Field Artillery Journal - Mar 1938

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Mar 1938

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March-April, 1938

CONTENTS

Hail to the Chief ......................................................................................................... 83

Artillery Map-Makers ................................................................................................. 85

By 1st Lieutenant John F. Greco, FA

Mechanized Field Artillery ......................................................................................... 96

By Major B. H. Perry, 68th Field Artillery

To the Finish ............................................................................................................. 109

By Peter B. KyneTo the Victors ........................................................................................................... 115

Fred T. Austin, 18661938...................................................................................... 116

Convoy ..................................................................................................................... 120

By Captain Reuben K. Ransone, 15th FA-Res

How to Make a Convergence Fan ............................................................................. 124

By Lieut. Harry E. Mikkelsen, FA

Workman Meets Tools ............................................................................................. 127

By Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Meyer, FAThe Conference-Demonstration Method of Tactical Instruction .............................. 137

By Colonel A. G. Paxton, 114th FA

One Hundred Percent Regiments of the National Guard Field Artillery ........................ 142

Lateral Conduct of Fire ............................................................................................ 144

By 1st Lieutenant D. C. McNair, FA

The Problem of Military Education .......................................................................... 151

By Madge Elwood

Letters ....................................................................................................................... 153

Foreign Artillery Notes ............................................................................................. 156

By J. S. W.

Analytical Studies ..................................................................................................... 165

By Colonel Ned S. Rehkopf, FA

Military Books .......................................................................................................... 168

New Members .......................................................................................................... 169

Reviews .................................................................................................................... 171

Carbine and Lance

The War in AbyssiniaThe Caissons Roll

Some Forward Observations .................................................................................... 175

AUTHORS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR ARTICLES


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28TH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

VOL. 28 No. 2MARCH-APRIL, 1938

THEFIELD ARTILLERY

JOURNALCopyright, 1938, by The United States Field

Artillery Association

A PUBLICATION FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE REGULAR ARMY, NATIONALGUARD, AND ORGANIZED RESERVE

Patron Saint of Artillery

PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY FOR

THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

BY MONUMENTAL PRINTING COMPANY32D STREET AND ELM AVENUE

BALTIMORE, MD.

Editorial Office, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.Michael V. Gannon, Captain, Field Artillery, Editor

Entered as second-class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office atBaltimore, Md., under the Act of March 3, 1879

Published without expense to the government

The Field Artillery Journal pays for original articles accepted


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THE U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

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ARTICLE II OF CONSTITUTION

"The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of theField Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for

disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the fieldartillery's progress, development, and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with theother arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; tofoster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militiaforces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the goodof our country."

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Hail to the ChiefAJOR General Robert M.Danford, the new Chief of Field

Artillery, has performed hisentire military service, since graduation atthe Military Academy, in the FieldArtillery arm. He has made an enviablerecord of accomplishment on everyassignment he has been given and isknown as an indefatigable worker andthorough student of the tactics andtechnique of Field Artillery, as well asthose of the combined arms.

At West Point, where he wasaffectionately known as "John," he wasstudious, efficient, and maintained strictdiscipline, but withal was generous andkindly toward underclassmen. He

participated in athletics and held therecord for the fence vault at the Academy.

As a young officer at Fort Riley,Kansas, he was a thorough student ofhorse-mastership. He was a graduate of theSchool of Application for Cavalry and

Field Artillery and a recognized authorityon the breeding, training, and feeding ofhorses. He took a particular delight in thestudy of Thoroughbred blood lines; a studysince put into practice in breeding bettertypes of horses and mules in our RemountService. Later he acted as Secretary in theimprovement and development of theMounted Service School.

He made a name for himself as

Inspector-Instructor of National Guard,New Haven, Connecticut, and inorganizing the first ROTC unit at YaleUniversity, where he was held in thehighest esteem and was honored with theA.M. degree in 1917. His students formedthe nucleus of the Yale Batteries whichwent to the Mexican Border in 1916, andlater many of these men served withdistinction in the World War.

He organized our first ReplacementDepot at Camp Jackson, South Carolinaduring the World War, where he finallyhad over fifty thousand officers and menin training. He handled the replacementof all field artillery specialists from cooks

to horseshoers. General Snow, our firstChief of Field Artillery, stated that

General Danford's work at Camp Jacksonwas a monument to him, and that he(General Snow) had never ceased to begrateful to him for making such acomplete success of one of the mostworrying problems that beset the FieldArtillery during the World Warthat ofreplacements. For this service he wasawarded the Distinguished ServiceMedal.

General Danford was one of the firstof the junior field artillery officers to bemade a Brigadier General during theWorld War.

As Commandant of Cadets at WestPoint, after the War, General Danfordadded further distinction to his record.The Military Academy, because of theearly graduation of classes during theWar, had lost most of its old traditionsand customs. The new cadets knew

nothing of the old West Point. Due ingreat part to General Danford's efforts,these cherished ideals, traditions, andcustoms were taught the new cadets, andin a short time, the Academy lifereappeared with all its worthwhileheritages.

General Danford is a graduate of thevarious service schools to include theWar College. He has served in the various

commands of field artillery at home andin the Philippines, and recentlycommanded the 13th Field Artillery inHawaii. His latest important assignmentwas as Chief of Staff of the Sixth CorpsArea, under General Drum.

General Danford comes to the Officeof the Chief of Field Artillery with athorough knowledge of that office, havingserved in it on four different occasions.

Needless to say, the entire personnel ofthe Field Artillery is happy in getting aChief whom they admire and respect, andwho has always been recognized as asuperior leader, and a sincere andsympathetic friend.

M


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Copyright by Harris and Ewing

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT M. DANFORD, FIFTH CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY


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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

VOLUME 28 MARCH-APRIL, 1938 NUMBER 2

The 1938 Prize EssayARTILLERY MAP-MAKERS

BY 1ST LIEUTENANT JOHN F. GRECO, FA

I

HE importance of survey inmodern artillery operations, asinitially developed during the

World War, is granted by all artilleryofficers of today, although veryregretfully by a great many. The principleof survey was first introduced into thegunnery problem of preparing firing datafor two primary reasonsto attain

surprise and effect; thus enabling artilleryto mass its weapons in predetermined,camouflaged positions, and withoutregistration (or with extremely limitedregistration) to concentrate its fires ontargets over which ground and airobservation was impossible. In the wordsof Brevet Major M. Hatline, RoyalEngineers, British Army, "The days whenartillery could do its job with a single fire

orderto cock the old bitch up a bitaredefinitely gone."

"The dragons are all dead and thelance grows rusty in the chimney corner.Wars are exercises in ballistics, chemicalingenuity, administration [and] hardlabor. . . ."*

In the succeeding pages I propose astudy of the extent to which the firingcharts of the artillery battalions in aninfantry division require brigade

coordination; and intend to demonstratethe necessity for a brigade-survey

platoon. What I will have to say aboutthis problem does not afford a definiteand tried solution; it amounts only to anindication of the direction toward whichwe must turn. But although not a testedsolution, what can be said at presentseems to me to bring out a deficiency inthe present division artillery organization.

With the recognition of the fact thatneither terrestrial nor air observation forartillery fire will always be available and

bearing in mind the mission of theartillery"to support the infantry byfire"we must fix now the best

procedure for the delivery of effectiveunobserved fire.

I will first briefly review the results tobe gained and that have been gained fromartillery survey and then by a comparison

of the present procedure with the oneproposed by the writer, justify therecommendations as made above.

"The purpose of artillery survey,"quoting FAB 161. Gunnery, page 148, "isto gather topographical data of the propercharacter and in the proper amount toenable battalion and higher headquartersto assign targets, and batteries to computefiring data." Considerable benefit is

derived from artillery fire by proper useof survey.

a. Concentration: When the relative

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*From "Rats, Lice and History," by Hans

Zinsser.


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positions of each battery are unknown, itis necessary for one gun in each battery to

adjust on all targets being fired on;however, when the battery positions areknown and plotted on a commoncoordinate system, any battery can fire atshort notice on any target registered on byanother battery.

b. Surprise: If the topography of thetarget area permits a detailed and accuratesurvey, the targets can be taken under firewithout registration, with the obvious

benefit of surprise. But this accurate

survey requires visible targets, and theenemy cannot be expected to pass inreview for our survey parties who arelocating them. Many targets, however,can be located from air photos, which,when sufficient control exists, are alsosatisfactory for the conduct of unobservedfire.

The tactical situation permitting,registration should always be allowed,

although it should be reduced to aminimum in order to deny information tothe enemy as to the mass of artilleryconcentrated against him.

c. Security: The quieter artillerystays during the registration period the

less its risk of being located by theenemy intelligence service. This danger

of location by the enemy may bereduced for the registering batteries byhaving them move from one surveyed

position into another upon completion ofregistration.

d. Economy: More efficienttactical handling of the artillery by theuse of survey methods, with consequentgreater concentration and accuracy ofits fires, will clearly result in moreeffective overcoming of opposition and

in economy of employment of otherarms.

II

It is well here to examine brieflyseveral examples of the use made ofsurvey by artillery during the WorldWar:

During the early years of the war,registration by each battery was considered

necessary; therefore any attempt to concealthe amount of artillery present in anyengagement was impossible. To overcomethis, the British established survey battalions(a separate service) charged with

performing survey work for artillery units.

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ARTILLERY MAP-MAKERS

Prior to the Battle of Cambrai inNovember of 1917, we find that the

artillery was given three don'ts.a. Don't register.b. Don't destroy obstacles by

preliminary bombardment. (In otherwordsno preparation.)

c. Don't fire on wire and trenches,but fire at guns.

Our principal concern here is the firstof the "don'ts," for up until this battle theartillery had insisted on registration. Thenewly established survey battalions

performed the necessary survey work andvisited all the batteries in order to explainthe new fire methods. So the Britishgunners made their debut of going into

battle without registering. The infantrybroke through in the attack, and theintense, surprisingly accurate artillery firewas greatly responsible for this success,despite the fact that this battle marked theintroduction of tanks into warfare. The

success of the infantry in continuing to apoint beyond the support range of theartillery necessitated a displacement ofthe pieces from the original surveyed

position into unsurveyed positions. There,registration was not accomplished, and asvisible targets were limited, the artilleryfired blindly in the general direction ofthe enemy. Consequently the infantrywere unable to resist the strongcounterattack delivered by the Germans,and the British successes of the first fewdays, gained under the cover of effectiveartillery supporting fires, were lost

because of the artillery's ineffective firefrom the unsurveyed positions.

At the time of the preparation for thebattle of Amiens in 1918, we find againthe same restrictions placed upon theartillery as there were before the battle ofCambrai. Again there were initial

successes for the infantry gained undercover of artillery fire from surveyed

positions. But there the analogy ceases.

After the initial phase, the battle wasapparently broken off to consolidate the

gains, local attacks being made to keepthe enemy guessing. No furtherattempts were made to advance alongthis front, but meanwhile the survey

battalions were surveying completelynew artillery positions in a differentareanorth of Ancre. As soon as it wasclear that the front had stabilized infront of Amiens, all guns not requiredfor defensive purposes were withdrawnto the new front north of Ancre.

Arriving there, the artillery foundeverything ready for them, and wentinto positions already completelysurveyed. Then, before the enemyrealized that one battle was over,another surprise attack was delivered;again supported by effective artilleryfire.

John R. Innes, in his book "FlashSpotters and Sound Rangers," writing of

the British army during the World War,states, "The claim is made that it was only

proper utilization of the survey battalionsthat made possible the successful attacksof 1918, and that there would not have

been so many attacks that missed fire iftheir work had been understood earlier.The influence of these units on thetactical use of artillery was very muchgreater than the scanty references to theirwork in official histories would seem toindicate."

In the same vein I quote MajorGeneral Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.,M.G., C.B., "In the early years of the war,fog or bad weather of any kind had beenregarded as a fatal obstacle to successfulattack, because it blinded the gunners and

prevented them from creating the breachfor the infantry assault. Time and again inthe early days of trench warfare, when the

Germans were firing five shells to ourone, a day of fog had been hailed by ourinfantry with joy as a day of rest and

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of relief from shell fire. Time and againattacks planned by us and our French

allies were postponed because theweather conditions made it difficult oreven impossible for the artillery toascertain by preliminary trial the exactadjustment of their guns needed for

bombardment of the targets alloted tothem. This process of registration oftargets had been regarded as anindispensable preliminary of battle, andwhen a great mass of guns was to beemployed it had given us warning of the

enemy's intention to attack and hadwarned the enemy that we were preparingto attack him; it was one of the factorswhich made it all but impossible toachieve surprise. But by 1918 thedevelopment of scientific gunnery hadmade it possible to ascertain for thegunners beforehand the exact adjustmentrequired to enable them to reach anygiven targets under any reasonable

condition of weather. So the slow processof registration became unnecessary. Itwas possible to open a great

bombardment without previouslyalarming the enemy, and best of all, theattacks became far more independent ofthe weather than they had ever been. Fog

became an aid instead of an impedimentto attack, because under its protection,guns, tanks and infantry could be massedunseen. So for this battle of August 8(The battle of Armageddon), twothousand guns were collected onRawlinson's front of attack, many of them

being brought into action at the lastmoment and hardly any opened fire fromtheir new positions before they all crashedout together. A friendly mist covered thefinal assembly of the assaulting troops andof the tanks, and these burst through theenemy's lines almost simultaneously with

the opening of the bombardment whichrolled on ahead of them in the form of acrushing barrage."

Note that if each of the five hundredbatteries employed in this battle

(assuming four guns per battery) had beenpermitted to register and that theammunition allowance per battery had

been 8 rounds, a total of four thousandrounds would have been required tocomplete registration. Then the

possibility of a surprise attack would havebeen slight indeed.

Consider the highly successful attackon the Italian front in October, 1918, forwhich all survey work was done by the

6th Field Survey Company. Artillery wasmassed in the usual large World Warquantities, yet so few guns registered that

prior to the attack the enemy had noknowledge whatsoever of the amount ofartillery opposing him. If it had not beenfor the work of this survey company therewould have been so much time andammunition expended in registration

prior to the attack, that the enemy would

have had ample warning of it. As it was,at 11:30 PM the artillery opened fire andthe Earl of Cavan stated in his dispatch,"The bombardment and subsequent

barrage were excellent."It is significant too that in the German

attack of March 1918, of the three armiesthat took part in the attack only onesucceeded in breaking through, and it

planned its attack on survey lines similarto the methods of the British, whereas theother two armies did not.

Contrast sixty thousand casualtiessustained during the first day of thecomparatively unsuccessful battle ofthe Somme of 1916, with the onethousand casualties incurred in thesuccessful battle of Amiens in 1918. Inthe latter battle the survey battalionswere at work and they made possiblethe successful counterbattery by the

British artillery, although there was noobservation because of the prevailingmisty weather. This resulted in the

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silencing of many German guns and theconsequent reduction of casualties from

sixty to one.The examples cited illustrate clearlythe great importance of coordinatedsurvey for all artillery operations, withoutwhich the artillery cannot guaranteecontinuous support. During the WorldWar, stabilized as it was, the British wereable successfully to employ Field Survey

battalions, an entirely separate service, toaccomplish the necessary survey work forall artillery units down to include the

battery. Obviously such a unit wouldhave no place in rapidly movingsituations, and with highly mobile forcessuch as are employed at present. The timerequired for a separate unit to furnisheach battery (or even each battalion) of a

brigade with essential survey data wouldpreclude rapid entry into action byartillery. This same disadvantage appliesto a brigade survey platoon, whose

function it would be to perform all surveywork within the brigade. However, suchuse is not contemplated for the survey

platoon I propose. Before discussing thisplatoon, let us first inspect our presentsurvey organization. With it, can theartillery guarantee successful continuedsupport for the infantry when unobservedfire is necessary, or must we, like theBritish gunners at Cambrai, fire blindlyafter a displacement from surveyed tounsurveyed positions, and thereafter

permit successful counterattacks to wipeout our infantry's initial gains?

III

From the Engineers and the Air Corps,

the artillery brigade will expect to receivethe basic ground control, which is thecompilation of known points in the formof coordinates, fire-control data sheets, ora final improved 1/20,000 fire-controlmap. This may be augmented byinformation from the corps artillerysound-and-flash units, although this isonly a possibility, inasmuch as these unitswill have pressing problems of their own.So it can be accepted that the artillery

brigade is dependent upon the Engineersand Air Corps for the basic groundcontrol. The brigade in turn distributes itsinformation down through its battalions.Each battalion then must locate its base

pieces, targets, check points, and the like,accurately with respect to each other, and

build up what is actually the ultimate aimof all survey worka firing chartwhich is defined as a (FAB 161, page

149) "sheet upon which base pieces,observation posts, targets, and other

points of importance are plotted. . . . Itmay be a fire-control map, a grid orcontrol sheet, or a photo mosaic or other

photo map. It is used by battalion andhigher headquarters in designatingtargets, and by batteries in calculatingfiring data."

During a war, especially in its initial

stages, maps, even of a small scale, canbe expected only for limited areas, thusthe artillery must be prepared to relysolely on air photos supplemented bystandard highway maps. That each

battalion under these conditions canaccurately locate base pieces,observation posts, base points, andorienting lines, is questionable. Brieflymy doubts are based on the followingfacts:

a. Basic control points will notbesupplied by the engineers at all times,

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and when supplied will often beinsufficient.

b. Air photos, without control eithervertical or horizontal, are not sufficientlyreliable in themselves for accuratedelivery of unobserved fires.

c. The prescribed grid, numberedarbitrarily by each battalion when nocontrol exists, combined with unrelatedvertical control for each battalion(inasmuch as each battalion started itschart by assigning the initial orienting

point an arbitrary altitude), does notpermit centralized control of fire for unitshigher than the battalion, and practicallydenies higher headquarters anyopportunity for assigning targets.

As a remedy for the foregoingdisadvantages, present regulations

provide only the following: (FAB 161,page 149) "When it is necessary and timepermits, the brigade or regiment mayissue such instructions as will coordinate

the survey work of its battalions insupplementing existing data." It is thismethod of coordination of the surveywork of the battalions which I believe to

be inadequate, and for which I wouldrecommend:

a. Brigade coordination of thesurvey work of its battalions to be astandard practice.

b. The coordination to be

accomplished by the addition of a brigade-survey platoon to existing survey groups.

c. The tactical and technicalemployment of the proposed survey

platoon and its relation to the surveysections of the lower units in the brigadeto be set forth in a manual on ArtillerySurvey.

The rapid development of aerialmapping methods has brightened

considerably the map outlook in the eventof a war in either an unmapped or poorlymapped area. Briefly, it is expected that

the mapping program during such a warshould progress as follows:

a. There will initially be available avery general 1/62,500 map, compiledfrom G-2 information, which will showimportant roads, stream and towns.

b. Air photos of the entire area ofexpected operations taken with a 1/40,000multilens camera, will be assembled intomosaics and used to augment the originallycompiled map. Thus there will be availablea 1/62,500 map which will show roads,railways, streams, towns and wooded areaswith a good degree of accuracy.

c. Simultaneously with the photomission described in b. above, the AirCorps will photograph the present and

immediate future operation area with a1/20,000 single-lens camera. From these

photos will be obtained li thographed

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mosaics within six days, and stripmosaics within twenty-four hours.

d. By photogrammetric processes,using the aerocartograph and themultiplex projector, the Corps ofEngineers will construct the Fire ControlData Sheet, which is a 1/20,000 skeletonmap showing roads, streams, and woods,and a number of critical points locatedaccurately both horizontally andvertically.

e. Contoured maps, prepared byphotogrammetry, from the photos

mentioned in b. above, will be issued onscales of 1/20,000 and 1/62,500. The timenecessary for the production of thesemaps is dependent on the number ofaerocartographs and multiplex projectorsavailable to the Engineers. However, withadequate equipment, a contoured1/20,000 map should be availablecovering the first twenty-five miles ofdepth within fourteen days after the

photos are taken, and from then on at arate of three miles per day.

Assuming that the mapping programdoes progress as outlined above, theartillery must still fire blindly or at leastwith one eye closed, in the opening

phases of any operation requiring supportwith unobserved fires because:

a. A controlled map will be lackinguntil the issue of the Fire Control DataSheet.

b. The accuracy of the strip mosaicfor fire control purposes varies as doesthe terrainfrom a fair accuracy in agentle, rolling country to a questionableaccuracy in rough terrain.

In addition it is extremely probablethat the mapping program will not

progress as per schedule in which casemaps will often be nonexistent. Theartillery, however, must still be able to

deliver effective unobserved fire whencalled upon to do so. My "three doubts"as to the effectiveness of our presentsurvey organization still exist.

IVSuch a statement, however, is not

proof in itself of any deficiency in thepresent artillery survey procedure, so Iwill assume an operation in an unmappedtheater of operations in order to illustratethe advantages to be gained by theemployment of a brigade-survey platoon.The advance guards of a reenforceddivision, operating independently, haveencountered the enemy and havedeveloped their positions. The two

battalions of light artillery which are with

the advance guards are in position, firingwith observation. They have each starteda firing chart, the grids having beennumbered arbitrarily and the altitudescomputed from an initial orienting pointgiven an arbitrary elevation.

The division commander decides toattack, giving to the artillery brigade itsusual mission of supporting the infantry.The only map available was compiled

from G-2 sources and is on a scale of1/62,500, therefore not suitable for firecontrol. The Air Corps has delivered

photos taken of the areas over which it isthought the attack will progresstheEngineers, however, have not yetsupplied control points. Artillery firing,except by the two battalions with theadvance guard, is prohibited until the

preparation, which will precede the attackby twenty minutes.

Each successive battalion of thebrigade, during the occupation ofposition, builds up a firing chart, usingthe same methods employed by the twoadvance guard battalions. Thecompleted survey within the brigaderesults in seven unrelated firing charts.The difficulty of a unit higher than a

battalion in assigning targets isobvious, as is also the difficulty of a

light battalion in calling for reenforcingfires from a medium battalion. Toillustrate this by an example is hardlynecessary, but imagine a brigade S-3 who

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has been ordered to place the fires ofseveral battalions in a specified area! The

problem of assigning such a mission, witheach battalion working on unrelatedcharts, is formidable, and the probabilityof obtaining effective fire on the areawithin a reasonable amount of time isvery slight.

Requoting from the defined purpose ofartillery survey in FAB 161, "The

purpose of artillery survey is to gathertopographical data of the proper characterand in the proper amount to enable

battalion and HIGHERHEADQUARTERS TO ASSIGNTARGETS, and batteries to computefiring data." (Capitals are the writer's.)

Coordination of the seven unrelatedcharts is certainly indicated. As

previously quoted, FAB 161 provides,"When it is necessary and time permits,the brigade or regiment may issue suchinstructions as will coordinate the survey

work of its battalions in supplementingexisting data." Thus coordination is

provided for but it can be accomplishedonly by makeshift methods, that is, either

by improvising a survey section or byrequiring that one of the battalion survey

parties provide the necessarycoordination. Neither method issatisfactory. The coordination resultingfrom the work of such details would be ofdoubtful value for the training andequipment of such sections would not besuch that the essential accuracy would beobtained. In addition and more importantis the fact that certain officers and menwould be taken away from their normalduties just prior to an attack and made todo work with which they were unfamiliar.Their normal work would be neglected or

performed by some other substitute. Allthis just prior to the launching of an

attack.It is believed that a brigade survey

platoon could provide the necessarycoordination and aid materially in the

successful accomplishment of the supportmission. To recommend in detail the

personnel and equipment which thisplatoon should have is beyond the scopeof this article, it being merely myintention to demonstrate the necessity forsuch a platoon. In general, however, thereshould be at least two officers, both ofwhom are well qualified artillerymen andspecialists in artillery survey, plus anumber of noncommissioned officersurveyors and enlisted specialists,sufficient to perform the required survey

work, and equipped with accurate surveyinstruments. The platoon would betransported in light, fast-moving, cross-country reconnaissance vehicles,equipped with SCR 194 radios.

A possible employment of thisplatoon in the above situation could beas follows: One of the brigade surveyofficers, with a small party,accompanied one of the advance guard

battalions. Upon employment of thesebattalions, their survey work proceededas prescribed at present, with theexception that the initial origin andorientation was supplied to one

battalion by the brigade survey officerwho was present. This control wasextended into the area of the otheradvance guard battalion. Immediatelyupon the employment of the advanceguard battalions, the forward brigadesurvey officer had radioed theremainder of his platoon to comeforward, which, when it arrived,extended the control established by itsforward party into the areas to beoccupied by the remaining battalions ofthe brigade. Each battalion, workingfrom the initial point as established bythe brigade survey platoon, continuedits survey as at present. Depending upon

the time available the platoon could alsolocate base points, lateral observation

posts, and observation posts for eachbattalion area. It is evident that an intimate

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knowledge of artillery fire-controlmethods is a prerequisite qualification for

a brigade survey officer.The completed survey within thebrigade now results in seven coordinatedfiring charts. The advantages gained bythe employment of this additional platoonare:

a. Units higher than a battalion cannow assign targets readily.

b. The results of registration andcorrection, as obtained by the advanceguard battalions, can be furnished each

incoming battalion.c. The prohibition of registration is

not so serious, now that the data in b.have been received throughout the

brigade.d. The need no longer exists for

improvising units and removing officersand men from their normal duties, inorder to coordinate the survey work of the

brigade. The coordination is guaranteed

by trained specialists.It is well to note here that this brigade

platoon takes over none of the surveyfunctions of the lower units, butcoordinates and extends their efforts.Such a platoon's usefulness is not onlyconfined to operations in unmapped or

poorly mapped territories, for wherecontrolled maps are available, the existingcontrol can be extended into each

battalion area, thus facilitating andexpediting their survey operations.

Care must be exercised that such aplatoon does not result in immobility. Forexample, during a tactical exercise held inGreat Britain, which consisted of a river

passage by a brigade in the face of weakopposition, contact with the enemy wasexpected at dawn the next day. Theartillery arrived in position late in theafternoon and the artillery commander

stated that, because only a one-inch mapwas available, at least six hours ofdaylight were necessary for him to

complete his survey, and so there waslittle possibility of the delivery of any

effective supporting fire at dawn. Wemust not place ourselves in such apositionsurvey is but a means to theend; namely, to support the infantry withfire when and where it is wanted andunder all conditions. It is to guarantee thissupport that the addition of a survey

platoon is recommended. If the time for acomplete survey should not be available,it should progress piecemeal. In order to

prevent a situation such as occurred in the

British tactical exercise, the employmentof the brigade platoon should be set forthin a Manual on Artillery Survey, whichwould cover not only the technique ofsurvey but the tactical employment ofsurvey details in varying situations.

The brigade survey platoon wouldhave duties in addition to coordinating thefiring charts of the battalions. Forexample, on obtaining photos from the

Air Corps it could be this platoon whichwould assemble the photos into mosaicsand furnish to the subordinate units acontrolled mosaic. This function forartillery units is one indicated by the

policy of the Chief of Field Artillery."If lack of an accurate map should

require the use of a controlled mosaic forfiring purposes, such as has been used atthe Field Artillery School in instructionwhich assumes no other more accurateform of map to exist, the Chief of FieldArtillery believes that the provision of

photographs therefor should be a functionof the Air Corps units under orders of thelocal high commandan expansion ofthe system supplying intelligence

photographsthe assembly into mosaicsto be performed by the Field Artilleryunits concerned. This is in accord withthe principle heretofore brought out, i.e.,

non-divergence of the activity and effortof the Corps of Engineers from its

primary ultimate objectivea complete

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and accurate map."As a basis for an experimental

peacetime organization of this surveyplatoon, the following is a possibility.Since July 1, 1937, there has been in each

brigade headquarters a meteorologicalsection consisting of four men and oneofficer, with the function of supplying toseveral posts metro data when requiredfor firing. Each metro officer could alsoact as a brigade survey officer by addingfour to six men and the essential surveyinstruments to the present metro section.

Then, in addition to furnishing metrodata, the section could, while at the postswithin its area, function as a survey

platoon. This would give to all artilleryunits an opportunity to work out problemswith situations similar to those outlined

below.A method of obtaining control quickly

and with fairly accurate results was triedduring General Field Exercise Number 8

at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in June, 1936. Twoparties, each equipped with the surveyinstruments now available and with SCR194 radios, took positions at two well-separated points, both on commandingterrain and in the position area. Thecoordinates of these points weredetermined by calculation from anintersection using a short base line, theends of which had been assigned arbitrarycoordinates by the acting brigade surveyofficer. Several station wagons, eachequipped with SCR 194 radios, were

posted at various critical points. By radiocommunication between the rovingstation wagons and the two survey

parties, it was easily determined when thevehicle was visible to both parties. Thestation wagon was then located by simpleintersection methods and upon a radiosignal from both survey parties, it

proceeded to another predesignated point.Numerous points were located within ashort period and thus from nothing there

was developed a firing chart, withsufficient control to enable the artillery to

restitute targets from air photos and toconduct fire under all circumstances. Thiswork was done by an improvised brigadesurvey section which it was foundnecessary to organize in order to augmentthe existing ground control furnished bythe Engineers. How much better it wouldhave been to have had a platoon alreadyorganized and equipped for such work.

On the same exercise in June of 1937,the brigade headquarters was allotted a

survey officer and a section of five men,equipped with transits for angle-measuring instruments. In the 1936solution of the same problem, the obviousdisadvantage was that the firing charts ofthe brigade, although coordinated, had norelation to the existing control on mapsfor adjacent territory. In order to remedythis, a base line was selected in themapped area from which the artillery was

withdrawing; the ends of which weretriangulation markers on twocommanding hills. (Points A and B, in thefigure.) So the problem consisted inextending this control to the rear adistance of some eight miles. Two points,visible from both A and B, were selectedin the new position area, shown as pointsC and D. Stations A and D were occupied

by parties with transits. The party at Aread the angle BAD and angle BAC, andalso the vertical angles to points C and D.The party at D read angle ADB and angleBDC, and the vertical angles to A, B, andC. The solution of two triangles thenresulted in the coordinates of points Cand D; and from the vertical angles therewas obtained the altitudes of the two

points.This work was done almost entirely

after dark and yet the locations were

accurate to within two yards in one caseand eight yards in the other case.

The party at A then moved forward

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to point C, and by intersection from

points C and D, sufficient points were

located both horizontally and vertically toenable the battalions to initiate their own

survey work.

As each battalion located additional

points, an overlay of the battalion survey

was furnished the brigade survey officer,

who then distributed that information to

the remaining battalions of the brigade.

The result of the survey was a firing

chart that, when augmented by points

determined by restitution from air photos,

was completely sufficient in itself for the

firing requirements of the entire brigade.

V

I have reviewed the value and

effectiveness of coordinated survey in the

task of the artillerymansupporting the

infantry by fire. The present survey

procedure is admirably suited tooperations in mapped areas, but in

unmapped or poorly mapped theatres of

operations, dependent as the Artillery is

upon the Engineers and Air Corps for

basic control, without which theeffectiveness of unobserved fire is very

greatly reduced, the present survey

procedure has been found to be inadequate.

When basic ground control is not

forthcoming, there exists a definite gap

between the Engineers and the Artillery

which at present can be filled only by

makeshift, inadequate means. It has

therefore been found advisable, in order to

fill this gap, to recommend as an additionto the artillery brigade a platoon, trained

and equipped to perform accurate survey,

to work well forward and to provide for

each battalion the necessary data in order

that at all times and under all conditions

the artillery can "Support the Infantry by

fire."

NOTE: The principles outlined above

would be equally applicable if the

divisional artillery were reduced to a

regiment of four battalions.

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Mechanized Field Artillery

Its Organization, Functioning, and Tactical Employment

BY MAJOR B. H. PERRY, 68TH FIELD ARTILLERY

N treating of the subject which hasbeen assigned to me today, I shallattempt to present a picture which may

prove of assistance to you in understandingthe functioning and tactical employment ofthe Mechanized Brigade as a whole.

Just as Mechanized Cavalry is Cavalryand is charged with essentially Cavalrymissions, so Mechanized Field Artilleryis but a particular type of Field Artillery,charged with the usual field artillerymissions. For the mission of all fieldartillery is to support, by fire, other arms,usually cavalry or infantry. In our case, ofcourse, we are charged with the supportof mechanized cavalry.

Organization

There is a tendency to regardmechanized artillery as essentiallydifferent from division light artillery. Ofcourse there are differences, but they allare results of environment and necessity.For we must, in order properly to supportmechanized cavalry, take into accountthose characteristics of mechanizedcavalrymobility, fire power and shockactionwhich set it apart as different fromhorse cavalry; and especially as differentfrom infantry tank units. We must be soorganized, equipped, and trained as to

permit us to support a force which marchestremendous distances at high speed andattacks with great rapidity; but which itselfcannot promise to mop-up the enemy.

There are certain other factors whichhave influenced the organization ofmechanized field artillery. The first isthe outstanding characteristic of allartilleryfire power. We must have asufficient number of artillery weapons to

enable us to place an immense quantityof explosive projectiles on a designatedtarget. The second is mobility, in orderthat the weapons may be moved aboutand placed into positions from whichfire may be delivered on the target. Thethird is communication, so necessary inorder that commands, tactical ortechnical, may be given to artilleryechelons. Around these factors our

organization is built.The 1st Battalion 68th Field

Artillery was originally organized inDecember, 1934, as an experimental

battalion, to determine the tactics andtechnique, as well as the equipment,needed to permit adequate fire supportto be furnished to mechanized cavalry.Starting with a small nucleus of mendrawn from older field artilleryregiments, the battalion, consisting of aHeadquarters, Headquarters Battery,and two firing batteries, had a strengthof but a few over 300 men. As moremen became available the strength ofour batteries rose, but restrictivelegislation prevented the formation ofmore batteries, even though we felt thatthey were necessary. It is true that when

A Conference Given at a Session of the Officers' TacticalSchool, Seventh Cavalry Brigade

96

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MECHANIZED FIELD ARTILLERY

but the 1st Cavalry was present in thebrigade, two gun batteries were probably

sufficient to furnish the needed support.But with the addition to the brigade of the13th Cavalry, the need for additional fire

power became apparent to all. It was atthis time represented to the WarDepartment that only if the artillery wereactually present in proper strength couldthe technique of support and the tactics ofthe mechanized brigade itself be properlydetermined. In the end, the WarDepartment was able to see its way clear

to further the development by providingsubstitute equipment and more personnelwith a fair allotment of grades andratings. We therefore were able toreorganize the battalion on November 1st,

past.The new battalion is the only

mechanized field artillery in our service,and is composed of a small Headquarters,a combined Headquarters and Service

Battery, and four howitzer batteries. Theauthorized strength of the battalion is 615enlisted men; the strength in officers hasnot yet been definitely fixed, althoughapparently it will be 32, excludingattached medical, etc.

The battalion is commanded by acolonel, who is assisted by a small staff.In order that he may exercise propercontrol over his howitzer batteries on themarch and in action, and may care for andadminister it in garrison and in the field, acomposite Headquarters and ServiceBattery has been provided. By far thelargest section of this composite battery isthe Headquarters Battery section. Thissection provides transportation for the

battalion commander and staff, thecommunication and command-postfacilities and personnel, and the usualhousekeeping details, such as messes for

officers and men.The Service Battery section is

charged with the procurement and

transportation of supplies, other thanammunition. It is directly under the

battalion supply officer for training andcontrol, but not for administration. Thecombat train, existing in peacetime atreduced strength, is charged with the

procurement of ammunition, itstransportation, and its delivery to thefiring batteries to replace expenditures.The Motor Maintenance section isorganized so as to assist the batteries inthe performance of first- and second-echelon maintenance. It consists of a

forward echelon, which tails thecombat elements of the battalion on themarch and renders assistance to them,and a rear echelon, which tails thetrains and assists them. This section isin charge of the battalion motormaintenance officer.

Although this composite battery hasno fire power, except small arms for itsown close defense, it fills an important

place in the command andadministrative functions of the whole

battalion. It really is an important cog inthe machine. As at present organized,however, this composite battery is ratherunwieldy. This is due to the difficulty ofcontrolling, training, and administeringsections which have such diverse dutiesand which, in action, operate on different

parts of the battlefield. For instance, theheadquarters section will usually befound well forward, supplying the

battalion commander and his staff withtransportation and communication; whileon the other hand the service section willusually be found with the trains at theservice park. We recommended, andhoped the War Department wouldapprove in ordering our recentreorganization, that the HeadquartersBattery and the remainder; that is, the

Service Battery, with the Combat Trainand Motor Maintenance included,should be separated. Although practically

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enough personnel was provided, theseparation was not ordered or authorized.

We shall continue to represent the needtherefor to the War Department, in themeantime separating the two, insofar asArmy Regulations will permit, foroperation.

The four gun or howitzer batteries, ofcourse, provide the real fire power of the

battalion. Eventually each of thesebatteries is to be armed with four 75-mm.howitzers of latest design, capable of

being towed at high speed behind prime

movers. At present, because of delays in

procurement, two of the batteries have thehowitzer, while the other two are armedwith the 75-mm. gun, temporarily. Each

battery carries with it into action about125 rounds of ammunition for each gunor howitzer. Two types of ammunitionare at present provided for the howitzer,the shrapnel and the semifixed shell. Bysemifixed, I mean that the shell is butloosely fitted into the cartridge case, thusallowing the two to be separated and theamount of propelling charge to be variedwithin certain limits. This variation in the

propelling charge changes the form of thetrajectory, making it possible to have asteep or flat trajectory; and thus enablingthe weapon to drop projectiles on targets

behind deep defilade, or to fire directly onvisible targets. The howitzer shell is

provided with a fuze which may be set forinstantaneous or slight delay action. Forthe gun, three types of ammunition are

provided; the shrapnel, the high-explosiveshell, and the chemical or smoke shell;each being provided with appropriatefuzes.

The prime movers used in our oldbatteries to tow their howitzers are half-track trucks; in the new batteries, four-wheel-drive trucks are being used at

present. A comparison of the road and

cross-country mobility of these types ofprime movers during the next few monthsmay go far in determining future

equipment of the battalion, and possiblyof division artillery as well.

The battery also has within itselfpersonnel and equipment for fire controland communication purposes. While, in themechanized artillery, we rely on radio as our

primary means of communication, werecognize the need of other means asauxiliaries. Accordingly, the battery has asmall telephone detail and personnel trained

as messengers and in the use of signal flags.The communication and fire-control

personnel together make up what we knowas the Battery Commander's Detail.

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75-mm. HOWITZER WITH HALF-TRACK TRUCK, T-5The prime mover has a 6-cylinder motor developing 125 HP (block test). Cargo load 3,600 lbs.

Passenger capacity, ten.


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I have mentioned the use of half-trackand four-wheel-drive trucks as prime

movers by the batteries. In additionthereto, scout cars are used fortransportation of personnel and radioequipment by the old batteries and byHeadquarters Battery; the new batteriesare to be provided with station wagonsand trucks for these purposes. Trucks areof course also used for supply purposesand as ammunition carriers in theService Section and Combat Train, andthroughout the battalion as kitchen

trucks; all in all, too many types ofvehicles for efficient operation. It ishoped that in the future a reduction inthis number may be made.

To sum up: We have howitzers andguns to provide fire power, high-speedmotor equipment to provide mobility,signal equipment for communication

purposes, and sufficient personnelefficiently organized to man this

equipment.

Functioning of Mechanized Artillery

As I stated earlier in this conference,the three factorsfire power, mobility,and communication are the pegs uponwhich our organization is built. They arelikewise the bases of employment ofartillery, and are in realityinterdependent. Each of them is

important; without any one of them theothers are rendered less effective oruseful, if not impotent. Fire Power, forinstance, without the mobility needed to

place the weapons in suitable locationsfrom which to bring effective fire to bearon the target, is of little value. In orderto appreciate this interdependence, let usexamine the functioning of mechanizedartillery.

In order that he may intelligently plan

for the employment of his battalion, theartillery commander must have every bitof hostile and friendly information he can

get; he must know the plan of action ofthe cavalry; he must in particular know

how the cavalry mortars and machineguns are to be used; and finally he mustknow where the artillery fires should be

placed in order to be of maximum benefitto the brigade. Likewise, the batterycommanders must know the situation,where their fires are to fall, where the

batteries should be emplaced, the amountof time, if any, available for preparationof firing data or for preliminary firing, thelocation of observation posts from which

direct observation of the target area isavailable, and kindred information. Howis this information made available to the

battalion commander, to his staff, and tohis battery commanders?

Suppose we take a typical example ofaction of the Mechanized Brigade and tryto visualize the part played by theartillery. Assume that the brigade ismarching to meet the enemy with a

mission which demands speed andoffensive action. Let us further assumethat contact is expected within a day.

Last month Captain I. D. White gavey o u a n e x c e l l e n t p i c t u r e o f t h efunctioning of the Reconnaissance Troop,

particularly in the advance. You willremember he stated that the troopnormally leaves bivouac at least an hourin advance of the main body. With

uninterrupted travel, this results in thetroop preceding the main body by 25 to50 miles, reconnoitering the main route ofadvance, seeking signs of the hostileapproach and, by frequent reports,keeping higher headquarters informed ofits whereabouts and of the situation. Themarch of this troop affords an opportunityto see the terrain over which the advanceis to take place and on which battle may be

joined. Accordingly, it is of sufficient

interest to the artillery to justify sendingwith the troop one or more reconnaissanceofficers. The number sent depends

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upon the width of the zone of advance,the road net, and the probability of

contact with the enemy. Thesereconnaissance officers attach themselvesto the commander of the troop or to

platoons or sections of the troop,preferably to those thought most likely tomake hostile contact. As they moveforward, each studies the terrain passedover, the ground forms, the condition ofthe roads, the hostile and the friendlysituation. When contact is made, eachestimates the situation, learns whether the

reconnaissance troop will attempt tobrush aside the hostile resistance, if it willremain in observation, or will sideslip theenemy. The reconnaissance officers thenreport by radio to the battalioncommander, in order that the latter may

be fully informed of the situation and theprobability of intervention. If it appearsthat the hostile resistance is such as tomake it probable that the reconnaissance

troop can not by itself clear it away andthat the main body may have to fight inorder to continue its forward movement,the reconnaissance officers immediatelyseek suitable position areas andobservation for the artillery to cover the

probable subsequent action. They theninform the battalion commander of thegeneral location of these areas and ask forinstructions. If one of thesereconnaissance officers is ordered toreturn to meet the battalion commander(and this is the usual course) he does so,looking for other position areas as hecomes, in order that the artillerycommander may be able to select thoseareas best fitting the brigade commander's

plan. If he is not ordered to return, heremains forward either with thereconnaissance troop or in observation byhimself, and continues to send such

information of the changes in thesituation as he is able to determine fromtime to time. It often will happen that he

will find himself in a position from whichhe may act as forward observer to

observe the fires of the battalion, and byreporting upon their efficacy be of greatassistance to the batteries.

The next party to the rear in themarch of the mechanized artillery is the

battalion commander, who, with hisplans-and-training officer, when actionis imminent, is with the brigadecommander. Through his reconnaissanceofficers and the brigade communicationsystem, and by conference with the

brigade commander, the artillerycommander is constantly informed ofthe situation and should be able toforesee the action that is to take place,even before the orders of the brigadecommander clarify the part the artilleryis to have in the perfected plan. Throughhis own communication agencies hekeeps his staff and battery commandersin touch with the situation, in order that

they also may be ready for action whenordered. From time to time the brigadecommander will call on the artillery

battalion commander forrecommendations as to the use of theartillery in the present circumstances.The battalion commander must be

prepared to give this advice at once andfreely; the ultimate decision is of coursethat of the brigade commander.

When the orders of the brigadecommander have been received, the

battalion commander, either directly orthrough his staff, supervises theoccupation of position by the batteriesand the delivery of initial fires. He thenreturns to the post of the brigadecommander in order that the furtherwishes of that commander may bereceived and carried out with dispatch.

The march of the battalion is

ordinarily conducted by the battalionexecutive, who, with the remainder of thestaff, marches at the head of the battalion

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proper. When action is imminent and it isapparent that orders for the occupation of

position will soon issue, the batterycommanders are ordered to leave theirpositions in column, and to direct theirbatteries to be marched by their batteryexecutives under supervision of the

battalion executive, while they, with asmall party, go forward to meet the

battalion commander or hisrepresentative. This representative may

be one of the reconnaissance officers orthe plans-and-training officer. The

situation is explained to the batterycommanders, position areas are assigned,the location of ground observation isindicated and initial targets, if known, areassigned. The battery commanders thenselect the actual battery positions and,leaving markers there, move to positionsfrom which direct observation of thetarget areas is possible. Preferably thisobservation should be as close to the

battery as it can be found. Here eachcalculates data necessary to place the fireof his battery on the assigned targets, andobserves the area in question to determineother possible targets.

In the meantime, the march of thefiring batteries has continued up to a

point where, in order that they may go totheir several positions, they must bereleased from battalion control. Theythen march directly to the assigned areasand take position as ordered by therespective battery commanders, whomeanwhile have sent data for theopening of fire.

The battalion executive, havingreleased the firing batteries, establishesthe battalion command post as directed bythe battalion commander. We make a

point of locating this command postrather close to the firing-battery positions,

for ease of communication. Thecommand post, or its component, the fire-direction center, is the nerve center of the

battalion in action; upon its smoothfunctioning largely depends the efficiency

of support in any situation involvingconcentration of fires. We require eachbattery under battalion control to report tothe fire-direction center, on theconclusion of fire on each target, theadjusted data for that target. These dataare recorded and plotted. Based onseveral such recorded fires, it soon

becomes possible for the battalioncommander to concentrate the fire of all

batteries on subsequent targets in the area

with a minimum expenditure of time andammunition.

At the command post is thereforecentered a considerable portion of fire-control traffic, including all orders fromthe battalion and higher commanders tothe batteries. A skeletonized messagecenter, as well as panel and pick-upgrounds, is established nearby. In order torelieve the radio of as much traffic as

possible, auxiliary means ofcommunication, such as wire circuits, areused from here to the batteries, when time

permits.I am especially anxious that I do not

give you the impression that we aremaking a fetish of centralization; or thatthereby the battery commander nevercontrols the fire of his battery. On thecontrary, an alert battery commanderwill find many opportunities to fire ontargets discovered by himself whileobserving the battlefield. And we expecthim to take these targets under fire,unless his battery is firing at targetsassigned by the artillery commander inaccordance with the desires of the brigadecommander. Even so, if he discovers atarget of greater importance to thesuccess of the whole force, he should acton the time-honored principle that

subordinates must take such action asthey believe the higher commander wouldhave ordered had the latter been present.

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Nor do I mean to indicate that wealways use the fire-direction center. As a

matter of fact, I am convinced that inmechanized artillery the usual case willbe for all batteries to be well up, withmost of the firing being controlled by the

battery commanders themselves; hence afire-direction center will not always benecessary. This I believe to be true due tothe rapidity of action of the force as awhole.

As the cavalry regiments are giventheir missions and move to their

appointed places, the artillery commanderattaches to each a liaison officer. Theduties and responsibilities of this officer

are many. Primarily his duty is to insurethe necessary artillery support for the unitto which attached. He accomplishes this

by keeping the artillery thoroughlyinformed of the dispositions, activities,and needs of the supported unit and thesituation in its immediate front; keepingthe supported unit thoroughly informed ofthe artillery plan of support; and byassisting in the maneuvering of the fire ofthe battalion. He should advise thecavalry commander of the capabilities ofthe artillery to furnish support, and, in

case a battery of artillery is attached tothe cavalry regiment, advise as to the bestuse that may be made of it, if the batterycommander himself is not at hand to

furnish this information. In actuality, Ibelieve that with mechanized artillery, the

greatest service both to the cavalry and tothe artillery that the liaison officer canperform, is his ability to see and sense thepoint of fall of the projectiles. Beinggenerally quite close to the target area, hemay inform the artillery of theeffectiveness of the fire, and, ifobservation from other points is ratherrestricted, he may observe and sense eachround that falls, communicating by radio tothe battery such errors as occur. Actually

this method of conducting fire is so simple,when the observer is close to the target,that great use is made of it, as it saves time

and ammunition. As Captain White hintedthe other day, during the Second ArmyManeuvers of 1936, at least one of his

cavalry officers used this method ofobtaining fire on a desired target.

I shall not go into detail on theestablishment on communication. Youare all familiar with the difficultiesencountered in this brigade inmaintaining communication. The

paucity of available frequencies and theterrific punishment taken by radio setsin hard cross-country going are greatly

to blame for our difficulties. But I dowant to mention the essentialcommunication channels we must use,leaving to others their provision. In the

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BC GROUP MOVING FORWARD IN FORT KNOX MANEUVERSNote smoke of artillery fire in background.


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first place, the artillery commander musthave a channel over which he can

exercise command over his subordinatesand receive information from them andfrom his reconnaissance agencies. Theneach battery commander must have achannel, distinct from that of the battalioncommander, over which he can transmithis commands to his firing battery andreceive information from hissubordinates. In addition there should bechannels over which the liaison officerscan communicate with the fire-direction

center or with the batteries direct.Although it is most desirable that theliaison officers each have a separatechannel, it is realized that the number offrequencies available in the band of

present equipment may temporarilyprevent such provision. Thereconnaissance officer does not need aseparate channel, although traffic on the

battalion command channel may prevent

his using it freely; this is not as serious asit sounds, as the peak loads ofreconnaissance and command use are notreached at identical times. Anotherchannel is needed for artillery-aircommunication when planes areavailable. Now I do not insist that all ofthese channels are always equallyimportant; that would not be reasonable.

Nor must they be provided at the expenseof the cavalry units; but I do wish you toconsider these needs and realize that theefficiency of operation of the artillery,and its ability to render maximumsupport, suffer when one channel is madeto do the work of two or more. We havetried to lighten the load on our presentradio channels by using direct wirecommunication without switchboardswhenever and wherever possible.However, in doing so, we insist that the

installation of such circuits must notdelay the opening of fire; radio must beused in the initial phases of the

occupation of position; as wire becomesavailable the load is shifted thereto. In

this connection, at present we are so shortof radio equipment, the new batteriesbeing provided with none, that we havefound it necessary to use old hand-generator sets in communicating withthem in position. On the march, onlymotorcycles are available in the newtruck-drawn batteries for this purpose, aswe haven't enough scout cars to permit ofour furnishing any to these batteries forthe present.

I have tried to picture the functioningof the artillery as it goes into action insupport of an attack. Obviously, if theattack is successful and is to becontinued, the artillery must eventuallydisplace forward. While in general, thesame series of actions again takes place,the period of displacement is one fraughtwith danger, not only to the cavalry byreason of diminished artillery support, but

also to the artillery as it moves from oneposition to another. Accordingly, it isimperative that the displacement betimely, and that it be made with as greatrapidity as is consistent with efficiency. Itis also important that all of the artillery benot displacing simultaneously; some mustremain in position to protect the cavalryin its assembly positions. Prior to theinitiation of the actual displacement itshould be known whither and when thedisplacement is to take place; observationshould be pushed up to the front; if

possible the artillery should be given aclear road from one position to another.By taking these precautions the dangerswill be greatly diminished.

What I have said thus far haspresupposed that the four batteries wereall under battalion control. It willfrequently happen that one or more

batteries will be detached from thebattalion and attached to cavalry units.This attachment will usually be made

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prior to the deployment of the brigade,before the cavalry regiments leave the

march column. As soon as the batterycommander is notified that his battery isattached to one of the cavalry regiments,he contacts the cavalry commander anddiscusses the situation with him. Helearns where his battery is to march in themarch column and orders his executive to

place it there. He accompanies thecavalry commander on his reconnaissanceand, after learning the cavalry plan ofaction, makes recommendations as to the

use to be made of his battery. He shouldbe careful to learn where the machine guntroop and the mortar platoon are to beused, and make sure that their fires andhis are well coordinated. Havingdetermined where his fire is to fall, heshould select a position for his batteryfrom which these fires can be laid downmost effectively. In general, we prefer a

position slightly off the flank of the

cavalry movement, in order that the firemay not be masked until the last moment

before the attack goes home. As theattack progresses and the battery is nolonger able to fire on its initial targets, thequestion of displacement arises. It willnot always be wise to displace the batteryon the heels of the combat cars, due to the

possibility of hostile counterattack on thecavalry in its assembly area. If the batterycommander, or his reconnaissanceofficer, has gone forward immediately inrear of the assault, the fire of the batterymay quickly be brought to bear on suchhostile targets. Of course, if the attack issuccessful and no counterattack isrealized, the battery hastens to rejoin thecavalry and take part in future action,unless the original orders of the brigadecommander have directed a reversion to

battalion control at this time. It is well for

the battery commander to come to adefinite understanding with the cavalrycommander as to when and where he is to

rejoin. Unless there is no choice of routesover which to make his displacement, the

battery commander will usually find thata slightly longer route over favorableterrain will save time in rejoining.

Tactical Employment

At the beginning of this conference Istated that the mission of mechanizedfield artillery is to support, by fire onthe battlefield, the cavalry elements ofthe brigade. This is true regardless of

the mission of the brigade, andregardless of the type of action in whichit is engaged, be it the mounted attackor the fire fight. It is generally concededthat artillery is entitled to look for its

protection to the troops it is supporting;this protection sometimes is afforded bythe location of the artillery with respectto the mass of the command, andsometimes by the location of the force

reserve. In the mechanized brigade wemay not always be able to obtain thisprotection. The proper tacticalemployment of mechanized fieldartillery requires a highly self reliantforce so equipped, so commanded, andso maneuvered as to be a source of aidand maximum support to themechanized cavalry, while causing aslittle diversion as possible from theoperations of the main force in insuring

the safety of the artillery.Artillery tactics really amount to

movements to place the firing batteries intopositions from which adequate fire may beplaced where it is desired, and the deliveryof that fire. There are certain well-established principles which should governthe operations of field artillery. Three ofthese are so vitally important to us that Iwish to discuss them briefly and then touch

on conditions favorable to theirattainment. In stating them I shall rewordthem so as to make them directly applicable

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to mechanized field artillery.The first principle is:Artillery with the

Mechanized Cavalry must be readilyavailable for early entry into action, and,similarly, it must expect to remain late.Artillery is capable of exerting, by its fire

power, considerable influence on thecourse of an action. Placed into actionearly, it may be able to cause prematuredevelopment and deployment of hostileforces, or at least so slow up the advanceof the enemy as to permit the fighting ofthe battle on ground of our own choosing.

The decision to place the artillery intoaction early, in support of the advanceguard, for instance, must be made by the

brigade commander. He must not behampered in making this decision by thenonavailability of the artillery. As to theartillery remaining in action late, theflexibility and long range of artillery fire

permit of accompanying by fire amounted attack for considerable distances

without the necessity of changing batterypositions; this characteristic is of especialvalue when withdrawal from action isforced on our troops, or in delayingaction.

The second principle is: Mechanizedartillery must be so emplaced that it canrender close and effective support to theattacking echelons throughout theaction. While the amount of artillerywith the brigade has recently beenincreased, there still exists the necessityfor making full use of what we have.The maximum fire power of all batterieswill be needed in order to give theattacking echelons adequate support,unless the enemy is known to be weak.This support must be given over as longa period of time as possible, in order thatthe cavalry may not meet a superiorenemy at the objective.

The third principle, although self-evident, I repeat because of the numberof times this question has arisen:

Mechanized artillery must consider itsmost important targets those most

dangerous to the cavalry at theparticular time. I do not refer, of course,to natural or artificial obstacles whichcan obstruct the path of the combat cars,causing them delay; but rather toweapons or personnel. In general, thetargets most likely to prove mostdangerous are artillery and antitankweapons. As artillery, unless used asantitank weapons, will usually be wellhidden from our observation posts, we

will generally be forced to useobservation aviation for the purpose ofobserving and reporting on our fire.Antitank weapons, if skillfully used, will

be concealed until the attack jumps off;they will seldom be located sufficientlyclosely prior to our attack to permit ofour destroying them; neutralization ofsuspected localities is about all that can

be done. As a matter of fact, although

we always are pleased when our firecauses destruction of hostile materiel,we usually will have to be satisfied withneutralization of hostile fire by

preventing the enemy from using theirweapons.

I believe this is a good opportunity totake a moment to indicate why, whentime is pressing or ammunition is nonetoo plentiful, we resort to neutralizationrather than seeking destruction. Both ofthese conditions are present with us, dueto the rapidity of action of the brigadeand the small amount of ammunition wecan carry into battle. When conditions asto observation, communication, etc., arefavorable, a bracket adjustment, which isthe basis of zone fire, sweeping the areain which the target surely is located,should not take more than two minutes;and, with an expenditure of 30 to 40

rounds of ammunition, fairly goodresults as far as neutralization isconcerned, can be obtained in a total

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elapsed time of say 5 minutes; and bychance we may happen to hit and destroy

the target. Under similar conditions ofobservation, destruction fire will almostcertainly require greatly increased timeand a prohibitive ammunitionexpenditure. For to neutralize, you merelyhave to come close enough to the target tocause personnel to vacate; to destroyrequires direct hits. Neutralization will

just as effectively fill our needs as actualdestruction, considering the short time theBrigade will be in action.

Now in order that we may complywith the principles I have mentioned,several conditions must be met in ouroperations.

First: Artillery should march welltoward the head of the main body. It isnot necessary that the entire battalionmarch near the head of the main body,although I do think that all combatelements of the battalion should not be

farther to the rear than the intervalbetween the cavalry regiments. But atleast one, and preferably two, of thefiring batteries should march

practically at the head of the mainbody, preceded only by a smallprotective group of cavalry. In this waysome artillery would be available forrushing into position in support of theadvance guard, and all of it would beable to occupy positions and cover thedeployment of the brigade.

Second: Artillery should occupypositions well forward, with directobservation from near the guns. Theseforward positions should also be such asto permit of the guns being pushedforward into direct-fire positions. Severaladvantages accrue as a result of suchlocations. In the first place, a certainamount of protection is afforded by the

proximity of the cavalry, up to the timethe attack is launched. And then, thelocation of the observation posts close to

the batteries simplifies the problem ofcommunication and control. And, finally,

although control of fire by the batterycommander results in more accurate firethan does control by the chief of section,the irregular progress of the combat cars

prevents close firing in advance of thecars, unless each gun is individuallycontrolled. It is, therefore, advisable tohave the guns so emplaced as to permit ofthis control in the crises of action.

Third: Reconnaissance and liaisonofficers accompanying the forward

echelons of the brigade must obtain thenecessary tactical and technicalinformation to insure timely occupationof position and opening of fire. Thisinformation must be transmitted to the

battalion commander in time for him tomake proper use of it in directing theoccupation of position. In thisconnection, it is pertinent to remarkthat it is of course necessary for the

brigade commander to keep the artillerycommander informed of his intentions;especially as regards the general planof action and where and how he desiresthe artillery to support the brigade.Without such early information, theoccupation of proper positions is rathera matter of chance.

Fourth: Close coordination must bemaintained between artillery fires andthose of the cavalry machine guns andmortars. These fires are oftensupplementary one to the other; onecovering the front not covered by theothers. Ordinarily it would seem to methat the targets of the artillery and of thesmoke mortars should not be the same,and might even be on different parts ofthe terrain. It is quite probable that themain fire mission of the artillery during theearly stages of an attack will be to smother

the objective with high explosive, thuspreventing hostile movement and their use,against the oncoming combat cars, of such

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antitank weapons as they have on theobjective. I believe the enemy will, if he

has sufficient time to do so, place themajority of his antitank weapons, not inthe path of the combat cars, but ratheron the flank, where they may attackthem in flank as they move forwardagainst the main position. Hence itseems to me that the mortars should

place their smoke so as to blind theseflank weapons, leaving to the artillerythe smothering of the objective.Experience has taught us that the

presence of smoke on certain parts ofthe battlefield may obscure artilleryobservation and thus prevent the

batteries from firing effectively on theirassigned targets. Especially is this so ifthe proposed location of the smoke isnot known in time to permit the choiceof alternate observation points, orwhere the wind direction has changedsuddenly.

Fifth: The organization of the artillerymust be flexible. The artillery must beavailable for use in general support of theentire brigade or in direct support of oneor more units thereof. In addition it must

be so organized as to permit one or morebatteries to be attached to the attackingechelons. The main advantage of theattached battery is the ease ofcommunication between itself and thesupported unit, and thus the increasedrapidity of furnishing needed support. Asecondary advantage is the fact that the

battery commander, moving with theassault echelon, or closely behind it, candetermine the apparent needs of the unitwithout the necessity of being told, andcan therefore bring suitable fire to bear onsensitive points. It must be understood,however, that the attachment of batteriesreduces to a considerable extent the fire

power under the control of the brigadecommander. Often this reduction is notrepaid by the increased battle efficiency

of the unit to which the attachment wasmade. Each case of attachment should

therefore be considered carefully by thebrigade commander; if attachment seemsnecessary after a full consideration of allfactors involved, then the attachmentshould be made without hesitation. As ageneral rule attachment is not justified ifthe battery, under battalion control, cancarry out the mission and be available forother missions as well. However, I

believe that the attachment of batterieswill more often be justified in the case of

mechanized field artillery than in the caseof division field artillery.

Sixth: For communication, primarydependence must be placed on radio. Onthe march and in the early stages ofoccupation of position, two-way radiocommunication has proven itselfinvaluable. We must have speed in ourcommunication, in its installation and inits use; nothing approaches radio in these

respects. However, in order to reduce theburden on radio installations as far as isconsistent with efficiency, auxiliarymeans, such as motorcycle messengers,wire and visual signals, will be usedwhere and when possible.

Seventh: Artillery observationpersonnel must be pushed forward withthe attack. Fire in support of the attackingechelons must be continued even after thefirst ridge line has been crossed; but itmust be observed fire, else accidentallywe may fire on our own troops anddestroy the cohesion of the attack. Untilthe batteries themselves can displace,their forward observers, assisted byliaison officers and aviation, must controlthe fire.

Eighth: While the attack echelons arereforming the artillery must cover them

from counterattacks. At this time the

brigade is most vulnerable; artillerymust not fail to provide protection. Itis therefore essential that all of the

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artillery be not in the act of displacing atthis time. In all probability the assembly

of the cavalry will take place well withinthe range of the artillery, firing from itsinitial positions.

Ninth: The artillery must be ready toact on information of hostile movementsand formations furnished by aviation. Tostate this somewhat differently andemphasize the other side of the picture,observation aviation must be prepared toobserve artillery fire on targetsdiscovered by the aviation. This is

especially important after the attack of thecavalry has been launched, for thenmovements of the enemy countering anattack must be met with powerful artilleryfire in the shortest possible time. Wewon't be able to wait until suchmovements have come into our field ofobservation. In order to effect thisnecessary cooperation, a plane must bemade available as soon as action is

imminent, and air-ground communicationmust be reliable and rapid.

Finally, the artillery must work at topspeed in all phases of its operation.

This is particularly true in itspreparations prior to entry into action, itsentry into action, its actual firings, either

in preparation for the attack or in supportthereof, and during displacements. There

will be little time for refinements in theselection of positions, or for the locationof and firing on auxiliary targets. In factthere is a real need for speed; and speedwill dictate the abandonment of allnonessential technique.

To sum up Tactical Employment: Thebrigade commander should be responsiblethat: Artillery march well forward in themarch column; its fires be coordinatedwith cavalry fires; its displacement be not

ordered at critical times; and that it befurnished assistance by aviation. For our

part, we should see to

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Mar 1938