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29 May 2013 | Vol. 4, № 18.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters, Welcome to the Strategic Weekly
Analysis. This week’s issue begins with a
report on the objectives of the Australian
Government’s newly-announced National
Food Plan.
We then examine the potential for
increased Australian exports to Qatar, in
light of the recent visit to Doha by Foreign
Minister Bob Carr.
Moving to Tanzania, we assess the
probability of further unrest surrounding
an important new gas pipeline. We then
look at the latest developments in the
wrangling between Sudan and South
Sudan and the implications of that dispute
for China, which has a significant interest
in seeing a stable flow of oil.
A little further afield, we examine the
devastating locust plague afflicting
Madagascar and its implications for the
country’s perilous food security situation.
We then consider the importance of
continued anti-piracy efforts in the
western Indian Ocean, even as the figures
for this year continue the downwards
trend of 2012.
Moving to Tehran, we look at the latest
events in the buildup to the 14 June
presidential election, after the barring of
leading candidates Mashaei and
Rafsanjani by Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei.
Returning home, we conclude this week’s
SWA by considering the implications for
ASEAN of the violence directed towards
Burma’s Rohingya minority.
I trust that you will enjoy this edition of
the Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
Page 2 of 15
National Food Plan to Boost Agricultural Optimism
Joe Ludwig, the Federal Minister for Agriculture has released the long anticipated National
Food Plan, with ambitions to take advantage of the growing Asian “dining boom”.
Background
First mentioned in the 2010 Labor election campaign, the National Food Plan promises
multi-million dollar research funds and grants to Australian producers, to boost trade ties
with Asia. The majority of the funding will go towards what is essentially a publicity
campaign targeting Asian markets and the development of an “Australian Food Brand”.
Much of the domestic focus is a result of a recent Federal Government inquiry into food
labelling, with an overwhelming response from consumers seeking to be better informed
about the origin and labelling of produce.
Comment
Foreign investment is a significant factor in the Australian agricultural sector, with some
reports stating that the level of capital investment the country will need over the next two
decades will only be possible with significant amounts of foreign investment. A long time in
development, the Plan builds on the Australia in the Asian Century white paper, advocating
an increased focus on the Asian export market.
A Federal government contribution of up to $30 million is earmarked for an Asian Food
Market Research Fund, to enable farmers to capitalise on the growth in Asia. Around $6
million will go towards a promotional campaign for Australian agriculture in overseas
markets, with an additional $2 million aimed at developing an “Australian Food Brand”.
Specifically targeting Asia, $5.6 million will be spent attempting to build closer trade
relationships.
Domestically, $1.5 million will go towards promoting careers in agriculture and food.
Community food groups will be eligible to apply for Federal Government grants of up to
$25,000, to support “food rescue activities” and address local food security issues.
Initiatives, such as small-scale community and city gardens, will qualify for grants of up to
$10,000.
Other elements of the plan include the creation of a new Food and Beverage Supplier
Advocate, to ‘work with small- and medium-sized Australian firms to help improve their
competitiveness and harness new business opportunities both domestically and abroad.’
The plan also recognises the need for a Productivity Commission review of the food supply chain regulations, in the light of recent negative publicity for Australian exporters. An Australian Council on Food will also be established, to engage and liaise with industry leaders and stakeholders, including addressing the domestic issue of Australia’s supermarket duopsony.
Tom Davy Research Manager Global Food and Water Security Research Programme [email protected]
Page 3 of 15
*****
Australia Seeks to Boost Ties with Wealthy Qatar
The recent visit to Qatar by Foreign Minister Bob Carr was a useful step in Australia’s
efforts to broaden Middle Eastern trade relations beyond the traditional regional markets
of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Livestock, meat, wheat and motor vehicle exports seem to be
the most promising sectors.
Background
Australia’s Foreign Minister Bob Carr visited Qatar last week, in the hope of boosting ties
with the Gulf state. The trip was aimed at registering ‘Australia’s interest in doing business
with Qatar in terms of economic and strategic relations’, Carr said. Australia’s trade with the
Middle East is currently modest, but there is significant potential for expansion, especially
with wealthy states like Qatar. Carr’s visit is therefore an encouraging development, as
Canberra seeks to build stronger relations with Qatar and diversify its trading partners.
Comment
Speaking to a range of journalists at the Qatar-Australia and New Zealand Business
Association in Doha on 20 May, Carr acknowledged the growing economic ties between
Qatar and Australia. ‘Trade between Qatar and Australia increased by 30 per cent last year
and reached $1 billion as Australia is exporting livestock, meat, wheat and motor vehicles to
Qatar’, he said.
While trade between Australia and the resource-rich Middle East has traditionally paled in
comparison to other states and regions, things are beginning to change. Economic ties with
the United Arab Emirates remain strong and the annual two-way trade totals almost $6
billion; but there is also significant potential to expand bilateral trade with other states in
the Middle East, particularly Qatar.
Indeed, Australia’s exports of live animals to Qatar, traditionally one of its biggest export
items to the Middle East, continues to expand. The value of live animal exports in 2011-12
totalled $70 million, though that is likely to increase in the future as Qatar’s population and
its appetite for meat, continue to grow. As Carr said during his visit, ‘we want to increase this
trade volume ... which is why I will talk to Hassad Foods’. The talks with Hassad Foods, a
Qatar-based conglomerate with significant holdings in Australia, were apparently geared
toward further co-operation in agricultural food production, one area were trade has
flourished in recent times.
Another key area where trade is expected to grow is motor vehicles. The Middle East
accounts for almost $2 billion and over 80 per cent of Australia’s motor vehicle exports,
General Motors-Holden’s cars are popular in the region. In 2011-12, the value of exports of
motor vehicles to Qatar totalled $50 million, or roughly ten per cent of all exports to the Gulf
state. This may only be a fraction of the motor vehicle exports to Saudi Arabia, which
Page 4 of 15
accounted for over $1 billion last year, but there is significant room for expansion, especially
in four-wheel drive vehicles.
Beyond this, agricultural exports of meat, wheat, sugar and barley are expected to increase.
Moreover, with Qatar set to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, there should also be
opportunities for Australian businesses in engineering and construction. As Carr noted, ‘I
think Australian companies are well placed to contribute to Qatar’s business development
and the run-up to the 2022 World Cup.’
As Qatar, on a per capita basis one of the richest countries in the world, continues its rise, its
trade relations with Australia will also increase. Carr’s visit, therefore, is an encouraging sign
as Australia seeks to build stronger relations with this wealthy state and to diversify its trade
partnerships in the Middle East beyond Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Tanzania: Violent Demonstrations over Gas Pipeline Resume
Violent demonstrations are expected to continue in the Mtwara region of Tanzania as the
government refuses to back down on constructing a gas pipeline from the area to the city
of Dar es Salaam.
Background
Tensions remain high in the southern Mtwara Region of Tanzania. The government has said
that, despite recent protests, it intends to continue with the development of a gas pipeline
from Mnazi Bay, located in the Mtwara Region, to the coastal city of Dar es Salaam. At least
one person was killed during protests on 22 and 23 May and dozens more were arrested, in
the renewed bout of civil unrest in opposition to the development of the pipeline. Further
protests are anticipated in the coming months, potentially causing delays to the project.
Comment
The China-funded pipeline is expected to be approximately 532km-long and will pump
natural gas from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. There the gas will be processed to produce 2,780
Megawatts of electricity, in an attempt to alleviate the country’s protracted power
problems. The decision to send the gas to Dar es Salaam for processing was made because
the city already has the necessary infrastructure required for the project.
Mtwara’s residents have become increasingly angered at the decision to send the gas to Dar
es Salaam and have held several protests in recent months. On 27 December 2012,
Page 5 of 15
thousands of Mtwara residents held
a protest march; although this was
peaceful, a subsequent protest on
27 January 2013 in the Masasi
territory turned violent. At least four
people were killed and dozens more
injured; the protest also caused
damage worth at least US$929,000
to vandalised property. Some
reports indicate that the residents of
Mtwara are not against the pipeline
being built, more that they have
become concerned at not receiving
a greater share of the benefits
expected to be generated by the
project. They are also disgruntled at
the prospect that the development
will not benefit the Mtwara area;
rather that Dar es Salaam, which is already developed, will gain the financial benefits and
potential employment opportunities it creates. As a result, residents argue that a processing
plant should be built in Mtwara instead.
Some commentators argue that large natural gas discoveries off the east coast of Africa,
including those off Tanzania, have caught these emerging countries off-guard. Updated
legislation is a key tool in calming fears amongst local communities and assuring them of
their entitlement to a fair share of generated revenue. Tanzania, where the only petroleum
law is the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act of 1980, has recognised that new
legislation is needed. It is currently working on the third draft of a Natural Gas Policy.
Nevertheless, as competition to attract investors intensifies and pressure to convert natural
gas increases, Tanzania’s government is unlikely to postpone development of the much-
needed pipeline infrastructure. Consequently, Mtwara’s residents are expected to continue
holding protests against the development, potentially causing delays to the project. This is
likely to continue at least until updated legislation is enacted and the community is informed
of the benefits they can expect.
Kim Moss Research Analyst Minerals and Energy Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Page 6 of 15
Sudan-South Sudan Oil Conflict Brings New Role for Beijing
Its growing engagement in Africa has led China to play an unprecedented mediation role in
the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan over oil exports. It is contrary to China’s long-
standing hands-off approach and potentially heralds a new and more complicated aspect
to its relations with resource-rich countries.
Background
When South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, it took 75 per cent of the oil reserves with
it. Being landlocked, though, it continues to rely on Sudan’s ports for its exports. In January
2012, disputes over transit fees led to a halt in oil production. South Sudan restarted oil
production in May 2013, following the resolution of the fees dispute. China has substantial
interests in the region and is likely to play a behind-the-scenes role in mediating the conflict.
Comment
South Sudan receives 98 per cent of its government revenue from oil. After production
ceased, South Sudan’s economy shrank. Sudan, which had already lost substantial oil
reserves suffered also.
The resolution of the oil dispute is part of a wider agreement that also involves the
withdrawal of troops from the disputed border. Territorial issues – which last year
contributed to pushing the two
countries to the brink of war – have
still not been resolved and continue to
plague the relationship and affect oil
flows.
Meanwhile, alleged Southern support
for the Sudanese Revolutionary Front
militia resulted in the threat, on 27
May, from Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir to ‘shut down the oil pipeline
forever’.1
China has vital interests in the region,
claiming the position of Africa’s
largest trading partner. China imports
82 per cent of the oil produced in
South Sudan and about 70 per cent of Sudan’s. Chinese state-owned enterprises were
among the first to invest in Sudan in the 1990s, but the civil war in Darfur deterred Western
multi-nationals. These circumstances highlighted China’s foreign policy principle of “non-
interference” in the internal affairs of other countries.
1 Laessing, U., ‘Bashir Threatens to Close Oil Pipeline in Row with South Sudan’, Reuters, 27 May 2013.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/27/us-sudan-south-oil-idUSBRE94Q0IL20130527>.
Page 7 of 15
Recently, however, vital economic interests in greater Sudan have necessitated China’s
involvement in mediating the dispute, challenging its non-interference policy. Peaceful
relations between the two African neighbours are essential to ensure a stable flow of oil
exports. Recognising this, Beijing sent a special envoy to defuse tensions, which represents a
new course for Chinese diplomacy in Africa. Additionally, as new reports of oil blockages
emerged last week, the South Sudanese Government summoned the Chinese Ambassador
to discuss the issue.
Beijing has long been an ally of Khartoum and a supporter of President al-Bashir – despite
warrants from the International Criminal Court for his arrest. In 2011, al-Bashir was
welcomed during an official visit to China. China has also courted Juba and has invested
heavily in infrastructure in South Sudan – although much of it has lain idle since production
ceased last year.
As well as the economic advantage of restarting oil exports, China will also reap a political
advantage through international conflict resolution. China wants to be seen as a responsible,
peace-building global power, wielding influence commensurate with its growing economic
and military strength. Successful resolution of this conflict will boost its reputation.
China’s role in this dispute may also have implications for its position on other conflicts in
the region. Having set a precedent, China may be expected to mediate other disputes in
areas where it is a stakeholder; although some analysts argue that this is an irregular case
that has forced a unique response from Beijing. As Chinese investment continues to grow in
Africa, however, deeper involvement in economic and political issues will lead to the need
for more substantial responses from China. This, in turn, will require more involvement in
the internal affairs of governments.
In the meantime, China is also seeking to reduce its dependence on the two Sudans, despite
its substantial interests there, due to the continuing risk of instability and potential conflict
between the two countries. China has already seized investment opportunities in other oil-
producing countries, including Iraq and Venezuela, and will continue to diversify its sources
of energy. Additionally, a planned oil pipeline, running from South Sudan to the Kenyan
coast – possibly funded in large part by China or Japan – will increase the prospects of stable
oil exports from South Sudan, reducing its reliance on its northern neighbour.
James Davies Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Page 8 of 15
Locust Plague Causing Food Security Crisis in Madagascar
Madagascar faces an extreme risk of food insecurity in the coming twelve months as a
serious locust plague threatens crops in up to two-thirds of the country.
Background
Already experiencing high rates of undernutrition, Madagascar’s food security situation is
expected to deteriorate over the course of the next twelve months, unless measures are
taken to control a locust plague building in the south-west of the country. The looming food
security crisis is the result of a series of cumulative shocks: Cyclone Hurana destroyed crops
and caused widespread flooding in February; the locust plague is spreading rapidly; and food
aid continues to be disrupted by political instability.
Comment
Madagascar has one of the lowest income levels in the world. Estimates indicate that 85 per
cent of the population live on less than US$1 a day; up from 68 per cent prior to the political
crisis in 2009. Low income levels combined with interrupted food production, make the
population vulnerable to high rates of food insecurity and malnutrition. The World Bank
estimated in 2011 that 83 per cent of the population was experiencing nutritional
vulnerability. Recent FAO estimates indicate that seven million people (33 per cent of the
population) are currently undernourished.
Natural disasters are the major stumbling blocks to Madagascar’s food security and
economic development at large. The country experiences an average of three to four serious
cyclones each year, along with associated flooding. Consecutive droughts also affect some
parts of the country. In February this year, Cyclone Hurana hit Madagascar, affecting 42,000
households and flooding 14,000 hectares of cropped fields in the south-western districts of
Morombe and Toliara. In
addition to directly harming
food security by damaging
crops and housing, the cyclone
resulted in a long period of
ideal breeding conditions for
locusts. This exacerbated the
spread of the plague, which
had already been designated a
national disaster in November
2012.
Locusts are currently
estimated to have infested
around half of the country.
Ongoing assessments indicate that, on average, 40 to 50 per cent of maize and rice crops
have been decimated by locusts in the mid-western regions, with up to 100 per cent losses
Page 9 of 15
in some areas. The heart of the plague is in the south-west, an area prone to drought and
cyclones, where more than 80 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.
In the absence of an emergency control programme, the FAO estimates that 1.5 million
hectares, up to two-thirds of the country, could be infested by September this year. The
plague is the worst since the 1950s and could last for five to ten years if untreated. A less
severe four-year plague that ended in 2000, caused widespread food shortages.
The FAO and Ministry of Agriculture have prepared an emergency response programme,
which will conduct large-scale aerial and ground control operations, to contain the locust
threat. The joint three-year programme will cost US$41 million. Some US$22 million is
needed before June to allow the programme to go ahead, but despite appeals to donors, so
far this sum has not been met.
Donors suspended all but emergency assistance to Madagascar and imposed economic
sanctions after the 2009 coup d’état. Since then food assistance has fallen to a very serious
level and supplies coming into the country have been intermittent. The political turmoil in
2009 also triggered an ongoing economic crisis. GDP fell by four per cent in 2009 and foreign
investment and tourism flows have drastically reduced. The political and economic crises
have stalled the implementation of a long-term disaster management programme and the
National Action Plan for Food Security (PANSA). Madagascar requires strong and integrated
policies from both the government and the international community, to reduce malnutrition
and support economic development. Uncertainty surrounding the country’s upcoming
elections poses further concerns for the recovery process.
Current estimates indicate that lower production and limited availability of food in
2013/2014, could expose 13 million Madagascans to food insecurity and livelihood
disruptions.
Lauren Power Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme [email protected]
*****
EU, Australia and New Zealand Continue Anti-Piracy Efforts as
the Number of Incidents Falls
Continued efforts, both at sea and on land, are necessary to consolidate the gains made
over the last year and prevent a resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Background
Anti-piracy efforts in the western Indian Ocean have received another boost, with the
European Union announcing that it will contribute over €37 million ($49.7 million) to the
Page 10 of 15
Programme to promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE). The continuing involvement of
far-flung external stakeholders, such as the EU, Australia and New Zealand – among others –
highlights the importance of maritime security in the area and is necessary to consolidate
the gains made on land, which have seen the incidence of piracy fall markedly.
Comment
The ICC International Maritime Bureau notes that so far in 2013, there have been just seven
reported incidents of Somali-related piracy, including one hijacking. So far, the figure
represents a continuation of the trend seen in recent years. The EU reports that pirate
attacks decreased from 299 in 2011 to 111 in 2012, with hijackings falling from 25 to 12 over
the same period. This trend was aided by the continuing international naval presence in the
region and the adoption of anti-piracy measures by vessels transiting the region.
The gains made at sea have been boosted significantly by the progress made on land, with
the Somali Federal Government and its AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) partners
extending their authority and dislodging the Islamist al-Shabaab militia from many of its
strongholds in the country’s south. The weakening of al-Shabaab has brought an incipient
stability which, combined with the greater difficulty and higher risks of piracy, has made the
waters of the western Indian Ocean the safest that they have been since 2008.
While the figures are encouraging, the trend could still be reversed, hence the importance of
the MASE programme. It aims to work with regional states, including Somalia, to address the
causes, as well as the symptoms of piracy. It features initiatives such as capacity-building in
legal and judicial systems and in coastal surveillance and patrols. Perhaps most importantly,
in Somalia it includes training programmes intended to provide people with vocational skills
that will hopefully steer them away from piracy. To be truly effective, however, the
programme will also require continued stability and economic development.
The progress made to date highlights the need to continue the contributions being made by
many extra-regional stakeholders, including Australia, New Zealand, the EU, the United
States, Japan, China and India.
HMAS Toowoomba is leading Australia’s contribution to the US-led Combined Maritime
Forces. It will remain until the end of May, when HMAS Newcastle will take over her duties
with Combined Task Forces 150 (counter-terrorism), 151 (counter-piracy) and 152 (Persian
Gulf maritime security), to prevent piracy and improve maritime security.
The Royal New Zealand Navy frigate HMNZS Te Mana will join the Combined Maritime
Forces for a three-month rotation in November 2013. The New Zealand Defence Force will
also deploy staff officers to the CMF taskforce command in 2013 and 2014. According to the
Ministry of Defence, six officers will be attached from mid-2013, with up to 14 staff officers
commanding a taskforce from 2014. A Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion maritime
patrol aircraft will also be deployed from mid-2014.
Efforts such as those from Australia and New Zealand might now seem to be less important
than before. In reality, they are needed as much as ever, to consolidate the still fragile gains
Page 11 of 15
made to date and secure the sea lanes of communication, which are vital to global trade and
the prosperity of even the farthest-flung countries.
Leighton G. Luke Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Iran’s Supreme Leader Playing it Safe
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s decision last week to ban Hashemi
Rafsanjani and Rahim Mashaei from the election has prompted criticism. How the remarks
will impact upon the Supreme Leader’s objective of stacking the government with loyalists,
remains to be seen.
Background
Rafsanjani has accused Iran’s leaders of ‘incompetence and ignorance’ in response to being
barred from participating in the upcoming 14 June presidential election. As a former Iranian
president, with public support, the decision by the Supreme Guardian Council to bar
Rafsanjani so early is likely to have repercussions.
Comment
Khamenei has positioned his political forces early this year, in an attempt to crush potential
protests and criticisms that question the legitimacy of Iran’s theological government. With
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on high alert, internet and media censorship at
an all-time high, and the disenfranchisement of two major political figures, Khamenei’s
actions exude many of the
characteristics of a regime in
crisis.
The policies enacted by
Khamenei indicate an increasing
politicisation of the Supreme
Leader’s role, perhaps as a
means of maintaining the status
of the clerical elite and the
regime as a whole. As seen from
Rafsanjani and Mashaei’s recent
comments and attacks on the
Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader, there is growing strength among marginalised
factions seeking to challenge Khamenei’s rule.
Page 12 of 15
Rafsanjani in particular, with his large popular support base, has been seen as a potential
rival to Khamenei for many years, particularly during his presidency immediately after the
Iraq-Iran war. During this period, Rafsanjani became known for his liberal economic leanings,
which were at odds with the administration, as well as his attempts to reform the ultra-
conservative blocs within the Iranian establishment.
During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Khamenei again dealt with a hostile
government, where the president utilised his position to undermine the ruling clerical elite’s
control over governmental policy. Consequently, it can be seen that Khamenei is taking no
risks by promoting two candidates who have been very close to the clerical establishment;
Saeed Jalili and Ali Akbar Velayati.
Khamenei’s decision-making process has been greatly changed as a result of these
protracted challenges to his leadership reducing his political stock both publically and
governmentally. Therefore, his decision to remove Rafsanjani and Mashaei from the race is a
means of “reins tightening” by the leader, and may be seen in a negative light. Its effects
though, will be muted by the lack of an organised opposition party to the regime.
The Iranian elections have not distracted either the US or Tehran from their rivalry, with
each conducting military exercises this month. The 41-country war games hosted by the US
in the Persian Gulf at the start of May this year, has been an overt signal to Tehran; despite
the US “rebalancing” towards Asia, it will still maintain a large presence in the Middle East.
Tehran responded with its own missile exercise, which featured several “new” missile
launchers. With the Supreme Leader expected to have more control over the government
after the election, it is unlikely that any future president will divert from the standard Iranian
practice of hostility to the US.
Saeed Jalili, one of Khamenei’s loyalists is a potential front-runner for the presidential
position. A safe pick, Jalili is likely to maintain his allegiance to the clerical regime and thus
be strongly supportive of the policies made by the clerical elite.
Khamenei’s preference for Jalili represents the need by the regime to preserve its hold on
domestic politics. So long as it can prevent an effective opposition from organising, such as
that seen in the 2009 presidential election, the position of the regime will remain
entrenched. Such a movement could potentially form around Rafsanjani, but his decision to
not contest the decision by the Guardian Council makes it unlikely.
With the IRGC on standby and mass communication technology heavily censored, it is
apparent that the power is still in Khamenei’s hands. Despite this, public consternation
about such heavy handed policies may have repercussions over time; in fact, the need for
Khamenei to engage in such tactics may signal a weakening of the clerical establishment.
Gustavo Mendiolaza Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
Page 13 of 15
*****
Rohingya Dilemma Complicates ASEAN Affairs
The leadership of the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN) must reconsider the
predicament of the Rohingya in Burma (Myanmar), as it is rapidly becoming a regional
issue. ASEAN is aware that the issue endangers the group’s stability, but has not
developed a joint position.
Background
The violence in Burma between Buddhists, particularly the members of the nationalist
Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), and the Muslim minority Rohingya
community has engendered a regional refugee crisis. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have
been directly affected by the influx of Rohingya refugees, but only Indonesia has called upon
Burma to address the issue.
Comment
The Rohingya, numbering around 800,000, live primarily in the western Burmese state of
Rakhine. Ethnic and religious violence has been ongoing in that area since June 2012. The
Rohingya are accused of attempting to “Islamify” Burma, among other allegations. Around
two hundred people have been killed and more than 140,000 made homeless in incidents of
mass arson, looting and murder. The official Burmese Government position is that the
Rohingya are illegal Bengali immigrants from Bangladesh. For its part, Bangladesh officially
denies them, as well. The result is that RNDP members, as well as the local sangha (order) of
Buddhist monks, have been able to organise and persecute the Rohingya with impunity.
Human Rights Watch, a New York-based NGO, has accused the Burmese Government of
engaging ‘in a campaign of ethnic cleansing’.2 Government authorities are allegedly
implicated in destroying mosques, conducting mass arrests, blocking aid, deporting and
forcibly transferring Rohingyas, and generally persecuting them. The security forces are
either implicated in failing to prevent the violence or even directly participating in the
violence. Many Rohingya currently reside in overcrowded refugee camps without adequate
care.
At least thirteen thousand Rohingya have fled Burma by sea, with around seven hundred lost
along the way. More will follow, and the status of the Rohingya is no longer just an internal
Burmese issue; it is now becoming one of significance to ASEAN as a whole. While the
Burmese Government shows no desire to escalate the issue to one of regional importance,
events have overtaken it. Thailand currently shelters around two thousand Rohingya
refugees, while others have landed in Malaysia and Indonesia, primarily for religious
reasons.
2 Human Rights Watch, 22 April 2013, ‘Burma: End “Ethnic Cleansing” of Rohingya Muslims’.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims>.
Page 14 of 15
Indonesia has seen protests against
the Burmese Government from its
Muslim population, with threats to
bomb Naypyitaw’s embassy in
Jakarta. President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono informed his Burmese
counterpart, Thein Sein, that he was
concerned about the conflict, but was
confident he was ‘trying do the right
thing in terms of getting the
communal violence under control’.3
Malaysia raised the issue in similarly
diplomatic terms on the sidelines of
the Asia-Europe Meeting last year.
Thailand, however, has not yet put pressure on Burma despite being informed that Rohingya
refugees will only be taken back if there is proof they lived in Rhakine. In general, despite
launching a human rights body at its most recent summit, the group has kept to the status
quo of non-interference. Burma is also scheduled to chair ASEAN in 2014, which will likely
ensure a tacit silence on the issue.
It is unlikely that the issue will be acknowledged until large-scale security risks from the flow
of refugees become apparent, or Burma’s internal security is compromised. Concerning the
latter, in March this year the Kaman, another Muslim ethnic group, was targeted during riots
in the town of Meiktila, 150 kilometres north of Naypyitaw. Clashes raged across eleven
townships, with forty-three people killed, eight hundred homes and five mosques torched.
The violence ended with another 12,000 people displaced. The unrest forced President
Thein Sein to declare a state of emergency. No real moves are being taken to end the
conflict, however, lending weight to accusations that the government is content to see the
Rohingya forced out of Burma, at the expense of the country’s general stability.
The alleged complicity of the security forces in the bloodshed may also be intended to be
seen by the general Muslim populace as a warning, but it may facilitate radicalisation among
persecuted groups. Refugees from the conflict might find support from various Islamic
militant groups residing in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Thailand, which could, in turn,
escalate the regional stakes of the conflict. Silence on the issue may undermine ASEAN’s
desire for peaceful economic development in the long-term; its members may thus be
forced to formulate a joint position on the matter in the near term.
Daniel Barnes Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
3 Marukatat, S., ‘ASEAN Fails to Step into the Rohingya Mess’, Bangkok Post, 6 May 2013.
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/348588/asean-fails-to-step-into-the-rohingya-mess>.
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What’s Next?
Representatives from Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and other
countries are attending a conference hosted by the Union for the Mediterranean
in Barcelona to discuss foreign investment and water management on 29-30 May.
Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh will visit Thailand on 30-31 May.
Bhutan will hold elections for its National Assembly on 31 May.
Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra will make an official visit to Sri Lanka
from 31 May – 1 June.
The Asia Security Summit (also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue), will take place
in Singapore from 31 May – 2 June. The defence chiefs of South Korea, Japan and
the United States will hold their first trilateral meeting in four years on the
sidelines of the summit.
The Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia
is hosting a lecture by Dr Emile Nakhleh titled “The Arab Spring at Two and a Half:
Lessons, Challenges, and Opportunities” on 10 June from 2.30-4.00pm. The venue
is G.06, Law, E-Moot Court, Hackett Entrance № 1, Hackett Drive, Crawley. For
more information, contact (08) 6488 4554 or [email protected].
