Field Artillery Journal - Oct 1946

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THEFIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

1218 Connecticut Avenue

Washington 6, D. C.

The FIELDARTILLERY

J OURNAL

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 36 OCTOBER 1946 NO. 10

Cover: Although neither played a decisive role, the important new weapons ofWorld War II were rocket missiles and atomic energy. The Signal Corps picture on thecover showy British antiaircraft rocket projectiles rooming through the sky.

EDITORIAL

Believing Isn't Enough ................................................................................................. 578

ARTICLES

Strategy of the War....................................................................................................... 562

Artillery Rockets, by Col. T. B. Hedekin, FA .............................................................. 564

"The Gunner Net," by Lt.-Gen. O. M. Lund, C.B., D.S.O. ........................................... 575

Seven-Up, by Maj. A. M. Anderson, FA-Res............................................................... 576

Universal Military Training........................................................................................... 579

A.G.F. Light Aviation, by the Staff AGFATS............................................................... 583

Air OP Is Here to Stay, by Maj. D. L. Bristol, FA ........................................................ 586

Perimeters in Paragraphs, by Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd......................................... 590

ARTILLERY NOTES

First U. S. Army Air OP Operations ............................................................................ 586

Air OP Operations in the Third U. S. Army................................................................. 588

OTHER FEATURES

For Heroism and Service ............................................................................................. 577

Of More Than Passing Interest .................................................................................... 587

Letters to the Editor..................................................................................................... 599Writing You're Reading ................................................................................................ 607

BOOKS .................................................................................................................................. 600

The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of WarDepartment doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone areresponsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles.Consistent with the objects of our Association, however. The Field Artillery Journalseeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in thechanging present.

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG

Editor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN LENNA PEDIGOAssociate Editor Business Manager

Published monthly by The United States Field Artillery Association. Publicationoffice: 3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md. Editorial and executive offices: 1218 ConnecticutAvenue, Washington 6, D. C. Address all communications to the Washington office.Entered as second class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore, Md.Accepted for mailing at the special rate of postage provided in Soc. 1103, Act of October3, 1917. Copyright, 1946, by The United States Field Artillery Association. Subscriptionrates: $3.00 a year; foreign, $3.50; single copies, 35 cents; additional single copies tosubscribers, 25 cents. The Field Artillery Journal does not accept paid advertising. It doespay for original articles accepted, but unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied byreturn postage if they are to be returned.

"PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY"


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STRATEGY OF THE WAR*Allies sought to follow national policier

even when engaged in fight for existence

NTIL RUSSIA was attacked by Germany in June1941, Russia's war effort was purely aggressive andpolitical warfare in pursuit of an undisguised policy ofaggrandizement, at the expense of Finland, the BalticStates and Poland. For two years thereafter, however,Russia was fighting for her existence and militaryconsiderations were paramount.

Great Britain, until the U. S. entered the war, was sohard pressed to stave off disaster that, in the last analysis,military considerations dominated her strategy. During thisperiod, however, military and political strategy workedtogether in mutual support whenever possible. Britain'spolitical efforts at this time were concentrated on gainingthe full backing and military cooperation of the U. S. as

soon as possible, on building up political resistance to theAxis in the Balkans and the Middle East, particularly inTurkey, and in maintaining the neutrality of Sweden,Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.

Except in the Balkans, which were overrun by Germanforces early in 1941, British political strategy in thesefields was successful. As the U. S. came to realize the truecharacter of the struggle in Europe and its ultimateimplication as to the Western Hemisphere, the U. S.progressed by stages from a status of major supplier to oneapproaching full military collaboration with Great Britain.As a result, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor the U. S.entry into the war was a natural step for which both nations

were more or less prepared.

WAR'S FIRST OBJECTIVE

The basic strategic decision of the war actually wasmade early in 1941, at the so-called ABC Conference inWashington and later confirmed at the Arcadia Conferenceshortly after Pearl Harbor. In accordance with thisdecision, the first and major objective of the combined U.S. and British effort was the defeat of Germany. As acompanion decision, it was agreed to operate on thedefensive against Japan, until such time as the meansavailable made it possible to take the offensive.

These decisions are generally considered to have been

sound from the military point of view and well supported byconsiderations of political necessity. Germany was the headand front of the Axis coalitionthe most powerful, mostsuccessful and most dangerous enemy. It was not certain thatboth Great Britain and Russia could wait for a decisivevictory over Japan, and if either of them collapsed or made asettlement with Germany, the U. S. ultimately would face

both Germany and Japan almost singlehandedly. On the

other hand, providing Japan could be prevented fromconsolidating and developing her early conquest she couldnot long survive the united powers of the Allies which waspledged after the war in Europe had been won.

Questions of how these decisions were to be interpretedand applied arose early in the war and continued to the end.The most important and controversial question concernedthe proportion in which available resources should bedivided between the war in Europe and the war againstJapan.

In this decision as to Europe vs. Japan as the primary warobjective, we find the first major manifestations of howpolitical factors were involved in the U. S.-British strategy ofthe war. Compared with her interests in the Far East Britain's

interest in Europe and the Middle East was overwhelming.For Britain, psychologically, politically and traditionally, thewar against Japan was a side show, as compared with the warin Europe. Furthermore, Britain must have sensed that the U.S. could and would handle Japan and do so withoutdemanding a quid pro quowhen the job was finished.

For the U. S., on the other hand, Japan as the primaryobjective was politically preferable to Germany. The U.S.had been disillusioned by the last war in Europe. She wastraditionally against getting involved in Europe's quarrels,and, after all, Germany had not directly attacked the U.S. Onthe other hand, the U. S. had extensive interests in the FarEast, a tradition of always helping China and a vague but

long-standing expectation of war with Japan. Pearl Harboradded the element of outraged pride and revenge for thetreachery.

As a result of these opposing political factors, there wasa continuing divergence between the U. S. and GreatBritain in interpreting the decision to finish Germany first.Britain consistently tended to de-emphasize the war againstJapan and to build up the effort in Europe at the expense ofthe Pacific. The U. S., while more than meeting itscommitments in Europe, insisted on what it considered tobe adequate effort in the Pacific.

From the results obtained, it would appear, however,that an excellent balance was achieved in reconciling these

conflicting points of view. In fact, it seems probable that,had either of the extreme views prevailed, final victorymight have been delayed.

From the outset, the British strongly advocated enteringEurope from the Mediterranean and getting at the so-called"soft underbelly" of Germany. Variations of this conceptinvolved entering the Mediterranean directly or via NorthAfrica and thereafter proceeding by way of Italy and eitherthe North Balkans, or Greece, Turkey and the Danube.

On the other hand, the U. S. was convinced, andconsistently

U

*Reprinted (slightly condensed) from World Report, an independentweekly magazine on world affairs published at Washington, D. C.

Copyright 1946, United States News Publishing Corporation.


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1946 STRATEGY OF THE WAR 563

maintained and argued, that the soundest, surest andquickest plan for defeating Germany was a cross-Channel,full-scale invasion of France. In April 1942, the U. S.proposed such an invasion for April 1943, and plansherefor were initiated. But, in June, Mr. Churchill came toWashington and convinced the President that the U. S.

proposal could not be accomplished on time and that theinvasion of North Africa was possible in 1942.The resulting campaigns across North Africa, the

Mediterranean and in Italy are well known. Althoughcontributing more than double its original commitments forthese campaigns, in 1943 and early 1944, the U. S. arguedand pressed for the invasion of France from Britain andwith equal persistence opposed the British proposals foradvance into Italy and thence into the Middle East or theBalkans.

COMPROMISE STRATEGY

In the resulting compromise plans, the U. S. acceptedthe conquest of Italy, refused flatly to be drawn into theBalkans or the Eastern Mediterranean and eventually

obtained British cooperation and support in the Normandyinvasion in June 1944.

The political influence underlying the British concept ofdefeating Germany via the Mediterranean was indicated bythe fact that, in all the important arguments anddiscussions, Mr. Churchill "carried the ball." The Britishwere undoubtedly fearful of the cost and possible failure ofthe cross-Channel operation, particularly if undertaken in1943, and they probably were not averse to a considerabledegree of mutual exhaustion as between Russia andGermany. But it is difficult to escape the conviction thattheir controlling reason was a strong desire to have the warend with Anglo-American, rather than Russian, forcesfirmly established in the Balkans and the Near East.

It is generally considered that, in this concept, theBritish allowed their political thinking to encroach on theirmilitary judgment and that, had the British plan beenfollowed, the end of the war would have been delayed,with increased chances of armed clashes with Russiaconcerning the Balkans.

Another manifestation of the political factor in the warinvolved the different attitudes of the U. S. and the Britishas regards China and Southeast Asia. The U. S. policy wasto support and build up China and her part in the war atalmost any cost. This policy was based in part on thetradtional American attitude toward China, but also on theconviction that, if so supported, China would make avaluable contribution to the war and thereafter to thestability and security of the Far East. The U. S. consideredthe build-up of China far more important than thereconquest of South Burma and the Malay States. On theother hand, the British considered China relativelyunimportant in the war and a doubtful investment of muchneeded Allied resources for either war or postwarpurposes. They understandably favored using all availableresources to reconquer Southern Burma and the MalayStates.

In accordance with their respective views, the U. S., atfabulous cost and effort, supported and built up China,

while the British consistently kept their Chinacommitments to a minimum while always pressing fordirect action looking to re-establishing the British positionin Southeast Asia.

If one were to comment on these conflicting concepts inlight of the present situation, it would seem that the British

were perhaps more nearly right than the U. S. as regardsChina. Neither during the war nor since has China really"paid off." On the other hand, events have supported the U.S. idea that Burma and all other outlying areas would "dieon the vine" when the attack was pressed home against thecitadel of Japan.

While these factors were at work throughout the war, asregards the combined strategy of the U. S. and Britain, therewere other political factors that concerned the strategicrelationship of those powers with Russia. Nevertheless, notuntil Tehran, in December 1943, was there a meeting of thethree heads of state and their chiefs of staff.

At this conference, Russia strongly supported the U. S.position as to the cross-Channel invasion, and in no small

degree contributed to its adoption, with the resulting earlierfall of Germany. In doing this, Russia undoubtedlyrecognized not only sound military logic but the basicpolitical objective of assuring that the end of the war wouldfind Russian, and not Anglo-American, forces in theBalkans.

Russia's entrance into the war against Japan was almostentirely political strategy. Though long considered anoverly important objective by the U. S. and Great Britain,her declaration of war came too late to have anyconsiderable military effect.

On the other hand, it was of great political value toRussia, because it firmly established her position in the FarEast in anticipation of the peace settlement.

UNCHANGING POLICIESIn broad outline, such was the pattern of major political

strategy during the war. But the policies involved areimportant not only as matters of history but because theycontinue into the post-war period and constitute essentialelements in the present world situation.

Great Britain is still primarily concerned with Europe, theMediterranean and her connections through it to the MiddleEast. She is relatively uninterested in China and countsheavily on the U. S. to safeguard her essential interests in thePacific and the Far East. The U. S. has accepted substantialcommitments in Europe, but with considerable reluctance.More naturally and more easily the U. S. turns her face to the

South, the Pacific, the Far East and China. Russia has firmlyestablished her position in Central Europe, the Balkans andthe Far East, but she still looks intently at the EasternMediterranean, the Middle East and Manchuria.

But there is one great difference between the politicalpattern of the war and of the present. During the war, militarynecessity compelled an integration of conflicting policies intoa workable arrangement. Now, while common interests stillreconcile divergencies between U. S. and British policies,Russia aggressively persists in transforming her wartime

position as a great ally into a postwar status of potentialopponent.


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ITHE PROBLEM

EW weapons are frequentlyconceived and born in wartime

when the entire energy of nations is

focused upon the business of war. Yetsuch new weapons rarely have a decisiveinfluence upon the war then in progress.Being new, the weapon is imperfect andis imperfectly understood. During the

peace that follows, the new weaponcomes of age; one nation, at least,

perfects it and masters its employment.Then, in the next war, the now matureweapon is drafted and wins its medals.

Consider World War I. Poison gas,the tank, and the airplane all made theirappearance. None was decisive, and only

poison gas played a major role. By the

time World War II started, however, theairplane and the tank had come of ageand were indispensable on the battlefieldto the infantry-artillery team.

The important new weapons of WorldWar II were rocket missiles and atomicenergy. Neither played a decisive role.Yet, just as the infant airplanes and tanksof World War I grew to be the giants ofWorld War II, so the infant rocket

missiles and atomic energy of WorldWar II are destined to be the giants offuture warfare.

Unquestionably, any nation that entersa future war with a decided advantage inrocket missiles and atomic energy willgain initial victories. These victories maywell prove decisive. Oceans and outpostscannot by themselves stop long-rangeguided missiles. And the atomic bomb isso tremendously destructive that ourindustrial potential might be irreparablydamaged at war's outset. We cannotafford again to enter a war with inferiorweapons or tactical doctrine.

Gifted with hindsight, we can now

see that in 1920 we should have devoted

our major effort to the development of

the "new weapons" of World War I, the

technique of their employment, and the

defense against them. Right now is to

World War II what 1920 was to World

War I. We have brought the boys back

home and demobilized them. We have

had our rest and rehabilitation. Our post-

war Army and the personnel of our

officer corps are taking shape. It's time

to get to work.

564


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1946 ARTILLERY ROCKETS 565

Rocket missiles and atomic energyreally constitute one weapon. Therocket-propelled guided missile is theideal vehicle for the atomic bomb. Andthere is a possibility that atomic energywill propel the long-range missiles of the

future.A rocket-propelled missile is

essentially an artillery projectile.* That itis propelled by jet propulsion rather thanfrom a cannon changes its artillery naturenot in the slightest degree. It is launchedfrom the ground against ground,airborne, or seaborne targets. Theartillery arm of our post-war army willinclude field, antiaircraft, and seacoastartillery. Inevitably, these threecomponents of the artillery arm willserve the three types of rocket-missiles.Artillery has suddenly acquired a weapon

with greatly increased range and power.Obviously, artillerymen must developnew techniques of gunnery, firedirection, survey, and service of the

piece. Signal communication will bevastly more difficult. Mechanicaldirectors and computers will be essential.Tatics and technique will require radicalalterations. But the essential nature ofartillery is unchanged, though we useguided missiles instead of cannon balls.

IIPRINCIPLE OF ROCKETPROPULSION

Rocket (or Jet) propulsion is not new;and it is the simplest, in principle, of alltypes of propulsion. Yet it has been solittle used that it is almost unknown toAmericans who are generally familiarwith the more complicated reciprocatingengine. There are few well knownexamples of rocket propulsion: the watersprinkler that rotates through jet action,the squid that moves itself by expelling aliquid to the rear, and the fourth-of-Julyskyrocket come to mind.

The basic principle is the law ofmotion that every action has an equal

and opposite reaction. In fact, rocketmotors are sometimes called reactionmotors.

When you fire a rifle from yourshoulder, the bullet flying toward thetarget is the action. The recoil or "kick"of the rifle against your shoulder is thereaction. Mount a .30-caliber machinegun in a wheeled cart, fire the gun, andthe recoil (reaction) gives your cart a

forward push. Fire the gun rapidlyenough to produce a forward movement,and you have a rocket-propelled vehicle.

Instead of bullets, rockets fire gases,using the recoil (reaction) for

propulsion. (The gas does not propel the

rocket by pushing against the air.) Thethrust imparted to the rocket dependsupon the mass of gas expelled to the rearand its velocity. Unfortunately, gases arevery light. In compensation, theirvelocities can be very high.

In addition to the reaction describedabove, rockets have one other source ofthrust. After leaving the motor chamber(and after contributing its reaction to thethrust), the gas is still highlycompressed. If the exhaust is in theshape of a venturi tube (Fig. 1), the outerexpansion (1) of the hot discharge gases

produces an additional forward thrust (2)much as the wind drives a sailboat. Inthis manner additional thrust is obtained.(See p. 566.)

A rocket motor consists essentially ofa chamber in which the propellant is

burned, a nozzle in the shape of venturitube, and a means of introducing the

propellant into the chamber. In itssimplest form (the solid-propellantfireworks rocket) (Fig. 2) the propellantis carried in the combustion chamber.The simplest type of rocket motor has nomoving parts--no pistons, no crank shaft,

no gears. The simplicity of the rocketmotor is illustrated by a design proposed

by Isaac Newton (1680) for a steamrocket for the locomotion of a carriage(Fig. 3).

However, the Ordnance designer of arocket-propelled missile does not haveso easy a task as might appear. Unlikethe ballistics of cannon, on which datahave been accumulating for manycenturies, the ballistics of rockets is newand its literature scanty. The size, shape,and contour of the chamber and nozzleare critical and vary with each

propellant. The propellant gases operateat terrific pressures, temperatures, andvelocities and pose most difficult

problems of cooling and erosion. Forexample, erosion of the nozzle maychange the direction of the jet and,consequently, the flight characteristics.Liquid fuels must be introduced into thecombustion chamber in the properamounts and proportions. Thecomposition of the propellant is

probably the most important item, and itinvolves a weighing of considerations ofefficiency, ease of procurement, andsafety in handling. A discussion of thedetailed factors bearing on rocket designis beyond the scope of this article and is

a matter of concern to the ordnancedesigner rather than to the artillery users.However, artillerymen should appreciatethe major differences between rocketsand shells shot from cannon.

The launcher's sole use is to giveinitial direction to the rocket. It absorbsno recoil; the recoil is used to provide

propulsion. So launchers are light,cheap, and mobile. With small rockets,multiple-tube launchers are practicable.Even a very large rocket can use a fairlylight and mobile launcher; the launcherfor the German V2 rocket of about 14-

ton weight and 200-mile range is lighterthan an 8-inch gun.

A rocket carries with it its motor and,at the start, its fuel. The rocket may beregarded as one assembly of bothammunition and weapon. This is as if anartillery shell had to carry its cannonwith it in flight. So a rocket requiresmuch more propellant to project a given

payload a given distance than does acannon or, for that matter, a

GAPA (Ground-to-Air PilotlessAircraft) takes off for air target.

*Subsequent to the preparation of this article,the WD announced that the AAF would becharged with the development of guided

missiles.Ed.


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566 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL October

propeller-driven aircraft. This isparticularly true at low speeds, whererockets are comparatively inefficient.

A rocket accelerates gradually andcan continue to accelerate for a longtime. (The German V2 accelerates forabout 60 seconds.) Accordingly, a rocketcan attain a much higher velocity than is

practicable with a shell, and it attainsthis velocity gradually, without beingsubject to the severe stresses and strainsof a shell. It is at these high speeds andhigh altitudes that the rocket motor is

most efficient.Present rockets do not attain stability

until they reach fairly high speeds. Sincea rocket is moving slowly at launching,it is unstable initially. Hence, unguidedrockets are comparatively inaccurate at

present. Rockets can be guided by vaneswhich operate either against theatmosphere or against the jet itself.

The above brief discussion of rocketversus cannon leads to the followingtentative conclusions. The rocket issuperior to the gun under the followingcircumstances:

1. When the recoil of the gun cannotbe tolerated (aircraft, light naval craft).

2. When sudden, massed, area firesare required with economy of personneland equipment (multiple-tubelaunchers).

3. When very large projectiles orvery great speed and ranges are required.(For this type of mission, the rocketmissile will probably have to be guided.)

IIIROCKETS IN THE PAST

The Chinese are generally creditedwith the first use of rockets, possibly

even before the Christian era. Certainly,rockets have been used for manycenturies, principally as fireworks butalso as weapons of war. The first reallysuccessful use in war was by the Britishin the early 19th century. These rockets,developed by Sir William Congreve,were employed in the Napoleoniccampaigns, as many as 20,000 beingfired in one bombardment. Congreverockets were also used by the British in

the War of 1812. It is the Congreverockets to which Francis Scott Keyrefers in the Star Spangled Banner, "Andthe rockets' red glate, the bombs burstingin air"; the occasion was the

bombardment of Fort McHenry, nearBaltimore, by a British fleet in 1814.

Congreve was confident that rocketswere the artillery of the future. However,cannon were greatly improved duringthe 19th century, and the superior rangeand accuracy of cannon caused theabandonment of rockets. The U. S.

Army did organize several rocketbatteries during the Mexican War, butsoon after that period rocketsdisappeared from modern armies. InWorld War I rockets were used little if atall.

Just prior to, and early in, World WarII the British, Germans, and Russiansagain took up the development of rocket

projectiles, and very soon the Americansalso developed successful rocketweapons for various purposes.

The Russians apparently concentratedon field artillery-type rockets using solid

propellants. Their rockets had a shortrange and were used to provideconcentrations of great density upon keyareas. The Russians had many rocketunits and employed them extensively

and effectively. The Germans too, used

solid-propellant artillery rockets. TheirNebelwerfer ("fog thrower"), originallydesigned to project smoke and otherchemicals, was among the best of thistype of rockets.Figure 1. left: the principle of the venturi fube.

Figure 2. above: a fireworks rocket.The British started serious rocket

development about 1937. Their initialeffort was to produce a solid-propellantantiaircraft rocket to supplement theirthen existing and inadequate antiaircraftdefenses. Anyone who heard the rocket

battery in Hyde Park, in London, fire avolley can testify that the sound wasfrightening, whatever the effect. Whenthe United States started serious rocketdevelopment, about 1940 we tookadvantage of the British experience.Consequently our early rockets bear afamily resemblance to the Britishrockets. The general British policy was

to take advantage of the rocket's abilityto fire a heavy barrage from light (andcheap) equipment with relatively smalldemands upon manpower.

Starting late, the United States maderapid progress. At the end of the war oursolid-propellant rockets were probablysuperior to those of any other nation.Accordingly, our development are worthyof study.

Navy. In an amphibious assaultlanding, there is a short but critical phasewhen the fire of supporting cruisers anddestroyers is masked by the leading

wave of landing craft. The Navy earlyrecognized the problem, and rocketsoffered a solution. Because of the lack ofrecoil and their light weight, numerouslaunchers could be

Figure 3Newton's steam rocket.


9/51


Two views of the T66. Rocket Launcherlight weight (1,240-pound) split-trail, towed weapon mounting 24 tubes.

mounted on light craft whose shallowdraft permitted them to approach closeto shore. Rocket craft have a tremendousvolume of fire, as long as their

ammunition lasts, and their comparativeinaccuracy is no handicap since themission is to saturate an area (the beach)with fire. First used in Sicily and Anzio,rocket naval craft eventually became aseparate class, these vessels playing anincreasingly important role in theamphibious operations in the Pacific.The fact is the Japanese ceased tooppose our landings at their mostvulnerable pointthe beach. Navyrockets are entitled to at least some ofthe credit for this tactical success.

Air Force. The Army Air Force early

recognized the need for a weapon thatcould fire a heavy projectile from anairplane against ground or air targets.Cannon were impractical because oftheir weight and recoil, characteristicsnot inherent to rocket launchers. By theend of the war, rocket-firing aircraftwere operating with considerablesuccess against both ground and airtargets. The Naval air arm employedrockets successfully against surface craftand submarines. It is interesting to notethat the fire power of a rocket-equippedfighter plane is the equivalent of a salvo

from a destroyer.Infantry-type Rockets. One of the

most successful applications of therocket principle is the "Bazooka,"familiar to all ground forces. Here againfull advantage is taken of the recoillesslight launcher inherent to rockets. The

portability and cheapness of rocketlaunchers suggested the use of heavierrockets as infantry weapons, especiallyin airborne operations and in difficult

terrain. However, their inaccuracy andrevealing blast at the launcher positionhave so far proved a great handicap.

Prime - mover Rockets. Rockets have

many possibilities as "prime movers" totransport objects short distances overterrain that is difficult of access becauseof ruggedness or enemy action. Possibleapplications include: minefieldclearance, short-range demolition,

projection of chemicals, and wire laying.A similar type of employment is jetassisted take-off, which assists airplanesto take off from water and small fields.

Antiaircraft. Unlike England, theUnited States has shown little interest inantiaircraft rockets, because present solid-

propellant rockets lack the essential

accuracy and high muzzle velocity.Tank-mounted Launchers. Tanks are

occasionally called upon to perform asecondary mission as field artillery. Theflat trajectory and small capacity of tankshells make them relatively ineffectivein this role. With use, the high-velocitytank guns quickly lose velocity and

penetrating power. Consequently, atank-mounted rocket launcher was

developed, but such a launcher has thedisadvantages of any auxiliary weapon.

Field Artillery-type Rockets. An earlydevelopment was a field artillery-type

rocket, the M8 using launcher T27. TheM8 rocket was fin stabilized, was highlyinaccurate, and had a short range (4,100yards). Its companion launcher wasawkward and had a poor firingmechanism. Its considerable use in ETO,

particularly by the 18th Field ArtilleryBattalion, was motivated principally bythe shortage of artillery ammunition. Thenext development was the M16 rocketwith launcher T66. The M16 rocket isspin stabilized, has much greater accuracythan the M8, and has 1,100 yards' greaterrange. The T66 launcher is also a great

improvement over the T27. It mounts 24tubes on a split-trail towed carriage andweighs about 1240 pounds. Several fieldartillery rocket battalions were organizedand trained with this equipment. Two ofthese battalions reached the Pacifictheater before VJ Day, but neither sawcombat. One such battalion is currentlystationed in the U. S.

The poor comparative range andaccuracy of the rocket as compared to agun and its additional disadvantage ofrevealing blast at the launcher position

prompts the question, why do we have

field artillery rockets?

For the past year Colonel Thomas B.Hedekin has been head of the RocketBranch of the Field Artillery Service TestSection (AGF Board No. 1) at Fort Bragg.During the early part of the war he servedas S-3 of the Field Artillery School. Aftercompleting the Army-Navy Staff Collegein December, 1943, Colonel Hedekin wasassigned as Executive Officer in theArtillery Section. First Army Group (laterTwelfth Army Group). He served in thatcapacity until November, 1944, when hebecame Artillery Officer, Twelfth ArmyGroup, on which duty he remained untilthe end of the European Campaign. Col.Hedekin has been awarded the Legion ofMerit, the Bronze Star Medal, and Frenchand Luxembourg decorations.Editor

One great advantage is that the lightlauncher carries numerous tubes. Arocket battalion can fire an 864-roundvolley, the equivalent of 72 battalionsof105-mm howitzers firing a one-volleyTOT. And, while a single rocketlauncher is less accurate than a singlecannon, a battery rocket volley is aboutas accurate as a TOT fired by a numberof cannon battalions.


10/51


The other great advantage iseconomy, both in materials andmanpower. Germany, Russia, andBritain all entered World War II withinsufficient artillery. The task ofequipping sufficient new units with

cannon while replacing the heavywastage of war could not be met by theiralready overburdened industrial plants.Factories lacked the needed workers andstrategic materials, and time as well waslacking. But rockets and launchers can

be made quickly and easily with simpletools and unskilled workers andcomparatively small demands forstrategic materials. The United Statesdid not have such pressing demands foreconomy; yet even we were scraping the

bottom of the manpower barrel by theend of the war, and strategic materials

were running short. Rockets wereeconomical in operation too, with simplemaintenance.

However, in all honesty, it must beadmitted that our rocket developmentswere disappointing. Congreve, in theearly 19th century, had a 42-poundrocket with a range of 3,000 yards; todayour rockets weigh about the same andhave not much greater range. True, theCongreve rockets were very inaccurate;there is even a report of their returningto strike a ship whichlaunched them. But our

present rocket, almost 150years later, is still notsufficiently accurate foremployment against pointtargets. It began to appear thatrockets were destined to playonly a small though importantrole in those limited situationswhere their favorable

characteristics could be exploited;lightness and recoillessness; ability tosaturate area targets with a few weapons;economy both in construction andoperation.

IVTHE GERMAN V ROCKETS

On June 15, 1944, only a few daysafter the Normandy landings, the firstV1 Rocket ("Buzz Bomb") fell inLondon. By VE Day, the Germans hadlaunched more than 10,000 of thesemissiles at London, Antwerp and othertargets. In September of 1944 theGermans started attacking the UnitedKingdom with V2 Rockets; according toThe Illustrated London News, more thana thousand hit southern England.Although these missiles were unable tochange the course of the war, their

sensational possibilities wereimmediately apparent. As early as Julyof 1944, Major General J. F. C. Fuller ofthe British Army stated in Newsweek:

"It demands no great flight of theimagination to picture . . . rapidevolution of the flying bomb during thenext 30 years.

"It is self-evident that such arevolution carries with it the doom of the

bomber as a piece of long-range artilleryand probably also the doom of the

cannon in most of its many forms."Because of their revolutionary

significance, it will pay to consider thesetwo rockets missiles, especially the V2,at some length. A fairly completedescription of the V2 Rocket is

contained in Army Ordnance of March-April 1945 G. Edward Pendray, in hisinteresting and informative book "TheComing Age of Rocket Power,"describes both the V1 and V2 rockets.The data that follow are extractedmainly from an article by Sir AlwynCrow in The J ournal of the RoyalArtilleryfor July 1946.

In Germany, interest in rocketdevelopments started in the 1920's,largely on the part of a number of rocketsocieties. The German military authorities

became actively interested in rocket

development in 1930; and, shortly afterHitler's rise to power, established arocketresearch center at Peenemunde at aninitial cost of about $75,000,000, prewarvalues. Eventually some 2,500 scientistsand technicians were employed in rocketwork at Peenemunde alone.

The early work leading up to the V2began in 1933 with the A1 rocket ofabout 330 pounds. The A2, very similar,designed in 1934, developed a thrust of660 pounds for 16 seconds and

successfully reached a heightof 6,500 feet. The A3

followed in 1938. It was animproved and larger version,weighing about 1,650 pounds.

Work on the finalversion, the A4, generallyknown as the V2, started in1940. It was a scaled upversion of A3. The firstsuccessful

Spin-stabilized M16 rocket on the left and fin-stabilized M8

rocket on the right. Another study of the two methods of stabilization asillustrated with the M16 and M8 rockets.

Cross-section of the 4.5 standard rocket, M16.


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Multiple barrel launcher in a DUKW. Navy automatic launcher in a DUKW. Navy Mark VII launcher on LVT.

launching took place about October1942, when one rocket is reported tohave gone 170 miles. Quantity

production started toward the end of1942. The main characteristics of the V2(A4) are approximately as shown below:

Overall length 46 feet

Diameter 5 feet

Total loaded weight 14 tons

Weight of propellant 9 tonsWeight of warhead 1 ton

Weight of rocket, unloaded 4 tons

Thrust 26 tons

Time of burning 60 seconds

Speed at end of burning 3200 m.p.h.

Time of flight 5 minutes

Range 200 miles

Fuelethyl alcohol and water

Oxidizerliquid oxygen

The alcohol and oxygen is forced intothe combustion chamber by a turbinewhich, in turn, is driven by a gasgenerator using hydrogen peroxide andcalcium permanganate. Control is bytwo set of vanes, one set operatinginternally in the jet stream and the otheron the edges of stabilizing fins.

Control is exercised about as follows:The rocket is placed vertically on a smallhorizontal turntable. The turntable isrotated so that the pitch axis of therocket is perpendicular to the planecontaining the target. After launching,the rocket travels vertically upward for ashort time. Then the two sets of controlvanes, which are synchronizedelectrically, maintain the pitch axis in itsoriginal direction and rotate the rocket in

pitch at a predetermined rate to an angleof about 45 degrees to the horizontal. Agyro-operated mechanism stabilizes therocket in roll. A mechanism measuresthe rocket velocity in flight and cuts offthe fuel at a point corresponding to therange desired. At the end of sixtyseconds, when the fuel is almost

completely consumed, the rocket hasreached a height of about 22 miles. Thetrajectory becomes parabolic andreaches a maximum height of about 60miles. (Recently a V2 fired vertically in

New Mexico reached an altitude of 104miles.)

The V1 is a flying bomb, or pilotlessaircraft. It is about 25 feet long with awing spread of 16 feet. Its range is

approximately 150 miles, and it carries aone-ton warhead. Its gyro-controls are

pre-set for direction and altitude andgive signals to a servo mechanism,which is powered by compressed air. Itstop speed is in the neighborhood of 400miles per hour, and the Germansoperated it at altitudes between 1,500and 5,000 feet. It is less accurate thanthe V2.

The most interesting part of the V1is its motor, which is a thermal jet ofthe type generally described as"intermittent duct." Unlike the V2,

which carries both fuel and oxidizer,the V1 carries only fuel and obtains itsoxygen from the air. In essence, themotor is a hollow tube with fluttervalves at the front end. The valves arenormally closed. The air is sucked intothe combustion chamber by the vacuumcreated by exhaust of the previouscycle. Fuel is sprayed into thecombustion chamber by pumps, and theresulting explosive mixture isdetonated. The explosion closes theintake flutter valves and expels thecompressed gasses through an exhaust

to the rear; the reaction propels themissile. This cycle is repeated. (Thistype of propulsion has been carried onestep farther in the "ram jet" motor, orathodyd. Here, the air is admitted in acontinuous stream into the combustionchamber, and the burning is continuous.A recent news dispatch stated that theU. S. Navy had successfully flown aram-jet rocket.)

The obvious advantage of the thermaljet rocket is the saving in propellantweight resulting from utilization of theoxygen of the air. A second advantage isthe possibility of using gasoline andother cheap, available fuels that presentno difficult problems of handling andstorage. One great disadvantage is that itmust operate within the atmosphere and,consequently, within the range of

antiaircraft artillery. (US and British AAartillery acquired an enviable record inknocking down V1 rockets.) Anotherdisadvantage is that the thermal jetmotor cannot operate until the rocket ismoving swiftly enough to ram air intothe combustion chamber. Consequently,the rocket must be launched by acatapult with sufficient speed to initiatecombustion.

The Germans had other rockets ofvarious types under development at theend of the war. The most fantastic ofthese are described by The Illustrated

London Newsof December 22, 1945. AnA9 Rocket is pictured. Apparently it isvery similar to the A4, but with wings. Itis launched by a booster rocket, the A10,60 feet in length and 11 feet in diameter.It is stated that this combination wouldhave a top speed of 8,000 miles per hourand a range of 3,000 miles. Its purposewas to bomb America.

At this point it would be well to comedown from the stratosphere and plant

both feet firmly on the ground. After all,the German V rockets failed to affectmaterially the course of the war in spite

of their sensational performance. Whatwere their capabilities and limitations,and what are the prospects for removalof these limitations?

VARTILLERY OF THE SKIES

In 1918 the Germans amazed theworld with their "Paris gun," whichshelled Paris from a distance of about 75miles. The shell was small with a


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Navy automatic launcher. Navy 10-rail launcher on a jeep. This T-32 launcher fires 7.2 rockets.

high-explosive filler of only 15 pounds.The V2 rocket of 1944 increased thatrange to about 200 miles, and the

projectile had a high-explosive filler ofabout one ton. With its tremendous

velocity, the V2 rocket is no morevulnerable to present antiaircraft orfighter planes than is the shell. Theimprovement in capabilities is apparent,

but what of the limitations?The first limitation is that of range

and destructive effect. The one-tonwarhead is impressive, but is muchsmaller than the projectiles dropped byheavy bombers, just as its range is less.The V2, with a payload of only 1 ton,had a gross weight of 14 tons; the ratioof 1 to 14 is disappointingly small. Toincrease either the warhead or the range,

we must increase the size of the rocketor its operating efficiency, or both.Undoubtedly, better propellants andmore efficient motors will be developed,

but the payload-gross weight ratio of 1to 14 in a 200-mile missile should soberthose who talk glibly about trans-oceanrockets.

Accuracy is another importantproblem. As previously explained, arocket is unstable at the moment oflaunching and acquires stability only atfairly high speeds. Eventually, we maylearn how to correct this instability at

low speeds. However, while theaccuracy of rockets is being constantlyimproved, there is no immediate hopethat unguided rockets can approach theaccuracy of cannon projectiles. The V2rocket was guided, but the guidance wasnot very efficient. Sir Alwyn Crowestimates that the average deviation forrange was not better than 1%. Now, even1% of 200 miles is a very considerabledistance. The V1 was even less accurate.

This brings us to the subject of controlof guided missiles. Control systems may

be classified generally as pre-set,remote, automatic homing, or acombination.

Pre-set Controls. The V1 and V2missiles had pre-set controls. Thelaunching crews computed what isessentially map data corrected formeteorological conditions. These datawere set on the auto-pilots thatcontrolled the missiles. After launching,the missiles received no intelligence ofthe target, either directly or indirectly.The accuracy depended, then, upon theaccuracy of the initial data and theaccuracy of the pilot mechanism.

Remote Control. A bomber airplaneis guided by a human pilot, who

navigates the airplane to the target andreleases the bomb. In a one-waymissile, such control is not possibleexcept with Japanese suicide pilots.However, the pilot's eyes could bereplaced by a television set

broadcasting to a ground operator whoguides the missile by remote radiocontrol. Likewise, the plane could betracked by radar and its course plottedon a chart. The fire-direction centercould then compute the necessarycorrections to make the trajectory of themissile intercept the target. The

necessary signals could be sent to thepilot mechanism by radio, and themissile would thus be guided by remotecontrol. Because of the missile's speed,computation of corrections would haveto be done mechanically. Television,radar, radio remote-control of airplanes,and mechanical computers are all

practical devices in general use today;undoubtedly, they can be combined intoa practical guidance system. However,

all these devices have their limitations;and the problem of combining them forthe control of a supersonic missile,especially a long-range one, is not to bedismissed with a wave of the hand.

Automatic-homing Control. By useof elctronic devices, such as radar,television and the like, it is possible atleast theoretically to equip a missilewith a device which seeks, or homes ona target. Though not incapable ofsolution the design and engineering

problems of such a device areobviously tremendous.

Combined Control. The controlsystem may require a combination of theabove systems. For example, a missilemay be guided to the general vicinity ofa target by pre-set control, after which

the homing device takes over.Any control system will have weightand bulk. If, to secure great accuracy, wemount a ton of control device in a V2,what happens to our payload? However,we know that the weight of the VT fuse,a very complicated electronic device,was measured in ounces.

Another limitation of guided missilesis cost. Dr. Malina, writing in ArmyOrdnance, estimates that it costs$75,000 to fire a V2, with prices goingup Larger and more complicatedmissiles may cost considerably more.

However, bombing aircraft are evenmore costly besides being comparativelyslow and vulnerable.

Also, the most efficient rocketpropellants are highly dangerousexplosives, difficult to store, handle, andtransport. For some time to come, rocketmissiles will be dangerous, temperamental,and erratic. (Dr. Malina states that 30%of all V2's launched by the Germansfailed to perform satisfactorily.) The


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day may come when it is possible to slapa guided rocket missile in a launcherextract the necessary settings from asimple firing table, set a few hand-wheels, pull the lanyard, and beconfident that the mechanical director

will guide the missile to the target withthe accuracy of an 8-inch howitzer. Butthat day is not near. For some time tocome the gunners who serve the missileswill have to be experts in every sense ofthe word and in every phase ofoperation.

In summary, rocket missiles haveprovided us with artillery of the skies.This artillery can do many things that itwas never able to do before. But alone itcannot win wars. Its mission is still tosupport the infantry, though even moreeffectively than before. It will have

limitations as well as capabilities. Intheory, rockets of any desired size,range, and accuracy are possible. In

practice, the problems are of staggeringmagnitude. The problems will be solved.How soon? One year? Five years? Fiftyyears? Who knows?

One last wordor rather two words:atomic energy. A supersonic guidedrocket of V2 type flying in thestratosphere at terrific speed is difficult,almost impossible to intercept; it is theideal vehicle for the atomic bomb. If aB29 can carry an atomic bomb, a rocket

can be built to carry one. And if energycan be used to propel rockets, the

present unfavorable weight ratio ofwarhead to propellant will be solved. Ofcourse, that is a big "if." Such a missilewould certainly play a definite role inany war, perhaps thedecisive role.

VIFUTURE TRENDS

No guided missiles are as yetavailable for artillery units. You cannotfight a war with blueprints, and youshould not base your training on theassumption that blueprints will becomeweapons before the next war. But it is

an equally bad mistake to assume thatthe blueprints will never becomeweapons and that we will fight a nextwar with the last war's weapons. Verywell then, what rocket weapons mayartillerymen reasonably expect to havewithin the foreseeable futurethe nextfew years?

In attempting to answer this question,I want to make clear that the answers areguesses and are mine alone. I have noinside information. My guesses may bewide of the mark. My sole purpose inestimating future trends is to stimulate

thought and provoke discussion, nomatter how violent.

For convenience in discussion Idivide field artillery rockets into threeclassifications according to range:short, medium, and long. This divisionis purely personal and entirelyarbitrary.

SHORT-RANGE ARTILLERYROCKETS

For this discussion I define short-range field artillery rockets as those withranges up to 25,000 yards, the limit of

our present 155-mm gun and 240-mmhowitzer. Now, a new weapon should beadopted only if it can do a job thatexisting weapons cannot do, or if it cando the same job better or more cheaply.Existing field artillery weapons provideus with excellent coverage up to 25,000yards.

Guided missiles, even if extremelyaccurate, could improve only slightlyupon the performance of existing fieldartillery weapons. But accurately guidedmissiles are costly and require costlycontrol apparatus. They are difficult to

maintain and supply. They requirehighly skilled operators. For the nextfew years at least, the cost andcomplexity of guided missiles rule themout as replacements for existing fieldartillery.

Unguided rockets, using solidpropellants and similar to our presentstandard rocket, can be made cheaply,and they are simple to operate. But their

present accuracy is sufficient only forextra fires. Without considerableimprovement in accuracy, unguidedrockets cannot replace existing field

artillery weapons. But our presentrockets do provide a most usefulsupplement to present weapons, and theimproved rockets expected soon will bestill more useful.

The general tactical uses of presentartillery rockets are discussed in WarDepartment Training Circular No. 19, 25April 1945.

It seems to me that, on the offensive,the main value of short-range free rocketsis in "set-piece" offensives againststrongly held positions. Such offensivesrequire tremendous artillery support. The

emplacement of the requisite masses ofartillery, equipment and personnel, ismost difficult to conceal from the enemy,and surprise is almost an essential tosuccess. As rocket launchers are smalland require only a few serving

personnel, they can be emplaced secretlywith comparative ease. Yet a singlerocket battalion with its 864 tubes candeliver a staggering volume of surprise

Night firing by T34 launcher on M4 tank. M17 launcher fires 7.2 rockets.


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fired. The revealing blast at thelauncher position will require frequentdisplacement to avoid counterbatteryfire. But it is an easy task to displacethe mobile materiel to previously

prepared alternate positions, where

ammunition can be stacked in advance.On the defense, the short range of

our present rockets restricts theirtactical flexibility. Yet if batteries, oreven platoons, are emplaced to covercritical avenues of approach and theseunits remain silent until the enemyattack gets under way, their intensivesurprise fires may well prove decisive.In static defenses, such as the defenseof a shore line or a river line, singlelaunchers may be employed asauxiliary weapons. Once emplaced,concealed, dug in and provided with

ammunition, a launcher can be loadedand fired by two men. Its 24 tubes canfire the equivalent of two volleys by a

battalion of 105-mm howitzers,whereupon the cheap launcher can beabandoned as expendable.

If the field artillery requiresprojectiles much larger than those ofthe 240-mm howitzer, rockets may

prove more practicable than very largehowitzers or mortars. This is especiallytrue if extreme accuracy is not required.

In summary, existing field artilleryweapons provide excellent coverage up

to 25,000 yards. For the immediatefuture, guided missiles will probably betoo costly and complicated to provide asatisfactory replacement. Unguided,solid-propellant rockets are cheap andsimple to operate, but they areinaccurate. Unless their accuracy can

be improved considerably they willremain a supplementary weapon withimportant but limited tactical uses. Forthe immediate future, short-rangeguided field artillery rockets will notreplace existing weapons.

MEDIUM-RANGE FIELDARTILLERY ROCKETS

For this discussion I definemediumrange field artillery rockets asthose with ranges up to 200 miles, theapproximate range of the German V2rocket. Beyond 25,000 yards we nowhave the 8-inch gun and the TacticalAir Force.

The 8-inch gun is hardly satisfactoryin this field. Its range is only 35,000

yards, its dispersion is large, itsprojectile is small, its tube has a shortlife, and it is heavy and immobile.Without major improvements in thescience of gun and ammunition designwe are unlikely to get a mobile gun

with much better range and accuracythan the 8-inch gun.

The Tactical Air Force in the lastwar supplied the Ground Forces withexcellent support up to ranges of 200miles and more. Yet the Tactical AirForce has its limitations. Its accuracy is

not always of the highest, and itsoperations are limited by darkness and

bad weather. The front-line groundcommander has difficulty in gettingaerial fire support where he wants itwhen he wants it, since the airplanesare based on distant fields. The Tactical

Air Force requires large amounts ofvery expensive equipment and largenumbers of highly trained personnel.The tactical air support of groundforces showed tremendousimprovement during the war. Since the

war, Army Ground Forces and the AirTactical Command have continued towork in the closest cooperation, andthere is every reason to expect even

better air support in the future. On theother hand, improvements in

antiaircraft artillery, includingproximity fuzes and, probably,antiaircraft guided missiles, may maketactical air support prohibitively costly.

A medium-range artillery guidedmissile, the German V2, is already inexistence. It should not prove verydifficult, or a very long-term project, todevelop an improved guided missilewith the desired accuracy and range.Such a weapon appears within theforeseeable future. Field artillery

battalions equipped with medium-rangeguided missiles would probably have thefollowing capabilities and limitations:

Capabilities.1. Provide accurate fire with heavy

destructive effect both in close supportof infantry (armor) and deep withinenemy lines.

2. Operate independently ofdarkness and bad visibility.

3. Provide higher commanders withan immediate reserve to reinforce widesectors of the front with massed fires oftremendous power.

4. Undertake distant destruction,

interdiction, and harassing missions.5. Provide continuous support with

infrequent need to displace launchingequipment.

6. Make use of existing artillery

target-gathering, liaison, observing, andcommunication facilities.

Limitations.

1. High cost of both missiles and

fire-control equipment.2. Necessity to emplace launchers

well behind front lines, because ofelaborate equipment, blast at launcher

position, and supply problems.3. Difficulty of maintaining

elaborate, delicate equipment; danger

in handling explosive propellants.4. Necessity for elaborate and

extensive communication facilities totie in with existing artillerycommunications.

5. Necessity for forward

installations to take over control andguidance of missiles as they approachfront lines.

In summary, fire support within therange of a medium-range (200-mile)guided missile is now limited to the 8-

inch gun and the tactical air force. The8-inch gun does not satisfactorily coverthis field and there is little prospect ofany greatly improved cannon. Thetactical air force operates efficientlywithin this field, though it suffers from

several serious limitations. Theselimitations may be overcome byimproved techniques, but this is by nomeans certain in the face of improvedantiaircraft fire. A guided 200-milerocket projectilethe German V2has been produced. Development of a

greatly improved medium-range guidesmissile is probable within the next fewyears. The expected capabilities andlimitations of such a rocket are such as

to make it a valuable supplement to thetactical air force, and even, possibly, a

substitute.

LONG-RANGE FIELD ARTILLERYROCKETS

For this discussion I define long-range field artillery rockets as thosewith ranges in excess of 200 miles

perhaps with ranges up to several

thousand miles.


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Since the 200-mile V2 rocket had apayload of only one ton in a grossweight of 14 tons, it is unlikely thatsatisfactory long-range rockets will bedeveloped within the next few years.Other factors, such as accurate

guidance at long ranges, also hinderdevelopment. Certainly, medium-rangeguided rockets can be developed

before long-range ones. We will thushave the opportunity to mastermedium-range artillery rockets beforewe are faced with the more difficult

problem posed by long-range rockets;we can learn to walk before we have torun. General Groves writes in theCoast Artil lery Journal, "The mostsignificant development which mightoccur in connection with the atomic

bomb appears to be that of the guided,

pilotless missile . In the past, thebombs were carried by conventionalaircraft; in the future, as pointed out

by the former Commanding General ofthe Army Air Forces, General of theArmy Arnold, improvements inaerodynamics, propulsion, andelectronic control may enableunmanned devices to carry atomic andother explosives to targets at distancesup to many thousands of miles." Withregard to the use of atomic energy as a

propellant, General Groves says, "ifthis energy could be utilized in that

fashion for propulsion, a large guidedmissile could be sent entirely aroundthe world with only a few ounces ofatomic fuel. However, the day ofatomic-propulsion is not yet at hand,and no valid predictions can be madeas to when it will be, if ever."

We may conclude, then, that"fantastic" long-range guided rocketscarrying atomic watheads will not beavailable within the next few years,although they are an almost certaineventual development.

ANTIAIRCRAFT AND SEACOASTARTILLERY ROCKETS

In view of the projected consolidationof the three artillery branches into asingle artillery arm, a brief estimate ofrocket trends as they affect antiaircraftand seacoast artillery is apropos.

The increasing speeds of all militaryaircraft and their higher operationalceilings pose a very difficult problem forantiaircraft artillery. It is doubtful if

mobile antiaircraft cannon can bedeveloped with greatly increased muzzlevelocity and range. However, asupersonic, guided antiaircraft rocketwith the necessary range appears to beentirely practicable. Lt. Col. Weinnig

writes in the Coast Artillery J ournal:"The antiaircraft weapon of the future isthe ground-to-air guided missile. . . . Theincreased speeds of aircraft and the

phenomenal speeds of rockets make animpossible problem of prediction for a

projectile of unalterable trajectory. It isevident that the antiaircraft projectile ofthe future must be capable of guidancein flight."

A medium-range missile capable ofaccurate guidance would make allexisting seacoast artillery obsolete. Thegreatly increased range and mobility

would provide seacoast artillery with atruly formidable weapon. Could the V2rocket be provided with accurateguidance, it would constitute such aweapon; its development should not betoo remote.

SUMMARY OF FUTURE TRENDS

There is no immediate requirementfor a short-range guided artillery rocket,since the field is covered excellently byexisting cannon and improved freerockets. Development of a medium-range artillery rocket is possible within

the next few years, and such a rocketwill greatly increase the capabilities offield artillery. Fantastic long-rangeartillery rockets will undoubtedly be aslower development, but a perfectedlong-range rocket carrying an atomicwarhead would be a major weapon,

perhaps a decisive one. Guided rocketmissiles would greatly increase theeffectiveness of both antiaircraft andseacoast artillery, and the developmentof such missiles at a reasonably earlydate appears feasible.

VIITHE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

So far I have stated the generalproblem and summarized the importantfacts bearing on the problem. I havegazed into the crystal ball and guessed atfuture trends. This brings us to theimmediate problem: What action, if any,must we take as artillerymen within thenext few years?

The course of development of aweapon in the U. S. Army is well

established. The user service states themilitary characteristics it desires. Thetechnical services then attempt to meetthese military characteristics. Aftertechnical tests, the weapon goes to oneof the Army Ground Forces Boards for

service test, from the user point of view.After the new weapon passes this servicetest, and after including any necessarymodifications, several developmentmodels are produced and issued to fieldunits for extended service tests.Thereafter the weapon is standardizedand produced in quantity. This

procedure has proved sound over aperiod of years.

The first step, then, in thedevelopment of artillery guided rocketswill be a statement of desired militarycharacteristics. And this statement

should be made by the artillerymen whowill use the rocket. However, theartillerymen who draw up the militarycharacteristics must understand thecapabilities and limitations of guidedrockets. We must ask for the bestobtainable rocket without asking for theimpossible. Then we must be prepared totest the pilot model and, later, conductextended field tests. By the time therocket is standardized we must have atleast tentative ideas of its technique andtactics.

We artillerymen can do our part in

the development of artillery guidedrockets only if we start now to study the

problem. This does not mean that weshould go completely "Buck Rogers."Until the new artillery rockets areavailable we must continue to useconventional weapons. Even after thenew rockets are standardized and in

production we will continue to useweapons of conventional types. But wemust become rocket conscious. Allartillerymenfield, antiaircraft, andseacoastmust learn at least thegeneral principles that govern guided

rockets. Some of us must becomehighly proficient. We must all thinkseriously about guided rockets; ourschools and service publications muststimulate such thought. For the day iscoming, perhaps soon, when guidedrockets will be a major artilleryweapon. When that day comes we must

be ready to take over our newresponsibilities and uphold our longand honorable artillery traditions.


16/51

THE REQUEST


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+

+

THE ANSWERWritten in response to the

request that is reproduced onthe opposite page. GeneralLund's article will interestsenior American commandersas well as artillerymen. TheDirector Royal Artillery duringWorld War II, General Lundneeds no further introductionto American artillerymen. Hewas recently assigned as GOC-in-C, Anti-Aircraft Command. Editor.

"THE GUNNER NET"

By Lieut.-Gen. O. M. Lund, C. B., D. S. O.

URING THE LAST WAR,artillery technique for producing

massed artillery fire was madepossible by the use of wireless. It wasa great adance tactically being able toswitch the fire of great numbers ofguns. It was not long, however, beforethe "Gunner Net," at first applied towireless, soon was used byartillerymen in a wider sense. It

represented the channel which was notthe command channel, but still hadofficial recognition, and I thinkperhaps covers what your Editormeans by the need for a suitablyintegrated artillery guidance. For astart it is necessary to be quite clear inour minds as to what comes under theheading of Command or Control andwhat under Guidance.

The control for all arms in anyformation must be in the hands of itsCommander since it is on his plan thatthe battle is fought. The senior artilleryofficer in the formation eithercommands the artillery of theformation or acts as the artilleryadviser: his first loyalty is to hisformation commander whatever hisstatus. A commander may be able touse artillery brilliantly withoutnecessarily having a profoundtechnical knowledge of artillerymatters. Moreover he may know whatimprovements he requiresin the fire of his guns butmay be thankful for the

advice of his Gunner as tohow this might be obtained;it may involvemodifications to existingequipments or thedevelopment of new ones.Such matters, I suggest,come under the heading ofGuidance. In thisconnection I consider thatany commander should

only have to deal with one Gunner. Itis neither necessary nor desirable thatthere should be separate artilleryadvisers or commanders for thedifferent natures of artillery. Theartillery view in its broadest senseshould be given by one authoritativemouth. If we keep this principle of asingle artillery commander or adviserin any formation and the simple

difference between Command andAdvice in front of us the whole time,then we shall appreciate how thepurely Gunner channels can and dowork in harmony with the organizationfor command.

It is the building up of thecommander's fire plan which is ofsuch great interest to the Gunner andin which he plays so prominent apartwhether as commander oradviser. The basis of any fire planconcerns the actual targets shot at by

the guns and to be certain of choosingthe right ones the information must, inthe first place, come from the frontwhere the troops are in contact withthe enemy. Those are the men who arelikely to know best where enemyresistance will be found. TheDivisional Artillery Commander willbuild up the divisional fire plan fromthe information he gets from his Lt.Colonels who are operating close to

assaulting armored and infantry

brigades and from all other availablesources. He may have to smooth outdifferences of opinion that occur ondifferent brigade fronts and if heshould want more artillery assistancethan is available from his divisionalresources he must see that it is

demanded. All artillerymen are wellaware of the many aspects of hisresponsibilities. Much will be capableof easy solution if the divisionalartillery commander can on purelytechnical matters discuss the questionsthat arise, with his colleague at CorpsHeadquarters, the Commander of theCorps Royal Artillery (CCRA): anofficer of the same rank as himself andentirely conversant with the Corpsplan. Both will thus implement theircommanders' plans and by dealing

with the purely artillery aspect preventthe command channels being over-burdened and save time.

In the British Army the CorpsCommander may place under thecommand of his CCRA all the artilleryin the Corps for a specific operation. Ifthe Corps Commander is the formationcommander responsible for the plan,he will use all his artillery resources tothe best advantage. While he may be

well advised to letdivisional commandersselect detailed targets, he

must see that the artilleryfire is coordinated, thatthe timings along hiswhole front are the sameand that a correct balanceof his guns is allotted toBombardment andCounter Battery tasks. Ibelieve that the use of aCCRA as a commander

D

6 pranti-tank gun


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of all the artillery in a corps is not soreadily accepted in the American Armyas it is with us. The British CorpsCommander will often use his CCRA ina set piece battle in this manner and willdecide for what phases of the battle this

centralized control is necessary. He is incommand and none of his subordinateshas "rights" over their artillery whichmight hinder success.

The senior artillery officer at theheadquarters of an Army or Army Grouphas, generally, more to do with theallotment of the available artilleryresources and the ammunition which can

be expended, than with fire plans. In alarge set-piece operation he will,however, be required to coordinate theArmy fire plan in all its aspects, in amanner similar to the CCRA in respect

of a Corps' operation. He will coordinateall the technical lessons andrequirements and give his Commanderguidance on matters which affect policy.

What does the artillery do throughofficial command channels (or as wewould call it the General Staff) and whatcan it do on the "Gunner Net" inharmony with the command channels soas to save the latter being swamped indetail? I suggest there is only oneguiding principle: policy and planning isin the orbit of command channels andanything which touches on that must use

these channels. However, the technicalmatters can with advantage be dealt withofficially to and from the War Officethrough Gunner channels.

We have not always been so fortunateas to have recognized heads of artilleryat every level culminating in theDirector Royal Artillery in the WarOffice and have experienced with youthe sensitiveness as to the inviolabilityof command channels. When thedifference between Control andGuidance is understood the suspiciouscommander who may have been

sensitive becomes merely thankful. Ihave found that very often they get sosure of the qualities and capabilities oftheir Gunner that it is very difficult toget them to change the individual whenhe is wanted elsewhere.

What does the Director RoyalArtillery in the War Office want toknow? He requires the firm requirementsof the Commander-in-Chief of Theatersand he will get them through the

Command chanels. However, throughthe "Gunner Net" he gets a "warningorder": he knows what is in the air,however unofficial it may be. Thisenables much to be done in preparationand he will be ready to implement the

official demand expeditiously. This maycover technical training (as he runs theartillery schools), specifications forweapon development, modifications toequipments, advice on the raising ofnew units or revised establishments ofexisting ones. The other aspect of this"Gunner Net" is that it worksdownwards as well as upwards. Thevarious senior artillery officersoverseas and at home can be keptinformed as to what recommendationsare being made and so enablecommanders to obtain reliable artillery

information.Needless to say the Director Royal

Artillery does not get all he asks forwithout considerable scrutiny beingmade of his demands. He may be anaccepted head of the Royal Regimentand his word may go a long way on the"Gunner Net," but he has to make a casewhen he gets off the net. He has toobtain the agreement of those whocoordinate and give priorities to hisdemands in competition with the generalneeds of the other arms and the army asa whole.

In addition he also deals in anadvisory capacity in the matter of

personnel; their promotion and posting,and quite apart from these officialduties he is now regarded as servinghead of the Royal Regiment of Artilleryand influences the numerous unofficialartillery interests such as theRegimental funds, charities,

publications and clubs. It has becomeby sufferance and usage a veryimportant part of his job that everythingthat affects the artillery is his concern.Every Gunner, I believe, feels that he

can bring his own personal affairs orhis professional views unofficially tothe Director and as a result, he knowsthere is someone who will give verycareful consideration to matters whichare often so close to his heart. Perhapsthat may help towards that coordinatedcooperation which General Deversmentioned as being so necessary, atyour Field Artillery Conference at FortSill last March.

SEVEN - UP

By Major A. A. Anderson, FA-Res.

N POSITION BEFORE LORIENT,France, the 212th Armd FA Bn

conducted the most unique adjustment thatever cleared through its FDC. The S-3received a telephone call from an infantryobserver, high in a tree, to the effect thathe had just observed seven Germans andthat artillery fire was desired.

Having turned down several previousrequests from the same outpost for fire onsingle Germans observed, the S-3 decidedthat seven Germans warranted the attentionof one gun. In reply to his query whetheran artillery observer was present at theoutpost to conduct the adjustment, theoutpost replied in the negative but addedthat they were capable of conducting an

adjustment and to go ahead. Accordingly,the S-3 directed Battery A to drop a roundat the coordinate location furnished andthen the following adjustment ensued:

S-3: "On the way."Observer: "That was about 100 yards to

the right and too short."S-3: "How short?"Observer: "About 300 yards."S-3: "On the way."Observer: "To far over."S-3: "How far over?"Observer: "300 over."S-3: "On the way."Observer: "That's about 300 to the right."

S-3: "On the way."Observer: "Still too far right."S-3: "How far to the right?"Observer: "About 300."S-3: "On the way."Observer: "Now it's too far left."S-3: (wearily): "How much?"Observer: "300."S-3: "Look, that takes us back where we

started. Let's split the difference and make it200 left."

Observer: "OK."S-3: "On the way."Observer (with wonder in his voice): "Oh

boy, that one hit the house!"S-3: "Yes, but where the hell are the

Germans in relation to the house?"Observer: "About 500 right."S-3: "On the way."Observer: "That's too far right."S-3 (patience exhausted): "Look, Bud,

that's seven rounds for seven Boched'yathink we're getting anywhere? I say the hellwith 'em."

Observer: "OK, the hell with 'emthey'reout of sight now anyway. But this shootingsure is a lot of fun. Me for the artillery in thenext war. OK?"

S-3: "No harm tryin', Bud."

I


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For Heroism and Service

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

Major General ARCHIBALD V.ARNOLD, for distinguished service in theSouthwest Pacific Area from October 1944 toJuly 1945, as Commanding General of the 7thInfantry Division. After participating in theassault landing on Leyte, the division pressedrapidly inland and quickly captured four enemyairfields and routed or destroyed a wellentrenched and stubborn foe. Subsequently hisdivision, within two days of its landing, cut thevitally strategic island of Okinawa in two and

then turned south, out-flanked the well-defended Shuri position, and in spite of heavily-concentrated enemy artillery fire, continueduninterruptedly forward until the island wassecured. General Arnold contributed in greatmeasure to the success of two importantcampaigns in the war against Japan.

Major General ROBERT W.HASBROUCK, for exceptionally meritoriousservice as Commanding General, 7thArmored Division, from December 1944 toApril 1945. He led his division in its valiantstand against enemy attacks in the Ardennesand later in the recapture of St. Vith. Insubsequent engagements, his forces

spearheaded the breakout from the Remagenbridgehead and helped encircle the Germantroops in the Ruhr pocket. His outstandingleadership was in greatest measureresponsible for his division's many successes.

Major General JAMES A. LESTER. Heperformed distinguished service in the PacificArea from March 1942 to March 1945. AsCommanding General of the 24th DivisionArtillery in Hawaii he greatly strengthenedthe artillery defenses of the north sector ofOahu. He expertly coordinated the artillery ofthe Tanahmerah landing force during theHollandia-Tanahmerah operation. Later, asCommanding General of the XIV Corps

Artillery, he provided superior artillerysupport for the initial landings on Luzon, forthe rapid advance of the Corps through thecentral plains and for the final assault on thestrongly fortified City of Manila. GeneralLester made a distinct contribution to thesuccess of these operations.

Brigadier General HARWOOD C.BOWMAN. As Commanding General,United States Forces, II Army GroupCommand, Chinese Combat Command, he

performed distinguished service from Januaryto September 1945. His inspiring leadershipinstilled a fighting spirit in a large Chineseforce, which, despite a lack of American armsand equipment in substantial amounts,advanced deep into enemy-held territory andwas threatening a port on the China coast atthe conclusion of hostilities.

Brigadier General HOMER W. KIEFER.He distinguished himself in the SouthwestPacific Area from June 1944 to September1945 as Artillery Officer, Headquarters Sixth

Army. He planned and coordinated theemployment of artillery during operations inthe Philippines and directed his troops in themountain and jungle fighting.

Brigadier General ROLAND P. SHUGG.He performed exceptionally meritoriousservices from November 19, 1944, to May 8,1945, in the highly responsible position ofCommanding General XIII Corps Artillery.With unusual professional knowledge,superior ability and untiring energy, he

planned, coordinated and executed theartillery employment which contributedmaterially to the completion of the Corps'missions. In the drive from the Roer to the

Rhine he skillfully applied aggressive tactics,grouping and regrouping his units, to crushand bewilder the enemy. Distegarding

personal safety, he directed artillery firesfrom the forward fire direction center,inspiring his subordinates with his courageand sound technique. Throughout the Corps'drive to the Elbe River, he gave close supportto infantry units and helped keep casualties ata minimum by quickly neutralizing andovercoming pockets of resistance in the wakeof the armored spearheads.

Brigadier General JOHN M. WILLEMS,for meritorious and distinguished service inItaly from June 1944 to May 1945. As Chief of

Staff, II Corps, he maintained within thevarious staff sections of the headquarters thehighest standards of operational efficiency,fusing their talents so as to develop a closelycooperating and smoothly functioningcommand unit capable of swift action andsustained planning. He manifested a high orderof leadership during two extremely difficultcampaigns against a fanatical enemy, making anotable contribution to the victoriousoperations of the Allied armies in Italy.

OAK LEAF CLUSTER TODISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL Major General HUGH J. GAFFEY

(posthumously)Major General JOHN P. LUCAS

SILVER STARColonel GEORGE A. HUTCHINSON

LEGION OF MERIT Maj. Gen. DONALD C. CUBBISONMaj. Gen. CORTLAND PARKERMaj. Gen. ARTHUR R. WILSONBrig. Gen. WALDO C. POTTERBrig. Gen. DAVID L. RUFFNER

Col. STUART A. BECKLEYCol. HOWARD T. BYLESCol. BRECKINRIDGE A. DAYCol. JESSE J. FRANCECol. WILLIAM C. HUGGINSCol. JESSE B. MATLACKCol. JOHN W. MORGANCol. WILLIAM E. ROBERTSCol. WILLIAM E. SHEPHERDCol. JOHN A. STEWARTCol. JAMES G. WATKINSCol. EVERETT C. WILLIAMSCol. JOHN R. YOUNGLt. Col. DAVID S. BABCOCK

(posthumously)Lt. Col. BERNARD J. RAUCH

Lt. Col. RICHARD G. STEWARTLt. Col. ARTHUR V. SWEDBERGMaj. DOUGLAS GORMAN, JR.Maj. HUGH deN. WYNNE

OAK LEAF CLUSTER TOLEGION OF MERIT

Brig. Gen. KENNETH P. LORDBrig. Gen. ROBERT V. MARAISTBrig. Gen. DAVID L. RUFFNERCol. ARTHUR P. MOORECol. JOHN B. WARDEN

BRONZE STAR

Col. NICOLL F. GALBRAITHLt. Col. HENRY L. MILLERLt. PAUL D. PHILLIPSLt. Col. ALLAN E. SMITH

(posthumously)Maj. JOHN F. SUTHERLANDMaj. LUNDY L. ZIEGLERCapt. WILLIAM B. BRUNTON

(posthumously)1st Lt. LEONARD J. NEELEMAN1st Lt. WILLIAM R. SLONEStaff Sgt. DEBS MYERS

OAK LEAF CLUSTERTO BRONZE STAR

1st Sgt. MATTHEW DIXON

577


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THE FIELDARTILLERY

JOURNAL

z

z

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELDARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1910WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS AS WORTHY NOW ASTHEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of theefficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its besttraditions; the publishing of a J ournal for disseminatingprofessional knowledge and furnishing information as to thefield artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign;to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding ofthe powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling ofinterdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between theregular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objectsare worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

The UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

Organised J une 7, 1910

Honorary PresidentHARRY S. TRUMAN

President of the United States

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMOND S. McLAIN, PresidentMAJOR GENERAL CLIFT ANDRUS, Vice-PresidentCOLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG, Secretary-Editor and Treasurer

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain Brig. Gen. Edward S. OttMaj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey Colonel Jess LarsonMaj. Gen. Frank E. Lowe Colonel Malcolm R. CoxBrig. Gen. Harold R. Barker Lt. Col. Robert B. Neely

Lieutenant Colonel F. Gorham Brigham, Jr.

It is a sound and democratic principle that each physicallyand mentally fit male citizen and alien residing in the UnitedStates owes an obligation to this country to under-go trainingwhich will fit him to protect it in an emergency; that adequatepreparedness will prevent aggressive wars against thiscountry and the needless sacrifices of human life; that a well-trained citizenry is the keystone of preparedness; and thatsuch preparedness can best be assured through a system ofmilitary training for the youth of the Nation.

A glance at the opposite page shows that the foregoing isthe opening paragraph of the War Department Plan forUniversal Military Training recently advanced for full andfree discussion by our people and for ultimate decision, in theAmerican way, by the Congress of the United States.

Editorially, this JOURNAL will not comment on the detailsof this Plan. It will limit itself to the words quoted above, with

particular emphasis on the all-important phrase, can best beassured through a system of military training. In the finalanalysis, these few words constitute the heart and soul of the

proposal. The issue is clearUMT either is, or is not, our bestassurance for national security. The decision will rest with the80th Congress. If the answer is affirmative, competent handscan and will arrange the working details of the UMT plan indue course and without serious difficulty.

As public and Congressional discussion is resumed,proponents of military training must not rest content in mereapathetic approval. Believing in UMT isn't enough! More thanall else, apathy by a "jellyfish" majority (opinion pollsconsistently show that a solid majority of our people favorsuch training) works a deadening influence on legislativeinitiative on Capitol Hill. The majority must speak, since wemay rest assured that the disbelieving minority will not beapathetic in their disbelief. They will grow progressively morecohesive and articulate as debate tension mounts, confusingand confounding the discussion by arguments generallyeccentric to the fundamental issuethat is, the relativeessentiality of UMT to our future security.

In weighing the relative essentiality of UMT, attentionshould focus clearly on the competence of those agencies,

both public and private, that set themselves as judges. It

strikes this JOURNAL

as profoundly significant that theexecutive agencies directly responsible for the security of ourNationnamely, the President and the State, War and NavyDepartmentsare solidly behind it. Audacious indeed is theindividual or agency that claims a greater competence of

judgment.Incidentally, although it is obvious that a great many

disbelievers are intellectually honest in their disapproval, it iswell to note that the motives stimulating certain groups ofdisbelievers will not withstand close scrutiny. Either un-Americanism or pure selfish interest is more than apt to be

present.It is most gratifying to know that the Secretary of War is

recommending that the President appoint a commission of

outstanding private citizens to evaluate the need. Theindorsement of Universal Military Training by such acommission should help eliminate lingering doubts.

Believing deeply, as it does, that adequate preparedness"can best be assured through a system of military training forthe youth of the Nation," this JOURNAL urges that everymember of our Association appoint himself an activesupporter.

Believing in UMT isn't enough!

578


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UniversalMilitary

Training

Selected extracts from the War

department Plan for Universal

Military Training, prepared for

explanation to the public and to serve

as the basis for further and more

detailed planning pending approval by

the Congress.*

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAININGFLOW OF TRAINEES

IT IS A SOUND AND DEMOcraticprinciple that each physically and

mentally fit male citizen and alienresiding in the United States owes anobligation to this country to undergotraining which will fit him to protect

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Oct 1946