In the meantime General Forsythe andMajor White (sic), with all of thebattalions of the 7th Cavalry, surroundedBig Foot's camp, * * * the old chiefwillingly surrendered. He was not seekinga battle; he was only trying to find someforgotten corner of the earth where his

band might worship unmolested."Big Foot surrendered to Major

Whitside nine miles northeast ofWounded Knee and was taken there by

him."The troops got drunk at Christmas,"

and were still in that condition December29.

That would have required a lot ofwhiskey, and it was many miles to anysource of supply! And it hardly seemsconsistent with the "full pursuit" throughthe Bad Lands that terminated with the"surrounding" of Big Foot's camp on

December 28."On the morning of the 29th a dozen

drunken soldiers dragged Big Foot fromhis tent and killed him." This is perhapsthe most atrocious of the many lies in thenarrative. The proof is absolute as to theevents preceding the fighting, anddescribed herein.

He gives a thrilling picture of the fight,the troops firing indiscriminately atIndians of any age or sex, "Gatling guns

poured in their fire," etc.There were no Gatling guns with the

troops. General Miles had declined theoffer of some in a telegram to the WarDepartment on November 23, in which hestated Gatlings were useless in fightingIndians.

"Two officers were wounded, twenty-five privates were killed and thirty-threewounded."

Actually, one officer and twenty-sixenlisted men and one Indian Scout werekilled, four officers and thirty enlistedmen wounded.

But inaccuracy is nothing to Mr.Gessner. After giving the officer

casualties as two wounded, he laterdescribes Captain Wallace as being dead"with a tomahawk sprouting from hisforehead." He also assigns him to the 9thCavalryno mistake in the figure; hespells it out, "Ninth."

Actually, Wallace was shot twice andhad a bruise on the head which mighthave been inflicted by a stone warclubthat lay near.

"Only one soldier was killed at the

hands of an Indian."But why continue? Not a statement of

Gessner's that cannot be refuted by sworntestimony given forty years before"Massacre" was written. The pity is thatsuch a foul libel on the Army of ourcountry should be permitted incirculation.

Seven years after the appearance of"Massacre," Wounded Knee again made

the front pages. Two Indians, allegedsurvivors of that battle, appeared before aCommittee of the Congress and under theguidance of a Washington lawyer, toldtheir stories. This was in support of a billto reimburse the survivors and thedescendants of Indians in that fight, in thesum of $1,000.00 each, the estimatedtotal being $280,000.00.

The Indians at Wounded Knee broughton their own destruction as surely as any

people ever did. Their attack on the troopswas as treacherous as any in the history ofIndian warfare, and that they were under astrange religious hallucination is only anexplanation, not an excuse. They do notcome into court with clean hands, thoughthey may believe their recollections ofwhat happened forty-seven years ago areaccurate.

An officer and twenty-six enlisted

men and one Indian Scout died on thefield doing their duty. Three moreenlisted men died next day. Fourofficers and thirty enlisted men were

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wounded on the field. Has anyonethought of compensation for twenty-nine

bereaved white families and an Ogallalaone? Or for the families of the woundedsoldiers? Or for those killed and woundednext day on White Clay Creek, the directaftermath of Wounded Knee? Or for thedescendants of all these and the fourhundred-odd soldiers and the hundredloyal Indians who risked their lives onthat field?

Not that anyone has heard!The "Survivors of Wounded Knee" are

not entitled to one penny as"compensation." But an audit of theaccount "United States vs the Sioux

Nation" would show a balance due thelatter that would make the"compensation" claimed look like somuch chickenfeed.

REFERENCES, BATTLE OF WOUNDEDKNEE

1. Major S. M. Whitside, 7th Cav.Testimony before Board. Jan. 7,1891.

2. Capt. Miles Moylan. Tr. A. 7th Cav.Testimony before Board.

3. Capt. Chas. A. Varnum. Tr. B. 7thCav. Testimony before Board.

4. Letter to Chief Historical Section,GS. April 11, 1931.

5. Lt. W. J. Nicholson, Tr. I. 7th Cav.Testimony before Board.

6. Asst. Surg. John Van R. Hoff. Med.Dept. Testimony before Board.

7. Capt. Edwin S. Godfrey, Tr. D. 7thCav. Testimony before Board.

8. Colonel Edwin S. Godfrey,correspondence.

9. Same letter to Historical Section GS.1931.

10. Lt. Sedgwick Rice. Tr. E, 7th Cav.Testimony before Board.11. Lt. Chas. W. Taylor, Tr. A, Indian

Scouts. Testimony before Board.12. Capt. W. S. Edgerly, Tr. G, 7th Cav.

Testimony before Board.13. Capt. Henry Jackson, Tr. C, 7th Cav.

Testimony before Board.14. Lt. T. Q. Donaldson, Tr. G, 7th Cav.

Testimony before Board.15. Lt. S. R. H. Tompkins, Tr. D, 7th

Cav. Testimony before Board.16. Capt. Allyn Capron, Battery E, 1st

Artillery. Testimony before Board.17. Captain H. J. Nowlan, Tr. I, 7th Cav.

Testimony before Board.18. 18. Gen. Garlington (Tr. I, 7th Cav.),

Letter His, Sec. GS, April, 1931.19. Gen. Guy H. Preston (Lt. Tr. A, Indian

Scouts), Testimony before Board.20. Robert Gessner, "Massacre," pub.

1931.21. General Order 2, Hq. Div. of the

Missouri, in the Field, Pine RidgeAgency, SD, Jan. 18, 1891.

22. Father Francis J. Craft. Testimonybefore Board.

23. P. F. Wells, Indian Interpreter,Testimony before Board.

24. "Frog," wounded Indian. Testimonybefore Board.

25. Lt. James D. Mann, 7th Cav.Narrative, as quoted in CavalryJournal, May-June, 1934.

25. U. S. Weather Bureau for MoonPhase at time of battle.

26. Lt. Henry L. Hawthorne, report andcorrespondence.

The Order of Saint Barbara, restricted to National Guard officers who are also

graduates of the NG-Res course of The Field Artillery School, was formed December 3,

1938, when 15 of the 18 eligibles of the 119th Field Artillery (Michigan) met at the

Charlotte Armory, adopted a Constitution, and elected the following officers;

Commander, Lt. C. P. Ismon; Adjutant and Treasurer, Captain Ross E. Hammond;

Steward, Captain W. H. Briggs.

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Sound-Flash SurveyBY CAPTAIN MILLARD PIERSON, FA

HE observation post was theforward dugout at Fort Riley

built about two years ago.The battery was being adjusted on a

base point to the left front, usingcompass data. While this problem was

being fired. I was given a target to theright front, depth 50 yards, front 10yards. I was directed to obtain my data

by plot (measuring the distance fromthe dugout to the base point by the rateof travel of sound), and a shift from

base point. Using a stopwatch, I timedthe travel of sound from the moment Isaw the burst until its detonationreached my ears. I took the averagetime of the six rounds fired for effect,and, multiplying 1083 (estimated rateof travel of sound per second for the

estimated temperature) by the averagetime, I obtained the distance from thedugout to the base point. I thenmeasured the compass from the dugoutto the base point and also the anglefrom the base point to my target.

After the battery had been adjustedon the base point I obtained theadjusted compass and the adjustedelevation. I drew a line on a piece oftracing paper and laid off on this linethe range corresponding to the adjustedelevation on a scale of 1:20,000, andassumed this line to be laid offaccording to the adjusted compass ofthe battery.

The difference between the adjustedcompass of the battery and the compassof the base point from the dugout gaveme T for the base point. I laid off theangle T for the base point and drew aline to the dugout, measuring on this

line (Scale: 1:20,000) the distancedugoutbase point obtained as above.

From the plotted position of thedugout I laid off the angle to my targetand estimating the distance dugouttarget I laid that distance off on thisline to the same scale, which gave methe plotted position of the target.

By drawing the line Gun-Target, I

obtained my shift from base point andmy range.

Surprising to say, the first-rounderror was less than one-s deflectionshift, and less than 50 yards in range.

(9-mil error in deflection; site error5 mils; T= 430.)

Just another fanatical way ofobtaining initial data.

Summary1. A line was drawn on the

tracing paper to represent the GunBase Point line and the adjustedrange corresponding to the adjustedelevation was laid off on 1:20,000scale.

2. DugoutBase point compasswas measured. The difference

between this line and the adjustedcompass on the base point gave angleT. The line DugoutBase point wasthen drawn.

3. The range, DugoutBasepoint, was obtained by sound asindicated above.

4. The angle, Base pointtarget,from the dugout, was measured and thedistance, Dugouttarget, estimated

and laid off on this line.5. The line G.T was drawn on, andthe shift and the range measured.

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Twelfth Field Artillery Loses Horses

Photo by Ekmark

PAT. AGED 31, THE REGIMENTAL VETERAN, STANDS BETWEEN THE COMMANDINGOFFICER, COL. B. M. BAILEY, RIGHT, AND MASTER SERGEANT H. W. ROBERSON, LEFT.

The occasion of the motorization ofthe Twelfth Field Artillery at Fort SamHouston, Texas, in December, was oneattended by mingled feelings: Interest and

anticipation in employment of the trucksand rubber-tired gunssorrow at thedeparture of so many old equine friends,that had, through many years, kept thecaissons rolling in that historic regiment.

The occasion was marked by solemnfarewell ceremonies to the horses. The18th Field Artillery, from Fort Sill, 450

miles distant, sent a detachment to march

247 of the animals back to that station.The ballade thus inspired, and reproducedon an accompanying page, is the work ofa former editor of this JOURNAL.

The officers and men of the regimentlined the route of march to pay theirlast respects. In a letter to MajorGeneral Danford, Chief of FieldArtillery, the regimental commander,Col. Benjamin Mort Bailey, describesthe events in a letter, extracts fromwhich follow:

"It is needless to say that many officers

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Photo by Ekmark

BETWEEN RANKS OF THE HONOR GUARD, OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE TWELFTH FIELD,THEIR OLD COMRADES MARCH AWAY.

and men in line swallowed lumps in theirthroats as the detachment marched by.Bands of the Ninth and Twenty-thirdInfantry Regiments played the CaissonSong. As the last element cleared the Post

the bands played Auld Lang Syne andone of the new motordrawn batteries fireda salute of four salvos.

"As a horseman you will appreciatehow our old men, including myself, felt. .. .

"A total of 495 horses will betransferred to the three stations asfollows: Sill, 247; Bragg, 106, and

Warren, 142. About 50 were destroyed.None of our officers or men were willingto witness the destruction of these oldfriends. . . .

"No less than 135 drivers and riders

had pictures taken of themselves withtheir mounts. The men have presentedme with a large framed picture of headsof all the old horses, for my office. Infuture, at social gatherings, theRegimental toast will be, 'Stand toHeel, Men!' Thus we will hand to

posterity a command to indicate ourorigin."

258th FA (New York) did a job of work in September with 97.78% attendance tolead the Empire State. Regimental and all battalion headquarters, and their combat

trains, with Battery C, attained 100%. Of the 35 units reported the 106th FA was third,

the 156th FA, 105th FA, and 104th FA, were 9th, 10th, and 11th, respectively.

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The German Artillery in Combat

Translation of an Article in Le Revue d'Artillerie for August, 1938

BY CAPT. A. P. GARNIER, FRENCH ARMY

This translation was made for my own convenience to study more thoroughly theinteresting discussion it contains. Since it is in part a translation of a translation, it issubject to some of the same distortions as Mark Twain's story of "The Jumping Frog,"as well as the errors of the inapt second translator.

The most important points for thought are:

The great effort to build up energetic initiative in the battalion and battery.

The insistence on prompt entry into action without delay for coordination by

centralized higher control.The avoidance of making sacred cows of standard procedure, by assisting on

adapting the employment of the artillery to the problem in hand without regard for fixedforms and methods.

The manner in which the artillery is employed in support of tanks.

RALPH MCT.PENNELL.

Colonel, Field Artillery.

N approving, January 26, 1937, thenew German regulation on the

"Conduct of the Artillery," Generalvon Fritsch, in a short foreword, againemphasized the spirit which ought toactivate the employment of GermanArtillery.

"Tactical exigencies cannot be cast ina mold. Not interminable messages, butclear orders, at the right moment and atthe right place, and dispositions suited tothe situation are the characteristics ofsure and strong artillery leadership."

In the light of this preface, it ispossible to deduce the evolution and thetendencies in the employment ofGerman artillery, its points in commonwith and its differences from Frenchideas.

Object of the new Regulation.

The new regulation has for its object tobring out the guiding principles in the

exercise of the command of artillery inthe problems of "troop leading." Itcorresponds generally to the relation that

"L'artillerie au combat" has to"L'instruction sur l'emploi tactique des

grandes units." But it differs on firstreading by its general nature and evenindefiniteness. Contrary to our regulation,the German regulations are almost silenton the technical operations used in theemployment of the artillery, on theirqualitative and quantitative distribution

between the units, on their organization,and on the principles governing entryinto action. This silence seems inspirednot only by discretion but also by theintention of creating above all a state ofmind, thanks to which the commanderwill of his own initiative, make thedecision best suited to the situation atthe time. Not some cut and dried plan ofmaneuver but a clear understanding ofthe situation, a fighting spirit, a promptdecision: such are the qualities for thechief of artillery to cultivate. As for thedetails of execution, the means to use,

they will be fully covered under themost varied situations on the map andon the ground, by special regulations

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and in appropriate publications like theArtilleristische Rundschau.

The present regulation is not, then, so tospeak, of age. It sets forth some principleson which accord is nearly unanimous

beyond the Rhine. At a time when thetechnical progress advances at a great paceand influences unceasingly the tactics, itoffers a measure of the progress which has

been made. (Footnote: By reference to thepreceding regulations of 1917 and 1922,which contained numbers of rules on themethods of fire and their organization; this

advance is very clear.) It is evident that theFrench regulations, brought out at a timewhen techniques and tactics seemedcrystalized for a long time, did not havethe same reasons to pass in silenceinstructions for the employment of artilleryadapted to materials in current use, tested

by long experience and still capable of aprolonged service.

Plan of the German regulation

The German regulation comprises twoparts:

The first treats of the generalprinciples for the employment of artillery.It studies successively:

1st. The mission, the effectiveness,the possibilities of artillery;

2nd. Artillery fire (mechanism, rateof fire, kinds of fire);

3rd. Organization and distribution of

command duties;4th. Principles of command (orders,

place of the commander, conduct of fire,maps, positions of batteries, liaison andcommunications);

5th. Reconnaissance, observation,information service.

6th. Basis of cooperation with theinfantry and with the tanks.

It is interesting to examine, amongthese different subjects, those which,

being in accord with French conceptions,are explained in a different manner andthose which, to the contrary, show

unmistakable differences between the twoFrench and German schools.

This will be the object of this firstarticle.The second part, which will be studied

ultimately, is devoted to the applicationof general principles in the different

phases of war: the approach march,safety, making of contact, attack, therencontre engagement, exploitation ofsuccess, the defensive, withdrawals,retreat, combat at night and in fog.(Footnote: Particular cases of combat:

combat of localities, mountain warfare,crossing streams, combat in defiles,should be the subject of furtherregulations. For the resupply ofammunition refer to the regulation on theconduct of troops of all arms.)

Mission of Artillery

"The mission of artillery is, thanks tothe power of its fire, to annihilate at the

propitious moment, the adversary forces

and, by this means to contribute to thevictory of the infantry arm."

"The flexibility, the range, themobility of its fire permit it to adapt itselfrapidly to all tactical situations. Thedestructive power and the moral effect ofits projectiles, give full expression to itsaction."

"The effect of surprise, theconcentration in time and space, as also

the rapidity of its fire, augment itseffectiveness.

"To attain its full development, thispowerful force ought above all to be inthe hands of an artillery chief imbuedwith the will to wrest from the enemy thesuperiority of the fire and to maintain it atall costs by every means and in allcircumstances, in order to smash in theenemy all capacity of decision and allforce of resistance."

The first expressions of theregulations emphasize that violence andrapidity govern all that follows. At every

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THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN COMBAT

turn, the words "rechtzeitig" and"schnell" accent the imperious necessity

of being always ready to intervene, toact quickly, to seize on the wing allopportunities. This abstractness has a

profound effect upon organization andthe distribution of duties to the variousechelons of command as well as on theconduct of fire. With the same object,they do not hesitate when the situationappears to demand it, to employ any ofthe following: decentralization,temporary subordination to the infantry,

pushing the artillery to the front, thesacrifice of maximum efficiency torapidity of entry into action.

Means Available to the Artillery

In the beginning the regulationrecalls very briefly the means inmaterial, projectiles and fire at thedisposal of the artillery to fulfill itsmission.

MaterielThe "field gun" is well

suited for fire against personnel notunder cover, capable of fire againsttanks and of engaging in counter-

battery, if it has good observation; it isparticularly suited for cooperation withthe infantry.

The "light field howitzer" is suitedto the same missions as the field gun,

but its larger caliber and the steeperangle of fall of its projectiles makes

possible better effect against lightdefenses and enemy artillery. Its

possibilities of entry into action areparticularly good. (Footnote: Thanks toits mobility and to its curved trajectory.It is well to recall here the Germantendency to make the light howitzer the

principal materiel of the divisionalartillery and to remark that its projectileis particularly suited to the use ofspecial ammunition.)

The mountain gun, the medium andheavy guns (10 and 15 c.m.), the heavyfield howitzers (15 c.m.), the mortars,

have capabilities analogous to those ofthe corresponding French materiels.

The regulation makes no furthermention of infantry cannon.Projectiles.The principal

projectile is the high explosive shell.Artillery uses both armor-piercing andsmoke shell against armored targets atranges of 1,000 m. or more. They nolonger mention shrapnel. As to timefire it is only envisaged for thedestruction of balloons and for high

burst adjustments.

FireThere are three principalforms of fire: harassing fire(Storungsfeuer), destructive fire(Zerstorungsfeuer), and fire of urgency(notfeuer), corresponding seeminglywith our "tir d'arret."

These different forms are shadingsaccording to the following tacticalconceptions utilized in the orders: toneutralize (niederhalten), to destroy

(niederkampfen), (either the materielverstoremor the personnelvernichten), to arrest (blenden).

Organization of Artillery Units

The different units of artilleryinclude:

1st. Division artilleries whichembrace organic light and heavy fieldartillery, an observation battalion, andreenforcing artillery.

2nd. Corps artillery of the armycomposed of organic artillery and ofreenforcing artillery.

3rd. Army artillery composedsolely of artillery not organic.

4th. G.H.Q. reserve artillery.This organization seems to differ, at

first sight, from the French system only bythe addition of an observation battalion tothe division echelon. But it should be notedthat the German manual is silent on thatfundamental element of comparison whichconstitutes the distribution of the calibers

between the different artilleries. Another

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thing, the organization of the commandreveals some important differences in

comparison with our conceptions.Organization and attributes of

command

The organization and the assignmentof duties of artillery commanders differsaccording to the echelons which theycommand.

1st. In the army and the corpsartillery, no commanders are provided,

properly speaking. It is the commander of

the higher unit who personally assumesthis responsibility. (Footnotes: Thereexists in the German army a particularlystrong proportion of commanders in thehigher organizations having organicartillery).

If he is the commander of an army, heconfines his control over the conduct ofthe artillery in battle to the directiveswhich he gives to his corps commanders,in this manner then he specifies the

mutual support of the different large unitsplaced under his command and to whichhe allots the reenforcing materiel andammunition. He sets up, in principle, anartillery staff which acts as assistant tothe general staff of the army for all thequestions of employment and ofreplenishing of supplies.

If he is a corps commander, he uses, astechnical adviser, the commander of the

organic corps artillery, assisted in somecases by an artillery staff. His roleconsists of arranging the mutual supportfires of the divisions as well as theresupply of the ammunition. He rarelyintervenes in the details of use ofdivisional artillery. He decides, accordingto the circumstances, if the organic corpsartillery and the reenforcing artilleryought to be allotted to the divisions or if itwould be better to constitute all or part of

it as a special groupment under the ordersof the army corps. This groupment is thencharged normally with missions of

counter-battery, of interdiction and ofharassing.

2nd. The commander of the divisionartillery is the only true chief of artillery.He not only organizes, as in the Frenchdivision, the cooperation with the infantry(assignment of battalions, missions, zonesof action and of observation, entry intoaction); he has also as his principal dutiesthe coordination of the work of thereconnaissance units, the set up of theSRA, the organization of counter-battery,harassing and interdiction fires as well as

arranging for the observation and theentry into action of the long rangeartillery.

To fulfill these multiple tasks, he hasat his disposal in general the whole of thereenforcement artillery.

His command duties are thenextremely heavy and although theGerman regulation is nearly silent on thesystem of organization of artillery

groupments (footnotes: It is no longer aquestion of the titles, consecrated by thewar of Aka, Ika, Feka, groupments, etc.)it is probable that the commander of thedivision artillery can perform all hisduties only by giving considerable libertyto certain units and delegating a part ofhis authority.

This organization tends then towards aforced decentralization which is also

desired for the purpose of placing asmany artillerymen as possible in thecombat atmosphere and of cutting out ofthe links of commandand so the delayin timewith the higher echelons.

In addition, the allocation of anobservation battalion and the organizationof counter-battery and long-range firein the division echelon permits rapidand effective intervention, especiallyon non-stabilized fronts. On the other

hand the long range weapons are notused to their maximum zones of actionin the narrow frame of a division and

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THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN COMBAT

the heavy concentrations of a higherechelon must be more or less

improvised, in the absence of apermanent commander of the artillery ofthe corps.

Finally, the artillery is generallyallotted entirely to the division echelonso that the superior commanders are ableonly with difficulty to influence the

battle by

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Jan 1939