Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1940

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1940

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R O O T S O FS T R A T E G Y

A Collection of MilitaryClassics

Edited by

Major Thomas R. Phillips

Containing

The Art of Warby Sun Tzu, 500 B. C.

The Military Institutions ofthe Romans

by Vegetius, 390 A. D.

My Reverie on the Art of Warby Marshal de Saxe, 1732

The Instruction of Frederick theGreat for His Generals, 1747

The Military Maxims ofNapoleon

In this one volume are contained the mostinfluential military writings of all times, thepermanent military classics of all nations and allages. None of them are available in English inany other edition. Truly, here is an omnibus thatshould be the basis of every officer's library andthe foundation of his military education.

446 pages 5 7 Beautifully PrintedSturdily and Attractively Bound Price $3.00

Postpaid

Book Department

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERYASSOCIATION1624 H Street, N. W.Washington, D. C.

Military Books ofProfessional Value

A MODERN MILITARY DICTIONARYCol. Max Garber ................. leather, $2.75

cloth, 2.50

AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS, 2 Vols.Steele ................................................ 8.00

CAVALRY COMBAT (compilation) ..... 2.50

CHEMICALS IN WARAugustin M.Prentiss............................................. 7.50

COMBAT INTELLIGENCESchwien.. 2.00

ELEMENTS OF ORDNANCELt. Col.T. J. Hayes ........................................ 6.50

INFANTRY IN BATTLE (compilation) . 3.00

MARCH OF THE BARBARIANS Harold Lamb ..................................... 3.75

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLDWARCol. G. L. McEntee ............... 7.50

NOTES ON FRENCH ORDNANCE,

1717-1936Hicks ............................ 3.50

OUTLINE OF THE WORLD'S MILITARYHISTORYCol. W. A. Mitchell ........ 3.00

ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVEBATTLESRoger Shaw .................. 2.00

PEN AND SWORD IN GREECE ANDROMECol. O. L. Spaulding .......... 2.00

THE INFANTRY BATTALION INWARLt. Col. Walter Wheeler........ 3.00

THE OFFICERS' GUIDE ....................... 2.50

WARFARESpaulding, Nickerson,

and Wright ........................................ 3.00

10% discount to Association members

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U. S. FIELD ARTILLERYASSOCIATION

1624 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.


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IN THIS ISSUE

GEN. SNOW'S Can We Arm? in the May-June issue was widely quoted in the press. Thecurrent installment of his memoirs treats of anequally important phase of nationalrearmament; namely, training.

MAJ. O. L. MARSTON describes a practicalmoving target which he developed recently atFort Sill. The author's article, The Rains Might

Not Come, in the Jan.-Feb. issue, stimulatedtraining in firing at moving targets, and was alsonoted by radio commentators and journalists.

MAJOR DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON, on ROTCduty at Ohio State, presents an excellentmethod of giving gun squads preliminary

practice in firing at moving targets.

MAJORG. B. BARTH, an instructor with theNew York National Guard, contributes sometimely and important conclusions provoked bya study of the European War.

COL., LANZA'S historical study of thecauses of the war continues with an account ofthe Czechoslovakian crisis.

THE IMPORTANCE of Gen. Scott's serialdealing with jungle and mountain warfare in the

Philippines in 1899 should be evident to allthinkers who visualize the possibility of similarfuture service in the western hemisphere.

CAPT. G. C. DUEHRING'S analysis of the lifeinsurance problem was prepared while theauthor was on duty with the Dept. ofEconomics, Government, and History at WestPoint; it will be helpful to all officers concernedin providing proper protection for dependents.

CAPT. S. E. VAUGHN, a battery commanderin the California National Guard, brings to outattention a matter which will concern everyartillery unit as soon as it campaigns awayfrom its home reserve. You will not find thisimportant instruction in our trainingmanualsbetter save it! (Extra copies of thisissue are available at 50 cents.)

CAPT. M. L. CURRY, a graduate of the U.S. Field Artillery School and of the FrenchArtillery School, is an instructor at the MarineCorps School at Quantico, Va.

OTHER CONTRIBUTORS include Maj.Watrous, a member of the FA Board; Capt. J.M. Burdge, 11th FA; and Capt. R. A.Ellsworth, on duty with the ROTC unit atOregon State.

The United States FieldArtillery Association

ORGANIZED JUNE 7, 1910President

Major General Robert M. Danford,

U. S. ArmyVice-President

Colonel Augustine McIntyre, U. S. ArmyExecutive Council

Major General Robert M. Danford, U. S. A.Brigadier General William H. Sands, VaNGBrigadier General C. C. Haffner, Jr., IllNGColonel John A. Crane, U. S. A. Colonel Fred C. Wallace, U. S. A.Colonel Leroy W. Herron, Reserve CorpsLieutenant Colonel W. C. Crane, U. S. A. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph C. Bishop, Res.Major Edward S. Ott, U. S. A.

Secretary-Editor and Treasurer

Major W. S. Nye, Field Artillery, U. S. A.

The Field Artillery JournalA Publication for the Field Artillery of the Regular Army. National Guard, and Organized Reserve

JULY-AUGUST, 1940

THE COVER ILLUSTRATION: ARTILLERY WITH MECHANIZED BRIGADEDURING RECENT MANEUVERS

ARTILLERY AND THE TANK................................................................................. 243

TRAINING FORWAR............................................................................................ 249By Major General William J. Snow, USA-Ret.

LET THEM PRACTICE FIRST ................................................................................. 261By Major Douglas V. Johnson, FA

ANTIDOTE FORBLITZKRIEG................................................................................. 262By Major G. B. Barth, FA

FAST MOVING TARGETS...................................................................................... 264By Major O. F. Marston, FA

CAN THEY LIVE WITHOUT YOU? ........................................................................ 269By Captain George C. Duehring, FA

ENGINEER AND FIELD ARTILLERY SURVEY ......................................................... 277By "Giraffe"

ON TYING ONESELF TO THE GROUND.................................................................. 279By Captain S. E. Vaughn, 144th FA

BASIC SURVEY OPERATIONS USING WIDE-ANGLE PHOTO .................................. 282ORIGINS OF A MAJORWAR................................................................................. 284

By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA

ARTILLERY IN THE ELASTIC DEFENSE ................................................................. 296By Captain M. L. Curry, USMC

GUNNER IN LUZON .............................................................................................. 300By Brigadier General Ernest D. Scott, USA-Ret.

BROTHER, CAN YOU USE A DOODLE?................................................................. 306By Strudux

FIELD ARTILLERY ABROAD................................................................................. 309

AS TO FLASHLIGHTS............................................................................................ 316

By Major F. W. Watrous, FA

MUZZLE BURSTS ................................................................................................. 317

BOOKREVIEWS ................................................................................................... 319

Vol. 30 W. S. NYE, Major, FA, Editor No. 4

Published bi-monthly at the Monumental Printing Co., 3110 Elm Ave., Baltimore, Md. Editorial and circulation office, 1624 H St.,N. W., Washington, D. C. Address all communications to the Washington office. Entered as second class matter August 20, 1929, atthe post office at Baltimore, Md. Copyright, 1940, by The United States Field Artillery Association. Subscription price $3.00;Canada $3.25; foreign $3.50; single copies to subscribers, 50 cents; nonsubscribers, 75 cents. T HE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL paysfor original articles accepted. It is published without expense to the government. Authors alone are responsible for statements made.

Addresses, and changes of rank, will be changed as frequently as desired, upon notification; not otherwise. Changes should reachthe editor three weeks before date of next issue. Immediate notice should be given of any delay in the receipt of the magazine .


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155-mm.

howitzersectionduringmaneuversnearFo

rtBenning


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An analysis of portions of theGerman Artillery Regulations

Infantry supporting Panzerunit during street fighting in

Warsaw.

FOREWORD

Seven years ago the German General von

Eimannsberger wrote a book titledMechanized Warfare, inwhich he accurately envisioned the war of 1940 in France,even down to the smallest details of armament,organization, and methods of operation. Further than thathe described an illustrative problem which he actuallystaged on the Amiens front. Reread in the light of what hasnow occurred, von Eimannsberger stands out as a man ofgreat analytic imagination, one whose proposals, possibly,have been acted upon by the German government. VonEimannsberger's remarkable work has been available tomilitary students here and abroad, and if they chose todisregard the handwriting on the wallwell, that ishistory. It is also history that after the Polish campaign the

German General Staff stated that one of the great lessonslearned by them was that their training regulations wereadequate and correct. These regulations can (or could) alsobe purchased on the open market in Berlin. The wisdom ofaccording them some attention should be obvious.

How did the Germans break through the French fortifiedpositions? Before attempting to answer that question, itmay be worthwhile to examine briefly the nature of theseFrench defenses. General descriptions of the Maginot Lineand its extension have been given in the press both here

and abroad, and a recent study in a Yugoslav servicemagazine went into considerable detail concerning this and

other defensive works abroad. It is unnecessary to reviewthese matters, which are of general knowledge. It isneedful, however, to point out one thing which has beenoverlooked, and that is that the French defensive systemwas based on a new (and, as subsequently proved, faulty)concept. In 1938 military thinkers in this country becameaware that the French had abandoned the old classical ideaof basing a defensive position on a good field of fire, infavor of a position behind an obstacle. Accordingly, theirfortified lines were built behind rivers and thick woods.Massive and powerful in a purely passive way, these worksnevertheless mounted only cannon of comparatively smallcaliber and short range, and not many of these in each unit.Because of the general plan of the fortifications, supporting

heavy artillery and antiaircraft artillery had to be emplacedin the open, where, being more or less "tied" to the fortress,these weapons were very vulnerable to air attack.

When the armored gun turrets were neutralized ordestroyed each fort became only a deep mine galleryprotecting solely its immediate garrison. Extensive barriersof concrete studs, steel rails, and patented flexible tanktraps made of angle iron were placed out in front.Presumably mine fields were employed. But in general

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244 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL July-August

it was the obstacle, not defensive fire, which formed thesinew of the defense. Where the natural obstacles werevery strong, as along the Meuse, the fire defense, theartificial barriers, and perhaps even the defending forceswere considerably weaker than elsewhere. It is known nowthat great masses of German heavy artillery could be

brought up behind the wooded "barriers" in front of theFrench defenses, secure from observation, yet out of rangeof the 75's with which the French fortresses were mostlyarmed; so the woods, instead of being a protection to theFrench, actually sheltered the attackers. Presumably theFrench expected these wooded areas to hinder the passageof great mechanized forces.

It is quite plain today that the Germans were aware of allthese things. It is equally plain that they more correctlyevaluated these defenses than anyone abroad or here. Themethods they evolved for penetrating the French fortresseswere not based on magic, nor on death rays, nor on secretsuper-weapons. True, the Germans built* 70-ton tanks; but

this was known to the Frenchthey had monster tanksalso (though in insufficient quantity, as always). Thesetanks went through the woods as if the trees were so muchbamboo. The Germans built many amphibious tanksnothing new in thatand with them crossed the waterobstacles. They also made extensive use of bridgingmaterials, employed combat engineers to clear mine fieldsand barriers, and to execute demolitions within the works.They fired powerful artillery concentrations. They usednumerous bombing planes. They employed smoke screensto blind the French cupolas. They fired at the turrets withhigh velocity weaponsantitank guns, antiaircraftartillery, and with heavy machine gunsall brought up

close so that their fire impinged accurately on theportholes. They used infantry armed with minethrowers,grenades, and mortars. In brief, they employed differentmethods and devices, or combinations, depending on thenature of the terrain and the defensive works. Above all,they had great coordination.

Let us not forget that in each case where the Germansattacked a French fortified line, quite a number of hours,sometimes three days, elapsed before the position wasruptured and the mechanized forces launched through theopening. The situation was much the same as that inPoland between September 1 and 3. In other words, thePanzer units did not by themselves create thebreakthrough, even though they exploited it sospectacularly. But, as ever, it is the halfback who gets theheadlines, not the guards and tackles who open the hole.

The German artillery regulations available to us do notcover the subject of artillery support of units which areexploiting a breakthrough. Doubtless their methods are thesame as for artillery support of cavalry or other fast-moving units, and it is believed that only the organicartillery, in general, accompanies the Panzer units in their

wide and deep movements. The German regulations, briefand to the point, give only the broad principles of artillerysupport of armored units which are assisting in abreakthrough, and these, together with brief antitankregulations, are set forth below.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF ARMORED FORCESThe German artillery regulations open this subject by

saying that, where the armored units are to be employed inconjunction with an infantry division, the artillery will besthelp the attack by promoting the success of the infantry.The artillery activity must adapt itself to the special way inwhich each attack is made, and can never be madeaccording to rigid model. Where armored forces are to beemployed with infantry divisions, the latter will bereinforced with additional artillery as well as withmechanized groups.

Two general situations are considered: First where anenemy is attacked who has not had time to prepare

properly for defense, and second where he is prepared. Inthe first case, time is the vital element, and the armoredunits do not wait to coordinate the attack with artilleryfires, nor for an artillery preparation. Surprise is gained byspeed of attack. The artillery support then consists mainlyin holding back such hostile forces as cannot be attackedby the mechanized units, mainly because of locallimitations. It renders early support to the farthestadvanced infantry; and assists this infantry to hold groundwon by the armored forces. "The ability of the artillery togive further direct support to the armored attack dependsalso on the number of batteries in readiness to fire, and onthe observation conditions; at the very least, efforts shouldbe made to give armored units protection with a portion ofthe available fire or to lay down a smoke screen againstenemy antitank weapons, lest the movements of thearmored units be impeded."

In attacking an enemy prepared for defense, the firstmission of the artillery is to render support to infantrywhich has no organic armored units or is insufficientlysupplied with them. The missions of the artillery alwaysinclude:

a) Counterbattery. This is most important whenarmored units are engaged in the zone of the enemy infantry.

b) Early neutralization of hostile antitank weapons.These will first appear after the tank attack has started;speedy blinding of the locality with smoke will often be

more effective than using HE.c) Neutralization of enemy heavy infantry weapons

which are firing against our infantry, especially when thesetargets have not yet been, or cannot be attacked by ourtanks.

No priority can be laid down for these tasks; it willdepend on the immediate situation. If insufficient artilleryis available, chemical troops (with smoke mortars) cantake over some of the work. Where ground observation isdifficult, aerial observation must be provided.

*Possibly captured from the Czechs.


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1940 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL 245

Before the armored attack, the mission of the artilleryaccording to the situationmay consist in:

German medium male tank, mounting 75-mm. gun, followingbreakthrough of Polish defenses in the Corridor.

a) Protecting the assembly of the armored units fromhostile artillery fire.

b) Concealing the noise of the tanks, especially atnight.

c) Deceiving the enemy as to where the attack is totake place, either by diverting fires or by projectingsmoke.

d) Placing fires on hostile OP's, artillery positions, anddiscovered minefields and antitank weapons; the latter,however, should not be attacked until shortly before theassault, lest they change positions.

Effort should be made to avoid disclosing theimminence of the tank attack by the type of artillerypreparation fired.

* * * * *During the attack the nature of the artillery action is

adjusted in accordance with the time of entry of the

mechanized forces into combat.If the armored units break into the hostile position

jointly with the infantry, the artillery smothers the point ofpenetration up to the last possible moment, until thearmored units are able to take over this mission at shortrange. Just before the armored units arrive at the enemyposition the artillery fire lifts, and boxes off the area ofpenetration at rear and sides. Hostile infantry and antitankweapons on the flanks are engaged heavily. All thisrequires good observation and absolutely reliablecommunication and liaison.

When the object of the armored attack is only the hostileinfantry, artillery neutralizes the enemy artillery during theentire period of the attack. However, if the armored unitsenter the enemy artillery area, our fire must lift in time.

The principal difficulty will be for the artillery todetermine the farthest advance limit of the armored wave."This may compel the regulation of speedy transfer ofartillery fire from the start until after the anticipatedduration of the armored attack. However, the disadvantageof the known inflexibility of fire is less than the danger ofhindering the armored attack by own artillery fire.Armored troops must take into consideration timelycoordination with the artillery firing plan."

* * * * *The artillery must utilize the penetration of the armored

attack into the enemy lines, by timely change of position,

and after the conclusion of the armored attack give newsupport to the front of the infantry attack and keep thesame moving forward. In this way the armored attacksupplements or bridges the intermittent artillery action; inthe same way the artillery from its new positions mustrender instantaneous help to the infantry whenever andwherever the latter lose the assistance of the armored units.It is only in this way, whereby the infantry receives supportalternately from the tanks and the artillery, that its progressis maintained. "It is wrong for the displacement of artilleryto coincide with the assembly of the armored units."


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The artillery furnishes a liaison officer to thecommander of the armored unit. This liaison officer"accompanies the armored attack in an armored vehicleequipped with radio, or if possible, with a telephone"(!)The artillery liaison officer also acts for the chemicaltroops.

* * * * *Besides the usual artillery support, the mechanized

forces also need special fire protection against hostileantitank weapons. If there are insufficient heavy ormedium male tanks present for this purpose, then aspecial artillery unit must be assigned. This unit alsofurnishes a liaison officer. The batteries assigned for thisduty are emplaced far forward, usually during the nightbefore the attack. They execute no general fires. If it canbe foreseen that infantry, advancing before the tankattack, will secure better OP's for this special artillerysupport unit, then the batteries should be held limbered,ready to hurry forward into position as soon as the

advanced positions are secured. The idea is to render thevery closest support; but this artillery, being unarmored,does not accompany the tanks except by observation andfire. It is highly important that this artillery be given thebest OP's, and, if available, an artillery plane. Forwardobservers, used liberally and in accordance withprepared plans, keep pace with the most advancedinfantry.

"Between the commander of the armored protectiveartillery, and that of the armored units which it is to join, aswell as in the posting of artillery observation during theprogress of the attack, there may be accomplished thenecessary uniform and strict information to the artillery as

to targets and lines attained by the armored attack. It maybe desirable to establish, before the attack, phase lines forthe advance, and check pointsparticularly near wherenests of antitank weapons may be encountered.

"This cooperation makes it possible, by extensive firedirection and other technical means, to assure a heavyeffective fire preparation against anticipated targets.

"The artillery commander transmits in proper time to thecommander of the armored forces the results ofreconnaissance to locate hostile artillery."

Comment: A word should be added here with regard tocomparing organization and equipment of German artilleryunits organically assigned to armored units and similar U.S. artillery units. In both cases mobility is, of course, aprime consideration. The Germans appear to obtainmobility by adding to their personnel and materiel whereaswe strip down to the ground to obtain it. What is the result?The Germans outgun us heavily, they having 105-mm.gun-howitzers drawn by specially-built fast tracklayingvehicles. We have only the small 75-mm. howitzers. TheGermans have 162 men per battery,* thus providing reliefgun crews and drivers and putting their batteries on a 24-hour day operating basis, whereas we are limited to 99 men

per battery, barely enough to operate on a peacetime basis.

ARTILLERY SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE AGAINSTARMORED FORCES

The German regulations give the following rules for theemployment of artillery support in the case where the mainforce is attacked by armored units:

The best support is to disperse, or at least to weaken, thearmored forces by firing on them before they launch theirattack. Assembly areas and jump-off positions aresubjected to concentrated, shock-like, massed fire, using

*Of this number 35 constitute the 2d echelon of the battery combattrain, but the remainder of the battery proper is still substantially stronger

in personnel than the corresponding U. S. unit.

German half-track vehicles used with ammunition train ofheavy artillery regiment.


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HE. Since map firing involves a great waste ofammunition, aerial observation should be provided ifpossible.

When the armored vehicles appear, the artillery, on thebasis of previous fire (registration), lays down a barrage onthe terrain through which the tanks must pass, paying

particular attention to defiles.As the tanks approach our front line the artillery shifts

its fire to hostile weapons which support or accompany thetank attack, and fires on the infantry which follows thetanks or moves with them.

If the tanks penetrate our position, then the artillerymust, if necessary, defend itself against them, employingthe methods of direct fire as described in the followingparagraphs.

CLOSE DEFENSE OF ARTILLERY AGAINSTMECHANIZED ATTACK

German artillery protects itself against mechanized attack

(as well as against air attack) first of all by a carefullyorganized scouting and warning service. This operatescontinuouslywhile the artillery is on the march, inbivouac, at halts, in position, during engagements, and evenin rest areas. Unceasing vigilance is the watchword, and theGermans do not trifle with these matters. Furthermore, thisscouting and warning service operates, not to the front andflanks alone, but through a full 360-degree sector, regardlessof what other friendly troops may be present.

"The task of the air observers and close-range patrol isthe watching with eyes and ears over the air and land areaon all sides, especially in the direction that would favorenemy rear attacks and tank attacks because of thelocation, and in the sun, in order to warn the troop leader.The warning is made through a call, visual or auditory. The

leader orders the necessary measures for protectionaccording to the special circumstances of each event. Onlythe leader of the unit can judge the nature of the threat ofthe moment and the measures for protection required at thetime. The protection measures must be governed by theneeds of each situation."

The personnel making up this scouting and warningservice are not the greenest recruits or the battery misfits.They are specially selected for their self-reliance andcourage, their excellent powers of sight and hearing, theirability to analyze quickly and make swift sure decisions.They are specially trained in their tasks. They are madeacquainted with the shape and appearance of hostile

machines and the methods which they employ in attack.They are equipped with sun glasses, field glasses, andtrumpets or whistles; and they wear no steel helmets.

"Scouting and warning service is very strenous andrequires frequent relief. No break in the service, however,may be permitted while reliefs are being changed."

Light tanks of Panzer division halted in wood along BrahaRiver.


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During the march, each subordinate unit issues its ownspecial orders for scouting and warning, unless this hasbeen prescribed by higher authority.

During selection of battery positions consideration isgiven to the requirements for close defense. The Germansmention the desirability of having adequate "wheeling

terrain," by which they mean an ability to shift the piecesshort distances by manpower. The battery defense isprepared under the direction of the battery commander inperson, or he may delegate it to the executive at the firingbattery, the RO at the OP, and the senior leader at thelimber position or vehicle park.

"Batteries in firing position, from which the near frontterrain can be shelled, protect themselves in front throughthe fire of their own guns (using direct fire and armor-piercing projectiles). They establish close OP's. Themachine guns of the battery are installed in such a mannerthat they can be used in surprise attacks, especially fromthe flank and rear.

"Also when the guns are shot out or are out ofammunition, the firing position is defended with machineguns, rifles, and hand grenades. In such instances strongpoints are established from which, with the help of theinfantry, resistance can be maintained against the enemyuntil reserve units have time and opportunity to make acounterattack.

"Guns should never be permitted to fall into enemyhands in useful condition. If they must be left, the firingpins, ejectors, and panoramic sights are dismounted andremoved."

The following are, in brief, the points which the artillerycommander must check in providing for close defense of

his command:a) On the march:Upon attack by tanks, the battery scatters and takes

cover. If this is not possible, it blocks the road toward theenemy, with vehicles or other materials, and defends theblockade; all not so engaged remain dismounted by thehorses (or prime movers) and the vehicles.

b) In the firing position:The firing position is to be so chosen that1. There is a good field of fire to the front.2. There are natural terrain obstacles (swamps, deep

waterways, thick forests, rocks, etc.) which canserve as protection against surprise tank attacks.

The following should be checked:1. From which direction are tank attacks possible?

2. Which of our own weapons may be usedimmediately in the defense?

3. What changes in front may be undertaken to followthe principal attack directions?

4. Can the guns be placed in echelon so that at least aportion of the battery can be fired without moving

the individual guns?The following preparations should be made at the firing

battery:1. The abutment of each trail must be reinforced in

sandy ground.2. The guns must be capable of being turned easily in

the principal attack directions.3. Camouflage screens must be placed aside.4. Cover (fox holes) for personnel must be dug for the

eventuality that the supply of ammunition becomesexhausted, the guns jammed, or hostile tanks get intothe position.

5. Chiefs of section and gunners must know, and if

necessary mark on their shields, the ranges, from600 yards to 1,000 yards, of points in the directionsfrom which attacks may come.

6. An NCO must be detailed to watch, at the batteryposition, for the appearance of tanks.

c) General:Fire is not necessarily opened as soon as tanks appear. If

it is believed that they have not discovered the battery, itmay be better to hold the fire until they reach a favorablerange.

The BC directs and distributes the fire. The platooncommanders assist him in this; and hasten to him whentanks appear. The actual firing is by section; each chief of

section supervises the fire of his piece. The gunner givesthe signal to fire. He does this by springing backwards.A change of position or change of front for the battery

may be considered only in special circumstances, ifsufficient time is available and the formation of the groundpermits.

CONCLUSION

A study of the foregoing discloses nothing that smacksof the mysterious or unorthodox. The striking thing aboutGerman methods (and results) is that they actually do whatothers are inclined only to talk about, and they have awonderful degree of coordination between arms, services,and organizations.

It is commonly said that modern war is the most recondite of things, requiringexperts. War, so long as man risks his skin in it, will always be a matter of instinct.

DU PICQ.


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Tra in ing fo r WarBy Major General William J. Snow, USA-Ret.

CAMP JACKSON, SOUTHCAROLINA, REPLACEMENT

DEPOT

Editor's note: Gen. Snow has described previously how hisoffice formulated, in 1918, a General Training Scheme forhandling the cadres of officers and enlisted men who wereto form part of the new National Army. Herein he tells howthat plan operated in the great field artillery replacement

depots and firing centers.

Of the permanentactivities provided for inthe General TrainingScheme, approved by the Chief of Staff, the one which I

was especially anxious to get started without a day's delaywas the Replacement Depot. Even while the Scheme wasbeing formulated, and in anticipation of its approval, Ihad assigned this establishment to Colonel Robert M.Danford, telling him he would have command of theDepot and directing him to work up tables oforganization, courses of instruction, and other details ascompletely as he could. This he did, the work occupyingseveral days. Each day he would bring in to me theresults of his work, which we would then discuss. I lefthim all the freedom I could, simply keeping himcoordinated with the other activities so as to preventduplication and overlapping.

The need for haste was urgent. The April replacementsfor overseas were 1006 and these could be obtained, in theabsence of a Replacement Depot, only by resorting to theold practice of robbing existing brigades in the UnitedStates; and these very brigades were short of men, evenbefore I robbed them. Many of the brigades in this countrywere reduced below one-fifth of their authorized strength.Of course, under such conditions, training in them hadpractically ceased. A check-up made in March showed thatthere were nine brigades having an average of four-fifthsof their authorized strength and not included in the firstthree corps. These nine brigades would therefore have tofurnish overseas replacements for March, April, May, andJune and also furnish the men to fill up brigades scheduled

for overseas sailing during that period. The nine brigades

would then be reduced toabout one-halfauthorized strength.After spending nearly aweek in unsuccessfulverbal efforts to getmen, I submitted a

requisition, on April 9th, for 54,000 men to fill up

existing brigades. Two days later, I asked in writing that,if necessary, a special draft for 60,000 men be made. Theprincipal obstacle lay in an inadequate supply of clothingand in certain objections made by the MedicalDepartment.

While I had set July as the date for the Depot to furnishits first replacements, yet I hoped that it could furnish theJune ones. But it could not do this, and due to not havinggotten the 50,000 or 60,000 men asked for in April, itbecame necessary to almost strip four brigades in June forreplacements and men to fill up the sailing brigades. I thennotified the commander of the Depot that he would have tofurnish the July replacements, even if only one month'straining could be given them. Accordingly on July 15th,the first contingent consisting of 44 officers and 5,500 menleft the Depot for the Port of Embarkation. The length oftime these men had been under training varied, thoughnone had completed the full course. We simply took thebest trained men at the Depot. It is interesting to note thatthe commanding general of the Port of Embarkation wroteme that the records accompanying these men were themost complete of any that had passed through the port upto that time.

The Field Artillery Replacement Depot at CampJackson, South Carolina, organized early in May, was thefirst replacement depot established in this country for anyarm during the war, and its success was so pronounced that

similar depots for the other arms were

Extracts from the World War memoirs of the first Chief of Field Artillery furnisha blueprint for meeting a similar emergency in these tumultuous days.

249


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Brigadier General Robert M.

Danford, commanding thereplacement depot at Camp

Jackson, S. C.

soon ordered by the Chief of Staff. It seems a severe reflectionon the War Plans Division of the General Staff (or whoeveroriginally prescribed the organization of our army during thewar) that apparently it was not thought there would be anyfield artillery casualties, and so no provision was made forreplacing them. Yet a slight knowledge of history would have

shown that casualties begin the day following mobilization,and last throughout the war.1 The only attempt to provide fieldartillery replacements was the organization, in the summer of1917, of three battalions, one for each of the 5th, 6th, and 7thRegiments of Field Artillery, and these battalions wereshipped overseas in the fall of 1917. It is true there were sixdivisions in a corps in France and two of these divisions wereto be Training and Replacement Divisions, thus apparentlygiving six regiments of field artillery for this purpose. But

three of these six were to beutilized in forming corps andarmy artillery. That left onlythree regiments to provide

replacements for division,corps, and army artillery;and, in addition, to actindependently as fightingunits. There was a depotbrigade of infantry in eachdivision (wholly inadequate),but it contained no fieldartillery recruits.

Hence the necessityarose of getting fieldartillery replacements byrobbing the brigades here,

and the practice necessarilyhad to continue until theReplacement Depot couldtake over this burden.

In the brigade which I had just left at Camp Jackson, wewere so short of men we had practically ceased drilling.The brigade had been repeatedly bled for men. In January,we had only about one-half as many men as we had theprevious October when I joined the brigade. At about thetime I left, an Engineer officer appeared at Jackson withcarte blanche permission of the War Department to selectmen as nucleus for two new regiments of Engineers. Thisof course took away the few key men that organizationcommanders had successfully concealed up to that time,

and necessitated a new beginning in specialist training withonly the poorer men to work on. The practice was ruinous,and no sooner would we get specialists of any kindpartially trained than they would be taken away from us.Yet this brigade had been no more unfortunate in thisrespect than many others.

I may give a story of an incident wholly unconnectedwith the Replacement Depot, yet showing the necessity forsuch a depot for each arm. One day, prior to theestablishment of these depots, I learned of the existencesomewhere (not in the Field Artillery) of a body of about1500 motor men. As at this time General Pershing wasconsidering the early motorization of certain horsed fieldartillery regiments, I immediately set out to see the GeneralStaff, locate these men, andtry to secure them for thefield artillery. After somesearch I finally found out thatthey had, only a few days

before, been shipped overseasas machine-gun unitreplacements. All I could dowas to cable the facts toGeneral Hinds, Chief ofArtillery, A.E.F., so that hepossibly might get hold ofthem at the port ofdebarkation. My recollectionis that he was too late.

Colonel Danford was fullyas alive as I was to the urgentneed of replacements, and I

cannot speak too highly ofthe executive ability he displayed in pushing the work. Inless than a week after he arrived at Camp Jackson I hadsent him nearly 400 officers. Two or three days later I gavehim over 2,000 more, and in the meantime I pouredenlisted men in by the thousands. My original idea was tofree him from camp administration, leaving him free to runthe Depot, while General French, camp commander,promised me to run the entire camp just as Danforddesired, and this he did as far as he could. But by the latterpart of August it became evident that a better plan wouldbe to place Danford in actual command of the entire camp,hence he was made a Brigadier General and General

French was removed to another camp. General Danfordwas thus promoted over the heads of a number of excellentofficers, but I simply had to have that Depot function100%; and I determined to promote these officers, who hadbeen jumped, just as soon as I could. They were promotedabout a month later when new brigades were organized.

Colonel George R. Allin,

Executive, OCFA

1In reality, this fact was well known to the War Department, andaccordingly the establishment of replacement depots for training all armswas considered in formulating the original set-up of our American Armyfor the war. The question was decided in the negative on psychologicalgrounds. Doubt existed as to the temper of the American people at thattime, and it was thought that the presence in replacement depots of largenumbers of men would immediately bring forth the cry: "A hundredthousand men are already being trained to step into the places of deadmen." So the Depot Brigade idea was evolved as a substitute. Thisamounted to scattering the replacement depot among all the divisionalcamps; and, like most substitutes and compromises, it proved

unsatisfactory and inadequate when a heavy strain was placed upon it.

By referring to the various General Staff memorandacommenting on my General Scheme for Training, it willbe noted that the General Staff seemed to think that allthe cantonment space at Camp Jackson would not beneeded for the Field Artillery, and that, consequently, by


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turning over the whole camp to this arm, space would bewasted. Yet, actually within three months after we took itover, Camp Jackson was too small, and a second FieldArtillery Replacement Depot had to be established atCamp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky, under BrigadierGeneral F. T. Austin; and I may further add that during

the period indicated we put up many additional buildingsat Jackson, and finally, while its capacity at the time wetook it over was about 40,000 to 45,000, yetsubsequently, at the peak of the load, General Danfordhad 53,000 men under him there, and early in 1919 wouldhave had 84,000. The work at Jackson was a monumentto General Danford's ability, and I have never ceasedbeing grateful to him for making such a complete successof one of the most worrying problems that beset meduring the war; that is, replacements. At the two Depots,Jackson and Taylor, and aggregate of 8,125 officers and73,235 enlisted men received training. Jackson alonesupplied 4,831 officers and 29,104 enlisted men for

schools and nuclei of new brigades in this country, andfor overseas replacement; of the latter, Jackson'saggregate was 460 officers and 21,230 enlisted men.General Danford organized specialist schools there ofevery sort, kind, nature, and description needed by thefield artillery, both for officers and enlisted men, such asfor drivers, cannoneers, supply sergeants, stablesergeants, mechanics, cooks, horseshoers, saddlers,

wagoners, buglers, bandsmen, bakers, tailors,shoemakers, clerks, machine gunners, automatic riflemen,trench mortar men, draftsmen, painters, telephonists,radio men, motorcycle drivers, motor mechanics,carpenters, chauffeurs, truck drivers, etc. The importanceof these schools, which would enable us to supply

replacements in the proportions that trained specialists ofeach kind were desired by the A.E.F., is apparent. It iseven more so when we consider that the instructions Ireceived on April 12, as to the supply of Junereplacements for the A.E.F., simply called for 8,160 menof whom eight-tenths of 1% were to be cooks, mechanics,and buglers; four-tenths of 1% were to be bakers, tailors,shoemakers, and clerks; one-tenth of 1% were to besaddlers and horseshoers. There was no mention of themany other specialists needed by the Field Artillery.

The tables of organization we had prepared in the officeprior to his (General Danford's) going to Jackson proved tobe not entirely satisfactory. This is not at all to be

wondered at, as they were pulled out of the air, withnothing to guide us. However, as experience showed whatwas needed, Danford made out new tables and sent them tome and I got them approved.

From General Hinds, Chief of Artillery, A.E.F., Ilearned monthly what specialists he wanted and howmany of each, and by dividing these between the twoDepots, Jackson and Taylor, I was by summer enabled

Mounted review at Camp Jackson


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to give him exactly what he wanted, except horseshoers.With these, we could never catch up to his needs. On theother hand, in motors our capacity was too great, as theA.E.F. did not move as fast in this direction as we hadanticipated. When, later in the summer of 1918, the MotorTransport Corps was created in the United States, its

organization provided that it would train drivers andchauffeurs for the field artillery. I said I would continue totrain my own until this Corps got going and, until suchtime, would help them out by giving them our surplusdrivers. The Corps never did get going, with the result thatwhen the Armistice was signed the Field Artillery was stilltraining drivers for the Motor Transport Corps, instead ofthe reverse as originally contemplated.

By the middle of October, 1918, a total of six training

brigades, each composed of three training regiments, hadbeen organized in the Replacement Depot at CampJackson. Four brigades were composed of two light andone heavy regiment, corresponding to the divisional fieldartillery brigade. One brigade, however, was composedexclusively of specialists attending the various schools andone was organized to receive the colored draft. All trainingwas divided into 6 twelve-day periods, each of whichculminated in a competitive "Progress Inspection." Atthese inspections a keen watch was kept for outstanding

individuals. Such men were, thereafter, given specialinstruction and tests with a view to sending them to takethe course at the Central Officers' Training School at CampZachary Taylor, Kentucky. The object of the Depottraining was to produce a disciplined soldier who would bein general a field artilleryman and a specialist in onesubject. There was an Inspector for each regiment, andthese inspectors were out all day on the job, seeing thatschedules were carried out, that instruction was thorough,and to observe where improvements could be introduced.

In addition to training enlisted men at this Depot, suchofficers as could be spared, upon their graduation from theCentral Officers' Training School, described later, weresent to Jackson for experience in actually handling enlistedmen and in learning, by actual practice, the interioreconomy of an organization.

The whole Camp Jackson Replacement Depot was awonderful plant, ably organized and run by GeneralDanford, under such discouraging conditions as wouldhave taken the heart out of an ordinary man. Due toGeneral March's continually speeding up the organizationof new units and their shipment overseas, no sooner wouldDanford get a draft of men partly trained than I had to takethem away from him. He never made a complaint,however, but, on the contrary, always sent the best men hehad. It must have been a temptation to "cover up" and

retain some men who were especiallyuseful to him, but this was never done.On the contrary, the Camp slogan, "The

Best Man Goes," was honestly lived upto. This slogan, so lived up to, proved tobe a powerful stimulant for both officersand men. The result of all this goingfaster and faster in our shipmentsoverseas and in organizing new brigades(for the organization of which newbrigades elsewhere he had to furnish anucleus) was that no enlisted man evercompleted the full 6 periods of twelvedays as planned. In fact, the averagetime a recruit was at the Depot,including Sundays, was between 45 and

46 days, and included fewer than half ofthe 6 periods of training. There wasanother mitigating factor to his trainingplan, which must have disturbed him,

but it disturbed me much more. It was my inability to feeddrafted men into his Depot as fast as he could handle themwith the plant he had in the late summer and early fall.This failure was due to two causes. First, uniforms gaveout. I pleaded with the Operations Section of the GeneralStaff to draft men anyhow and give them to me, stating thatthese men all had some clothes which they could bringwith them and wear until we could uniform them, and inthe meantime I would put an outer denim suit on them toshow that they were soldiers. I explained that every day'sdelay in getting these men counted with me. ButOperations were adamant. I think they rather stood in aweof the Medical Department, who opposed my plan. Ioffered to take full responsibility for the health of suchuniformed men, but to no avail.

"The best man goes"

The second thing that slowed down the Depot was theexhaustion of the draft. Under the law, as it then stood,only men between 21 and 30 years of age could bedrafted. As it became apparent that we were approachingthe exhaustion of men within these limiting ages, the


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Secretary of War asked Congress for a new law extending theage limit in both directions, 18 to 45.2 But Congress tookabout 6 weeks in deliberation before finally passing the lawsometime in September. There never was a period in the warwhen such delay was less justified. It was just when Pershingwas getting his Army ready for its first battle as an American

Army under American officers, and no one could foresee theoutcome. But Congress delayed until it could hear from "thepeople back home" in the Congressional districts.

Of the hundreds of officers who were on duty at thisReplacement Depot, and who contributed of their best tothe undertaking, the following are a few who were reportedas having occupied the most important key positions in itsorganization, who remained with the Depot through itsentire life, and who were important factors in making it asuccess: Major Houston L. Whiteside, Camp ExecutiveOfficer; Colonel Philip W. Booker, Senior Instructor;Lieut. Col. Edwin R. Van Deusen, Senior Inspector andCoordinator of Instruction; Colonel Oliver A. Dickinson,

Commanding 1st Brigade; Lieut. Col. Edwin P. Parker, Jr.,Commanding 2d Brigade; Colonel Robert C. F. Goetz,Commanding 3d Brigade; Lieut. Col. Jack A. Rainier,Commanding 4th (Schools) Brigade; Lieut. Col. Lloyd E.Jones, Commanding 5th Brigade; Lieut. Col. Thomas J. J.Christian, Commanding 6th (colored) Brigade.

Regimental Commanders: Majors Paul V. McNutt,Theodore D. Drury, Isaac Spaulding, Otto W. Mull, JubeR. Parton, Howard Eager, John A. Robenson, FrankHarrison, Leslie L. Anderson, Louis E. Ballenbach,Malcom Green, George O. Huey, Donald L. McCuen,Onorio Moretti, Paul Muller, L. Nash, Samuel G. Rea, andJohn A. Stephens. The first three of these regimental

commanders were especially commended.The Depot was inspected by an officer of the InspectorGeneral's Department November 9-12, 1918, and thefollowing are his conclusions:

"(a) Training and instruction of this depot is intensive andefficient. Work is coordinated in such a manner as to insureabsolutely uniformity and the spirit shown by officers andenlisted men is excellent.

"(b) The policy in force at the depot is one which has as itsidea to thoroughly ground the individual soldier in thefundamentals. This fact is never lost sight of during the trainingof first making a thoroughly soldierly recruit and thenimmediately training him for an intensive period in somespecialty. After the first twelve-day period, a man becomes adriver, a cannoneer, or one of the various specialists and receives

instruction in his own specialty with an object in view ofproducing at the end of the course a thoroughly trained individualsoldier in his particular line.

"(c) The compilation of training regulations and outline ofprograms of instruction for a complete six-day period course,which has just been finished, is a model that could well be

followed, in principle, by any other training center of any branchof the service. The program of instruction is completely outlined,each day's work specifically laid out, the object of instruction andresult to be obtained plainly presented, and a very numerous andvaluable number of hints are given instructors to aid them inefficiently presenting their instruction to the men under training.

"(d) At the present time, if given sufficient number of men totrain, this depot is reaching its full capacity and very soon, werenot automatic replacement drafts for overseas increased innumber, the complete schedule of instruction could be placed ineffect. Training cadres are now about to be filled and, at the

present when apparently hostilities have ceased, this plant isabout to function at its greatest efficiency. It is unfortunate that sofar it has been impossible to put through at least one draft ofthoroughly trained men, for it is believed that the results obtainedwould be worthy of consideration in any future policy fororganizing and training a proper military force for this country.

"(e) The discipline and soldierly bearing of men underinstruction is excellent. Men are very smart in their appearance andsnappy at their work. The 'click' system school is rigidly adhered to."

THE FIELD ARTILLERY REPLACEMENT DEPOT ATCAMP ZACHARY TAYLOR, KENTUCKY

I have already referred to the fact that the Field ArtilleryReplacement Depot at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, hadbarely been established when it became apparent that theload was greater than a single Depot could bear, andanother one had to be created at Camp Zachary Taylor,Kentucky. Another and very impelling reason for theorganization of a second Replacement Depot was the factthat the recruits received at Camp Jackson came largelyfrom the agricultural and mountainous southern states anddid not have the basic education and experience desirablein field artillery recruits. A great deal of thought was given

to the question of a suitable location for a secondreplacement depot in which we could give the necessarytraining throughout the year and still obtain drafted menwho had the basic characteristics desired. Camp ZacharyTaylor came as near to meeting these requirements as anyplace considered, for there we would receive the mendrawn from the industrial and agricultural areas of Indiana,Michigan, western Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.

To command this new Depot, I selected BrigadierGeneral Fred T. Austin, who had served under mycommand when I was a colonel. I sent him to the JacksonDepot to familiarize himself with its operation. TheZachary Taylor Depot, accordingly, became a replica of

Jackson, though on a smaller scale. The Jackson tables oforganization, drill schedules, and so on, were furnishedGeneral Austin, who thus fortunately could escape allpioneering, although, of course, numerous minor changeswere made from time to time to meet the differentconditions surrounding this depot. Although the object ofthe two depots was a common one, viz., to produce adisciplined soldier who was to be in general a fieldartilleryman and a specialist in one subject, yet these resultswere to be arrived at by different procedures at the twodepots. At Jackson, the training first given to the recruit

2Under the draft Acts, the following registrations were made: The firstone, June 5, 1917, covered the ages of 21 to 31; the second, June 5, 1918,and August 24, 1918, included those who had attained the age of 21 sincethe first registration; and the third registration, September 12, 1918,extended the age limit to include 18 to 45.


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was purely disciplinary in its nature, followed by his fieldartillery training; at Taylor, on the other hand, both classesof training were carried on concurrently. Colonel H. D.Higley, who formulated the Taylor schedules, had veryfirm convictions as to the time to take up the field artillerytraining, and I rather agreed with him. However, I decided

to allow each depot to work out its own detailed methodsand I simply insisted that the scope and total amount of thetraining should be the same at both depots. I expected thattime would show which plan was the better one, butunfortunately the depots were not in existence long enoughprior to the armistice to enable definite conclusions to bedrawn. The Depot started July 1st, and during the nextthree weeks Camp Jackson sent to it some 500 officers; itsenlisted strength, as I remember,ultimately reached about 15,000 men.

The same specialist schools that Ihave mentioned as being at Jacksonwere established at Taylor. The receipt

here of the Jackson schedules, hints toinstructors, and all other trainingmemoranda enabled Taylor to progressrapidly and in addition it kept the twodepots co-ordinated. But here again thecontinual speeding up in theorganization of brigades, overseasshipments, and other causes preventedany replacements from ever completingthe full 6-period course. The averagelength of time the men were at the depotwas less than thirty-six days.Parenthetically, it may be remarked that

it was this failure of replacements toever complete the full schedule oftraining at either depot that rendered itimpossible to make any decision as towhich depot had the better system oftraining.

In addition to training enlistedreplacements, both depots had toinstitute schools for officers. Omittingall questions of technical training, it wasnecessary to establish officers' schools to teach officerswho were graduates of Training Camps or DivisionalCamp Schools, the handling of government property by abattery commander, the council book, operation of thebattery mess, battery paper work, returns, reports, and thelike. These schools were generally held at night. This partof training was covered in the Central Officers' TrainingSchool when it replaced the Divisional Training CampSchools.

In each Depot there was maintained an excellentPersonnel Office, with qualification cards and locator cardsof all men in the Depot; also, a Classification andAssignment Office to classify incoming men and assignthem to the training for which their civilian experience had

best fitted them; also, a Transportation Office to meet allincoming detachments, make all necessary railroadarrangements for outgoing detachments, and see that eachman's Service Record was correct and complete. Inaddition, confidential records were kept of each officer asto his value as an instructor, as a disciplinarian, and other

qualifications, these cards being particularly useful inselecting good officers to be sent as replacements.

Although this Depot was nominally commanded byBrigadier General Fred T. Austin, yet its success is duedirectly to Colonel Harvey D. Higley. And, in thisstatement, I do no injustice to General Austin, as he wascamp commander, having under him this ReplacementDepot, The Field Artillery Central Officers' Training

School, The Depot Brigade (leftbehind by the 84th Division), TheRemount Depot, a large hospital, andother activities. No human being couldhave commanded all these enterprises

and devoted any time to the details ofthe Replacement Depot. GeneralAustin had a big task, and he did itwell.

Unfortunately, Colonel Higley wascarried on the papers as SeniorInstructor, I think, instead of inCommand of the Depot, and due to thisslight error he has never been given thecredit he deserves. He actuallyorganized and commanded the Depot infact if not in name. And he did it well,too, displaying excellent judgment and

much initiative in meeting complexproblems daily. I am deeply indebted tohim, and have several times tried tohave his services recognized by theaward of the D.S.M., but each time Ihave been unsuccessful on account ofthe way he was carried on the records.If I had to organize that Depot again Iwould put Colonel Higley in the sameposition he held, but I would see that he

was carried as being in Command of the Depot. As it was,the only reward I could give him was a good command afterthe war; and this I did by sending him to Germany, as soonas the opportunity offered, to command the Field Artillery inour Army of Occupation.

Colonel Harvey D. Higley, in charge ofreplacement depot at Camp Zachary

Taylor, Ky.

FIRING CENTERS

The original plan of the War Plans Division of theGeneral Staff, under date of September 11, 1917, stated:"The Plan is to have in Europe 1 army of 5 corps, 30divisions, in time for an offensive in 1918"; and, inpursuance of this plan, General Pershing had secured certainfiring centers from the French, at which the brigade trainingof the American Field Artillery could be completed.


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These centers had a total capacity of 18 brigades. Yet wehad fallen so far behind in shipment of troops that at thetime I became Chief of Field Artillery there was not asingle brigade in any of these centers. However, the factthat the centers did exist and consequently could be used, ifwe could get the troops to France, naturally subordinated

the establishment of such centers in the United States to theestablishment of the Replacement Depots here, which atthat time did not exist in either country. I had neitherequipment nor trained officers for instructors to carry onboth activities at 100% nor anything like it.

However, with the shortage of shipping to furnishsupplies it was uneconomical and most undesirable tomaintain brigades for months in France merely learningsuch things as they could have learned equally well in thiscountry. The nearer we could get field artillerybrigades to combat efficiency before shippingthem overseas, the closer we approached realpractical efficiency, hence the inclusion of

such Brigade Firing Centers in the UnitedStates in my Training Scheme.

In working out the details of these Centers,I followed the same general plan as with theReplacement Depot; that is, I designated anofficer, Colonel E. L. Gruber, in generalcharge of filling in details of the TrainingCenter organization, course of instruction,and so forth, and he held a daily discussionwith me to harmonize the Centers with otheractivities so as to prevent duplication andoverlapping. I selected Colonel Gruber tohead the Centers and work out the

complicated problems involved because Iregarded him as without a superior inknowledge of field artillery technique andtactics thorough in everything, and a hard and tirelessworker. The results he accomplished proved my opinionto be correct. In looking back now, twenty-two yearslater, and considering all the difficulties under which helabored, I still marvel at the results he accomplished. Noman without a complete knowledge of the tactics andtechnique of field artillery in all its minutae could havelaid out the work as well as he did and no man withoutunlimited physical and mental energy and force ofcharacter could subsequently have succeeded in puttinghis plans into execution.

Of course we got the idea of the Firing Centers fromFrance, where General Pershing, as I have stated, hadinstituted them for his field artillery. In addition, GeneralVignal, the French Military Attache, had several timessuggested their establishment to me. I agreed with him asto their desirability, but I told him frankly that I did nothave the guns and other equipment. Finally, I said I wouldestablish them if he could get a few guns sent here fromFrance. On March 6th, he agreed to take up the gunprocurement through his Ambassador and the President,

and then cable for the guns. He estimated that they wouldbe here in about a month.

At the time we were planning the organization of FiringCenters and their course of instruction in this country, ourproblem was complicated by the insistence of our alliesthat we send overseas only infantry and machine gunners.

There was backing and filling over this question for weeks.I did not know how many brigades there would be in thiscountry, nor how much time we had to get them in shape.But it looked as though there would be at least twenty-fiveof them, and that to their inefficient state of training therewas now to be added a low state of morale, caused byseeing themselves left behind when the infantry of theirdivisions sailed for France. On the other hand, if thesebrigades were to be left behind, our problem would be

partially simplified by giving us moretime to whip them into shape. The cruxof the matter lay in the uncertainty, andthis uncertainty rendered it almost

impossible to lay out a course oftraining, either as to length of time orscope of instruction. However, we had toplan a definite course of some sortbefore we could begin training, so weblocked one out. Our idea was that thecourse, while being almost entirelypractical, including firing and tacticalproblems, would in general be one ofcoordination and advanced work. Itwould be a sort of Finishing School. Inorder to provide facilities, therefore, weplaced at each center a far more

complete equipment for the brigadesundergoing training there than they hadever before possessed. Even so, the

equipment at the Centers was far from complete.

Colonel E. L. Gruber, organizerof the Firing Centers.

In addition, we concentrated as many skilled instructorsat each center as we could. Some of these men we broughtback from France for this purpose. In carrying out ourFinishing School conception, our idea was that,immediately upon the arrival of a brigade, a week or twowould be devoted to checking up its state of training, andanother week or two might be necessary to correct theweaknesses and deficiencies developed by this inspection,either in individuals or smaller units; and then we would goahead with our advanced work. This we intended to beginby carrying forward each individual battery, then eachbattalion, then each regiment, and finally putting all threeregiments, the trench mortar battery, and the ammunitiontrain, together as a complete brigade. The brigade trainingwould include the advance to and complete occupationand organization of a sector, including organization of theechelons, supply of ammunition, materiel, rations, forage,and the like, preparation for an attack and advance,preparation for retirement to a scondary position, forrelief, complete organization of liaison, programs of


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fire, both day and night, including barrages, counter-offensive preparation, harassing fire, interdiction fire, useof aerial observation, and many other featurescharacteristic of actual battle.

But upon the arrival of the first brigades it wasdiscovered that their training had not progressed to the

point where they could undertake our proposed course withadvantage. In reality, we had to start with the mostelementary instruction, lay a sound foundation, and lead upto the point where they could profitably undertake thework we had planned for them. In order to correct forprevious lack of progress, we had to establish at the FiringCenters many of the schools I have previously stated wereorganized at the Replacement Depots. It became apparentthat much of the training, which both officers and enlistedmen had gotten in division camps, was superficial. Thestandard of knowledge I had set for officers had been toohigh for them to reach by their own efforts, and with thelack of facilities at division camps. Anyhow,

they were far below that standard. So wehad to establish schools for officers and formen.

We had to teach the officers drillregulations, blackboard firing, indoor terrainboard, use of range tables, methods of fire,corrections of the moment, probabilities,orientation and reconnaissance, use of maps,sketching, telephone upkeep and signalling,radio, machine gunnery, materiel,ammunition, and gas defense.

Similarly for the enlisted men, we had totrain them in equitation, saddling,

harnessing, driving, road marches, batterydrill, occupation of positions, camping, fieldkits, first aid, and gas defense.

And, while as a result of thisunexpected delay, the brigades did notadvance as far as we had anticipatedduring the three months' course, yet theyattained a degree of efficiency far beyond that of thebrigades we had sent to France prior to establishingthese Centers. I have in my possession a letter from anInspector in France in which he comments mostfavorably upon the condition of a field artillery brigadewhich had reached that country after completing aFiring Center course in the United States. He said that itwas by far the best brigade as concerns training that hadlanded in France; and he even went so far as to say thatthis brigade subsequently went backwards in its furthertraining in that country.

So much for our Finishing School idea. As the abovequoted letter shows, it was working out satisfactorily. Andnow, while we were striving to complete the training ofthese brigades, which had been in existence for a year,roughly, new burdens were added to the Firing Centers. InJuly, as will be seen later, several new brigades had to be

organized, and authority was given me to organize them atFiring Centers. This meant enlargement of the schools wealready had and the addition of others at these Centers. Asthe subject is more fully discussed later, nothing furtherwill be stated here, except to say that it meant more workfor the already hard-pressed Firing-Center personnel.

Colonel Gruber started his center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,early in May. He was the pioneer. He not only carried onthe work of his own center, but in addition he largelyguided the others also. These other centers were CampMcClellan, at Anniston, Alabama, under Colonel John S.Hammond; West Point, Kentucky, under Colonel CharlesS. Blakely; and Camp Jackson, Columbia, South Carolina,under Colonel Thomas D. Osborne. Colonel Gruber aloneescaped the burden of organizing new brigades at hiscenter. He carried on the Finishing School idea to theArmistice.

It might here be interjected that Colonel Blakely, instarting the Firing Center at West Point,

Kentucky, proceeded to that place in anautomobile borrowed from Camp ZacharyTaylor. He was accompanied by Colonel Leeand Captain Robinson. When Camp Taylorwas abandoned some years later, theauthorities at that place were still waiting forthe return of the borrowed car!

The work done at these centers was hardand discouraging for the commanders.There was a shortage of every sort ofequipment; competent instructors were fewand far between in spite of all my efforts toget them from France; and the commanders

had to feel their way from day to day. Theywere junior in rank to brigade and manyregimental commanders, whose commandswere under instruction. Of course, my officegot out a memorandum establishing therelations between the Training Centerauthorities and the brigade undergoing

instruction, and General March approved thememorandum. This, however, merely helped, for nopaper could entirely remove the difficulties inherent insuch relationship. This called for tact as well as a superiordegree of professional knowledge. The fact that in all thebrigades that passed through these Centers but littlefriction actually developed, not only speaks well for thespirit dominating the whole field artillery but is also amonument to the tact, wisdom, and great ability of theFiring Center commanders. I now record with the deepestpleasure my appreciation of the fine work done by theseFiring Center commanders.

Colonel Thomas D. Osborne,commanding the Firing Center

at Camp Jackson.

Up to the signing of the Armistice, seven brigades hadpassed through these centers: Three through Fort Sill, twothrough Camp Jackson, and one each through West Point,Kentucky, and Camp McClellan, Alabama. In addition,there were eight brigades in the Centers in training.


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As to the Camp McClellan Center, itearly became apparent that the reservationwas inadequate in size, did not lend itself toexpansion, and was otherwise ill suited tothe work. I visited it personally to see whatcould be done to improve the situation, but

found it to be a bowl in the mountains,containing only 16,000 acres, and with mostof the buildings located in the middle of thebowl. Surrounding land, which could beused only at great inconvenience, was highin price. I therefore determined to give upthis center as soon as I could locate a newand suitable place, there being no existingcamp or cantonment available. Uponpresenting the situation to the properauthorities of the War Department, I wasgiven authority to secure a new and suitablereservation if I could find one, and to turn

McClellan over to the General Staff forassignment to some other purpose as soon asthe Field Artillery could vacate it.

Ultimately, I located the area which is now Fort Bragg,North Carolina, and thereupon completed the plan ofmaintaining Centers as follows:

Fort Sill, Oklahoma ..................... capacity 2 brigades

Camp Jackson, South Carolina .... capacity 4 brigades

Camp Knox, Kentucky ........................ capacity 6 brigades

Camp Bragg, North Carolina............... capacity 6 brigades

Total....................................................... 18 brigades

This is the number we contemplated maintaining in theUnited States under the 80-Division Plan that was in effectwhen the Armistice was signed.

After we secured possession of the Camp Braggreservation and construction had progressed to the pointwhere it could furnish a nucleus of accommodation for theTraining Center, I ordered Colonel Hammond to proceedthere from Camp McClellan, and to command the newcenter. He had been there only a few days when I receiveddisquieting news as to his health. I sent Colonel Edward P.King, Jr., to investigate, while I went to West Point,Kentucky. Colonel King promptly followed me there. Ashe walked into the tent where I was discussing affairs with

certain officers, I knew that there was trouble. Wheneverhe promptly followed me to some place during the war, italways meant a situation that admitted of no delay. Heinformed me that Colonel Hammond was in such a state ofhealth as to necessitate his immediate relief. This soundslike a very simple matter; it looks like merely sendinganother colonel to replace him; but, actually, colonels ofField Artillery for important work in the United Stateswere few and far between, and each one was in a positionfrom which he could ill be spared and in which he couldnot be satisfactorily replaced. The whole structure was

pretty much like a house of cardspull oneout and the whole structure falls. As therewere a number of officers present in the tent,I stepped outside to avoid the noise andconfusion while thinking out the problem ofColonel Hammond's successor. It was a dark

night and while I was walking back andforth, a light rain began to fall; if the officerwho came out of the tent and threw a raincoatover my shoulders ever reads this paragraph,I hope he will accept my belated thanks forthe performance of a kindly and thoughtfulact. After spending over an hour inconsidering different men and the work theywere on, I finally determined to moveColonel Maxwell M. Murray from commandof the Knox Center and to have him organizeand command the Bragg Center. I thenselected Colonel Waldo C. Potter to

command the Knox Center, and this in turninvolved a delay in replacing Colonel Gruber

in command of the Fort Sill Center for which ColonelPotter had been slated.

Colonel E. P. King, Jr., head ofCamps, Ranges, and RealEstate Section, OCFA.

I had previously promised Colonel Gruber that as areward for his fine work, I would send him to France justas soon as I could find a successor to take over his FiringCenter. Ultimately I selected Colonel John G. Tyndallfor this duty. But the various changes I have mentionedcaused such a delay that it was not until late in Octoberthat Colonel Gruber was freed. I then met him at CampZachary Taylor, when he again asked me to hasten hisorders. I told him that his name was on the next list of

colonels to be made brigadier generals and that I thoughthis chances for his promotion would be lessened if hewent overseas at once as a colonel. He replied that hestill wanted to go at once irrespective of rank, andaccordingly I agreed to send him. When we arrived inWashington, however, early in November, there was somuch armistice talk in the air that I could notimmediately carry out my promise, so, at my request, hewas detailed on the War Plans Branch of the GeneralStaff to handle the problems of demobilization andreorganization of the field artillery.

I sent Colonel Hammond to Walter Reed Hospital. Thiswas late in September, 1918, and, as the Armistice came in

November, no brigades completed their training at the newCamp Bragg Center. Colonel Murray, I am certain, wouldhave developed a Center there fully the equal of the others.As it was, he remained at Camp Bragg and did excellentwork in handling many post-war difficulties at that place.

The reader will have noted that Bragg and Knox wereeach to have been Centers of a capacity of six brigades,the greatest number contemplated at any one Center. TheKnox reservation would have had an area of about 80,000acres, while Bragg would have had about 140,000, and inaddition it offered many more possibilities as a


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field artillery range. Thus the Bragg Center would in everyrespect have been our most important Center.

I have discussed the four Firing Centers as though theywere all alike and the problems of one characteristic ofall, and as though the solution of the problems at oneCenter was the solution of those at all. This was not the

case. Each had its own peculiar trouble and difficulties.In reality, the only factor that was absolutely common tothem all was the hard, gruelling work. Nor do I want toleave the impression that all the Firing Centercommanders, other than Colonel Gruber, had merely tofollow his schedules, training memoranda, andpamphlets. Some of his instruction matter could be, andwas, used as written; much of it had to be revamped to fitit to the particular Center where it was used, and inaddition it had to be modified to fit the state of training ofthe particular brigades under instruction, for no twobrigades were ever duplicates of one another in their stateof training when they arrived at a Firing Center.

Then there were many other local problems to be solvedat each Center. Each Center had some advantages andsome disadvantages over the others. In the most vague andgeneral terms, I would say that Colonel Gruber, at FortSill, being the pioneer, did the spade work (and it washard) of working out schedules, preparing problems, andwriting and publishing an enormous number of printed andmimeographed pamphlets of instruction, all of which werefurnished to the other Centers; on the other hand, he hadthe facilities of the School of Fire, located on the samereservation, to assist him to such anextent as it could spare. ColonelOsborne, at Camp Jackson, South

Carolina, had the advantage of theinstruction matter gotten out byColonel Gruber, and had an excellentfiring range, though it was not wellequipped; but he suffered fromhaving his activity subordinated tothe Replacement Depot, at the sameplace.

I was compelled to so subordinateit, as only the early success of thisDepot could relieve the draining of allother existing brigades, whether inFiring Centers or not, to supplyreplacements for the field artillery inFrance. These replacements had to goforward on schedule time eventhough so doing wrecked everyexisting brigade in continental UnitedStates.

General Blakely, at West Point,Kentucky, had the advantage ofColonel Gruber's instruction matter;but his firing range, at the time, wasfar inferior to either Sill or Jackson,

and he had, in addition and to some extent, to dividefacilities with the Central Officers' Training School atCamp Zachary Taylor, some 30 miles away; he did nothave a free hand; and, in addition to this, he was in generalcharge of constructing a many-million-dollar cantonment,where he was harassed by labor troubles.

Colonel Hammond, at Camp McClellan, Alabama,had the advantage of Colonel Gruber's instructionmatter, but he had the poorest firing range of any of theCenters, so poor in fact that we were planning toabandon it as soon as we could get Bragg ready to takeover the work; and as a consequence he had the leastamount of equipment available for instruction purposes.And, finally, I want to add that the different conditionsexisting at these four Firing Centers, so widely scatteredphysically, involved no small amount of work in theOffice of Chief of Field Artillery to keep them all "onan even keel." For we were, of course, trying to producea standardized product, a reasonably well-trained field

artillery brigade.There were several factors upon which I counted to

produce this result. One was Colonel Gruber's literaturefurnished to all Center commanders. Another wasencouraging personal correspondence directly amongCenter commanders with one another. A third was frequentvisits by an Inspector from my office. In this last case, Ifollowed a rather unique plan of having the Inspector pointout verbally on the spot any errors he might find instead ofwriting back long letters after he returned to the office. If

he had noticed any particularly goodfeature of training or administration atone Center, he discussed this with the

other Center commanders, leaving tothem the adoption or rejection of theidea. The Inspector brought back to myoffice lists of the needs, generallypersonnel or supplies, of the Centercommanders and we then helped toremove the deficiency to the best of ourability.

Major Kenneth S. Perkins, Inspector-General.

This idea of the Chief letting theCenter commanders know of his desiresas to results, and then permitting them towork out their mission withoutinterference, while the Chief assisted insupplying their needs, worked miracles.No order from the Chief's office and nocut-and-dried program furnished by himcould possibly have produced thewonderful results actually obtained.These results were a monument to thezeal, ability and loyalty of the Centercommanders.

There was also a change ofcommanders at the other Centers. AtJackson, Colonel Osborne was succeeded


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by Colonel Erlenkotter and he, in turn, was succeeded byColonel Paine shortly before the Armistice. And whilethese changes were taking place, Colonel Charles S.Blakely, commanding the Knox Center, and who was theonly remaining one of the four Center organizers, waspromoted to a brigadier generalcy in September and given

command of a field artillery brigade at his Center. Whenhe was so promoted, it was necessary to relieve him asFiring Center commander so that he could devote moretime to his brigade; that in itself was a big enough task forone man. He was succeeded by Colonel Murray as Centercommander; and Colonel Murray in turn had to be relievd,as I have previously stated, to take over the more importantBragg Center. Colonel Murray was succeeded at Knox byColonel Waldo C. Potter. So, during the course of four tosix months, while the Centers were struggling to get going,under every sort of handicap, half of themhad two different commanders and the otherhalf had three. Of course, so many changes

were bad. They tended to prevent continuityof methods and of policies. But the changescould not be avoided. As I have stated, ourwhole structure depended upon a few keymen, and, when one of them was removed,other changes inevitably had to follow.

It will be noted that Colonel Blakely wasthe only one of the four original Centercommanders to become a general officer.But he was also the senior of the fourcommanders. Thus, both by seniority andhis work, he was entitled to this promotion.This last sentence may be unfortunate, for I

do not want to give the impression that heor anybody else was promoted during thewar as a reward. It was not so. GeneralBlakely was promoted to this gradebecause his whole record showed him to bewell fitted for this work, and that he waswell qualified to fill it. He was a field artilleryman ofoutstanding ability, of much versatility, and to a pleasingand disarming personality he added an exceptionally alertmind; he also possessed a capacity for getting thingsdone, and this qualification was put to a severe test inhandling the construction of a many-million-dollarcantonment we were building at Camp Knox under themost trying conditions. The more troubles thataccumulated around him and the greater the number oftrying problems that he had to solve the more hisphilosophical nature shone forth and the less he showedhis troubles to the world.

Omitting the subject of organizing new field artillerybrigades at the Firing Centers, which will be consideredlater, and confining our remarks merely to the brigadeswhich had been in existence nearly a year at the time theCenters were established, the work of the Centercommanders in putting the first semblance of efficiency

into these brigades was marvelous. It was all the more sowhen consideration is given to the many handicaps underwhich the Centers labored. Nothing but the greatest spiritof zeal and devotion to duty, coupled with much ability onthe part of all who labored in this field, could haveproduced the results that were obtained. Under these

conditions and considering that there were several hundredofficers of junior rank on duty at the Centers and thatchanges of commanders were continually occurring, itbecame an extremely difficult task later to select a limitednumber of such officers for special commendation withoutinadvertently doing an injustice to others equally worthy ofmention. But, notwithstanding this difficulty, the followingnamed officers who were on duty at different times at theField Artillery Brigade Firing Centers were reported ashaving materially contributed to the success of these

Centers. In listing these few names, thequestion is not so much whether each of theofficers named should be included in the list,

as whether many more should not also be soincluded:

In addition to Colonel E. L. Gruber, whoorganized the Brigade Firing Center at FortSill, Oklahoma, the following officers, byreason of their efficiency, energy, anddevotion to duty contributed materially to thesuccess of this Firing Center: Colonel C. P.George, Director of Instruction; Lt. Col.Ivens S. Jones, Assistant Director; Lt. Col. H.L. C. Jones, Assistant Director; Lt. Col. J. B.Anderson, Assistant Director; Major H. R.Corbin, Assistant Director; Major R. D.

McDonald, Assistant Director; Captain A. Y.Wier, Commanding Enlisted Detachment;Captain Wayne Johnson, Assistant Adjutant;Captain John B. Grimball, Munitions Officer;1st Lieut. L. H. Dean, Range Officer; 1stLieut. R. J. Turner, Transportation Officer;

Captain Bennet (French Army).

Brig. Gen. Charles S. Blakely,commanding Firing Center at

Camp Knox.

InstructorsCaptains D. R. Sigourney, LuckettCochran, T. K. Fisher, T. P. Speer, K. T. Tenner, David C.Spooner, William Horstkotte, Signal Corps; C. C. Ellzey,and E. K. Ruth of the Chemical Warfare Service.

In addition to Colonel C. S. Blakely, who organizedthe Brigade Firing Center at Camp Knox, Kentucky, thefollowing officers, by reason of their efficiency, energy,and devotion to duty, contributed materially to thesuccess of this Firing Center: Colonel R. E. Lee, CampAdjutant and Executive; Colonel Maxwell Murray,Commandant (relieving Col. Blakely); Colonel Waldo C.Potter, Commandant (relieving Col. Murray); MajorHoward M. Randall, Camp Adjutant; Major CraigieKrayenbuhl, Camp Adjutant and Senior Instructor;Captain W. Meade Robinson, Camp Quarterm

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1940