Frazier Obedience and Revolution

7/30/2019 Frazier Obedience and Revolution

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Princeton University Press

Between Obedience and RevolutionAuthor(s): Clyde FrazierSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 315-334Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265055 .

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L D Z Between Obedience and

Revoluton1

Politica! man nds himself in many dilemmas because he is unableto create a government which will insure that only just laws arepassed Even with the best of constitutions, a overnment may at times

commit morally outrageous acts and al the legal remedies providedby that constitution may prove ineectual in bringing aout a changeIn such circumstances the concientious citizen nds himself in a paradoxical situation In the interests of preserving a politica! process thats basically just and to which he nay indeed have committed himself,explicitly or otherwise, he has an obligation to perform an act at which

his conscience rebels His commitment to the system may prevent himfrom becoming a revolutionary, but his sense of moral outrage pre-vents him from being a completely loyal subjet either Because they

have been continually faced with such dilemmas and have foudthemselves unable to eliminat them completely by framing a proce-dure to insure that law and justice coincide, men have tried to deviseand justify a kind of politica! action that falls somewhere betweenstrict obedience to the state and an attempt to overthrow it

What follows is an eort to shed some light on the nature andvariety of actions that comprise this category of extraordinary politica!acts It will be my thesis, in particular, that extraordinary politics is amch broader and more inclusive category than we have generally

This is a revised vesion of a aer originally read at the annul meetino the American Politica! Science Association, Setember amindebted to more eole than can ention for helful crticism f th arlrdraf f hi aer


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Phsphy & Pbc Aars

supposed This essay will be divided into fur main parts In the rstI shall examine the literature on civil disobedience with a vie to mak-ing explicit its assumptions about the nature and limits of justiabledisobedience Next these assumptions will be traced back to their roots

in traditional liberal theory and an attemt made to show that this

theory actually allows a much broader range of disobedience than hasgenerally been assumed The third section resents a characterizationand examination of the kinds of disoedience encompassed withinthese broader limits The nal section explores some of the considerations involved in justifying such acts

I ISOBEIENE AS SPEEH

Falling as it does between ordinary politics and revolution, extraor-dinary politics takes on some of the characteristics of each type of

politica! action It is always both inside and outside the existing legalsystem It is always extralegal or illegal enough so that opponents cancry "foul and attept thereby to divert attention from the substantive

issues raised It may, on the other hand, be clse enough t existinglegality for its proponents to claim that it should be recognized by thelegal system and go unpunished2 The predominant tendency in therecent literature on the subject has been to emhasize only one sideof this dichotomy, and to admit as morally serious disobedience onlytose actions which are so narrowly restricted that their obedient

aspects are their main onesMost of is literature has focused on something called "civil dis-

obedience The underlying theme of this work is that disobedience cabe justied only when it is so limited that it can be characterized as anact of politica! speech Disobedience is, from this perspective, anappeal ( albeit a despera te appeal) "to the public to alter certain lawsor policies that the minority takes to be incompatible with the funda-mental principles of morality, principles that it believes the majorityto accept3 It is an attempt to address "the sense of justice of the

2 Car Cohen Law Seech ad Disobedience" in Civil Disobedience: Theoand Practic, ed Huo A Bedau (New York 1) 16

3 Marshall Cohen Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy TheMassachusetts Reiew 10 n 2 (Srin 16): 217-218


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Between Obedience andRevolutin

ajority i order to urge reconsideratio,4 "a for of persuasio5Thus conceived, the ctions falling under the heading of extraordiarypolitics e unusual ones, but they are ot totally foreign to our politi-ca traditions They are departures from e ordinary channels of poli-tics but tey ae appeals to the as well The disobedience ust, there-

fore, be of a limited chaacter and desind nt to overthw or bypssth syste but erely to get the syste to work The utilization of thisexaordinary form of politica! apeal may be justied because of theshortcomings of ordinary speech Mere speech ay fail to producechange in any situations because it does not demand a responseCivil disobedience is designed to reinforce the disobedient's appealDirect disobediene of intrinsically objectionable laws may actualy

force the comunity to act on the issue and eiter enforce its laws orchage the 6 Unless the community decides to act and enforce the

law i such a situation, that law may i eect be annulled by thextraleg acon of the disobedient Society becomes the tacit partneri th change through its inaction Where a protest is indirect, involv-in disobedience to laws not objetionable in themselves, the rationaleo disobedience is similar, soewhat weaker While he cannot forcea response, such a disobediet, by capturing public attention or bydeonstrating his own seriousness, may strengthen his appeal adake a sponse much more likely

lthough the recent literature o civil disobedience is divided into

wo majors strands, both of the characterize disobedience as speech school of tought, following former Justice Fortas, admits as jus-abl only that disobediece which presents itself as a legal appealdsiged to test the constutionality of a speic law7 The othe school

would allow a somewhat broader range of disobedience, admitting tossibiliy that politica as wll as legal appals may be justied e

4 Joh Rawls he Justcato f l Dsedee Ciil isoei-enc, p 240.

5 arrs Woord No-Violece ad the aw: he aw eeds l

Ciil Disobedience, p 63 .6 arr rosch its t the oral la i Disedece Ehics 75

2 (Jauar 165) 03-05 ee Fortas' ook Conceing Dissen n Ciil isoedienc (Ne or

68)


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318 Phsphy & Pbc Aars

can, in this view, use disobedience in appeling to the governmet tochange its politics even when it is clear at the policy in question islegally enacted and constitutionally permitted n both cases disobedience is employed as a means of appeal, though the appeal is directedto dierent audieces: the legal system in te one case and the po ticl system in the othe

Some dirences in the types of acts disobedients may employ follow from the dierent characterizations of disobedience advanced byth two schools ( te justiability of indirect disobedience is a primexample); but the concern of the vast majority of writers of bothschools has been to stress the limits on disobedience that ow from itscharacterization as speech and which they terefore hold in commonWriters of both persuasions hav bee almost unanimous in demand-ig that disobedience be open, pulic, limited, and respectful of therights of other citizens Only if al these limits are observed, they

assert, can the act of disobedience be charaterized as speech Dis-obedients have ofte been advised, in addition, to accept the penaltyfor their disobedience willingly in order to prove their seriousness andrinfoc hei apeal While ost authors have grd with JohnRawls that violence is not cmpatible with civil disobedience as speech,sinc it does not invit a dialogue but demands submission,8 MarshallCohn has defended some forms of violence, claiming that whenstrictly limitd it ca b a very eective form of expressio9 t isrvaling that although ther is disagreement about the justiability

of olenc, there is agreeent as to the grounds on whih any attempta such justication must be ad

This very limited conception of disoedience as speech seems tohave gained wid accetance largely because it describes the kind ofcivil disobedience that was so successful in the civil rights campaignsof the early fties Later attempts to use disobedience to cobat deeplyooted social segregatio and to protest against the war have provemuch less eective ad have exosed a weakness i the ratioale forthe kind of disobedience tat ca be described as speech The courtd the public have both been unwilling to face squarely the issuesaised by the disobedients ad have hidde behind the bae of 1aw

8 Rawls, Th Justication of Civil Disobedinc, 24g Cohn Cil Disobdinc in a Constitutional Democrac 2


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Beeen Oedence andRevolution

d order istead Unable to resolve his moral dilemma through thuse of disobedience in e narrow sense, the citizen may aain fdhimself faced with the basic qustions of obigation and bdience Ifas many contend, disobedience ca only b justied as an act ofspeech, the only alternatives left to th unsucessful disobedient aobedience and revolution It is my contention at our fate is not so

hash as this and that one may, on occasion, be able to justify morradical varieties of disobedience which still al short of revoluo Itis to an examination of the possibility of such alternatives that nowturn

I RAIAL ISOBEIENE

search for th reasons that it has seemed necessary to restrict disobedience so narrowly takes us back to the oriins of liberal theoryssumpions rst mad by Hobbes and acceped by ocke connue o

inform much of contemporary thinking about disobediene Maymodern arguments against disobedience apea to be only slightlyaltered restatements of the original Hobbesia ones Hobbes pointedout that we have reason to obey even a bad law because we have an

interest in the preservation of a system of abitration through whichdierences between citizens can be settled peacefully Such a system

is possible, he reasoned, only if each member of society is willing toforswear the use of force in disputes with his fellows and to submitthem to binding arbitration by the sovereign and his laws. Hobbes felt,

accordingly, that unless a member of society could be sure that otherswould submit to the outcome of such abitration even when they disagreed with it, he himself would b foolish to submit when he disagreed with the outcome. The sytem could ot be preserved unless me agreed to submit to al las. Hobbes's arguments have beereeated i almst ideca form by may moder thinkers. WheDavid itz state that "For th sake of th greater good ecured bythat systm though its ovement and its law, [citizens] accepteactments which they otherise disapprove,0 he is elying on theorce of the Hobbesia argument

Hobbes did not stop, however, with the propostion tht the citize

10 Sitz, Democrac ad the Problem o Civil Disobediece," Americanolitical Science Review 8, 2 (u 15) 7


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0 Phosopy bc Aar

is bound to obeylthe laws. He claimed, using exactly the sam logic,that one is obligated to obey any stat whatsoever, irrespective of itsorigins or policies The mere existence of a state, whatever its form, issucient reason for obedience. s long as the state provides a meansfor settling conicts pecefully, one is bound to obey. citizen mightprefer that the state operate for his own benet, or in accordance withcertain principles, and Hobbes never denied that it might indeed bedesirable to have it so. He insisted, however, that guaratees for citizes against the state, eve though they were desirable, could everbe enforced without destroying the state Men would only forswear theuse of violence and submit their disputes to adjudication, h argued,if they could be absolutely sure that their fellows would do likewiseny attempt to set limits on the sovereign or to give the citizens guar-antees against the state would open the way to irresolvable coict,for there would be o one to rede an authoritative decision shoulda dispute arise o these matters betwee the citizes ad th sover-eig ny attempt to set up such a arbiter would leave uasweredthe question of what guarantees the citizen would hav against thatabiter The roble of ulmate sovereignty would not be solved, it

would only have been made mo remot. The existene of these areasof potential conict would, according to Hobbes, leave each citizenunsure that others would comly with the commands of th sover-eign; being unsure, h would have no reason to do so himself Men

would fall bac into the stt of ature, which was a wa of all againstall.s it stands so f, Hobbes's argument is icomplete. While he has

shown that th logic of abitration is allencomassing, he has notshown that men must agree to arbitraon in the rst place Might nota citizen choose to reject the state altogeter ad tae his chances inte state of nature? Hobbes met this diculty with a premise whih,considering its importance to his arment, he left curiously unex-amined He simply asserted that "te eatest [evil] that in any form

of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarcesensible in respect of the miseries and horible calamities that accom-pany a civil war or tat dissolute condition of masterless men, witout subjection to laws ad a coercive power to e their hands from


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Between Obedience andRevouti

aine and revenge ....11Men ought to obey even te hshest state,since from Hobbes's perspective even te worse state would be ettehan the best war. He himself recognized only a very few exceptionsto this rule. hen te sovereign ondemned a an to die or commanded him to do something tat he regarded as worse than deathhe had no obliaion o obey.12 Since he underlying purpose of thecompact is security of life and liberty, the agreemen is broken if tesovereign threatens your life or worse.

Locke denied that man had no choice but to obey any governmentunder which he happened to nd himself, and al of liberal teory hasfollowed him in this denialY Locke saw, and others have agreed, atorder alone is not a sucient condition to permit the reaization oftose values for which we establish government.14 Locke's ews onthis atter dier frm Hobbes's in at least two important respects. On

e one hand, he took a more sanguine view of the condition of manin he state of nature than did Hobbes. He accused Hobbes of con-fusing the stat of nture wih e state war, and poited ut tathe former only ccasionally dgeneraes int the latter ocke wasalso more keenly aware tan Hobbes that the cncentration f pwewhich a stat eails makes ssibl greater evil han the state ofnaure or even the stae of war16 In their natural onditon men an atlast ght it out as equals, but n man would have a chance againstthe suerior force f the tate.The bral view, following Locke, as

been hat when e preservation of a sate compels wse evils thaanarchy, the costs of tat state are to high.A citizen has n reasonto preserve such a state, for there is no greater good which it maespossile.

This arment was used by liberal teorists to defend he right orevolution against Hobbesian insistence on the necessity for absoluteobediece, but it cmprises only a part of the liberal response to

II. Thoa obb, Liathan (N ork, 958 522 obb, h Citizn (N ork, 99, 79

3 Joh ock h Son atis of Gon (N or 952 90

itz, Docrac a th robl of iil Diobic 3935 ock, Son atis, 2 a of cha 3 i. 8


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322 Phioophy & Pbic Aair

Hobbes ndeed, if taken alone, it leaves man wit an even ore dis-mal destiny an Hobbe ad envsioned. hie it olds hat ancan do worse than the state of nature, it does not establis tat e cando any betterThis argument alone does not callenge Hobbes's otercontention, tha ay attempt to provide citizens with guanteesagainst the sovereign is bound to return them to te state of nature

( not actually to te state of war) Te wole stucture of iberaleory wih its constiutiona pscriptions an inaienabe rts ustdepend, therefore, on the assertion of a second premise, if it is no tobe ere wishfu tinkingiberal theory ust depend on a premiseto the eect that te logic of arbitration is not allencompassinghispremise seeed so obvious to Locke and is followers at n one, sofa as 1 can tel, as bohere to me it expici; t remans, never-teless, the implicit basis f liberal theory. iberal teorists assumetat we do not need absolute certainty at r fellow tzens in

a circumtaces ain o disobeg th sovereign in order forit to be rational for us to refran ourselves. On th contrary, it seemsmore ikey tha only a fairly i deee of prbabiity t they do so is necessary. Some laws t least e clearly not essential to theaintenance of social order, for any laws are broke every dy with-out causing the coapse of te state.ndeed, we may suspect that henonenforcement of certain ws is in fact a condition of social stabil-ity. Nor ave the muc ore irect threats to e legitimy of thestate reresente by civil rigts and antiwar disobedients (and evenrioters) destroyed the fabric of law and order, thou it ould befos o cten at that fabric as not been amage to seextent, particularly by the more violent manifestations of deance.Some citizens probably do experience easure of insecurity, becausesuc occurrences me e fee ta the stae is no onger protecingtem. But if we do not ave total domestic peace, neither ave wereturned to the stte of nture as Hobbess eory redicts.

Tou Locke never made expcit is denial of Hobbess claimsbout the loc of bitration, e clearly relied on tHe acknowledgede fct that in tteptg to ve ctizens uarantees gains the statee wa leaving open the possibiity of vioence and revlutin. Tee

is, e admitted, no judge on eth th authority to decide the controersies at these guarantees wou ignite: "the appea then !ies


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323 Beeen Obeience anRevoon

nowhere but to heaven; fore between eiher persons who have noknown supeor n earth or which permits no appeal t a judge onear, being properly a stae of war wherein te appeal lies only toheaven.7 is a possibility and Locke never denies that it is, buttis mere possibility is not enouh to make men s insecure as to feeltat hey ust retrn to the state of nature here each underakes to

protect himsef by his own force.Liberal theory clely assumes tatman is not stu in the state of nature, for that theory is an attemptto expore various aternatives t this undesirable state.

It is my contention that liberal theory, throuh its reection fobbes's argment about e ogic of arbitration, opens the possibilityof a much wider range of disobedience than liberal theorists have gen-erally recognized. Locke himself was not coneed i he problemo disbedience but wih that of revolution. He id dispute Hobbes'sontention that he iizen as n choice but to obey, but Locke et

a evout was e nly aleative open th citizen. Hobbes'sassertn that anying less tan total obedience is revolutionary wassuported by his argument about e lic of sovereignty.He used thatsame gument to deny the possibility of a limited, constituional state.Loke had to dispue Hobbes's argument about he logic of sovereignty

in order to establish the possbility of limits on the power f he government, but he ailed to realize that this also undermined his ( andobbes's) assumpton that any disobedience to te state was ipso factorevolutinary. t seems, ironically, that the very arguent by whichberal theorists established the possibility of a limited constutionalegi as established possibility of a de ran f acts disobedient to the laws of that reme but stiU fallin short of revolution.Locke probably failed to recognize this because he never made his ownagment eit, and because he failed to se the connecon betweete two dierent parts of obbes's work. He therefore contnued tosupport obbes's denial of the possibility of nonrevolutioary disobedi-ence, while his o work contradicted the assuptions on which thatdeni was based.

Most modern theorists have made a similar mistake. They havedenied te possibility of all but the most strictly limted dsobedience,

bid


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Philoophy & Publi air

and the ogic of their denials has been consisten obbesi Walma's reasonng s typica when he states, "hose who assetghts under th constuto and the aws made ereunder must abde

b a constitution and the aw if that ontitution i to urvive18

Notce at W dman speaks only to ose who do assert rights underthe constitution Revolution remains a possbiity for anyone who

wiling to forgo the benets of constttional guarantees, bt short ofthat e only option s to obey.Wdman denes, a obbe and Lockedenied, the ver poibili that disobeence s coatibe th thesurviva o any sort of state at l. e does nt contend that a disobedience is unjustied, but holds that the justiation mus be revolutionary one. he ontnng prevalence of i o oeimportant reason for te insistence ta disobediene be limited tosuch an extent at it can be cassied as an ac of peech.Ee supporters of disobedence seem to have aepted the obbesi og

and to assume that if one oversteps the narrow imit which alo act of disobedience to be characteed as kind of speeh t becoe

iplicity revoutiony.19 I most eem a i ost iterature on"ci disobedience is attemptng to show at very arefuy tedisobedience is not really otsie the syste te ch ehaha led to an extremel nrow notion of jutible diobeenere ha been a failure to expore te ange d chaacter of e acti whic nonrevolutionry disobedient igt enge It to uexploraon that 1 trn n the next seton

VARETES OF RESSTANCE

Not stdents of disobedience ave been bnd to te estenof aternaves to taditiona cv disobedience an ve inted tatalternaves are viabe, 20 bt tey e not folowed p tese g-gestons, and the exact natre d range of sc ats remains a ystery f the dening featre of traditiona c disobeence was h

t could be charactezed as a fo of speec te moe c pos

18 Wldman, "Civil ghtsYes: Cil DisobeiecN, in Civil Disbedn 0 (ts mne) Cohen, Civ soedene n a Consttutonal Demoray, 215

20 Mrshal Cohen, "Cv soediene, h G I oy 1971 Chiago, ), 246; an Mart Luther Kn, "Lette fom Binh CiJa, Cii ioin p. 78.


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5 Beeen beience andRevoluti

tion that I wisb to exlore defens the rit of a citizen not only toapeal to the state ut to resist it as well. n so doing the iizen is fcourse asserting bis h t defy the stae's laim make iningdeisions in a sei area. Tbe logic of bis at is oerive, and it isthis movement from aeal to oerion that baraterizes tbe radialdisoedient and dierentiates bim from the more traditional ivil dis

oedient. Altbouh the great ody of literature on ivil disoeienebas assumed that ajustiale disoediene ould e baraterized asseeb, this more radial aset bas een resent, to some degree, inalmost all acts of disoediene. If we aeal to the onsiene of thesovereign with an at of disodiene we ertainly defy bim to anextent as well, even wben we are areful to do so only to a ver mitedegre. No matter bow arfully one irumsie a rotst to make

it barmonze with the sit of tbe laws, there always remans an element f deane, bowever small it may e. I is this element of de

ane tht onents bave ften reognized in even the mildest formsof disdiene and ued as a asis for their ojetion to it.

At times suporters f disoediene bave reognized tbe reseneof a oeive elment in disoediene and bave even iluded the ideaof oerion as art of their denition of traditional iil disoediene.21Tbe sbortoming of sub analyses is that they bave generally failedto dierentiate ats tha may vary in many resets, eause they bavefousd on the form of an at and not on its sustane or eet. Itbas usually n assumed in analyses of this kind that e ritea ofiility are etern! fators: wbether tbe at is oen and ulic,wbether the enalty is aeted willingly, and so on. It is my ontention that sub a fous osures vitally imortant dierenes. A disoedient can aept the enalty for bis at eause be thinks it is bisdue or eause be wants to bel k the jails and ring down tbe system of justi. Even some rvolutionary ampaigns, sub as Gandhisgbt for Indian indeendene, bave een arried on y means of atsthat meet a the riteria generally set up as tests of the ivility ofdisoediene. If an at of disoediene is to e aeptale as a formof seeb it generally must bave sub extea! barateristis, ut tbe

1 Hugo A Bedau, On Civil Disobedience,]oua o hiosoph 58 no 1(161) 661; and Anthony De Cresiny, The Natue and Methods of Non

Vlen Coecion oltica Stuie no (June 16) 63.


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Phhy & Pbc Ar

ossession of these haraterstis alone is not enouh to assure thati e aeale as speeh. By fousing on exrna haraterisisof e at even those ho have roe the oerive eeent in isoeiene have een revente fro seeing he full soe of ossiilities oen to the isoeient. They have ontinue to ean that isoeiene reain within very nao limits esit the iliitly

raial thrust of thir analysisResistane to the state is or at least an e very raia inee. f

as we have seen eane of he state oes not enail revolution thereoes reain a sense in hih it is evouona. t ou e neathough muh too sile to say that e resister asserts his right toefy e state only in ertain areas while the revolutionary reahesolete eane. t oul e too sile eause revolutionarieslways shae me oon groun th their oonents. Rater thanatteting to seak f resistane an revolution as two istint oes

of ation i sees referale o onsier the as ar of a ontinuuof ations that vary in their egree of oosition to the given orer.Ther is of urse a istinon eween thos ats hat ar esineto ng own the existing egal-onstitutional struture an thosethat are not ut this istintion is not alays foun at the sae ointon the ontinuu. Thee e numerous exales oth of onservativeevluon an of aial rsstane. woul like evote th rest ofhis setin to an examinatin of a nue of varials whih aetthe extn t hi isoeiene is rvoutionary an o a very genera

onsieration f the ieent kins of as isoeiene might involve.One iortant aset in whih isoeient ats an vy is the

egree to whih they are oerive. A isoeient or gou of isoeients is selom in a osiion o fore a soiey o hoose a pariularourse of ation or to revent its hoosing another. More oonlywha e isoeien is ale o o is to raise he osts assoiate wihthe hoie or rejetion of a artiuar ateative inreasing the roailit hat the alternative hosen e the one that he favors. Fora heir talk aout sting the oerations of the Pentagon it is iult to elieve that the aniar eonstrators in 967 atualy eievehat hey oul in an alou gh with th tros guaring the uiling. What they erhas hoe as that the goveent oul eithern i o uh troule or (ore likely) oul no n it raly


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n bdnc andRevn

ossile to take the ations neessary to revent an ocuation of theuilding. he dsoedient may emloy minimal oeron when thepuli is aathti aout a oliy and rsists in following it not out ofstrong commitment ut largely through iertia. n suh a situationraising the osts only slightly may ause a hge in uli sentimenttoward the oliy. (Of ourse the disoedient also risks rovoking the

oosite reation.) n general, the higher the degree of oerion anat of disoediene involves (verything else eing equal), the moreradial a hallenge it oses to the estalished authority.

A seond ruial varale is the soe and imortane of the areain whih the disoedient hallenges the states authority. Deane ofone patiular law n very nrow grounds sems uh less hraten

ing to the tate than deane of a roadr ty whih involv disoeying many dient laws. The imotne f t artiular law question is also a relevant fator here. Dae of r lw or of laws

regulating ersonal sexual ehavior seems hardly more than a nuisane to the state, ut deane of draft laws strikes at an area that

is mh more entral to the states owr and authority. t is for thisreason that many have seen refsal to ay taxes as eing among themost radial ossile ations, for if it ere widesread it would render

impossile the estene of any kind of government at One anonsider the question of the so of deane in another sense as well.Ats of disoediene an vy greatly in the extent to whih theyattemt to thwart the enforement of any artiular law. The ase ofthe moral refuser, who does not attemt to thwart the enforementof a law ut refuses for moral reasons to rform artiular dutiesrequired of him y that law, is eseially interesting in this reset.The draft refuser ay defy the apliation of the law only to one of

its suets, himself. Even though his t may e hihly oerive, sinehis refusal is asolute, his hallenge to the state is less radial thanmany oters, ivolng as it dos suh a small erentage of the citizens aeted y the law

A ird aor variale is the extent to whih ats are urely oerive, rather than eing mixed orms of oerion and aeal he astaority of disoedient ats, though they ha ve involvd som oerion,have relied mainly on a moral apeal. Disoedients have attemted todramatize the inustie of government oliy at the same time they


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Phloophy & Pul Ar

tried to frustrate it y their disoediene and their willingness to suffer. hile in some ases oerion and aeal are imliit in the saeat, in others they may e art of the same amaign ut ertain todierent ats. Those who artiiated in th underground railradmade a moral aeal against slavery as well as trying to frustrateenforement of the law, ut they did not make this aa y heling

the slaves to esae. Any attemt to make their ats uli would haveundermined their eetiveness. This simultaneous aea to oth theonsiene and e selfinterest of the uli has een one of the greatstrengths of traditiona disediene. Oer ossile forms of ationmay minimize the element of aeal and e almost urely oerive.Saotage is an at of this sort, and for this reason it omes very loseto the revolutionary end of the ontinuum. One an imagine instanes,

however, where a itizen might attemt to saotage a artiular govement roam, the nulear weaons develoment rogram for

examle, wiout hallenging the government in any other ea. Suhan ation would e a diult one to evaluate, for although it is oth

highly and exlusively oerive it hallenges only a very limited asetof government ower

A fourth imortant variale, n the demorati ontext at least, isthe numer of eole involved in the rotest A demorati soiety

ases its legitimay on oular suort, and a rotest movement whihhad very wide suort ould hav a ind of legitimay in suh asoiety It might even go so fa as to e suversive of the artiular

regime in ower without attemting to underut the fundamental onstutional order. It ight indeed e laimed that the regime itself wassuversive of the more fundamental order. It is for this reaso atattemts to render the draft ineeve through mass refusal of indution have always seemed less threatening than shemes to do so ythe destrution of draft les, even though the otentia degree andsoe of oerion is the same oth ases. An eetive rogram ofmass refusal requires the kind of road uli suort whih endows

it with a good measure of resetaility in a demorayA fth vaale of imortane is the romity of the disoediene

to e law or oliy eing rotested. Diret disoediene raises the fewest hallenges to the state, ut it is not always ossile. Disoedieneto laws not diretly hallenged ut whih suort te ect of e


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Bn bdnc ndRvoluton

otes aise a ew oe qestios Cil hts deostaos col boe tesass s with hich e had o qe s scecase sch las ee sed t efoce seregatio Attets to ocehage b disbeyig law that have dit coecti ith theobject o the otest se ve eet ideed Suh isbeiecesets a a e adical challee to sociy a sees to be alost

a o social blacal he eed salli o the eeasdi to th Nw Yk ds ai is a eaple o such actios e a (houh b eas l) sitis Ma of the ecetattepts to bob publi buildi e this cass sice the coe-o betee the tats f the attacs ad the cotiuati of thew is teuous ideed

A sixth a al sieatio i evaluati the deee of theatat ats o isobediee se to e state is the ete to whih theolate te ights o othe itizes Sie the gaatee o suh ights

is a tally ipoat utio ay goveet a isobediet wholates e ghts o his elow izes is uh oe heateig thae who does t Attets t eve opoets o seaig lhtly be see as etreel subvesive i a deocati ode beasee olate oe o the os basi olitia ights Sitis th iedea acess to oes ow et o t bli opet ae steets o e hts e ctes bt he e a esseos Sipe eusa t op ih the t aw cod aso be sdo e the iht o othe ities o e deeded but the coec-o s ve iiet ad the ea tha i poses t e tate is co

espodigly weaI ave ted i eales to ive ve gh idea o te e

actios ope o the adial disobediet It is ctetio ta i ts the ids vaabes discussed aove ad ot by yeteal haatestis that oe st evalate his t t deteiethe deee dage it eesets to the establishd de

V. JUSTFYNG RESSTANCE

oe so a has bee oly to spot te that theeeists ide age of extaoiay polia! ats ad o exploe sef e wys i whih hese ats va I hve eaied o eaigte eated estio of hei ustaio ti w ease I fe ta


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330 Phloophy & Pblc Ar

uch of the debate about the various ors of disobediee has beearred y a ofuson of these o issues Too ofte studets of dis-oeiece have olude that ats f disobediene ould ot b justied erely because they assued that disoediece was revoltioary this al sectio I wat t tae up the questio of theusticatio of resistace

I oe sese a east e otio of justifyi acts of resistance tothe state presets rave probles t is lear tha oe aot hope tojustify suh resistae i the sse of reahi ooly areeupon criteria to disinuish justied fo unjustied instanes. Thevery recourse to disobedience in the rs place sees to indicate thasuch coon standads have broen down. There is no rule or principle one can loo to as a justication for disobedience tha iht not

itself be subject to conroversy.22 f any such standard could be areedon it could be incorporad no th law and disobedience would no

be necesary. There can therefore be no leal rih o disobedienealthough exceptions to articular laws ay be ade in cerain cases.(The provision for conscientious objection to ilitary service is anexaple of this.) This does no ean of course tha acts of resisanceare never jutied. Many are (alhouh any are not) and as acors

in the politica! syste we are consantly called on to ae decisionsabout the justicaion of such cts and to ehave accordinly. I doesean however ha we canno hope to nd publicly areed uponstandads on which to base our judents. Allowin individuals ointerpret hir w politc oblatios aes i entirely possible thatirreconcilable conicts ay develop which can be setled only byforce.

To a certain exten then we erely pic our oral cteria andact on the but his does no ean that we are lef enirely outsidethe bounds of oral discourse. There is a dierence beween justifyin an ac and justifyin the ator who perfors i.23 An actor canperfor he wron acts for the riht inds of reasons. Because of tis

we ay at ties face opponents who act because of deeply held beliefshich we respect but canno share. In such cases we accep our oppo

22 ea, "O Cl oeee p 323 R tma te emaxk Cv Dsobedence e Hop

Feeman (Sata axaxa, Cal, 9), p


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331 Btn Obdnc ndRvoluton

et as a oally seious acto ut this oes ot olige us to ageewith hi o to acquiesce to his wishes. ay situatios we ay ecovice that ou oppoet shoul act as he oes (give his eliefsetc.) eve whe we feel that ou ow uty lies i opposig his ais.2

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Frazier Obedience and Revolution