FORTITUDINE - United States Marine Corps Vol 37 No 3.… · the “Wake Island Avengers,” and Sergeant Bradley Atwell, an aviation technician with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron

that the unique capabilities of theHarrier matched the requirementslaid out by General Pate a decade ear-lier. Colonel Miller and his superior,

General Keith McCutcheon,Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, dis-played a remarkable degree of po-litical prowess in convincing boththe U.S. Navy and Congress topurchase the Harrier, which en-tered service with the MarineCorps in 1971 as the AV-8A. Sincethat time, the Marine Corps hasbeen the sole American operatorof V/STOL tactical aircraft. As theimproved AV-8B Harrier II awaitsreplacement by the F-35B Light-ning II, the Corps need forV/STOL aircraft remains asstrong as it was in 1957. The Na-tional Museum of the MarineCorps recently received one of thefew remaining Hawker SiddeleyAV-8A Harriers.

2 Marine Corps Aviation

About the Cover: A Marine AllWeather Fighter Attack Squadron121 pilot refueled his F/A-18D Hor-net over the skies of Afghanistan.The helmet visor reflects the refu-eler, a McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Ex-tender, USAF.

“Where do we get such men”Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Close Air Support: The Core Capability of Marine AviationLieutenant Colonel Shawn P. Callahan

Lieutenant General Thomas H. Miller Jr.Second Lieutenant Taylor H. Couch and Dr. Fred H. Allison

Trial by Fire: Donovan Earns Multiple Medals as Sea Knight Aviator in VietnamBeth L. Crumley

Marine Aviator Helps Police Take Out An Urban SniperDr. Fred H. Allison

Cobra: The Evolution of the Attack HelicopterSecond Lieutenant Sivasubramaniam Ambikapathi and Stephanie Wasburn

Book Review: Last Men OutPaul Weber

Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada, 1983Dr. Fred H. Allison

Cobras Hit Back at al-KhafjiPaul W. Westermeyer

Marines Rescue Embassy Staff at MogadishuDr. Fred H. Allison and Second Lieutenant Bryan C. Bergman

Thunderbolts Rain Down on the Serbs During Operation Deny FlightDr. Fred H. Allison

“Break! Break! Flares!”Paul W. Westermeyer

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea KnightBen Kristy

Hawker Siddeley AV-8A HarrierBen Kristy

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FORTITUDINE100th Anniversary ofMarine Corps Aviation

100th Anniversary 43

In 1957, General RandolphMcCall Pate, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, commit-ted the Marine Corps to field afleet of V/STOL (vertical and/orshort takeoff and landing) air-craft because this type of aircraftwas vital to future Marine Corpsamphibious operations in the ageof atomic weapons. American air-craft companies spent manyyears and millions of dollars inthe pursuit of developingV/STOL aircraft, but it was anEnglish company, Hawker Sidde-ley, which first fielded a viableV/STOL tactical attack aircraft—the GR Mk 1 Harrier. ThenColonel Thomas H. Miller, Jr.,head of the Air Weapons Re-quirement Branch, recognized

In the winter of 1976–77, AV-8As from VMA-231 deployed on board the USS Roosevelt totest the ability of a V/STOL aircraft to operate as part of a full carrier air wing. The testsshowed that the Harrier was fully capable of operating alongside non-V/STOL carrier aircraft.

National Archives and Records Administration

is issue celebrates the second 50 years of Marine Corps Aviation.

PRESIDENTof Marine Corps UniversityBGen William F. Mullen III

DIRECTORof History DivisionDr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DIRECTORof National Museum of the Marine CorpsLin Ezell

PRODUCTION STAFFFortitudine Managing EditorGregory A. MacheakVisual Information SpecialistW. Stephen Hill

MARINE CORPSHISTORY DIVISION3078 Upshur AvenueQuantico, Virginia 22134Telephone (703) 432-4877http://[email protected]

This bulletin of the Marine Corpshistorical program is published forMarines, at the rate of one copy forevery nine on active duty, to pro-vide education and training in theuses of military and Marine Corpshistory. Other interested readersmay purchase single copies or four-issue subscriptions from the Su-perintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office.

COMMANDANT OF THEMARINE CORPS

Department of the NavyHeadquarters United States

Marine Corps3000 Marine Corps Pentagon

Room 2B253Washington, D.C. 20530-3000

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PCN 104 012 20100

Hawker Siddeley AV-8A Harrier

Leonard H. Dermott

Harriers—A Pair

This edition of Fortitudine is dedi-cated to the memory ofLieutenant Colonel Chris “Otis”Raible, commanding officer of VMA 211,the “Wake Island Avengers,” andSergeant Bradley Atwell, an aviationtechnician with Marine AviationLogistics Squadron 16, both of whomwere recently killed in action inAfghanistan during a Taliban attack onthe airfield at Camp Bastion. While theinvestigation into this deadly attack isstill ongoing, it was clear long before thisattack that Lieutenant Colonel Raiblewas an extraordinary leader of Marines. On the night of 14 September 2012,

approximately 15 Taliban fighters,allegedly wearing American uniforms,broke through the outer defenses ofCamp Bastion, located adjacent to thelarger Marine base at Camp

Leatherneck. Camp Bastion is the tem-porary home to several USMC squadronsflying missions in support of the NATOeffort in Afghanistan. Once the enemyattack commenced, Lieutenant ColonelRaible responded nearly instantaneous-ly, and he jumped into a vehicle alongwith another Marine. LieutenantColonel Raible moved so quickly that heleft his position armed with only his 9-millimeter sidearm. The gun battle withthe insurgents lasted for over fourhours. It was during this time thatLieutenant Colonel Raible was killedattempting to retake his flight line fromthe enemy. Before being eliminated byU.S. Marines and a British reaction force,the insurgents destroyed six MarineCorps Harrier aircraft and damaged twoothers. However, the loss of the valiantLieutenant Colonel Raible was far more

“Where do we get such men?”by Dr. Charles P. NeimeyerDirector of Marine Corps History Division

100th Anniversary 3

LCpl Harrison York, an AV-8B Harrier II maintainer with Marine Attack Squadron 211, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), salutes CaptStephen White as he taxis at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The aircraft bears the name of LtCol Raible, the former squadron’s commandingofficer who was killed during an attack on Camp Bastion on 14 September 2012.

Sgt James Mercure

significant thanthe destructionof any airplane. In the movie,

The Bridges atToko-Ri, the leadcharacter playedby actor WilliamHolden, is forced tocrash land following a successful bomb-ing mission over North Korea. A twoman rescue helicopter sent to retrievehim is hit by enemy ground fire and alsocrash lands nearby. Holden and the tworescue crewmen fight off North Koreansoldiers until all three men are killed.Back aboard the U.S. Navy aircraft carri-er where Holden’s mission began, theadmiral in charge of the battle group isvisibly upset over the loss of his bestpilot and the rescue crew who tried to


early morning hours of 23 December,Captain Elrod was in the thick of thefight. His scratch force of grounded avia-tors and civilian volunteers tenaciouslyrepelled multiple Japanese infantryattacks when after hours of intense com-bat he was killed in action. He is creditedas the first Marine aviator to receive theMedal of Honor for actions during WorldWar II. His stalwart defense of his sectoron Wake reinforced the long held view ofthe Marine Corps that “every Marine is arifleman.” So where do we get such men?—ask

Lance Corporal Ethan Burk of MarineAviation Logistics Squadron 16 and asquadron mate of Sergeant Atwell. LanceCorporal Burk, a native of Milford,Texas, was also at Camp Bastion thenight of the Taliban assault. He wasalone driving a four-wheeled tractorwhen his vehicle drew the fire of insur-gents who had broken through the wire.Feeling something hit his arm and imag-ing that he banged it as he bailed out ofthe tractor to escape the incomingenemy machine gun fire, Burk foundanother Marine, and they both tooksteps to repel what they believed was animminent enemy assault upon theirposition. When the anticipated attackdid not take place, Burk signaled a near-by British reaction force in order to fillthem in on what he thought was going

on. It was at that moment that Burk wasinformed by one of the British soldiersthat he was wounded and bleeding. Afterchecking in with his command, onlythen did Burk seek out a Corpsman whoconfirmed that he had indeed been hit inthe elbow by a machine gun round andhad fragments of the bullet still lodgedin his arm. He later had the fragmentssurgically removed. When asked if hewished to be evacuated home, Burkretorted, “I just got here, why would Iwant to go home?” This latest edition of Fortitudine will

focus on the exploits of Marine Corpsaviation from the Vietnam era to thepresent day. While there has been con-siderable historical emphasis on MarineCorps aviation during the earlier con-flicts of World War II and Korea, therehas been little coverage or time givenover to recounting the exploits ofMarine aviators who served and flewduring the Cold War and beyond. Thisedition will hopefully shed further lighton some of the more significant episodesof Marine Corps aviation history duringand after the Vietnam War.

save him. Watching flight operationsfrom the bridge the admiral rhetoricallyasks: “Where do we get such men?” Lieutenant Colonel Raible’s fight

against the insurgents at Camp Bastionreminds us of a historical parallel toanother member of this legendaryMarine squadron, Captain Henry T.Elrod. Captain Elrod was the executiveofficer of VMF-211, and he lost his lifeon the ground resisting the Japaneseassault of Wake Island on 23 December1941. While Captain Elrod’s andLieutenant Colonel Raible’s individualcombat actions are separated in time byover 70 years, both men were killed inaction not in the air as they had beentrained to do, but fighting on the groundalongside their Marines. Henry Talmage Elrod, sometimes

called “Hammerin’ Hank” for his aggres-sive flying style, arrived on Wake Islandjust three days before Pearl Harbor. On12 December 1941, Captain Elrod, flyinga lone Grumman F4F Wildcat, attacked aformation of 22 enemy aircraft. He shotdown two aircraft and was later creditedwith successfully sinking the Japanesedestroyer Kisaragi with bombs. Once hissquadron no longer had any operationalaircraft left to fly, he defended a criticalpart of the island’s ground defense.When Japanese Naval Special LandingForce troops assaulted Wake during the

Sgt James MercureLCpl Ethan Burk stands in front of a bullet-riddled concrete barrier after the night attackon Camp Bastion. Wounded during the attack, Burk and LCpl Kevin Sommers maneuveredout of the kill zone to inform the British quick reaction force about the insurgent attack.

Marines pay their final respects to LtColChristopher Raible during a memorial cere-mony on 19 September 2012. Raible,Commanding Officer of Marine AttackSquadron 211, was from Huntingdon,Pennsylvania.

Sgt Keonaona Paulo

100th Anniversary 5

Close Air Support:

The Core Capab i l i t y o f Mar ine Av i at ion

Marine aviation fills a variety of missions insupport of the Marine air-ground taskforce, but two roles stand out in the mindsof most Marines: close air support, andassault support or tactical mobility. This perception isbased in truth, for the most distinctive feature of Marineaviation relative to other air forces over most of the last100 years has been its deeply ingrained focus on sup-porting ground units, and this is most evident in thesetwo basic functions. Some form of close air support hasbeen a regular mission of Marine aviation for at least 85of its 100 years, and while the definition of close air sup-port has varied over time, it has always included threemajor components: It involves the attack of targets closeto friendly forces, it requires communication betweenthe attacking aircraft and the supported unit, and itimplies that the attack is made to further the objectivesof the ground combat force. The prominence of close airsupport among Marine aviation missions warrants anexamination as to how close-air-support doctrine has

evolved, how the training and equipping of Marine avia-tion for close air support has changed, and what resultssuch efforts have produced for Marines in combat. As with the other services, the first decade of aviation

in the Marine Corps was characterized by operationalexperimentation that proved necessary to develop viableconcepts. As a result, during this period Marine aviationwas employed in ways that would later appear unortho-dox. In World War I, for example, Marine aviators did notsupport the 4th Marine Brigade and instead servedalongside Navy squadrons in antisubmarine operationsand in strikes against naval bases. This did have a posi-tive effect in the long run, for while the Army’s air forcesleft the Great War strongly influenced by the strategic airconcepts of Sir Hugh Trenchard, Marine pilots like AlfredA. Cunningham were apologetic for the disconnect whichhad occurred in the war, stating that “the only excuse foraviation in any service is its usefulness in assistingtroops on the ground.” The Marine Corps perpetuatedCunningham’s attitude with personnel policies which didnot allow Marine pilots to separate themselves from therest of the Marine officer corps, having no distinct mili-tary occupational specialty and insisting that they alter-nate flying tours with ground tours. These attitudes andpolicies, and the experiences in postwar deployments ofMarine aviation to places like China, Haiti, theDominican Republic, and Nicaragua as part of larger taskforces provided fertile ground in which to germinatewhat would later become a deeply ingrained concept ofclose air support.

by Lieutenant Colonel Shawn P. Callahan

Alfred A. Cunningham.Marine Corps

Don Brammer

DH-4B at Port au Prince, Haiti, early 1930s.


Several historians have attributed combat operationsat Ocotal, Nicaragua, in 1927 as the birth of close air sup-port in the Marine Corps, but to do so would suggestthat, it was a revolutionary combat innovation. In fact,the process was much more gradual. Marines had beenrefining the techniques necessary for close air supportsince the initial postwar deployment to Haiti in 1919. During that deployment Lieutenant Lawson H. M.

Sanderson refined the technique of dive bombing, usingsteep dive angles to hit targets in heavily vegetated ter-rain. The accuracy imparted by such techniques was vitalto the ability of Marine pilots to bomb in proximity tofriendly troops, but Marine aviators only gradually devel-oped the other capabilities required to conduct true closeair support. The defeat of a Sandinista attack on theMarine garrison at Ocotal eight years later was the mostconspicuous event in this progression because in thatengagement the bombing by Major Ross E. Rowell’sflight of five aircraft was decisive in driving the enemyaway. While this did earn him the first DistinguishedFlying Cross to be presented to a Marine, it could not besaid that there was close communication with the groundforce in this event or that the static tactical situationrequired detailed coordination between ground and air

units. Rowell was, however, vital to the process of contin-ued innovation and air-ground team building. Continuedcooperation over the next year between his squadron andMarine leaders on the ground, like Lieutenant Merritt A.Edson, helped solidify the value of aviation to the Corpslight infantry forces in the field and provided ampleopportunities to refine techniques for bombing andincreasing cooperation.The development of a formal doctrine and the tools for

implementing a close-air-support doctrine took longer,and the establishment of the necessary training pro-grams was further behind that. As the Corps shifted itsfocus to a potential amphibious war in the Pacific, itadapted its vision for using aviation to support landingforces, but the 1935 Tentative Landing Operations Manualdiscussed air support in only very general terms, givingno detail at all on what was later discovered to be a criti-cal issue: how such support should be coordinated andsynchronized. By 1939 Headquarters clearly stated thatthe primary function of Marine aviation was the supportof Fleet Marine Forces in landing operations and opera-tions ashore, but it was the Small Wars Manual publishedin 1940 that provided specifics on procedures for close airsupport, such as the use of marking panels and tech-niques for communicating directly between a flightleader and the ground unit he was supporting. This doc-ument also describes the synergistic use of close air sup-port in a concept very similar to modern-combined-arms

Marine Corps

Lawson H. M. Sanderson. Ross E. “Rusty” Rowell.Marine Corps

100th Anniversary 7

doctrine, asserting that air support for ground troopswould present the enemy with few tactical optionsagainst this new form of ground warfare.These were important steps in the right direction, but

other obstacles remained, and Marine aviation wasunprepared to provide close air support in World War II.Like the rest of the Marine Corps, it faced the challengesof rapid expansion, which were exacerbated by the long-training requirements to produce combat-ready pilots.The Corps also suffered from a lack of any specific train-ing program for close air support and had only just start-ed to replace the relatively primitive two-seat, fabric,open-cockpit biplanes like the De Havilland DH-4 andVought 02U. While these had proven to be vital tools ofinnovation in the 1920s, they were not well suited for thehigh-intensity combat of World War II, and the best thatcould initially be obtained were still-inadequate mission-specific aircraft like the Douglas SBD Dauntless scout-bomber. The Corps also started the war without any aircommand and control system to speak of. OnGuadalcanal, no forward air controllers were assigned toground units, and mission coordination was sometimesconducted by infantry battalion officers going to thenearby flight line at Henderson Field. As the war went on, the vision for amphibious close air

support was hamstrung by unsatisfactory naval escortcarriers, Marine squadrons not properly equipped, andMarine pilots not fully trained. Consequently, Marine avi-

ation did not support the Marine ground divisions formost of the key battles in the Central Pacific, leaving thelanding forces dependent on carrier-based aircraft of theNavy. It was not until the final year of the war thatMarine aviation realized its full potential for close air sup-port. The first occasion occurred in the Philippines whereMarine Air Group 24 and Marine Air Group 32 supportedthe 6th Army. The second was at Okinawa where the cul-mination of previous efforts led to effective Marine air-ground teamwork. There, carrier-based Marine aviationprovided much of the initial support to the landing forcesand was then replaced by land-based Marine aviation, allcoordinated by a robust command and control systemthat included air-liaison parties in the ground units. Thissystem generated effective support for ground units in anenvironment where the Japanese were contesting U.S. airsuperiority, long considered a vital requirement for closeair support and the loss of which often led to the suspen-sion of close-air-support missions. At the conclusion ofWorld War II, Marine aviation had an enhanced close-air-support capability with a cohesive air-ground team, effec-tive aircraft and weapons, well-trained, experiencedpilots, and a robust command and control system. Theclose-air-support doctrine had evolved to include all themodern precepts of close air support with the notableexception of positive control, which is the requirement fora forward air controller to issue a clearance to expend ord-nance before any weapons system can be employed.

Don Brammer

VMSB-231 Douglas SBD Dauntless bombers taxi at Majuro Atoll, South Pacific, in World War II.


The de facto separation of Marine aviation fromground units that characterized much of the war in thePacific led Marine leaders to question the value of theirair arm, but their ultimate response was to further focusMarine aviation on its reason for existence—support ofground forces. Fortunately, the short interval before thestart of the Korean War meant that the Marine Corpsentered that conflict with the doctrine and resources itneeded to demonstrate the full potential of the air-ground team. The inclusion of two carrier-based Corsairsquadrons in the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, sent tothe Pusan perimeter, simply could not have been possiblewithout the lessons learned from World War II. ThePusan battles and Inchon landings were successful due tothese lessons learned.The greatest challenge to air-ground cooperation was

the newly created Air Force, which sought to implementa doctrine based on a different vision of air power, root-ed in its World War I and II experiences. The Air Forceargued that the effectiveness of Marine aircraft would bemaximized when it was centrally controlled along with allother air units. Some of the same, innovative Corps lead-ers from early days of close-air-support development,fought against this vision. A concession was made so thatMarine aircraft would be used to support Marine unitswhenever possible, but the ability for Marines to planand execute as an integrated team was jeopardized by theadditional layers of command that now separated them:The 1st Marine Division was subsumed into the 8thArmy, and the 1st Marine Air Wing was absorbed into the5th Air Force. Fortunately the agreement to align Marinesorties with Marine ground units was honored in dire cir-cumstances like the Chosin Breakout. At Chosin, Marineaviators were put to the test by executing perilously lowattacks in extreme weather conditions with a precisionthat earned them high laurels.By the end of the Korean War, the Corps close-air-sup-

port doctrine had been refined to the point of what wasnearly identical to that in use 55 years later: “The attackof hostile ground or naval targets which are so close tofriendly forces as to require detailed integration of eachair mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”The doctrinal refinement was paralleled by other pro-grams of far greater significance, even if their impact wasindirect. One of these was The Basic School. Although acomprehensive school for new officers had existed withperiodic gaps since the establishment of the School ofApplication in 1892, in the 1950s the program wasenhanced and formalized into The Basic School. Sincethat time, almost all Marine officers have attended TheBasic School, and as a result, aviators have an apprecia-tion for the needs of and challenges faced by groundtroops. The Corps commitment to this training has beenvital to the cohesiveness of the air-ground team and isoften the first thing cited to explain the fundamental dif-ferences between Marine aviation and those of the otherservices. Another concept, born of the experiences inWorld War II and Korea, was improved expeditionary air-fields. One result was the short airfield for tactical sup-port, which included catapults, arresting gear, and alu-minum mats suitable for jet aircraft operations. The late 1950s and early 1960s was a period of rapid

modernization within naval aviation and the Corps.During this period, the Corps used the Douglas A-4Skyhawk, Grumman A-6 Intruder, and McDonnellDouglas F-4 Phantom. The Corps developed tools like theTPQ-10, a ground-based radar-direction system, to pro-vide control of attack missions under all weather and vis-ibility conditions. The Intruder, under radar control, pro-vided an especially credible and potent nighttime close-air-support capability. With the onset of the Vietnam War, the Corps put

their air assets to the test. One month after the 9thMarine Amphibious Brigade landed at Da Nang, Marine

F4U Corsair firing rockets over Okinawa, Japan, during World War II.Marine Corps

100th Anniversary 9

Phantoms from VMFA-542 were operating out of thatairfield, soon to be the home of Marine Air Group 11.Next, just 45 days after the order was issued and lessthan three months after the initial landing, a short air-field for tactical support was established at Chu Lai,which immediately became the home of Marine AirGroup 12, including two A-4 squadrons, VMA-225 andVMA-311. A third group, Marine Air Group 13, wasadded, providing fixed-wing close air support throughoutthe III Marine Amphibious Force area of responsibility. Critical to this teamwork was the spirit of cooperation

that existed between ground combat officers and avia-tors, although some deviation from the policies was nec-essary. A small number of aviators were sent directly toflight school without the benefit of The Basic School, andwinged aviators were not always used as forward air con-trollers in ground units. Furthermore, because of press-ing manpower constraints, Marine aviation increased thecommitment of aviators to ground units by making theaviators spend the last half of their thirteen-month com-bat tour as forward air controllers. This commitment ofhard-earned aviation training and combat experiencemade the greatest effect in creating air-ground synergy.

Counterinsurgency in densely vegetated terrain high-lighted a need for observation aircraft to provide coordi-nated airborne support. The Cessna O-1 Bird Dog metthis need until it was replaced by the North AmericanRockwell OV-10 Bronco. Both of these aircraft wereflown by VMO squadrons and had two aviators: A pilotflew and provided forward air control, and an artilleryofficer usually coordinated indirect fire support from therear seat. The resulting shift toward more airborne for-ward air controllers actually helped alleviate some of theshortages of tactical-air-control parties, making the for-ward air controllers more mobile and available to agreater number of ground units. Additional capabilities were provided by jet aircraft

such as the two-seat Grumman TF-9J Cougar, flown byheadquarters and maintenance squadrons in tactical aircoordinator (airborne) missions. The role of the Cougarin coordinating complex-close-air-support operationswas superseded by the Douglas TA-4F Skyhawk. Anotherimportant wartime improvement was the attack heli-copter. Bell UH-1 Iroquois (Huey) arrived at Da Nang inMay 1965 and provided rotary-wing close air support. In1969, the Bell AH-1G Cobra (Huey Cobra) arrived, which

Marty Halpin

Col John D. Noble, Commanding Officer MAG-12, eats first piece of cake near a Douglas A-4C Skyhawk aircraft of VMA-225 at Chu Lai,South Vietnam, 1 June 1965. The celebration marked the opening at Chu Lai of the short airfield for tactical support, a new type of expe-ditionary airfield.


the Army had developed, but the Marines happily adopt-ed it. Initially flown by VMO-2 out of Marine Air Group16’s Marble Mountain Air Facility, it were later reorga-nized into HML-367. The Huey Cobra significantlyenhanced the capability of the Marine air wing to provide

closely coordinated, accurate fire support for groundforces.Marine close air support proved critical during a num-

ber of engagements, but the most graphic example isprobably the battle for Khe Sanh where the 26th Marines

Col Kevin K. Baggott

Shown are VMO-1 pilots Captains Kevin K. Baggott (left) and Rick D. Boyer (right) next to their OV-10 Bronco that they flew duringOperation Counter Drug in Puerto Rico in 1989.

A Marine UH-1N Huey patrols over Mogadishu, Somalia, supporting relief operations during Operation Restore Hope in 1993.Department of Defense


was surrounded by several North Vietnamese Army divi-sions. General William W. Momyer, the Air Force generalin charge of Westmoreland’s air efforts, saw the battle ofKhe Sanh as an opportunity to lure the NorthVietnamese Army into a set-piece battle where they couldbe destroyed by heavy air power. It will never be knownhow effective his heavy bombers and tactical fighter-bombers were at pulverizing this enemy, but severalthings are clear: Marine close air support was the pre-ferred weapon when needed close to the Marine perime-ters, Marine aviators kept the enemy at bay by their pre-cise bombing attacks, and the North Vietnamese Armynever launched an attack which presented a crediblethreat of overrunning the combat base.Unfortunately, the battle also reignited an interservice

dispute which had been simmering between the Air Forceand Marine Corps since the Korean War. The Air Forcedoctrine called for centralized control of air power tomaximize its efficiency and concentrate its effects at anoperational level. This doctrine was in direct oppositionto Marine doctrine, which saw air power as a tactical toolto be made readily available to ground commanders. ToGeneral Momyer, the existence of the 1st Marine AircraftWing as a subordinate unit of the III Marine AmphibiousForce could not be tolerated any more than the existenceof a second air force. Consequently, he used the air oper-ation around Khe Sanh as an opportunity to finallyachieve centralized control under a concept called singleair management. The move for single management wasstaunchly opposed by Marine leaders and quickly escalat-ed to General William C. Westmoreland, who was then

overruled by Commander in Chief Pacific, Admiral U. S.Grant Sharp Jr.In the postwar period, the Marine Corps shifted its

focus to its forward deployed forces, most notably theexpeditionary units. The wartime adoption of the attackhelicopter, Sea Cobra, provided expeditionary units withan organic-close-air-support capability that paid big divi-dends in contingencies like Operation Urgent Fury inGrenada in 1983. This integral-close-air-support capabil-ity was soon augmented by the vertical and/or shorttakeoff and landing aircraft McDonnell Douglas AV-8BHarrier II. The Corps also stressed its commitment to anexpeditionary aviation capability that was capable ofaccompanying ground Marines wherever they went.Equally important was the Omnibus agreement signed in1986 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At a time when theGoldwater Nichols Act was stressing joint command andfurthering such concepts through the empowerment ofJoint Force Air Combatant Commanders, the Omnibusagreement placed limits on this more modern version ofthe single management concept when it came to taskingMarine aviation that was more devoted to missions likeclose air support. The post-Vietnam fielding of the Harrier was paral-

leled by other modernization programs like theMcDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet. The Marine Corpsultimately adopted three combat models to replace theCorps’ aging fleet of aircraft. This transition process wasincomplete, however, when the ground war in OperationDesert Storm commenced. As a result, the 3rd MarineAircraft Wing provided close air support with various air-

Ben Kristy

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II of VMA-331 in low-level flight over the desert.


craft from aging Hueys to brand-new Hornets and con-ducted visual-close-air-support procedures with the Mk-80 series “dumb” bombs alongside more sophisticatedsystems like radar-beacon forward air control, laser guid-ance, and night-vision goggles. Marine aviation was ful-filling its charter to provide expeditionary fire support:Helicopters rearmed and refueled at forward locations,and jets operated from airbases under austere conditionsand from on board ships. Ultimately, the adoption of newaircraft and advanced technologies proved well worth theconsiderable time, money, and effort. Antiaircraft fireclaimed two Broncos over Iraq, but the seven Hornetsthat were hit by air defense systems, all survived to flymore combat missions within days.As the first real test of the joint force air combatant

commanders concept, Desert Storm once again foundMarine commanders at odds with the Air Force. Thephilosophical differences were manifest once the firstfew days of “prescripted” joint air tasking orders werecompleted, and the Air Force command and control sys-tem was too slow to react to the dynamic battlefield andtarget its missions appropriately. In essence, this was arepeat of some mistakes committed in Korea, but theMarines solved it with the same ingenuity they hadapplied in 1968—by working around the system toaccomplish the mission in spite of the air tasking order.This commitment and “can-do” spirit, combined withpotent new weapons systems, produced first-class sup-port for the two Marine divisions involved in complexbreaching operations and the brief, but dynamic battlefor Kuwait which followed.

Important acknowledgment of the Marine Corpsexpertise at close air support came in 1995, when theCorps was recognized as the lead service for defining thenew joint-close-air-support doctrine. The first majorproduct of this was Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (close airsupport), which demonstrated strong Marine influenceover the procedures that were now prescribed for all ser-vices to conduct close air support. To begin with, close-in fire support was reclassified as rotary-wing close airsupport, and Air Force Lockheed AC-130 Spectre mis-sions were brought closer to adopting procedures con-sistent with the other close-air-support platforms, aprocess that continued in subsequent editions. Moreimportantly, the current definition of close air supportwas adopted: “Air action by fixed-and rotary-wing air-craft against hostile targets which are in close proximityto friendly forces and which require detailed integrationof each air mission with the fire and movement of thoseforces.” By essentially adopting the pre-existing Marinedefinition under the authority of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, a debate, which had existed for decades, ended.The Air Force had sought to tie close-air-support propo-nents to a specific distance from friendly forces at whichthe mission could be conducted without the require-ment for a ground unit to clear aviation fires. Instead, allthe services had to conform to the Marine approach,defining close air support by what it did and how it didit, and in the process, rejecting the notion that beyondsome inflexible distance such coordination might beunnecessary.

Department of Defense

The Lockheed Martin KC-130J Hercules refueler aircraft can be upgraded to provide air support using Hellfire, Griffin, or Viper Strikemissles. This upgrade is called the Harvest Hawk. The aircraft shown is from VMGR-252 at Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan, 2011.


Some might argue that while the increased emphasison joint action has given Marine close-air-support pro-ponents greater influence over doctrine, it is also sowingthe seeds of its own destruction. Some have argued thatjoint aircraft programs like the Lockheed F-35 LightningII, using increasingly precise weapons (GPS-guided jointdirect attack munitions) that require less pilot skill,meant that the aircraft and pilot assets are unimportant.To dispel this illusion, one needs to look at the preferencefor Marine close air support by Marine ground forcesduring Operation Iraqi Freedom. Furthermore, oneneeds to look at the failings of the other services to exe-cute the joint doctrine. One example is the FairchildRepublic A-10 Thunderbolt II or Warthog, a superiorclose-air-support platform flown by brave and skilledpilots, but which has been involved in numerous fratri-cides in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The trend in thesemishaps was that skilled pilots were making well-inten-tioned decisions, but that they were not informed by theMarine ethos toward close air support, foremost of whichis the principle that no weapon be dropped without

absolute assurance that friendly forces are not being tar-geted. Even in less dynamic battlefields, like OperationAnaconda in Afghanistan in 2002, unnecessary and dan-gerous chaos resulted from other services which had nei-ther internalized the new joint-close-air-support atti-tudes and procedures, nor equipped themselves with anadequate command and control system for coordinatingair attacks with the fire and movement of ground forces.As the Marine Corps celebrates the 100th anniversary

of its aviation forces, it should continue to pursueadvanced expeditionary aircraft capable of providingclose air support like the Lightning II, but it must alsomaintain its commitment to the intangible programsthat embrace the heritage of the air-ground team. To theoutside observer, the Marine Corps devotion to preserv-ing its own air force and program like The Basic Schoolmight appear dogmatic, but the history of Marine avia-tion with its single-minded focus on maximizing supportof the ground combat element is a distinctive feature thatis just as important to the future of the Corps as its war-rior ethos.

Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.Andy Wolfe


Lieutenant General Thomas H.Miller Jr. led a distinguishedcareer as a Marine Corps avia-tor, leader, and visionary: As an avia-tor, he broke the world speed recordin 1960, flying a McDonnell DouglasF4H-1 Phantom II; As a leader, heserved as the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Aviation from 1975–79; As avisionary, he supported not only ver-tical and/or short takeoff and land-ing (V/STOL) aircraft, e.g., Harrier,but also other acquisitions and pro-grams that helped evolve modernMarine aviation.He is considered one of if not the

first American to fly the AV-8AHarrier. As Deputy Chief of Staff forAviation, he led the fight to obtainthe Harrier’s upgraded variant, theMcDonnell Douglas AV-8B, HarrierII. Because of his enthusiasm forV/STOL aircraft, Miller is consid-ered, in the Marine Corps, the“father of the Harrier.”Miller, a native of Texas, began his

military career in the U.S. NavalReserve V-5 Program in June 1942before enrolling in aviation training.When it came time to select Navy orMarine Corps, Miller opted to goMarine. He later asserted that hewanted to be a Marine aviatorbecause he figured they were the“damned best there was.” On 1March 1943, Miller was designated anaval aviator and commissioned aMarine second lieutenant. He andJohn Glenn ended up in the samesquadron, Marine Fighting Squadron155, which deployed to the Pacific inFebruary 1944 where they flew com-bat missions at Midway Island, andthe Gilbert and Marshall Islands.After World War II, Miller became

a test pilot at the Naval Air TestCenter, Patuxent River, Maryland.

During the Korean War, he served inMarine Fighter Squadron 323 andflew the F4U Corsair in numerouscombat strikes. In 1955 Miller,Executive Officer, Marine AttackSquadron 224, was in charge ofintroducing and evaluating the leg-endary Douglas A-4D-1 Skyhawk jetto the fleet. In 1960, Lieutenant Colonel

Miller worked at the Bureau ofAeronautics as the research anddevelopment project officer on theF4H Phantom II jet. In an attempt toset a new world speed record, Millerflew a 500 kilometer closed-circuit

course near March Air Force Base,California, on 5 September 1960 at1,216 miles per hour, breaking theprevious record by 400 miles perhour. He was awarded theDistinguished Flying Cross for thisaccomplishment.After graduating from the Army

War College in June 1966, he servedas Head, Air Weapons RequirementBranch in the Department ofAviation, commanded by MajorGeneral Keith B. McCutcheon. Fromthis post he lobbied for the acquisi-tion by the Marine Corps of a dedi-cated attack helicopter, the Bell AH-

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS H. MILLER JR.By Second Lieutenant Taylor H. Couch and Dr. Fred H. Allison

LtGen Thomas H. Miller Jr.

Lieutenants John Glenn (left) and Miller (right) are shown in their Marshall IslandQuonset hut in 1944 while serving with VMF-155.


1G Cobra, then being flown inVietnam by the U.S. Army. He suc-ceeded in this endeavor and gainedapproval to build a twin-engine vari-ant for the Marines, the AH-1J SeaCobra. He also gained approval toput the same engine package on theBell UH-1 Iroquois or Hueys that theMarines flew. Miller believed themultiengine variants were safer inthe event of mechanical malfunc-tion, especially over water, in addi-tion to providing greater power andreliability.In 1968, Major General

McCutcheon sent Colonel Miller andLieutenant Colonel Bud Baker toFarnborough, England, to investi-gate a revolutionary jet aircraft beingdeveloped by the Hawker SiddeleyCompany. This aircraft was theHarrier, which could take off andland vertically but otherwise per-formed like a fixed-wing jet. ThisV/STOL capability appealed to theMarine Corps for its close-air-sup-port needs by providing basing flexi-

bility and reducing on-target timesto support ground forces. While inEngland, Colonel Miller becameprobably the first American to fly theHarrier, and upon return to the U.S.,he recommended the Harrier for theMarine Corps. General Leonard F.Chapman, Jr., Commandant of theMarine Corps, and GeneralMcCutcheon agreed with Miller’sassessment and pushed for an initialbuy of 12 Harriers in lieu of 17 addi-tional McDonnell Douglas F-4s.Colonel Miller, who knew theMcDonnell family, garnered theirsupport of the Harrier programdespite the F-4 cuts. With an agree-ment that McDonnell Douglas wouldmanufacture Harriers in the U.S.,Congress authorized their purchase.Ordered to Vietnam in December

1969, Miller served as AssistantChief of Staff, G-3, and later as Chiefof Staff, III Marine AmphibiousForce. Upon returning to the U.S., hebecame Assistant Wing Commanderin 1971 of the 2nd Marine Aircraft

Wing and assumed command of it in1972. After completing his commandof the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing inJuly 1974, he became DeputyCommander and Chief of Staff, FleetMarine Force Pacific, in Hawaii. InApril 1975, he became Deputy Chiefof Staff for Aviation. From this lead-ership post Miller fought for andacquired the more capable Harrier,the AV-8B, and lent early support todeveloping a tiltrotor aircraft thateventually became the Bell BoeingMV-22 Osprey. Miller also supportedthe initiative to create MarineAviation Weapons and TacticsSquadron 1, which standardized avi-ation tactics, techniques, and proce-dures across the Marine Corps.Indeed Marine Aviation Weaponsand Tactics Squadron 1 has proven tobe the most significant factor inmaking modern Marine aviators theresident experts in air-support tac-tics.Miller retired from the Marine

Corps 1 July 1979. He passed awayon 27 November 2007. His impactupon Marine Corps aviation wassummed up by his lifelong friend,Senator John Glenn: “His vision andconcepts expanded and altered therole of Marine Corps aviation tomake it ever more effective as part ofthe Marine air-ground team.”

LtCol Miller (right) in England in 1968 after he flew the Harrier. With him are John Farley(left), chief test pilot for Hawker Siddley, and Dr. John Fozard, Harrier designer.

LtGen Thomas H. Miller Jr.

Marine Corps

Lieutenant General Thomas H. Miller Jr.


Over the course of 77 days inearly 1969, First LieutenantJoseph P. Donovan, a younghelicopter pilot, became one of themost highly decorated aviators in thehistory of the Marine Corps. Flyingwith what he later described as thefinest Marines (crew chiefs, mechan-ics, and gunners) the Corps had tooffer, Donovan earned an astoundingarray of medals, including two NavyCrosses, a Silver Star, twoDistinguished Flying Crosses, and aPurple Heart. He was also awarded a

total of 35 Strike/Flight Air Medals. Designated a Marine aviator on 2

April 1968, Donovan was originally aUH-1E pilot and later stated that hewas “fully qualified to serve my tourin Vietnam as a Huey gunship pilot.”However, by August 1968, he wasordered to Vietnam to serve withMarine Medium HelicopterSquadron 364 (HMM-364).Operating initially out of Phu Baiand later Marble Mountain AirFacility, located near Da Nang,HMM-364 was flying Boeing’s

improved CH-46D Sea Knight. Theirmission was one of resupply, mede-vacs, and insertions and extractionsof troops.After a period of transitioning to

the Sea Knight, Donovan settled intothe day-to-day realities of flightoperations in Vietnam. There wasrarely a “routine” flight. On 24January 1969, while copiloting air-craft YK-22, the flight came underenemy fire. A hydraulic line was hit,resulting in the loss of both the aux-iliary and number two hydraulic

First Lieutenants Joseph P. Donovan and William A. Beebe were photographed on 1 September 1969, the day they arrived at Phu Bai toserve with HMM-364.

Honorable Joseph P. Donovan

Trial by Fire:Donovan Earns Multiple Medals asSea Knight Aviator in VietnamBy Beth L. Crumley

CORE OF THE CORPS


February 1969. 1st LtDonovan, and his co-pilot 1stLt Sam Ware had preflightedYK-5 earlier . . . the bird and thecrew were ready for the eveningmedevac. I had just finishedbuttoning her up when I heardthe whooshing of incoming, fol-lowed immediately by theirexploding on impact in andaround Marble Mountain AirFacility. As the rockets andshells rained down on our loca-tion, I started the auxiliarypower plant in preparation forengine start as Lt Donovan andLt Ware ran toward the chop-per. Donovan launched at about 2200

as wingman in a flight of two SeaKnights, assigned to medevac a seri-ously injured Marine from an areanorth of the bridge. The lead aircrafthad the corpsman on board. Onceairborne, the lead aircraft experi-enced mechanical difficulties, and

boost system, and drenching the air-craft and crew with hydraulic fluid.The helicopter made an emergencylanding at a remote fire base on thewestern edge of Charlie Ridge, northof Thuong Duc. It would not be thelast time Donovan and his crewwould find themselves in peril. Marine patrols in the area north

of the Nam O Bridge in Quang NamProvince had increased. Troops hadswept the area and discovered noenemy, although an extensive tunnelsystem ran through the area.However, the situation heated up onthe night of 22–23 February whenthe enemy acted. Mortars and 122-millimeter rockets hit Da Nang,igniting a 450,000-gallon fuel tankand damaging six helicopters. Crewchief and earlier 1968 Navy Crossrecipient, Corporal Ernesto “Gooie”Gomez stated that

my aircraft had beenassigned the night medevacmission on the evening of 21

with no radio, the pilot was forced toreturn to Marble Mountain.Donovan, having never flown as anight helicopter aircraft commander,resolutely elected to continue themission, stating that “we will try.”Gomez handled the medical as wellas crew chief duties: “When theMarines call you in the middle of thenight with a medevac, somethinghappens inside you . . . it soundskinda crazy, but these guys are sur-rounded, these guys are getting hit,these guys are getting shot . . . andwe’re going out there in a helicopterto help them.”As they approached the designat-

ed area, Donovan observed a rocketlaunching site, and the accompany-ing gunships went after it. Despitethe heavy enemy fire and withoutgunship support, he maneuvered theSea Knight onto the side of a cliff andloaded the wounded Marine in theinky darkness, illuminated by rocketlaunches. Gomez stated that “it was

Marine Corps

A Sea Knight from HMM-364 delivers supplies to Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in July 1969.


difficult to see through the smoke ofthe incoming. A grenade went offnearby and Donovan yelled ‘I’m hit!’over the intercommunication system(ICS).” Although wounded in the leg and

face, Donovan managed to fly thedamaged helicopter and headedtoward Charlie Med in Da Nang. Henoted that “rockets were hitting allover Da Nang. I was flying very slow-ly along China Beach toward theriver and III MAF . . . and it waslights out at Marble Mountain.” Once at Charlie Med, Gomez

ascertained that the helicopter wasstill operational, and Donovanlaunched a second medevac mission.Again, he landed in an hazardousarea, without gunship support, totake on a wounded Republic of KoreaMarine. Informed there were eightmore seriously wounded Marines inanother area, Donovan proceeded to

the site. Coordinating his approachwith gunship fire, he picked up thewounded Marines, only to lift outand land again a third time, pickingup two additional casualties in criti-cal condition. After returning toCharlie Med and preparing to flyagain, at dawn Donovan was orderedby Major Ernest C. Cunningham tostand down. Said Gomez,

Not too many other heli-copters got off the ground thatnight . . . It was now almostdawn. We had refueled underthe flashes of incoming roundswhile the tower and airfieldwere closed. We had flown allnight from outpost to outpost.We were shot at, by, and flewthrough enemy rockets, .51-cal-iber machine gun rounds, andother assorted small arms. Wehad grenades thrown at us. Ihad seen black pajamas in the

LZ Lt. Donovan had managednot to pass out, but he was veryweak.For his courage and devotion to

duty, Donovan earned his first NavyCross. He earned a DistinguishedFlying Cross, less than a month later,on 17 March 1969. Go Noi Island is located on the Hoi

An River between An Hoa and Hoi Anin the Quang Nam Province ofVietnam. In 1969, it was a hotbed ofViet Cong and North VietnameseArmy activity. Donovan launched ona daytime medevac flight, given themission of picking up nine woundedMarines. Although UH-1E helicoptergunships attacked enemy positionsaround the landing zone, he encoun-tered heavy fire upon his approach.While his crew sought to suppressthat fire, he was able to land the air-craft. Almost immediately, however,the landing zone came under heavy

Marines of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, board a “Purple Foxes” helicopter, 1969.Marine Corps


mortar fire, and he was forced to liftoff. After additional strafing runs bythe gunships, he landed once more,and although dangerously exposedto enemy fire, maintained his posi-tion until all the wounded were onboard the aircraft.Throughout the month of April,

Marines in Quang Nam Provinceundertook a series of operations,including large patrols to secure the“rocket belt” around Da Nang.Stretching from the Hai Van Pass inthe north to Marble Mountain in thesouth, this area was where enemyforces launched 122-millimeter rock-ets into the Da Nang complex. On 21 April, Donovan was

assigned to evacuate seriouslywounded Marines of Company B, 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, from a ricepaddy, northwest of Liberty Bridge.As he neared the designated landingzone, Donovan commenced a high-speed, low-altitude approach towarda tree line to the north of the wound-ed Marines. He immediately cameunder machine gun fire, which dam-aged the forward section of his air-craft. Despite the continuing enemyfire and his damaged helicopter, heflew close to the casualties who wereloaded and flown to the hospital atDa Nang.A subsequent inspection of

Donovan’s helicopter revealed theaircraft was no longer airworthy. Hetook command of a second aircraftand immediately received anothermedevac mission to the same area.Once again, he was forced to flythrough intense enemy fire. As thewounded were being moved onboard, additional ground fire erupt-ed which prevented the Marines onthe ground from getting the rest ofthe casualties into the helicopter.Lance Corporal John E. Harris, whowas manning the starboard .50-cal-iber machine gun, was wounded inthe right arm but continued to laydown suppressive fire. Donovan wasthen forced to lift out of the landingzone. Once he determined that

Harris was not seriously woundedand the aircraft was still capable ofaccomplishing the evacuation, hecommunicated to the Marines on theground that he would attempt anoth-er landing. He was, however,informed that another helicopterwould complete the medevac mis-sion. Donovan later stated thatHarris “was, and is my personal heroon this mission.” For this action, hereceived his second Navy Cross (GoldStar in lieu of second award.) Sevendays later, he would, once again, findhimself on a mission that wouldrequire courage and devotion to duty.The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

was stationed at An Hoa CombatBase. On 28 April, Donovan flew areconnaissance team of 15–18Marines into enemy-held territorysome twenty miles southwest of DaNang. During his briefing, he advisedthe reconnaissance team that “whenwe land and the ramp goes down,wait one minute, if no fire, then getoff.” He initiated a high-speedapproach to the planned landingzone and, once again, encounteredintense enemy fire. Climbing to asafe altitude, he selected an alternatelanding zone. As the Sea Knight land-ed and unbeknownst to Donovan, ayoung reconnaissance lieutenant andanother Marine bounded off theramp and immediately engaged thewell-concealed enemy. As small armsand automatic weapons fire pep-pered the helicopter, he lifted off andhis crew chief said “Sir, we left a manin the zone.” He returned to the land-ing zone and maintained his positionuntil the two Marines were on board.According to Donovan, they didn’tclimb out of the landing zone asmuch as they dived off the side of amountain. Said the red-haired, blue-eyed, reconnaissance lieutenant atthe debriefing at An Hoa, “Sureappreciate you coming to get me.”Donovan would be awarded a GoldStar in lieu of his secondDistinguished Flying Cross.On the morning of 9 May 1969,

Donovan and another pilot assignedto HMM-364, First LieutenantWilliam A. Beebe, had been flyingmedevacs for more than six hours.They returned to Marble MountainAir Facility and refueled, fully expect-ing to be relieved by another sectionwhen a call came in from AlphaCompany, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines. The company had twokilled and another ten wounded:They were still fighting a large NorthVietnamese force near the village ofMy Hiep 3. The terrain was flat,teeming with rice paddies and dikes. As information flowed in over the

radio, it became apparent that thecasualties were widely separated atmultiple locations. In 2003,Donovan’s crew chief, SergeantKenneth A. Altazan stated that “thir-ty-four years later I can still hear thegarbled chatter and almost sublimi-nal flow of information over myheadset . . . It was a disaster lookingfor a place to happen.” Donovanneared the landing zone, marked byyellow smoke, flying at low level andescorted by gunships. He later statedthat “the Marines and the NVA wereall mixed up, and there was no clear-ance to fire.” Because the woundedwere scattered over a large area atfive different positions, Donovanflew at low altitude over the rice pad-dies and spent an inordinate amountof time on the ground. As such, hisSea Knight got hit many times.At one point, as the helicopter

began taking on casualties, one ofthe Marines carrying a casualty wasshot, and both men fell. Altazan laterstated that “at this time I unpluggedmy intercommunications system(ICS) cord and ran to help the twofallen men at some distance from theaircraft. Carrying one on my shoul-der, and helping the other as best Icould, I heard or felt a sniper’s bullethit the man I was carrying. Theimpact caused me to fall with mywounded Marine, and I injured myknee.” With the help of HospitalCorpman-3, John L. VanDamme,


Altazan and the wounded enteredthe aircraft. The quick-thinking gun-ners, realizing Altazan had no com-munication with the cockpit,informed Donovan that the heli-copter was clear to take off. As thehelicopter continued to take hitsfrom enemy fire, they were advisedto pull out of the zone. According toAltazan, Donovan “respondedemphatically and in no uncertainterms that ‘We’re not leaving thiszone until we’ve got all your mede-vacs! Do you understand that?’”Donovan said that “the last loca-

tion was the most difficult. It wasclose to the tree line.” Altazannoticed movement some distancefrom the helicopter and realized thata Marine was located in a smallcrater waving a green T-shirt.According to Altazan,

I did not have time to tell LtDonovan that I was leaving theaircraft, but I decided to go tothis man who obviously wasnot able to come to us. As Ibolted from the front door ofthe aircraft, I forgot to unplugmy long cord and in full stridewas jerked from my feet when Ireached the end of that cord.As I got up again I felt a terriblepain in my knee and was notcertain that I was going to beable to even get to the mede-vacs, much less help them . . . When I got to the spot, I

found two men. One wasunconscious, and the other wasexhausted and suffering heatstroke. I picked up the uncon-scious man and grabbed theother man by the belt . . . I canstill reflect back on the surrealscene before me as Iapproached the plane—a pilotholding his aircraft fast in afire-swept zone, my right gun-ner firing his .50-calibermachine gun, the other gunnerstanding in full view on thesteps of the front door firingover and past me with his rifle,

Huey gunships and fixed-wingaircraft literally right over ourheads . . .The floor of the helicopter was

covered with “wounded Marines,spent brass, medical bandage wrap-pers, hanging intravenous bags,windblown grass, and debris” asthey finally lifted out of the zone.Both Donovan and Altazan wereawarded Silver Stars for theiractions. A year later, Donovan was pre-

sented the 1970 Frederick L.Feinberg Award by General Lewis W.Walt. The award, established by theKaman Aircraft Corporation, isawarded annually to a helicopterpilot for “outstanding achievementin rescue, flight, and test develop-ment of a new aircraft or generalhigh level of performance in opera-tional flying during the preceding

year.” Given Donovan’s record, it wasan honor he deserved. Years later, Donovan would reflect

on his service in Vietnam and hisMarine air-ground team:

By my count on every mission,we were a team of pilot, copilot,crew chief, two gunners at each.50 cal, and the Navy Medic, or inthe case of Doc Linkous, a NavyDoctor on board, not to overlookthe maintenance crew that con-stantly went without rest to keepthe aircraft ‘up.’ We were and area Marine air-ground team linkedby oath and blood to those onthe ground we serve. We allachieved the missions, and we allrespect the memory of oursquadron mates and Marines onboard who paid for the lives oftheir fellow Marines with theirown.

On 27 July 2007, LieutenantEileen C. Donovan, daughterof Joseph and Beba Donovan,earned her “Wings of Gold” aftercompleting her training at TheNaval Aviation Training Center, inPensacola, Florida. The wings shereceived were worn by ColonelEugene R. “The Papafox” Bradywho commanded HMM-364 whenher father flew under Brady’scommand in Vietnam. She hascontinued in her father’s foot-steps, flying Sea Knights inMarine Medium HelicopterSquadron 166. Perhaps mostnotable, Captain Eileen Donovanand Captain “Big Cat”Stephenson, flew the very sameHMM-364 “Purple Fox” heli-copter on 21 April 2010, 42 yearsto the date, that LieutenantJoseph Donovan completed the21 April 1969 mission for whichhe was awarded his second NavyCross. On 23 June 2010, HMM-

Eileen C. Donovan

166 was redesignated as a tiltrotorsquadron, VMM-166. CaptainEileen Donovan, is currentlyassigned to VMM-166, flying theV-22 Osprey.

Captain Eileen C. Donovan.Honorable Joseph P. Donovan


Marine reservists aresometimes asked toassist U.S. local authori-ties, bringing theirexpertise and materiel assets intoplay. In 1973 in downtown NewOrleans, Lieutenant Colonel CharlesH. Pitman flew his Boeing VertolCH-46 Sea Knight helicopter withheavily armed police on board whotook out a determined and deadlysniper.It was chilly, rainy, windy, and

hazy, typical January weather inNew Orleans. Pitman, the comman-der of Marine Air Reserve TrainingDetachment (now called MarineAircraft Group 49 Detachment C),had just returned to his office afterjogging. Marines were in his officesetting up a television. He asked,“What the hell are you doing?” Theyreplied that “there’s a sniper shoot-ing people downtown and wethought you’d be interested.” As hewatched the drama unfolding, heassumed the Coast Guard wouldhandle the emergency responsebecause they were the best outfittedand trained for this type of opera-tion. He thought the Coast Guardwould provide helicopters for thepolice in order to neutralize thesniper. Furthermore, due to his pre-vious collaboration with the CoastGuard, regarding emergencies athigh-rise buildings, he ordered twoMarines with M-14 rifles to protectthe Coast Guard helicopters.Pitman continued to watch the

television but saw no Coast Guardaircraft flying downtown. Later, hisMarine shooters came back and stat-ed that the Coast Guard wouldn’t flybecause of the awful weather. Hebelieved he could fly into downtowndespite the weather and approach-ing darkness. “I knew where the

[Mississippi] River was and how itwent—we could hover down to theriver and then follow it into NewOrleans.” He submitted his plan andwas authorized to fly. He recalledthat the reservists were “jumping upand down” and “going nuts watchingthe events on TV.” They wanted togo. He selected his executive officer,Major Charles “Wimpy” Wimmler ashis copilot and a couple noncommis-sioned officers as shooters.With the weather so lousy that it

stopped the Coast Guard from fly-ing, Pitman began flying, slowly, upthe river toward New Orleans, keep-ing his Sea Knight only feet abovethe water and staying clear of obsta-cles. As he approached downtownNew Orleans, he found the fog-shrouded mile-long Interstate 10bridge over the Mississippi only bythe vehicle headlights on it. Heturned the Sea Knight right and pro-ceeded to land in a parking lot nextto city hall. With his crew waiting atthe parking lot, a policeman drovehim near the Howard Johnson hoteland pointed to another police car

about a block away. The policemanwanted him to go to that police carin order to communicate with thechief of police. Pitman took in thescene:

People were shooting ateach other, the fire trucks[were] in the road and they[were] shooting water at thebuilding because the guy[sniper] started fires [in thehotel]. And in every doorwaythere’s a policeman, maybe aplainclothes or whatever.Everybody’s got a gun, exceptme. I walk down the street at anormal pace so as not toattract attention. I get to thecar and get on the radio and Isaid, ‘This is the helicopterpilot. I need to talk to thechief.’ The chief says, ‘Comeinto the command center.’ Isaid, ‘Where is the commandcenter?’ ‘In the HowardJohnson’s on the first floor.’Pitman walks to hotel, and he

enters the lobby to find a chaotic sit-uation:

The emergency lighting ison. There’s a policeman with acrowbar who has the elevatordoor open and another police-man is shooting an automaticweapon up the elevator shaftand somebody is shootingback. There’s a darkened area,it’s the restaurant, and thereare all these things lying there.These are all the firemen intheir rubber suits and equip-ment, and they’re sleepingbecause they’ve been up since4 AM and on the job and gettingshot at and everything. Overby the bar are a bunch of peo-ple in pajamas, patrons of thehotel that they wouldn’t let go

Marine Aviator Helps Police Take Out AnUrban SniperBy Dr. Fred H. Allison

Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Pitman.


because they want to sort outwho’s who and what’s what. Inthe middle is this big squaretable, 20 feet on a side, it’s alllit up, and all around the tableare police officers. I’m standingthere in my flight suit and thelittle guy over on the far sidelooks at me and he’s got a two-star general standing next tohim. He pushes the generalaside and says to me, ‘Sir, comeover here.’It was Chief of Police, Clarence

Giarrusso, searching for ideas; hethought the sniper(s) were on theroof. With a helicopter now avail-able, the chief wanted Pitman to flythe Sea Knight, loaded with police-men and Marines, over the building

to assess the situation and shoot thesniper if possible. He lifted off,ascending toward the rooftop fromthe south. He swooped up over theroof line, and the combined team ofMarines and policemen used asearchlight to locate the sniper.Because another policeman inanother high-rise building hadlocated the potential location of thesniper, the shooters blasted the con-crete and cinderblock alcove thatprotected the sniper. When theshooters ran out of ammunition,Pitman started to descend, and ashe did, the sniper shot at the SeaKnight with his .44-caliber magnumRuger rifle and hit the helicopter.Over the next few hours, this

same cat and mouse scenario repeat-

ed itself: Pitman flying the SeaKnight over the roof; shooters chip-ping away at the alcove and runningout of ammunition; sniper taking ashot at the Sea Knight as it droppedaway from the roof. However, thesniper’s end was near. Using a feintin order to get the sniper to revealhimself, Pitman dropped over theedge of the roof line and then flewright back up. The sniper came outof the alcove to shoot at the heli-copter, but the shooters on the SeaKnight blasted away. The body wasriddled with about 200 bullet holes. For his bravery under extreme

risk, Pitman was awarded an AirMedal and received the John PaulJones Leadership Award from theNavy League.

Marine Corps

The Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight openings for the door and machine gun port were used by the New Orleans Police to shoot the sniper.


Over the last 40 years fromthe Vietnam War to theLong War, the Cobra heli-copter has been used by theMarine Corps. Though it has under-gone numerous technologicalimprovements, it still remains a wide-ly respected and lethal attack heli-copter for close air support andground escort operations. The Cobra began its evolution in

the early years of the Vietnam Warwhen the Army decided to develop adedicated attack helicopter. Becauseof urgent operational needs, BellHelicopters modified the UH-1 series(Huey), calling the new helicopter theHuey Cobra or Cobra for short. Itincorporated most of the componentsof the Huey but with a slender profile(“three feet, six inches wide as com-pared to over eight feet on the stan-dard UH-1”). It also retained the “Lycoming T-53-L-13 gas turbine

engine” and “the pilot, gunner, andthe vital parts of the aircraft were pro-tected by armor.”The increased firepower of the

Cobra was impressive. Its fuselagehad two short wings, “less than twofeet long,” which could be outfitted

with different weapons. Dependingupon the type of turret, it could fire7.62-millimeter miniguns or 40-mil-limeter grenades, and later, wasarmed with a multitude of differentweapons, including 2.75-inch rocketpods. The Army was delighted withthis new attack helicopter, and thefirst units arrived in South Vietnamon 29 August 1967. It was renamedthe AH-1G (Attack Helicopter-1G).The Marine Corps received their first24 Cobras in South Vietnam on 10April 1969 and were assigned toVMO-2 at Marble Mountain AirFacility, Da Nang.Because of its historical mission

with amphibious operations, theMarine Corps also wanted a shipboardCobra variant. This variant would becalled the AH-1J or Sea Cobra andwould include several importantupgrades: rotor brakes, standard Navyavionics, and twin engines (“two 900-horsepower turboshaft engines cou-pled together”). The last upgradeimproved reliability, payload, growth

Cobra: The Evolution of the Attack HelicopterBy Second Lieutenant Sivasubramaniam Ambikapathi and Stephanie Washburn

J. Webster

Marines trained in the AH-1G Cobra at Hunter Army Airfield in Florida. This photo showsthe Cobra with a dual 40-millimeter grenade launcher in the turret, and a minigun androcket pod on the wing.

The first of 49 twin-engine AH-1J SeaCobras to be delivered to the Marine Corps.The Sea Cobra’s 20-millimeter cannon wascapable of firing 750 rounds per minute.The helicopter cruised at 185 miles per hourand dove at 219 miles per hour.


potential, and safety. Furthermore,the Sea Cobra’s armament included athree-barrel, 20-millimeter cannon inthe front turret and different combi-nations of 7.62-millimeter miniguns,and seven or nineteen tube rocketpods on the wings. The Marine Corpsreceived their Sea Cobras in February1971.Bell developed a variant of the Sea

Cobra with a “larger diameter rotor”and increased weapon capabilities toinclude the TOW (tube launched, opti-cally tracked, wire guided) missile.This variant was labeled the AH-1T.The Marine Corps put the AH-1TCobra into service in 1979.By 1986, the Cobra evolved into

the AH-1W, Super Cobra (the currentvariant being used). It provides “fullnight-fighting capability with theNight Targeting System (NTS)” alongwith the potential armament of 20-millimeter cannons and TOW, Hellfire(air to surface), Sidewinder (heatseeking, short range, air to air), andSidearm (self defense against antiair-craft weapons and SAM radar) mis-siles as well as 5- or 2.75-inch rocketpods. The Super Cobra uses morepowerful twin engines that can pro-duce up to 1,690 horsepower eachwith a maximum speed of nearly 207miles per hour and increased perfor-mance in hot weather environments.The Super Cobra is capable of air sup-port, antitank attacks, armed escort,and air-to-air combat missions using

Forward Looking Infra Red technolo-gy for both nighttime and low lightconditions. The Super Cobra has anadvanced fire control system and aHeads Up Display with Doppler navi-gation, which helps the pilots seekand engage targets with differentweapons systems. The cockpit of theSuper Cobra is protected from smallarms fire with Kevlar seating andarmor. The body of the helicopter isbuilt to absorb small caliber ammuni-tion hits with self-sealing fuel tanks,and the main rotor can withstand theimpact of 23-millimeter bullets. EightSuper Cobras can be refueled whileflying with a modified Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion.

The evolution of the Cobra has con-tinued with an upgrade package for

the AH-1W Super Cobra. This upgradeconverts the AH-1W variant into theAH-1Z Zulu Cobra that is less vulner-able to ground fire and improves sur-vival for the crew. The Zulu varianthas self-sealing fuel tanks and sys-tems, “energy-absorbing landinggear,” and energy reducing “crashwor-thy seats.” Defensive capabilitiesinclude warning systems when theaircraft is targeted by laser or radarsystems. The aircraft can be loadedwith combinations of the followingordnance: Hellfire antitank and anti-ship missiles, up to 16 each; 70-mil-limeter rocket pods, up to 76 total;Sidewinder air-to-air missile; “night-time illumination flare”; fire bombs;20-millimeter cannon; “77- and 100-gallon external fuel tanks”; and threetypes of practice bombs. The aircrafthas the latest avionics suite with a tar-geting system that has the “longestrange” and “highest weapon’s accura-cy possible of any helicopter sight inthe world,” and a third generationForward Looking Infra Red system.The Zulu variant has a “bearinglessfour-bladed foldable rotor system”that decreases vibration. The newrotor system increases performance,payload, speed, using the sameGeneral Electric T-700 engine as theBell Helicopter UH-1Y Yankee gener-al-purpose utility helicopter. The AH-1Z Zulu has 84 percent identical com-ponents with the UH-1Y Yankee.

An AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267departs Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, 19 August 2011, en route to a close-air-support mission.

SSgt James R. Richardson

Sgt R. L. Roeder

A left-front view of an AH-1T Sea Cobra helicopter from Marine Light Attack HelicopterSquadron 269.

Paul Weber, review of Last MenOut: The True Story of America’sHeroic Final Hours in Vietnam,by Bob Drury and Tom Clavin, 2011. I must confess that I have not read

much about Vietnam. WhileVietnam literature has never cap-tured my imagination as has theSecond World War, The Last MenOut, certainly did. In 271 engagingpages, you are taken through the lastdisastrous days of South Vietnam’sexistence from the perspective of theMarine Security Guards stationed atthe U.S. Embassy in Saigon and theConsulate Guards in Da Nang andCan Tho. The strength of this book lies in

learning about all the Marines, notjust the leaders, Major James Keanand Master Sergeant Juan Valdez.(For those of you who rememberthe coffee commercials, this is hisname.) Included in the narrative areshort biographic sketches of eachMarine. These sketches show howeach Marine faced the uncertainty

and stress of a potential “Alamo” laststand on the roof of the embassy. The authors are strongly sympa-

thetic to the South Vietnamese allies.The authors continually stress the

promises made over the years by theU.S. that it would stand by the SouthVietnamese and see the war throughto a successful conclusion. Part of theproblem with convincing theAmbassador to leave was that, untilthe very end, he worked under apersonal illusion that the U.S. stillhad influence and could negotiatewith the North Vietnamese. In theend, it took a direct order fromSecretary of State Kissinger forGraham Martin to leave. I highly recommend this book as

a companion to General Moore’sexcellent book: We were SoldiersOnce . . . And Young: Ia Drang—TheBattle That Changed The War InVietnam. Moore’s book details thebeginning—combat operations inVietnam of 1965; Drury andClavin’s book details the end—theconfusing withdrawal of 1975. Ifyou are familiar with Vietnam liter-ature, The Last Men Out shouldprove an interesting addition, andif not, a good place to start.


Last Men Out

BOOK REVIEW

Vietnamese board CH-53s in LZ 39, a parking lot. The 9th MAB extracted 395 Americans and 4,475 Vietnamese in April 1975.Department of Defense


Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada, 1983By Dr. Fred H. Allison

The 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, a component ofAmphibious Squadron Four, sailed out ofMorehead City, North Carolina, on 17 October1983 bound for Beirut, Lebanon. Two days out of port,the ships carrying the 22d Marine Amphibious Unitunexpectedly took a turn south and stopped about 500miles north of the small Caribbean island of Grenada.Here radical Communists, linked to Cuba and the SovietUnion, had deposed and killed the Prime Minister andstarted establishing a hard-line Communist government.Their military entity, called the People’s RevolutionaryArmy, had about 600 men bolstered by a few thousandmilitia and police. Most importantly they had military-advisory support of Cubans and some Communistweapons, including 12.7- and 37-millimeter antiaircraftweapons. There were also about 750 Cuban “constructionworkers” present. The situation was a distinct threat to U.S. strategic

interests in the region. Of great concern was the status ofthe 600 Americans on the island, many of whom weremedical students at St. George’s University. The lastthing the U.S. wanted at this time was another hostagecrisis—Iran was still a fresh memory. Marines of the 22dMarine Amphibious Unit, commanded by Colonel JamesP. Faulkner, got the word: “Prepare for action onGrenada”; they had scant information or maps, neverthe-less, with considerable urgency, they planned variouscontingencies of which the most likely being a noncom-batant evacuation. While they waited and planned, on 23October word came of the Beirut bombing that killed 220of their fellow Marines. Meanwhile the Organization of Eastern Caribbean

States was agitated at the “horror show” occurring onGrenada and requested that the U.S. do something. TheOrganization of Eastern Caribbean States planned toinvade Grenada if the U.S. did not. However, Washingtonacted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent word near midnighton 23 October: “Conduct military operations onGrenada”; protect and evacuate U.S. citizens and desig-nated foreign nationals; neutralize Grenadian forces; sta-bilized the country; and maintain the peace. OperationUrgent Fury was on. The landing was to occur in less than30 hours. The Marine portion of the assault would entail moving

the three companies of the 22d Marine AmphibiousUnit’s ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team,2d Battalion, 8th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Ray L. Smith, ashore to secure the key northerntowns of Pearls and Grenville. Army battalions—therewould be elements of six of them—bore the responsibili-ty for the southern part of Grenada. A Navy SEAL team’sinspection of the terrain around Pearls revealed itsunsuitability for the Marines’ amphibious tractors. The22d Marine Amphibious Unit’s aviation combat element,Reinforced Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261,commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Granville R. “Granny”Amos, bore the responsibility of getting two companiesof Marines ashore in the initial assault. Brief time was 0100; take off was at 0320. Despite the

weather briefer’s promise of a beautiful tropical day, ahard, wind-blown rain greeted the aircraft crews as theystepped upon the USS Guam’s flight deck. Assured it wasonly a squall, the Marine pilots launched all 22 aircraft.Mission commander Amos, flying a Boeing Vertol CH-46Sea Knight, was startled as he watched the first SeaKnight take off from the Guam, clear the deck, and thendrop below the deck. The pilot descended to clear theclouds and to affect a squadron-sized rendezvous. Amosrecalled that this rendezvous, conducted in the dark andrain at less than 400 feet was the “hardest thing we did allday, get all 22 aircraft airborne without a mid-air . . . thekids sorted it out.”The unexpected squall had delayed the assault, never-

theless, it was still dark when the first helicoptersapproached landing zone “Buzzard” south of Pearls.Amos adjusted the landing site to avoid palm trees in the

Marine Corps

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights and a Bell Helicopter AH-1TCobra on board USS Guam, 1983.


planned landing zone. The Sea Knights approached thelanding zone and circled it “at an unbelievably steepbank,” thereby reducing their vulnerability to ground fireand giving the door gunners a better view of the landingzone. When the People’s Revolutionary Army gunnersarced streams of antiaircraft fire at the transports, BellAH-1T Cobras rolled in and unleashed cannon fire and2.75-inch rockets at them. The gunners fled, leaving thefollowing helicopter assault waves unchallenged. In the assault on Grenville, which followed an hour

later, Amos again directed the assault. The terrain in theplanned landing zone again caused him to adjust thelanding site. He sent this wave of helicopters to a soccerfield in the middle of town, dubbed landing zone “Oriole.”The citizenry were cheering and waving as the heli-copters approached. By midmorning, the Marines hadtheir two objectives firmly under control. To the south in the Army zone, the situation was not

so encouraging. Here three battalions of soldiers, 82ndAirborne and Rangers, had the difficult task of securingthe sizeable urban area in and around Grenada’s principlecity, St. George’s, where the Cuban-bolstered People’sRevolutionary Army was putting up a fight. Althoughthere were other aviation assets available, Joint TaskForce Commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III,decided to use the Cobras of Reinforced Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 261 to provide air support for theArmy. Captains John P. Giguere and Timothy B. Howard,with gunners First Lieutenant Jeffrey R. Scharver andCaptain Jeb F. Seagle, respectively, were the first Marineaviators to respond. Because they could not establishcommunications with the Army units and were low onfuel, they returned to the Guam.Captains Douglas J. Diehl and Gary Watson lifted off

next with gunners First Lieutenants Harold R. Gielowand Rick S. Ryan, respectively. Watson finally establishedcommunications with an Army forward air controller,and Diehl passed the flight lead to him. A target was

identified as possibly a 90-millimeter cannon in a house,but without a common map, the pilots could not posi-tively identify the target or the forward air controller’sposition. The forward air controller signaled his positionusing his pocket mirror. With the forward air controller’slocation pinpointed, the pilots knew the general locationof the target, but still didn’t have the exact identificationof it. As they passed over a small house, the forward aircontroller shouted: “That’s it! That’s it! It’s right underyou!” Watson sharply turned left, while Diehl coveredhim, spewing 20-millimeter cannon shells at the house.The two pilots then returned for another attack. Watsonhovered over a ridgeline, almost directly above the for-ward air controller, and fired a TOW (tube launched,optically tracked, wire guided) missile into the window ofthe house. It blew the roof off and flushed out three menwho piled into a truck. Watson fired another missile anddemolished the truck. The Cobra pilots asked for another target and were

told of antiaircraft positions at Fort Frederick, near theharbor of St. George’s. The forward air controller had lit-tle information on the exact location of the antiaircraftposition except to say that “we lost a Black Hawk upthere.” Since there were no friendly troops close by whocould direct an airstrike and “they did not have the fuelto go looking for targets,” Diehl and Watson headed backto the Guam. They passed Giguere and Howard’s Cobrasheading south.Giguere and Howard did not have the fuel to look for a

target, either, and after talking to the Army forward aircontroller, headed toward Fort Frederick. Metcalfordered the Cobras to attack the fort. It was a hot posi-tion in “range of every type of weapon in the St. George’sarea.” On their fifth run, Howard’s Cobra took antiair-craft hits, piercing both engines and ripping into thecockpit. He suffered serious wounds to his right arm andleg, and a chunk of shrapnel had lodged in his neck. Hecalled for Seagle to take over the flying, but he did not

Marine CorpsMembers of the People’s Revolutionary Army practiced night firinga quad mounted 12.7-millimeter antiaircraft weapon, encounteredby U.S. forces during Operation Urgent Fury.

AH-1T Cobra of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261.Marine Corps


respond. The blast had smashed his forehead into thegun site and rendered him unconscious. Howard contin-ued to fly, seeking a landing site. He selected a sportsfield, called Tanteen, in the middle of St. George’s. He hadonly one good arm and leg, and only seconds to get theaircraft under control.

I couldn’t use the pedals, so I set the stick whereI thought it would level the helicopter and proppedmy left foot around it. I then pulled the collective upwith my left hand as we neared the ground toaccomplish autorotation. As I pulled it toward me,the bird hit hard. I was sure the crash would kill us.It hit so hard the canopy removal systems musthave activated because all the windows blew out.Even though the helicopter bounced very hard offthe deck, it didn’t flip over. The crash landing awoke Seagle who promptly crawled

out and yelled at Howard to get out who managed tounbuckle himself and then fell out of the helicopter.Seagle dragged Howard about 30 meters away from theburning aircraft. Enemy troops, located in the buildingsaround the sports field, peppered the scene with small-arms fire. Howard admonished Seagle to get away.However, Seagle ripped his radio cord off his helmet,wrapped it around Howard’s right arm, and stayed. In aneffort to draw attention away from Howard or possiblyget assistance, Seagle finally left. Alone, Howard suddenly felt the earth “start shaking.”

Giguere was blasting away with his 2.75-inch rockets andcannons at the Communists approaching the crash site.Giguere and Scharver made continuous attack runs andmade radio calls for a medevac. Major Melvin J. DeMarsand copilot First Lieutenant Lawrence M. King, flying aSea Knight over the Guam, heard the radio calls for a res-cue. Without waiting for clearance from the air boss, theyresponded and accelerated toward St. George’s. As theyneared Howard’s position, Giguere briefed them on the

situation. Giguere volunteered to providecover for the Sea Knight as it flew in to pickup the Marines. Impressed by Giguere’swillingness to provide cover, DeMars statedthat “it was a very unorthodox thing forhim to do . . . he would have no one to coverhim . . . he was going to expose himself tosome pretty serious antiaircraft fire inorder to cover me to come into that zone.”Despite Giguere’s bold attacks, the Sea

Knight was hardly out of danger. DeMarsunderstood that he was flying into a hotzone where the enemy had been hittingAmerican aircraft. “I just figured we wereall dead men . . . but it was just somethingthat we had to do.” Flying low and fast overthe bay and St. George’s and approaching

the sports field, the door gunners, Gunnery SergeantKelly M. Neidigh and Corporal Simon D. Gore, hammeredthe enemy fighters with their .50-caliber door guns.DeMars planted his Sea Knight about 30 meters fromHoward. Overhead, Giguere continued his attacks on theenemy, but the Sea Knight took some rounds. Neidighjumped out of the Sea Knight, ran over to Howard, andcarried him back to the helicopter.Once Howard was on board, DeMars still did not leave,

waiting for Seagle. Giguere and Scharver made anotherattack run on the antiaircraft site and enemy fighters.After a short delay, Giguere called DeMars and told him toget out. DeMars reluctantly flew out. Giguere made hisfinal dummy-attack runs because he was totally out ofammunition. When DeMars cleared the town, Giguerefollowed him out over the bay. The enemy gunners thenfired lethal rounds into the departing Cobra, and itplunged into the bay, killing both aviators. After leavingthe crash site, Seagle was captured and shot by the enemy.In order to secure the safety of the Governor-General,

Sir Paul Scoon, a Marine amphibious and helicopterassault was planned for the southern coast across theisland from Pearls and Grenville. The amphibiousassault, composed of 13 amphibious tractors, tanks,jeeps, and a company of Marines, went ashore on theevening of 25 October. Predawn the next day, 14 heli-copters of Reinforced Marine Medium HelicopterSquadron 261 delivered another company of Marinesonto a patch of beach only large enough for two heli-copters at once. The air-sea assault, under the cloak ofdarkness, gave a “psychological shock” to the revolution-aries who discarded their uniforms and fled their posi-tions. Marines seized the Governor’s mansion and liber-ated him while a SEAL team conquered other enemypositions in St. George’s including the daunting FortFrederick.By the second day of the operation, the crews of

Marine Corps

Curious Grenadians inspected the crash site and remains of the Cobra helicopter,piloted by Captains Timothy B. Howard and Jeb F. Seagle.


to have to sleep on the deck between launches,” and theydid. In the afternoon of the second day, an unexpected

mission arose: “Rescue American medical students.”There were about 200 students at an annex at GrandAnse Beach on Grenada’s southeast coast. Metcalfordered the helicopters of the Reinforced MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 261 to assist the 2dRanger Battalion in a rescue operation. Under the pro-tection of Navy attack jets, a Air Force gunship, andMarine Cobras, nine Sea Knight helicopters inserted theRangers to rescue the students; four CH-53 Sea Stallionsloaded up the students; and Sea Knights returned andpicked up the Rangers. In all, 231 civilians, includingGrenadians, students, and dependents were safely res-cued.By 31 October, Grenada was secure, and the Marines

of the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit returned to theships of Amphibious Squadron Four. Besides an assaulton a small