Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1939

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1939

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September-October, 1939CONTENTS

Editorial ........................................................................................................ 371

Military Aspects of the Sudeten Crisis ......................................................... 373By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA

Has the Close-Support Problem Been Solved?............................................. 385By Captain Conrad L. Boyle, FA

Special Notice............................................................................................... 402

Young Field Artillerymen Honored.............................................................. 403

A Writ........................................................................................................... 404

Some Lessons from the Spanish War ........................................................... 406

Solutions to Writ........................................................................................... 416

Awards of Field Artillery Medal .................................................................. 418

A Battery of Seventy-Fives in the Tempest, May, 1918............................... 421

Notice of Annual Meeting, U. S. Field Artillery Association....................... 435

The Specialist ............................................................................................... 436By George E. Laughinghouse

Fort Sill Game Farm..................................................................................... 439

Does John Think Faster? .............................................................................. 440

Mechanical Correction Board....................................................................... 441

Alexander Hamilton Battery Receives Special Guidon................................ 442

Field Artillery Polo Team at Colorado Springs ............................................ 444By Captain A. R. S. Barden, FA

Attack in Wisconsin...................................................................................... 446

On the Way................................................................................................... 447

Our Foreign Contemporaries ........................................................................ 451

Muzzle Bursts............................................................................................... 454

Some Forward Observations......................................................................... 458

The European WarA Resume ................................................................... 460

Reviews ........................................................................................................ 462

AUTHORS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR ARTICLES


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29TH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

VOL. 29 NO. 5SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1939

THEFIELD ARTILLERY

JOURNALCopyright, 1939, by

The United States Field Artillery Association

A PUBLICATION FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE REGULARARMY, NATIONAL GUARD, AND ORGANIZED RESERVE

Patron Saint of Artillery

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Editorial Office, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

W. S. Nye, Captain, Field Artillery, EditorEntered as second-class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at

Baltimore, Md., under the Act of March 3, 1879

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EditorialNews of the European war looms larger on the military horizon than anything else

which can be printed. The American press is giving its readers a more complete

coverage of day-by-day happenings than the citizens of warring nations themselves can

obtain. Military men everywhere are eager to draw conclusions which will enable them

to confirm or revise their own prior estimates as to materiel and methods. But detailed

information of a professional character, if we are to judge by the Spanish war, will not

be available for weeks, perhaps months to come.

When such data is released, our readers may rest assured that THE FIELDARTILLERY JOURNAL will be first in the field in presenting articles dealing with warlessons of particular interest to the Arm. In the meantime it is possible to indicate

briefly how an artilleryman's study of war news can be so directed as to be of

professional benefit.

For several years past, many questions have presented themselves to serious

thinkers, the answers to which, it has been agreed, would be found only if and when war

occurred. Here are a few of them:

Air power: Will it do all that its protagonists have claimed for it? Will the best

doctrines be followed in its employmentattack of such vital targets as airdromes,

defiles in supply arteries, industrial establishments devoted to production of war

materials, large formed bodies of troopsor will combatants succumb to the temptation

to use it against anything and everything that moves and lives? To what extent will "air

infantry" be employed? Will defensive measures planned by the field artillery or other

arms be effective? What further measures will be necessary? Will the bomb replace the

artillery shell in reducing hostile resistance on the actual front?

Mechanized forces: Will mechanized forces find their principal role in making

sweeping envelopments, or in power-drives through a prepared position, or in

exploiting a breakthrough made by other arms? Will they succeed in keeping war from

settling down to stabilized fronts? Will defensive doctrines be changed so that tank

obstacles rather than fields of fire are the deciding factors in selection of position?

What antimechanized provisions will be most effectiveland mines, barriers, antitank

guns, or field artillery? Will field artillery have to protect itself against mechanized

attack? Will these defensive measures change our conception of what types of position

we should occupy and what auxiliary weapons we should employ?

Field artillery: Will artillery fire continue to inflict 80 per cent of all battlefield

casualties? Will infantry accompanying weapons take over much of the duty of close

support? Will mobility or power of weapons gain the ascendancy? What calibers will

prove most desirable? What is the answer to the gun-howitzer argument? Will recent

developments in gunnery and fire direction stand the test of battle experience? Will

ultra short wave radio supply the solution to the communication problem? Which type

of motor traction will be most satisfactorytruck, tractor, or half-track truck? To what

extent will animals be used?

Other artillery problems, named at random, involve field fortification, camouflage,

flash-and-sound ranging, mapping and survey, organization, ammunition supply, and so on.

Much of the above may remain controversial even after complete reports have

been received. Yet it should soon be possible, by sifting fact from conjecture and by

balancing conflicting communiques, to obtain at least a partial picture of modern large-

scale warfare. Field artillerymen should so study their war bulletins as to keep their

thought dynamic and ready for a time when they might be called upon to substitute

actuality for vicarious experience.


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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNALVOLUME 29 SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1939 NUMBER 5

Military Aspects of the Sudeten CrisisBY COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA, FA

N 28 May, 1938, ChancellorHitler of Germany held aconference with his advisors. It

was of serious import. On its outcomedepended peace or war and the lives and

happiness of countless humble peoplewho knew nothing about this conference.The subject discussed was: How andwhen shall the Sudeten, then an integralpart of Czechoslovakia, be annexed toGermany?

It was realized that, regardless oftheories and propaganda as to rights ofinhabitants of the Sudeten to determinefor themselves as to which country theypreferred to belong, Czechoslovakiawould object to loss of her territory. Shemight fight rather than agree to peacefulcession.

France had an alliance withCzechoslovakia effective if that countryshould be invaded. There was anotheralliance by which Russia bound herself toaid France if the latter went to war. GreatBritain was friendly to France, for sometime had supported her diplomatically,

had intimated that she would probablyjoin France in war. There was a strongpossibility that if Czechoslovakia wereattacked by Germany these three greatPowers would come to her aid.

Germany could count on Italy andHungary, probably on Japan. If all thesecountries started fighting, a new worldwar would be in progress, the ultimateresult of which would be difficult to

determine. Was it worthwhile to run sucha risk?The Army leaders did not favor risking

a major war. They considered that the

German force was hardly one-half ofwhat they considered as necessary tofight France and her allies on the west.Czechoslovakia on the south, possiblyPoland and Russia on the east.

The west front of Germany was open.The opposing French frontier wascovered by the formidable Maginot line,the strongest line of fortifications that hadever been constructed. Germany wasdeficient in heavy artillery, which the warin Spain had shown was necessary toattack even moderately defendedpositions. The same war had proved thatthe German tanks were too light, hadsmall combat value, and needed to bereplaced by heavier tanks.

Because of the few years which hadelapsed since rearmament had begun,German organized reserves wereinsufficient in numbers. Owing to lack ofresources in Italy and Hungary, theassistance of these nations ought not to beovervalued. Japan might aid, but, as thiscountry was already engaged in a majorwar in China, her assistance would

probably not be of great worth.The situation was thoroughly

discussed. It was better to prepare for alleventualities rather than risk disasterthrough insufficient consideration. Theproposition looked dangerous. The Armywas not enthusiastic.

The Chancellor was persistent. Heinsisted that the mission must beaccomplished. He recognized that there

was a shortage of materiel, that there wasa lack of reserves. But he thoughteverything needed could be provided withina relatively short time, and that if this

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were done quickly, preparations might becompleted before possible enemiesbecame aware of what was to occur. He

was of the opinion that four monthswould suffice to correct the conditionsadmitted to be unfavorable. It wouldrequire hard work, but he was sureGerman organization could do it.

Accordingly a plan was decided upon,and was approved by the Chancellor. Thisplan provided for:1. Military action against

Czechoslovakia and her allies to be

ready to start on 2 October, 1938.2. Extension of the western frontierdefenses, to ward off a possibleoffensive from France. Defenses to becontinuous from Belgium toSwitzerland.

3. The army to be increasedimmediately to 96 divisions, witharrangements to supplement this forcein a short time by an unstated numberof additional divisions.

4. All preparations to be secret. Noalarm, no warning. Only the heads ofgovernment of the Axis PowersItaly, Hungary, and Japanwere tobe consulted and these only secretly.Officials to be given orders, but noinformation as to the plan.

5. Initiation of propaganda exploiting thefact that the Sudeten was German, anddesired to join Germany; and that under

the principle of the self-determinationof nations they were entitled to do so.At the proper time a showing was to bemade that the Sudeten was grievouslyoppressed, and that justice requiredcession to Germany to end anintolerable situation.

Thus closed an historic conference,secretly held to decide the fate of millions ofpeople. It had been dominated by ChancellorHitler. He made the decision againstwarnings of able advisers. He recognized thedanger of precipitating a general war, but feltconfident that he could avert it. He waswilling to incur necessary risks, understood

that unexpected events might occur, desiredto be fully prepared. He thought he could be.He decided to go ahead swiftly.

Evidence recently uncovered indicatesthat the annexation by Germany ofAustria and Czechoslovakia, to takeeffect at some future convenient date, wasprovided for in one or two of severalprotocols signed by Count Ciano, forItaly, and by Chancellor Hitler, forGermany, at Berlin and Berchtesgaden on25/26 October, 1936. They were annexesto a treaty of alliance signed at the same

time between Italy and Germany. Thisagreement was the price paid by Italy tosecure her new ally, believed to benecessary by reason of the sanctionsimposed by the democratic Powersagainst Italy during her war withEthiopia. Thus it may be seen that thedismemberment of Czechoslovakia as anindependent state was envisaged andplanned for by Chancellor Hitler andDuce Mussolini as early as 1936.*

The leaders of Italy and Hungaryappear to have been notified of thedecision reached on that fateful 28 May,1938. Italy accepted the situation. It waspart of the game agreed upon. InDecember, 1937. Italy had warnedCzechoslovakia to settle the Sudetenquestion by direct negotiation, ratherthan chance a war through which shecould gain nothing, and might lose all.

This suggestion was not accepted. Thedate upon which Japan was notified of

*According to a speech by Mussolini, deliveredon 1 November, 1936, the treaty of alliance whichhad just been signed between Germany and Italyinaugurating the famous Rome-Berlin Axis, wasaccompanied by "several" protocols. To this day,neither the treaty, nor the protocols, nor the number ofthe latter, have been revealed to the outside world.From indirect evidence, one, two, or three of theprotocols arranged for final disposition, at some futureconvenient date, of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and

Albania. This much has been accomplished. In eachcase, the principle of surprise has been utilized tosecure a speedy victory before opposition could form.

What do the remaining protocol, or protocols,cover! Are further surprises in store for an anxiousnumber of small nations, and some great ones!

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MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SUDETEN CRISIS

the plan of 28 May is not known.Germany at once took steps to provide

the required additional troops and

materiel. Of the 96 divisions to be readyby October, only 48 existed, including 4mechanized and 4 motorized. Forty-eightnew Landwehr divisions were orderedformed. The personnel for these wasfurnished from drafts from the RegularArmy, semi-military organizations, andfrom cadres of reserve officers and men.The organization of these divisions hadso far progressed as to enable the final

complement of men to join duringAugust. As this movement was noted byforeign observers, it was announced that anew form of training, involving use ofreserve organizations at full war strength,had been decided upon, and would takeplace in selected maneuver areas, toinclude the month of September.

The supply departments provided thenecessary batteries of heavy artillery andnew heavy tanks. This issue was secret.

Work on the west defenses was pushedstrenuously. Something had been done onthis line as early as 1932. In the spring of1938, more construction was undertaken.By May, 1938, there was a fair defensivesystem opposite Strasbourg, and at someother points where an enemy might try tocross the Rhine. Between the Rhine andBelgium there was nothing.

Early in June large numbers of

workmen were assigned to this task. BySeptember over 100,000 men wereerecting long lines of continuousdefensive positions extending fromBelgium to Switzerland. The front lineinitially consisted largely of wire andtrenches covering tank obstacles, whichmore properly might be classified as fieldfortification. To supplement this,permanent works in concrete and steelwere added, distributed in depth toprovide from two to five defensive lines.By October the first field line was nearlycompleted. Considerable work had beendone also on the permanent lines, but as a

whole the project was less than halfcompleted.

In spite of attempts at secrecy, by

August France and Great Britain werealarmed. They believed that Germanywas preparing some kind of a surprise.They were not satisfied as to theexplanation as to the reserve divisionshaving been mobilized for training only:they suspected there was some otherreason. They consulted each other and,before what seemed to be a commondanger, definitely agreed to be allies in

case of war. They wished to avoid a warbut were quite decidedly opposed topermitting Germany a substantialincrease in territory and power.

The German propaganda departmentby now was in full action, making muchplay as to the right of the inhabitants ofSudeten to exercise the principle of self-determination. The Allies had fought forthis same ideal during the World War,and, although they did not believe this to

be the main reason, they found it hard todeny the proposed cession of theSudeten when it was alleged. Still, theydid not like the situation. Theycommenced war preparations, at first ona restricted scale. Some Alliedstatesmen, and much of the Allied press,believed that Germany was bluffing andwould not fight. It was thought that ashow of determination by the Allies not

to permit Germany to annex moreterritory, coupled with a show of force,was all that would be necessary to stopGermany.

The Allies were encouraged by reportsthat there were no signs that Italy wasmobilizing. It seemed certain that ifGermany expected war Italy would knowabout it, and would have takenappropriate measures to assist her ally.Very strong moral support came from theUnited States, and it seemed that thatcountry could be counted upon forunlimited supplies and probablyeventually for military support.

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Maybe Germany was bluffing.Perhaps a firm diplomatic policy, coupledwith a showing of the risk that Germany

incurred of becoming involved in a majorwar against three great democraticpowers having immensely superior naviesand enormous resources and wealth,would bring Germany to her senses. Itwas first decided to remain firm.

The general situation in Europebecame tense. Germany had believed thatit might be possible to commence anattack on Czechoslovakia before other

nations could mobilize, but this was nowno longer certain. On 22 August, astrategical estimate of the situation wasmade by Germany and Italy. Thisconsidered that in case of war over theSudeten question.a. Great Britain and France would come

to the assistance of Czechoslovakia.b. Poland was known to have mobilized

several classes of reserves. She wasprepared to act, but had not decided

which side to join. Initially she mightremain neutral.

c. Rumania had had under considerationa request to allow Russian land andair forces to cross her territory intoCzechoslovakia. To date she hadgiven an evasive answer. Apparentlyshe was, like Poland, ready to stayout of war, or join either sideaccording to events.

d. Yugoslavia would be definitelyneutral.

e. The United States might enter a waron the side of the Allies, but this wasyet doubtful.

f. Japan had advised that it would jointhe Axis. However, in view of herwar with China, the assistance thatJapan could give seemed to be of nogreat value.

It was certain that Great Britain andFrance would come to the aid ofCzechoslovakia, and that the UnitedStates might. Notwithstanding thiscombination, it was decided to proceed

with the mission as planned as of theoriginal date of 2 October.

The estimate of the situation by Great

Britain and France agreed with all itemsof the Axis estimate. Although theyconsidered that they could if need bedefeat the Axis in war, they soughtadditional allies to increase their forceson land and in the air. As to resources andreserves on land and on the sea, they hadall that appeared necessary.

The Allies exerted diplomatic pressureand offered economic inducements and

loans of gold to the Balkan countries and toPoland. They did not succeed in obtainingguarantees from any of them. These smallcountries did not want to committhemselves in advance. Russia wasapproached; the advantages of beingconnected with the Allies were explained toher. Russia was not enthusiastic; on thecontrary, she was suspicious. She had anidea that the Allies wanted her to fightGermany for their benefit, and not for

Russia's benefit. In September Russia didstate that in view of the fact that she had in1936 signed an alliance with France, shewould, in case that country becameinvolved in war over Czechoslovakia,comply with her agreement, and would jointhe French. She gave no information as towhat she would do if she did go to war.

The Allies knew that there was unrestin Russia; it seemed quite possible that if

Russia engaged in a major war theremight be a revolution at home. Manyleading generals had been executed foralleged treason. The Allies thought that ifthey were guilty of treason, others wereprobably involved, and the loyalty of thearmy was likely questionable. If thegenerals had been put to death forpolitical reasons, as was generallybelieved, their successors were apparentlyinsufficiently trained to lead large units inwar. New division commanders hadonly a year before been captains ormajors. If Russia did join the Allies, itseemed nearly certain that Japan would

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MILLTARY ASPECTS OF THE SUDETEN CRISIS

join the other side. If the United Statesthen entered the war on the side of theAllies there would be a distinct net gain

in strength; but if the United States didnot do so, the appearance of Russia in thewar was judged to be of uncertain value.All that surely could be counted on at theoutset were France, Great Britain, andCzechoslovakia.

What were the actual forces availableto the Allies and to the Axis should warcome? The general staffs of both sidesknew closely the strength of the

prospective enemy. There was oneexceptionthe Allies apparently had notidentified all the new German divisions.

In the following tables, completelyequipped and trained Regular Armydivisions have been noted as first class;

the reserve divisions as second class.SEA FORCES

Without entering into a detailedanalysis of forces, their relative strengthswere:a. The British navy was greatly

superior as a whole to thecombined German and Italiannavies. Against surface craft itcould enforce a blockade of

German North Sea ports, and adistant blockade of Italy by closingthe Red Sea and Gibraltar entrances to

LAND FORCESThe Axis Powers

1st-class divisionsGermany 48 (includes 4 mechanized and 4 motorized)Italy 40 (excludes troops in Spain)Hungary 15

Total 103

2nd-class divisionsGermany 48Italy 20Hungary 5

Total 73

Grand total 176

The Allied Powers

1st-class divisionsFrench 40 (includes 2 mechanized)England 3 (all available for duty in France)French Colonial 15 (after arrival from Africa, estimated at from 15 to 60

days)Czechoslovakia 30

Total 88

2nd-class divisionsFrance 40

Grand total 128

Of the 128 divisions available to the Allies, as against 176 to the Axis, 30 would bein Czechoslovakia, separated from the remaining 98 in France.

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AIR FORCESThe number of combat planes of the various powers cannot be determined exactly.

Best available information indicates that the approximate figures are:

The Axis Powers

Combat planesGermany 3,500, possibly 4,000. Excellent machines, nearly all new,

using noninflammable fuel. Some pilots trainedin war in Spain.

Italy 2,000. Excellent machines. Pilots with war experience inEthiopia and Spain.

Hungary 250

Total 5,750 to 6,250 combat planes.Capacity for replacing planes

Germany Own reports stated 1,000 per month.Italy No figures available. It was, however, known that the Italian plane

strength had been substantially unchanged for several years,in spite of special production efforts. It seemed probable thattheir production about balanced ordinary losses, war losses inSpain, and sales to Spain and to Japan.

Hungary SmallTotal Uncertain, but well over 1,000 per month.

The Allied Powers

Combat planesFrance 2,000England 2,000 includes old machines.Czechoslovakia 300

Total 4,300

Capacity for replacing planesFrance 300, actually 100, but this was considered a temporary

condition due to new social laws.England 300, actually less, but expected shortly to be increased.

Czechoslovakia none under war conditions.Total 600 per month. This was expected to be increased by

purchases from the United States.

the Mediterranean. It was notsufficiently superior to form a fleetdetached at the same time to the FarEast, which would be comparable tothat of Japan.

b. It was agreed that the French navy

would be under British direction. Itwas about equal in strength to theItalian navy, and was counted on toconvoy troop ships from Atlantic

ports in North and West Africa toFrance. To avoid air and submarinedanger, the direct route from Algiersto south France could be discontinuedat the cost of some delay in arrival oftroops in France.

c. The submarine strength of Italyexceeded that of Great Britain orFrance. The German submarinestrength has not been ascertained, but

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the Axis submarine strength wasequal to or superior to that of theAllies. It was conceded that the

Mediterranean could be blocked forimportant Allied movements. Havingbases at both ends, and in the middleof that sea, the Allies believed thatthey too could interrupt movementsof Italian ships in the Mediterranean.

d. Submarine war in the Atlantic waspossible. The Allies recognized theseriousness of this, particularly if theAxis had access to Spanish ports,

which seemed to be quite possible.They believed that theirantisubmarine forces could controlthe situation.

e. Should Japan enter the war, thetemporary control of the North Pacificand the East India regions to that countrywas conceded, unless the United Statesjoined the Allies. Should this occur, itseemed probable that the United StatesNavy, by using Allied bases in the Far

East. and with some reenforcementsfrom the Allied fleets, could eventuallyovercome the Japanese.

RESOURCES

The Axis Powers

GermanyNearly self-sustaining as tofood. Surplus capacity for productionof munitions. Large excess stocks ofall kinds.

ItalyNearly self-sustaining as to food.Military supplies excellent as toquality, but scanty, because ofexpenditures in wars in Ethiopia andSpain. Would need extensiveassistance as to munitions.

HungarySurplus food supplies, whichcould be sent to Germany and Italy,Scant stocks of munitions.

JapanSufficient food supplies. Deficientin certain raw materials, especiallyiron and oil. Stocks probably, but notcertainly, sufficient for a year'swarfare. With development of Chinamight carry on longer.

The general view of the Axis resourcesindicated that they had food suppliessufficient for their needs. Provided that

German production plants were notdestroyed, they could amply supply thatcountry, and materially assist Italy andHungary, which countries would needextensive aid shortly after a war started.

The Allied Powers

England and FranceLacked manysupplies, both as to food and as tomunitions. With control of the sea,apparently assured, and access

thereby to the British and FrenchEmpires, they would be self-sustaining both as to food and as tomunitions. With access to the marketsof the United States, large excess ofresources was expected.

CzechoslovakiaFood ample, Munitionscould be produced in sufficientquantities, provided mines andfactories could be protected. Doubt as

to this. Stocks would permit of astrong defense.

We will not follow the political plays ofthe Sudeten crisis. Diplomatic action wasextensive; for the Allies it was not verysatisfactory. They did not know by thistime whether Germany would fight, or wasbluffing. The Allied press publishedreports that in May, 1938. Germanybacked away from a then-intended

invasion of Czechoslovakia, when theAllies had intimated that this meant war.The Allied press argued that the strength ofthe Allies, especially on the sea, and as toresources, was superior to that of the Axis,that the Axis knew it, and that it would notventure a war. The United Statesdiplomatically, and in its press, suggestedthat the Allies show a bold front, and makethe Axis understand that furtheraggressions from them would not betolerated. The peoples of the democracies,not familiar with the facts as to the relativereserves and resources of the contendingparties, had no doubt as to the greater

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strength of the Allies, especially if theUnited States was considered asbenevolently neutral, and as furnishing

supplies.By about 20 September some gradual

changes in the positions of troops hadoccurred. None were individuallyalarming; and they were not inconsistentwith the idea of maneuvers or ofprecautionary measures.

It was known that the German westerndefenses were far from being completed,but enough work had been done to

provide a continuous position againstFrench attack. France considered that thedefenses could be smashed by strongartillery preparations. But these defenseshad two to four lines in depth. Severalartillery displacements forward, with asmany artillery preparations, would benecessary to pierce them. This was boundto take time. It was doubtful whether theGerman frontier could be penetratedbefore Czechoslovakia was

overwhelmed.The Balkan states still showed no sign

of action. Fearful and intensely interested,they preferred to remain neutral until theyhad reliable information as to which sidewould be likely to win. They refused tocommit themselves at this time.

There were reports that Russia hadconcentrated about 30 divisions, plus twocavalry corps, near Kiev. It was

understood that these troops were notentirely at war strength; and the Allies didnot know what they were to do, or whenthey would do it. Their location wassuitable for advancing through Rumaniatowards Czechoslovakia; but it was alsosuitable for a defense against invasion byPoland, or for an invasion into Poland. Asno permission had yet been received fromRumania for passage of Russian forces,the only conclusion was that the Russianswere concentrated in readiness for futureundetermined action.

As near as could be determined,Russia had 70 other divisions, about

6,000 planes and a large tank force. Therewas an absence of information as towhether Russia could or would place

these forces in line and be able to supplythem. No one knew whether a major warmight cause a revolution in Russia.Russia continued sympathetic to theAllies but was very noncommittal.

Poland at this date was alined with theAxis. She wanted her share of any spoilsresulting from the disintegration ofCzechoslovakia. On the frontier of thatcountry she had about 5 divisions; 35

others were available against Russia. TheAllies doubted whether Russia reallyintended to intervene; they thought that ifshe did. Poland, with German resourcesat her disposal, and with superiorleadership, might defeat Russia. Had notPoland alone done so in 1920?

Japan quite positively announced herintention of joining the Axis. This wasanother reason why assistance fromRussia was considered improbable.

It is curious to note the Japanesereasons for intervening in a quarrelapparently nowise connected with theirown interests. In 1919, Japanese troopshad formed the largest, best, and mostactive contingent of an Alliedexpeditionary force in Siberia. Thealleged mission of this incursion was tosave Czech troops, prisoners deep in theinterior of that great land. The Czechs

were rescued; they were duly sent back totheir own country. Japan believed that shewas entitled to some expression ofgratitude from Czechoslovakia, and wasunpleasantly surprised when Mr. Benes,president of that country, in 1932 took aleading part before the League of Nationsin condemning Japan for her occupationof Manchukuo. Later in 1937 and 1938,Japan noted that an important part of themateriel she captured in her war withChina was marked "Made inCzechoslovakia." To the Japanese this alllooked like base ingratitude.

In 1935, the same Mr. Benes, in the380


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same League of Nations, was the leaderin imposing sanctions against Italy. TheItalians did not forget this. Mr. Benes was

personally disliked strongly by Japan andItaly. He was equally strongly disliked byGermany for failure to provide autonomyfor the Sudeten, as had been promised in1919. This personal dislike, or hatred, forBenes, was extended to include hiscountry. In the hour of Czechoslovakia'sneed, the three great Axis Powers repaidold scores.

The German preparations for the

attack, originally scheduled for 2October, were on time. About 20September it was decided to move thedivisions and artillery from the maneuverareas into battle positions close to theCzechoslovakian frontier. Germanyadvised Italy and Hungary of herintentions, and these two countries alsocommenced to concentrate their troops.The first large troop movements inGermany were on 23 September. They

were made during daylight hours, andpassed through large cities; the variousunits could be counted and identified. Onthe same day, Chancellor Hitlerannounced that his troops would enterCzechoslovakia on 1 October unless theSudeten was surrendered before that date.

According to reports of Americansthen in Germany, the troops marchedwith full war equipment. The newest and

most modern types of heavy guns, tanks,and other materiel were visible to all.There was no enthusiasm, either amongtroops or people. On the other hand, thetroops were imbued with a spirit to dotheir duty. And there was an indefinablefeeling that the cards had been stacked,that war would be avoided. But theGermans believed that if war did come,the Axis Powers were much the stronger,and would overcome resistance within ashort time. They hoped and expected thatmatters would not be allowed to go too far.

French and British intelligenceoperatives in Germany promptly reported

the movements of the German army; theylocated most of the Regular divisions, andsome of the reserve divisions. Plotted on

maps at London and Paris, theencirclement of Czechoslovakia by strongbodies of excellent troops was apparenton 24 September. Other reports indicatedthat Polish and Hungarian divisions wereclosing in on their sections of theCzechoslovakian front.

It being certain that the Allied powershad observed the concentration oftroops, and were themselves mobilizing,

on 26 September, Germany declared thatshe certainly did intend to seize theSudeten, and would advance into thatcountry at 2:00 PM, 28 September,unless a peaceful cession was arrangedprior to that time.

The mobilization of Italy during thesedays was secret and so well conductedthat the Allied operatives discovered onlythe movements of certain specialists. Thesecret mobilization of some of the

German reserve divisions wassuccessfully accomplished.

There was great excitementthroughout the world. There had beendoubt as to whether Germany wasserious in her war threats. It now seemedthat she was, that war was inevitable,and would occur in a few days. Citizensof France and Great Britain immediatelyforesaw bombing of their cities, bringing

gas, injury, and death to their womenand children.

There was a rush to evacuate Londonand Paris. A million people departed fromthe latter city. Uncounted numbers fledfrom London. There was hasty emergencyconstruction of trenches and shelters. Gasmasks were issued. Dugouts were built inparks and public places. But in spite of allthat could be done, it was evident that itwould be impossible, in the time available,to protect large centers of population fromwidespread catastrophe. And couldCzechoslovakia be saved? How?Apparently that unfortunate country would

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be crushed by the combined forces ofGermany, Poland, and Hungary, beforehelp could possibly reach her.

France had started mobilizing on 24September, two classes joining the colorsthat day. England had called out herreserves and sent her fleet to occupy theirwar stations. Owing to the small size ofher country. Czechoslovakia wascompletely mobilized by 25 September.She prepared to fight to the last, statingthat she expected France to come to heraid as required by treaty. Under existing

treaties, it was understood that if Franceattacked Germany, the only thing shecould do to assist Czechoslovakia, thatRussia and Great Britain wouldautomatically enter the war on the side ofFrance. Although Great Britain andRussia, as well as France, understood thisquite well, they showed no greatenthusiasm for this mission which mightbring ruin to their countries yet not saveCzechoslovakia.

On 25 September Great Britain andFrance decided to confer. On the followingday the heads of their governments and thechiefs of staff of the respective armies metin London. This conference was unlike theone held in Germany only three monthsearlier. Time now pressed. Hitler had thatday announced his intention to advanceinto Czechoslovakia on 28 September,only two days later. The people were not,

as in May, in ignorance of the situation.On the contrary, they were excited andfully aware of the impending danger. Theyhad definite impressions as to what wasgoing to happen.

No one in France or Great Britainwished to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. Butno one desired to see civilization endedby wholesale destruction of cities or bybrutal slaughter of men, women, andchildren. Was there any solution to thisproblem? What could it be? This waswhat the conference had to decide.

The prime ministers and their militaryand naval advisers discussed the

situation. Except as to the mobilization ofItaly, the facts narrated above wereknown. It was believed that Italy had not

mobilized; it was hoped that this was anindication that Italy might considerwithdrawing from the Axis. It was just ahope. They realized that Italy mightremain with Germany; common prudencerequired that her forces be counted as partof those of the Axis.

According to the latest information,the disposition of the ground forces of theAxis were approximately as follows:

Opposite Czechoslovakia55 divisions,being 40 German, 10 Hungarian, and 5Polishall 1st-class, and including 4mechanized and 4 motorized.

Opposite France (Rhine)13 divisions,all German, 10 of which were 2nd-class. Very strong artillery.

Opposite France (Italy)5 1st-classdivisions.

In reserve43 divisions, German, 2nd-class; 35 divisions. Italian, 1st-class;

20 divisions. Italian, 2nd-class; 10divisions. Hungarian, 5 each class; 35divisions, Polish. In all, 216 divisions.

The Allies only had the 128 divisionspreviously listed.

If Russia with her 100 divisions shouldjoin the Allies, the latter would then havea slight superiority, but there was doubtas to what Russia would do. On 20 Maypreceding, Stalin, in an address to the

directors of the International CommunistParty, had stated that the interests of SovietRussia lay in a war between capitalisticstates. He added that the entire efforts ofRussia, and of Communists elsewhere,must be directed to promoting such a war,which would certainly lead to a revolutionof the proletariat. Now the hour had come,the World War was about to break. Hedesired all Communists to be prepared toprofit by this. In view of such an order,could the Allies depend on Russia? Itseemed quite possible that the reportedmobilization of Russia's huge armiesmight be for a very different purpose

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than that of assisting Czechoslovakia.There was doubt as to the ability of

Germany to build 1,000 combat planes

per month. Factories to do this had beenestablished, but could the necessarymaterials be obtained? Some thought that600 planes was nearer the limit. If thatwere so, and the Allies had access to themarkets in the United States (as appearedcertain), the Allies ultimately would havean air force superior to the Axis.

In the beginning the Axis would haveabout a 3 to 2 superiority in the air. This

was unfortunate. Judging fromexperiences during the war in Spain, itcould result in serious damage, some loss,and occasional tactical derangements.The general belief was, however, that ifnations were prepared to supporttemporarily this very undesirablecondition, the Axis could not force adecision in their favor in this way.

French generals considered itimpossible for the Axis to invade France,

either through the Maginot line oppositeGermany or over the Alps from Italy.They believed that given sufficient timethe highly trained and equipped Frenchdivisions could smash through the yetuncompleted German west defenses. TheCzechoslovakian army was first class,and would be able to prevent Germandivisions being sent to the west before alarge part of the penetration by French

troops had been accomplished. But therecould be no promise that Czechoslovakiacould be reached early enough to saveher.

As to resources, Germany hadsufficient to last a year, possibly muchlonger. But if she had to supply Italy andHungary, as seemed to be the case, shemight break down at some future datenow impossible to predict. The Allies hadunlimited resources, especially if those ofthe United States were available. Onresources alone the Allies in the long runshould win.

The conclusions were:

a. That because of the Axis havingsuperior land and air forces,Czechoslovakia could not be saved

from being overrun before Alliedtroops could penetrate through southGermany.

b. That if war started, it would be ageneral world war, and might last along time. It would finally be won bythe side having the most reserves andresources, which was the Allied side.

The conference closed with an earnestdesire to avoid a war if an honorable way

out could be found. The peoples did notwant war. The result of a world warwould be uncertain, would entailenormous danger.

The result of the Septemberconference was that rather than risk alengthy, uncertain, and horrible war, theAllies accepted on 29/30 September aproposition of the Axis to agree topeaceful cession by Czechoslovakia ofthe Sudeten to Germany, based on the

principle of self-determination of peoples.This ended that crisis.

COMMENTS

The open movement of German troopswhich precipitated the acute stage of theSudeten crisis was deliberate. It wasintended that the Allies should "discover"about 40 first-class German divisions,with artillery, tanks, and so on, plus

numerous Hungarian and Polishdivisions, lining up aroundCzechoslovakia. Only about 13 otherGerman division, mostly second-class,were "discovered" opposite France. It wasclear that Germany intended to crushCzechoslovakia, but had no intention ofattacking France.

Why did she disclose her plan?It was an application of the

psychological principle that if fear issuddenly and unexpectedly caused, but away to escape is open, the first impulsiveinstinct is not to reason, but to retreat.The opinion that Germany was bluffing

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had been widely held. The Allied presshad quite generally boasted that on 21May, 1938, Germany had abandoned an

intended invasion of Czechoslovakiabecause France and Great Britain hadannounced that they would not permitthis. It had been represented on numerousoccasions that the dictators understood nolanguage except force. The Alliedgovernments were urged not to yieldagain. Their people believed that thetotalitarian states were so hopelesslyinferior that they could not dream of

waging a major war; that all that wasnecessary to stop the proposed aggressionwas to make it understood that the Allieswould fight.

Therefore Chancellor Hitler decided toshow that Germany was strong enough tocrush Czechoslovakia. He moved hisdivisions into their battle positions,creating a situation which made it highlyimprobable that Czechoslovakia could berescued. Hitler knew that the French and

British general staffs would correctlyevaluate the Axis strength. What hedesired was to impress the Allied men-of-the-street, and Allied statesmen, that tointerfere with Germany meant death anddestruction without possibility of savingCzechoslovakia.

Chancellor Hitler has an extraordinaryknowledge of psychology, an unequalledpsychic insight. He did instill fear into the

Allied nations that they might becomeinvolved in a useless, disastrous war. Theirfirst blind reaction to this sudden view wasto avoid the war if some face-saving waycould be found. The Axis arranged for this,insisting on immediate conference andaction, before extended reflection shouldsuggest some other solution.

Suppose the Allies had not yielded.Would the Axis have given way, orwould they have fought? Had notGermany, by disclosing the deploymentof its forces, violated the militaryprinciple of acting by surprise? Only twomen can positively answer the first of

these two questions. These two are theGerman Fhrer and the Italian Duce, andthey have not told us. We do not know,

and may never know, what their realintentions were. The evidence available atthis time indicates that the Axis wasprepared for war, better so than theAllies.

While the mobilization of the Germanregular divisions was openly made, Italianmobilization was secretremarkably so.Allowing for 10 divisions on the Frenchfront, and assuming that Hungary would

watch Yugoslavia (expected, however, tobe neutral), 30 first-class Italian divisionsremained. The Germans could add 43second-class divisions to these, themobilization of which had been only partlyobserved by the Allies.

There is no information yet as to howthe Axis intended to use these 73divisions. Germany and Italy, on 26September, arranged for a joint GHQ atMunich to open on 28 September. This is

an indication that the Axis intended tooperate in south Germany, possibly afterthe Allies had become partially exhaustedthrough frontal attacks on the Germanwest defenses. The presence of the strongGerman artillery force in rear of thesedefences would be consistent with thisview.

Undoubtedly the Axis preferredsincerely to avoid a war, provided its

mission could be accomplished. It was,nevertheless, well prepared for war.

As to the second questionwhetherdisclosure of German troop movementsviolated the principle of surprisetheanswer is, it did not. The Sudetenoperation on the part of the Axis was anexample of the change in method ofapplication of this principle. It combinedmilitary with psychological factors.Surprise was distributed between fear,widely and suddenly disseminated, andcertain military measures carefullyhidden. It was a modern way, and itworked.

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NEAR QUARRY HILL, GFX-8

Has the Close-Support Problem

Been Solved?

BY CAPTAIN CONRAD L. BOYLE, FA

INTRODUCTION

LOSE support of advancingtroops by artillery fire waspractically nonexistent during the

World War, except where a rollingbarrage was used and the pattern of theattack was required to conform rigidly to

this support. Close support by observedfire, generally acknowledged to be themost efficient type, could not be usedbecause of a definite lack ofcommunication between the guns andartillerymen forward with the assaultelements. No agency of communicationexisted at that time which would allowforward observers dependable control ofthe fire power available to them.

And, it would seem, none is availabletoday with present communicationequipment!

This statement is made with a full

knowledge of recent advances claimed incommunication materiel, technique, andtactics. Some of these so-called advancescan seriously be questioned, as they are,in reality, backward steps and willcontribute little to the final solution of ourclose-support problem.

The problem is, first, to get

ammunition to the guns in quantity; andsecond, to get it from the guns to thetarget. The first is difficult, back-breakinglabor; the second a purely technicalproblem. Fortunately the problem is notinsoluble. But it consists, not in waitingfor some great discovery "to come out ofthe blue," but in being practical andutilizing properly developments alreadyat hand.

The ammunition-supply feature of theproblem of close support will not bediscussed herein, except to point outbriefly that solutions disregarding it will be

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fundamentally unsound. The other phase,that of fire direction and gunnery,depends for its solution on perfecting two

items; Communication and methods ofemployment. Of the two, communicationnow presents the most vital, pressing, andperplexing features; and upon it also reststhat of the methods of employment.Therefore the communication elements ofour question will be discussed first.

PART ITHE COMMUNICATIONQUESTION

Will Our Communication Become ofAge?

Perhaps before becoming too feelinglyinvolved in the subject of field artillerycommunication we should define the term"of age." Many students of the problemvisualize communication equipment, yetto be developed, which will be light andportable; such that instant and completecommunication for direct-support

battalions of field artillery will result inmerely setting up the necessary terminalpieces of equipment. The hundred percent functioning of this equipment willnot be subject to the vagaries of terrain orweather, time-and-space element betweenunits, mutual interference between ourown radio sets, or, above all, plannedinterference by the enemy. In short, it willwork. And will give us complete andsatisfactory communication under anyand all circumstances. If we wish toemploy this equipment among trees, in adepression, behind a terrain feature, inrain and fog, or to operate it at twice thenormal range of the equipment, we maydo so. When we get such equipment wewill be able to say that ourcommunication has truly become of age.

Solution of the communicationproblem will allow us to devote our

energies along other lines which atpresent are in a state of flux partlybecause of inadequate communicationfacilities. For example, in our present set-

up we have guns which will shoot 12,000yards and more, but when observationpost and guns are separated by only a

fraction of that distance the guns must bemoved because of the difficulty ofinstalling and maintainingcommunication over long distances in theassault area.

What loss! What inefficiency! Yetwith proper communication equipmentthere would be no need to displace theguns until they had reached theirmaximum range. We could control their

fire power with ease up to and beyondthat maximum range.

Why does this sad condition exist?Everyone realizes that our primary meansof communication is wire. We havenothing better to take its place. Theamount of wire which we can install andmaintain in the forward combat areas isdependent partly on the training of thepersonnel, partly on supply, and partly on

our own and hostile activity. We may beable to lay and maintain wire for a matterof from 1,000 to 3,000 yards in theforward areas. To lay and maintain it12,000 yards or more we know we cannotdo. And so we are forced to move ourguns frequently.

This greatly reduces fire power. It alsocomplicates the problem of ammunitionsupply almost beyond hope of solution.This problem is of equal importance with

the purely technical one of controllingfire power, and is more likely to slow usup and break our backs. Give us propercommunication equipment if we are toutilize the full range of our cannon so asto facilitate ammunition supply andmaintain that flexibility of fire towardwhich we are ever striving. If this is notdone, there will be a trend toward short-range weapons and communication

gadgets. Then the consequent frequencyof displacement will add to the burden ofammunition supply until it becomesintolerable.

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HAS THE CLOSE-SUPPORT PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?

Long-range weapons with no deadspace, together with communicationequipment which would allow us to use

the full range of these weapons, wouldeliminate also much of the ever presentproblem of reconnaissance, selection, andoccupation of position. Practically all thatwe would need ask of our gun positions isthat they be accessible and have cover.The batteries of a battalion would nothave to be jammed into a small area forpurposes of control. The hard fought "lastmile" of march into position would

largely disappear; which of course wouldease our transport problem tremendously.Our ideas on gunnery and methods of

employment would be radically changed.With long-range weapons and reliablecommunication, we would have direct-support battalions worthy of the name.We would have flexible unitseasilycontrolled and capable of sustainedsupport of the infantry.

Now that we have a picture of what is

required, how are we going to obtain suchequipment? Can our old friend "wire"solve the problem? Obviously not,because the time-and-space element oflaying two strands of wire between twowidely separated points, one of which isconstantly on the move, alone woulddefeat us. Not to mention the impossibletask of supplying and servicing thousandsof yards of wire in the assault areas. On

the other hand, we have an agency ofcommunication which requires onlyterminal pieces of equipment, and usesthe air for the necessary connecting link.With this equipment, the time-and-spaceelement of installing and maintaining theconnecting media does not exist.

This agency is radio. It is our onlyhope in solving the communication phaseof the close-support problem.

If we grade our electrical means ofcommunication from front to rear in theorder in which they can best be used, wefind radio is the only one which canpotentially fill the needs of the assault

troops; while wire becomes increasinglydependable and important as we leave theassault areas. It is a cardinal principle,

however, that all possible communicationagencies be kept ready and in perfectcondition against possible needs.Especially is this true as we get nearer thefront.

The question "Will ourcommunication become of age?" can nowbe answered by expressing doubtdoubtat least that the immediate futurepromises a perfect solution. To the query

"Has radio become of age?" the onlyanswer is a forceful NO!

Can Radio Become of Age?

To this question the answer is "Yes,"but there are few who take this stand; andthe ways and means of attaining thesolution are not always obvious. Incontinuing this discussion it is hoped tobring others to this viewpoint, for it isbelieved that radio can, must, and

eventually will solve our problem.Our greatest asset in using radiothe

use of the air as a connecting mediumislikewise our greatest weakness. This isbecause all sets, both friendly and hostile,use this medium also. Hence there arebound to be varying amounts ofinterference and intercept, either plannedor unplanned. Intercept may be reducedand its ill effects nullified by the use of

proper censorship, net control, the use ofcodes and ciphers, and (the goniometricphase) by not locating radios too nearimportant points, and by moving themfrequently. The interference problem isequally important if not more so, and ithas not been solved. We shall deal moreparticularly with it.

Mutual interference and sufficientoperating channels are questions of basicimportance, but they can be solved bydesigning proper equipment. How muchdamage will result to our communicationif the enemy should choose to sacrificehis own radio communication and

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arrays are hard to manage as well asdangerous to use near the front-lines, it iseasy to see why we should turn to the

shortest practicable waves for ouroperation.

Short waves mean simple antennaequipment, which should ever be ourgoal. However, there is a definite limitbeyond which we cannot go in shorteningthe wave-length and still maintain reliablecommunication. It is essential that wecontinually strive for 100%communication, in solving our close-

support problem.All of us are familiar with theproperties of light transmission, howbuildings and terrain masses cause dead-space and prevent communication. Allare also familiar with the fact that thelength of the waves of the visible portionof the spectrum are very short. It wouldseem reasonable to expect, then, thatshortening the length of radio waveswould cause these waves to take on, in

increasing amounts, the properties oflight. This is true.

All know that light transmission as ameans of communication for the fieldartillery is a gadgetcapable of being usedonly in special situations. Aside from thedanger of hostile interception when usinglight signals, the property which causesthis method to be a gadget is dead-space.

In our quest for 100% communication

equipment we must stay well away fromall gadgets which have dead-space.Communication must never fail becauseour men are unable to find high groundfrom which to operate their equipment.Our people with the front-line troops will,more often than not, be hunting holesinstead of hills.

Present equipment very definitelyproves that waves of as short as tenmeters in length have too much dead-space for reliable communication. Power,of course, is a factor in the amount ofdead-space a certain wave-length willhave. Generally, increasing power on a

certain wave-length will reduce the dead-space. However, at present only a verylimited amount of power can be used on

ten-meter equipment capable of beingcarried in the field by man-power. Later,as the art of radio becomes moreperfected the picture as to ten-meter andshorter waves may change somewhat. Atthe present time waves of ten meters orless in length are definitely unsatisfactoryfor our purpose even though highlysatisfactory from the standpoint of sizeand efficiency of antenna.

If ten-meter waves are unsatisfactoryfrom the standpoint of dead-space whathappens when the wave-length isincreased? The longer the wave the lessthe dead space. This fact is a fundamentallaw of transmission of radio waves andcan be stated about as follows: Given acertain amount of power, the longer thewave-length the greater the tendency ofthe wave to follow the folds of theground, or the less the dead-space.

As we increase the wave-length fromten to sixty meters we come to thefrequency of that old reliable fieldartillery set, the SCR 161. Although anextremely low-power and (today)antiquated piece of equipment, most of uswill agree that this set proves that sixty-meter waves are satisfactory for ourpurposes, as far as freedom from dead-space is concerned.

Ten-meter waves are unsatisfactory;sixty-meter waves are satisfactory. Ten-meter waves require an antenna 2meters in length, which is highlydesirable; sixty-meter waves an antenna15 meters in length, which is lessdesirable. It is easy to see that our choiceof a wave band must be a compromisewhich will best balance the conflictingitems of antenna and dead-space. Aglance at Figure 1 will perhaps make theproblem more clear.

Based on the experience of radioamateurs it would seem probable that ourband will be between forty and sixty

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FIGURE 1

meters; probably near the present band ofthe SCR 161 set. Note that the 15-meterantenna of the 60-meter wave is one wehave some chance of approaching in a

field set.One often hears discussions which

indicate that directional or beam antennaswill solve the dead-space problem of theshorter waves by concentrating the bulkof the power in one direction. Directionalantennas, of course, do concentrate mostof the power in one direction. Thisdirectional effect is obtained by buildingreflectors behind the transmitting

antenna, and is done successfully bycertain commercial stations and amateurswho can build an antenna for a certainwave-length and direction. If we were touse such a system we would becommitted to using waves of one meter orless, in order to get small reflectors, sincethe size of the reflector is in directproportion to the shortness of the wave.The idea would seem to be impracticalbecause we would be committed to using

one channel, or else build, issue and carrya separate antenna for each channel inuse. In any event, directional antennaswould not solve the inherent

disadvantages of the ultra-short waves;namely, their inability or refusal to followthe folds of the ground. The use of ultra-short waves, while more free from static

interference than longer waves, probablywill not hinder the enemy in hisinterference plans, but will help him, forhe has only to hunt a hilltop and sweepthe crests from which we must operate.The enemy could very well use a wide-angle directional antenna system for thispurpose.

Other arguments have been advancedwhich indicate that directional

transmission will eliminate enemyintercept and goniometric activity. Ofcourse, waves of one meter or less inlength are required for directionaltransmission; and they only exaggeratethe ruinous dead-space effect. The actionof these ultra-ultra short waves is, ofcourse, comparable to light without thebad feature of visibility. It might be wellto point out again that our equipment mustbe used with 100% reliability to control the

fire power of our cannon up to theirmaximum range. The orientation of highlydirectional equipment beyond the visiblerange, with one station constantly on the

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move and with only a general direction ofmovement known, at night, and under allconditions of terrain and weather, will

likely prove an insurmountable obstacle.It might be better to have equipmentwhich, once set up, will guaranteecommunication under all conditions ofterrain and weather. It may be possible toreduce the danger of enemy goniometricand intercept activity by other means.

Having arrived at a wave band shortenough to allow simple, efficient antennasand still give reliable communication

(which must have first consideration), itonly remains to solve the question ofpower and equipment design.

Power

The power question is simple andanswers itself. If our enemy, on a givenchannel, can project more power into ouroperating area than we can ourselves,radio communication will fail. On theother hand, if we have the preponderance

of power we can function. It follows atonce, then, that having determined themaximum weight requirements of oursets, we should have the most efficientand powerful transmitters available underthose weight requirements. Relativelyhigh-power transmitters are the answer toour problem.

At this point it might be well tomention that at the present state of the art

of radio, the maximum output to beexpected of portable equipment onchannels suitable for our purposes shouldbe in the neighborhood of forty or fiftywatts.

At the first mention of power, a chorusof disapproval is raised, based on theproblem of mutual interference betweenour own sets. It is obvious, regardless ofthe number of channels available, thatthere must come a time on a single frontwhen a channel must be duplicated, orused again by another organization. In thepast, the power of our equipment hasdeliberately been limited in order to allow

it a working range no greater than thelateral distance between twoorganizations using the same channel.

Based on 20-kilocycle separation, theSCR 161 set was designed to have arange of from 5 to 7 miles, since channelswould not need to be repeated under thatdistance. It is easy to see that if channelseparation could be reduced to fivekilocycles, the working range could beincreased four times. Today procurementof equipment which will operate on five-(or even two-) kilocycle separation is a

simple matter of proper design.The above idea or reason for limitingpower is a fallacy, as can easily beproven. Let us take the case of two SCR161 sets separated by a distance of eightmiles, but operating on the samechannel. The present theory is that sincethese two nets are separated by adistance greater than the maximumrange of the set (five miles, say), signalsfrom one net will not be received by the

other. True, the low-gain receiver of theSCR 161 will not receive the weaksignal of a set eight miles away, but thesignal is present and a higher-gainreceiver would pick it up. The powergenerated by the SCR 161 transmitter issufficient to work twenty or more milesprovided we used a better receiver. Inshort, the only reason we can work SCR161 nets as we do at present is because

of the low-gain receivers of the SCR161. Receivers with lower gain than theSCR 161 would allow us to use higherpower transmitters!

To put the question in another way: Alow-power transmitter, working with ahigh-gain receiver, will give the sameresults as a high-power transmitterworking with a low-gain receiver. Wemust, then, have lower-gain, or better yet,variable-gain receivers if we are to workhigh-power transmitters over shortdistances, without mutual interference.

The answer to our problem of mutualinterference, then, is first to design

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equipment which will work on five orless kilocycles separation, in order torepeat channels at twenty miles instead of

at five miles as at present. Next, since wemust use high power to confound theenemy, we must also use low-gainreceivers in order to prevent mutualinterference. Low-gain receivers will, ineffect, reject all signals below a certainsignal strength level. Our transmittersmust, then, place signals into ourreceivers sufficiently strong that theeffective signal above this "rejection

level" of our receivers will operate themover the desired range.With high-power transmitters and

low-gain receivers the enemy must thenbuild an interference level up to the"rejection level" of our receivers beforehe can bother us. If we refer to Figure 2,the line M N represents the "rejectionlevel" of our receivers. Each of ourtransmitters must, then, place a signalinto the receiver with which it is

working, high enough above the

"rejection level" of the receiver tooperate it. Of course, the enemy mustforce signals up above the line M N

before he can interfere with ourequipment. It is easy to see that the morepower our transmitters can place on theair, the higher we can push the "rejectionlevel" of our receivers and, of course,the harder the task of interferencebecomes for our enemy.

Perhaps it would be well to point outthat efficient transmitters are entirelydependent upon efficient antennas for

effective operation. Without efficientantennas, power cannot be placed on theair. Power is useless to us, of course,unless we can place it in the air in theform of electromagnetic or radio waveswhich will do our work for us.

At this point it would be well to gointo the difficulties and problems of anenemy in his attempts to block out theentire band of our receiver, or even tointerfere with a small portion of it. The

enemy can do two things: Have one very

FIGURE 2

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high-power interference machinecentrally located somewhere in the backareas; and with it attempt to block the

entire band; or he can have several suchmachines of smaller power (and moreportability) nearer the lines, and attemptto have each one block a portion of theband.

The idea of one central interferencemachine would be faulty for two reasons:First, the machine would be so far to therear that the interference would lose toomuch strength by attenuation or

absorption by the time it reached ourreceivers; second, if we glance at Figure2 again, it will at once become apparentthat in order to block the entire band, theinterference level would have to be builtabove the line M N over the entire band.Since our set should have a band about1000 kilocycles wide, it is easy to see thata tremendous amount of power would berequired, even if such a versatile machinecould be built, which is doubtful. It is

doubtful also if the enemy could carry somuch power in the field.

The second idea of using manymachines would have more chance ofsuccess. As these machines would becloser to the front lines, there would beless signal loss due to attenuation; a muchnarrower interference signal from thestandpoint of band coverage would berequired. Since such a system would take

practically a machine for each net of oursin operation, it at once becomes apparentthat a great deal of men, equipment andorganization would be required; so muchthat, even if sure of success, it is doubtfulif it would pay the enemy to commit somany of his resources to such a task.

Some students of this questionadvocate the use of a spark gap, such aswas used in the old spark transmitters,which would develop a shock action overthe entire band. Of course lightningcauses the same kind of shock action, yetcode operators have worked even theSCR 161 set through electrical storms.

(However, for voice equipment, thesituation is very different.)

It seems reasonable that equipment

can be so built that an enemy would findthe task of blocking an entire bandimpossible, and the interfering with evena few channels difficult. However,research should be started in this field, ifonly to see what may be expected and sothat proper plans can be made forcombating interference.

We should have many channelsavailable. Each battalion should have its

channels evenly distributed over theentire band, and each net should have analternate channel, widely separated fromits primary channel, to which it couldtransfer in case of trouble. The primarychannels of one brigade would very wellbe the alternate channels of an adjacentbrigade.

At this time it should be pointed outthat our receivers should not be entirelylow-gain, but should be variable-gain. In

other words, the receiver should becapable of being made either high- orlow-gain by merely turning a control.We then could vary the rejection levelby the simple expedient of turning aknob!

Let us consider the value of this. SCR161 operators often have wished forextra power in situations where theyneeded to work over greater-than-normal

distances or under bad operatingconditions. In the latter situation muchof the signal strength is absorbed and thesignal arrives at the receiving set tooweak to operate the receiver. Withpresent equipment, when sets are locatedin woods or other unfavorable operatingpositions, our normal range is cut downtremendously. However, with variable-gain receivers, we would merely have toturn a knob and utilize as much of theavailable power as needed, since withhigher-power transmitters the signal willbe present in strength. The chance ofmutual interference will be very slight

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because, with five or less kilocycleschannel separation, the nearest net usingthe same channel will be twenty or more

miles away, and the signals from this netwill reach our receivers so weak they willstill be below the lower than normalrejection level of our receivers.

The principle of high-powertransmitters and low-gain receivers hasbeen tried out in the commercialbroadcast field, and it works perfectly,The Crosley station WLW increased itspower to 500,000 watts for the same

reason that we must increase our power tothe maximum. Static is nature'sinterference level and, in order to whipstatic, WLW had to increase its power sothat each subscriber or listener couldbuild the rejection level of his set abovethe interference level of the static.Listeners did this by merely turning downthe volume. Of course, those listenersnear the transmitter could always pick offthe cream of the signal above the static

level and get good reception. However,with a weak signal, those people somedistance away from the transmitter had togo down into the static level to hear thestation at all, and had poor reception. Byplacing a whopping big signal into the setof each listener, WLW was able to dropthe static level out of the picture for agreat many more people. Result forWLW more listeners, and, of course,

more money.Design

Once the operating band and thepower question have been decided. it onlyremains to design efficient equipmentwhich will meet our requirements. Thefirst consideration in designing any pieceof military equipment is that itaccomplish our purpose; in other words,it must work. Since transportation isalways a problem, weight is the nextconsideration. However, we should neversacrifice sturdiness and the ability to takeknocks merely to gain a few ounces ofweight, because flimsy equipment invites

breakdowns. Our forward details caneasily carry forty or sixty pounds ofequipment, provided it is broken into

about four loads capable of being carriedby two or three men as is the SCR 161set. There is little doubt that a relativelyhigh-power field set, embodying thefeatures just discussed, can be built,which will weigh about sixty pounds.However, if it weighed as much as theSCR 161 set, no one should complain.

Our set must use continuous-wavetelegraphy because that type of radio

transmission allows us to build a field setwhich is the cheapest, simplest in design,smallest number of parts, most reliable inoperation, lightest in weight, and whichdelivers the highest power. To use voiceor tone modulation it would first benecessary to build the above basicequipment, and then add gadgets to itwhich would not only increase the weightby at least 50%, but cut down the powerby a tremendous amount.

At once the question of voice versustelegraphy comes up, and now is the timeto reach a settlement. Figure 2 gives acomparison between voice andcontinuous-wave telegraphy from thestandpoint of power and channelseparation. The curves of this figurerepresent the frequency coverage of agiven band, and the power peak obtainedfrom a continuous-wave signal, as

compared to that of a voice signal usingthe same power, on a given wave lengthor channel which we will call X. It willbe noticed that the base of the curve CD.representing voice radio, is muchbroader than the continuous-wave curveAB. This is because frequencies aboveand below the carrier wave length offrequency X, equal to the range of thehuman voice, must be transmitted withfidelity in order to have an intelligiblevoice signal. The continuous-wavesignal, on the other hand, requires poweron only the one wave length orfrequency X, and of course, the base is

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narrow and the power curve on the singlefrequency shoots up.

If we were to integrate the two curves,

we would obtain the area under eachcurve, representing the power generatedby the transmitter. It is at once apparent,since the area under each curve must bethe same for a given transmitter, that ifwe broaden the base of the curve the waythe voice signal does, then the peak mustdrop. Conversely, as we narrow the basewe drive the peak of the curve higher.This at once explains why it is possible

with the same power to drive acontinuous-wave signal a much greaterdistance than a voice signal. With voicewe dissipate power, and all to no purpose.

Figure 2 shows also that, in order towhip hostile interference, we should useas powerful and stable transmitters as weare able to build within our weightrequirements. The higher we drive thepeak of the curve, the higher we can buildthe rejection level of our receivers, and

the more difficult we make the solution ofthe interference problem for the enemy.With voice radio we have little chance todo this and still keep within the weightrequirements, because the area under thecurve increases and absorbs the additionalpower without driving the peakappreciably higher.

There is no merit in radio-telephonefor military communication purposes in

the front-line areas! We require manyradio channels on a given front, as hasbeen stated before. The horizontal line inFigure 2 represents the entire bandcovering possible to build into a set.Notice that the voice radio, with its broadbase, occupies a good deal more space onthe band than does the continuous waveof the same power. In other words, withvoice radio we have fewer channelsavailable than if we use continuous wave.

To add voice to any piece of radioequipment, working in the channelswhich we must use, adds much weight,reduces the number of available channels,

complicates the design and amount ofequipment, and cuts power; in short, doeseverything which we must avoid. For

some strange reason the fact thattelegraphy is faster and more accuratethan telephony in the transmission ofmessages, whether using wire or radio,has received insufficient consideration.The only real reason that can be advancedin favor of voice over telegraphy is that itis easier to train operators to use voiceequipment than to teach them code.

The real truth is that voice, from a

radio standpoint, is very susceptible tointerference, planned or otherwise,while code in the form of continuous-wave telegraphy is not. It is easy to seewhy this is so, for in order to reproduceintelligible voice signals, all the tonesof the voice must be reproducedexactly, else we have unintelligible"mush." On the other hand, code ismerely a succession of sounds of anydesired tone or frequency, so it is easy

to pick code out of a hash of sounds.Operators do this with ease. For proof,we have only to listen in on anyamateur band where code is used. Thesecode bands are absolutely unregulatedand are simply a mass of signals,through which thousands of amateurswork every day.

To interfere with voice transmission,we have only to garble the tones of the

voice; whereas, in order to stop codetransmission, the signal must be drownedout. In brief, voice can be rendereduseless under conditions which would notmaterially affect code.

Of what value, then, to use voice,although it may be easier to trainoperators, if when we most needcommunication it is going to fail? We ofthe field artillery should take a sensibleview about this matter of voice, and placegreater emphasis on reliability of radioequipment. The training of code operatorsis not the fearful thing it is reputed tobe. The problem is greatly simplified

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by the fact that the things we must telleach other in the front lines are relativelyfew, and can easily be handled by a few

prearranged signals. The best example ofthe use of prearranged signals is a simplecode for transmitting fire commands fromobservation post to guns.

Without becoming too technical orgoing into the matter in great detail, weshall discuss, finally, the generalfeatures which should be embodied in ashort-wave radio set for employmentwith close-support artillery. In other

words, here are the "caliber board"requirements:1. General. a. For use with close-support

artillery we should have a continuous-wave radio telegraph set operating onabout sixty meters.

b. It should be capable of beingcarried by man power. Preferably itshould weigh not more than 60pounds, and be capable of beingbroken into not more than four loads.

c. The entire set should be sturdyand capable of operation in all kinds ofweather. Duraluminum to be usedwherever possible, for lightness withstrength.

2. Transmitter. a. To be stable, with achannel separation of five kilocyclesor less.

b. The power output to be as highas possible under the weight

requirements. Source of power to behand generator, this having beenproved to be the most efficientmethod of "converting army beansinto watts."

3. Receiver. a. To be a superheterodyne-type receiver, with stability equal tothat of the transmitter.

b. To be a variable-gain receiverof the single-signal type.

c. To use a unit-type battery forpower.

4. Antenna. a. To be of the quarter-wave,vertical type. Mast sections jointed in3-ft, lengths.

b. The antenna to tune with as fewas one mast section, in order to obtaina transmitter of variable output.

PART IIMETHODS OFEMPLOYMENT

Too Much Centralization

The present methods of fire controlrecognize the principle that the individualwho identifies the target on the groundmust have some control of the fire powerwhich is to be used against the target.

Unquestionably the above principle issound, and its adoption now allows somemeasure of close support by observed-firemethods where little or none wasavailable before. However, in applyingthis doctrine to close-support fires, wehave adopted, with one sound idea, thevery unsound scheme of extremelycentralized control. The one valuablething about prior methods of firedirection, so far as observed-fire or close-

support purposes was concerned, was thedecentralization of control. It now seemswe have lost it.

In general, direct-support artillery firestwo types of missions: First, massed firemissions within the zone of action of thesupported unit, at the will of the battalioncommander, as well as outside the zoneof action of the supported unit at the willof the division or higher commander; and,

second, close-supportmissions within thenarrow zone of action of the supportedinfantry. The use of massed fires requiresthe greatest amount of control possible,since much detailed effort is required inproperly coordinating and timing the firesof the individual batteries. On the otherhand, for best results, observed fires inclose support of advancing troops call forlittle or no control by the battalioncommander. They do call, however, for agreat amount of detailed control by theforward observers.

Our present system handles theproblem of massed fire nicely, but is too

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rigid and susceptible of break-down toallow efficient close support by observedfire. What we want is a system of fire

direction that will allow the battalioncommander to switch from centralized todecentralized control at will, and at amoment's notice. Furthermore, the systemshould be such that when battalioncontrol fails, even though momentarily,the elements of the battalion which arestill intact can continue functioning onclose-support missions within the narrowzones of the supported units.

Does our present system of firedirection allow such flexibility? Definitelynot. The system is built on rigid control bythe battalion commander, to includecontrol of all agencies of forwardobservation available for close-supportpurposes. Under this system it is obviousthat a breakdown at the battalion commandpost will render all batteries of thebattalion useless even though they havesuffered no trouble and are still intact.

From a tactical standpoint our presentbattalion is nothing less than an immensetwelve-gun battery. In the interests ofeconomy and reduction of overhead,perhaps we ought to carry this to the bitterend in the matters of administration,supply, and messing. Is such a systemdesirable? We haven't come to it yet.

While it is necessary for the battalionto have control in the proper handling of

massed fires, the same is not true ofclose-support fires. In order to renderproper close support, we should placeforward many obser

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1939