Field Artillery Journal - May 1938

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - May 1938

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May-June, 1938CONTENTS

A Message to the Field Artillery .............................................................................. 179Cushing's Command................................................................................................. 180

By Rollin Quezon

Lessons From Spain ................................................................................................. 183By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, FA

New President of Field Artillery Association........................................................... 196

Are Private Soldiers Necessary? .............................................................................. 197By William Hazlett Upson

From Sea to Mountain .............................................................................................. 203

By Lt. Col. G. H. Franke, FAFire Direction Indoors .............................................................................................. 210

By Major G. D. Wahl, FA

Communication Within the Light Battalion ............................................................. 215By 1st Lt. A. V. Dishman, FA

Spring National Guard and Reserve Class at the School .......................................... 216

Type Problems.......................................................................................................... 217

Mountain Guns Forward........................................................................................... 223

Field Artillery Family Party ..................................................................................... 224

Counterbattery in War of Movement........................................................................ 225By Lt. Col. John S. Wood, FA

The Bigger They Are the Harder They Fall ............................................................. 229By Lt. Col. Arthur R. Harris, FA

Buckin' ..................................................................................................................... 234By P. R. Howell, Hq Btry 76th FA

Acoustical Phenomena Associated With Gunfire..................................................... 235By Capt. W. S. Nye, FA

Solution to Writ........................................................................................................ 239

The Songs of the Field Artillery ............................................................................... 240Lines of Communications......................................................................................... 246

Reviews .................................................................................................................... 249

The Command and General Staff Quarterly, March 1938The Lost BattalionWhat About The Airship?The Power of DiversionThe Men I KilledThe Story of ReconstructionThe Journal of the American Military History Foundation

Announcement.......................................................................................................... 253Some Forward Observations .................................................................................... 254

Military Books.......................................................................................................... 256

AUTHORS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR ARTICLES


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28TH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

VOL. 28 No. 3

MAY-JUNE, 1938

THEFIELD ARTILLERY

JOURNALCopyright, 1938, by The United States Field Artillery

Association

A PUBLICATION FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE REGULARARMY, NATIONAL GUARD, AND ORGANIZED RESERVE

Patron Saint of Artillery

PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY FOR

THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

BY MONUMENTAL PRINTING COMPANY

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BALTIMORE, MD.

Editorial Office, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. Michael V. Gannon, Captain, Field Artillery, Editor

Entered as second-class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore, Md.,under the Act of March 3, 1879

Published without expense to the government

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THE U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

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"The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of theField Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal fordisseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field

artillery's progress, development, and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with theother arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; tofoster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militiaforces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the goodof our country."

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A Message to the Field ArtilleryThe vast amount of constructive and progressive work

accomplished by the Field Artillery during the past twenty years

under the leadership of its four devoted and distinguished Chiefs

Generals Snow, Austin, Bishop, and Birniewould seem, at first

thought, to have left but little to be done now or within the

immediate future.

Ever to be satisfied with present gains, however, is always to

stop further progress. The problems of the Field Artillery today,affecting as they do its personnel, its materiel, its organization, its

training, are as acute and pressing as they ever have been, save only

during the late War when General Snow, in 1918, took them over in

a condition of chaos.

The wise and efficient solution of these present-day problems

requires the best thought and the most cooperative effort of the

entire Field Artillery. As has been the case ever since the

establishment of the Chief's Office, your assistance, your ideas, and

your suggestions, looking to the progressive development and

improvement of our armthe arm that in the last war caused by far

the largest percentage of battle casualtiesare solicited and will

always be welcome.

I shall hope by your visits to this office, and by my visits among

you at your work, to learn at first hand of your difficulties, your

problems, your plans, your successes, and your achievements. This

applies to all componentsRegular, National Guard, Reserve,

R.O.T.C., and C.M.T.C.

In 1907 we had 170 Regular and a few National Guard officers

of Field Artillery. Today we have 17,709 Field Artillery officers of

all components. May our constructive efforts for the accomplishment

of our mission as Field Artillery; for the efficiency of our Army as a

whole; and for the welfare of our entire Country, be correspondingly

multiplied and effective.ROBERT M. DANFORD,

Major General, U. S. Army,Chief of Field Artillery.


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Picture by the courtesy of Colonel Stephen Elliott, 109th FA

N the Gettysburg ridge splashed afountain of steel,

Where the cannon of Cushing rangedwheel beside wheel,

And just to the left was the cluster oftrees,

The target to splinter that last lance ofLee's.

Alexander was spanning the Emmitsburgroad

With a bridge formed of shell, as thoughdrawn by a lode

To the rock-like abutment where Cushingstood bold,

Defying the flood that the thunderforetold.

And the faded red guidon of "A" of theFourth

Was reddened again by the blood of theNorth,

As the six sturdy sections by Cushingarrayed,

Supported the Shamrock that Hancockdisplayed.

Though few are the years the commandercan boast,

His battle-learned art is to Hancock ahost;

And proud of their leader, his gunners,who stand

To their posts at the pieces of Cushing'sCommand.

A limber explodes with a deafeningcrash,

And axles drop earthward, but quick as aflash,

To cannon disabled the spare wheels arebrought,

While galloping caisson replenishesshot.

Though hot now the barrels tocannoneer's hand,

Cool are the gunners of Cushing'sCommand,

As loading and laying and firing, andthen,

As swiftly they're loading and firingagain.

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CUSHING'S COMMAND

And the guidon that waves by thebattery's guns,

Is red from the blood of the battery's sons:One section surviving the death-dealinghail,

And Cushing, twice wounded, still fightsby its trail.

Then, out of the smoke of the lastcannonades,

Like a wave from a fog, surge theSouthern brigades,

While down to the fence where the

footsoldiers stand,Is rolled the last cannon of Cushing's

Command.

Wherever red guidons float over this

land, Let them dip to the mem'ry of

Cushing's Command;

Wherever a driver has tightened a cinch,

Let him mount to the whistles of

Cushing's "Three-Inch";Wherever a wheeler leans into a load, Let

him follow the leaders that Cushing's

men rode;Wherever, at lanyard, awaits Number

One, Let the answer re-echo to

Cushing's last gun.

For Pickett's men come, although blownlike the chaff,

And the cannoneers meet them withrammer and staff,

And back rolls the wave with a wake thatis red

But close by his cannon, young Cushinglies dead.

ROLLIN QUEZON

"Lieutenant Cushing of Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, challenged the admiration ofall who saw him. . . . . At last, severely wounded himself, his officers all killed or wounded,

and with but cannoneers enough to man one section, he pushed his gun to the fence in front,

and was killed while serving his last cannister into the ranks of the advancing enemy."

Norman J. Hall, Colonel, Commanding. (3d Brigade, 2d Division, II Corps, Army of the

Potomac.)

SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO THIS JULY

The Picture

Not quite historically accurate, the stirring scene here shown contains many pointsmentioned in the verses. In the distance may be seen the Emmitsburg Road. On the leftis the "cluster of trees." The central figure in the foreground is Lieutenant Cushing.Behind him, "Hancock the Superb," corps commander who never lost an action inwhich he was in direct command, grandson of Winfield Scott, under whom he fought inMexico. In several places, notably in the left foreground, may be seen the "Shamrock,"the trefoil insignia of Hancock's Corps. Four pieces are shown in action, another beingbrought "down to the fence where the footsoldiers stand." On the right is the limberstruck by a hostile shell. In the middle background are the gallant hosts of Pickett,marching into the cannon's mouth.

The story of the battery's engagement is told on the following page.

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"Right Here and Fight It Out!"

USHING'S Command" and

its accompanying illustrationare portrayals of one of the

great, heroic incidents of the Civil War.Longstreet's assault on the third day atGettysburg. Pickett's division formingthe spearhead, was directed toward aclump of trees on Cemetery Ridge,where Hancock's Second Corps wasposted. The attack was preceded by aheavy preparation fired under thedirection of Alexander, Longstreet'schief of artillery. Battery A, 4th USArtillery, commanded by LieutenantAlonzo H. Cushing, supported theSecond Corps from a position on theridge, where the mass of fire had itsheaviest concentration. In spite ofrepairs made to carriages under fire,five of Cushing's six guns were out ofaction at the end of the Confederatepreparation. The last remaining gun was

then run down to the fence on the lineof the defending infantry, so that its firewould not be masked, and the oncomingranks were met with double and triplecharges of cannister, Cushing, himself,serving the piece. The young batterycommander had been suffering for overan hour from two severe wounds. Inpersonnel, Cushing, 1st SergeantFrederick Fuger, and a handful of

cannoneers were all that remained of thefiring battery. Of Cushing at thismoment, Sergeant Fuger afterwardwrote: "He called to me and told me tostand by him, so that he could imparthis orders to the battery. He became illand suffered frightfully. I wanted him togo to the rear. 'No,' he said, 'I stay righthere and fight it out, or die in theattempt.'" When the assault approachedto within 100 yards of the gun, Cushing

said to General Alexander S. Webb,who commanded the Second

(Philadelphia) Brigade of Hancock's

Corps, the organization which receivedthe brunt of the attack, "General, I willgive them one more shot." At themoment of the discharge of this lastremaining round, Cushing was shot inthe mouth by a musket ball, and felldead.

Battery A of the 4th lost, atGettysburg, two officers killed and onewounded, of three; seven enlisted menkilled and thirty-eight wounded, ofninety; eighty-three horses killed ofninety; and five guns put out of action ofsix. According to Sergeant Fuger, whowas afterward commissioned in theregular army for his bravery, "not anuninjured wheel remained, and nineammunition chests were blown up."

Alonzo Hereford Cushing was born atMilwaukee, Wisconsin, January 9th,1841; graduated from the United States

Military Academy, 1861; brevetedCaptain at Fredericksburg, Major atChancellorsville, and Lieutenant Colonelat Gettysburg for conspicuous gallantryon the first day of the battle. Because ofthe slow promotion which existed in theartillery, his permanent rank was onlythat of first lieutenant. He was buried atWest Point.

General Webb, in his official report

of the part played by the PhiladelphiaBrigade in the battle, wrote:"Lieutenant A. H. Cushing, 4th USArtillery, fell mortally wounded, at thefence by the side of his guns. Cool,brave, competent, he fought for an hourand a half after he had reported to methat he was wounded in both thighs. . . .I recommended, for promotion, Sgts.Frederick Fuger and Edward M. Irvingof that battery; also Acting Gunner

Francis Abraham. This battery wasnobly served."

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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

VOLUME 28 MAY-JUNE, 1938 NUMBER 3

Lessons From SpainBY COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA

HE fate of the battles of the nextwar is being decided by presentpeacetime preparations. War has

become extraordinarily complex. Weused to believe that tactics changed everyten years, but in these days, not onlytactics, but organization, equipment,arms, and munitions change yearly. It isno longer a question of simple principles,such as whether the offensive ispreferable to the defensive. It is necessaryto know whether we are able to carry outeither of these types of warfare.

Over thirty kinds of divisions, andother large units, varying as toorganization, mechanization,motorization, and armament exist. Thereare divergent opinions as to which ofthese will be most suitable for the nextwar. Nations doubt whether their armiesas now constituted and equipped willstand the test of war. Everywhere there isdiscussion and experiment.

This uncertainty is a prime reason whythe great war, which is being anticipatedwith incredible energy, has not started.General staffs wish to know more as towhat can be expected from new weaponsnow available; and they desire to increasethe quantity of materiel which apparentlyis absolutely required as a prerequisite forvictory, and which is a greater quantitythan until recently had been foreseen andprovided for.

Now nothing that can be done in peacewill give the information that war alone

offers as to what materiel will give thebest results, how much of it is needed,and how it is to be used. Consequently

recent campaigns are being carefullystudied. Italy has had considerableexperience in Ethiopia, where she hastested her materiel in difficult country;and tried out new forms of tactics. A waris now occurring in China. This is faraway, and it is hard to obtain informationas to details. In both Ethiopia and China,success has attended the power markedlysuperior in equipment and leadership.

Our best available recent lessonscome from Spain. Observation of thiswar has been practicable. Reports arenot lacking. The fact that this war isoccurring just at the time when there hasbeen a change of tactics, organization,and weapons among nations, makes itimportant, and desirable of close study.Some nations have thought that this wasan excellent opportunity to try outmateriel and ideas. Germany, Italy, andRussia have intervened, on an unofficialbasis, but effectively, with organizedforces, which are testing, on Europeanbattlefields, tactics, implements, andorganization. France has had noorganized force involved, but she hasfurnished some of her materiel. Thesenations are profiting from theirexperiences.

Let us first consider the forces

involved:At the end of 1937, the Loyalists had

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around 600,000 men under arms. About5,000 were former members of the

Spanish Army, and 20,000 were foreignvolunteers. Of the foreigners 90% hadno previous military training. About10% of them were trained specialists,including officers of artillery, tanks, andaviation, and mechanics andnoncommissioned officers of all armsand services.

During the first year the Loyalistswere handicapped by lack of competentofficers, and lack of training of the

enlisted personnel. Within their rankswere those who, while admitting thenecessity for officers, objected to anyobligation of obedience, unless orderswere acceptable to those receiving them.They reserved the right to investigate andform an opinion on orders. They carriedthis so far that during the advance of theenemy on Madrid, at a time when ahostile turning movement was noted, a

debate was started as to whether an orderto change front towards the threatenedflank was to be obeyed. Motions weremade to substitute for the order a retreat,also to stand fast, etc. While the unitconcerned, acting as a committee of thewhole, was hotly discussing the subject,the enemy completed his movement, andopened fire with machine guns. Thisimmediately ended the debate, all presentsuddenly arriving at the unanimousdecision that a very rapid retreat wasnecessary.

On the Barcelona front, dominated bythe Federation of Iberian Anarchists,command of companies and battalionshas been by roster, for a day at a time.Orders of the commander of the day werenot necessarily to be obeyed; anyone whodisagreed was free to do as he pleased.This front has had a superiority in

numbers over their enemy of not less than3 to 1, but it has never been able toaccomplish anything, except to hold

positions. Several offensives have beentried, but they have failed, sometimes

through disagreements after the operationhad commenced, and sometimes throughfailure of supply, either through inabilityto decide what to do, or failure to do it.

Defeats, and no victories, have provedthat discipline is necessary for an army ifit is to do more than carry out a passivedefense. A corps of officers has beenestablished, and a training school forthem is functioning at Valencia.Leadership is now improving, but is not

yet satisfactory, especially on theBarcelona front, where there is strongopposition to the Valencia methods.

In the Valencia-Madrid army, sovietdiscipline prevails. This system ofdiscipline prescribes that everyone, fromgeneral to private, is called "comrade."General officers have soldiers visitingtheir headquarters to investigate what isbeing done, and to suggest what ought to

be done. This practice was at one timeso bad as to make it impossible for staffsto function. The soviet practice ofhaving a commissar as politicalrepresentative for battalions and higherunits has now been adopted. Thecommissar explains orders to thesoldiers, with a view to eliminatingsoldier committees of investigation. Heexplains the reasons for wars, distributesgovernment propaganda withappropriate explanations, lectures on theadvantages of communism and thedisadvantages of other forms ofgovernment, and is in general chargedwith the maintenance of morale, and thesecuring of obedience to orders withoutundue delay.

Provided orders are receivedsufficiently in advance to allow thecommissar time to do his explaining, this

system in a way works. It fails inoffensives, after the men become fatiguedor disheartened. When this happens,

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LESSONS FROM SPAIN

they revert to delays in obeying orders,under pretext that a discussion isnecessary to determine the properprocedure for the future. To date theloyalist offensives have, after a few days,failed to make progress.

Men for the Loyalist army areobtained by conscription, and throughvoluntary enlistment. A soldier has anassured means of livingquarters, foodand clothing. His base pay of 300 pesetasa month is high. Life is hard in Spain, andopportunities for sudden death have not

been, and are not now, lacking. Wearing agovernment uniform has been anexcellent way to keep out of trouble, andhas furnished a strong incentive to men tojoin the army.

The Nationalist (Franco) army, at theend of last year, had under 500,000 menunder arms. Inferior in numbers to theiropponents, they have surpassed them indiscipline and in leadership. The nucleus

of their forces consists of:a. The old Spanish army, about80,000;

b. The old Guardia Civil, about15,000, nearly all reenlisted men;

c. Moors, probably about 30,000,with their own officersthese areexcellent attack troops;

d. Three Italian divisionsabout36,000;

e. Italian specialistsaviation,

services, arms and supplies; variouslyestimated as 10,000 to 30,000;

f. German specialists, of all armsand services5,000 to 10,000.

There have been sufficient officersfrom the beginning of the war to enabletraining schools to function continuously.

The Nationalist enlisted personnel ismaintained by conscription and byvoluntary enlistment. Devotion to ideals

such as religious enthusiasm, monarchialtraditions, Carlism, Fascism, have beeneffective in securing recruits. The basepay is just one tenth of that paid in the

Loyalist army. The various Nationalistcomponents, including the officers, differwidely as to political beliefs, but theyhave decided to postpone a decision onthe final form of government for Spain, inorder to unite on the immediate missionof suppressing communism andanarchism, and establishing law andorder.

Loyalists and Nationalists are nowwell equipped with materiel. Sometimesone side has the advantage, andsometimes the other side. The

Nationalists, with their trained officers,have been able to use their materiel tobetter advantage both as to technique, andas to tactics. The Loyalists have been at adisadvantage, due to lack of trainedpersonnel. This difference has beenstrikingly noticeable in the artillery. Wewill mention this later.

Recollecting the differences betweenthe two sides, let us see what lessons have

issued from Spain.The outstanding one has been thepower of the defense. It has takenunexpectedly stronger forces,ammunition, and time, to break thesimplest lines, held by poorly trained, andsometimes poorly equipped units. Allkinds of terrain have been able to hold offan antagonist. It was not news thatmountain lines were hard to break, butlines in open country have been difficult

to overcome. Towns, large and small,have been held by very mediocre forces,notwithstanding in many cases thepresence of large numbers of inhabitantsto hamper the defense.

Defensive positions during the earlystages of the war had some regularformation. It was easy to locate these,and a combined infantry and artilleryattack could break them. Concealment

became the rule, and with practicecamouflage became excellent. Theskeleton of the defense was a dispersedsystem of machine-gun posts, supported

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by artillery in defiladed positions. Thedispersion was both as to distance and as

to interval, and was as irregular aspossible. The machine guns afforded notargets that were visible from air orground observation, and their positionswere changed frequently.

Machine guns have not neededextensive fields of fire100 meters hassufficed. Positions on reverse slopes, witha mission of stopping attacks at a crest infront, have been successful. If the enemyremained on, or just in rear of the crest,

the artillery destroyed him by shell firecrests are easy targets to bracket. It hasbeen found to be almost impossible todiscover even approximately the locationof concealed machine guns. They havebeen as close as 100, and as far as 2,000meters from where infantry has beenstopped. In general, defensive positionshad several lines in rear of one another.

Woods have been defended by

machine guns which could not be locatedby any kind of observation. Open groundin front could be covered by fire throughtunnels cut through the underbrush.Ravines inside of woods affordedexcellent defense positions, especially ifprotected by wire, but any kind ofposition has been found difficult to seize.Where time permitted, machine gunshave had overhead cover. The artillerymission has been, for the defense, toprovide emergency barrages, and to shellhostile troops which have been halted bythe machine guns.

Spanish towns have stone buildings,and have been important centers ofresistance. Only selected buildings, orparts of buildings, were occupied.Defenders could be posted as desiredbetween roofs and cellars, and on eitheror both sides of streets, and anywhere

within a radius of several blocks.Passages opened between buildingsenabled the defense to shift from abuilding being shelled to one which was

temporarily safer. Even when close by, itwas no easy task for the attack to

determine where the enemy was.The initial attack on Madrid wasstopped by a force of 8 machine guns,1,400 rifles, and 1 75-mm. gun. Thisforce was outnumbered 20 to 1, but itheld. The castle of Alcazar sustainedprolonged shelling over a period of sixweeks; it was mined, and repeatedlyattacked by superior forces, but it wasnever taken.

Stone, concrete, and steel-framed

buildings have been difficult artillerytargets; not hard to hit, but hard to drivedefenders out of. Light and mediumartillery have caused but partialdestruction, and have not driven outpersonnel in lower stories and cellars.Heavy artillery, firing with delayed-action fuzes, especially if of 210-mm.caliber or larger, may bring down entirebuildings of considerable size. But there

has been little artillery of this caliber inSpain. Bombing with delayed-actionfuzes, using bombs up to 300 kilograms,has been very destructive, but it has notbeen very accurate. Battles for towns, ofeven minor importance, have lasted forweeks and months, there not havingbeen sufficient heavy artillery andammunition to destroy the enemy'spositions within a reasonably short time.Successive destructions have affordedthe possibility of occupying oldpositions previously shelled, and havegiven no solution.

Machine guns have formed the nucleusof the defense, but they have neededartillery to support them. The machineguns have arrested the attack, and haveforced the attackers to seek cover. Theartillery has had the mission of searchingout the enemy, destroying him, or causing

him to retire. Usually the artillery hasbeen inferior in strength to that of theenemy, and has been unable to cover theentire front at one time. When an attack

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was received the artillery firedsuccessively at targets which had beenstopped by the machine guns. In brief, themachine guns immobilized the enemy;the artillery destroyed him.

The defense has profited by terrestrialobservation. In the early days attacks wereloosely made, and were visible to the OP's.With improved training and experience,infantry is no longer often seen; but theauxiliaries of the infantrytanks, infantrycannon, and the like, are hard to conceal,and have given the OP's at least some idea

as to the location of the hostile infantry.In general, the result has been that a

defensive line which averaged 20machine guns to the kilometer of front, ifsuitably sited and camouflaged, has beenunbreakable by any infantry attack,regardless of support by tanks, aviation,and accompanying weapons, unless it wassupported by strong artillery forces.

A hundred men have been able to holda kilometer of front; a regiment, threekilometers with triple lines of defense.Nine to ten kilometers has been a goodfront for a division, which could providea defensive position of such depth that itwould be impracticable to break the rearlines, without the enemy first causing adisplacement forward of his artillery.Where only a single line of defense hasbeen necessary, as for temporarypositions, extensive fronts have been held

by small forces.The power of the defense, through

extensive use of machine guns supportedby artillery, has caused battles to beprolonged over days and weeks, has

involved heavy losses, and especially forthe offensive, has required theexpenditure of enormous quantities ofammunition.

The defense, in Spain, is constantlyimproving, from experience, training, andnew materiel. Both sides are now providedwith antitank and antiaircraft artillery asbasic elements. Mustard gas would be anexcellent defense weapon, but reports todate do not indicate its use in Spain.

How has the offensive succeeded inovercoming such difficult and tenacious

resistance, which has caused battles tolast over prolonged periods of time?Before we answer this question, let us seewhat tanks have done.

Much had been expected of tanks, andmuch had been hoped for from them.There had been speculation, mostinteresting, as to what tanks would dowhen their opportunity came. Theartillery has been interested from theviewpoint of bringing effective fire on arapidly moving target, which could shootback. Infantry has been interested both inthe use of tanks as an offensive weapon,and as to how, when on the defensive,best to meet their attacks.

What are the facts?Tanks in Spain have been German,

Italian, and Russian. Germany sent unitsfrom, or the same as, those assigned toher mechanized units. Italian tanks were

those which had been successful inEthiopia. Russia sent two kinds oftanksa light type and a heavy. Thecharacteristics of these four kinds oftanks, in round numbers, were:

Type Unknown Fiat T-26 T-28

Weight, tons ............................. 6 3 9 20Speed, maximum miles per

hour ..................................... 30 25 30 25

Armor, inches .......................... .6 .25 .37 .6Machine guns ........................... 2 2 2 3Antitank guns ........................... None None One 47-mm. One 47-mm.Crew ........................................ 2 2 3 4

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The first tanks appeared in October,1936. They were Russian, and were near

Madrid. At this date there were noantitank guns or mines in the field, andtanks were not employed against tanks.Conditions were most favorable for theiruse. They were employed in groups notexceeding twenty to make turningmovements, and then to operate againstthe enemy's flank. These tanks had somesuccess, and they inflicted losses. Butthey never had a decisive effect on theengagement. They were not tied to the

infantry, nor to any artillery fire; theyinvariably scattered, and were destroyed,or were put out of action by the hostileartillery. Light batteries were a dangerousantagonist. Certainly batteries had to takeprecautions for their own safety. A sharplookout, the ability to change thedirection of fire of at least one piece toany direction, with a fair field of fire allaround, were necessary. In the Madrid

battles, tanks never broke through theartillery line.

Russian tanks had certain mechanicaldifficulties, which were sharply broughtout by war conditions. They hadconsiderable rubber in their runninggears. This melted or burnt out whencrossing through gasoline fires, which instreet fighting were hard to avoid.Grooves existed on the under side of thetanks. Individual hostile infantry, fromthe shelter of shell holes or other places,threw bottles of gasoline against the sideof the tanks. The escaping liquidaccumulated in the grooves, and was thenignited by a hand grenade. The resultingfire forced out the crew, and the tank waslost.

There were numerous tank actionsduring the winter of 1936-1937. Theinfantry on both sides eventually secured

tanks, so most attacks had some. Theysecured no important results.

The lessons of the World War, thattanks should be used in masses, had not

been forgotten, but it was the spring of1937 before enough tanks were available

so to employ them. Loyalists andNationalists both secured considerablenumber of tanks at about the same time,but as pointed out, the Loyalists had tankswhich were heavier, and all of whichwere armed with an antitank 47-mm. gun.

In the Guadalajara campaign, theNationalists used nearly 100 tanks in onemass. They were covered by a strongartillery preparation. They hadconsiderable success, for they made a

breach in a defensive line which hadpreviously resisted numerous infantryattacks. An advance of nearly 30 mileswas made, notwithstanding bad weather,with nearly continuous rain and snow.The artillery which had supported thetanks displaced forward, but because ofwet ground failed to occupy positions,and remained in march order on the roadspending information as to location of

targets.At this stage, the Loyalists

counterattacked with a mass of about 50Russian tanks. The Russiansoverwhelmed the smaller German andItalian tanks, whose armor could notresist the Russian tank 47-mm. guns.Neither had the Nationalists at this dateany antitank guns or heavy-calibermachine guns capable of stopping theRussians. The Germans and Italians fledback through their supporting troops. Thisbattle appears to have been the first oftanks versus tanksthe one with theheavier armament and armor won.

Now came the Loyalist aviation.Finding the Nationalist artillery strungout on roads with trains in rear of them,they bombed these columns, causingserious losses and tremendousconfusion. This was too much for the

Nationalist infantry. Observing whatappeared to be a spectacular destructionof their artillery, from which they werereceiving no assistance, confronted

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by advancing Russian tanks with armorimpenetrable to their projectiles, they fled

after their own tanks, and streamed to therear. The Russian tanks made asubstantial advance, but they were notable to penetrate the line of reserves. Theoperators understood how to drive theirtanks, and how to fire their weapons. Butwhen they got in advance of theirsupporting troops, the tanks were notemployed to the best tactical advantage,and they lost the opportunity for allexcept a local success.

The lessons of the Guadalajaracampaign were evident. Tanks bythemselves had not accomplished much.It seemed clear that thereafter, the actionof tanks must be jointly with, and incoordination with:

The artillery to clear the way.The infantry to hold what the tanks

seize.Tanks with armored cars are an

intermediate weapon between artilleryand infantry. They had given excellentresults for exploitation, but only whenthe enemy had no prepared defense line,antitank guns, or artillery to opposethem. For the future, the possibility oftanks and armored vehicles beingopposed by like types must be expectedand provided for.

Both sides in Spain have nowequipped themselves with antitank guns.Standard equipment on the Nationalistside is 4 65-mm. guns per battalion ofinfantry. They have been very successful,for since the spring of 1937, unless theantitank guns were first knocked out byan artillery preparation, no frontal attackby tanks has succeeded.

This brings us back to the point ofdetermining how attacks must beconducted in order to penetrate, or drive

back, a modern defense.Many, in 1918 and afterward, thought

that the great concentrations of artillery

in the closing year of the World Warwere exceptional, and would not again

occur. They were of the opinion that theWorld War showed decisively thesuperiority of the offensive, and that thismethod of warfare was undulyhandicapped when it was contingent onaccumulating masses of guns andammunition. They looked forward toemancipating the infantry from beingtied to masses of artillery. Schoolstaught that extensive artillerypreparations would occur only in a

limited number of cases, and that effortshould be directed to avoiding them,substituting mobility for fire power. Toobtain mobility there has been in someplaces a marked tendency to decreasethe artillery, on the ground that it iscumbersome and interferes with thedesired mobility. If Spain has shownanything, it has been that even slenderlyheld positions can not be broken except

through thorough artillery preparation.The rule has beenno artillery: noprogress.

The facts are that the World Warproved not the superiority of theoffensive, but the superiority of materiel.The offensive of the Allies in 1918 won,but they then had the artillery andammunition needed. Offensives in earlieryears had been generally fruitless becauseof lack of materiel, and the war drifted onuntil the means to end it wereforthcoming. Then it ended rapidly.

Once again we see the same lesson inSpain. When one side has accumulatedmateriel sufficient for an offensive,progress may be made, and it ends whenthe materiel, especially the ammunition,is exhausted. A pause results until a newstock of guns and ammunition has beenconcentrated. It is not of course necessary

that new assemblies of means be in thesame sector as a preceding one.

After one and a half years' strenuous

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fighting, through mountains and acrossplains, and against cities, large and small,

it has been everywhere found that onlyartillery fire in great volume would breakan even moderately defended front. Bothsides in Spain had to increase, and arestill increasing, their artillery. It has beennecessary to provide much moreammunition than had been previouslyeven imagined.

The artillery has been the main arm onthe offensive. Not only has there had tobe artillery in quantity, with lots of

ammunition, but it has had to be prettygood artillery. Victories by theNationalists have been largely due to thefact that the major portion of the RegularArmy artillery joined their side. TheLoyalists have from the first beensuffering from a dearth of competentartillery officers. They had a deficiencyof materiel at the beginning of the war,but this was later corrected by

importations of artillery and materielfrom Russia and France. But they havenot been able to find competent artilleryofficers to handle the excellent materielnow at their disposal.

The offensive has won battles bypiercing fronts. Excepting the early daysof the war before armies had beenorganized, turning movements haveeventually had to fight a frontal actionfrom the local point of view. Victorydepended on having sufficient guns andammunition, not necessarily a superiornumber of personnel . . . at the decisivepoint. Owing to the quantity of artilleryrequired for frontal actions, attacks todate have only been possible on narrowsectors, because of lack of materiel formore extensive operations. It has beenpossible to change sectors from time totime, and also theaters of operations, but

this has taken time to accomplish.War is dangerous and expensive.

European armies are under constant threatof having war break out without notice.

They realize that the conditions of theWorld War were not exceptional, but

were the necessary and reasonableconsequences of improved materiel, andthat the situation created by these, andnewer developments, must be met andprovided for.

That large quantities of artillery andammunition are necessary to make anoffensive possible is now recognized. Asthe artillery provided by current tables oforganization is insufficient for modernneeds, this situation is being temporarily

met by:a. Increase of artillery, as far as

stocks permit.b. Great increase in ammunition

reserves.c. Reducing fronts of attack to a

width commensurate with thenumber of guns and ammunitionavailable.

France has arranged, effective upon

mobilization, to double its division andcorps artillery. The materiel for this ison hand. An increase of the armyartillery is under consideration. Theincrease will provide approximately 50guns per kilometer of front, of which alittle over one-half are 75-mm. guns, andthe balance of larger calibers. Thesefigures are basic strength, and areexclusive of antiaircraft, antitank, andinfantry guns.

Fifty guns per kilometer is low toinsure success. It is a minimum forfavorable cases, such as where no coverexists and observation is good. Wherecover does exist, the basic strength is tobe doubled or tripled.

Germany and Italy are increasing theirartillery, details not yet known. Europeancountries are increasing the ammunitionreserves, as it is evident that war will

come to a standstill if very large suppliesof shell and powder are not constantlyavailable.

Cessation of hostilities, due to lack

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of materiel, occurred during the WorldWar, and is again occurring in Spain.

Such a situation is costly. Prolongation ofwar gives time for economic factors,finance, starvation, lack of raw materiel,to exert pressure. Economic pressure isimportant and effective, and no nationwill nowadays start a war unless it has onhand sufficient war materiel to give morethan a reasonable chance of lastingthrough the period of all battles neededfor the mission of the war. Every effort isbeing made to avoid in the coming war

long delays between battles. Quantities ofmunitions in stocks are secret. No nationwishes to allow a possible enemy todetermine whether it is ready for war, orapproaching that status. We can not statehow nearly ready for war certain nationsare.

Based on recent war experiences,battles of the future are envisaged ascommencing with an artillery

preparation against a front restricted insize to the number of guns available. Allguns will fire at a high rate, delivering adeep and terrific barrage, largely ofmedium and heavy calibers. Thisbarrage will advance slowly, startingfrom a range which is known to be shortof the nearest hostile positions, and willcontinue to a range beyond the objectiveof the infantry. We will discuss theinfantry advance later. The barrage mustdrive out, or destroy, substantially allenemy installations in its path, whichmust include those of the flanks of theattacking force. Since it has beenrepeatedly proved that a very small forcecan defend a front, it is sufficient in anattack, if only a thin line of infantryreach the objective, provided there be ashort time for orientation andreorganization.

Coordination of artillery, infantry,tanks, and aviation must be arranged. Inthe past we have found that coordination

of artillery and infantry was far fromsimple. To add thereto two other arms,

tanks and aviation, certainly complicatesthe question. But it is absolutelynecessary that it be done. And it hasbeen accomplished in Spain, the firsttime at Bilbao, where there wasprovided:

a. A powerful artillery barrage.b. Regulated bombing, coordinated

with the artillery.c. Tanks in masses, closely following

the artillery barrage.d. Infantry closely following the

tanks.Lacking sufficient artillery, the sector ofattack was narrow, but it went through.

A later example of a modern attackoccurred at Santander in August, 1937.The battle was fought over terrainconsisting of narrow valleys, betweenwide stretches of open upland. In oneattack by the 61st and 62d Nationalist

Divisions, the artillery preparation, aidedby bombing, broke the enemy's lines, andthe tanks and infantry reached theirobjectives without opposition.

Two Italian divisions, Black Flameand Black Arrow, had stiffer opposition.These two divisions had about 72batteries, or 288 guns, in support, on afront of some 5 kilometers. The artillerypreparation lasted 75 minutes, with anaverage expenditure of not quite 2 roundsper gun per minute. About 120 tanksfollowed the barrage. Approximately one-fifth of the tanks was of a newer typecarrying an antitank gun, and covered,against hostile tank attack, the lighter Fiat2-man tanks. In this battle no enemytanks appeared, so that there was notank-versus-tank action. The light tanksran around everywhere. Theyconcentrated against enemy nests which

had not been destroyed by the artillery;they mopped up in a most effectivemanner. The infantry assisted in mopping

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up, and organized the territory gained.The infantry, having reached its

objective, protected itself with but minorassistance from the artillery. The latterwas released for a following mission,which was to prepare for an attack inanother sector, not necessarily adjacent.Utilizing long ranges, and wide traverseson carriages, the artillery, with as fewchanges of positions as possible, drove asecond wedge into the enemy's front. Thissystem kept the artillery constantly busy;the infantry was mainly employed by

sectors.Successive attacks on restricted fronts,

each with limited objectives, are notpreferable to attacks on a wide front withunlimited objectives. It has simply been anecessity, due to the strength of thedefensive, which has imposed this type ofattack as the only one possible. An attackon a wide front would require more gunsand ammunition than either side in Spain

now possesses. This lesson is becomingwell understood, and has led, as stated, toa general movement to increase theartillery and ammunition supply ofmodern armies. If a new war occurs soon,attacks on limited fronts, deliveredsuccessively in different sectors, is whatwill probably occur.

The days of infantry marching on footare at an end. Columns on roads are nolonger possible, and while it would bepracticable to march infantry on foot ifdivided into small detachments, thiswould require so much space as to beimpracticable. Road movements for thefuture are clearly to be by motor vehicles,which may march at high speed, withsufficient distance between vehicles as topreclude effective bombing or shelling.

The best opinion tends to having theinfantry in attack follow the artillery

barrage mounted on caterpillar cross-country tractors, preferably armored.Speed is not essential, as the artillery

barrage to accomplish its mission mustmove slowly. The tanks in Spain have

clearly shown that this is practicable. Tentractors to the kilometer carry enoughmen, machine guns and ammunition tohold an objective. The artillerypreparation can neutralize most of theresistance; the tanks can mop up whatlittle escapes the artillery. Infantry somounted can safely follow the barrage atsome distance, and may march in anirregular formation.

The French War Department has

announced that as a result of the war inSpain, and of their own maneuvers heldin Normandy, in September, 1937, that alarge increase would be made inmechanized armored vehicles. Thisprogram is being pushed, as it is realizedthat possible hostile states may be doingthe same thing, and may seize anopportunity to commence a war beforetheir opponents have properly armed

themselves. For example, some notablediscussions of what is being prepared onthis line have appeared in the Germanmilitary press.

New weapons and equipment aredecisive in modern battles. The offensivebattles of the future, and the fate ofnations, now are being planned, and thisrequires a strong artillery with plenty ofammunition, an air force to bombobjectives beyond artillery range, tanksand armored vehicles to precede theinfantry attack, infantry mounted ontrucks for road movements, and on cross-country armored vehicles for attack. Thedays of infantry operating on foot, exceptfor defense, are disappearing.

Another lesson from Spain has beenin the use of infantry reserves. To holdout important forces until reports arereceived which will enable a decision

to be made as to the best place toemploy them, has given poor results. Ithas been impossible for the

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OPs' or air reconnaissance to follow battlemovements, because of universal use of

camouflage and the impossibility ofcertainly distinguishing hostile fromfriendly infantry. Reports giving a clearpicture of a battle do not arrive until thebattle is over, and it is then too late to usethe reserve. If used at all, it must beduring the battle. The risk of committingreserves too soon is small compared withthe risk of losing the engagement by notusing them. The best plan has been tohave the reserves follow whatever unit is

advancing, and in any case keep movingforward.

Liaison between infantry and artilleryhas been difficult on account of inabilityof OP's and air reconnaissance to keeptrack of battle movements. In theoffensive, the infantry has been able tofollow the barrage, and if the artillerypreparation has been correctly calculatedfor its mission of sweeping enemy units

out of the sector of attack, the infantryhas closely adhered to a time schedule. Inthe later battles, the artillery has set thepace, and has opened a way for theinfantry.

On the defensive, time has beenrequired to relay information from thefront line as to enemy positions. Suchinformation has occasionally arrivedsimultaneously from different sectors,which has introduced the problem of thepriority of artillery fire between differenttargets.

For both offensives and defensive,CP's of artillery and infantry havetended to be close by. Modern artilleryregulations generally have required this,but in practice it has not always beendone. Some regulations show artilleryCP's, diagrammatically in texts, as inrear of the next lower unitsbattalion

CP's behind batteries; regimental CP'sbehind battalions; etc. War has notdemonstrated that artillery CP's must be

in rear or subordinate units. What a CPneeds is:

a. Connection with own units, andsupporting units.b. Information as to targets, and as to

the enemy.An artillery CP which is near to an OP,

and close to the front, may be bettersituated to secure information as totargets, and maintain liaison with theinfantry CP's, than if it were in rear of thebatteries. A forward CP position has beenindicated as frequently desirable.

Advances and retirements near thefront, for all arms, have been in deployed,or semideployed, formations. TheGermans practiced this in their retreat inFrance in 1918, so this method is not new.Some think that it must be slow andexhausting. Even if this were true it is,nevertheless, necessary. But its truth isdoubtful. Modern vehicles, and utilizationof roads, including secondary ones for

small parties moving at a high rate ofspeed, afford means of transportationheretofore unknown, and must now bereckoned with.

The high rate of movement ofmotorized and mechanized troops enablesforces 100 miles away to be in line overnight. For troops to take shelter withsafety, an outpost line must be at least thatfar out. It can be maintained only withmotor vehicles and radio installations. Ifsecurity detachments thrown out toconsiderable distances appear liable tocapture or to severe losses, it must beremembered that they have greaterdelaying power than formerly, that theycan be reenforced quickly, and that ifnecessary they can get away rapidly.

Excellent motor equipment inquantities is necessary for troopmovements. It may be used deployed, or

in numerous small columns on roads if atconsiderable distances apart. The increasedlengths of columns will be balanced

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by a shorter time distance, due to the highrate of speed of vehicles. If moving at 30

miles an hour, and an average distance of100 meters between vehicles (which isprobably sufficient to avoid extremelosses from bombing) more than twice asmany troops may move over a road thanif on foot, marching at 2 miles per hour.The days of advancing at this speed,except for small units, are gone.Protection against bombing and shelling,especially near the front, has to be taken,and detours may be frequent. Cross-

country vehicles are indicated as the typefor future troop movements in forwardareas.

Comments

If war should come soon, there is astrong probability of repeating thesequence of events which occurred in theWorld War. Rushing troops to the front,stabilizing warfare, conscription, efforts

to have more men at the front than theenemy, sacrificelargely uselessandthen, after a long time, costly victory,provided we furnish men, money,materiel, and ammunition absolutelynecessary to win.

Why start on such a course? For someit is easier to follow a path alreadydefined than to discover a new one. Butwhen the old path is known to lead todestruction, it ought to be boldlyabandoned, and a complete new directiontaken, in the light of lessons of recentwars.

We have been basing our training onthe value of the offensive. Our annualtraining programs have stressed thispoint, and have insisted on teaching ourofficers that the offensive must beundertaken. There seems to be a generalopinion that history indicates that

victory goes to the side which adopts theoffensive. This is not true. A moderateknowledge of history will show thatvictory by no means went always to the

side which commenced the offensive.The passive defense has occasionally

won decisive actions; the active defensehas won the majority of decisive battles.Think about Saratoga, Gettysburg,Waterloo, and the Moscow campaign of1812. Nowadays the tactical offensive ismost difficult, and ought not to beundertaken unless there are available themeans required for successartillery,ammunition, tanks, armored vehicles,planes. No training should stress thepoint that we must attack, if

insufficiently or improperly equipped.To do so is to play into the enemy'shands.

In the past 50 years, decisive victorieshave been won only against forces whichhave been greatly inferior as toequipment, particularly as to artillery andammunition. This is what is occurring inSpaina repetition of past lessons. Whyblind ourselves to this fact? If we are

going to win our next war, a very greatsuperiority will be needed to win. If wedo not have this superiority, it is uselessto try. For this reason, nations in Europe,although having assumed missions whichfrom their point of view would justifywar now, hesitate to start one, as they donot have the superiority necessary forwinning. This explains the presentstalemate in Spain. Neither side has thegreat superiority required for theoverthrow of the other side. Two yearsago in Ethiopia, and today in China,successful offensives have occurred. Inboth cases, one side has had noticeablyinferior numbers, but a tremendoussuperiority in materiel, ammunition, andleadership.

In past wars decisions were soughtprimarily through application of

principles. The main one was that victory

generally went to the party which had thestrongest force on the battle field. Therewere discussions as to whether moralewas more important than numbers.

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As there was not much differencebetween opposing forces as to morale and

equipment, the result usually was that thelarger force won. Many still have thesame ideaat the present time adangerous one.

The opinion that the offensive issuperior to the defensive is notnecessarily true. Nearly a quarter of acentury ago, in 1914, the French attackson the Belgian frontier showed this to befalse. Yet our regulations have notchanged. Men are no match for machines.

To hurl infantry forward, improperlysupported with materiel and ammunition,is to invite death and defeat. Attacksnowadays do not succeed unless correctlyplanned, and equipped with materiel andammunition.

If Spain has taught any lesson, it hasbeen that morale will not compensate forlack of means. We need morale and trainedtroops, but we must have weapons and

ammunition, and know how to use them,before we can expect victory. Numbers areno longer the main factor. A small, trained,and well-equipped force is superior to alarge but improperly or insufficientlyequipped force. We need only rememberthe offensive at the Dardanelles in 1915,with a superiority of 9 to 1; or at NeuveChapelle in 1916, with a superiority of 16to 1. Both of these failed, notwithstandingoverpowering strength of numbers, due toinsufficient equipment, particularlyartillery and ammunition.

Modern weapons have changed war,and we can not count upon the oldsystems of tactics being of value today.We have not had meeting engagementsbetween large forces since our Civil war,and not many then. Seventy years afterthis type of warfare has disappeared, weare still teaching it. Advance and rear

guards marching on roads in columnsare now impossible. The British haveboldly abandoned this idea, and practice

advancing on a wide front, with smallmobile motorized bodies. Some of our

generals have practiced this maneuver,but we continue to instruct in oldformations which are completelyobsolete.

What has replaced the old tactics?Advances in line; marching of troops atrapid gaits through use of motor vehicles;an extraordinary change in materiel; thegreat strength of the defensive due tocombined use of machine guns andartillery; the increased need of a powerful

artillery and immense quantities ofammunition when on the offensive; theuse of air forces to bomb and reconnoiter;armored vehicles to assist the attack; thecoordination of numerous andcomplicated kinds of weapons and troopsinto one joint maneuver.

Competent leadership is more thanever necessary. Spain has shown thatimposing masses of artillery and tanks

will give but minor results, whenleadership fails to make the best use ofthem. A leader with a high morale, and awill to win, will not compensate for lackof artillery, munitions, and materiel, anda knowledge of how to use themproperly.

How are we to obtain this leadership?Our schools follow some old methods

which ought to be discarded, to bereplaced with a corresponding amount ofinstruction based upon moderncampaigns. Campaigns of this centuryshould be treated as normal, and not asexceptional instances not likely to bereproduced in the future. Spain once moreshows that stabilized warfare is notimpossible, but is the necessaryconsequence of insufficient artillery andammunition to keep moving. This is arepetition of the experience of innumerable

wars. For the combined arms, maneuversare necessary, with decisions basedupon modern battles, and not

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upon tactics long dead. Above all, carefulattention and study of lessons

demonstrated in recent campaigns.For an offensive, the artillery and theammunition for the artillery determine thewidth and depth possible for an attack.Artillery communication is the least liableto interruption; its fire is the mostaccurate; it acts independly of theweather, terrain, and visibility. It candeliver fire, within the range of its guns,anywhere and at any hour, and in trulydestructive volume, if ammunition is

provided. Artillery blasts a way for tanksand infantry, and with its barrage marksout the path which they are to follow. Itprotects and screens, and destroysmachine guns and other hostile weaponswhich oppose an advance.

Twenty years have elapsed since theWorld War. Unexampled changes haveoccurred in weapons, organization andtactics. A complete new orientation is

required; new training with new ideas.There may be a delay before the nextwar starts. No nation desires to startwar, if it feels there is the slightest risk

of losingthe result would be tooterrible to contemplate. No nation is

sure of all changes which ought to bemade in existing armies. All are rapidlychanging and adjusting their forces,hoping to complete reorganization andincrease of materiel, before theirpossible enemies can do the same thing.But on certain changes all nations areagreed. These are:

a. Ability of the defensive to holdfronts with only a light occupation, untilthe enemy has assembled a vastly

superior force of materiel and munitions.b. Great increase of artillery for the

offensiveofficers, men and guns.c. Greatly increased expenditures of

ammunition, which for both defensiveand offensive must be provided inadvance while peace still reigns.

d. Necessity to coordinate with theartillery and infantry, air forces, andmechanized units. For this, frequent and

extensive maneuvers.Let us take advantage of the time

which may yet be available before ournext war starts.

New President of Field Artillery AssociationMajor General Robert M. Danford, the Chief of Field Artillery, has been selected

by the Executive Council, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, as Presidentof the United States Field Artillery Association, to complete the unexpired term ofMajor General Upton Birnie, Jr., who resigned his office March 25th.

During National Airmail Week, letters from Fort Hoyle, Md., carried a "cover" ofthe Sixth Field Artillery (Colonel William P. Ennis), the regimental crest in black on ascarlet background, and the reminder that a gun of this command fired the first

American shell in the World War.

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Now, 14,000 seems like a lot ofrounds, and 324 miles seems like a long

distance to traveluntil you consider theeffort that went into it. 100 days' work by200 men makes a total of 20,000 days ofman-labor. This does not include the timespent in training. It does not include thework which the railroad and steamshiporganizations performed in moving thebattery from the United States to the frontin France. And it leaves out the labor ofthe services of supply in deliveringammunition. In other words, this 20,000

days is purely and simply the amount ofman-labor that had to be expended inorder to move the battery 324 miles andfire 14,000 rounds.

20,000 days of man-labor divided by14,000 (the number of rounds) gives 1.4days of man-labor per round. 324 milesdivided into 14,000 parts gives 122 feetas the distance travelled by the battery foreach round fired. And 122 feet multiplied

by 4 (the number of guns in the battery)gives 488 feet of gun travel for eachround fired. All of which may be summedup by saying that in our battery it required1.4 days of man-labor to move one gun488 feet and fire one round.

At first sight, this seems completelycock-eyed. Does it take one man almost aday and a half to hitch up the horses,move one gun 488 feet, and shoot it off

once? Or does it take ten men two weeksto hitch up the horses, move one gun less

than ten miles, and fire a hundred rounds?The answer, of course, is that no suchamount of time could possibly berequired for any such task, and that mostof the ceaseless labor of our battery wasexpended on nonessentials. Instead ofconcentrating on the only two jobs thathad any effect on winning the warmoving and firing the gunsweartillerymen of 1918 frittered away ourenergies in an incredible number of

miscellaneous activities which had noreal connection with what we were tryingto accomplish.

And what were these miscellaneousactivities? Well, different members of theoutfit did different things. According tothe roster in the D Battery history, we hadfive officersa captain and four assortedlieutenants. These gentlemenas near asI can rememberused to spend most of

their time telling others what to do. (Theyalso engaged in certain minor activities,such as orienting the guns, figuring firingdata, riding around on horses, andadding to the burden of the service ofsupply by consuming their due quota offood.) We had thirteen sergeants andsixteen corporals, who also spent mostof their time, when not eating, in tellingothers what to do. This means that the

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moving and firing of our four gunsrequired the presence of thirty-four

people to give directions.It was also considered necessary tohave four cooks, four mechanics, eightwagoners, one horseshoer, one saddler,two buglers, and a miscellaneousassortment of telephone and instrumentmen, and other specialists.

And, finally, there were almost onehundred and fifty privates, classified asdrivers and cannoneers. The drivers did acertain amount of driving, and the

cannoneers actually put in a smallfraction of their time firing the guns. Butmost of their energies were devoted toodd jobs such as digging fox holes,setting up pup tents, taking down puptents, rolling packs, carrying packs onlong marches, digging latrines, cleaningharness, washing wagons, groominghorses, leading horses to water, servingon mess details, carrying hay in bales,

and so onfar into the night. You knowthe dismal story as well as I do.

And what was the reason for all thistoil and trouble? Whyif the basicfunction of the battery was merely tomove and fire the gunswas there somuch messing around with picks andshovels, pup tents, packs, wagons,kitchen equipment, curry combs, baledhay, and what not? The answer is that allthis extra work was necessary becausethere were so many men and horses in thebattery. And why were there so manymen and horses? Because there was somuch work. The whole thing was avicious circlewith the members of thebattery, both human and equine, spendingmost of their time waiting on each other.And, to make matters worse, all of themwere in turn being constantly waited onby the services of supply.

So what is the answer to all thisfoolishness? Well, part of the problemhas already been solved by getting rid ofthe horses. And, as I have already pointed

out, the rest of the mess can be cleaned upby getting rid of the privatesand also, if

possible, the noncommissioned officers.How this reform can be brought aboutis, of course, a difficult question. It isalways easy to criticize; it is hard to workout a solution. However, privatesinspite of their uselessness in fighting awarhave always been noted for theirwealth of ideas on how to improve theArmy. And Ex-Private First-ClassWilliam H. Upson, Serial Number563,591, Battery D, 13th Field Artillery,

Fourth Division, AEF, is no exception. Sohere goes.

My plan is to appeal directly to theSecretary of War, and get myselfappointed, through special act ofCongress if necessary, as Grand HighField Artillery Reorganizer, with fullauthority to carry out my reforms, andplenty of funds for expense. It mighttake several million dollarswhich is a

lot of money, but not much when youconsider the good I would accomplish.Without the authority and the cash, Iwould of course be helpless, so, for thepurpose of this discussion, we mustassume that I am to be granted theseprimary requisites.

Like any other good executive, I planto carry out my job by referring allproblems to competent experts. Inchoosing these experts I will always bearin mind the fact that my principalobjective is the saving of labor.

I will avoid all European ordnanceexperts, and all Americans whose ideasare derived from them, because in Europelabor is so cheap that no European hasany real conception of labor-savingtechnique. I will pick all my helpers fromAmerican industry, particularly suchbranches as automotive production,

where the saving of labor has been morehighly developed than anywhere else inthe world.

The first problem will be the redesigning

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of the basic unit of all artillerythe gun.In tackling this job I will first get hold of

one of our ancient cannonslet us say aSchneider 155-mm. short. I will hitch itonto a caterpillar tractor. I will drive thewhole works up in front of the office ofsomebody like Mr. Kettering, of GeneralMotors. And I will ask him to come outand give it the once over.

I will say, "Look what we have here,Mr. Kettering. This is what we used touse when we fought the Germans over inFrance. Since that time, however, there

has been one improvement. The eightclumsy horseswhich used to be urgedalong by four drivers, with a corporal ona fifth horse to tell them how to do ithas been redesigned into a tractor whichcan be handled by one man. We havenow decided that this clumsy cannon,which required anywhere from four toeight men to operate, must also beredesigned into something which one

man can handle. Our slogan is, 'Onegunone man.' and you, Mr. Kettering,have been selected to make this ideal areality."

If Mr. Kettering should refuse, it isalmost certain that some other competentman could be found who would besuccessful in putting over the jobdifficult though it might be. The mainproblem would be the devising of somemechanical means by which theammunition could be received from atruck, held in temporary storage in somesort of magazine, and then fed into thebreech of the gun as needed. The setupwould be very similar to the automatichandling of materials in factories. Andthe details would be left entirely to ourengineering expert. He could use cranes,hoists, belt conveyers, pneumatic tubes,or even magnets. He could employ fixed

or semifixed ammunition, or, for greatersafety, he could keep the shell, fuse,propelling charge, and primer separate

and assemble them during the loadingprocess. He could borrow ideas from the

mechanism of machine guns, revolvers,sausage-stuffing machines, or anythingelse that met his fancy. The power couldcome from the recoil, or from a specialmotor on the gun, or from the tractor.And this power could be applied in anyway that seemed bestelectric,pneumatic, hydraulic, or mechanical. Afew operationssuch as screwing infuzes, and swabbing out the boremightpossibly be done by hand. The gun tractor

could be kept as separate units, orcombined by mounting the gun on thetractor. The only requirement is that thegun be developed into a machine whichcan be operated by one man.

If any of you artillery officers doubtthat such a machine can be constructed, Iwould suggest the examination of certainintricate machines which are already incommon use. There is the newspaper

press, the automatic cigarette-makingmachine, and the machine which permitsone man to control the simultaneousgrinding of a dozen or more cylinderblocks. If you feel that such intricatemachinery cannot be successfullyoperated in the field, even by highlytrained army officers, you mightinvestigate the operation of complicatedcombined harvesters by ordinary farmers.

If civilians can use elaboratemachines, the army can do it too. All weneed is a competent engineer, two orthree years for experiments, and a coupleof million dollars for expenses, and I amsure that a thoroughly practicable, fullyautomatic one-man field piece can beproduced. And, as soon as we get thisfield piece, the rest will be easy.

As Grand High ArtilleryReorganizer, I will at once set up an

experimental battery of four guns. Tobegin with, I will not attempt any fancytricks like firing the guns while they

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ARE PRIVATE SOLDIERS NECESSARY?

are in motion, so I can use one man bothto drive and to fire each piece. This

means that, in a pinch, the whole batterycould be operated by four menlet ussay a captain and three first lieutenants.However, we want plenty of help in caseof emergencies, so I plan to assign oneextra manprobably a shavetailto eachgun. This, of course, will raise thepersonnel of the battery to eightwhichmay seem excessive. But the four extramen will be useful whenever it isnecessary to run day and night shifts.

They can also act as replacements in caseof casualties. And they will come inhandy for the few odd jobs which stillremain in spite of the reorganization.

Most of the jobs which used to weardown the strength and morale of the oldbattery will, of course, disappearentirely. And the rest will be handled, inlarge part, by machinery. By getting ridof the privates and noncommissioned

officers, as well as the horses, we reducethe task of supervision and the paperwork to almost nothing, and weeliminate entirely the whole miserableround of grooming, feeding, andwatering of horses, the cleaning ofharness, and the washing of innumerablewagons. No longer will there be onehundred foxholes to dig, and onehundred pup tents to be pitched thereon.Instead, each tractor will be providedwith a neat cabin, incased in steel armorplate, and containing two comfortablebunksthus providing far betterprotection, both from weather and shellfragments, than the former arrangement.If elaborate gunpits are desired, they canbe scooped out by the regimental powershovel. The laboriously-excavated 200-man latrines of former days will bereplaced by four cute little chemical

toilets, one in each tractor cabin.Kitchen arrangements will be worked

out in collaboration with some competent

firm like the Statler Hotel people orpossibly the Cornell University School of

Hotel Administration. Probably thereshould be light housekeeping apparatus ineach cabin. We might also experimentwith foods cooked at the rear, anddelivered, along with the ammunition, inthermos containers. Or, we might have afully-equipped armor-plated regimentaldining car, mounted on caterpillar treads,and operated by a highly trained cook,whoconsidering the importance ofgood food in maintaining high morale

should rank at least as a major.The communication problem will be

referred to the Radio Corporation ofAmerica with the request that they workout a system of two-way radios for allguns and for the colonel's armored car.If they fall down on this job we shallprobably have to develop a couple ofregimental high-speed motor-drivenarmored reel-carts. Orienting the guns

for map firing can be done by two orthree of the spare lieutenants. If anobservation post is needed, it can beestablished by one or more lieutenantsand a regimental reel-cart. Firing datawill be figured on machines developedby some adding-machine, comptometeror cash-register company. If thesepeople can make apparatus which worksout an intricate problem in compoundinterest with a mere flip of the wrist,they ought to be able to providesomething that would handle an old-fashioned one-hour firing-datanightmare in about thirty seconds.Probably the firing-data machine shouldbe built into the panoramic sight, so thatthe results of all computations, includingcorrections for barometer, wind,temperature, drift, site, and so on, can beapplied directly to the laying of the gun.

There will, of course, be otherproblems. But in an article of this lengthit is not possible to discuss everything,

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and I have therefore attempted to list onlya few of the high spots.

On the whole, I think my plans arerather conservative. Instead of taking onthe whole army, and attempting toeliminate the privates from the infantry aswell as from all other branches, I amconfining my efforts to the artillery alone.And I am proposing only a very moderatereform. Later on, with machine-operatedguns, it may be possible to shoot eachpiece four times as fast, thus using a one-gun battery, and reducing the personnel to

one captain and one lieutenant. Atpresent, however, I am content to let itgo at eight men to the battery instead ofthe former two hundred. And there is noreason, in my opinion, why this changecannot be brought aboutif the problem

is taken up in a systematic way, and theservices of the best experts in the

country are utilized.At any rate, it is a swell idea. And, if itcan be accomplished, everybodyexceptperhaps the enemyought to be satisfied.The taxpayers will have a much lessexpensive army to support. The service ofsupply will be relieved of tremendousburdens. The artillery privates should bedelighted at this opportunity to help winthe war by sitting around at home. Andyou artillery officers ought to be more

than delighted at the prospect of carryingon a whole campaign without beinghampered by the presence of vast herds ofstupid horses, privates, andnoncommissioned officers. So what doyou say?

ROUGH GOING

Dry-point etching by Kerr EbyCourtesy of Charles Sessler, Philadelphia

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BY LT. COL. G. H. FRANKE, FA

ARLY in December last year thecommanding officer of the 1stBattalion 2d Field Artillery,

stationed at Fort Clayton, Canal Zone,was confronted with the problem ofputting on the finishing touches in

preparation for Pacific Sector andPanama Canal Department maneuvers tobe held the following February andMarch. His "ship" had been in "dry dock"the previous eight months of the rainyseason, undergoing repairs, and in hiscrew of six hundred and seven enlistedmen, three hundred and twenty, morethan fifty percent, had never sailedbefore. A like proportion applied to the

15 officers for duty with the unit. A"shakedown cruise"; in the form of atactical march and to includereconnaissance, selection, and occupationof positions and some service firing,promised a happy solution.

La Venta, located in the Republic ofPanama some eighty miles southwest ofthe Canal and on the Pacific Coast,offered itself as an ideal terminal campsite. It possessed, for these parts, the rarecombination of an ample supply of freshwater and several miles of excellentocean beach in close proximity to one

another. Nineteen thousand acres werealso already under lease to the U. S.Government as an air-corps bombing andmachine-gun range. The open cattle-grazing country suggested servicepractice and the nearby mountains some

real pack artillery marching which hadhitherto been extremely limited on thejungle-covered terrain in the vicinity ofthe Canal Zone. Suitable intermediatecamp sites en route to this ideal spot wereto be hadbut only after many man-hours of under-jungle clearing to providethe cover demanded by tactical conditionsimposed.

Permission to make the march having

been secured in late December, planswere devised for a combined animal andtruck movement to La Venta, to providetraining in certain phases of currentdefense plans. Early January was devotedto polishing off the conditioning of menand animals. Practice in loading weapons,equipment, and men on trucks wasincluded in the schedule. The number oftrucks required to supplement our ten-vehicle motorized section had to bedetermined. Native officials and privateproperty owners had to be contacted forthe approved use of necessary camp sites,

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without cost to the Government. Thusended the important features of the final

preparatory phase for the battalionmaneuvers to say nothing of innumerabledetails covering such matters as supply,boot-fitting, training in antimalarialmeasures; and teaching the recruit how totrim and notch his toenails.

The animal column of two hundredand thirty officers and men and fourhundred and twenty-three animalsdeparted from Ft. Clayton at 4:00 AMon Monday, January 17th, crossed

Miraflores Locks, and arrived at the LaVenta camp site at 11:00 PM onWednesday the 19th. Better to simulatesuch a move under combat conditions, itwas placed under the command of alieutenant. First Lieutenant Carl Darnell,who was assisted by First Lieutenant R.G. Baker. In addition to the SecondField Artillery, this column included the

62d Quartermaster Pack Train of fifty-eight mules and fourteen men, and

attached veterinary and medicalpersonnel. Conforming to the tacticalsituation and at the same time avoidingthe tropical sun, all marches were madeunder cover of darkness with daylightfinding men and animals hidden along astream under the shade of the trees. Themarch of four laps, totaling seventy-eight miles, was made in the totalelapsed time of sixty-seven hours. Thelast two hikes, thirty-eight miles, were

made in the final twenty-three hours,with men and animals arriving inexcellent condition.

Forty-four vehicles, mostly borrowedfrom the Pacific Motor Pool and the 33dInfantry, and consisting largely of 1-ton Dodge trucks, comprised the motorcolumn. This column departed at 6:00AM, January 17th, crossed the

NOW WHERE DID THAT OUTFIT GO?Within the area marked "A," 600 men and 400 animals are bivouacked on the beach at La Venta,

Panama, "C" marks the Santa Clara Inn.

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FROM SEA TO MOUNTAIN

WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TIRE CHAINS

"Come on, pal, up!" The Bn CO supervises the crossing.

Balboa Ferry and arrived at La Ventabefore noon the same day. All borrowedmotor vehicles were now released andhenceforth the Second Field was to dependonly upon its own transportation. Thisproved an easy trip for these mountainartillery soldiers, but their two days' waitfor their buddies with the animal columnwas not to be spent in play. Camouflagewas still demanded. The camp siteoverlooked the ocean from one-hundredfoot heights and extended along streamlines leading to the sea. Large treespromised concealment from the air, butjungle growth underneath had to be

removed to make the area comfortable fora rather extended stay, A small freshwaterstream, flowing but seventy-five gallons aminute, had to be dammed in two placesfor potable water supply and fresh-waterbathing. The arrival of the animal columnfound these jobs completed, while alimited schedule provided at the same timesome training in the Service of the Piece,and Communication.

Streams in the Republic of Panama,particularly near the seashore, are mostlikely to have high precipitous banks ortreacherous muddy shores. To overcome

this handicap, a small engineer detachmentof four enlisted men, equipped withgasoline-motor water pumps and canvastroughs, supplied the command with itsfresh water requirements. Theyoccasionally had to be reenforced by a fewartillerymen. This detachment served usuntil our return to Fort Clayton and, exceptwhen in the mountains, where motortransportation was prohibitive, they metevery water demand with well-knownEngineer efficiency.

With the command assembled, dailytraining began, radiating from La Venta.The working day generally began at dawn

and, except for occasional afternoon careof equipment and the usual chores in ananimal outfit, it was over by midday.There were instances, however, whendeparture from camp long preceded theglow of the morning sun, and an all-nightproblem further augmented the variety ofthe training. Marches and RSOP'scovering appreciable distances were theorder of the day, but the experience also

included two days of excellent servicepractice with all batteries participating.The artillery range in the Canal Zone iscovered with dense jungle or thick

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cogon grass, the latter growing to heightsof eight or more feet. Eight months of theyear the whole remains saturated withwater. Percussion problems have provenimpossible with the ammunition thus farfurnished. The Air Corps Bombing Rangejust north of La Venta enabled us to useshell for a change.

Mention should be made of theSunday morning ride, with all officersand their orderlies participating. Leavingcamp at 7:30 AM, we traversed junglegrowth along the streams and grazing

lands in the higher regions. Five gorge-like stream lines were crossed, requiring

leading down the steep rocky descents ofseveral hundred feet and up again on theopposite slope. Much of the route was noteven marked by native footpaths and theexperience very nearly cost us one animal

and one officer. The horse, which hadpaused on a precipitous trail and backedaway from the officer leading him,would, with one more step to the rear,have crashed a hundred feet or so below.The threatened officer casualty was dueto near heat exhaustion. With a littleslowing up he survived the march butlearned, it is hoped, that service in thePack Artillery requires superior physical

endurance in ability to hoof it as well asto ride astride a sturdy steed. After anestimated twenty-five miles we were backin camp at 12:30 PM. The mess sergeants

had saved us a good Sunday dinner and,although the trip had thwarted a fewcontemplated week-end family reunionsat Santa Clara Inn, all gave evidence offeeling that the experience was wellworth such minor sacrifices.

Initially only a two-week sojourn wascontemplated but, so unanimous was thewish to prolong it, extension of anotherweek was secured. The fact that all wasnot work undoubtedly contributed greatlyto this desire. There were many featuresof a lighter and recreational nature, the

most popular of which

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - May 1938