From Violence to Resilience

8/2/2019 From Violence to Resilience

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This chapter sets out the Reports framework for how countries

escape the vicious cycle of fragility and move toward a virtu-

ous cycle of condence-building and institutional transfor-

mation, especially in the areas of citizen security, justice, and jobs.

The framework is presented as an expanding spiral because these

processes repeat over time as countries enter and exit multiple

transition moments. Even as one set of immediate priorities is

resolved, other risks emerge and require a repeated cycle of actionto bolster institutional resilience. This process takes at least a

generation. Societies undertaking this endeavor face a legacy of

pervasive and enduring mistrust, which makes collective action to

address challenges or provide public goods so dicult. Outsiders

cannot restore condence and transform institutions for countries

because these processes are domestic and must be nationally led.

But to help countries restore peace and reduce regional and global

instability, international actors can provide external support and

incentives and help reduce external stresses.


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Why transforming institutionsis so difficult

Changes in power relations andcontests around them are a con-stant feature of all societies. Thereis nothing unusual about intense

social confrontation during the transforma-tion of institutions, which normally involveschanges in the distribution of power and

wealth. Such contests do not end at somepoint in a societys development. U.S. gov-ernment support for private banks andgreater state involvement in health care pro-vision have stirred fierce controversy, as havethe recent transformations in public sectorfunctions caused by the impact of the finan-cial crisis in Europe. In other words, change iscontested and painful in all circumstances.But some societies can accomplish change inthe national interest, even when this involves

temporary losses for some groups. Other so-cieties find this more difficult.

What makes institutional transformationparticularly difficult for states affected by vi-olence? Many countries that recovered fromwar in the mid-20th century, including mostof Europe and Japan, transformed their insti-tutions quickly and smoothly. But they had along history of national institutional devel-opment and high levels of physical and hu-man capitaland they had faced an external

war, not internal violence. Todays middle-and low-income countries affected by in-ternal violence face greater challengesforthree key reasons. First, launching an initialagreement on change is hard because elitesdo not trust each other and few people trustthe state. Second, maintaining an agreementis difficult because institutional change canincrease the risks of violence in the shortterm, due to political backlash from groups

that lose power or economic benefits. Third,countries do not exist in isolation: duringfragile periods of institutional transforma-tion, they may face external securitythreatsor economic shocks that can overwhelmprogress. These challenges are difficult toovercome when physical, institutional, andhuman capital is relatively low.

The challenge of low trust and risingexpectations

Launching an initial transition in fragile sit-uations is difficult because of low trustandlow capacity to deliver on promises.1 Mis-trust is much more pervasive in violence-affected countries than in those with a longhistory of a reasonably stable social compactbetween state and citizen. This makes manyforms of cooperation difficult, includingmeasures to address the stresses triggeringviolence in the first place. When there is

From violence to resilience:Restoring confidence andtransforming institutions

CHAPTER3LENCE and

RAGILITY

CITIZEN

SECURITY,

JUSTI CE,

AND JOBS

RESTO

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100 WO R L D D E V E L O PM E N T R E PO R T 2011

require strong signals of real change. Yet thecapacity to deliver change is weak in most so-cieties that score low on governance indica-tors.4 A further reason for failure in reform isthe premature load-bearing of institutions:too many demands and expectations areplaced on them in a short period. When theydo not deliver, there is a loss of confidenceand legitimacy (see box 3.2).

no convincing track record of progress andinformation is poor, individuals can easilyhave expectations that are either too low(they are unresponsive to positive signals ofchange)or too high (they hold unrealisticexpectations and are easily disappointed)(see box 3.1).

Low institutional capacity to deliver fur-ther reduces trust. Low-trust environments

The impact of a legacy of mistrust in violence-affected countries

A legacy of mistrust can mean that key actors do not respond as hoped to new political signals or new public programs. Consider

Afghanistan, where citizens need to calculate the risks of siding either with the Taliban or with the government and NATO (North

Atlantic Treaty Organization)or with neither.

In making these decisions, individuals consider what they think others are likely to do. The thinking process might go like this: The

consequences of my decision to provide the authorities with information on the Taliban depend on what others around me are going

to do. If my neighbors wont cooperate, the authorities are going to lose control, and Id be crazy to help them. So, even though I do

not support the Taliban, Im better ohelping them. The same could apply to providing information on drug trackers.2

All institutional change requires the coordinated actions of many people. That is why small events that change the beliefs about

what others will do can evoke big changes in the choices each individual makes. A single, but widely publicized, government humilia-

tion in combat operations, for example, can translate into a major loss of popular support. A single, but widely publicized, incident of

corruption can evoke big changes in expectations and in political and economic behavior.

Expectations and trust in fragile states and in non-fragile states

Analysis of 280 country surveys in Latin America and Africa shows a signicant dierence in citizen trust in fragile and non-fragile

states. The results reveal that countries that are not fragile or aected by conict have signicantly higher levels of trust in the police,

the justice system, and the parliament. This is consistent with recent research that explores cross-country di erences in trusting neigh-

bors and governments.

In simple terms, peoples expectations are often wrong about the future in fragile states. A simple cross-country regression using

data on expectations of economic improvements and actual economic growth suggests that, in non-fragile states, peoples expecta-

tions of the direction the economy will take in the next 12 months has a signi cant correlation with actual outcomes.3 But in fragile

states, there is no such correlation: responses to the survey question, will economic prospects improve in the next 12 months? bear

no relationship to what subsequently happens in the economy. This is important, because all rational expectations theory in econom-

ics and political scienceand the policy decisions linked to itassume that people have a reasonably informed ability to make judg-

ments about the future.

The low trust in government institutions in fragile and conict-aected countries poses a formidable constraint to leaders trying to

launch positive change. To further complicate the situation, operational experience and input from national policymakers highlight a

second, quite dierent version of the expectations problem, that is, the excessively high popular expectations that arise in moments of

political hope and transition. Governments repeatedly encounter this: signing a peace agreement or a donor pledge conference can

create a wave of enthusiasm and the expectation that rapid change will follow. When the bubble bursts, as it usually does, govern-ments can experience a rapid loss of credibility.

If policy makers understand these dynamics, they can harness public enthusiasm for changeto their advantage by crafting signals

in ways that conform to expectations (chapter 4). Where mistrust is high, they have to take actions that send very strong signalssig-

nals that are self-evidently costly, such as integrating former rebels into the national army structure, as in Burundi, or guaranteeing

long-term employment to former adversaries, as in South Africa through the sunset clause oered to white civil servants. They also

have to nd ways to make promises binding, often using third parties as guarantors.

Sources: Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hoand Stiglitz 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Schelling 1971, 1978; Axelrod 1984; Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon,

forthcoming.

Note: Dierences in trust and expectations between fragile and non-fragile states reported here were statistically signi cant at the 5 percent

level. These dierences were signicant whether non-fragile was dened as CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) greater than 3.2

or CPIA greater than 3.8.

BOX 3.1 Unrealistic expectations in fragile states are hurdles to progress


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From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 101

The challenge of vulnerability toexternal stress

Countries with weak institutions are dispro-portionately vulnerable to external shocks.Severe external shocks can overwhelm evenfairly strong institutions: witness the incipi-ent social unrest in 2010 in many parts of Eu-rope as a result of austerity measures to con-tain the global financial crisis, or the assaultson governance from shifting patterns inglobal drug trafficking. When institutions areboth well-developed and reasonably static

The process of reform itself may carryshort-term security risks. Research suggeststhat a shift from authoritarian rule towarddemocracy is associated with a higher riskof civil war and an increase in criminal vio-

lence.5 Taking on too many reforms too fastsuch as decentralizing services and combatinginsurgents or traffickerscan risk backlashand institutional loss of credibility. Rapid re-forms make it difficult for actors in the post-conflict society to make credible commit-ments with each other, since they do not knowhow the reforms will affect the balance ofpower. Elections, often seen as winner takesall events in fragile states, can evoke powerfulreactions from those who lose.6 And if disad-

vantaged groups or regions are empoweredby reform, existing power-holders must losesome power as a result. Economic restructur-ing changes the balance of economic accessand opportunity. Anti-corruption efforts at-tack entrenched interests, sometimes verypowerful ones. The point here is not that it iswrong to attempt such reform: instead it is tobe aware of the risksand to adapt the de-sign of reforms accordingly, to ensure that thestate can deliver on promises.7

A history of recent violence sharpens thisdilemma. In societies that lack effective secu-rity and rule of law, potential reformers maywell perceive that reforms will put their livesat risk and cause them to postpone or avoidchange. In the 198393 narco-terroristperiod in Colombia, the Cali and Medellndrug cartels ordered an estimated 3,500 as-sassinations of presidential candidates, poli-ticians, judicial officers, and government of-ficials seen to oppose them.8 For those who

need protection, legacies of violence can un-dermine their belief in the efficacy of the stateand weaken their willingness to support re-form. For those considering violence, thepossibility of impunity can reinforce theirwillingness to use violent means.9 A potentillustration of how reforms can evoke vio-lence is the transitional experience of theformer Soviet Union, where homicide ratessoared as the state undertook wide-rangingreforms (see box 3.3).

Public policy (or program) implementation involves agents taking action with a

particular set of standards. Tax implementation, for example, involves the collec-

tion of taxes (sales, income, dutiable import, property valuation, and so on)

according to rules for assessing the amount due. Procurement involves assessingbids according to stipulated procedures, followed by contract awards. Premature

load-bearing can occur during a reform process when there is a large divergence

between what is in the agents best interest and what they are supposed to do.

For example, in implementing a revised customs code, if the tari is very

high, the importer may oer the customs ocer a side payment to avoid (or

reduce) what is owed. Higher taris entail greater pressure on the system: but so

do complex taricodes with exemptions based on intended use. In Kenya and

Pakistan the collected tarirate increased with the ocial tari(not one for one,

but it did increase) up to around 60 percent, after which the collected rate

stopped increasing. After that point, further increases in the tari just increased

the discrepancy between the ocial rate and the collected rate. As the tarirate

increases, the amount importers would pay to evade the tari increases too, so

the temptation for customs ocers to deviate also increases. In other words,

complexity and its ambiguity make collusion with importers easier. In this case a

low and uniform tax would create less organizational stress.

These same considerations apply across the range of state activities, from

policing to justice and to public nancial management and education. Dierent

tasks create dierent organizational load-bearing pressures and dierent

inducements to deviate from organizational standards. When those pressures

overwhelm capacity and incentives are not aligned, systems fail.

Systems often fail when stress is placed on individual components. Pressure

can sometimes cause a nonlinear degradation in performance. In many organi-

zational situations where one agents performance depends on many other

agents around them, modest amounts of stress can bring about total collapse.

An example is the Chad College, established to enhance government account-

ability in the use of proceeds from newly discovered oil. The mechanism relied

heavily on local civil society to secure, evaluate, and provide opinions on gov-ernment funding allocations out of the oil revenuesa formula that works well

in environments where civil society has high capacity, and where a tradition of

government openness and accountability to citizens has been established.

Under stress, however, the civil society groups could not hold government to

account, and the mechanism collapsed.

Sources: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010; Kaplan 2008; Lund 2010.

BOX 3.2 Premature load-bearing


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researched, and this Report has only some ofthe answers. The framework below suggestssome fundamental differences between fragileand violent situations and stable developingenvironments.12 The first is the need to re-

store confidence in collective action beforeembarking on wider institutional transforma-tion.Second is the priority oftransforminginstitutions that provide citizen security,13

justice, and jobs. Third is the role of regionaland international action to reduce externalstresses. Fourth is the specialized nature ofexternal support needed (figure 3.1).

The framework is not meant to be agrand theory of violence, nor is it the onlyway to understand violence prevention. It

builds, however, from the research describedin chapters 1 and 2 and a review of countryexperience, and provides a useful organizingframework for action. First, it provides a sys-tematic way of thinking about what can bedone to prevent violenceand the recur-rence of violence over time. Indeed, the ques-tion of most relevance to national reformers

as in the OECD (Oranisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development) countriesexternal shocks can be absorbed, but eventhen, they will affect reform plans. Chapter 2showed that fragile countries experienced

more food protests, and more violence dur-ing food protests, than non-fragile countriesduring recent food price crises. Likewise, re-cent research suggests that the impact of nat-ural disasters is more pronounced in fragilestates.10 Not only are fragile countries morevulnerable to the effects of disasters, but di-sasters and external shocks can interrupt in-stitutional transformation, as was the case inpromising sectors after Haitis devastatingearthquake in early 2010.11

Escaping violence, developingresilience

Given the difficulties, how have countries es-caped from violence and achieved institu-tional resilience?These pathways are under-

F I G U R E 3 . 1 WDR Framework: Repeated cycles of action to bolster institutional resilience

The WDR framework is presented as an ever-expanding spiral because these processes repeat over time as countries go through

multiple transitions. Even as one set of immediate priorities is resolved, other risks and transition moments emerge and require a

repeated cycle of action to bolster institutional resiliency. The arrow below the spiral illustrates that external supportand incentives

can help this nationally led process, and the arrow above it illustrates howexternal stresses can derail it.

Source: WDR team.

VIOLENCE and

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collaborate until they believe that a positiveoutcome is possible. Chapter 4 examinescountry-level experiences of three mecha-nisms to restore the confidence of key stake-holders in fragile and violent situations:

Developing collaborative, inclusiveenough coalitions. To bridge problemsof low trust between societal groups andbetween the state and society, we examinethe role that coalitions involving a broadrange of stakeholders have played insuccessful exits from violencewhethergovernment-led alliances in support of se-curity and development actions or negoti-ated agreements between parties to a con-flict. Inclusion can embed strong politicaleconomy incentives. It brings benefits toleadersby providing support and re-sources from key stakeholder groups andensuring that individual leaders or partiesdo not take all the blame for unpopular de-cisions.15 It can also signal change and pro-vide incentives for reform if parties respon-sible for abuses are excluded. An inclusiveapproach can also carry longer-term politi-cal economy benefits, by creating pressurefor continuing change, avoiding narrowand persistent elite captures of the state.

Using signals and commitment mecha-nisms to build support. Without strongsignals of a break with the past and waysto reassure stakeholders that the new di-rection will be sustained, developing co-alitions of support for change can be dif-ficult. Leaders need ways to find the rightsignals to galvanize supportsignals thathave been successful in different countrycontexts are examined. When trust in

announcements on future policy is low,leaders also need mechanisms to lockpromises in and persuade people that theywill not be reversedcalled commit-ment mechanisms by economists andpolitical scientists. We consider the typeof commitment mechanisms that havebeen useful in the face of risks of repeatedcycles of violence.

Delivering early results. Expectationsfrom government policy announcements

alone will likely be insufficient to persuade

and international agenciesand the one thatan institutional emphasis puts front and cen-teris in practical terms, what can we do toprevent violence? Second, the framework iscompatible with the theories of violence in

different disciplines (box 3.4). Third, by fo-cusing on the challenges in moving from cri-sis management to security, justice, and eco-nomic institutional transformation, it bringstogether the thinking of local, national, andinternational actors as well as political, secu-rity, and development agencies.

The framework suggests that institutionaltransformation and good governance, whichare important in development generally,work differently in fragile situations. The

goal is more focusedtransforming institu-tions that are directly important to the pre-vention of repeated cycles of violence. Thedynamics of institutional change are alsodifferent. A good analogy is a financial crisiscaused by a combination of external stressesand historic weaknesses in institutionalchecks and balances. In such a situation, ex-ceptional efforts are needed to restore confi-dence in national leaders ability to managethe crisisthrough actions that signal a real

break with the past, and through locking inthese actions and showing that they will notbe reversed. To prevent the crisis recurring,concerted action will also be needed to ad-dress the underlying institutional and gover-nance weaknesses that precipitated itbutwithout a restoration of confidence amongboth national and international stakeholders,these reforms will not be possible.

Restoring confidence and transforming

institutions

The framework therefore argues that confi-dence-buildinga concept used in politicalmediation and financial crises but rarely indevelopment circles14is a prelude to morepermanent institutional change in the face ofviolence. Why apply this to the challenges offragility and violence? Because the low trustcaused by repeated cycles of violence meansthat stakeholders who need to contribute po-

litical, financial, or technical support will not


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Paul Collier in Breaking the Conict Trap and The Bottom Billion, and Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry

Weingast in Violence and Social Orders have been among the most inuential theorists of the links among

conict, violence, and development.

North, Wallis, and Weingast describe three doorstep conditions for fragile countries to move towardlong-term institutional violence prevention:

-

ments to bind successor leaders

Their framework provides a perceptive analysis of national development dynamics but does not

explicitly address international stresses on states, international assistance, or the inuence of international

norms and standards.

Colliers work, by contrast, focuses less on domestic political dynamics and more on low income, cor-

ruption, and natural resource rents. He explicitly considers external security guarantees and international

standards for resource extraction.

This Report brings together these strands of thinking and adds analysis that both supports earlier

hypotheses and provides new questions for further research. It uses quantitative techniques to conrm

that institutions matter for violence prevention. It brings this together with other work from economics,

political, and social science on how institutional transformations take place. And it adds some concepts

and examples from country case studies and regional and country consultations to esh out understand-

ing of these transitions.

Chapter 2 provided empirical analysis of the importance of institutions for long-term violence preven-

tion. It supports the theories of economists and political scientists who have focused on institutions, such

as Collier; Fearon and Laitin; and North, Wallis, and Weingast. Interestingly, it provides some initial evi-

dence not only that very highly developed countries dened by North and colleagues as open access

ordershave lower rates of violence, but also that institutions and good governance outcomes matter at

much lower levels of development. Institutions matter for preventing criminal violence and organized

crime as well as for preventing political conict.

This chapter focuses on practical lessons that can be applied in extreme conditions of insecurity and

weak institutions. It expands on existing work in three ways: Why institutional reforms are so dicult. The chapter draws upon scholars such as Acemoglu and

Robinson, Fearon, and Laitin; Keefer, Weingast and others who have studied early transition periods to

describe why the political economy of institutional reform in insecure environments is so dicult, and

why so many reform eorts therefore fail.

What it takes to make institutional reforms happen. The chapter uses country case studies and inputs

from national reformers to look at how countries in outright crises have restored condence, and how

countries with ongoing insecurity and weak legitimacy, capacity, and accountability have transformed

their institutions in the longer term. This work builds on North and colleagues analysis of the pathways

to move to broader institutional transformation, prevent violence from recurring, and lay the basis for

longer-term developmentbut it focuses on earlier periods of transition in very insecure environ-

ments. In so doing, it moves beyond most existing theories by explicitly considering how external

stresses and external assistance can aect these processes.

Understanding that transformations take time and adopting appropriate institutional models iscritical. The chapter adds empirical measures of how long these transformations take, even for the

countries that made the fastest transitions in the late 20th century, and considers what can accelerate

them. It also adds an important qualier to institutions matter for violence prevention by arguing that

this does not mean convergence toward Western institutional models. Societies that prevent violence

from recurring have designed solutions based on their own history and contextand have created or

adapted rather than simply copied institutions from other countries.

The rest of this chapter elaborates the arguments in each of these areas. Chapters 49 then show how

countries can restore condence and transform institutionsand how international support can help

them do so.

Sources: Collier and others 2003; Collier 2007; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Weingast 1997; Fearon and Laitin

2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Keefer 2008.

BOX 3.4 The WDR framework and theories of violence prevention


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form efforts, there is a tendency to tackleeverything at once, and immediately. Weexplore early efforts that have proven suc-cessful in reforming institutions thatdirectly address the correlates of vio-

lencesecurity, justice, and economicstressesand which reform areas havegenerally been addressed more gradually.

Using and exiting best-fit reform ap-

proaches. The record of backlash againstchange described above argues that re-forms of institutions in fragile contextsneed to be adapted to the political contextrather than be technically perfect. We ex-plore the extent to which countries thathave become resilient to violence haveoften used unorthodox, best-fit reformapproaches that allow for flexibility andinnovationpublic support for employ-ment; non-electoral consultative mecha-nisms; combinations of state, privatesector, faith-based, traditional, and com-munity structures for service delivery, forexample (see box 3.5).

Marshaling external support and

resisting external stressesBuilding resilience to violence and fragilityis a nationally owned process, but externalsupport and incentives and external stressescan contribute to progress or to backsliding.Outsiders cannot restore confidence andtransform institutionsthese processes aredomestic and have to be nationally led. But tohelp countries restore normalcy and reduceregional and global instability, internationalactors can offer the following:

Providing effective external support and

incentives.Some countries have restoredconfidence and transformed institutionsusing only their own financial and tech-nical resources, but most have drawn ondiplomatic, security, and developmentassistance from outside. External actioncan help by building trust through exter-nal commitment mechanisms; deliveringquick results that reinforce government

stakeholders that a positive outcome ispossible due to credibility issues describedabove. Delivering early tangible results inareas that reflect the priorities of keystakeholder groups and the broader citi-

zenry is vital. We look at the mecha-nisms countries have used to deliver early,confidence-building results, includingresults that span the security, justice, andeconomic domains, and the use of com-bined state, community, private sector,and civil society capacities to deliver.

Confidence-building is not an end in itself.Institutional reforms to deliver security andcheck the power of those in government arenecessary to prevent a reversion to the vicious

cycle of narrow elite pacts and recurring vio-lence (chapter 2). For this to happen, person-alized leadership has to shift toward morepermanent, depersonalized institutional ca-pacity and accountability. Unless confidence-building signals and early results are linkedto the development of more legitimate, ac-countable, and capable institutions, coun-tries remain acutely vulnerable to violence.In chapter 5, we explore two mechanisms forsustained institutional transformation:

Devoting early attention to the reform of

institutions that provide citizen security,

justice, and jobs.The interlink between se-curity and development has been debatedunder the notion of human security, whichencompasses freedom from fear, freedomfrom want, and freedom to live in dignity.By putting the security and prosperity ofhuman beings at the center, human secu-rity addresses a wide range of threats, both

from poverty and from violence, and theirinteractions. While acknowledging the im-portance of human security and its em-phasis on placing people at the center offocus, this Report uses the term citizen se-curity more often to sharpen our focusmore on freedom from physical violenceand freedom from fear of violence. Thehope is to complement the discussion onthe aspect of freedom from fear in the hu-man security concept.16 In institutional re-


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one country does not simply push prob-

lems to neighboring countries.

Doing it againand again, and indifferent types of transition

Just as violence repeats, efforts to build con-

fidence and transform institutions typi-

cally follow a repeated spiral. Countries that

moved away from fragility and conflict oftendid so not through one decisive make or

break momentbut through many transi-

tion moments, as the spiral path in figure 3.1

illustrates. National leaders had to build con-

fidence in the state and to transform institu-

tions over time, as with the Republic of Ko-

reas transitions in the security, political, and

economic spheres, which included repeated

internal contests over the norms and gover-

legitimacy; supporting institutional trans-formation with flexible approaches thatrespect best-fit reform options; applyingrealistic timelines for institutional prog-ress; and providing incentives to rewardresponsible governance and to sanctionfailing leadership.

Diminishing external stresses on fragile

states. Reducing external stress includesaction to contain the adverse impact ofillegal trafficking, international corrup-tion, and money launderingand pro-tecting countries against economic shocks.Some of these challenges are beyond thecontrol of individual states. Analyzing thestrengths and weakness of regional andglobal initiatives can ensure that national

reform efforts are not overwhelmed bynew pressures and that successful action in

What do we mean by best-t reforms? Because of the risks of political backlash and premature overload-

ing described earlier, in conditions of imperfect security and weak institutions, best-practice technocratic

reform options may not work. Less orthodox approaches that are best-t in the context of imperfect secu-

rity, institutional capacity, and competitive markets can work betterbut may have second best implica-tions that need to be managed.17 Consider the following ve examples:

election, but insecurity still rages over most of the territory, many voters cannot get to the polls, and

polling and vote-counting cannot be monitored. Non-electoral representative mechanisms, where per-

ceived by citizens to provide genuine voice and accountability, can be used in the short term, but in

the medium term, they will require renewed legitimization.

an economy structurally underinvested in areas of its comparative advantage. In the short term, pub-

licly subsidized employment may be the best-t option, but in the longer term, an exit pathway to for-

mal employment in the private sector will be needed.

large generation and distribution facilities. Medium-size generators may cost more but may be the best-t option in the short term. In the longer term, the country may need to exit to a lower-cost solution.

army and a rebel army in place. In the short term, integrating these forces and paying their salary

costs may be the best-t option, but in the longer term, the force may need to be downsized and

professionalized.

-

tice system can process only 200 cases a year. A community-based process may be the best- t option,

but the formal justice system will still need to be built, with redress for families inadequately dealt with

in the initial process.

Source: WDR team.

BOX 3.5 Best-fit reforms


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Do not expect too much, too soon

The passage of time permits the developmentof an institutions identity and the shared val-ues that support it. And repeated successes in

delivery by an institution both reinforce in-ternal morale and build credibility in the eyesof the public. To make reasoned judgmentsabout time frames, it is important to havehistorical reference points. One approach isto ask how long it took todays high- ormiddle-income societies to achieve currentinstitutional attainment levels. A comparisonbetween the most and the least developedsocieties is unhelpful: in 1700, for example,the Netherlands already had a real per capita

GDP higherthan that of the poorest 45 coun-tries today.22 A more useful approach is tocompare current rates of institutional devel-opment among todays fragile states againstrates of more recent transformers.

Historically, the fastest transformationshave taken a generation. Well-known institu-tional indices are relevant to reducing therisk of violencethe rule of law, corruption,human rights, democratic governance, bu-reaucratic quality, oversight of the security

sectors, and equity for the disadvantaged.23How much time has it taken to move fromcurrent average levels in fragile states aroundthe world to a threshold of good enoughgovernance? The results are striking. It tookthe 20 fastest-moving countries an average of17 years to get the military out of politics, 20years to achieve functioning bureaucraticquality, and 27 years to bring corruption un-der reasonable control (box 3.6). This didnot mean perfection, but rather adequacy.

Nor should these targets be considered easybenchmarks for most of todays fragile andviolence-affected countries, since the fast-est transformers described above often hadmore favorable starting conditions than to-days fragile states. Portugal and the Republicof Korea are among the fastest institutionaltransformers of the 20th century, but bothstarted their transformations with a founda-tion of extensive state institutional experi-ence, and with literacy rates far higher than

nance of postwar society.18 A repeated pro-cess enables space for collaborative normsand capacities to develop, and for successto build on successes in a virtuous cycle.For each loop of the spiral the same two

phases recur: building confidence that posi-tive chance is possible, prior to deepening theinstitutional transformation and strengthen-ing governance outcomes.

Transitions out of fragility and repeatedcycles of violence occur through preventiveactions as well as post-conflict recovery.TheSouth African transition was not a classicpostcivil war transition: while low-level civiland political violence existed, leaders tookpreventive action before the country suc-

cumbed to outright civil war (feature 3). Thisis not unusual: two-thirds of the societiesexiting fragility in the last 20 years did so with-out a major civil war.19 Some opportunitiesarose when incumbent leaders recognized theneed for change and created the conditions tomake change happenas in Ghana in 2003,where a potential conflict over successionrights between two clans in the north wasavoided.20 Other opportunities arose frommass protests or social action, as in Benin in

1990, where a popular movement precipitateda national conference that led to a new consti-tution, multiparty elections, and the end of 17years of autocratic rule.21 Multiple transi-tions have also been the general pattern inmiddle-income countries emerging from au-thoritarian rule, such as Argentina and Chile.

Even the worst natural disasters can pro-vide opportunities for transitions from con-flict and fragility: although movements tonegotiate a settlement between the Indone-

sian government and the Free Aceh Move-ment (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) began justbefore the devastating 2004 Indian Oceantsunami, the resulting humanitarian crisisand massive reconstruction effort createdcommon ground, as both sides turned tohelping survivors and rebuilding Aceh. Whilecountries can remain in a vicious cycle of se-vere violence for long periods, there are manyopportunities for key participants to recog-nize that change is in their self-interest.


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regional norms are dealt with in more de-tail in chapter 6.25

-ing demands for good governance. Peopletoday have much easier access to infor-mation on what others think (includingothers across the world), and this makesit far harder for governments to ignorethe interests of their broad masses.26 Vid-eos of events at the end of the Soviet erashowed citizen movements from Nepal toRomania what could be achieved throughmass protest, while recent revolutions27

have exploited the newer personal com-munication technologies, such as the so-called Twitter revolution in Moldova, andthe role of social media in the MiddleEast and North Africa.28 States do some-times reject citizen demands, but theprice they pay today tends to be higher,measured in repression, economic stag-nation, and international isolation. Thespread of new technologies reinforcesthe circulation of international principles

those in, say, the Democratic Republic ofCongo or Haiti today.24

The track record of institutional transfor-mations indicates that they have been gettingfaster over time: modern transformationscan be contrasted with the 100+ years com-mon in previous centuries. Three interna-tional trends may plausibly support a virtu-ous spiral for faster transformations:

from each other or the global system.Modern states are part of an internationalsystem that confers certain benefits and

requires specific behaviors. Today thesebehaviors include helping to maintain in-terstate security (by not threatening otherstates, for example, and by observingrules of warfare), upholding interna-tional law, and abiding by treaty obliga-tionsand behaving at home in waysconsistent with international norms (byprotecting human rights and eschewingcorruption or unconstitutional changesin government, for instance). Global and

The table shows the historical range of timings that the fastest reformers in the 20th century took to achieve basic

governance transformations.

Scenarios for dimensions of state capability

BOX 3.6 Fastest progress in institutional transformationAn estimate of realistic ranges

IndicatorYears to threshold at pace of:

Fastest 20 Fastest over the threshold

Bureaucratic quality (04) 20 12

Corruption (06) 27 14

Military in politics (06) 17 10

Government eectiveness 36 13

Control of corruption 27 16

Rule of law 41 17

Source: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010.

Note: Calculations are based on International Country Risk Guide indicators that ranked countries on a 04 scale over the period

19852009. The column fastest 20 shows the average number of years the fastest 20 performers have taken to reach the threshold,

and the second column shows the time it took the fastest ever country to achieve a threshold indicator score.


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macy. In the Democratic Republic ofCongo, transitional payments were madeto over 100,000 ex-combatants via cellphone since 2004, and citizen surveys havebeen conducted using SMS (short message

service).31 Such services would have beencostly and inefficient across a vast territorywith little infrastructure before the adventof technological change.

Wishful thinking on timing pervades de-velopment assistance when it comes to gov-ernance and institution building. In part itderives from the desire to meet internationalnorms quickly, which is understandable: hu-man rights abuses and gross corruption areabhorrent. But goals are then set that requirestate capability, sometimes without consider-ing whether the capability exists, and some-times under the presumption that it can becreated quickly (given resources and politi-cal will). This is mistaken. Even the Republicof Korea, which had the resources and politi-cal will (and a higher level of human capitalthan many fragile states today), took a gen-eration to make these changes.32 No countrytoday is likely to be able to make it in three tofive years, the typical timeline of nationalleadership and the international community(box 3.7).

Adapt to different contexts

The process necessary to restore confidenceand transform institutions are similar incountries that have different combinationsof stresses and institutional characteristics;between low- and middle-income countries,

and even high-income countries facing sub-national violence; and between countriesfacing violence of purely criminal originsand those facing political and civil conflict.While the dynamics of change may be simi-lar, the framework must be applied differen-tially, depending on the specific features ofthe case in question.

In some countries, stresses from interna-tional trafficking in natural resources or infil-tration of armed groups from abroad are im-

portant, while in others, trafficking of drugs

and the benchmarking of governmentperformance by citizens and civil societyorganizations. This, and the organiza-tional capabilities embodied in new tech-nology, has a huge impact on peoples

ability to put pressure on their state in-stitutions (as in the Islamic Republic ofIran in 2009).29 But the expansion ofcommunications channels can cut eitherway. For example, in early 2008 in Kenya,following the contested December 2007elections, mobile phones played a dualrole of encouraging violence and pre-venting its spread.30

-bilities for improving service delivery, evenin the most fragile situations. Technolo-gies that enable communication betweencitizen groups within and across countriescan help governments accelerate the typeof institutional transformation that im-proves performance and process legiti-

Haiti at the end of 2009 had made considerable advances in restoring security

and better governance in the wake of the 2004 crisis following the removal ofPresident Jean-BertrandAristide. Security had been restored in urban areas.

Trust in government institutions, including the police, had risen. Basic public

nance functions were functioning. And considerable humanitarian and com-

munity services and small reconstruction projects had been launched.

Before the earthquake struck Haiti in 2010, the government was in discus-

sions with various parts of the international communitydiplomatic, peace-

keeping, and developmenton pressing institutional transformations. These

included fundamental economic restructuring needed to create jobs in agricul-

ture and textiles; the appointment of personnel in both the Supreme Court and

the lower courts to restore better basic functioning to the justice sector; consti-

tutional changes to, among other things, reduce the frequency of elections;

increased decentralization in the administration; rapid expansion of the police

force; anti-corruption measures to avoid diversions of aid funds; revenue reform

to increase the tax base; and action against drug trackers to address shifts in

transit patterns into the Caribbean. All these actions were to take place over 18

months when Haiti also had two elections scheduled.

The tragedy that overtook the country in January 2010 makes it impossible

to know whether these reforms would have been completed. The link between

violence and institutions, and of historical state-building experiences elsewhere,

does show that these changes would make Haitian society more resilient to

renewed violencebut that no country has ever successfully completed this

level of change in 18 months.

Sources: WDR consultation with government ocials, United Nations and donor

representatives, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community-based

organization representatives in Haiti, 2010.

BOX 3.7 Optimism or wishful thinking?


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tory of recent deterioration may mean that

upcoming transition moments present anopportunity to reverse deterioration in the

situation, but may not yet present a real op-portunity to deliver decisive improvements.

The types of transition moment that offer anopportunity for change of course vary enor-

mouslyfrom elections to external crises tonew government reform plans to anniversa-

ries that are important in the countrys na-

tional psyche.Thus, differentiated application of the

framework is essential. In applying the

framework, the choice of different types ofinclusive-enough coalitions and priori-

ties for early results, the sequencing of in-stitutional transformation efforts, and the

development of politically innovative insti-tutions all depend on country-specific cir-

cumstances. Equally, external support andincentives and international actions to ad-

dress external stresses need to be designedto fit the specifics of each country situation.

Throughout this Report, a differentiated po-litical economy framework is used to ask the

following questions:

increase the risks of violence occurring orreoccurring? Areas to explore include the

infiltration of external armed groups andtrafficking networks; potential corruption

pressures from natural resources or other

may be the principal external stress. Internalstresses stemming from actual or perceivedinequalities between groups may take theform of urban-rural divides in some coun-tries, ethnic or geographical in others, or reli-gious in still others. Economic shocks or highunemployment may be important in somecountries but not in others.

Institutional challenges in dealing withthese stresses also vary (box 3.8). Some coun-

tries have to deal with weak capacity in bothstate and civil society institutions, combinedwith weak accountability; others may possessreasonably strong capacity and resources, butface challenges in state legitimacy because thestate is perceived to lack accountability in po-litical representation, in its management ofpublic resources, or in its respect for humanrightsor is perceived to represent the inter-ests of only one section of the population, tothe exclusion of others. In some countries,

the challenge is national: all areas of thecountry are affected. In others, it is containedbut still significant: subnational areas exhibitcharacteristics of fragility, with risks of actualor potential violence.

Stresses and institutional characteristicsalso change over time, with new stresses aris-ing and new capabilities being developed.In addition, the trajectory of change is im-portant.In some countries, events may pro-vide an opportunity for major political,

social, and economic change. In others, a his-

BOX 3.8 Spectrum of situation-specific challenges andopportunities

Types of violence: Civil, criminal, cross-border, subnational, ideological, or any combination

of these

Transition opportunity: Gradual/limited to

immediate/major space for change

Key stakeholders: Internal vs. external

stakeholders; state vs. nonstate stakeholders;

low-income vs. middle-high-income

stakeholders

Key stresses: Internal vs. external stresses;

economic vs. political stresses; high vs. low

level of divisions among groups

Institutional challenges: Low capacity

constraints vs. high capacity; low

accountability vs. high accountability;

exclusion vs. inclusion

Source: WDR team.


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* * *

Institutions matter, doubly so for coun-tries affected by violence. It is well knownin the economic literature that institutionsmatter for economic development.33 Theemerging econometric evidence suggeststhat countries are doubly affected by veryweak institutionsbecause the lack of in-stitutions slows development, but also be-cause weak institutions make them morevulnerable to violence, which, itself, reversesdevelopment. They find themselves in atrap: the institutional reforms they need toexit the vicious cycle of violence and tem-porary elite pacts are difficult to achieve,precisely because the threat of violenceremains very real.34 As a result, the virtuousspiral of restoring confidence and trans-forming institutions cannot expandsincecredibility is missing where violence (in-cluding the legacy of violence or the threatof violence) is present, leaders must first en-gage in confidence-building through inclu-sive enough pacts and early results for theircommitments to be credible.

Only after actors have built trust and es-tablished their commitment to peaceful de-velopment through confidence-building canthey then credibly undertake the institutionalreforms necessary to escape the vicious cycle.The repeated expansion of the WDR frame-work spiral is important because transfor-mation takes time. Leaders, stakeholders, andthe international community must remem-ber that societies will go through multiplecycles of confidence-building and institu-tional reform before they can achieve the re-silience to violence necessary for develop-

ment as usual.

forms of trafficking; political, social, oreconomic inequalities and tensions be-tween groups; high or rising unemploy-ment and income shocks; and stresses thatarise in terms of ex-combatant or gang-

member activity and circulation of arms.

-amount: capacity, including in differentstate and nonstate institutions; account-ability, including for different aspectspolitical representation, corruption, re-spect for human rights; inclusion ofdifferent groups, ethnic, religious, class,geographical? What risks do these institu-tional characteristics present for nationalactors and international actors?

building confidence and transforming in-stitutions, and what signals, commitmentmechanisms, and results are most impor-tant to these groups? This may includedifferent groupings among political ac-tors, security force leadership, excludedcitizens, business, labor, faith-based in-stitutions, or other influential civil soci-ety groups, and external actors such as

neighboring governments, donors, andinvestors.

coming up, and what opportunities dothey present? This needs to include notonly a creative assessment of opportuni-ties for change, but also a realistic assess-ment of what these opportunities can andcannot achievefor example, some up-coming transition moments may offer anopportunity to reverse deteriorations, butnot yet consolidate all the dimensions ofchange needed for long-term resilience toviolence.


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FEATURE 3 Restoring security in Colombia

Colombia, a middle-income country, has experienced peacefor only 47 of its first 200 years of independence. Until theturn of the 21st century, large parts of the territory weremarked by the absence of state institutions, and a long se-

quence of amnesties and negotiations with armed groupsmerely recycled, but did not resolve, incentives for violence.

Over the past two decades, a number of new initiatives weretaken to restore confidence and security. These have been ledby both local and national governments and have had a sig-nificant impact in recent years.

DESEPAZan acronym for Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz,or development, security, and peacestarted in Cali in 1992,based on epidemiological studies of the violence that afflictedthe city (murder rates had climbed from 23 per 100,000 inhab-itants to 93 from 1983 to 1992). Contributing to significant

reductions in violence, its programs included mulitsectoralcoordination of arms control, policing and justice, education,housing, and recreation activities.

With homicide rates very high, Bogot, like Cali, imple-mented a multisectoral approach in the 1990s that includedcooperation between community police and local residents,and initiatives to stimulate the local economy. These and otherinterventions reduced homicide rates in Bogot from 80 per100,000 people to 28 between 1993 and 2004, and increasedarrest rates by a factor of four.

More recently, Medelln also experienced a dramatic reduc-

tion in levels of criminal violence. As a city directly affected byrebel groups and the violence of the drug cartels, Medelln be-came in 1991 the most violent city in the world, with a homi-cide rate of 381 per 100,000. The impact of national and localsecurity policies combined with social development strategieshelped reduce this to 29 per 100,000 people in 2007.

Serious efforts to negotiate with rebel groups began in the1990s and included the creation in 1998 of a neutral zone un-der the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-bia (FARC). The failure of these efforts was blamed by manyon the FARC, and this helped build popular support for a shift

in strategy that branded the FARC as a criminal group. Begin-

ning in 2002, the new administration decided not to continuewith the previous governments four-year negotiation with theFARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). It focused in-stead on consolidating state control throughout Colombia,

protecting the population and fighting the illicit drug tradeaims subsequently formalized in the governments democraticsecurity policy. Based on an integrated approach to restoringconfidence through security, private-sector job creation, andsocial cohesion, the new policy aimed at institucionalidad, orbuilding and transforming institutions.

From 2002 to 2008, this approach had considerable success:the armed forces were expanded from about 300,000 in 2002 tomore than 400,000 in 2007,35 and state presence throughout thecountry reduced violence, particularly in rural areas. Nationalhomicide rates were halved, from 70 per 100,000 people to 36, 36

households forcefully displaced fell by 60 percent, and kidnap-pings fell by 83 percent.37 To increase the transparent function-ing of government, Colombia improved on measures of cor-ruption (from 0.44 to 0.24), the rule of law (from 0.92 to0.50), government effectiveness (from 0.40 to 0.13), and ac-countability (from 0.50 to 0.26).38 The reduction in violencehelped sustain rapid economic growthat an average of 4.9percent a year between 2002 and 2008, almost three times therate in the previous seven years.39 These impressive securityachievements did not come without costs, however: more than300,000 people were newly displaced in 2008. Crime and inse-

curity have also begun to rise again in some urban areas, such asMedelln (an increase in the homicide rate from 33.8 to 94.5 per100,000 in 200709),40 as new forms of organized crime haveemerged. Nor has the FARC insurgency been decisively ended.

Several key lessons follow:

building broad national support for security goals whenceasing negotiations with the FARC. After an in-depth dia-logue with business groups, a wealth tax paid by the coun-trys richest taxpayers was introduced in 2002, earmarked

for the security effort. Social network campaigns were

Types of violence: Tracking, criminal and gang violence, civil conict

Transition opportunity: Preventive action in the face of rising

criminality and failed peace talks

Key stakeholders: Government, armed groups, citizens, civil society,

regional, international partners, criminal networks

Key stresses: Legacies of violence, presence of international tracking

and criminal networks, social and economic inequity

Institutional challenges: Absence in parts of the country of state

institutions; legacy of capacity, inclusion, and accountability challenges


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REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

B OX 3. 9 Lessons of the South African transition: Restoring confidence and transforming

institutions Jay Naidoo, Chairman of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; Former General Secretary, Congress of

South African Trade Unions; Minister of Reconstruction and Development, South Africa; and FormerChairman of the Development Bank of Southern Africa; WDR Advisory Council Member

Based on discussions with Mac Maharaj, Sydney Mufamadi, Roelf

Meyer, Leon Wessels, Fanie van der Merwe, and Jayendra Naidoo.

In May 2010, as part of the World Development Report 2011 pro-

cess, I was part of a discussion with key negotiators from the

ANC Alliance and National Party in which we reected on the

lessons that could be learnt from the political transition to de-

mocracy in 1994. We were all agreed that a prerequisite for

successful political transitions had to be strong national own-

ership and that the peace process underpinning it had to be

embedded at a local level and deliver a peace dividend that

benetted local communities. The following points are what I

extracted from South Africas experiences:

There were multiple transition points which required ef-

forts from the protagonists to shift the debate, rather than

only one moment of transition in 1994. These included citi-

zen protests and strikes; legalization of unionism for black

workers; the start of undercover contacts in the late 1980s; the

release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and

political parties in February 1990; the National Peace Accord in

1991; CODESA in 1992; the Transitional Executive Council and

associated bodies in 199394; the Reconstruction and Devel-opment Program in 199394; the Growth, Employment and

Redistribution Program in 1996; and the local government

democratic transition which only culminated in 2000.

Restoring confidence

South Africas transition steps in the early 1990s were preceded

by a much longer period of change in mentality, or paradigm

shift, amongst the protagonists that gave credibility to the

process:

broader, more inclusive approach, and the realization of

the need to ensure incentives for the National Party and

the white population.

thinking in terms of group rights and protection of minori-

ties to thinking in terms of individual rights and majority

rule.

-

bly the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the

suspension of the ANCs armed struggle) were critical in

maintaining trust between parties.

bogged down by narrow interests in their own constituen-

cies, in particular in periods of devastating crisis such as the

political assassination of Chris Hani.

After the 1994 elections, delivering a few early resultsin-

cluding maternal and infant healthcare and using community

structures to improve water supplywere important to main-

tain condence in our new government.

Transforming institutions

Unorthodox, locally adapted reforms. Participants agreed that

much of the global communication on South Africas transition

has been on the specic organizational form of the institutions

used (for example, Truth and Reconciliation Committees, na-

tional peace committees); and that in fact it may be more useful

to consider the underlying principles and approaches (including

those described above), on the basis that each country needs to

design their own institutional forms if they are to have full own-

ership of political processes.

Challenges in prioritizing and sequencing. In addition to some

of the key principles emerging from South Africas successful

transition, participants reected on mistakes made or opportu-

nities missed which may be of use when other countries con-

sider these experiences. Four elements were highlighted as par-

ticularly important:

preparation for delivery through the civil service. Problems

which later emerged as a result include lack of preparation in

setting up the provinces and dening local government de-

livery responsibilities. We should have anticipated the capac-

ity constraints as we increased the number of provinces and

set up new institutions.

-

inal violence meant that we did not fully address the critical

need to ensure that the new generation who had not lived

through the apartheid struggle as adults were provided with

a strong stakeand economic opportunitiesin the new

democratic state.

-

nance of social consensus to manage the mismatch between

the aspirational goals of the Reconstruction and Develop-

ment Program, the macro and scal framework to pay for

them, and the institutional capacity to implement them.

culmination of a process of democratization and reconcilia-

tion. Relatively little attention was given to what was meant

by the transformation to a constitutional state; the contin-

ued role of civil society in deepening not just democratiza-

tion and accountability, but also delivery; and there was a

need for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on rac-

ism, inequality, and social exclusion.


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Notes

1. According to Margaret Levi, Trust is, in fact, a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enableindividuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways thatseem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest. Furthermore, Levi notes that At issue is a co-operative venture, which implies that the truster possesses a reasonable belief that well-placed trustwill yield positive returns and is willing to act upon that belief (Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 78).

2. Similar problems arise in the transition from communism to a rule-of-law state. The thought pro-cess might be as follows: If I build value in a new firm rather than stripping the assets of the state, Iwill gain only if rule of law is established. That will happen only if others demand rule of law, too. Ifothers dont believe rule of law will be established, they will prefer to strip assets rather than buildvalue, so they will be unlikely to demand rule of law, and in that case, Id be crazy to build value in anew firm. Thus, even though most people would be better off building value under rule of law thanstripping assets in a lawless state, given my expectations of political development, Im better off strip-ping assets.

3. A 30 percent increase in people who believe that growth will improve in the next 12 months is associ-ated with a 1 percent increase in actual growth rates in the subsequent year, significant at the 5 per-cent level.

4. A few societies have very strong state capacity, but score low on governance indicators because theyare highly exclusionarySouth Africa under apartheid is an example. These countries will have lessdifficulty in implementing promises because their military and civilian organizations are capable.But it is possible that, even in these cases, institutional weaknesses in shared values and cohesionmake it difficult to deliver on change. Indeed, in South Africa change has not been a simple process.

5. Collier, Hoeffler, and Sderbom 2008; Fearon 2010a; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006.6. Goldstone 2010.7. de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005.8. Rich 2010.9. Economic theory helps us understand the consequences of a perception of impunity that increases

willingness to use violent means.Chapter 2 referred to the way in which insecurity dynamics produceprisoners dilemmas, where lack of trust between two actors undermines their ability to cooperateto produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Economic theory shows that if the actors in question be-lieve they will encounter the same dilemma again in the future, their calculation may differtheymight recognize that taking a risk by trusting their counterpart in the present can produce importantpayoffs in the future. So-called iterated prisoners dilemmas make cooperation possible, though notguaranteed. If a society is confronted by a situation where many actors believe that others withinsociety may use violence to resist change, their willingness to bet on future cooperation is dimin-ished. Where insecurity is not an immediate issue, betting on future payoffs makes sense; where thefuture is highly uncertain, logic dictates placing an excessive premium on protecting existing privi-leges and resources, not risking them for collective gains. See Axelrod 1984.

10. See Keefer, Neumayer, and Plmper 2010.11. See UN Security Council 2010a, WDR consultation with government officials, UN donor represen-

tatives, local nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organizations in Haiti, 2010.12. An alternative perspective to the intertwined relationship between institutions and violence can be

found in Cramer 2006.13. The WDR defines citizen security as both freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear

of violence. Applied to the lives of allmembers of a society (whether nationals of the country orotherwise), it encompasses security at home; in the workplace; and in political, social, and economicinteractions with the state and other members of society. Similar to human security, citizen securityplaces people at the center of efforts to prevent and recover from violence. Also see Frhling, Tulchin,and Golding 2003.

14. Confidence-building in mediation means building trust between adversaries; in financial crises, trustin markets means that governments are adopting sound policies and will be capable of implementingthem. The WDR defines the term as building trust between groups of citizens who have been dividedby violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key stakeholders (neigh-bors, international partners, investors) whose political, behavioral, or financial support is needed todeliver a positive outcome.

15. These incentives are not always enough. Chapter 4 discusses cases where leaders are unwilling torecognize an impending crisis or take action, and the approaches used to resolve these situations.

16. Building on the Commission on Human Security 2003 report, the importance of human security has


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been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005b resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit,the UN General Assembly 2009b report, and UN General Assembly 2010 Resolution, as well as inother fora, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum.

17. Throughout this report, the term best-fit describes solutions that are fitted to context of the societyat the moment and may not be the first best solutions by other metrics. Thus, these solutions invokethe concept of the second best as used in economic theoryreforms may only be optimal once all

distortions and considerations are taken into account.In this way, best-fit solutions may be optimalgiven all of the economic, political, physical, and institutional constraints and conditions.

18. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Chang and Lee 2006.19. Based on historic CPIA scores, 40 countries would have been classified as fragile for five or more

years between 1977 and 1989. Box 2.10 showed that 17 of these countries remained fragile until 2009and that 16 of those experienced minor or major civil war. Of the 23 that escaped fragility, 15 hadno war, 4 had minor civil war and 4 had major civil war between 1990 and 2009. WDR team calcula-tion. Also see Mata and Ziaja 2009.

20. Odendaal 2010; Ojielo 2007; UNDPA 2010a.21. Encyclopedia of the Nations 2010.22. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010.23. The indices are the Quality of Government Institutes quality of government indicator (derived

from International Country Risk Guide data; the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi indicator of gov-

ernment effectiveness; the Failed State Indexs progressive deterioration of public services indica-tor, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Indexs resource efficiency indicator). See Pritchett andde Weijer 2010.

24. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010.25. Global and regional norms play an essential part in preventing violence by constraining leadership

abuses of power, and in supporting local institutional transformations by helping maintain a focus ongoals and functions rather than particular institutional forms. These norms can take the form of formalinternational agreements and can also manifest as social movements, such as the Otpor movement.

26. For example, while both Myanmar and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea haveto varyingdegrees of successused communication and travel bans to limit access to information and main-tain control domestically, their ability to restrict information has declined dramatically in recentyears, as Internet access in Myanmar, and satellite television in both countries, convey images of theworld outside. See Horsey and Win Myint 2010.

27. Color revolutions refer to a series of spontaneous movements that arose in succession in severalformer Soviet republics and one Balkan state during the early 2000s. These were mainly nonviolentprotests advocating for democracy against governments seen as corrupt and/or authoritarian. Start-ing as small spontaneous actions, they evolved within days or weeks into mass movements that top-pled governments and instituted new democratic regimes. Each movement adopted a specific coloror flower as its symbol, and at the center of these movements were nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and particularly student activists. These movements were successful in Serbia (2000), Geor-gia (Rose Revolution 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution 2004), and the Kyrgyz Republic (TulipRevolution 2005). See Kuzio 2006; DAnieri 2006; Michalcik and Riggs 2007.

28. See Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009.29. See, for example, Afshari and Underwood 2009.30. Goldstein and Rotich 2008.31. MDRP 2006.32. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Chang and Lee 2006.33. North 1989, 1995; Rodrik 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005.34. There is an important difference between what this report argues and the conflict trap described by

Collier and others 2003. In a conflict trap, low incomes lead to conflict, and conflict leads to lowincomes, creating a low-level equilibrium.The WDR focuses on the institutional deficit: the institu-tions that enable the peaceful resolution of contests are missing from fragile environments. Withactors lacking the means to make credible commitments to reform, societies are unable to break freefrom the threat of violence. A low-level equilibrium of dysfunctional institutions and recurrent vio-lence is thereby created.

35. See Arboleda 2010.36. WDRteam calculations.37. See Arboleda 2010.38. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a.39 WDR l l i b d W ld B k 2010

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