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The University of Westminster Regent Campus School of Social Sciences, Humanities, and Languages Foreign domination in the Democratic Republic of Congo: To what extent should external forces be held accountable for the country’s state failure and underdevelopment? Total words: 11,999 A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in International Relations and Contemporary Political Theory/ Master of Arts degree in International Relations 1

Foreign Domination in the DRC

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Page 1: Foreign Domination in the DRC

The University of Westminster

Regent Campus

School of Social Sciences, Humanities, and Languages

Foreign domination in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

To what extent should external forces be held accountable for the country’s state failure

and underdevelopment?

Total words: 11,999

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in

International Relations and Contemporary Political Theory/ Master of Arts degree in International

Relations

Maria Castellanos

January 2015

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I gratefully acknowledge the guidance and comments offered by Dr. Hannah Cross throughout the

research stages of this dissertation.

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Regent Campus

University of Westminster

Maria Castellanos

21 January 2015

MA Dissertation Title:

Foreign domination in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

To what extent should external forces be held accountable for the country’s state failure and

underdevelopment?

I confirm that the above-submitted dissertation is my own work and that all references/sources are duly

acknowledged.

Maria Castellanos

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Table of Contents

Introduction………………………..............................................................................................................5

1.1. Why this topic demands attention..........................................................................................................5

1.2. The importance of the historical context..............................................................................................6

1.3. Research questions................................................................................................................................7

Theoretical Approaches..............................................................................................................................8

2.1. State failure theory..………..................................................................................................................8

2.2. Development theory……………………............................................................................................12

Colonialism and its Legacy……...............................................................................................................15

3.1. King Leopold II and the Congo Free State.........................................................................................15

3.2. The Congo under Belgian rule............................................................................................................16

3.3. Colonial legacy and the challenges at independence…......................................................................18

From Mobutu to Kabila............................................................................................................................19

4.1. Western Cold War strategies..............................................................................................................19

4.2. Patrimonialism and Zairianisation......................................................................................................20

4.3. The effects of Western aid...................................................................................................................23

4.4. Laurent Kabila, external involvement and the Congo Wars...............................................................27

4.5. Congo’s resource curse.......................................................................................................................28

4.6. Joseph Kabila: towards a new democratic state?................................................................................30

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................31

Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................35

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Introduction

1.1. Why this topic demands attention.

At independence in 1960, the country that is today known as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

appeared to have the potential to become an African postcolonial success story. The last six decades

however, are testimony that this was not be. Whilst the tragic conflict throughout the eastern region in

recent years has been cause for stalled development and widespread suffering, the DRC’s dire socio-

political and economic situation cannot be reduced to this one factor. This study therefore seeks to explain

the reasons why a stable state, capable of ensuring the welfare and security of its people, has failed to

develop in line with the hopes and expectations set at independence.

The 2014 United Nations Development Report positions the Congo at the bottom of the human

development scale: 186 out of the 187 countries included in the report. Moreover, predictions state that in

a best-case scenario, 1960 development levels will only be attainable by 2030, and only if growth rates

remain consistently high (Trefon 2011, p.2). The Congolese people have lost faith in the state and have

come to expect little from it. This should not be the case; in 2006, Joseph Kabila became the first

democratically elected leader since 1960, and should therefore have been accountable to his people.

Kabila has failed to bring the country out of the misery that he found it in. In spite of this, he was re-

elected in the 2011 elections, a process that had been condemned by international observers as well as

nationals for its disorganisation and irregularities (Smith 2011). Western governments are now in talks

with Kabila, offering aid in exchange for him to step down at the end of his term in 2016. There is a

certain degree of irony in this, since it was with the help of these very governments that he was able to

secure his position a decade ago. It is not surprising, however, when the history of Western involvement

in the Congo is considered, as this dissertation will set out to do.

The US in particular, though not exclusively, has played a central role in the DRC’s political and

economic development since independence. Whilst in the Cold War years Western interests were closely

linked to the Congo’s geostrategic significance (Collins 1997, p.284), today, as it was during the colonial

era, the country’s mineral wealth leads to continued international involvement. This study will aim to

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demonstrate that in pursuing their own national interests, the US and other Western governments and

institutions have greatly contributed towards what has emerged as a war-torn, poverty-stricken nation,

subject to a predatory state.

1.2. The importance of the historical context.

In order to address issues of state failure in the country, the Congo’s history must be first examined.

Power, war, corruption and economic accumulation in their current incarnation, form part of a political

economy of dependence that must be understood within a historical context (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou

1999, p.xvi). Moreover, Carothers states that in sub-Saharan Africa it is evident that specific institutional

legacies from previous regimes have a strong effect on political outcomes (2002, p.16). State systems

formed at independence are often considered to be copies of Western models that were ill suited to

African society and culture (Trefon, Van Hoyden and Smis 2002, p.386). Thus, colonial rule and its

consequential effects on the ensuing regimes of the DRC will be considered and analysed.

Since King Leopold II of Belgium declared the Congo his own in the 19 th century, Congolese people have

suffered from the social division of oppressed versus oppressors (Boyle 1988, p.274). Furthermore, since

the days of Leopold, they have been ruled by ‘kings’ who have claimed control over their country’s

mineral wealth (Moore 2001, p.130). Independence was the opportunity to break away from these

unlawful norms, yet Congolese elites were unprepared for the transition; instead of fighting for a

democratic society, they chose to inherit colonial patterns of control. Centralisation, authoritarianism and

state violence did not originate in the country under Mobutu’s three-decade regime. Instead, they were

part of the legacy left behind by Belgian rule.

Another legacy from colonial times was the dependence on resource revenue and the willingness to kill in

order to secure it. The DRC is often described as suffering from a resource curse. It contains strategic

minerals such as copper, cobalt and uranium and industrial diamonds amongst others (Schmitt 2013,

p.57). This vast supply of raw materials has consistently been the cause of widespread violence over time.

David Moore relates this violence to foreigners who, in seeing the country as little more than a supply of

resources- from ivory and rubber extracted at Leopold’s request to the demand for diamonds or copper

today- work with and at times come into conflict with the despots who are in control (2001, p.130). The

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culture of resource extraction began in colonial days, yet it is firmly in place today in order to serve the

needs of an increasingly globalised world. It is the responsibility of foreign governments and companies

to avoid dealing with authoritarian undemocratic regimes, yet this responsibility continues to be

undermined in order to serve economic interests. The Congolese people have for years suffered the

consequences of this, with rulers such as Mobutu or Kabila propped up by external actors with the clear

purpose of fulfilling their own interests. National and international leaders alike have historically shown a

clear disregard for the needs of the people. This is something that needs to be addressed in order to

appreciate the way in which Congolese society has come to choose a very distinct development path.

1.3. Research questions.

This work sets out to answer two key questions regarding the Congolese state and development. The first

considers the involvement of Western actors in the DRC’s political economy and questions whether the

West should put an end altogether to the culture of dependency that historically binds them together, or

whether its involvement should continue; but in a morally and socially constructive way. The second

question that this study will consider concerns the patterns of development that have been for some time

emerging in the DRC, in contrast to those that have traditionally been followed by Western liberal states.

Is this unique developmental path enough for society, or must Northern states and organisations continue

to be actively involved in promoting their own version of development?

In order to answer these questions this dissertation will begin with an analysis of the theoretical

approaches to both state failure and development. The second chapter will examine the period of colonial

rule, first by King Leopold II and its subsequent years under Belgian control. The weight of these years of

exploitation will be analysed. Moreover, by examining its conflict-ridden transition from independence,

the implications colonial rule had on state formation will also be considered. The next and central section

of this study will follow the evolution of the state in the DRC, from 1965 with Mobutu at the helm,

through to today’s Kabila-led government. Throughout this section, the involvement and influence of

foreign actors within the context of the Cold War and subsequently in the Congo wars will be

investigated, as well as Joseph Kabila’s relationship both with the international community and his

constituents. The final chapter will bring all the research together, arriving at a conclusion regarding the

two research questions this work seeks to answer.

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Theoretical Approaches

2.1. State Failure Theory

Following independence from their European colonisers, sub-Saharan African countries embarked on

what proved to be a difficult journey of state making. In order for a state to fulfil its role some basic

functions have been described as essential, including sovereign control of territory and supervision of

resources, the capacity to build and maintain infrastructure, to provide basic services and to maintain law

and order (Mazrui 1995, p.28). In his analysis of ‘quasi-states’, Jackson emphasises the difference

between de jure, and de facto state sovereignty (1990, p.21). For him, postcolonial African states

possessed juridical statehood resulting from international recognition of their sovereign rights. However,

they lacked empirical statehood, with limited institutional authority, political will, or ability to provide

socioeconomic welfare (Ibid). Thus, the African quasi-states, as described by Jackson, often proved

unable to perform the aforementioned fundamental functions.

In view of the short span of time in which states were expected to be fully formed in accordance with the

European standard, the fact they have been referred to as ‘quasi-states’ comes as no surprise. Their task

was almost an impossible one considering they were emulating a foreign model, whilst dealing with

internal and international demands to render their juridical statehood into an effective one (Ayoob 1995,

p.32). The international community specifically pushed for their recognition as sovereign states,

overlooking the inability of many to meet the established criteria for statehood (Clapham 2004, p.81).

Therefore, the view that statehood extended to areas that were ill adapted to it (Clapham 2002, p.794) is a

noteworthy one, since state failure unfortunately became a common defining feature of countries south of

the Sahara, post-independence.

Mohammed Ayoob describes state failure as ‘the major source of suffering and disorder in the Third

World’ (1995, p.173). The reasoning behind it varies considerably. In 2005, the Fund for Peace published

their first ‘Failed States Index’, in which countries are ranked in order of risk of state collapse. Twelve

indicators are used to measure this and, out of these, the two most consistent with state failure are uneven

development and the criminalisation or deligitimisation of the state (Amburn 2005). David Carment goes

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further in his definition: as central governments cease to function, providing no basic services to its

citizens, including education and healthcare, the economy weakens, infrastructure breaks down and crime

escalates out of control (2003, p.409). The key aspect that must be examined is how central governments

reach the point of total loss of legitimacy and control that subsequently leads to state failure. A common

conception is that blame for government collapse lies with leadership failures. If state failure is man-

made, and not caused primarily by geographical, environmental or external forces, then leaders are to be

assigned responsibility for destroying states (Rotberg 2002, p.93).

A concept very closely linked with leadership malfunction in African politics is neo-patrimonialism. Ex-

colonial countries compensated for their weak social bases with neo-patrimonialism, or ‘the buying of

clients’ (Rotberg 2004, p.27). In this way, a small minority elite was able to milk the rest of the country’s

citizens of all income-yielding resources (Davidson 1992, p.209). Furthermore, ‘the formation of patron-

client relations resulted in a state based on personal authority and coercion’ (Carment 2003, p.412).

Patron-client relations became the way by which leaders and elites were able to accumulate power and

wealth – leaders distributed state wealth to their clients, who in turn offered them their undivided support,

helping maintain the corrupt leadership in power.

Even though neo-patrimonialism had devastating effects on many African states, including the DRC (as

will later be examined), some scholars feel there is an overemphasis on the concept in the study of state

failure. One such academic is Zubairu Wai, who states that it has become a ‘catch all conceptual staple’

(2012, p.31). To quote him more extensively:

‘Neo-patrimonialism posits a single conceptual framework to explain a multiplicity of complex and varied

socioeconomic realities, and in doing this, makes the concept impossibly elastic (…) thus stretched

beyond its analytical capacity, every political reality on the continent can be, and has been finessed to

appear consistent with a variant of the neo-patrimonialist logic’ (Wai 2012, p.32-33).

It seems clear that a single explanation cannot solely justify the widespread state failure that took place in

much of postcolonial Africa. Consequently, there are various contributing factors that can be found within

state failure theory. There is extensive academic writing on the subject, with some putting a higher

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emphasis on the negative impact foreign dominance had both over the colonial period, during the Cold

War and after, and others stressing internal aspects such as the ‘resource curse’ and corruption. In my

view all factors listed are invariably interconnected. The predicaments suffered in the continent cannot be

solely assigned to African decision making, they are also a consequence of the severe foreign intrusion

into African affairs (Schmidt 2013, p.1).

As a result of the Berlin conference that took place in 1884, the European powers formally drew up new

borders for Africa, which have remained almost entirely untouched to this day. These borders have often

been described as arbitrary. Independence, therefore, has not just been considered a liberation movement,

but also one of enclosure, since populations of different ethnic, political and religious groups were

confined to ex-colonial boundaries and subjected to inexperienced indigenous governments (Jackson

1990, p.151, Carment 2003, p.412). Moreover, culpability for the failure of states at the time of

independence does not solely lie with the new untried governments. Davidson emphasises the political

incompetence of the colonial administrators, and the lack of thought given to decolonisation prior to its

occurrence (1992, p.186), describing the transfer of power as a transfer of crisis (Ibid, p.190). Conversely,

not all writers on the subject offer a total disregard for the handover process at independence, with Ayoob

highlighting the proto-states provided by colonialism as ‘jumping-off points for the creation of a post-

colonial political order’ (1995, p.34). This view is, however, somewhat hopeful in view of the lack of

success suffered by so many states shortly after independence.

The Cold War, with its entailing super-power rivalry, also contributed to the demise of states south of the

Sahara. In the existing bipolar world order, external interests based on Cold War tensions would alter the

dynamics of local conflicts, in many cases leading to their escalation at the expense of African peoples

(Schmidt 2013, p.3). Regimes were propped up by the US or the Soviet Union based on their support

towards their ideology, regardless of the legitimacy or viability of said governments. As Cooper

describes, western governments were eager to work with gatekeeping states, permeable to their influence

and useful in Cold War rivalries’ (2002, p.159). He refers to them as gatekeeper states due to their one

central objective: with a lack of control over the people, their key function was the interface between their

states and the rest of the world, through the control of resources, foreign aid, or permits to do business in

their country (Ibid, 159). As will be studied later, Mobutu’s Zaire was one such example of a gatekeeper

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state that received vast external support. Moreover, the Cold War years helped undermine states due to

the free flowing arms supplies from the superpowers, which often escaped the control of governments

(Clapham 2004, p.91). In the post Cold War period many of the conflicts taking place were sustained

thanks to the easy availability of weapons originally supplied by their foreign supporters.

Another element that is often cited as a cause for state decay is the resource richness of a country. As

such, the concept ‘resource curse’ has emerged. Resource rich countries often became highly dependent

on the production and export of raw materials, ignoring other industries that may appear less profitable.

However, global prices fluctuate on an annual basis and these changes can result in crisis for the countries

dependent on their income (Hayter 1983, p.68), as was the case in the 1970s oil crisis. Furthermore, on a

domestic level, African governments have regularly profited from their countries’ resource endowment.

Taking on the role of predators, they make use of their power to extract resource wealth, hollowing out

the state, seeking to swim but not navigate and, in doing so, giving up their responsibilities to the state

(Rotberg 2004, p.29, Bates 2008, p.121).

According to state failure theory, each of the above-described factors undoubtedly plays a central role in

the downfall of the state. However, it must also be noted that there are academics that dismiss the thesis

of state failure altogether, and consider it a mere reflection of the West’s Eurocentric global view.

Jonathan Hill introduces his critique on the failed state thesis by calling for a rejection of the term. He

writes:

‘Failed state analysts constitute the identities of African societies in relation to those of the West,

simultaneously attributing negative characteristics to the former and positive to the latter’ (Hill 2005,

p.139).

Additionally, Western expectations for the creation of states mirroring theirs in Africa have been

unrealistic. Nonetheless, the fact that societies are not developing in the manner expected by the West

does not necessarily mean that they are failing altogether. Whilst they may not be replicating the Western

model initially imposed on them, they are not simply backward or delayed but are instead developing

differently (Chabal 1999, p.143). What's more, there is the possibility that what many refer to as state

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failure is in fact a misinterpreted process of state formation (Wai 2012, p.27). Nevertheless, the view of

the South as underdeveloped failing states has led to the continued unequal power relationship between

them and the global North that began during the colonial period. As such, there exists a common

misconception that the path to successful development can only be driven through Western development

assistance (Ibid, p.40).

2.2. Development Theory

Within the neoliberal line of thought, great emphasis is put on the importance of aid. It is considered to be

the glue holding together societies that would otherwise fall apart, societies whose realities are those of

the fourteenth century, encompassing civil war, plague and ignorance (Collier 2008, p.3). Accordingly,

there is a collective task that needs to be carried out – the West needs to help them onto the development

ladder, or at least help them gain a foothold at the bottom of it (Sachs 2005, p.2).

Such neoliberal views, however, are not shared by many development thinkers who view development

aid as a continuation of colonial inequality (Kothari 2005, p.48, Escobar 2012, p.39). Describing it as ‘a

new White Man’s Burden to clean up the mess left behind by the old White Man’s Burden’ (2006, p.239),

Easterly believes that current developmentalists share the same flaws as colonial officials, which include

excessive self-confidence, desultory local knowledge and lacking consultation with the locals (Ibid,

p.247). He is not alone in believing that Third World countries should be left to their own devices in order

to develop at their own speed in accordance to their needs. In addition, whilst development was supposed

to be about people, it has been criticised for excluding them. Instead, it is considered a top-down process

that treats people and cultures as abstract concepts and statistical figures (Escobar 2012, p.44). This line

of thought, extreme in its negative portrayal of development, is a reflection of the International Financial

Institutions (IFIs) and the role they play within it.

Both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were set up in the mid 1940s and are still

key organisations today in the field of development assistance. In relation to their position on Third

World development, they have been equally criticised for lacking political neutrality and promoting the

capitalist interests of the Western powers. The World Bank, described as ‘the high church of

development’ (Easterly 2007), receives most of its funds from major capital markets, Wall Street in

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particular, has an immediate interest in the repayment and servicing of debts (Hayter 2005, p.94).

Similarly, within the IMF, only the US has the power to veto and the largest economies are the ones who

have the most votes, therefore having the ‘dollars vote’ (Stiglitz 2013, p.12). As a result of such policies,

both institutions are considered by some as undemocratic.

In the 1970s, Third World countries borrowed heavily from commercial banks in order to pay for rising

import costs. This led to a debt crisis, since they had no way of paying back the loans. Stiglitz criticises

the lenders for over lending, particularly since being sophisticated financial institutions, they should have

been able to make better judgements on reasonable debt burden (Ibid, p.216). In contrast, the Brandt

Report, written in 1980, pushed for heavier lending from commercial banks, supported by the World

Bank and the IMF, to developing countries (Brandt 1980, p.256). By the beginning of the 1980s, the debt

crisis had worsened and, in order to address it, the IFIs introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes

(SAPs). The IMF and World Bank worked closely together, motivated by the need to ensure the

repayment of outstanding debts (Allen and Thomas 2000, p.206). Structural Adjustment proved in most

cases, to be a catastrophic failure for the economies of the countries that underwent the reforms outlined

by the programmes, and the 1980s have been described by some as a ‘lost decade’ for developing

countries (Ibid, p.300).

SAPs were supposed to address four economic maladies, which included excessive government spending

and intervention in markets, too much state ownership and poor governance (Sachs 2005, p.81). In order

to achieve this and secure debt repayments, reforms focused on trade liberalisation, privatisation of public

enterprises and cuts in government spending. Such reforms have been criticised by many, who not only

felt that they were draconian but also that they favoured the economic interests of governments and

companies of the North who provided the majority of funding, denying the countries of the South

democratic control over markets (Bracking 1999, p.208, Hayter 2005, p.104, Escobar 2012, p.57).

Moreover, those most affected by the reforms were the poor in developing countries, who were severely

hit by reduced subsidies in food and fuel, raised charges of basic services and lower wages (Williams

1994, p.221). As such, alternative means for survival were developed. Bayart famously describes this as

the ‘politics of the belly’, by which he means the necessity to exploit one’s profession or abilities, not for

the purpose of lucre, but in order to alleviate their poverty and survive (2009, p.236).

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Another effect of SAPs was the emergence of shadow networks and informal economies. These are,

however, not regarded as negative my some academics, who view them as not only a means of survival

for developing countries but also as their own version of development. Duffield defines this as a ‘popular

economic initiative in the face of restrictive state practices’ (2014, p.48). Consequently, he believes the

1980s were a period of social transformation in which the South developed non-liberal forms of economic

reinvention (Ibid, p.150). This view is far removed from the abovementioned ‘lost decade’. Nonetheless,

the figures presented by the Oxfam Poverty Report in 1995 are proof of the lack of success of structural

adjustment. Between 1980 and 1987 Africa’s debt increased to the equivalent of almost three quarters of

its income, compared to the earlier one third, and its debt to export ratio had risen to 500 per cent by the

end of the 1980s (Oxfam 1995, p.74). Thus the IFIs needed a change in strategy and the 1990s presented

them with the opportunity to adjust their development policies.

The World Bank Development Report in 1990 showcased a departure from the strict conditionality of

structural adjustment, and outlined the Bank’s primary goal to be poverty reduction in the Third World

(p.5). However, after the damage caused in the preceding years, a post development movement emerged,

calling for alternatives and for the rejection of the paradigm as a whole (Escobar 2012, p.215). In his

critique of development, Easterly writes:

‘The ideology of development should be packed up in crates and sent off to the Museum of Dead

Ideologies, just down the hall from Communism, Socialism, and Fascism. It’s time to recognise that the

attempt to impose a rigid development ideology on the world’s poor has failed miserably’ (2007).

Nonetheless, aid is still viewed by many as a fundamental component in reducing poverty and the risk of

state failure in the countries of the South. There are extensive calls for the reduction and even cancelation

of Third World debt. In addition, further aid is considered necessary in order to fight Africa’s poverty

trap, which includes widespread Malaria and Aids (Sachs 2005, p.194). Yet, aid should preferably come

in the form of grants. Stiglitz highlights that countries in desperate poverty are unlikely to turn down

loans even if they may not be able to repay them, therefore assistance combining grants and more diligent

lending is likely to relieve countries of future excessive debt (2007, p.228). Whilst the Oxfam Poverty

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Report agrees with the need for debt relief, it rejects the idea of increased aid. It states that, from the early

1980s to the mid 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa received over £200 billion in aid, a 10 per cent increase, but

economic recovery and improved human welfare are yet to materialise (Oxfam 1995, p.190). In view of

the report, the success of development assistance over the period is called into question.

In her work on foreign interventions in Africa, Schmidt concludes that during the period of 1945 to 2010,

external involvement in the continent caused it more harm than it did good (2013, p.229). Whilst the

theory revised in the preceding paragraphs highlighted the factors behind state failure, the following

chapters will now turn to an in depth analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Through the

examination of the country’s history and relationship with foreign powers, the impact of foreign

domination in the country will be assessed, as will Schmidt’s own conclusion.

Colonialism and its Legacy

3.1. King Leopold II and the Congo Free State.

Trefon asserts that the crisis in contemporary Congo’s political economy originates from the patrimonial

system that was firmly put in place by King Leopold II (2011, p.19). This statement is difficult to call into

question once a thorough analysis of Leopold’s policy in the Congo is carried out. The original mission as

stated by the Belgian Monarch was a humanitarian one, or so he sought to persuade the international

community in a speech made in 1876 at the Geographical Conference organised by Leopold himself:

‘To open to civilisation the only part of our globe which it has yet not penetrated, to pierce the darkness

which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress’ (Hochschild

2012, p.44)

His philanthropic parade, which also contained a seemingly deep antislavery character, was a success. In

1884 the US officially recognised Leopold’s claims to the Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.16). Other

countries soon followed suit. The terms of the Berlin Conference that took place later that year guaranteed

free trade in the Congo. However, the agreement was amended in the Anti-Slavery Conference where

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King Leopold offered his services in the provision of fortified posts, roads and railways for troops

pursuing the slavers, in exchange for an authorisation to levy import duties to fund the fight against

slavery (Hochschild 2012, p.93). Considering that as early as 1876 he had acquired the signatures of

African rulers for treaties which signed over their land to him, often in exchange for clothes or alcohol

(Young 1994a, p.84, Hochschild 2012, p.71), King Leopold now held complete political and economic

control over what he named the Congo Free State, and what was to become little more than a personal

property for him to exploit.

His humanitarian pretensions were quickly put aside, as he set up what was essentially a system of

slavery in the production and extraction of resources, a system that hindered any chance of positive

development in the region (Renton, Seddon and Zeiling 2007, p.3). Aside from the power and prestige he

hoped to achieve internationally as a colonial ruler, Leopold only saw the Congo as a source of wealth for

metropolitan development exclusively. In order to ensure revenue, mostly from ivory and wild rubber,

gross violations of human rights fell upon his African subjects (Young 1994b, p.251). Hochschild uses

words such as genocide and holocaust to describe the proportions of violence endured by the enslaved

central Africans, and estimates that by 1920 the population in the Congo was cut by half, dropping by

approximately 10 million people (2012, p.225, 233). Wild rubber collection was imposed on the populace

through particularly exploitative techniques, becoming known as the rubber regime, or ‘red rubber’ due to

the atrocities committed to secure its production (Young and Turner 1985, p.33). It is in this way that the

Congo was incorporated into the capitalist world system, and as a consequence of this brutal insertion into

the imperial political economy, the origins of the DRC’s socio-economic and moral decay came to light

(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.2, 13).

3.2. The Congo under Belgian rule

After international condemnation of human rights abuses committed under Leopold’s rule, in 1908 the

Congo formally changed ownership, becoming a Belgian colony. Not only did the Belgian government

take on the debt left behind by King Leopold, but also, as a sign of gratitude for the ‘great sacrifices made

for the Congo’, Leopold received fifty million francs (Hochschild 2012, p.259). This sum was given as a

sign of gratitude, ironically, to someone who had not once set foot in his African colony and had

sacrificed the lives of thousands at the expense of personal gain.

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As a Belgian colony, the Congo did not fare much better than in Leopoldian times. The transfer of control

did not provide significant changes, and the state was governed and organised purely for the benefit of

Belgium and its international partners (Davidson 1992, p.255). As Rodney declares, ‘colonialism for the

most part aimed at developing the metropoles, and only allowed certain crumbs to the colonies as

incidental by-products of exploitation’ (2012, p.213). Consequently, all aspects of colonial rule were

carefully constructed to achieve the central aim of extraction of economic surplus (Van Hoyweghen and

Smis 2002, p.576).

Never was this more evident than the period spanning the two world wars, where even though the fighting

was taking place so far from the Congo, and so its people should have been unaware of it, the case was

quite the opposite. Already harsh conditions worsened as a result of a boom in the mining industry, and

therefore increased forced labour, due to a demand in minerals such as copper or uranium. Allied shells

used in combat during the First World War were often made with Congolese copper, and the nuclear

bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were made with Congolese uranium (BBC 2013). In order to

guarantee obedience and hard labour, the Force Publique – the colonial army- used repression,

intimidation and punishment (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.37). Moreover, traditional African rulers were

often transformed into members of the colonial administration, in order to ensure that activities such as

forced labour, conscription or tax collection were carried out adequately (Ibid, p.35). Accordingly, a rise

in local tensions was bound to arise, since chiefs were working alongside the colonial repressive machine,

obtaining certain social and economic benefits, at the expense of those enduring the suffering imposed on

them.

Belgian authorities had no real incentive to grant independence to their profit-reaping colony, and so

when independence inevitably came, the Congo was a country completely unprepared for the challenges

awaiting them in the years ahead. With political organisations banned under Belgian rule, and an enduring

paternalistic attitude towards the Congolese, a complete lack of preparedness for political responsibility

amongst the local elites was unsurprising (Trefon 2002, p.485). Young sums this up in his claim that the

state had no desire to transform its subjects into a true civil society (1994b, p.255). African elites were to

inherit a Western state system that was unsuited politically, culturally and socially to them (Trefon, Van

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Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.386). Moreover, they were faced with a task for which they had no

instruction. At the point of independence no army officers and only three out of the top 4,500

functionaries in the country were Congolese (Young 1998, p.99).

The decolonisation process, which took place in 1960, was extremely rushed. A plan was drawn up in the

space of two weeks, for it to be implemented within the following six months (Ibid, p.6). To all effects,

the Belgian colonial administration left no tradition of democracy (Ibid, p.13); instead, they left a culture

of exploitation, repression and control. As such, emerging leaders, with little revolutionary consciousness,

and no experience in government, sought to perpetuate the colonial forms of control (Nzongola-Ntalaja

2007, p.4). Nugent’s words aptly describe the process that ensued: ‘decolonisation provided a façade of

change, behind which a continuity in unequal power relations was effected’ (2012, p.9). Given the legacy

that the people of the Congo were left with at independence, the crisis that followed, often referred to as

state collapse, comes as no surprise.

3.3. Colonial legacy and the challenges at independence

Within the colonial debate and its impact, the benefits of colonisation are sometimes brought to the

forefront. Though it’s true that hospitals, schools or railways were built and may be counted as beneficial

towards African development, the damage caused to entire societies is overwhelming. Improvements in

infrastructure are not enough to justify the plunder and abuse carried out by European administrators. The

repercussions of this socio-economic exploitation were instantly felt in the Congo when it gained

independence. According to Clapham, the state collapse that occurred in the central African country

during the era of decolonisation was by far the most spectacular within the continent (2002, p.782). State

collapse may not be the right term in which to conceptualise events however, as at this early stage the

state was arguably in process of formation, and therefore far from fully functioning or complete.

No matter how this period in Congolese history is labelled, with violence emerging almost immediately,

the newly independent country found itself in a state of national crisis. Within two weeks of independence

and the election of the nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba as prime minister, there was a mutiny by the

army’s Congolese soldiers, as well as a secessionist movement in the mineral-rich Katanga region (Reno

2006, p.47). Both revolts are said to have been instigated by international mining companies keen to

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protect their interests, and the Belgians (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.94), eager to maintain their control in

the region, particularly after Lumumba’s election, which was seen by the West as a threat to their

interests.

Both conflicts led to the arrival of UN troops, sent by the international community in order to secure

Congo’s territorial integrity (Boyle 1988, p.273). Lumumba was the one to request UN forces, yet soon

he found himself in disagreement with them as it became apparent that their priority was the resolution of

the conflict in line with Western economic and political interests (Schmitt 2013, p.61). Even though the

state in Congo was evidently not working, international forces felt the need to ensure the state’s existence.

Due to its strategic location, size and raw material endowment, a Congolese ‘quasi-state’- to use

Jackson’s earlier description- was preferable to the potential instability a power vacuum could cause

(Cooper 2002, p.166). Thus, a decolonised Congo was far from independent in practical terms, and future

foreign intrusions were to be heightened due to Cold War geopolitical interests, which would further

derail the possibility of a natural development towards a democratic government and social stability.

From Mobutu to Kabila

4.1. Western Cold War strategies

Since the creation of the Congo state in 1884, dominant powers have upheld the same strategic objective

in the region: to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.258). The wrong

hands being of course, any political leader unwilling to serve Western interests. Lumumba was such a

leader, and as such, external forces – the CIA and Belgium in particular, worked towards his demise.

Lumumba wished to go beyond territorial independence. In order for the Congo to break from its colonial

past, the country needed to cease being an economic colony of the West (Renton, Seddon, Zeilig 2007,

p.85). Despite being the country’s first democratically elected leader, and considered to be a real

contender to drive the Congo towards stability, he was met with an untimely death. A much written about

conspiracy at the hands of Northern powers and Mobutu Sese Seko, the man they had handpicked to take

over the leadership role, led to the murder of Lumumba in January 1961. The fate of the state, stolen from

the Congolese people, was once again at the hands of external actors, this time by neo-colonial forces,

and the man they had chosen as their ally in order to secure their national interests.

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According to sources, Mobutu was recruited by the CIA, and put on a payroll, which included $150

million in bribes and secret payments over the first decade of his rule (Collins 1997, p.283). This was in

full knowledge of Mobutu’s corrupt nature, human rights violations and undemocratic practices. Cold

War interests seemed to go beyond morality or responsibility. Anti-colonial nationalists and

prodemocracy activists such as Lumumba were put aside, regardless of the contribution they could make

towards good governance and development (Schmitt 2013, p.197). Instead, ‘no regime was dubbed too

corrupt or repressive for American support so long as it allied with the US in the Cold War’ (Ibid). Thus,

in encouraging and securing Mobutu’s rise to power, colonial power structures remained practically

unchanged (Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.577). Within five years of gaining independence, the

people of the Congo found themselves governed by a president who had simply adapted colonial

structures, and patrimonialised them (Boyle 1988, p.278), hindering any chance of healthy development,

and they had Northern governments – the United States in particular, to thank.

4.2. Patrimonialism and Zairianisation

Describing Mobutu’s early yeas in power, Young and Turner refer to his politics as being of leviathan

proportions; a modern version of Leopold’s absolutism (1985, p.43). The state was centralised, leaving no

space for institutional autonomy at any level of the state apparatus, taking control of all corporate

interests, and therefore asserting a political monopoly (Ibid) that excluded the large majority of the

Congolese people. Nonetheless, in the first years of centralisation, Mobutu was able to achieve some

political stability and an increase in productivity (Boyle 1988, p.277). However, the long-term effects

proved to be far from beneficial for the country.

In order to maintain control over the state, Mobutu resorted to a system of patrimonialism, used to ensure

total loyalty from his political entourage, as well as the security forces required for his protection and that

of his regime’s. With his role as the gatekeeper of the Congolese state, and a lack of popular support,

Mobutu had to turn to a weave of patron-client relationships within the state (Cooper 2002, p.157). As a

result, Mobutu and ‘his shifting entourage, extracted resources arbitrarily from poor peasants and rich

merchants to such a degree that the formal dimension of state rule collapsed’ (Ibid, p.159). His

patrimonial system of government had the single objective of amassing personal wealth whilst retaining

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his hold on power. As Rotberg argues, any form of democracy, such as legitimate political institutions,

civil society or even economic development was for Mobutu a possible threat to his authoritarian rule

(2004, p.12). He was able to maintain his patronage networks thanks to the considerable income he

obtained form resource revenues and foreign aid intended for the country’s development, but

conveniently funnelled to Mobutu’s personal accounts. Critics conclude that as a consequence of

patrimonialism, corruption became the defining feature of the Congolese state (Young and Turner 1985,

p.183).

In 1971, Mobutu changed the name of the country to Zaire, and in November 1973 he embarked on his

Zairianisation project. It was claimed to be a war against the bourgeoisie and it comprised amongst other

things, a state take over of all private ventures, including colonial ones (Young 1998, p.115).

Consequently, large parts of the economy were transferred to Mobutu’s cronies. Young and Turner argue

that one of the main objectives of Zairianisation was to obtain a new pool of resources for patrimonial

distribution through the expropriation of commercial and agricultural businesses (1985, p.168). Some

critics illustrate this period of patrimonialism and corruption as the ‘Zairian sickness’ – a time of

economic social and moral decay (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.7). Furthermore, Zairianisation had

devastating effects on the state and its people. The early 1970s saw the launch of vast, miscalculated and

eventually failed development projects, as well as a rapid decline in copper, which had been key in

promoting growth up to this point. These factors quickly lead to a debt crisis. By 1975 Zaire’s debt was

$3 billion (Young 1998, p.118), yet in spite of this Mobutu and his clients continued to enrich themselves

through resource appropriation. Calculations indicate that as much as 20 per cent of the official budget

was allocated to the president, whilst the Bank of Zaire was to turn over significant amounts of foreign

exchange to him on a regular basis (Ibid). Zairianisation’s clear unfeasibility became indisputable;

therefore, before the end of the decade, it was tossed aside. This did not put an end to the Zairian leader’s

plunder of his own country, yet the international community watched from the sidelines and remained

impassive as Zaire ceased to be a functioning state. The Cold War was ongoing, and in 1975 the

battleground had become neighbouring Angola. Due to geopolitical strategy, it was important that

Mobutu continued to be an ally, therefore he remained worthy of their support.

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External actors, and the role they played in sustaining the Zairian leader, make up a key component in the

durability of this regime. In order to understand how Mobutu remained in power for over three decades,

the influence of the US and other Western forces must be analysed. According to Allen, there are four

reasons for Mobutu’s endurance: leadership skills, windfall gains from high commodity prices, technical

sophistication in repression, and finally external support in the form of economic or military aid (1995,

p.309). An earlier section of this chapter has explained how without the involvement of Northern

institutions such as the CIA, Mobutu may never have become the president of the Zairian state. Yet their

influence did not end there, with relations remaining close until in the early 1990s, when Western

governments and institutions decided to bring them to an end.

Resulting from international military support, a free flow of externally supplied armaments allowed the

government and its security apparatus to deal with opposition by force (Clapham 2004, p.91), thus

reducing the capabilities of political rivals to pose a serious threat to the president’s rule. Moreover, in the

instance that a serious threat did materialise, the three members of the ‘Western Troika’ (Nzongola-

Ntalaja 2007, p.162) – Belgium, The United Stated and France, were able to fight for the regime’s cause.

One such example is the invasion of the copper-rich Shaba province, earlier known as Katanga, in 1977

and 1978. With Mobutu’s forces unable to put an end to the invasion, the three powers intervened,

sending troops from Morocco and bringing the invasion to a halt (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, p.11).

Aside from military assistance, a key element of international support came in the form of investments,

and, more importantly, aid. Throughout his rule, Mobutu amassed a huge fortune, part of which came

from foreign aid intended for debt relief and development. The role played by the International Financial

Institutions and Western governments will come under closer inspection in the next section of this

chapter. Yet, it is important to note at this point, that Mobutu was often able to manipulate donors, and

play them so as to achieve his financial aims. As Bayart observes, it is ‘occasionally the puppets who pull

the strings’ (2009, p.26). This was particularly the case in later years when aid became conditional upon

various demands for reforms, such as democratisation. In the case of Mobutu, as with other postcolonial

African leaders, democratisation was only a tactic used in order to secure aid from donors (De Herdt

2002, p.447). Moves towards democracy were but feigned attempts, yet the rents assured through the

pretence served him well in his continued embezzlement of any available resources.

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4.3. The effects of Western aid

The debt crisis that emerged during the time of Zairianisation cannot be solely blamed on Mobutu’s bad

policies. Western private banks contributed greatly to the regime’s economic collapse. In their need to

recycle petro-dollar reserves, the West lent huge sums to Mobutu for his industrialisation programme

(Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis, 2002, p.380). For instance, from 1972 to 1974, Citibank, along with

its London and Paris affiliates, arranged loans of $164 million for Zaire (Young and Turner 1985, p.379).

Aside from the fact the industrialisation process proved largely unsuccessful – Mobutu was more

interested in immediate access to capital than in long-term investments (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and

Smis, 2002, p.380)- it also pushed further the marginalisation of the agricultural sector. With many

Zairians leaving their rural homes in search for urban employment, large unemployed groups in the cities

developed (Boyle 1988, p.277). The situation in Zaire became unsustainable, and Mobutu had to resort to

the IFIs for support.

With an outstanding debt amounting to 30 per cent of the country’s GDP in 1980, Zaire became one of

the first African countries to formally submit to an IMF structural adjustment programme (Renton,

Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.133). Critics of the IFIs and their policies in developing countries maintain that

SAPs represented a neoliberal package that was virtually unaltered regardless of the country the policies

were being applied to (Nega and Schneider 2014, p.486). The core of the programmes remained the same:

the privatisation of parastatals as well as of public goods previously provided by state institutions (Ibid,

p.487). Such policies would hit the poor hardest, as was the case in Zaire, but for the IFIs the priority was

financial stability and avoiding debt defaults (Hayter 1981, p.88). Easterly suggests that state failure in

Zaire came to be in 1991, and highlights that this was after a period of 10 years in which the country had

spent 73 per cent of the time under IMF programmes (2006, p.192). Just like Zairianisation, SAPs in

Zaire had proven incapable of promoting growth, bringing about stability or encourage development. In

fact, the country found itself drowning in ever-growing debt.

However, SAPs alone should not be held responsible for Zaire’s economic fate. Mobutu and his close

entourage used the resources made available through aid with complete disregard for the wellbeing of the

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masses. Nonetheless, many critics condemn their irresponsibility in enforcing reforms on fragile or

corrupt regimes where the likelihood of successful application was limited at best. Collins emphatically

makes this point in saying that

‘the US, Western European governments, the World Bank, the IMF and many international corporations

and foreign businessmen knowingly conspired to loot Zaire. They all ‘lent’ millions to Zaire, carefully

watched as Mobutu stole it, then cynically demanded its repayment. Mobutu, of course, obliged,

squeezing debt repayments from an impoverished people in his periodic bouts of structural adjustment’.

(1997, p.286)

Other critics join Collins, in declaring that whilst politicians such as Mobutu had become predators, donor

institutions acted like loan-sharks (Birmingham 1998, p.281). When the president did choose to pay his

arrears, IFIs turned a blind eye to the dubious provenance of funds, so long as some debt was repaid.

Moreover, the World Bank’s country reports only included a short section on poverty, often almost like

an afterthought. It was believed that poverty was secondary, with stabilisation measures and cuts in public

spending being the priority in order to deal with debt, inflation or deficit issues (Hayter 2005, p.104). As

such, neoliberal hegemony can be said to have placed markets above morality (Duffield 2014, p.260), at

least in the period concerned.

Financial assistance from lending agencies should be designed with the purpose of reinforcing positive

leadership (Rotberg 2002, p.95). The International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 stated that the US

and other donor agencies should not channel their assistance to countries whose governments engaged in

human rights violations. Zaire’s case demonstrates that this Act was largely ignored. What’s more, the

flow of international funds fostered the development of illegal activities and the further erosion of the

state’s administrative capacity (Hibou 1999, p.93). The level of corruption that emerged in this time was

unrestrained. Mobutu was however, clearly unrepentant or even ashamed. In an interview where he was

asked whether he could personally pay off Zaire’s debt, he brazenly replied that it was indeed technically

possible, but he couldn’t be sure that he would be paid back (Braid 1997). An incongruous answer if there

ever was one, considering his fortune belonged rightly to Zaire and its people, and not to the ruler and his

patrimonial regime.

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In spite of the evident gross misappropriation of funds by Mobutu and his cronies, Northern institutions

and governments remained at his side until the early 1990s as a result of national interests that clearly

took precedence over the welfare of the Zairian state. By 1993, Zaire’s situation was so abysmal that the

World Bank stopped including the country’s data in their annual World Development Report, and the

IMF suspended their voting rights and placed its membership on hold (Young 1998, p.129). Aid was

officially suspended, and Mobutu was on his own.

During the decade above described, the situation for the Zairian people can be described as dire at best.

By 1988 the country was ranked the eighth poorest in the world, with an average per capita income of

$160 per annum, and real income levels lower than the pre-independence period (Renton, Seddon and

Zeilig 2007, p.148). None of the money received through foreign investments, aid or resource distribution

was funnelled towards the improvement of the national welfare provision, building of infrastructure or

any security provision (Rotberg 2002, p.94). The nation became used to ‘doing without’ – without food,

safe drinking water, or basic health services to name a few things (Trefon 2002, p.486). Though the entire

country was poverty stricken, the rural community suffered the most. Although those working in the

agricultural sector made up the majority, their needs were largely ignored, and until the late 70s less than

one per cent of the state’s budget went towards this sector (Davidson 1992, p.258).

The value of health services declined sharply and medical supplies became exceptionally rare, and this

along with the decline in nutrition levels led to the deaths of a third of children before they reached the

age of five (Young and Turner 1985, p.91, Renton, Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.149). Although there was

an increase in the number of schools, most rural ones were in a derelict state, lacking all basic equipment

and teaching staff were completely demoralised (Young and Turner 1985, p.403). If any development was

indeed taking place, the mass of the Zairian population were excluded from it. Unsurprisingly, ‘to the

subject the state became not just the alien oppressor of colonial memory but a simple predator, at best

irrelevant to the daily needs of the citizen’ (Young 1998, p.98). As such, the Zairian people chose to

follow a distinct path towards their human development. Through what has been described as ‘the politics

of the belly’, and the emergence of a flourishing informal economy, Zairians were able to ensure their

survival.

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As the state apparatus ceased to function in an official manner, social services began to be provided, but

in an unofficial way – services were provided in a fee-for-service basis (Van de Walle 2004, p.106). This

form of institutionalised corruption, carried out by civil servants, is considered by Bayart ‘a method of

social struggle’ (2009, p.236). Moreover, these activities, traditionally considered illegal, carried out by

the majority of the population for survival, are for him a mere reflection of the methods used by those in

power to accumulate wealth and power (Ibid, p.237). For Mobutu and his entourage patrimonialism was a

means of retaining power. For the masses the politics of the belly is a form of resilience in the face of a

predatory state that seems to have forgotten their rights. Within the educational system for instance,

teachers are paid approximately $30 a month by the state (Trefon 2009, p.12.). To avoid teachers leaving

their jobs and schools closing down, parents ‘motivate’ them to stay by paying them bonuses (Ibid).

Should such practices be considered immoral? Though they may be seen as illegal in the traditional sense

of the word, Zairians can justify and legitimise their illicit activities, since it provides them with jobs,

income and it’s often the only way of getting ahead (Hibou 1999, p.103).

The informal economy is another way in which Zairian society has combated the collapse of the country’s

economic collapse. As in many of the Southern states, it represents a critical lifeline for all those outside

the state’s patronage networks (Duffield 2014, p.146). By 2001, the informal economy in Zaire made up

two-thirds of the country’s GDP (Samset 2002, p.466). Activities within this sector include street

vending, trading and manufacturing, smuggling or hustling (Trefon 2011, p.45). There are varying

opinions on the effects of a growing parallel economy. Some critics believe that it’s not a path to

development, but simply a way to enable survival (Ibid) for an otherwise impoverished population in the

face of a non-existent state. For others however, this sector represents much more than just a way of

coping. Cooper for instance, declares that those living independently of the Zairian state, off their own

production and social networks have not only created a parallel economy, but also a parallel society full

of cultural dynamism, particularly though not exclusively in Zaire’s capital, Kinshasa (Cooper 2002,

p.167). This may not be development in the Western liberal sense, but it surely represents a form of social

development in a struggle to move forward despite the obstacles presented by the government’s political,

economic and social predatory ways.

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4.4. Laurent Kabila, external involvement and the Congo Wars

For the international community a collapsed state and the alternative development that emerged in the

country were sources of concern for their national interests. Though the Cold War was over, the central

African country remained of geopolitical interest. Thus, in order to bring stability Mobutu needed to be

replaced. In 1993 Laurent-Desire Kabila wrote an open letter condemning Mobutu’s regime, declaring the

necessity to eliminate him (Kabuya-Lumuna Sando 2002, p.618). This suited the interests of Western

forces and regional neighbours alike. Consequently, with the consent and support of the US, a coalition of

neighbouring countries along with Kabila’s ‘Alliance of Democratic Forces of Liberation’ (ADFL) drove

Mobutu out of power (Dizolele 2010, p.145). In 1997 Kabila declared himself president of the country,

now renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Once in power, Kabila faced criticism for lack of a clear vision or political programme. Nonetheless,

Western backers stressed the need to give him time and support in developing his strategy (Collins 1997,

282). Despite the fact that the new leader quickly began running the country through relatives and cronies

who made the most of the rents now available to them, the US stood by Kabila, even blocking UN

Security Council condemnation of the new regime (Schmitt 2013, p.211). It seems clear that Kabila

would have never reached his position of power without the support of external actors. The US and other

Western powers had historically been involved in all aspects of Congolese development (or lack thereof),

but why at this point did neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda feel the need to intervene in the DRC?

Nzongola-Ntalaja suggests that Kabila was simply the client of Rwandan and Ugandan authorities, who

used him in order to justify an invasion, take out Mobutu and have access to the country’s mineral wealth

(2007, p.135). Perhaps the first war was one of liberation, but the second, starting in 1998, was a

fragmented one in which countless regional and armed conflicts were being fought in the DRC, clearly

exploiting the country’s failed state syndrome (Lemarchand 2002, p.391, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002,

p.413). Kabila had no real control over his territory, and Rwanda and Uganda no longer fought on his side

but against him, and Western governments soon stopped offering him their support.

Kabila was soon dubbed ‘Mobutu II’, showing no interest for political debate, and having no issue with

committing human rights abuses (Cooper 2002, p.167). He introduced methods of corporal punishment

such as whipping at ADFL checkpoints that brought to mind the practices of colonial times (Collins 1997,

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p.281). However, what concerned the Western world the most was Kabila’s unpredictability and

nationalist rhetoric that suggested a threat to their geostrategic interests (Kabuya-Lumuna Sando 2002,

p.619). As such, not only did the international community refuse him economic assistance in the second

Congo War, but they also supported the invading states, with the hope that it might bring an end to

Kabila, replacing him with a more Western friendly leader in the DRC (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, 421).

Though this was a central reason for their support of Rwanda and other invading countries, there was

another important cause for it. Both the British and the US governments failed to act in the face of the

Rwanda genocide back in 1994. Now, therefore, they offered support to Rwanda’s new president who

justified the invasion as a security strategy against Hutu forces now operating in the DRC (Trefon 2011,

p.13). The international community therefore chose to sit by and watch whilst neighbouring countries

ransacked Congo’s mineral resources in a war that resulted in millions of deaths.

4.5. Congo’s resource curse

The DRC’s raw material endowment can today only be seen as a curse. As earlier chapters have

examined, at all instances throughout Congolese modern history resources have led to misappropriation,

repression, corruption and inequality. The Congo is a major producer of cobalt, industrial diamonds and

copper as well as of rare metals needed for electronic items used throughout the world (Trefon 2011,

p.41). What should have led to economic prosperity and development has instead brought the vast

majority of the country to ruin except for a few elites. Moreover, not only has it been a cause for conflict,

but it has also been a key determinant for the sustenance of fighting. A political economy of war has

become a means of accumulation and production, and for many of those involved, war is decidedly more

profitable than peacetime could ever be (Moore, 2001, p.132, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.428). This

of course means that the participants in the conflict are undeniably bound to the globalisation process.

Plunder and therefore war is so lucrative because of worldwide demand for what lies underneath

Congolese soil. Despite widespread condemnation of the violence carried out by all warring factors in the

war, multinational companies clearly remain in business with them.

Collier relates an example that clearly illustrates the above point: when asked by a journalist how difficult

rebellion was, Kabila’s alleged response was that it was easy, a few thousand dollars to hire a small army,

and a satellite phone to strike deals with resource extraction companies (Collier 2008, p.21). It is therefore

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important not to make the assumption that the greedy politician holds all responsibility for enriching

himself through plunder whilst the population struggles to move forward in life. Whilst as Mobutu’s and

Kabila’s record suggest, there is definitely truth in this, it is important to consider who is on the other side

of these multimillion dollar deals that allow them to continue their kleptocratic regimes.

Western companies contributed greatly to the conflict, by fuelling it with their business and trade

involving Congolese minerals (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.381). Belgium has been

denounced for its continued involvement in the illicit trade of diamonds and coltan throughout the conflict

in the DRC (Bustin 2002, p.555, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.422). More worrying even is the interest

of mining companies to meet with Kabila the moment Mobutu ceased to be president. The new leader had

managed to strike deals worth approximately $3 billion a year with the companies De Beers and

American Mineral Fields (Renton, Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.181.). Rwanda and Uganda were similarly

profiting. The World Bank publicly praised both countries for their increased development and economic

success, even though it was clear that both were resulting from the exploitation of the Congo’s minerals

and the contracts they were signing with Western companies (Ibid, p.194). The fact that large

international companies were profiting from a conflict that in just a few years has caused such widespread

displacement, rape and death is extremely alarming. More so, however, is the inaction from the

international community at large. Their attitude was dominated by the idea of sovereignty: ‘African

solutions for African problems’ (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.427). However some question whether

economic interests were the true reason behind their response. Lemarchand suggests that

‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that by turning a blind eye to the profits drawn from the looting of

the Congo’s wealth, the international community – meaning not only the European Union and the US, but

the World Bank and the IMF- is tacitly encouraging a colonial enterprise in the best tradition of

European imperialism’ (2002, p.394).

Though the war is officially over, fighting continues in the Eastern region, and no doubt, minerals are still

being plundered and keeping the conflict alive. International actors have made some efforts towards

limiting the illicit trade of resources. An example is the Kimberley Process launched in 2003, a

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certification scheme to prevent the trade of minerals that help fund conflict. Unfortunately, it is not

proving to be the success that was initially hoped for (Global Witness 2011).

4.6. Joseph Kabila: Towards a new democratic state?

With the conflict still ongoing, Laurent Kabila’s leadership came to an abrupt end. He was murdered by

one of his bodyguards. The DRC was in need of a new leader, and as if it were a monarchy, Kabila’s son

Joseph inherited the role. Lacking any legitimacy at home, Joseph Kabila’s first presidential move was to

travel to the West to seek it abroad (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.247). He travelled to Washington, Paris

and Brussels, and just like Mobutu in his heyday, enjoyed great support from his new ‘godfathers’, who

no doubt had their own agendas, but were all united in their need to avoid a power vacuum in the DRC

(de Villers and Omasombo Tshonda 2002, p.408). The younger Kabila lacked political experience and

therefore Western actors felt he would be easier to mould to their needs. Moreover, he worked towards

putting an end to the war economy, adopted more liberal policies and moved forwards with the Inter-

Congolese Dialogue, a step towards finalising the Lusaka Peace Agreement (Ibid).

For the West, the US particularly, state building is not just a matter of charity, it is an investment towards

their own security and stability, a way to protect the global economy that provides them their prosperity

(Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein 2005, p.135). As such, nurturing Kabila was of vital interest to donor

states. Therefore upon his succession to power development aid was quickly resumed (Smis and

Oyatambwe 2002, p.419). Critics highlight the international community’s pressure to liberalise the

economy in the DRC, which takes precedence over political liberalisation, thus ‘the Congo will be free

for the market, and a few more warlords and kings than before, but not for its people’ (Moore 2001,

p.135). With Kabila’s strategy principally being about taking control of economic networks, instead of

establishing control and an administration throughout the country (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis

2002, p.281), the prospects of democracy in the country were bleak.

Nonetheless, elections were organised, and in 2006 Kabila officially became president of the DRC. The

international community played a major role in ensuring this was the result. Under the leadership of the

EU, $700 million was provided for the electoral process, and troops were sent to ensure security (Dizolele

2010, p.151). Moreover, potential challengers to Kabila’s victory were discouraged from competing by

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ignoring their demands, and by the time of the elections, political parties that had formed in a rush were

unprepared for them (Ibid). Kabila’s victory came as no surprise. However, if the Congolese people

hoped for major changes, they soon learnt they would not materialise. Kabila promised improvements in

infrastructure, health, education, water and electricity, housing and employment (Trefon 2011, p.29). Yet

both poverty and vulnerability indicators remain catastrophic (Ibid). However, there has been some

progress within fiscal discipline and transparency, and the implementation of economic reform

programmes set by the IMF has led to some growth in private investments (Ibid, p.43).

Nonetheless, vast amounts of aid for development received is badly implemented, and the ‘politics of the

belly’ earlier described remains an issue in the country. Public service providers are said to prioritise

personal gain over duty, and a hierarchical administrative system has been established to ensure that the

provision of any service benefits someone at every level of the administrative chain (Ibid, p.96). More

worrying however, is the feeling of disengagement with the state throughout the Congolese population,

comparable to the state-society relations under the Mobutu regime. This is clearly summed up by a survey

that asked Congolese people what they would do it if the state were a person; ‘kill him’ was the

unequivocal response (Trefon 2009, p.13). Despite the aid provided by international partners and the

moves towards reform that are claimed to be in place, equitable growth is not taking place. Accordingly,

the majority masses of the DRC are still fending for themselves and therefore are still living in parallel to

the state.

Conclusion

If the democratic elections held in 2006 gave hope to the people of the DRC, the 2011 elections failed to

provide the people with feelings of optimism. In the lead up to the elections journalists and politicians

were arrested, opposition rallies violently broken up, and a renowned human rights activist killed

allegedly with the complicity of the police (Stearns 2011). Perhaps the good news in this is that an

opposition movement is rising, along with a flourishing civil society – after Kabila amended the

constitution so as to eliminate a second round of voting, opposition groups demonstrated in cities around

Europe in January 2011 (Trefon 2011, p.129). Opposition groups, such as these represent a path towards

democracy, stability and development. The current government, as it stands today, will not be the one to

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bring the country out of the misery it has been in since Leopold colonised it in 1885. Kabila has ruled

with an increasingly heavy hand, and the country has remained in a violent rut, were prosperity has only

come to those close to the president and the dubious mining deals he has signed (Gettleman 2011).

As Dizolele asserts, in light of the destructive role the international community has played throughout the

Congo’s history, they have a moral obligation to assist the people of the DRC in their efforts towards

democracy (2010, p.149). Providing support for Kabila’s authoritarian and corrupt regime will not allow

space for democratic development. The $3 billion provided annually in development aid needs to be

directed towards constructive projects, such as battling corruption or empowering the people politically

(Stearns 2011). Turning a blind eye to Kabila’s exploitative regime because his policies don’t threaten

Western interests is morally irresponsible. However, it seems that Northern governments may currently

be pushing for political change. As Kabila strives to make changes to the constitution that limits

presidents to two terms in office, Western governments have joined the Congolese opposition leaders and

thousands of protesters in condemning this move (Bavier 2014). Whether Kabila chooses to ignore them

and run in the 2016 elections remains to be seen, but it is clear that international actors have the ability to

pressure him to comply with the constitution and step down at the end of his term.

This brings me back to my first research question, which asked whether the West should put an end to the

relationship of dependency that has existed between them, and cease its close involvement in the political

economy of the DRC. Northern states and institutions are so tied to the history of the country’s

development that a hasty end of relations would prove harmful. Moreover, the effects of globalisation

make escaping the culture of dependency a near-impossible feat. Nevertheless, Western involvement

must be both constructive and morally responsible for the Congolese population, and must attempt to

restrict the unequal power relations that are currently in place. Moves have been made towards this,

particularly with the IMF and World Bank’s 2010 announcement of the $12.3 billion in debt relief for the

country. This should be an incentive for the Congo to move towards ending its aid dependency. As Moyo

remarks, it is aid dependency that has hindered good governance for so long, and in putting an end to it,

the chances of a positive growth trajectory will be reinforced (2010, p.143)

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Instead of direct financial assistance, aid programmes focused on public administration reforms (Trefon

2011, p.102-103), which serve long-term development goals have been put in place. Rather than focusing

on propping up a leader to suit their interests like they have done in the past, the West must focus on

institution building (Dizolele 2010, p.156). If donors focus on aid programmes that concentrate on state

stability and democracy building, the DRC’s government will then be able to set its own development

path. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) set up in 2001 by African leaders

(Nugent 2012, p.374) should be the organisation helping the Congo realise its development needs, as

opposed to Northern donors who are likely to push for a Eurocentric version of development.

My second research question took issue with the patterns of development emerging in the DRC. Is this

enough for its people, or should international actors continue to promote the development as experienced

in liberal states? It is clear that in striving to survive in a country that has placed obstacles before them at

every step of the way (whether national leaders or external forces), the Congolese people have managed

to secure their place in the process of globalisation in non-traditional ways (Bayart 1999, p.116). The

DRC, like much of Africa, is living its own modernity, reinventing itself according to its own logic (Van

Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.580, Trefon 2009, p.19). According to Escobar, ‘out of hybrid or minority

cultural situations might emerge other ways of building economies, of dealing with basic needs, of

coming together in social groups’ (2012, p.225). This is precisely the process that has been taking place in

the Congo. In the face of adversity they have created their own development path. This should not be

considered lesser than the one experienced in liberal states.

However, the issue of the predatory state remains. Accordingly, international governments and agencies

should centre their efforts in promoting transparency and good governance. This is no easy task, but if

Congo’s mineral wealth were to be distributed in an equitable way, leaders such as Mobutu or now Kabila

would enjoy less power with which to exert their control. Moreover it would lead to equitable growth.

This is the area that donor states should be focusing on: signing illicit mining contracts, or backing

corrupt regimes that commit human rights violations should be a thing of the past. It is no use claiming

that the state in the DRC has collapsed, whilst failing to acknowledge the role of Western states and

institutions in said collapse. From the days of Leopold II up until now, Northern states, Congolese leaders

and local elites have contributed to a permanent state of inequality, poverty and conflict. Fortunately the

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Congolese population have proved resilient following a development logic that has enabled them to

survive.

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