Field Artillery Journal - Oct 1941

8/6/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Oct 1941

1/99


2/99

A New Handbookfor the FIELD ARTILLERY!

DRILL AND CEREMONIES

FOR FIELD ARTILLERY(COMPLETE)

Check the Table of Contents and see for yourself thecompleteness of this new and handy training manual forthe Field Artilleryman. It is based upon and conforms tothe latest training doctrines of the Army. We believe

this to be the only single text in which the importantsubject of Dismounted Drill for the Field Artillery maybe found in print today.

Nowhere else is all this information available underone cover. Every officer and soldier of Field Artilleryshould have a copy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISMOUNTED DRILLSERVICE OF THE PIECE

Section 1. 75-mm Gun, M1897 (Horse-Drawn)and 77-mm Gun, 1897A4 (Truck-Drawn)

Section 2. 155-mm Howitzer, M1918A1 (Truck-Drawn)

PISTOLEQUITATIONTHE MOTORDRIVERDRIVING AND DRAFT

MOUNTED FORMATIONS AND MANEUVERS

Section 1. The Truck-Drawn Battery

Section 2. The Horse-Drawn Battery

Section 3. The Battalion, Regiment, andBrigade, Truck- and Horse-Drawn

STANDARDS AND GUIDONS

INTERIORGUARD DUTY

CEREMONIES

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND TENT PITCHING

MILITARY COURTESY, CUSTOMS OF THE SERVICE ANDDISCIPLINE

10-24 copies, 10% discount, postpaid.Quantity orders: 25 or more copies, 20% discount, F.O.B. Harrisburg, Pa.

PRICE $1.00, POSTPAID

Order through

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION1624 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.


3/99

MAJOR W. S. NYE,Editor

LIEUT, HARVEY S. FORD,Assistant Editor

LENNA PEDIGO,Business Manager

FIELD ARTILLERYMEN should beparticularly interested in the mapping and surveyexercises conducted at Fort Bragg. For years theField Artillery has been testing and teachingcertain methods and doctrines, but here for the

first time was afforded an opportunity to try themout, on a large scale, with troops in the field.Today's fast-moving war has swung attentionfrom the deliberate methods of the War of 1914-18 back to the "Indian-fighting" style. Observedshooting, they say, is all-important. This is true,and never has the Field Artillery lost sight of the

prime value of open-warfare methods andobserved fire. But in blitzkrieg, also, there aremany occasions where observation varies fromdifficult to impossible, even for forward observersand air observers. Map shooting, at such times, isthe only alternative. The Fort Bragg exerciseswere designed to determine whether we have beenkidding ourselves as to our abilities andcapabilities in survey and mapping. Hence in thetwo articles by Majors North and Echols,reporting these maneuvers, little mention is made

of observed fire. No inference should be drawnthat the School or the Chief's office intend toneglect the latter. Observed fires may be going oneven while survey and mapping is in progress. Butgood survey will facilitate observed fire, and willsupplant it only when observation fails. In rapidlymoving situations survey may never becompleted, yet it is always initiated against the

possibility that some degree of stabilization mayoccur, when it will be necessary to rely on massshooting and schedule fires.

NEXT MONTH we will begin a serial byColonel Onacewicz, Polish Army, whocommanded a regiment of field artillery servingwith the Polish corps in France in the campaign of1940. This story is packed with psychological aswell as professional lessons. It shows that strong-

hearted fighters equipped even with antiquatedweapons can stop the blitz. This Polish regimentwas placed in position behind the Maginot Line,and in the withdrawal therefrom fought to the

bitter end, not even surrendering after theArmistice. The men made their way in small groupsthrough a land infested with the enemy, until afteran astounding trek of hundreds of miles theyescaped from France. Don't miss the beginning ofthis fascinating and significant article!

The United StatesField Artillery Association

ORGANIZED JUNE 7, 1910

PresidentMajor General Robert M. Danford

Vice-PresidentBrig. Gen. George R. Allin

Executive CouncilMajor General Robert M. DanfordBrigadier General William H. SandsBrigadier General C. C. Haffner, Jr. Brigadier General John A. CraneBrigadier General Fred C. WallaceLieutenant Colonel Ralph C. BishopLieutenant Colonel Edward S. OttMajor Thomas NorthCaptain George L. Hart

Secretary-TreasurerMajor W. S. Nye

The Field Artillery JournalA Publication for the Field Artillery of the Army of the United States

OCTOBER, 1941Vol. 31, No. 10

PAGE

COVERILLUSTRATION: MOTORIZED REVIEW OF 13TH FA BRIGADE

THENEW MOTORIZED DIVISION ................................................................................. 715By Major Ritchie Wolfe

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING, U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION........................ 723

WIDENING HORIZONS ................................................................................................. 724By Lieutenant Edward A. Raymond, FA.

ON THE ALSACE FRONT, 1940 .................................................................................... 731By Lieutenant Jean Dupont

THE BATTERY COMMANDER: PART I .......................................................................... 736

HOW TO PRODUCE AN EFFICIENT FIRING BATTERY ..................................................... 743By Majors H. F. Handy and V. F. Burger, FA.

THENEW SAFETY REGULATIONS ................................................................................ 748By Lieut. Col. George Keyser, FA.

AN IMPORTANT TEST .................................................................................................. 751

By Lieut. Col. Thomas North, FA .THE GUNNERY PHASE ................................................................................................. 753

By Lieut. Col. M. P. Echols, FA .

WHO SHOT POLARIS? ................................................................................................. 760By Master Sergeant Lewis Griffin

CAMPAIGN OF FLANDERS, 1940: PART II .................................................................... 762By Captain Leo Framery, French Army

TANKBATTLE ............................................................................................................ 769By Captain Schneider-Kostalski

GERMAN PANZERS VS. FRENCH LIGHT MECHANIZED DIVISIONS ................................. 772By Captain Ernst von Jungenfeld

MOTORVEHICLE IDENTIFICATION............................................................................... 776By Colonel John N. Hauser, FA.

THE

INFANTRY

-ARTILLERY

TEAM

............................................................................... 779By Marshall Sachs

FLY IT AWAY ............................................................................................................. 781By Captain T. L. Crystal, Jr., FA .

WITH THE OTHERARMS AND SERVICES: VCOAST ARTILLERY ................................ 783By Captain Arthur Symons, CAC.

AWARDS OF FIELD ARTILLERY MEDAL ....................................................................... 788

WITH THE ARMIES OF FOREIGNNATIONS .................................................................... 789

PROBLEMS IN GUNNERY.............................................................................................. 795

TO DETERMINE WEATHERCORRECTIONS .................................................................... 796By Lieutenant C. E. Welsh, FA.

NOT IN THE BOOK....................................................................................................... 798

A RING IN HERNOSE.................................................................................................. 800

By Rosalee C. PorterFROM THE CHIEF'S OFFICE .......................................................................................... 802

BOOKREVIEWS ................................................................................................ 806

Published monthly by the United States Field Artillery Association. Publication office 3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md.Business and editorial office, United States Field Artillery Association, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Address allcommunications for publication to the Washington office. Entered as second class matter August 20, 1929, at the post officeat Baltimore, Md. Copyright, 1941, by The United States Field Artillery Association. Subscription price $3.00; Canada$4.00; foreign $3.50; single copies to subscribers, 25 cents; nonsubscribers, 35 cents. T HE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL paysfor original articles accepted. It is published without expense to the government. Authors alone are responsible forstatements made. Addresses, and changes of rank, will be changed as frequently as desired, upon notification; not

otherwise. Changes should reach the editor three weeks before date of next issue. Immediate notice should be given of

any delay in the receipt of the magazine. Unsolicited manuscripts should be accompanied by return postage.


4/99

Fort Sill, October


5/99

Part 1- How will it be employed? . . . . .

The experimental motorized division which is being builtat Fort Benning from the 4th Division bears someresemblance to Germany's Schnelletruppen and Italy's celeridivisions. It is, however, a native product, well adapted tomodern combat over much of the vast spaces whichconstitute North America. Its organization and armament, on paper at least, look very, very good. The master minds aswell as the pick-and-shovel boys have done a fine job.

The motorized division, which contains 14,000 officersand men, is a cross between a triangular division and anarmored division. Its component parts are:1 reconnaissance battalion

2 reconnaissance companies 52 light tanks (thesetake the place of armored cars)

1 company of scout cars (36 bantam cars)1 weapons company (AA and AT guns and machine

guns)3 infantry regiments, motorized, each having

2 rifle battalions, each having2 rifle companies1 weapons company (machine guns, light AT guns,

81-mm. mortars)1 support battalion, having

1 company of self-propelled accompanying artillery,75-mm. howitzers

1 company of six 37-mm. AT guns1 company of .50 caliber AA machine guns

1 divisional artillery, having3 battalions of 105-mm. howitzers1 battalion of 155-mm. howitzers

1 antitank battalion2 companies of light AT guns1 company of heavy AT guns1 mine company

1 tank battalion

1 headquarters company3 companies of medium tanks (total 54 tanks)

1 antiaircraft battalion24 37-mm. guns.1 engineer battalion1 QM battalion1 medical battalion1 ordnance maintenance company

The division will contain a total of about 2,600 motorvehicles.

According to the War Department, the motorized division'semployment will be characterized by swift, decisive actionand all-around fighting ability. "It could go through a break orcontain an enemy force while an armored division looped

around a flank to destroy rear installations. When terrain becomes difficult it could relieve armored units. With itsmobility, armor and heavy fire power, the new division couldbe used as a shock force in the van of an infantry division or tofollow it up in exploiting success."

The motorized division can be used to advantage in

BY MAJOR RITCHIE WOLFE

715


6/99

716 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL October

Life

Motorized units may have to leave the roads and make detoursthrough swampy ground.

Life

Proper route reconnaissance will help avoid this

rapid offensive thrusts,1 to anticipate the enemy in applyingstrength at important points, to localize and restrict theconsequences of a local failure, to protect an exposedflank, or to widen the range of an action. Its value will beenhanced if there are wide spaces offavorable (for motorized units) terrain in

which to operate. In delaying action or inpursuit, a motorized division will be at itsbest. The European War has demonstratedthat a defeated force composed of foottroops cannot successfully break contactand escape from motorized pursuers.

On the offensive, the motorizeddivision is organized and equippedespecially to attack units similar to itselfand also ordinary infantry divisions, eitherin motion or in a fixed defensive position.It should attempt to avoid making frontalattacks against organized localities,

however, and should employ its superior

maneuverability in striking from the flank and rear.2 Itsvery attribute of great maneuverability implies that thedivision may, at times, be used (like cavalry) to operate at arelatively great distance from the main armies. Hence itssustained offensive power may be weak.

The value of the motorized division will be conspicuous

when it attacks moving infantry (either foot or motorized).While the actual assault will be made dismounted, its effectwill be great because of the ability of the division to securesurprise. Guderian's armored and motorized divisionssurprised French troops at drill in the barracks grounds atAbbeville. French units far behind the supposed front wereconstantly surprised and defeated by reconnaissanceelements of German motorized divisions which had maderapid marches beyond the range of foot troops. All this hassignificance for artillery. It implies reconnaissance partieswell forward, fire direction greatly decentralized initially, positions close to the attacking infantry, much forwardobservation, simple communication systems.

A motorized division will normally attempt to move ona wide front in multiple columns consisting of a variedarray of units and detachments. If this war has proved onething, it is that the order of march of an armored ormotorized division falls into no pattern of "infantry,followed by artillery, then more infantry." Serials arevery mixed affairs, but they are short. The general depthof advance is based (among other factors) on time-space,and consists of two echelonsthe reconnaissance unitsand the main bodies. The width of the advance dependsupon the road net and the hostile situation.

1In this discussion the motorized division is

visualized mostly in its role of operating ahead of themain bodies, as a semi-independent force. Of course,it will be useful in many other ways, especially withan armored corps, where it may be used more as aground-holding unit.

2There may be cases where it will be forced tomake a frontal attack. The motorized division willoften be operating as part of an armored corps, inwhich case it might make the holding attack whilethe armored divisions make the envelopment.


7/99

1941 THE NEW MOTORIZED DIVISION 717

Both width and depth will beconsiderably greater than for anordinary infantry division. Theterrain is studied constantly tokeep the commandercontinuously informed as to

what possibilities it offers forquick massing for a blow in apredetermined direction.

Signal Corps photo

Drivers and assistant drivers clean the vehicles during a maneuver in the South

The line of demarcation between reconnaissance groupsand groups of the main bodymay not always be a clear one.Under certain conditions thewhole division may advance as amass of separate reconnaissancedetachments gradually increasingin power. The picture is one ofinitial decentralization so

arranged that centralization andcoordinated effort occur progressively as hostile resistancestiffens. It is not an advance on successive lines according tothe old cautious French school of thought, but it does lenditself to a prompt seizing of the initiative.

Those who have viewed the European War from theroadside (and that is where it was mostly fought) statethat the German schnelletruppen advance in little groupsor cells, each composed of a few motorcyclists, a platoon or so of motorized infantry, a few tanks orarmored cars, a battery or a platoon of artillery, andsome pioneers. Each cell, radio-equipped, is able to callfor air-force assistance or to bring up other cells from

farther back in the column. These cells fight miniature,self-contained battles; but they are like antswhen onediscovers a job too big for him, others quickly clusteraround. This is the battle of "blobs" mentioned by Maj.Gaither in his article on Infantry in the July issue of THEFIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL. The Germans like itbecause it provides safety to all elements on the march,facilitates (because of the small size of serials) marchcontrol, and above all because it lends itself to thesudden, vigorous style of piecemeal attack which theygenerally employ.

3Even when the motorized division fights as part of an armored corps,

it may operate at a comparatively great distance from other units.

If the forward reconnaissance elements of the divisionare unable to brush aside resistance, and the main bodybecomes involved in the engagement, the action becomessimilar to that of an ordinary infantry division.Centralization sets in, a coordinated effort is made, andartillery employment is in mass. Nevertheless,maneuverability and the time element retain a high order ofimportance. Furthermore, the motorized division willfrequently fight alone, whereas the infantry division isengaged as a part of a larger unit.3 Quite often thefractional parts of the motorized division are thrown

unexpectedly into action unassisted, and must be able to break off such action abruptly. The reconnaissancedetachments often have to fight to perform their missions,as do the flank-protection groups. These detachments,whose success frequently has the greatest bearing on thatof the division, need more than their inherent mobility.They need fire power. That is why the Germans give themtanks, self-propelled antitank guns, artillery.

For the sake of argument, suppose that our motorizeddivision adopts the method of advance which we have justdescribed and which the Germans employed in France andin the Balkans. What would the march formation look like?

Can we visualize an example?To limit the discussion, suppose that the division is toadvance in three columns with the center column echelonedto the rear. The question of air support will not be insertedinto the picture. According to Maj. Gen. Brereton (Cavalry

Journal, August, 1941), the current doctrine of our Air Forceis to furnish close support to ground troops only when "vital"targets are encountered. Which targets are vital willpresumably (if we interpret Gen. Brereton correctly) be thedecision of the air officer at the headquarters of the taskforce commander. Hence it may be supposed that manyobjectives will present themselves at the front of a motorizeddivision which the man on the ground considers vital butwhich will not produce air support. It does no good to tell aninfantryman, an artilleryman, or an officer of the armoredforce that air support is necessary for the successfuloperation of his unit. He would be delighted to have thissupport, but when he is given a mission he must go aheadwith or without air support.

With the "air thus cleared," we may picture each flankcolumn of the motorized division advancing in thefollowing formation:4

4The time-distance between groups may vary from 5 minutes to anhour.


8/99


Reconnaissance groupsGroup No. 1:

14 scout cars (jeeps). The personnel are armed withautomatic weapons of various calibers. Some of thecars are equipped with radio. This group fans out ona broad front.

Group No. 2:2 scout cars5 light tanks1 section of AA and AT guns (from support company

of the reconnaissance battalion)1 section of pioneers

Group No. 3:Same as Group No. 2

Main bodiesGroup No. 4:

1 company of infantry, reinforced from weaponscompany

1 platoon of assault guns

1 battery of artillery5

1 company of pioneers (less platoon)1 section of AT guns

from support battalion

5This artillery is for long-range fire, not for close support of Group 4.

It would be desirable if one or more batteries of long-range guns could beattached to the division.

1 section of AA guns1 section of ordnance maintenance company

Group No. 5:1 battalion of infantry (less detachments)1 platoon of assault guns1 platoon of 37-mm. AT guns1 platoon of .50 caliber AA guns1 battery of 105-mm. howitzers

Group No. 6:1 regiment of infantry (less detachments)

1 battalion of 105-mm. howitzers (less detachments)The center column would contain, not necessarily in the

order shown:1 regiment of infantryDivisional artillery (less detachments)AT battalionTank battalionAAA battalionEngineers (less detachments)Services (less detachments)Reconnaissance and security elements of this column

would be furnished from the column itself. If the centercolumn were not echeloned to the rear, it might be better to

organize it similarly to the others.The AAA and AT battalions are employed under

divisional control. Whether they are held together, andwhere they march, depends on the situation. The AAAguns usually are leap-frogged forward to protect defiles.Since the subordinate units of the division possess someorganic AT protection, the AT battalion is usually heldtogether for division employment.

In the march of a motorized division, traffic control is amajor and vital problem. The Germans use special traffic-control groups, some of which are stationed at key pointswhile others patrol the columns. Further, each driver isconsidered to be a part of the traffic-control system. This hasa beneficial psychological effect in that the driver feels that

he is a cooperating member of a team rather than a herdednonentity. The traffic-control work of the higher Germancommanders is interesting. Examples have been noted wherethe division commander or even corps commander (videGuderian at the Meuse) personally directed traffic through abottleneck. This may seem contrary to the idea that a generalis too important a figure to be concerned with such details; but what is more important at such times than the smoothadvance of the unit? Many officers in our own army willrecall seeing a higher commander standing beside the roadwatching the column pass. Other than OK-ing the marchorder drawn up by his staff, he seems to exercise no othercontrol on the march. There is no known case where his

standing by the road has contributed materially to the progress of the unit, but doubtless it has furnished goodammunition for critiques. If the division commander knowswhich units should reach the battlefield first, he might welltake charge personally at the defile to establish the order ofpriority for units to go through.

This rule should extend down to lower commanders,who should take active command when their units are passing difficult points, always with the proviso that iftheir personalities do not contribute to smooth progressthey should remain absent.

In advancing into foreign territory it is advantageous toselect personnel of the foremost groups from men and

officers who speak the language of the country. This placing of linguists in the advance elements, instead ofonly in the CPs where prisoners (or enemy civilians) arequestioned, permits the acquisition of early intelligence asto routes, conditions of roads and terrain, and sometimesalso as to the hostile situation. Intelligence obtained in thismanner is, of course, always subject to scrutiny as to itsreliability, but the advantage of having linguists in theadvance groups seems self-evident.

Mention has been made of the need for a special typeof artillery (long-range guns) to be attached to themotorized division. It is possible also to visualizeoperations in certain theaters where an even more

exceptional kind of weapon is required. In the westernhemisphere there are many localities where it is possibleto move a motorized division rapidly along a splendidhighway, but extremely difficult for the vehicles to leavethis highway. This is almost always true in mountainouscountry, and frequently so in the jungle or semi-jungle.Consider, for example, the stretches of highway throughsome of our southern states where the ground is swampy andheavily forested on both sides of the road. The infantrymight be able to dismount and make its way on foot throughthe morass, but not the wheeled vehicles. Again, consider


9/99


the quite possible case where the motorized division mustmove rapidly for several hundred miles over a fine pavedhighway, only to arrive in a roadless broken terrain wherethe actual fighting must be done. The infantry can walk;the tanks and jeeps can be left behind. Must the artilleryalso cool its heels by the roadside wondering how it can get

forward through the brush, hills, swamps, glaciers, or oldlava flows to support the infantry?

The answer to this is pack artillery, attached to themotorized division in quantity as needed. This packartillery must be carried porte to give it the necessarystrategical mobility. In rare cases animals may be leftbehindwhere there is an assurance that suitable ones can be procured locallybut usually they must be carried porte. This can be done, and has been done in certainsmall tests; but it should be rehearsed by our newmotorized division, too.

In discussing the subject of the motorized division,principal attention has been given to its use offensively.

It may be necessary at times to use such a division indefense. Doubtless this defense would usually beconducted along the lines prescribed for cavalry; that is,

the division would employ its units aggressively toattack the heads, flanks and rear of the advancing enemycolumns. It should never be used deliberately in a statictype of defense. Nevertheless the exigencies of thesituation may force this type of defense upon it, inwhich case it fights similarly to an ordinary infantry

division. Its mobility, however, in shifting units andreserves, may permit it to hold a wider front. Indefensive situations in open warfare the motorizeddivision usually adopts the deep horseshoe or hedgehogformation as recently taught at the Command andGeneral Staff School and as practiced by German panzerunits operating alone in hostile territory. Defense isalways peripheral.

The foregoing discussion leaves untouched manyinteresting phases in the operation of the motorizeddivision; and it naturally is too general in character to bevery satisfying to subordinate commanders. It may serve,however, to get the "ball rolling." It is hoped that others

will send to the JOURNAL their ideas on supply,evacuation, reconnaissance, motor maintenance, and soon. Once again there is need for some original thinking.

Part 2- The Artillery Component . . . . . . .

Artillery technique has been evolved as the result ofyears of study, experimentation, and exhaustive test. It isconstantly undergoing revision, but major changes are slowof adoption and comparatively rare. Our present methods,

remarkably similar to those of the Germans, have been proved in modern combat. We can accept them withconfidence. With appropriate and slight modification theyapply to artillery support of any type of division or otherunit.

Tactical employment, however, may differ widelyaccording to the type of unit. For it no rigid rules can belaid down. Nevertheless, while each specific problem must be solved as it is presented, the exercise of a littleimagination and foresight will prepare one for some of themore unusual exigencies which will occur. For example, a battery commander of artillery with an ordinary divisionrarely considers the problem of local security except in

terms of defense against aircraft and tanks, and even thenhe considers himself as a part of the battalion team. The battery, or even section commander of artillery with amotorized division, however, may have to provide his ownadvance, flank, and rear guard; he may be in action farfrom supporting troops. He may have to devise his ownbridge or raft to cross a stream. He may have to execute hisown survey, supply his ammunition, evacuate hiswounded, repair his own materiel. He must be skilled intechnique; he must be self reliant; he must never lean tooheavily on the battalion fire-direction team.

Artillery support of a motorized division will often be ofthe same pattern as for an ordinary division, and thesequence of eventsreconnaissance, selection, andoccupation of position, firing, displacementwill be the

same. But the whole tempo will be tremendously speededup.

After the division commander has announced hisdecision as to the number of columns in which thedivision will march, and has specified the elementswhich will constitute the advance guard (which may ormay not include the reconnaissance battalion), it will beup to the artillery commander to recommend anassignment of the divisional artillery to these columns.The consideration of a few general principles will behelpful to the divisional artillery commander in makingthese allotments:

1. Difficulty of control on the march. Although

some people may think of a motorized unit as beingvery flexible, in some phases of its activities the reverseis true. Owing to the speed at which it moves, thelengths of its columns, and the fact that it is confinedduring a great part of the time to roads, the advance ofthe motorized division is difficult to control or changeonce it has been launched. It will not be easy to halt thevarious elements, change their routes, or effect anyrapid regrouping. The success of the operation may beseriously impaired unless great foresight is exercised inthe original assignment to the various columns. If it


10/99


Signal Corps

The motorized division on the march

is felt that a certain column may have need of artillery,some artillery should be assigned to it initially.

2. Zones of advance. It generally is safer toprescribe zones of advance rather than routes, even if thedivision order has not so specified. This is helpful to theartillery elements in that they will know the zones ofobservation and fire for which they are most likely to beresponsible. Of course, higher authority may requireassignment to specific routes, but this does notnecessarily prohibit the artillery commander from addingan allotment of zones.

3. Decentralization. It is uneconomical to break upthe battalions, and weakens their possibility for masseffect. Nevertheless owing to the special characteristics ofcombat of motorized divisions, which obtain results byutilizing the factors of time and speed (and often resort topiecemeal attacks), the weaker but more immediate fire ofa battery may be more important than the more powerful but delayed action of the battalion. Thus the initial

allotment to columns may mean the attachment of batteries, or even parts of batteries to the divisionalreconnaissance battalion or following units.

4. If the division is confined to a very narrow zoneof advance, it may be necessary to have all the artilleryexcept two light battalions follow the infantry of the main body. In spite of the natural desire of the artillerycommander to place his battalions well forward, he mayhave to make sacrifices where the situation demands thatthe advance elements be short and easily maneuverable.Artillery, especially with its ammunition batteries, adds

greatly to the length of the column; it may be that thesituation confronting the division is one in whichunsupported small groups of motorized infantry and tankscan clear the path most expeditiously.

5. On the contrary, when it is believed that nothingwill contribute more to the advance than the possibility ofdelivering early and powerful artillery fire, the artillerycommander should not hesitate to urge that all lightartillery be placed in support of the reconnaissanceelements or advance guard.

6. It is axiomatic that the main effort will be giventhe maximum artillery support.

In the order attaching artillery to the reconnaissancebattalion, it may be necessary to make provision for specialreinforcements for this artillery. This may includeadditional reconnaissance, liaison and communication personnel, ammunition supply, motor-maintenancevehicles, demolitions or pioneer groups and equipment. Incase less than a battery is attached, special administrative

and supply arrangements may have to be made. Inconsidering these matters it is well to maintain theprinciple that all small groups should be, so far as possible,self-sufficient in all respects. The action and movement isfast, units are often widely separated.

Above all, as has been mentioned briefly, special provision must be made for security. In spite of therepeated grievous lessons of history, even veteran unitsgrow careless concerning local security. There is anexample where in May 1940 a small German armored unitran through the bivouac area of a French artillery battalion


11/99


which was sixty miles from the main fighting area. TheFrench, feeling perfectly secure, had failed to install anylocal security system. The artillery cannot rely at all timeson the protection of its own infantry. It is a cold, hard factthat extremely mobile units during maneuvers have acommon habit of forgetting that their artillery is with them.

They will be apt to act in the same way during theexcitement of war.

Artillery units must never assume that front, flanks andrear are safe during the march or in bivouac. Today'stactics constantly involve ambush of motor columns. Suchambush is hard to circumvent in close terrain. Artilleryunits must always inform themselves as to the amount andefficacy of protection afforded by other units, and must oftheir own resources, reinforce this as necessary. Frequentlya single "jeep" patrolling a side road may suffice as a flankguard. The main thing is not to overlook the necessity. Astudy of the terrain may disclose the most dangerouslocalities; these must be given special attention. Watch for

covered localities on the flank where a good field of firecovers a long stretch of road; watch defiles.

The artillery order for the advance must provide forreconnaissance elements of that artillery which is notattached to the reconnaissance battalion. Since time, notspace, is the important consideration, reconnaissanceparties pertaining to artillery with the main body must bepushed well forward, unless it is felt that the artillery withthe advance guard can supply all needful informationconcerning routes, positions, objectives, andtopographical data. Decision must be secured as to whatsize reconnaissance parties will be permitted toaccompany the advance elements. The artillery will wish

to have them as large as possible, so as to execute earlyroute reconnaissance, marking, and pioneering; survey;installation of communications, or reconnaissancetherefor; selection of likely position areas; study of thetarget area.

Preoccupation with these tasks must not blind theartillery commander to the fact that in today's war,

especially with motorized units and a fluid "front," targetsmay appear most unexpectedly, in most unexpected places.Hence the reconnaissance groups should be securelyconnected by radio or other appropriate means to firingelements which are prepared to get into action quicklyfrom roadside positions. These reconnaissance groups (and

this is an unusual consideration) must be prepared toconduct fire as well as to perform their usualreconnoitering, pioneering, and survey tasks. If the marchhas been planned in detail, and successive checkconcentrations spotted along the axis of advance, this taskmay be simplified. If not, other means of target locationand identification must be employed, perhaps the use ofpyrotechnics as suggested by Capt. Hart in a recent issue ofthis magazine.

With respect to reconnaissance, the main duty of thesedetachments will notbe to locate firing positions, for thesewill depend on the situation. Their big job will be to locateroutes to possible firing areas. The very nature of modern

highways, with their deep cuts, steep-sided fills, androadside drainage ditches, makes it very difficult formotorized artillery to leave the road quickly.Reconnaissance groups must furnish information of suchdanger spots, and tell the commanders of firing units whereroutes of egress from the highway exist.

Another important thing is that reconnaissance partiesmust have the ability to make lightning choices in selectingroutes and positions; reconnaissance made from a fast-moving vehicle requires excellent training and a highdegree of mental mobility.

Battery commanders will often find it advantageous tomarch with the advance elements, keeping close to the axis

of advance so that they will be centrally located to receivereports from parties sent to the flank. Here, too, they willbe in closer touch with the commanders of the supportedunits.

Where the size of advance parties is limited, thecolumn artillery commander is faced with a dilemma ofwho should go; the RO's, the Com O's, or S-3? The

Signal Corps

Truck-drawn 155-mm. howitzer


12/99


decision will result from a careful study of the technicaland tactical requirements. Never should a rigid rule befollowed. For the motorized division, route reconnaissancewill always rank high in priority. Survey andcommunications are of lower importance initially becausesimple, open-warfare methods prevail. However, if

observation is restricted, survey may take high precedence.Since radio will be the more common means ofcommunication until a coordinated attack is made, the ComO's work will not require such early reconnaissance forwire routes or other installations. The need for S-3 to be farforward will likewise be of reduced importance untilcentralization is effected.

When the division advances in multiple columns, thesenior artillery officer with each column usually will be a battalion commander. He, like the divisional artillerycommander, will probably advance with the first echelon.Initially, he should keep his staff together (not necessarilywith him) so that it may make early plans for the

coordinated employment of the battalion, and prepare thebattalion to advance in pursuit of the enemy or to echelonthe batteries properly to cover a withdrawal if the lattershould become necessary.

The initial stages of the action of the motorized division,however, will be characterized by decentralization. Duringthis time the artillery battalion commander must hold reinof his natural inclination to interfere with his subordinateunits. He can occupy himself (and his staff) best by makingall arrangements to assume centralized control against themoment when the need therefor arrives. Included in hisfunctions in the interim will be detailed reconnaissance forroutes, OPs, firing-position areas, CPs, communications,

antitank and antiaircraft dispositions, and so on. He canarrange for resupply of ammunition and other necessities,and for evacuation and replacement of both personnel andmateriel. He can become more familiar with the situation,visit supported and subordinate units, and make plans forfire-direction. He should welcome this opportunity fordetailed study of the situation before being called upon tomake the numerous decisions usually required. These tasksshould keep him busy; and if he has used imagination andforesight, he will have so facilitated the work of hisbatteries that "taking over command" will be a smooth andrapid transition, accomplished without stoppage of firing.

The conditions under which the motorized division will

move, especially in hostile terrain where surprise due to theinfiltration of fast mobile elements is always possible,make it necessary for the batteries to be well armed andtrained for close defense. In spite of using all means at itsdisposal for self-protection, the artillery will at times bedangerously exposed to hostile attacks. The enemy willseek to make sudden and deep counter-thrusts, using tanksand motorized infantry. These attacks, usually deliveredfrom flank or rear, are aimed at the area generally occupiedby our artillery.

One of the best ways of assuring self-protection duringan advance is for the artillery always to stay as close aspossible to its infantry. Recent military events in Europe,especially the sad experience of the Russians in theirwinter campaign against the Finns tend to confirm the truthof this.

On initial entry into action, positions will be locatednear roads so as to facilitate early delivery of fire anddisplacement as necessitated by circumstances.

Much of the fighting, so far as the artillery isconcerned, will be roadside fighting. The idea of this isdistasteful to many; and some of our units on maneuvershave been severely criticised for being road-bound. Nodoubt much of the criticism is just, but there is room forspeculation as to whether roadside fighting might not be adistinctive development of this war. Perhaps it will occurwhether we like it or not. Lieut. Dupont and others whohave faced the German panzers state that during May andJune 1940 the armored and motorized columns clungquite close to the main highways. The noted Germancommentator, Soldan, verifies this in a recent article. Ifthis is the caseand we ought to be sufficiently realisticto recognize that things do happen which have not beenplanned that waysome little thought should be given tothe slightly special technique involved in emplacing batteries in and firing them from the road or roadsideditches.

Without going into detail, it might be mentioned thatramps, timbers, blocks and tackle, etc., may be neededfor getting vehicles off the road; and should be carriedwith each battery. The Germans appear to use a metaltrough-shaped ramp to permit light vehicles to cross

ditches or descend roadside banks. In swampy terrain,mats made of fascines are useful, and should beprepared beforehand and carried on the vehicle. In rockyterrain, and especially where the ground is covered withold lava flows, some blasting or other demolitionequipment may be mandatory; this fact is easily lostsight of by troops who are accustomed to maneuver onlyon sandy soil.

Special effort should be made to keep the batteries asmobile as possible during combat. To accomplish this,commanders should avoid the unloading of moreammunition and equipment than will be required for theimmediate situation. Vehicles should be held near at hand,

communication lines kept simple and short. Continuousand early reconnaissance must be made for alternatepositions and for routes of advance or withdrawal.

Battery positions must be far forward, in order toshorten wire lines and to effect close support. Unlessthis is done, liaison with the supported unit will bealmost impossible. Additional protection must be givento the batteries so employed. During the advance intoPoland, the German battalions of artillery frequentlyoccupied positions in advance of the line of departure


13/99


14/99

A Pan American Airways plane over South America. Photograph by Henry S. Villard.

WIDENING HORIZONSBy Lieutenant Edward A. Raymond, 87th FA Bn.

Editor's note: In line with the quickening interest in areas of possible strategicinterest to the United States, this magazine will print from time to time generalarticles dealing with other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The first of these,in the July and August issues, concerned Mexico. Last month we ran an article onCanada. Herewith is a brief but up-to-date picture of Peru, with emphasis on thethings which military men, and especially artillerymen, should know. Of specialsignificance are the author's comments concerning mountain troops.

724


15/99

1941 WIDENING HORIZONS 725

Subject: Orders.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in themilitary service that you proceed to Albrook Field, CanalZone, and accompany the military aircraft flight leavingthat station for Lima, Peru. . . .

That meant taking off on a Goodwill Flight to Lima at5:30 the next morning! A whole flock of ideas crowded tomind immediately. A leisurely flight in the somewhatantiquated bombers which have been on duty in the Zonefor years. Stops in those countries between Panama andPeruby the way, was Venezuela one? Notions, too, ofthe Andes, with condors; Lima, old and shabby; and thePeruvian Army with officers who specialized on life ingarrison cities. Not forgotten were the diplomats, withpurple soutaches across their starched shirtfronts, nor thewillowy senoritas. What a furbishing of military finery began! All of these were normal reactions, probably, butlike so many mental pictures of the shape of things tocome, entirely false.

The trip did not prove to be a pleasure jaunt, but strictlybusiness. It brought home interesting lessons. We flew inmodern, fast ships (flying fortresses), and got straight to

Lima in eight hours. Peru suddenly seemed extremely nearto the Canal, and Peruvian friendship seemed important.As we lost an escort plane on the trip down, the Missionentered official mourning. We concentrated our attentionon the Peruvian Army, not on balls and cocktail parties.We found a hard-bitten force adapted and trained for

special operations in high mountains and Amazon jungles,operations which the writer believes would be entirelyimpracticable for any present units of our Army. ThePeruvian mountain artillery was particularly impressive,both as to type and quantity. It looked as though we wouldhave a very difficult time driving any external aggressorout of that country without the help of the Peruvian Army.The friendship of Peru seemed still more important. Shouldnot the same considerations apply to Chile, to Brazil, and possibly to other South American countries? That smallneighboring armies could help us much and teach us morewas a new idea. But to go back to the beginning, anddescribe our trip chronologically

FLYING DOWN TO LIMA

The prospect of a non-stop flight as long as atransatlantic hop made waking easy, even at three o'clock of


16/99


Operations over suchunexplored mountain

terrain as this demandspecialized mountain

troops.

a foggy morning. Breakfast, in a squadron mess, wasdisposed of in silence, and all officers making the flightassembled in the Operations Room, overlooking theconcrete runways of Albrook Field. Our flight commandermoved a step away from a little knot of senior pilots.

"Gentlemen, here is your flight plan."He spoke with the easy, definite tone of a good officer.

"Weather eight-tenths overcast to 1,100 feet. Mountainscovered. Fly initial course on 52 degrees. That will take usoff the coast. Headwinds expected. Radio frequencies will be. Carburetor settings. Special instructions: Do notenter clouds at closer intervals than five miles. Do not altercourse in clouds. The central coast of Peru has a perpetualovercast 1,500 feet thick from 1,000 feet at this time ofyear. I shall decide whether to go underneath it or stay ontop on the basis of later reports. Order of take-off, one,three, two. Usual instructions, last man off. Anyquestions?" He paused. "It is now 5:05. That is all."

We blasted off the field and went up on instruments.Some time later we came out on top. Suddenly the worldwas brilliantly clear and the sunlight was reflected from a boundless tundra of cloud beneath. Our spirits rose. Weforgot the steamy mistiness of a tropical dawn upon theground, and the intense loneliness of climbing through acloud bank. It was fun to try guessing just where the otherships would emerge to join us in our super-world. Theflight formed into echelon and headed for Peru.

Breaks in the clouds revealed the old familiar coast ofPanama, so toilfully defended on maneuvers. The end of the

isthmian section of the Pan-American highway at Cheposhowed up sharply from the air. There is the jumping-offplace into virgin jungle. Columbia was largely hidden. Morerifts in the clouds did not appear until we were off Ecuador.It was hard to follow our progress from small-scale maps, as

the little jig-saw pieces of ground we saw did not make muchsense. Even from our altitude, the Ecuadorean rivers lookedmuddy, and that gave us the clue to the ground conditionsunderneath that carpet of tree tops. There is nothing like theroot mass of a jungle for holding moisture. Evaporationoccurs slowly from the heavily shaded ground, and theresulting swamps are not the lightest curse of South American"bosky." What a contrast between that green, fetid hell belowand the cloud sea we were surmounting in the planes!

With the feeling of sailors sighting land we glimpsed theAndes, forming a false coastline in our strange double-decked world. Naturally, the sun is very bright in thelatitudes of Ecuador, so that every snow cap and ravine of

the great black range was etched clearly. Mountains have personalities; those who know them well can recognizethem as they recognize people, without stopping toscrutinize the features. The starkness of the Andes isapparent at first glance, and the more they are seen themore strongly that characteristic stands out.

The clouds beneath melted away before we reachedPeru. We came in over a sunlit sea to the bulge ofcoastline which contains Talara. This, the second port ofPeru, sits on the edge of rich oilfields. One thinks ofcopper and silver in connection with Peru; actually half


17/99


the mineral production of the country is of petroleum andits derivatives. Derricks run back from Talara as far as theeye can see, and out into the ocean over the broad, yellow beaches. The juxtaposition of tank farms, with plenty ofrefined gasoline, to a large airport, must be known inTokyo and Berlin. The airport is at the edge of a 100 per

cent desert covering northern Peru. The rains never come.The very rivers run sand, with a seepage of moisture far below the surface causing infinitesimal movement of thewhole sand mass. The small black specks of vegetationwhich exist depend upon rare mists.

Farther down the coast the wasteland is splashed byemerald-green patches of irrigated land, commonly lying invalleys. Peonage persists, and the population of a wholetownship may work the sugar plantation of one well-bredSpaniard or industrious German. Even more important thanthe sugar industry is cotton growing, which accounts for aquarter of the country's total exports. To an appreciableextent this industry is in the hands of Japanese.

The volcano Osorno, photographed at 10,000 feet by Robert M. McClintock

Cotton fields came intosight as our planes flewfarther south. Wedescended to a loweraltitude for the last hour offlight, to get under thewinter overcast. Flying atonly a few hundred feet,we saw clearly the face ofthe country. So perfectly preserved were the Incaterraces on all the hills,and such a geography-

book appearance did theygive the landscape, that itwould almost have beeneasy to believe that wewere traveling over timeas well as space, andlooking at the pre-Spanishempire itself.

Nothing in northernPeru, nothing seen sinceleaving Panama, had beenany preparation for thesight of Lima. After

jungle and mountain anddesert and tin-roofedTalara, a grand city of500,000 people wasimpressive indeed. Callao,the port of Lima, onceeight miles from the city,has now become ingrown;the residential suburbs goup to the foothills of theAndes to the east. Still at a

few hundred feet, the flight circled Lima three times andlanded on one of the airports at the outskirts of the city.Crowds were there to greet us, and after a brief ceremony,punctuated by magnesium bulbs, the flight was taken to theleading hotel. Even though the past eight hours had beenspent in a stable flying fortress, with a corridor to walk up

and down, most of the time had been passed at highaltitude, much of it on oxygen, and all hands were tired.But it had been a good trip.

THE PERUVIAN ARMY

Peru is bounded on the west by the Pacific ocean andon the other three sides by territory disputed withEcuador, Columbia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. Lima,capital of South America in Inca days, capital of therichest viceroyalty of Spain, had a two-year reign ofterror under Chilean occupation after the War of thePacific. San Marco, oldest university of the New World,was sacked and the National Library was burned. The

rich nitrate provinces of Tacna and Arica were lost. No


18/99


The strategic areas of South America vary from the arid mountainous desertssuch as that of Peru, to the lofty cordilleras whose summits are covered with

perpetual ice and snow. On the eastern watershed is a dense jungle.

wonder that Peru is amilitarized nation! InSouth America only theA-B-C powers(Argentina, Brazil andChile) have larger

armies. Conscription,while not alwaysenforced, is universal,and carries a two-yearterm. There areapproximately 12,000trained men under arms,and about the samenumber in reserve. TheArmy is divided into aregular component andthe Guardia Civil, fromwhich certain ideas

might be taken at somefuture date for our own

National Guard. TheGuardia is a permanentforce, with officerstrained in the militaryschools and staffschools of the army.

All guardsmen havecompleted periods inthe other force. Theycarry the rifle, live in barracks, drill, andengage in militarymaneuvers. Yet theyearn their keep bydoing police work.

The regular armyhas five divisions, eachwith its divisionalheadquarters at a

strategic point. Thelargest permanent

Mt. Aconcagua, highest peak of the Andes on the "hump" near the border of Chile, elevation 23,098 feet, is in the midst of a magnificentmountain area. Photo by Capt. Albert W. Stevens, courtesy of Pan American-Grace Airways.


19/99


concentration of troops, and the General Headquarters, is atLima. The American Flight, which landed the day beforean anniversary of the death of Pizarro, was able to watch a parade of all units of the division based on the city. ThePeruvian soldiery is squat, sturdy, and reflects the general blood pattern of the country10 per cent white, 30 per

cent mestizo and 60 per cent Indian. The uniform is of thesame mustard color as used by the French in the currentwar, and the helmet is of French type. The rifle is a five-shot Mauser. Leather and equipment showed excellentcare, and the marching was good.

Besides two regiments of infantry and a regiment ofcavalry, each Peruvian division has a field artilleryregiment, armed with 75-mm. pack howitzers. Most ofthese weapons are Model 1916 Schneiders. They have theadvantage of being broken down into nine loads instead ofour six. Their heaviest load instead of being in excess of300 pounds, like ours, is approximately 200 pounds,including the pack. Four batteries are equipped with the

Model 1928 Schneider. This jewel has a maximum rangeof 14,000 yards with HE shell. A third type is the JapaneseOsaka, which is not as highly regarded by the Peruvians astheir French materiel. Purchase was made some six or eightyears ago during a crisis on the Colombian border. Creditsin France were inadequate. Germany had other uses inmind for her munitions. Peru attempted to buy our present pack howitzer. We were "unwilling to arm one neighboragainst another," so Peruvian orders went to build up theOsaka works, and the Peruvians obtained a pack piecemore mobile and with greater range than ours.

The American Flight rode a train up into the Andes allone day to see the mountain conditions under which the

greater part of the Peruvian Army operates. It is in Peru,incidentally, that the Andes reach their greatest height,with seven peaks vaulting up over 19,000 feet. It might beadded that this portion of the range is rising at least a footevery hundred years, which is fast work, geologicallyspeaking. The writer rode much of the time with alieutenant colonel of Peruvian artillery. This officer was a

graduate of the Ecole de Guerre in Paris, and had served ina French artillery regiment before the present conflict.Colonel S mentioned that the military influence, aswell as the cultural influence, of France had always beenstrong throughout South America, and remained so. He pointed out that Germans and Japanese in Peru virtually

never entered the Army, finding other occupations pleasanter and more lucrative. French training influenceamong Peruvian artillery officers, he emphasized, waslifelong, and not to be forgotten in a few months. Col. S had been stationed on the Ecuadorean frontier, whererepeated rifle skirmishes had already taken place. ThePeruvians do not have anything like enough artillery piecesto be strong everywhere along a defensive front, so theyhold their force massed for a counter-thrust, or, in theEucadorean view, an aggressive assault. The slight,mountain-bred mules and stocky mountaineer soldiers areable to climb, march and maneuver all day at altitudesabove 10,000 feet. The aviators as well as groundlings of

the American Flight were so giddy and so badly "blown"after climbing one steep hill at 12,000 feet that they had torest for twenty minutes. The effect of such altitudes on thefleshy, hulking mules which stagger under our 300 poundloads in Panama would be disastrous.

It was not until part way back to Lima on the trainthat the Americanos del Norte learned that they were notseeing the "montaa." The Montaa Division in thePeruvian Army is not a mountain, but a jungle, force.The "montaa" of Peru lies to the east of the Andes, andits military and economic headquarters are in Iquitos,the only ocean port in the world two thousand milesfrom the sea. To be exact, Iquitos is 2,653 miles from

the mouth of the Amazon, and lies in an immense arealess than 1,000 feet above sea level. Not only this basin,but the foothills, lower slopes and valleys of the easternAndes are covered with a half-impenetrable jungle,steaming endlessly with bluish mist. One tiny illustrationof what American troops would have to face in such jungle is the gnat problem. Small hard-shelled gnats

The flagship of a Goodwill Flight landing at Limatambo Airport, Lima.This was the first Flying Fortress ever to land on foreign soil.


20/99


there can force their way through sandfly bars, and nevereven know a headnet is being worn. Each bite raises ablood blister the size of a dime. In a matter of minutes anunprotected man is unable to see, or even grip a riflehecan not close his hand sufficiently. The Peruvians use aprotective salve which we do not know how to make. They

do not toil the best part of an hour in tropical heat to buildjungle beds each night (these are raised platforms coveredwith large leaves or fronds, on which a shelter-half may beerected, out of the path of snakes, ants and vermin). Insteadthey carry a small woven hammock weighing less than fivepounds. Montaa troops are recruited almost entirely fromIndians and mestizos who have grown up in that climate,know its dangers, and can live in comfort on its half-hiddenresources.

We have read of the German and Austrian mountaintroops in action in Norway, the Balkans, and Crete. Also,we know that the huge Colonial Institute in Berlinflourished all through the post-war years when the Reich

had no colonies. We have voluminous evidence on thefascination colonial military problems hold for Germanstudents of war. Operations with French colonial andJapanese allies in Africa, Indo Chino and the StraitsSettlements might supply veteran jungle troops before wereckon. We cannot assume that an aggressor would be atas great a disadvantage in South America as we would beourselves.

Part of Peru is neither rugged mountain nor Amazon jungle, but coastal plain. Here the GHQ artillery of thePeruvian Army would be a trifle inadequate against a first-class power. It consists of one battery of World War 105-mm. howitzers, horse-drawn, of Krupp manufacture.

Incidentally this has been our own strength in weapons ofthat caliber until very recently.Peru has an extremely popular Air Force, which attracts

the finest blood in the country, is immaculately tailored,and is "advised" with an iron hand by the lieutenantcolonel heading a U. S. Marine Corps Air Mission to thatcountry. The Force has approximately two-hundred planes,the best of which are American A17A attack ships and

German Junkers transports confiscated from the LufthansaAirline. An "obolo," of a day's wages, is being imposed onall citizens to buy more planes in the United States.

Peru also has a Navy, under the tutelage of a high-ranking American Naval Mission. This service, also, has agreater social and public standing than the Army.

From the standpoint of hemisphere defense, thePeruvian Army would seem a much better investment forthe Peruvians than planes and ships. Her contribution inthese can be but trifling. She must depend on our aid, inany conflict except one with another American nation. Itwould seem the part of common sense to influence Peru, by all means at our disposal, to supplementour potentialpower in South America; rather than try to supplantit.

The Goodwill Flight convinced this writer that actualmilitary aid from the armies of Latin America could be ofdecisive importance in resisting invasion of the other halfof this hemisphere. It may sound ridiculous to contend thatin defending Peru, for instance, her army of 12,000 active

troops could render critical aid to ours, which is more thana hundred times as large. Here is the answer: Peru, like thegreater part of South America, has such difficult terrainthat only highly specialized mountain and jungle troopscan operate there. Let us keep this thought in mind as wewatch the progress of United States foreign policy in SouthAmerica.

With official blessing, the press and screen are doing agreat deal to popularize Latin America in the United Statesand to spread goodwill abroad. Large loans are beingmade. Political and military conferences on New Worldsolidarity are held. Army, Navy and Marine Corpsmissions are sent. The Good Neighbor Policy is being

given all possible effect, to the end that our interventionwould be sought at once if invasion came. This is well, forthe situation of the American republics now is strikinglysimilar to that of the thirteen colonies, once summed up sowell by canny old Ben Franklin. There are others in worseneed of hanging than ourselves, and after his flight, thiswriter is anxious to see the Peruvians, also, on theexempted list.

Errata

a. In the September number of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, on page 694, line13, right column, the date 1940 should be 1934.

b. The picture displayed on page 635 of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL is aSchneider 105-mm. rifle, and not a howitzer.

c. On page 636, the number of cannoneers in the battalion is shown as 60 insteadof the correct number, 69.


21/99

BY LIEUT. JEAN DUPONT(Formerly French Army)

February 12th. Our division, which had been at rest for

two months in a little Alsatian village, received the order togo up again to the front. The news was received cheerfullyby officers and men. We all were fed up with the "rest,"which meant hard drilling more than anything else. Myobservers in particular were tired of climbing hills sweptby icy winds, tired of seeking through their binoculars animaginary objective, and of setting up topographicalequipment in unheated barns. The machine gunners were bored with following, through their sight-finders, smallwooden airplanes carried in front of them on long sticks;and never firing one shot.

On the 15th of February, the battalion with its twelveguns took to the road. On the frozen paths the horses

slipped, and on one sharply banked curve a gun slid into asmall ravine, pulling its team of horses with it. In theafternoon we reached a little village on the Maginot Linewhere we waited for several days for our position to beorganized.

It was a pretty village, typically Alsatian, with cleanhouses made of beams and plaster, a handsome church,and at the main crossroads a lifesize statue of Christ instone. Unlike the other villages we had left, this wasunoccupied, the inhabitants having been forced to abandon

it a few hours after the outbreak of the war.

Here we were told that the mission of the division wasto cover the Maginot Line in the Seltz sectorin the angleformed by the frontier of Alsace and the Rhine River. Inthis section the Maginot Line curved away from the angleat a great distance from the frontier, and joined the Rhinethrough the Forest of Hagenau.

It is well known that the Maginot Line was composed ofmany forts of different sizes: from simple blockhouses,manned by a few soldiers and one machine gun, topowerful fortresses manned by 1,500 soldiers and artillery.The much publicized Hochwald, set on our left on the firsthill of the Vosges Mountains, was one of the greatest ofthese fortresses. It may be described as an enormous plant,

with its repair shops, its storage rooms, its hospitals, and itsunderground railwayall built at a depth of two or threehundred yards under the surface, and from which emergedartillery turrets and infantry battlements with their machineguns and antitank guns.

It has been said that after the armistice the Germansremoved heavy guns from here and put them on theChannel coast, or intended to use them against Gibraltar; but as a matter of fact, the guns of the Maginot Line,though remarkably well protected, were of small caliber.

731


22/99


The Hochwald artillery, for example, included eight long-range semi-automatic 75's and four semi-automatic 135howitzers.

The other forts which were part of the main line werespaced at an average distance of six or seven hundredyards, and were connected by a continuous barrier made of

rails, barbed wire and deep ditches. These forts hadinfantry armament but no cannon. The artillery andparticularly the heavy artillery was on the surface behindthe Line.

Everyone who visited the Maginot Line brought backthe impression of great strength, which was, I think, justified. True test of this strength was never made. Theonly blockhouses which were attacked and taken were notin the main Maginot Line, but in advance of it, sometimesnot even connected by telephone and not protected, bymaterial barriers, against close approach. One can easilyrecognize these advance works in the description given inthe German magazine Signal. Their purpose was merely to

give the alert and to slow up the enemy advance.Our division was to occupy a position on two linesone

on the frontier, the other on the north of the HageneauForest, five kilometers in advance of the main MaginotLine. This position was new because, originally, ourGeneral Staff had decided to give up all the ground in frontof the Line, but had changed its mind.

It was decided to set the main observation post for my

battalion of 155's on the second line inside an infantrycenter of resistance, and on a hill with a splendid view. Onthe north were the rolling hills of Alsace, on the south the black mass of trees which was the Forest of Hageneau, behind which appeared on a clear day the tower of theStrasbourg Cathedral; to the east was the Rhine Valley

with the Black Forest as a background.The view was ideal for an OP, but unhappily the hill on

which we were stationed was completely bare of trees andfoliage, thus affording no natural cover.

Every observer knows that he cannot see well withoutsometimes also being seen; but in this case, it was better tohave 25 inches of concrete overhead. Hence we decided totake advantage of the fact that the sector was quiet to builda good OP. The type which we adopted had been tested before and found satisfactory. It was made of wood,concrete, and arches of steel. The wood we got from theforest, the steel arches from the engineering company ofthe division, and the iron frame in the concrete was made

of metal harrows and garden gates removed from villagesin the neighborhood.

The observersone non-commissioned officer andfive privateswere, in civilian life, a stone-cutter fromParis, a steel worker from the north, two farmers from thecenter of France, and a clerk from the westa happycombination which produced amazing results. They wereas fond of mixing concrete and digging as they were ofobserving and, later on, of patrolling and scouting. Thetype of OP which we adopted included a shelter dug deepin the ground and built mainly of wood and steel arches,in which two bunks could be set up. Encased in andprotruding above the shelter was a concrete tower, for the

observation itself. The walls of the tower were 20 inchesthick and the roof 40 inches, and inside two mencould stand side by side. Through two openings theycould observe the landscape. Periscopic binocularswere mounted in the apertures; on large wall panelsthe maps (20,000 scale) were pinned, showing placesseen and unseen. On another wall was a panoramic


23/99

1941 ON THE ALSACE FRONT 1940 733

drawing showing the angles of site and theranges to reference points.

Therese Bonney, courtesy "The American Foreign Service Journal"

On the church steps at Givet(Ardennes) women and children wait to be pickedup in evacuation.

During the three weeks which this workrequired, the Germans certainly sighted us, butkept quiet. When the last shovel of concretewas thrown on the roof, the men traced their

names with their fingers on the fresh cement;then in the shelter, by candlelight, officers andmen drank champagne to the glory of theregiment.

The observation post was in communicationby telephone with the main network of the Line.It also had a two-way radio which had beenhidden (as was the rule) in a less elaborate dug-out shelter a few hundred yards behind the hill.Most of the time the OP did not function as aseparate unit but was incorporated into theobserviation network of the whole sector. Itsreports were wired to the headquarters of the

division and analyzed by the lieutenant incharge of the divisional artillery intelligencesection.

No observer worthy of the name is satisfied with onlyone OP. He sets up several others, topographicallyequipped, summarily constructed but occupied onlyoccasionally. These secondary observatories are chosenwith the idea of having a more complete view of the sectoror are set up in the second defensive position. Weestablished an OP of this type in a pine tree, 75 feet abovethe ground; and it was great sport to climb up to it. Wewere always delighted to give our visitors, after a heavymeal, the opportunity of struggling up the tree, in a high

wind.At the same time the OP was organized the batteries builtup their positions in the forest; huge concrete shelters weredug in the ground, platforms for guns were set, and so on.

We discovered then how a camouflage, however crude,can fool the planes. The work undertaken in a clearing inthe woods should have been easily discovered by theGerman observation planes which were always flyingabove us. To hide from their view, we had stretched a fewwire nets on which were hooked tops of pine trees. AfterMay 10th the Germans often tried to reach the batteries,but their shooting was erratic, and sometimes the shells fellat great distances, which proved they had not located us. Atthe same time, the batteries erected small "barracks"ornamented with foliage. There were about thirty houses,all of different types of architecturethe imagination ofthe builders had an opportunity to expend itself freely.

Providence was with the battalion, and furnished us witha big house in a village nearby which contributedabundantly windows, doors and tiles. The house had belonged to a spy, shot at the beginning of the war. Byusing his belongings for our comfort we helped him payhis debt. His bed served our Major, and we intended to usehis bathtub, but we were forced to leave before we had put

it in place in a lovely corbeille of foliage in the woods.Only the system of running water had been completed,thanks to a fire-engine pump from a neighboring village.

On May 8th, I left my battalion for a much-longed-forten days' leave. May 11th, I was back again, summoned bytelegram. War had actually begun.

During the long winter we had often rehearsed andcarefully worked out every part of our plan. During thespring we had worked hard to build a powerful positionand at last we had the opportunity to test it.

What happened afterwards showed that this war was notthe kind for which we were preparedthat instead of our155's we would have had more use for antitank guns; thatinstead of concentrating on such things as the effect ofhumidity on an 11-kilometer trajectory, we would havebetter trained in pistol or rifle shooting.

In a village in the rear of the Line (on my way back tojoin my battalion) I experienced the first attack by planes.Later on, low-flying planes were constantly above usweshot at them repeatedly with our few machine guns, butwith little hope of ever bagging one. We were amazed oneday when we saw one of them suddenly lose control underour fire and turn back to the German lines, where heprobably crashed.

On May 13th, the Germans attacked the first line of ourdivision and succeeded in reaching several points on it, butwere repulsed by counter-attack. One of the young officersthere was shot, lost his sight and was captured. At the sametime, the batteries were subjected to a severe pounding.Three officers of the forward 75-mm. batteries were killed.

Our division received then the order to fall back tothe second line. This was quite a surprise, but later welearned that this was part of a general move to freesome troops urgently needed on the northern front.


24/99


Anyway, the first line was far ahead of the second and itwas better not to wait for a violent attack before retreating.In this way, the second became the first line, and ours became the forward observatory. This new first line wasweak, and the infantry center of resistance in which our OPstood consisted only of a few shallow trenches. No shelters

had been dug for the infantrymen, and the young lieutenantin charge, fresh from St. Cyr, had only a small dugoutpropped up with thin boards and covered with tar paper.

Therese Bonney, courtesy "The American Foreign Service Journal"

Alsatian refugees in Haute Vienne.

The infantrymen could rightly claim that they were notnumerous enough to work, that they were tired from night patrolling, and, moreover, lacked implements and meansfor transporting the materials. For its defense, the centerwas equipped with a few heavy and light machine guns andhad a 25-mm. gun to rout the tanks. The position of thisgun, because it was the only one, had been discussed manytimes and had often been changed, so that no sufficientground protection had yet been built up. I must not forgetto mention that the center was surrounded by barbed wire

which would not have kept out even the cows which,abandoned at the outbreak of the war, and now wild, werewandering in the fields.

But the worst of it was that, being a forward position, itwas two kilometers from the main line of resistance. Theseinconveniences appeared in their full light when thepounding began.

The Germans had, of course, easily located the centerand as soon as they brought forward their batteries, began abombardment with 105's and 150's. Our OP was not muchaffectedwe had only to remove earth which theconcussion had dislodged, and to rebuild the entrancewhich had received a direct hit. Inside the shelter, we

defied the German batteries, but out in the open, on ourway to and from the main line, the two kilometers seemedvery long. No communicating trenches had been dug, but asmall ditch made for telephone wires proved very useful. Itwas surprising to see sometimes how quickly a rather fatman could slide into such a narrow space.

On the morning of May 16th we were advised thatfrom certain sure clues, the Germans were to attack withtanks at 3 AM the next day. Our infantrymen filled thevalley at the foot of the hill with land mines. The young

St. Cyrien was full of fire and energy, but ratherperplexed as to how we were going to stop the tanks. Wehad full confidence in the Maginot Line but it was 3 miles behind us. Our only 25-mm. gun had been taken away,the 75-mm. batteries were two miles behind us and ratherinefficient for indirect fire against tanks. So our main

hope rested on the barrage of155's which I was charged tostart 200 yards in front of ourline. But we didn't expect muchfrom it, either. The infantrylieutenant on our left, a hard- boiled former officer of theForeign Legion, had just asmuch enthusiasm as the St.Cyrien, and was just as puzzledas to the way of fighting thetanks. He was better off than wewere, for he had a couple of 25-mm. guns; but we knew them tobe inadequate.

We had read in thenewspapers during the Finnishwar that a good antitank defense


25/99

1941 ON THE ALSACE FRONT 1940 735

was to jump on the tank, open the trap-door and shoot itsoccupants. But what if the Germans were mean enough tolock the door? We would just be taken for a ride. So wethought it better to duck into the bottom of the trench andlet them pass above. "Wouldn't it be a good opportunity,"said the Foreign Legion Lieutenant, "to take advantage of

the situation and see how the German tanks are madeunderneath?" We hoped, however, to emerge afterwardsand strike at the German infantry which we believed was tofollow the tanks.

All night the forest was illuminated by flashes of ourguns, firing toward the places through which the Germanswere expected to bring their attacking troops. Threeo'clock, not yet dawn, found the observers scrutinizing thefoot of the hill; the infantry with their forefingers on theirtriggers; and my radio man, with his telephone headgearon, ready to buzz the signal for the barrage. . . . Butnothing happened.

We wondered what actually had been the "clues" for the

expected attack. It seemed that the Germans had nevereven had it in mind. Proof of this was given when, the dayafter, two prisoners, without thinking they were releasingany valuable information, told that during the night, threetimes in succession, they had been ordered to pack, andthree times had the order countermanded. For one whoknows how carefully the Germans prepare an attack, thisseemed as if they had not planned one.

During the following days, action was limited toengagements between patrols. In one of them, an infantrylieutenant was killed. He had, a short time before, narrowlyescaped capture, when he had been surprised by a German patrol while sleeping in a little village. Ordered to dress

quickly, he had, instead of putting on his helmet, struck theGerman officer with it, knocked the flashlight out of hishand, grabbed his pistol, and forced him to flee.

As for us artillerymen, we were busy principally withartillery duels. Our system worked well. The target wasfirst located in direction, and when possible, its distancewas gauged by means of the angle of site. Generallyseveral OP's worked together, calling each other in order tocheck their findings. Their information was transmitted tothe "bureau director of fire" (computation squad of fire-direction center) of the battalion, which made calculationsand sent the elevation and deflection to the batteries. Littleby little, and not without great distress, we saw the lovelyAlsatian villages being demolished and burned, and oncemore a part of French soil ravaged by war.

While we were becoming enrooted in a war of position,the Germans had crossed the Meuse in the Sedan-Givetsector and broken through the Allied front. It may bebecause of the relative ease with which the Germans hadcrossed a river considered to be impassable, that one daywe had orders to face our guns toward the Rhine. As I havesaid, the right shoulder of the division was holding alongthe river, but we had always faced the northern frontier,taking for granted more or less, I suppose, that the Rhine

could not be crossed. Along the river our defense hung onseveral pill-boxes, rather small and far apart. In Aprilalready the Germans had tried a coup-de-main on one ofthem. They had succeeded by crossing the river at night ina motorboat to surround a pill-box, and after havingcaptured several sentinels had been repulsed only withsome difficulty.

Around May 18th, we were ordered to destroy threesuspicious-looking barges on the right bank, but we had no

direct view of them, and fired by the map; the bargesescaped unharmed. It appeared then that, if the Germanssucceeded in establishing a bridgehead and building aponton bridge, our artillery could not demolish it due to theinsufficient view of the river.

The only OP on the river was in a bell-tower in a villagein the valley. But one can not rely on a bell-tower, as was proved later on, when it was demolished by Germanshelling and two observers killed. It was hastily decidedthen to erect a metallic observatory, 100 feet high, in theforest. We had laid its foundation by May 23rd when wewere ordered to leave for an unknown destination.

We said farewell to our trenches, shelters and newly-completed barracks, and started our night's march to therailway where we were to entrain. We had been advisedthat German parachutists had descended in the forest, sothe column was carefully patrolled. The "parachutists"were found. But they turned out to be our General'smessengers, who had put on white overalls.

At two o'clock on a hot day the regiment entrained.German planes kept circling over us. They did not attack usbut succeeded in killing seven men of the infantry regimentwho departed after we did. Before leaving, we boughtAlsatian dollssouvenirs of a country dear to every one of us.


26/99

The Battery Commander*

Life

In Two Parts

Part I

"Military leadership is predicated uponcheerful responsibility,superior ability, anduntiring care."

The war that is now in progress will decide between life and death for many nations. Thisconflict may eventually engulf us; our armedforces will then be called upon to defend ourright to exist as free men. The nation is lining upfor this task and it is our responsibility, asofficers and leaders, to fit ourselves and our menfor the sacrifices which will have to be madeshould we find ourselves a part of the titanicstruggle which appears just beyond the horizon.

There can be no greater and more gratifyingtask for an officer of our army than to be theleader and comrade of the men under hiscommand. There is no other similarly direct wayfor his personality to make itself felt. Knowing aunit's leader, one can have a fairly accurate ideaof what the unit will be like. If the men feel thattheir battery commander unfailingly has theirinterests at heart they will not fail to take afriendly interest in him.

His problems will then become their problemsand the result will be a balanced relation that willbe hard to beat when the battery is put to the test.

The officer who gives most, in this way, willreceive most in return. Our pride should be togive each to his battery the best that is in him.Many of our soldiers merely await the word.Leadership and command are for them a mererelease of forces that urge into action. There aremany, however, who will require an urging call

and the force of a great example; and the timidand fearful have to be swept along and forcedahead by a leader's determination of will andsuperior insight.

*Editor's note: Based on a booklet, Der Kompaniechef, by Capt. H. Ellenbeck, one of the finest pieces of "grassroots" military philosophy produced during this war.Ellenbeck wrote his little treatise for the company leaders ofthe new German Army, but its appeal and application areuniversal throughout the profession of arms.

736


27/99

1941 THE BATTERY COMMANDER 737

For all these men the commander of the battery is theman who must supply the cues. "To be an officer is to be aliving example for one's men." An officer should beregarded by every one of his men as the soldier parexcellence, as an ideal they wish to imitate.

Their leader has to be a living example for them on the

way to their greatest adventure and accomplishment,indeed at the supreme moment itself when they have torisk life and limb in battle for their country. Any officer inthe army who is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of thistask and has grown with it beyond his own stature, willfeel awakening deep down within himself the finest oflatent forces. Life will take on its true meaning for him ifhis constant endeavor is "by sheer ability, bearing andspirit to compel his men to follow him anywhere." Such isa man's task for which he can willingly risk his life inorder to gain it.

Practical advice on therelationship between the"Old Man" and his men.

Heavy burdens go with this task, and heavyresponsibilitiesall the more reason for pausing to

contemplate the meaning and content of what goes to makeup the official existence of a military commander.Willingness of the heartcan be guided bydiscipline andreflection, and raised toits highesteffectiveness.

AUTHORITY FOR THETASK

Provided he is reallycapable, any soldier inour army has a right to consider that an officer's career is potentially open to him; but the winning of hiscommission must be based upon the strength ofperformance and ability. Once this promotion is obtained,his performance must continue at the same high level ofexcellence.

The officer's subjective, individual authority has to benewly created from day to day by his personal conduct.Regarding this authority one can apply an old dictumabout the inheritance from one's forefathers: "You mustdeserve it, if it is to be your own." The effect produced byan officer's personality upon his men will depend on hiscommand of subjective qualities to support the objectiveauthority of his rank. No one who is commissioned can

afford to rely on it that his rank alone will suffice as asource of authority, and to suppose that he has reachedhis goal and can now safely relax his effort. Genuineauthority has nothing to do with insignia; it is basedsolely on accomplishments and performance of duties.

According to an old European military principle, it isalways important to be more than one seems to be; and this principle incidentally points the way for an individual atwork on his self-improvement. If we are aware, at allclearly, of the tremendous responsibility we owe theNation, we officers are bound to make every possi

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Oct 1941