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The University of Westminster
Regent Campus
School of Social Sciences, Humanities, and Languages
Foreign domination in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
To what extent should external forces be held accountable for the country’s state failure
and underdevelopment?
Total words: 11,999
A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in
International Relations and Contemporary Political Theory/ Master of Arts degree in International
Relations
Maria Castellanos
January 2015
1
I gratefully acknowledge the guidance and comments offered by Dr. Hannah Cross throughout the
research stages of this dissertation.
2
Regent Campus
University of Westminster
Maria Castellanos
21 January 2015
MA Dissertation Title:
Foreign domination in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
To what extent should external forces be held accountable for the country’s state failure and
underdevelopment?
I confirm that the above-submitted dissertation is my own work and that all references/sources are duly
acknowledged.
Maria Castellanos
3
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………..............................................................................................................5
1.1. Why this topic demands attention..........................................................................................................5
1.2. The importance of the historical context..............................................................................................6
1.3. Research questions................................................................................................................................7
Theoretical Approaches..............................................................................................................................8
2.1. State failure theory..………..................................................................................................................8
2.2. Development theory……………………............................................................................................12
Colonialism and its Legacy……...............................................................................................................15
3.1. King Leopold II and the Congo Free State.........................................................................................15
3.2. The Congo under Belgian rule............................................................................................................16
3.3. Colonial legacy and the challenges at independence…......................................................................18
From Mobutu to Kabila............................................................................................................................19
4.1. Western Cold War strategies..............................................................................................................19
4.2. Patrimonialism and Zairianisation......................................................................................................20
4.3. The effects of Western aid...................................................................................................................23
4.4. Laurent Kabila, external involvement and the Congo Wars...............................................................27
4.5. Congo’s resource curse.......................................................................................................................28
4.6. Joseph Kabila: towards a new democratic state?................................................................................30
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................31
Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................35
4
Introduction
1.1. Why this topic demands attention.
At independence in 1960, the country that is today known as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
appeared to have the potential to become an African postcolonial success story. The last six decades
however, are testimony that this was not be. Whilst the tragic conflict throughout the eastern region in
recent years has been cause for stalled development and widespread suffering, the DRC’s dire socio-
political and economic situation cannot be reduced to this one factor. This study therefore seeks to explain
the reasons why a stable state, capable of ensuring the welfare and security of its people, has failed to
develop in line with the hopes and expectations set at independence.
The 2014 United Nations Development Report positions the Congo at the bottom of the human
development scale: 186 out of the 187 countries included in the report. Moreover, predictions state that in
a best-case scenario, 1960 development levels will only be attainable by 2030, and only if growth rates
remain consistently high (Trefon 2011, p.2). The Congolese people have lost faith in the state and have
come to expect little from it. This should not be the case; in 2006, Joseph Kabila became the first
democratically elected leader since 1960, and should therefore have been accountable to his people.
Kabila has failed to bring the country out of the misery that he found it in. In spite of this, he was re-
elected in the 2011 elections, a process that had been condemned by international observers as well as
nationals for its disorganisation and irregularities (Smith 2011). Western governments are now in talks
with Kabila, offering aid in exchange for him to step down at the end of his term in 2016. There is a
certain degree of irony in this, since it was with the help of these very governments that he was able to
secure his position a decade ago. It is not surprising, however, when the history of Western involvement
in the Congo is considered, as this dissertation will set out to do.
The US in particular, though not exclusively, has played a central role in the DRC’s political and
economic development since independence. Whilst in the Cold War years Western interests were closely
linked to the Congo’s geostrategic significance (Collins 1997, p.284), today, as it was during the colonial
era, the country’s mineral wealth leads to continued international involvement. This study will aim to
5
demonstrate that in pursuing their own national interests, the US and other Western governments and
institutions have greatly contributed towards what has emerged as a war-torn, poverty-stricken nation,
subject to a predatory state.
1.2. The importance of the historical context.
In order to address issues of state failure in the country, the Congo’s history must be first examined.
Power, war, corruption and economic accumulation in their current incarnation, form part of a political
economy of dependence that must be understood within a historical context (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou
1999, p.xvi). Moreover, Carothers states that in sub-Saharan Africa it is evident that specific institutional
legacies from previous regimes have a strong effect on political outcomes (2002, p.16). State systems
formed at independence are often considered to be copies of Western models that were ill suited to
African society and culture (Trefon, Van Hoyden and Smis 2002, p.386). Thus, colonial rule and its
consequential effects on the ensuing regimes of the DRC will be considered and analysed.
Since King Leopold II of Belgium declared the Congo his own in the 19 th century, Congolese people have
suffered from the social division of oppressed versus oppressors (Boyle 1988, p.274). Furthermore, since
the days of Leopold, they have been ruled by ‘kings’ who have claimed control over their country’s
mineral wealth (Moore 2001, p.130). Independence was the opportunity to break away from these
unlawful norms, yet Congolese elites were unprepared for the transition; instead of fighting for a
democratic society, they chose to inherit colonial patterns of control. Centralisation, authoritarianism and
state violence did not originate in the country under Mobutu’s three-decade regime. Instead, they were
part of the legacy left behind by Belgian rule.
Another legacy from colonial times was the dependence on resource revenue and the willingness to kill in
order to secure it. The DRC is often described as suffering from a resource curse. It contains strategic
minerals such as copper, cobalt and uranium and industrial diamonds amongst others (Schmitt 2013,
p.57). This vast supply of raw materials has consistently been the cause of widespread violence over time.
David Moore relates this violence to foreigners who, in seeing the country as little more than a supply of
resources- from ivory and rubber extracted at Leopold’s request to the demand for diamonds or copper
today- work with and at times come into conflict with the despots who are in control (2001, p.130). The
6
culture of resource extraction began in colonial days, yet it is firmly in place today in order to serve the
needs of an increasingly globalised world. It is the responsibility of foreign governments and companies
to avoid dealing with authoritarian undemocratic regimes, yet this responsibility continues to be
undermined in order to serve economic interests. The Congolese people have for years suffered the
consequences of this, with rulers such as Mobutu or Kabila propped up by external actors with the clear
purpose of fulfilling their own interests. National and international leaders alike have historically shown a
clear disregard for the needs of the people. This is something that needs to be addressed in order to
appreciate the way in which Congolese society has come to choose a very distinct development path.
1.3. Research questions.
This work sets out to answer two key questions regarding the Congolese state and development. The first
considers the involvement of Western actors in the DRC’s political economy and questions whether the
West should put an end altogether to the culture of dependency that historically binds them together, or
whether its involvement should continue; but in a morally and socially constructive way. The second
question that this study will consider concerns the patterns of development that have been for some time
emerging in the DRC, in contrast to those that have traditionally been followed by Western liberal states.
Is this unique developmental path enough for society, or must Northern states and organisations continue
to be actively involved in promoting their own version of development?
In order to answer these questions this dissertation will begin with an analysis of the theoretical
approaches to both state failure and development. The second chapter will examine the period of colonial
rule, first by King Leopold II and its subsequent years under Belgian control. The weight of these years of
exploitation will be analysed. Moreover, by examining its conflict-ridden transition from independence,
the implications colonial rule had on state formation will also be considered. The next and central section
of this study will follow the evolution of the state in the DRC, from 1965 with Mobutu at the helm,
through to today’s Kabila-led government. Throughout this section, the involvement and influence of
foreign actors within the context of the Cold War and subsequently in the Congo wars will be
investigated, as well as Joseph Kabila’s relationship both with the international community and his
constituents. The final chapter will bring all the research together, arriving at a conclusion regarding the
two research questions this work seeks to answer.
7
Theoretical Approaches
2.1. State Failure Theory
Following independence from their European colonisers, sub-Saharan African countries embarked on
what proved to be a difficult journey of state making. In order for a state to fulfil its role some basic
functions have been described as essential, including sovereign control of territory and supervision of
resources, the capacity to build and maintain infrastructure, to provide basic services and to maintain law
and order (Mazrui 1995, p.28). In his analysis of ‘quasi-states’, Jackson emphasises the difference
between de jure, and de facto state sovereignty (1990, p.21). For him, postcolonial African states
possessed juridical statehood resulting from international recognition of their sovereign rights. However,
they lacked empirical statehood, with limited institutional authority, political will, or ability to provide
socioeconomic welfare (Ibid). Thus, the African quasi-states, as described by Jackson, often proved
unable to perform the aforementioned fundamental functions.
In view of the short span of time in which states were expected to be fully formed in accordance with the
European standard, the fact they have been referred to as ‘quasi-states’ comes as no surprise. Their task
was almost an impossible one considering they were emulating a foreign model, whilst dealing with
internal and international demands to render their juridical statehood into an effective one (Ayoob 1995,
p.32). The international community specifically pushed for their recognition as sovereign states,
overlooking the inability of many to meet the established criteria for statehood (Clapham 2004, p.81).
Therefore, the view that statehood extended to areas that were ill adapted to it (Clapham 2002, p.794) is a
noteworthy one, since state failure unfortunately became a common defining feature of countries south of
the Sahara, post-independence.
Mohammed Ayoob describes state failure as ‘the major source of suffering and disorder in the Third
World’ (1995, p.173). The reasoning behind it varies considerably. In 2005, the Fund for Peace published
their first ‘Failed States Index’, in which countries are ranked in order of risk of state collapse. Twelve
indicators are used to measure this and, out of these, the two most consistent with state failure are uneven
development and the criminalisation or deligitimisation of the state (Amburn 2005). David Carment goes
8
further in his definition: as central governments cease to function, providing no basic services to its
citizens, including education and healthcare, the economy weakens, infrastructure breaks down and crime
escalates out of control (2003, p.409). The key aspect that must be examined is how central governments
reach the point of total loss of legitimacy and control that subsequently leads to state failure. A common
conception is that blame for government collapse lies with leadership failures. If state failure is man-
made, and not caused primarily by geographical, environmental or external forces, then leaders are to be
assigned responsibility for destroying states (Rotberg 2002, p.93).
A concept very closely linked with leadership malfunction in African politics is neo-patrimonialism. Ex-
colonial countries compensated for their weak social bases with neo-patrimonialism, or ‘the buying of
clients’ (Rotberg 2004, p.27). In this way, a small minority elite was able to milk the rest of the country’s
citizens of all income-yielding resources (Davidson 1992, p.209). Furthermore, ‘the formation of patron-
client relations resulted in a state based on personal authority and coercion’ (Carment 2003, p.412).
Patron-client relations became the way by which leaders and elites were able to accumulate power and
wealth – leaders distributed state wealth to their clients, who in turn offered them their undivided support,
helping maintain the corrupt leadership in power.
Even though neo-patrimonialism had devastating effects on many African states, including the DRC (as
will later be examined), some scholars feel there is an overemphasis on the concept in the study of state
failure. One such academic is Zubairu Wai, who states that it has become a ‘catch all conceptual staple’
(2012, p.31). To quote him more extensively:
‘Neo-patrimonialism posits a single conceptual framework to explain a multiplicity of complex and varied
socioeconomic realities, and in doing this, makes the concept impossibly elastic (…) thus stretched
beyond its analytical capacity, every political reality on the continent can be, and has been finessed to
appear consistent with a variant of the neo-patrimonialist logic’ (Wai 2012, p.32-33).
It seems clear that a single explanation cannot solely justify the widespread state failure that took place in
much of postcolonial Africa. Consequently, there are various contributing factors that can be found within
state failure theory. There is extensive academic writing on the subject, with some putting a higher
9
emphasis on the negative impact foreign dominance had both over the colonial period, during the Cold
War and after, and others stressing internal aspects such as the ‘resource curse’ and corruption. In my
view all factors listed are invariably interconnected. The predicaments suffered in the continent cannot be
solely assigned to African decision making, they are also a consequence of the severe foreign intrusion
into African affairs (Schmidt 2013, p.1).
As a result of the Berlin conference that took place in 1884, the European powers formally drew up new
borders for Africa, which have remained almost entirely untouched to this day. These borders have often
been described as arbitrary. Independence, therefore, has not just been considered a liberation movement,
but also one of enclosure, since populations of different ethnic, political and religious groups were
confined to ex-colonial boundaries and subjected to inexperienced indigenous governments (Jackson
1990, p.151, Carment 2003, p.412). Moreover, culpability for the failure of states at the time of
independence does not solely lie with the new untried governments. Davidson emphasises the political
incompetence of the colonial administrators, and the lack of thought given to decolonisation prior to its
occurrence (1992, p.186), describing the transfer of power as a transfer of crisis (Ibid, p.190). Conversely,
not all writers on the subject offer a total disregard for the handover process at independence, with Ayoob
highlighting the proto-states provided by colonialism as ‘jumping-off points for the creation of a post-
colonial political order’ (1995, p.34). This view is, however, somewhat hopeful in view of the lack of
success suffered by so many states shortly after independence.
The Cold War, with its entailing super-power rivalry, also contributed to the demise of states south of the
Sahara. In the existing bipolar world order, external interests based on Cold War tensions would alter the
dynamics of local conflicts, in many cases leading to their escalation at the expense of African peoples
(Schmidt 2013, p.3). Regimes were propped up by the US or the Soviet Union based on their support
towards their ideology, regardless of the legitimacy or viability of said governments. As Cooper
describes, western governments were eager to work with gatekeeping states, permeable to their influence
and useful in Cold War rivalries’ (2002, p.159). He refers to them as gatekeeper states due to their one
central objective: with a lack of control over the people, their key function was the interface between their
states and the rest of the world, through the control of resources, foreign aid, or permits to do business in
their country (Ibid, 159). As will be studied later, Mobutu’s Zaire was one such example of a gatekeeper
10
state that received vast external support. Moreover, the Cold War years helped undermine states due to
the free flowing arms supplies from the superpowers, which often escaped the control of governments
(Clapham 2004, p.91). In the post Cold War period many of the conflicts taking place were sustained
thanks to the easy availability of weapons originally supplied by their foreign supporters.
Another element that is often cited as a cause for state decay is the resource richness of a country. As
such, the concept ‘resource curse’ has emerged. Resource rich countries often became highly dependent
on the production and export of raw materials, ignoring other industries that may appear less profitable.
However, global prices fluctuate on an annual basis and these changes can result in crisis for the countries
dependent on their income (Hayter 1983, p.68), as was the case in the 1970s oil crisis. Furthermore, on a
domestic level, African governments have regularly profited from their countries’ resource endowment.
Taking on the role of predators, they make use of their power to extract resource wealth, hollowing out
the state, seeking to swim but not navigate and, in doing so, giving up their responsibilities to the state
(Rotberg 2004, p.29, Bates 2008, p.121).
According to state failure theory, each of the above-described factors undoubtedly plays a central role in
the downfall of the state. However, it must also be noted that there are academics that dismiss the thesis
of state failure altogether, and consider it a mere reflection of the West’s Eurocentric global view.
Jonathan Hill introduces his critique on the failed state thesis by calling for a rejection of the term. He
writes:
‘Failed state analysts constitute the identities of African societies in relation to those of the West,
simultaneously attributing negative characteristics to the former and positive to the latter’ (Hill 2005,
p.139).
Additionally, Western expectations for the creation of states mirroring theirs in Africa have been
unrealistic. Nonetheless, the fact that societies are not developing in the manner expected by the West
does not necessarily mean that they are failing altogether. Whilst they may not be replicating the Western
model initially imposed on them, they are not simply backward or delayed but are instead developing
differently (Chabal 1999, p.143). What's more, there is the possibility that what many refer to as state
11
failure is in fact a misinterpreted process of state formation (Wai 2012, p.27). Nevertheless, the view of
the South as underdeveloped failing states has led to the continued unequal power relationship between
them and the global North that began during the colonial period. As such, there exists a common
misconception that the path to successful development can only be driven through Western development
assistance (Ibid, p.40).
2.2. Development Theory
Within the neoliberal line of thought, great emphasis is put on the importance of aid. It is considered to be
the glue holding together societies that would otherwise fall apart, societies whose realities are those of
the fourteenth century, encompassing civil war, plague and ignorance (Collier 2008, p.3). Accordingly,
there is a collective task that needs to be carried out – the West needs to help them onto the development
ladder, or at least help them gain a foothold at the bottom of it (Sachs 2005, p.2).
Such neoliberal views, however, are not shared by many development thinkers who view development
aid as a continuation of colonial inequality (Kothari 2005, p.48, Escobar 2012, p.39). Describing it as ‘a
new White Man’s Burden to clean up the mess left behind by the old White Man’s Burden’ (2006, p.239),
Easterly believes that current developmentalists share the same flaws as colonial officials, which include
excessive self-confidence, desultory local knowledge and lacking consultation with the locals (Ibid,
p.247). He is not alone in believing that Third World countries should be left to their own devices in order
to develop at their own speed in accordance to their needs. In addition, whilst development was supposed
to be about people, it has been criticised for excluding them. Instead, it is considered a top-down process
that treats people and cultures as abstract concepts and statistical figures (Escobar 2012, p.44). This line
of thought, extreme in its negative portrayal of development, is a reflection of the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) and the role they play within it.
Both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were set up in the mid 1940s and are still
key organisations today in the field of development assistance. In relation to their position on Third
World development, they have been equally criticised for lacking political neutrality and promoting the
capitalist interests of the Western powers. The World Bank, described as ‘the high church of
development’ (Easterly 2007), receives most of its funds from major capital markets, Wall Street in
12
particular, has an immediate interest in the repayment and servicing of debts (Hayter 2005, p.94).
Similarly, within the IMF, only the US has the power to veto and the largest economies are the ones who
have the most votes, therefore having the ‘dollars vote’ (Stiglitz 2013, p.12). As a result of such policies,
both institutions are considered by some as undemocratic.
In the 1970s, Third World countries borrowed heavily from commercial banks in order to pay for rising
import costs. This led to a debt crisis, since they had no way of paying back the loans. Stiglitz criticises
the lenders for over lending, particularly since being sophisticated financial institutions, they should have
been able to make better judgements on reasonable debt burden (Ibid, p.216). In contrast, the Brandt
Report, written in 1980, pushed for heavier lending from commercial banks, supported by the World
Bank and the IMF, to developing countries (Brandt 1980, p.256). By the beginning of the 1980s, the debt
crisis had worsened and, in order to address it, the IFIs introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs). The IMF and World Bank worked closely together, motivated by the need to ensure the
repayment of outstanding debts (Allen and Thomas 2000, p.206). Structural Adjustment proved in most
cases, to be a catastrophic failure for the economies of the countries that underwent the reforms outlined
by the programmes, and the 1980s have been described by some as a ‘lost decade’ for developing
countries (Ibid, p.300).
SAPs were supposed to address four economic maladies, which included excessive government spending
and intervention in markets, too much state ownership and poor governance (Sachs 2005, p.81). In order
to achieve this and secure debt repayments, reforms focused on trade liberalisation, privatisation of public
enterprises and cuts in government spending. Such reforms have been criticised by many, who not only
felt that they were draconian but also that they favoured the economic interests of governments and
companies of the North who provided the majority of funding, denying the countries of the South
democratic control over markets (Bracking 1999, p.208, Hayter 2005, p.104, Escobar 2012, p.57).
Moreover, those most affected by the reforms were the poor in developing countries, who were severely
hit by reduced subsidies in food and fuel, raised charges of basic services and lower wages (Williams
1994, p.221). As such, alternative means for survival were developed. Bayart famously describes this as
the ‘politics of the belly’, by which he means the necessity to exploit one’s profession or abilities, not for
the purpose of lucre, but in order to alleviate their poverty and survive (2009, p.236).
13
Another effect of SAPs was the emergence of shadow networks and informal economies. These are,
however, not regarded as negative my some academics, who view them as not only a means of survival
for developing countries but also as their own version of development. Duffield defines this as a ‘popular
economic initiative in the face of restrictive state practices’ (2014, p.48). Consequently, he believes the
1980s were a period of social transformation in which the South developed non-liberal forms of economic
reinvention (Ibid, p.150). This view is far removed from the abovementioned ‘lost decade’. Nonetheless,
the figures presented by the Oxfam Poverty Report in 1995 are proof of the lack of success of structural
adjustment. Between 1980 and 1987 Africa’s debt increased to the equivalent of almost three quarters of
its income, compared to the earlier one third, and its debt to export ratio had risen to 500 per cent by the
end of the 1980s (Oxfam 1995, p.74). Thus the IFIs needed a change in strategy and the 1990s presented
them with the opportunity to adjust their development policies.
The World Bank Development Report in 1990 showcased a departure from the strict conditionality of
structural adjustment, and outlined the Bank’s primary goal to be poverty reduction in the Third World
(p.5). However, after the damage caused in the preceding years, a post development movement emerged,
calling for alternatives and for the rejection of the paradigm as a whole (Escobar 2012, p.215). In his
critique of development, Easterly writes:
‘The ideology of development should be packed up in crates and sent off to the Museum of Dead
Ideologies, just down the hall from Communism, Socialism, and Fascism. It’s time to recognise that the
attempt to impose a rigid development ideology on the world’s poor has failed miserably’ (2007).
Nonetheless, aid is still viewed by many as a fundamental component in reducing poverty and the risk of
state failure in the countries of the South. There are extensive calls for the reduction and even cancelation
of Third World debt. In addition, further aid is considered necessary in order to fight Africa’s poverty
trap, which includes widespread Malaria and Aids (Sachs 2005, p.194). Yet, aid should preferably come
in the form of grants. Stiglitz highlights that countries in desperate poverty are unlikely to turn down
loans even if they may not be able to repay them, therefore assistance combining grants and more diligent
lending is likely to relieve countries of future excessive debt (2007, p.228). Whilst the Oxfam Poverty
14
Report agrees with the need for debt relief, it rejects the idea of increased aid. It states that, from the early
1980s to the mid 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa received over £200 billion in aid, a 10 per cent increase, but
economic recovery and improved human welfare are yet to materialise (Oxfam 1995, p.190). In view of
the report, the success of development assistance over the period is called into question.
In her work on foreign interventions in Africa, Schmidt concludes that during the period of 1945 to 2010,
external involvement in the continent caused it more harm than it did good (2013, p.229). Whilst the
theory revised in the preceding paragraphs highlighted the factors behind state failure, the following
chapters will now turn to an in depth analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Through the
examination of the country’s history and relationship with foreign powers, the impact of foreign
domination in the country will be assessed, as will Schmidt’s own conclusion.
Colonialism and its Legacy
3.1. King Leopold II and the Congo Free State.
Trefon asserts that the crisis in contemporary Congo’s political economy originates from the patrimonial
system that was firmly put in place by King Leopold II (2011, p.19). This statement is difficult to call into
question once a thorough analysis of Leopold’s policy in the Congo is carried out. The original mission as
stated by the Belgian Monarch was a humanitarian one, or so he sought to persuade the international
community in a speech made in 1876 at the Geographical Conference organised by Leopold himself:
‘To open to civilisation the only part of our globe which it has yet not penetrated, to pierce the darkness
which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress’ (Hochschild
2012, p.44)
His philanthropic parade, which also contained a seemingly deep antislavery character, was a success. In
1884 the US officially recognised Leopold’s claims to the Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.16). Other
countries soon followed suit. The terms of the Berlin Conference that took place later that year guaranteed
free trade in the Congo. However, the agreement was amended in the Anti-Slavery Conference where
15
King Leopold offered his services in the provision of fortified posts, roads and railways for troops
pursuing the slavers, in exchange for an authorisation to levy import duties to fund the fight against
slavery (Hochschild 2012, p.93). Considering that as early as 1876 he had acquired the signatures of
African rulers for treaties which signed over their land to him, often in exchange for clothes or alcohol
(Young 1994a, p.84, Hochschild 2012, p.71), King Leopold now held complete political and economic
control over what he named the Congo Free State, and what was to become little more than a personal
property for him to exploit.
His humanitarian pretensions were quickly put aside, as he set up what was essentially a system of
slavery in the production and extraction of resources, a system that hindered any chance of positive
development in the region (Renton, Seddon and Zeiling 2007, p.3). Aside from the power and prestige he
hoped to achieve internationally as a colonial ruler, Leopold only saw the Congo as a source of wealth for
metropolitan development exclusively. In order to ensure revenue, mostly from ivory and wild rubber,
gross violations of human rights fell upon his African subjects (Young 1994b, p.251). Hochschild uses
words such as genocide and holocaust to describe the proportions of violence endured by the enslaved
central Africans, and estimates that by 1920 the population in the Congo was cut by half, dropping by
approximately 10 million people (2012, p.225, 233). Wild rubber collection was imposed on the populace
through particularly exploitative techniques, becoming known as the rubber regime, or ‘red rubber’ due to
the atrocities committed to secure its production (Young and Turner 1985, p.33). It is in this way that the
Congo was incorporated into the capitalist world system, and as a consequence of this brutal insertion into
the imperial political economy, the origins of the DRC’s socio-economic and moral decay came to light
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.2, 13).
3.2. The Congo under Belgian rule
After international condemnation of human rights abuses committed under Leopold’s rule, in 1908 the
Congo formally changed ownership, becoming a Belgian colony. Not only did the Belgian government
take on the debt left behind by King Leopold, but also, as a sign of gratitude for the ‘great sacrifices made
for the Congo’, Leopold received fifty million francs (Hochschild 2012, p.259). This sum was given as a
sign of gratitude, ironically, to someone who had not once set foot in his African colony and had
sacrificed the lives of thousands at the expense of personal gain.
16
As a Belgian colony, the Congo did not fare much better than in Leopoldian times. The transfer of control
did not provide significant changes, and the state was governed and organised purely for the benefit of
Belgium and its international partners (Davidson 1992, p.255). As Rodney declares, ‘colonialism for the
most part aimed at developing the metropoles, and only allowed certain crumbs to the colonies as
incidental by-products of exploitation’ (2012, p.213). Consequently, all aspects of colonial rule were
carefully constructed to achieve the central aim of extraction of economic surplus (Van Hoyweghen and
Smis 2002, p.576).
Never was this more evident than the period spanning the two world wars, where even though the fighting
was taking place so far from the Congo, and so its people should have been unaware of it, the case was
quite the opposite. Already harsh conditions worsened as a result of a boom in the mining industry, and
therefore increased forced labour, due to a demand in minerals such as copper or uranium. Allied shells
used in combat during the First World War were often made with Congolese copper, and the nuclear
bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were made with Congolese uranium (BBC 2013). In order to
guarantee obedience and hard labour, the Force Publique – the colonial army- used repression,
intimidation and punishment (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.37). Moreover, traditional African rulers were
often transformed into members of the colonial administration, in order to ensure that activities such as
forced labour, conscription or tax collection were carried out adequately (Ibid, p.35). Accordingly, a rise
in local tensions was bound to arise, since chiefs were working alongside the colonial repressive machine,
obtaining certain social and economic benefits, at the expense of those enduring the suffering imposed on
them.
Belgian authorities had no real incentive to grant independence to their profit-reaping colony, and so
when independence inevitably came, the Congo was a country completely unprepared for the challenges
awaiting them in the years ahead. With political organisations banned under Belgian rule, and an enduring
paternalistic attitude towards the Congolese, a complete lack of preparedness for political responsibility
amongst the local elites was unsurprising (Trefon 2002, p.485). Young sums this up in his claim that the
state had no desire to transform its subjects into a true civil society (1994b, p.255). African elites were to
inherit a Western state system that was unsuited politically, culturally and socially to them (Trefon, Van
17
Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.386). Moreover, they were faced with a task for which they had no
instruction. At the point of independence no army officers and only three out of the top 4,500
functionaries in the country were Congolese (Young 1998, p.99).
The decolonisation process, which took place in 1960, was extremely rushed. A plan was drawn up in the
space of two weeks, for it to be implemented within the following six months (Ibid, p.6). To all effects,
the Belgian colonial administration left no tradition of democracy (Ibid, p.13); instead, they left a culture
of exploitation, repression and control. As such, emerging leaders, with little revolutionary consciousness,
and no experience in government, sought to perpetuate the colonial forms of control (Nzongola-Ntalaja
2007, p.4). Nugent’s words aptly describe the process that ensued: ‘decolonisation provided a façade of
change, behind which a continuity in unequal power relations was effected’ (2012, p.9). Given the legacy
that the people of the Congo were left with at independence, the crisis that followed, often referred to as
state collapse, comes as no surprise.
3.3. Colonial legacy and the challenges at independence
Within the colonial debate and its impact, the benefits of colonisation are sometimes brought to the
forefront. Though it’s true that hospitals, schools or railways were built and may be counted as beneficial
towards African development, the damage caused to entire societies is overwhelming. Improvements in
infrastructure are not enough to justify the plunder and abuse carried out by European administrators. The
repercussions of this socio-economic exploitation were instantly felt in the Congo when it gained
independence. According to Clapham, the state collapse that occurred in the central African country
during the era of decolonisation was by far the most spectacular within the continent (2002, p.782). State
collapse may not be the right term in which to conceptualise events however, as at this early stage the
state was arguably in process of formation, and therefore far from fully functioning or complete.
No matter how this period in Congolese history is labelled, with violence emerging almost immediately,
the newly independent country found itself in a state of national crisis. Within two weeks of independence
and the election of the nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba as prime minister, there was a mutiny by the
army’s Congolese soldiers, as well as a secessionist movement in the mineral-rich Katanga region (Reno
2006, p.47). Both revolts are said to have been instigated by international mining companies keen to
18
protect their interests, and the Belgians (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.94), eager to maintain their control in
the region, particularly after Lumumba’s election, which was seen by the West as a threat to their
interests.
Both conflicts led to the arrival of UN troops, sent by the international community in order to secure
Congo’s territorial integrity (Boyle 1988, p.273). Lumumba was the one to request UN forces, yet soon
he found himself in disagreement with them as it became apparent that their priority was the resolution of
the conflict in line with Western economic and political interests (Schmitt 2013, p.61). Even though the
state in Congo was evidently not working, international forces felt the need to ensure the state’s existence.
Due to its strategic location, size and raw material endowment, a Congolese ‘quasi-state’- to use
Jackson’s earlier description- was preferable to the potential instability a power vacuum could cause
(Cooper 2002, p.166). Thus, a decolonised Congo was far from independent in practical terms, and future
foreign intrusions were to be heightened due to Cold War geopolitical interests, which would further
derail the possibility of a natural development towards a democratic government and social stability.
From Mobutu to Kabila
4.1. Western Cold War strategies
Since the creation of the Congo state in 1884, dominant powers have upheld the same strategic objective
in the region: to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.258). The wrong
hands being of course, any political leader unwilling to serve Western interests. Lumumba was such a
leader, and as such, external forces – the CIA and Belgium in particular, worked towards his demise.
Lumumba wished to go beyond territorial independence. In order for the Congo to break from its colonial
past, the country needed to cease being an economic colony of the West (Renton, Seddon, Zeilig 2007,
p.85). Despite being the country’s first democratically elected leader, and considered to be a real
contender to drive the Congo towards stability, he was met with an untimely death. A much written about
conspiracy at the hands of Northern powers and Mobutu Sese Seko, the man they had handpicked to take
over the leadership role, led to the murder of Lumumba in January 1961. The fate of the state, stolen from
the Congolese people, was once again at the hands of external actors, this time by neo-colonial forces,
and the man they had chosen as their ally in order to secure their national interests.
19
According to sources, Mobutu was recruited by the CIA, and put on a payroll, which included $150
million in bribes and secret payments over the first decade of his rule (Collins 1997, p.283). This was in
full knowledge of Mobutu’s corrupt nature, human rights violations and undemocratic practices. Cold
War interests seemed to go beyond morality or responsibility. Anti-colonial nationalists and
prodemocracy activists such as Lumumba were put aside, regardless of the contribution they could make
towards good governance and development (Schmitt 2013, p.197). Instead, ‘no regime was dubbed too
corrupt or repressive for American support so long as it allied with the US in the Cold War’ (Ibid). Thus,
in encouraging and securing Mobutu’s rise to power, colonial power structures remained practically
unchanged (Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.577). Within five years of gaining independence, the
people of the Congo found themselves governed by a president who had simply adapted colonial
structures, and patrimonialised them (Boyle 1988, p.278), hindering any chance of healthy development,
and they had Northern governments – the United States in particular, to thank.
4.2. Patrimonialism and Zairianisation
Describing Mobutu’s early yeas in power, Young and Turner refer to his politics as being of leviathan
proportions; a modern version of Leopold’s absolutism (1985, p.43). The state was centralised, leaving no
space for institutional autonomy at any level of the state apparatus, taking control of all corporate
interests, and therefore asserting a political monopoly (Ibid) that excluded the large majority of the
Congolese people. Nonetheless, in the first years of centralisation, Mobutu was able to achieve some
political stability and an increase in productivity (Boyle 1988, p.277). However, the long-term effects
proved to be far from beneficial for the country.
In order to maintain control over the state, Mobutu resorted to a system of patrimonialism, used to ensure
total loyalty from his political entourage, as well as the security forces required for his protection and that
of his regime’s. With his role as the gatekeeper of the Congolese state, and a lack of popular support,
Mobutu had to turn to a weave of patron-client relationships within the state (Cooper 2002, p.157). As a
result, Mobutu and ‘his shifting entourage, extracted resources arbitrarily from poor peasants and rich
merchants to such a degree that the formal dimension of state rule collapsed’ (Ibid, p.159). His
patrimonial system of government had the single objective of amassing personal wealth whilst retaining
20
his hold on power. As Rotberg argues, any form of democracy, such as legitimate political institutions,
civil society or even economic development was for Mobutu a possible threat to his authoritarian rule
(2004, p.12). He was able to maintain his patronage networks thanks to the considerable income he
obtained form resource revenues and foreign aid intended for the country’s development, but
conveniently funnelled to Mobutu’s personal accounts. Critics conclude that as a consequence of
patrimonialism, corruption became the defining feature of the Congolese state (Young and Turner 1985,
p.183).
In 1971, Mobutu changed the name of the country to Zaire, and in November 1973 he embarked on his
Zairianisation project. It was claimed to be a war against the bourgeoisie and it comprised amongst other
things, a state take over of all private ventures, including colonial ones (Young 1998, p.115).
Consequently, large parts of the economy were transferred to Mobutu’s cronies. Young and Turner argue
that one of the main objectives of Zairianisation was to obtain a new pool of resources for patrimonial
distribution through the expropriation of commercial and agricultural businesses (1985, p.168). Some
critics illustrate this period of patrimonialism and corruption as the ‘Zairian sickness’ – a time of
economic social and moral decay (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.7). Furthermore, Zairianisation had
devastating effects on the state and its people. The early 1970s saw the launch of vast, miscalculated and
eventually failed development projects, as well as a rapid decline in copper, which had been key in
promoting growth up to this point. These factors quickly lead to a debt crisis. By 1975 Zaire’s debt was
$3 billion (Young 1998, p.118), yet in spite of this Mobutu and his clients continued to enrich themselves
through resource appropriation. Calculations indicate that as much as 20 per cent of the official budget
was allocated to the president, whilst the Bank of Zaire was to turn over significant amounts of foreign
exchange to him on a regular basis (Ibid). Zairianisation’s clear unfeasibility became indisputable;
therefore, before the end of the decade, it was tossed aside. This did not put an end to the Zairian leader’s
plunder of his own country, yet the international community watched from the sidelines and remained
impassive as Zaire ceased to be a functioning state. The Cold War was ongoing, and in 1975 the
battleground had become neighbouring Angola. Due to geopolitical strategy, it was important that
Mobutu continued to be an ally, therefore he remained worthy of their support.
21
External actors, and the role they played in sustaining the Zairian leader, make up a key component in the
durability of this regime. In order to understand how Mobutu remained in power for over three decades,
the influence of the US and other Western forces must be analysed. According to Allen, there are four
reasons for Mobutu’s endurance: leadership skills, windfall gains from high commodity prices, technical
sophistication in repression, and finally external support in the form of economic or military aid (1995,
p.309). An earlier section of this chapter has explained how without the involvement of Northern
institutions such as the CIA, Mobutu may never have become the president of the Zairian state. Yet their
influence did not end there, with relations remaining close until in the early 1990s, when Western
governments and institutions decided to bring them to an end.
Resulting from international military support, a free flow of externally supplied armaments allowed the
government and its security apparatus to deal with opposition by force (Clapham 2004, p.91), thus
reducing the capabilities of political rivals to pose a serious threat to the president’s rule. Moreover, in the
instance that a serious threat did materialise, the three members of the ‘Western Troika’ (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2007, p.162) – Belgium, The United Stated and France, were able to fight for the regime’s cause.
One such example is the invasion of the copper-rich Shaba province, earlier known as Katanga, in 1977
and 1978. With Mobutu’s forces unable to put an end to the invasion, the three powers intervened,
sending troops from Morocco and bringing the invasion to a halt (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, p.11).
Aside from military assistance, a key element of international support came in the form of investments,
and, more importantly, aid. Throughout his rule, Mobutu amassed a huge fortune, part of which came
from foreign aid intended for debt relief and development. The role played by the International Financial
Institutions and Western governments will come under closer inspection in the next section of this
chapter. Yet, it is important to note at this point, that Mobutu was often able to manipulate donors, and
play them so as to achieve his financial aims. As Bayart observes, it is ‘occasionally the puppets who pull
the strings’ (2009, p.26). This was particularly the case in later years when aid became conditional upon
various demands for reforms, such as democratisation. In the case of Mobutu, as with other postcolonial
African leaders, democratisation was only a tactic used in order to secure aid from donors (De Herdt
2002, p.447). Moves towards democracy were but feigned attempts, yet the rents assured through the
pretence served him well in his continued embezzlement of any available resources.
22
4.3. The effects of Western aid
The debt crisis that emerged during the time of Zairianisation cannot be solely blamed on Mobutu’s bad
policies. Western private banks contributed greatly to the regime’s economic collapse. In their need to
recycle petro-dollar reserves, the West lent huge sums to Mobutu for his industrialisation programme
(Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis, 2002, p.380). For instance, from 1972 to 1974, Citibank, along with
its London and Paris affiliates, arranged loans of $164 million for Zaire (Young and Turner 1985, p.379).
Aside from the fact the industrialisation process proved largely unsuccessful – Mobutu was more
interested in immediate access to capital than in long-term investments (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and
Smis, 2002, p.380)- it also pushed further the marginalisation of the agricultural sector. With many
Zairians leaving their rural homes in search for urban employment, large unemployed groups in the cities
developed (Boyle 1988, p.277). The situation in Zaire became unsustainable, and Mobutu had to resort to
the IFIs for support.
With an outstanding debt amounting to 30 per cent of the country’s GDP in 1980, Zaire became one of
the first African countries to formally submit to an IMF structural adjustment programme (Renton,
Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.133). Critics of the IFIs and their policies in developing countries maintain that
SAPs represented a neoliberal package that was virtually unaltered regardless of the country the policies
were being applied to (Nega and Schneider 2014, p.486). The core of the programmes remained the same:
the privatisation of parastatals as well as of public goods previously provided by state institutions (Ibid,
p.487). Such policies would hit the poor hardest, as was the case in Zaire, but for the IFIs the priority was
financial stability and avoiding debt defaults (Hayter 1981, p.88). Easterly suggests that state failure in
Zaire came to be in 1991, and highlights that this was after a period of 10 years in which the country had
spent 73 per cent of the time under IMF programmes (2006, p.192). Just like Zairianisation, SAPs in
Zaire had proven incapable of promoting growth, bringing about stability or encourage development. In
fact, the country found itself drowning in ever-growing debt.
However, SAPs alone should not be held responsible for Zaire’s economic fate. Mobutu and his close
entourage used the resources made available through aid with complete disregard for the wellbeing of the
23
masses. Nonetheless, many critics condemn their irresponsibility in enforcing reforms on fragile or
corrupt regimes where the likelihood of successful application was limited at best. Collins emphatically
makes this point in saying that
‘the US, Western European governments, the World Bank, the IMF and many international corporations
and foreign businessmen knowingly conspired to loot Zaire. They all ‘lent’ millions to Zaire, carefully
watched as Mobutu stole it, then cynically demanded its repayment. Mobutu, of course, obliged,
squeezing debt repayments from an impoverished people in his periodic bouts of structural adjustment’.
(1997, p.286)
Other critics join Collins, in declaring that whilst politicians such as Mobutu had become predators, donor
institutions acted like loan-sharks (Birmingham 1998, p.281). When the president did choose to pay his
arrears, IFIs turned a blind eye to the dubious provenance of funds, so long as some debt was repaid.
Moreover, the World Bank’s country reports only included a short section on poverty, often almost like
an afterthought. It was believed that poverty was secondary, with stabilisation measures and cuts in public
spending being the priority in order to deal with debt, inflation or deficit issues (Hayter 2005, p.104). As
such, neoliberal hegemony can be said to have placed markets above morality (Duffield 2014, p.260), at
least in the period concerned.
Financial assistance from lending agencies should be designed with the purpose of reinforcing positive
leadership (Rotberg 2002, p.95). The International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 stated that the US
and other donor agencies should not channel their assistance to countries whose governments engaged in
human rights violations. Zaire’s case demonstrates that this Act was largely ignored. What’s more, the
flow of international funds fostered the development of illegal activities and the further erosion of the
state’s administrative capacity (Hibou 1999, p.93). The level of corruption that emerged in this time was
unrestrained. Mobutu was however, clearly unrepentant or even ashamed. In an interview where he was
asked whether he could personally pay off Zaire’s debt, he brazenly replied that it was indeed technically
possible, but he couldn’t be sure that he would be paid back (Braid 1997). An incongruous answer if there
ever was one, considering his fortune belonged rightly to Zaire and its people, and not to the ruler and his
patrimonial regime.
24
In spite of the evident gross misappropriation of funds by Mobutu and his cronies, Northern institutions
and governments remained at his side until the early 1990s as a result of national interests that clearly
took precedence over the welfare of the Zairian state. By 1993, Zaire’s situation was so abysmal that the
World Bank stopped including the country’s data in their annual World Development Report, and the
IMF suspended their voting rights and placed its membership on hold (Young 1998, p.129). Aid was
officially suspended, and Mobutu was on his own.
During the decade above described, the situation for the Zairian people can be described as dire at best.
By 1988 the country was ranked the eighth poorest in the world, with an average per capita income of
$160 per annum, and real income levels lower than the pre-independence period (Renton, Seddon and
Zeilig 2007, p.148). None of the money received through foreign investments, aid or resource distribution
was funnelled towards the improvement of the national welfare provision, building of infrastructure or
any security provision (Rotberg 2002, p.94). The nation became used to ‘doing without’ – without food,
safe drinking water, or basic health services to name a few things (Trefon 2002, p.486). Though the entire
country was poverty stricken, the rural community suffered the most. Although those working in the
agricultural sector made up the majority, their needs were largely ignored, and until the late 70s less than
one per cent of the state’s budget went towards this sector (Davidson 1992, p.258).
The value of health services declined sharply and medical supplies became exceptionally rare, and this
along with the decline in nutrition levels led to the deaths of a third of children before they reached the
age of five (Young and Turner 1985, p.91, Renton, Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.149). Although there was
an increase in the number of schools, most rural ones were in a derelict state, lacking all basic equipment
and teaching staff were completely demoralised (Young and Turner 1985, p.403). If any development was
indeed taking place, the mass of the Zairian population were excluded from it. Unsurprisingly, ‘to the
subject the state became not just the alien oppressor of colonial memory but a simple predator, at best
irrelevant to the daily needs of the citizen’ (Young 1998, p.98). As such, the Zairian people chose to
follow a distinct path towards their human development. Through what has been described as ‘the politics
of the belly’, and the emergence of a flourishing informal economy, Zairians were able to ensure their
survival.
25
As the state apparatus ceased to function in an official manner, social services began to be provided, but
in an unofficial way – services were provided in a fee-for-service basis (Van de Walle 2004, p.106). This
form of institutionalised corruption, carried out by civil servants, is considered by Bayart ‘a method of
social struggle’ (2009, p.236). Moreover, these activities, traditionally considered illegal, carried out by
the majority of the population for survival, are for him a mere reflection of the methods used by those in
power to accumulate wealth and power (Ibid, p.237). For Mobutu and his entourage patrimonialism was a
means of retaining power. For the masses the politics of the belly is a form of resilience in the face of a
predatory state that seems to have forgotten their rights. Within the educational system for instance,
teachers are paid approximately $30 a month by the state (Trefon 2009, p.12.). To avoid teachers leaving
their jobs and schools closing down, parents ‘motivate’ them to stay by paying them bonuses (Ibid).
Should such practices be considered immoral? Though they may be seen as illegal in the traditional sense
of the word, Zairians can justify and legitimise their illicit activities, since it provides them with jobs,
income and it’s often the only way of getting ahead (Hibou 1999, p.103).
The informal economy is another way in which Zairian society has combated the collapse of the country’s
economic collapse. As in many of the Southern states, it represents a critical lifeline for all those outside
the state’s patronage networks (Duffield 2014, p.146). By 2001, the informal economy in Zaire made up
two-thirds of the country’s GDP (Samset 2002, p.466). Activities within this sector include street
vending, trading and manufacturing, smuggling or hustling (Trefon 2011, p.45). There are varying
opinions on the effects of a growing parallel economy. Some critics believe that it’s not a path to
development, but simply a way to enable survival (Ibid) for an otherwise impoverished population in the
face of a non-existent state. For others however, this sector represents much more than just a way of
coping. Cooper for instance, declares that those living independently of the Zairian state, off their own
production and social networks have not only created a parallel economy, but also a parallel society full
of cultural dynamism, particularly though not exclusively in Zaire’s capital, Kinshasa (Cooper 2002,
p.167). This may not be development in the Western liberal sense, but it surely represents a form of social
development in a struggle to move forward despite the obstacles presented by the government’s political,
economic and social predatory ways.
26
4.4. Laurent Kabila, external involvement and the Congo Wars
For the international community a collapsed state and the alternative development that emerged in the
country were sources of concern for their national interests. Though the Cold War was over, the central
African country remained of geopolitical interest. Thus, in order to bring stability Mobutu needed to be
replaced. In 1993 Laurent-Desire Kabila wrote an open letter condemning Mobutu’s regime, declaring the
necessity to eliminate him (Kabuya-Lumuna Sando 2002, p.618). This suited the interests of Western
forces and regional neighbours alike. Consequently, with the consent and support of the US, a coalition of
neighbouring countries along with Kabila’s ‘Alliance of Democratic Forces of Liberation’ (ADFL) drove
Mobutu out of power (Dizolele 2010, p.145). In 1997 Kabila declared himself president of the country,
now renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Once in power, Kabila faced criticism for lack of a clear vision or political programme. Nonetheless,
Western backers stressed the need to give him time and support in developing his strategy (Collins 1997,
282). Despite the fact that the new leader quickly began running the country through relatives and cronies
who made the most of the rents now available to them, the US stood by Kabila, even blocking UN
Security Council condemnation of the new regime (Schmitt 2013, p.211). It seems clear that Kabila
would have never reached his position of power without the support of external actors. The US and other
Western powers had historically been involved in all aspects of Congolese development (or lack thereof),
but why at this point did neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda feel the need to intervene in the DRC?
Nzongola-Ntalaja suggests that Kabila was simply the client of Rwandan and Ugandan authorities, who
used him in order to justify an invasion, take out Mobutu and have access to the country’s mineral wealth
(2007, p.135). Perhaps the first war was one of liberation, but the second, starting in 1998, was a
fragmented one in which countless regional and armed conflicts were being fought in the DRC, clearly
exploiting the country’s failed state syndrome (Lemarchand 2002, p.391, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002,
p.413). Kabila had no real control over his territory, and Rwanda and Uganda no longer fought on his side
but against him, and Western governments soon stopped offering him their support.
Kabila was soon dubbed ‘Mobutu II’, showing no interest for political debate, and having no issue with
committing human rights abuses (Cooper 2002, p.167). He introduced methods of corporal punishment
such as whipping at ADFL checkpoints that brought to mind the practices of colonial times (Collins 1997,
27
p.281). However, what concerned the Western world the most was Kabila’s unpredictability and
nationalist rhetoric that suggested a threat to their geostrategic interests (Kabuya-Lumuna Sando 2002,
p.619). As such, not only did the international community refuse him economic assistance in the second
Congo War, but they also supported the invading states, with the hope that it might bring an end to
Kabila, replacing him with a more Western friendly leader in the DRC (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, 421).
Though this was a central reason for their support of Rwanda and other invading countries, there was
another important cause for it. Both the British and the US governments failed to act in the face of the
Rwanda genocide back in 1994. Now, therefore, they offered support to Rwanda’s new president who
justified the invasion as a security strategy against Hutu forces now operating in the DRC (Trefon 2011,
p.13). The international community therefore chose to sit by and watch whilst neighbouring countries
ransacked Congo’s mineral resources in a war that resulted in millions of deaths.
4.5. Congo’s resource curse
The DRC’s raw material endowment can today only be seen as a curse. As earlier chapters have
examined, at all instances throughout Congolese modern history resources have led to misappropriation,
repression, corruption and inequality. The Congo is a major producer of cobalt, industrial diamonds and
copper as well as of rare metals needed for electronic items used throughout the world (Trefon 2011,
p.41). What should have led to economic prosperity and development has instead brought the vast
majority of the country to ruin except for a few elites. Moreover, not only has it been a cause for conflict,
but it has also been a key determinant for the sustenance of fighting. A political economy of war has
become a means of accumulation and production, and for many of those involved, war is decidedly more
profitable than peacetime could ever be (Moore, 2001, p.132, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.428). This
of course means that the participants in the conflict are undeniably bound to the globalisation process.
Plunder and therefore war is so lucrative because of worldwide demand for what lies underneath
Congolese soil. Despite widespread condemnation of the violence carried out by all warring factors in the
war, multinational companies clearly remain in business with them.
Collier relates an example that clearly illustrates the above point: when asked by a journalist how difficult
rebellion was, Kabila’s alleged response was that it was easy, a few thousand dollars to hire a small army,
and a satellite phone to strike deals with resource extraction companies (Collier 2008, p.21). It is therefore
28
important not to make the assumption that the greedy politician holds all responsibility for enriching
himself through plunder whilst the population struggles to move forward in life. Whilst as Mobutu’s and
Kabila’s record suggest, there is definitely truth in this, it is important to consider who is on the other side
of these multimillion dollar deals that allow them to continue their kleptocratic regimes.
Western companies contributed greatly to the conflict, by fuelling it with their business and trade
involving Congolese minerals (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.381). Belgium has been
denounced for its continued involvement in the illicit trade of diamonds and coltan throughout the conflict
in the DRC (Bustin 2002, p.555, Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.422). More worrying even is the interest
of mining companies to meet with Kabila the moment Mobutu ceased to be president. The new leader had
managed to strike deals worth approximately $3 billion a year with the companies De Beers and
American Mineral Fields (Renton, Seddon and Zeilig 2007, p.181.). Rwanda and Uganda were similarly
profiting. The World Bank publicly praised both countries for their increased development and economic
success, even though it was clear that both were resulting from the exploitation of the Congo’s minerals
and the contracts they were signing with Western companies (Ibid, p.194). The fact that large
international companies were profiting from a conflict that in just a few years has caused such widespread
displacement, rape and death is extremely alarming. More so, however, is the inaction from the
international community at large. Their attitude was dominated by the idea of sovereignty: ‘African
solutions for African problems’ (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002, p.427). However some question whether
economic interests were the true reason behind their response. Lemarchand suggests that
‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that by turning a blind eye to the profits drawn from the looting of
the Congo’s wealth, the international community – meaning not only the European Union and the US, but
the World Bank and the IMF- is tacitly encouraging a colonial enterprise in the best tradition of
European imperialism’ (2002, p.394).
Though the war is officially over, fighting continues in the Eastern region, and no doubt, minerals are still
being plundered and keeping the conflict alive. International actors have made some efforts towards
limiting the illicit trade of resources. An example is the Kimberley Process launched in 2003, a
29
certification scheme to prevent the trade of minerals that help fund conflict. Unfortunately, it is not
proving to be the success that was initially hoped for (Global Witness 2011).
4.6. Joseph Kabila: Towards a new democratic state?
With the conflict still ongoing, Laurent Kabila’s leadership came to an abrupt end. He was murdered by
one of his bodyguards. The DRC was in need of a new leader, and as if it were a monarchy, Kabila’s son
Joseph inherited the role. Lacking any legitimacy at home, Joseph Kabila’s first presidential move was to
travel to the West to seek it abroad (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p.247). He travelled to Washington, Paris
and Brussels, and just like Mobutu in his heyday, enjoyed great support from his new ‘godfathers’, who
no doubt had their own agendas, but were all united in their need to avoid a power vacuum in the DRC
(de Villers and Omasombo Tshonda 2002, p.408). The younger Kabila lacked political experience and
therefore Western actors felt he would be easier to mould to their needs. Moreover, he worked towards
putting an end to the war economy, adopted more liberal policies and moved forwards with the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue, a step towards finalising the Lusaka Peace Agreement (Ibid).
For the West, the US particularly, state building is not just a matter of charity, it is an investment towards
their own security and stability, a way to protect the global economy that provides them their prosperity
(Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein 2005, p.135). As such, nurturing Kabila was of vital interest to donor
states. Therefore upon his succession to power development aid was quickly resumed (Smis and
Oyatambwe 2002, p.419). Critics highlight the international community’s pressure to liberalise the
economy in the DRC, which takes precedence over political liberalisation, thus ‘the Congo will be free
for the market, and a few more warlords and kings than before, but not for its people’ (Moore 2001,
p.135). With Kabila’s strategy principally being about taking control of economic networks, instead of
establishing control and an administration throughout the country (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen and Smis
2002, p.281), the prospects of democracy in the country were bleak.
Nonetheless, elections were organised, and in 2006 Kabila officially became president of the DRC. The
international community played a major role in ensuring this was the result. Under the leadership of the
EU, $700 million was provided for the electoral process, and troops were sent to ensure security (Dizolele
2010, p.151). Moreover, potential challengers to Kabila’s victory were discouraged from competing by
30
ignoring their demands, and by the time of the elections, political parties that had formed in a rush were
unprepared for them (Ibid). Kabila’s victory came as no surprise. However, if the Congolese people
hoped for major changes, they soon learnt they would not materialise. Kabila promised improvements in
infrastructure, health, education, water and electricity, housing and employment (Trefon 2011, p.29). Yet
both poverty and vulnerability indicators remain catastrophic (Ibid). However, there has been some
progress within fiscal discipline and transparency, and the implementation of economic reform
programmes set by the IMF has led to some growth in private investments (Ibid, p.43).
Nonetheless, vast amounts of aid for development received is badly implemented, and the ‘politics of the
belly’ earlier described remains an issue in the country. Public service providers are said to prioritise
personal gain over duty, and a hierarchical administrative system has been established to ensure that the
provision of any service benefits someone at every level of the administrative chain (Ibid, p.96). More
worrying however, is the feeling of disengagement with the state throughout the Congolese population,
comparable to the state-society relations under the Mobutu regime. This is clearly summed up by a survey
that asked Congolese people what they would do it if the state were a person; ‘kill him’ was the
unequivocal response (Trefon 2009, p.13). Despite the aid provided by international partners and the
moves towards reform that are claimed to be in place, equitable growth is not taking place. Accordingly,
the majority masses of the DRC are still fending for themselves and therefore are still living in parallel to
the state.
Conclusion
If the democratic elections held in 2006 gave hope to the people of the DRC, the 2011 elections failed to
provide the people with feelings of optimism. In the lead up to the elections journalists and politicians
were arrested, opposition rallies violently broken up, and a renowned human rights activist killed
allegedly with the complicity of the police (Stearns 2011). Perhaps the good news in this is that an
opposition movement is rising, along with a flourishing civil society – after Kabila amended the
constitution so as to eliminate a second round of voting, opposition groups demonstrated in cities around
Europe in January 2011 (Trefon 2011, p.129). Opposition groups, such as these represent a path towards
democracy, stability and development. The current government, as it stands today, will not be the one to
31
bring the country out of the misery it has been in since Leopold colonised it in 1885. Kabila has ruled
with an increasingly heavy hand, and the country has remained in a violent rut, were prosperity has only
come to those close to the president and the dubious mining deals he has signed (Gettleman 2011).
As Dizolele asserts, in light of the destructive role the international community has played throughout the
Congo’s history, they have a moral obligation to assist the people of the DRC in their efforts towards
democracy (2010, p.149). Providing support for Kabila’s authoritarian and corrupt regime will not allow
space for democratic development. The $3 billion provided annually in development aid needs to be
directed towards constructive projects, such as battling corruption or empowering the people politically
(Stearns 2011). Turning a blind eye to Kabila’s exploitative regime because his policies don’t threaten
Western interests is morally irresponsible. However, it seems that Northern governments may currently
be pushing for political change. As Kabila strives to make changes to the constitution that limits
presidents to two terms in office, Western governments have joined the Congolese opposition leaders and
thousands of protesters in condemning this move (Bavier 2014). Whether Kabila chooses to ignore them
and run in the 2016 elections remains to be seen, but it is clear that international actors have the ability to
pressure him to comply with the constitution and step down at the end of his term.
This brings me back to my first research question, which asked whether the West should put an end to the
relationship of dependency that has existed between them, and cease its close involvement in the political
economy of the DRC. Northern states and institutions are so tied to the history of the country’s
development that a hasty end of relations would prove harmful. Moreover, the effects of globalisation
make escaping the culture of dependency a near-impossible feat. Nevertheless, Western involvement
must be both constructive and morally responsible for the Congolese population, and must attempt to
restrict the unequal power relations that are currently in place. Moves have been made towards this,
particularly with the IMF and World Bank’s 2010 announcement of the $12.3 billion in debt relief for the
country. This should be an incentive for the Congo to move towards ending its aid dependency. As Moyo
remarks, it is aid dependency that has hindered good governance for so long, and in putting an end to it,
the chances of a positive growth trajectory will be reinforced (2010, p.143)
32
Instead of direct financial assistance, aid programmes focused on public administration reforms (Trefon
2011, p.102-103), which serve long-term development goals have been put in place. Rather than focusing
on propping up a leader to suit their interests like they have done in the past, the West must focus on
institution building (Dizolele 2010, p.156). If donors focus on aid programmes that concentrate on state
stability and democracy building, the DRC’s government will then be able to set its own development
path. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) set up in 2001 by African leaders
(Nugent 2012, p.374) should be the organisation helping the Congo realise its development needs, as
opposed to Northern donors who are likely to push for a Eurocentric version of development.
My second research question took issue with the patterns of development emerging in the DRC. Is this
enough for its people, or should international actors continue to promote the development as experienced
in liberal states? It is clear that in striving to survive in a country that has placed obstacles before them at
every step of the way (whether national leaders or external forces), the Congolese people have managed
to secure their place in the process of globalisation in non-traditional ways (Bayart 1999, p.116). The
DRC, like much of Africa, is living its own modernity, reinventing itself according to its own logic (Van
Hoyweghen and Smis 2002, p.580, Trefon 2009, p.19). According to Escobar, ‘out of hybrid or minority
cultural situations might emerge other ways of building economies, of dealing with basic needs, of
coming together in social groups’ (2012, p.225). This is precisely the process that has been taking place in
the Congo. In the face of adversity they have created their own development path. This should not be
considered lesser than the one experienced in liberal states.
However, the issue of the predatory state remains. Accordingly, international governments and agencies
should centre their efforts in promoting transparency and good governance. This is no easy task, but if
Congo’s mineral wealth were to be distributed in an equitable way, leaders such as Mobutu or now Kabila
would enjoy less power with which to exert their control. Moreover it would lead to equitable growth.
This is the area that donor states should be focusing on: signing illicit mining contracts, or backing
corrupt regimes that commit human rights violations should be a thing of the past. It is no use claiming
that the state in the DRC has collapsed, whilst failing to acknowledge the role of Western states and
institutions in said collapse. From the days of Leopold II up until now, Northern states, Congolese leaders
and local elites have contributed to a permanent state of inequality, poverty and conflict. Fortunately the
33
Congolese population have proved resilient following a development logic that has enabled them to
survive.
34
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