Upload
nillethvillasantapontino
View
215
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
1/11
CASE ANALYSIS: FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
NUCLEAR DISASTER
FINVEMA K31
Submitted by:
RED Group
Baluyot, Raccey
Galero, Sealtiel
Go, Robin
Nerona, Ingrid
Pontino, Nilleth
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
2/11
I. IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM
The Fukushima nuclear disaster is the largest nuclear incident since the
Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The Chernobyl incidents recoded massive contamination
poses concern on the effect to the society and natural environment of the recent
Fukushima disaster. Local and international communities are worried of the aftermath of
the latter incident. Moreover, it is debated whether the incident was manmade or
natural; and if it could have been prevented.
II. DATA
The plant is located in the seaside Fukushima prefecture and was specifically
planned in that layout so as to execute efficiency during its operations. Water is drawn
out more easily from the pumps directly situated in the sea, which could mean lower
costs. The 25-meter foundation of the facility was lowered down from its original 35-meter plan because the engineers and constructors believed that it would provide a
more stable bluff in the case of an earthquake. To add, the seawall would act as a
buffer from any tsunami that would follow in the event of an earthquake. Nonetheless,
the calculations in the plans have overlooked the possibilities of more dangerous
circumstances.
The Boiling Water nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi power plant were of
the Generation II-type, a fairly old design, considering the facility was constructed
around 1967 and officially commissioned in 1971. Boiling Water Reactors work by
generating heat from the constant fission controlled by control rods that are made up of
elements that neutralize the charges of uranium so as to prevent the atoms fromsplitting too quickly. Coolants also maintain the temperature of the reactors to prevent
overheating. Water is then turned into steam through the heat from the fission and is
pumped to the turbines where electric power is generated.
Testa (2014) explains that Generation II reactors have active safety techniques
which rely heavily on electrical, mechanical, and human operation and this has caused
many criticisms in the design since there is the imminent danger in human involvement.
Compared to the newer types since Generation III, these reactors are more passive in
nature when it comes to safety techniques thus there is minimal to no human action.
Also, they are not standardized in terms of operation and tend to differ from plant to
plant. This evident Generation II characteristic of is found in the nuclear reactors in the
facility since their manufacturers were three different companies forming a joint venture
in the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant project, namely: General Electric (Units 1, 2, and
6), Toshiba (Units 3 and 5), and Hitachi (Unit 4) as Dedman reported (2011). General
Electric provided the design and blueprint of the reactors. Given this, it is difficult for the
power plant to compare the reactors as they have different problems and solutions.
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
3/11
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission explains that there is a Mark I
containment system around the reactors, with the exception of Unit 6 which has a Mark
II-type, characterized by a sturdy sheet metal and concrete secondary containment
system. Mark I types are the oldest, having an inverted light bulb-shaped drywell
nuclear reactor containment with the wetwell, which contains the water, above.
Moreover, the safety vents and features of this kind of containment system require
electric power to operate. Thus, the Mark I has often been a subject of criticism for
safety failure during times of blackout (How Nuclear Reactors Work, 2013). In the
Fukushima Power Plant, the reactors with secondary containments were reported to be
too thin and were not able to withstand the hydrogen explosions, specifically Units 1 to
4, resulting in destroying nearby complementary structures and equipment. Units 5 and
6 were undamaged.
In terms of casualties, 18,500 deaths were reported from the earthquake and
tsunami while 1,600 out of 300,000 people died due to poor evacuation conditions.
However, there were no deaths during the hydrogen explosion from the power plant butthere is a high possibility of future deaths due to radiation-related cancers. According to
the Asahi Shimbun as of November 2013, the Fukushima Prefectural Government
prepared a report and revealed that there were 59 children diagnosed with thyroid
cancer. Nonetheless, the cause, whether due to radiation exposure or not, of the
cancers is still yet to be determined (Moresuspected and confirmed cases of thyroid
cancer diagnosed in Fukushima children, 2013). Updates on environmental problems
disclose on August 20, 2013 that 300 metric tons of radiation-contaminated water had
leaked from the facilitys storage tank.
Figure 1: The workings of a BWR reactor
A graphical representation of the processes involved in a boiling water reactor. Image retrieved from RIA
Novosti, http://en.ria.ru/
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
4/11
III. FACTS
On March 11, 2011, which was a Friday, an earthquake struck Honshu, Japan
with a magnitude of 9.0 at 2:46 pm. This will later be known as the Tohoku Earthquake.
It lasted for six minutes and caused a tsunami that devastated thousands of people. The
intensity of this earthquake came as a surprise because while scientists did predict that
there would be an earthquake, they expected it to have minor intensity. It was revealed
that it was caused by stress worth two hundred years between the Pacific Plate and the
Eurasian Plate.
Automatic shutdown happened to eleven nuclear reactors in the four nearby
Honshu power plants upon sensing the tremors. Reactors had to be continuously
cooled because residue from nuclear fission continues to decay and produce a large
amount of heat even when shut down. The electricity in the Fukushima Daiichi plant,
however, was cut due to the earthquake. The situation was held under control for a
while through the use of the emergency diesel generators. Unfortunately, the low-lyingrooms where the generators were located were flooded an hour later because of the 14-
meter tsunami which easily went over the ten-meter seawall of the facility. The plant
was then unable to supply enough power to keep the water pumps working and this
caused the reactors to overheat.
TEPCO declared a state of emergency. An announcement was given to the
communities within a three-kilometer radius from the plant to evacuate immediately.
People who lived within 10 kilometers from the plant were told to stay indoors.
The nuclear leak happened on March 12. The pressure within the Fukushima
Unit 1 reached dangerous levels of 840 kPa. The workers tried to lower the pressure
through ventilation. This proved insufficient for the unit still exploded. This blew off theroof and left four workers injured. With the roof gone, people began to panic. TEPCO
appeased them by explaining that the airtight steel structure was the true container for
the units. However, the evacuation radius kept getting bigger in case things turn for the
worse.
March 13 was when a partial meltdown happened in two of the reactors. Water
levels continued to drop within the units. Various water injections were used in order to
cool the reactors. The workers were able to restore a residual heat remover for Unit 1.
Unit 3 was safely shut down and cold. They were currently in the process of fixing Unit 2
and 4. On March 14, the units 1, 2, and 3 were finally given a cold shutdown. Unit 4 had
still not yet achieved this yet. Unit 4 caught on fire on March 15. As a result, radioactive
levels increased. Two hours later, the fire was extinguished. Wolchover (2011) recounts
that on the next day, things suddenly changed for the worse when Unit 3s pressure
level unexpectedly dropped. In order to remedy this situation, Japanese Defense
Minister Toshimi Kitazawa planned to drop water on Unit 3s spent fuel rods. Unit 5s
water level was also decreasing. Several workers had already been affected by
radiation exposure.
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
5/11
From March 17 to 29, a series of unfortunate events occurred. The workers
continued to fix the units. They switched seawater to fresh water in the pumps in order
to lessen corrosion and deposits. Radioactivity around the plant kept rising. Problems
concerning the power supply were also quite frequent. This all ultimately led to an
announcement in March 30. Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant was declared permanently
unusable. Workers still stayed in order to quarantine the leaking radioactive residue.
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis aims to offer a close examination on the given data and facts and
make an intelligent conclusion on the contribution of the information to reconstruct the
valid events that occurred before, during, and after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
disaster.
The advent of nuclear energy study has given scientists the opportunity to make
a change in the course of civilization. From building weapons of mass destruction to
providing a clean and sustainable energy alternative, The World Nuclear Association
recalls that this discovery in 1896 by the scientists Becquerel, Rutherford, Villard, Marie
and Pierre Curie has given double-edged sword to the human race (Outline History of
Nuclear Energy, 2010). While the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant was constructed
during the 1960s and even though the most disastrous nuclear power plant accident
being the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster happened at around 1986, there was enough
evidence of the negative after-effects of nuclear radiation exposure to humans from the
early official medical research after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings during the
Second World War (Radiation Effects on Humans, 2011). Rogers (2011) recounts thatthere were other nuclear reactor catastrophes of various International Nuclear Events
Scale (INES) levels ranging from 1 to 7 recorded as early as 1952 such as the Chalk
River in Canada (1952, first recorded, recorded as a level 5), the Kyshtym in Russia
(1957, recorded as a level 6), the Three Mile Island in the United States (1979, recorded
as a level 5), Saint Laurent des Eaux in France (1980, recorded as a level 4) and many
others. The dangers of not properly controlling nuclear energy were already apparent
before the Fukushima facility was constructed and therefore, more research and stricter
implementation on safety measures should have been a priority to the future developers
of nuclear power plants so as to prevent or at least minimize the probabilities of
accidents in case of human or mechanical error.There were questionable articles of information asymmetry among the
companies and institutions involved. Reactors have a typical lifespan of over forty years
and Unit 1, which was constructed in July 1967, would have been 44 years old in 2011.
There were initial plans by the Japanese regulators to have the said unit for a scheduled
shutdown around early 2011 but by February, there was a granted extension of ten
years for the continued operation of the reactor. TEPCO also admitted to falling short of
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
6/11
transparent reporting and falsification of records to the Japanese Nuclear Industrial
Safety Agency regarding the maintenance of the reactors, specifically obscuring the fact
that they had failed to inspect around 30 nuclear reactor components. Also, no action
was taken after a 2008 tsunami study warned the plant that there is a need to further
protect the structures from seawater flooding. Lastly, 20 years ago around 1991, there
was a risk of losing emergency power in the facility as told by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; this statement has been reiterated by the during a 2004 report
but again, no action was given out to mitigate the probability of the said occurrence.
Anzai, Ban, and Tokonami (2011) states that the geographical location of the
facility being in Japan, which is within the Pacific Ring of Fire, is prone to the regular
occurrence of earthquakes. More so, the plant is situated along the shore of the
Fukushima prefecture which is designed for efficiency and cost-cutting in gathering the
seawater necessary for the power-generation. Along with the compromised layout of the
low-lying structures housing the fragile equipment, the overall plan of the Fukushima
Daiichi Power Plant raised a red flag in the practical security standards.Japan follows certain Nuclear Power Plant Safety Standards wherein the facilities
are expected to utilize the defense-in-depth approach, summarized as Prevention,
Monitoring, and Action. The important aspects of this kind of approach takes into
account the design and construction of the power plant, obtaining fail-safe equipment,
regular and thorough reactor monitoring, and scrupulous damage control systems. The
given information all show evidence that the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant failed to
meet the required safety standards and TEPCO admitted to this mistake on October 12,
2012 (Fackler, 2012).
The premature safety systems of nuclear reactors, its containments, and the plan
of the structures in the facility are alarming proofs of playing with fire; trying to uncoverthe possible beneficial scientific mysteries while human lives and environmental status
are at stake. The continuing development in the sciences and technological
advancement, most especially in the field of perfectly harnessing nuclear power, has led
to its questionable feasibility of being a safe source of energy despite being a cheaper
and a more efficient alternative. Human and mechanical error, combined with the
hazard-prone tendencies of nuclear energy, can have after-effects that are catastrophic
in nature and degree. Moreover, although natural disasters can be predicted, the
accuracy is sometimes inexact. A problem arises whenever the time of the forecast
does not provide ample time for the necessary additional precautionary preparations.
V. ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION
It was evident that the Fukushima Daiichi Plant did not follow the basic safety
measures. It was also discovered that the reactors had different manufacturers. These
reactors could have had required different standards of maintenance and care which
may have been left unnoticed by the workers. The somewhat lax attitude of those in
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
7/11
charge of implementing the Japanese Nuclear Safety Standards indirectly had a hand in
the accident. Had they not overlooked the plan of cost-cutting then the problem could
have been prevented or at least lessened.
The rising fear from the imminent dangers of the destruction of human lives and
the environment in the hands of the underdeveloped and continuous study and research
in utilizing nuclear energy has strengthened the arguments in the side against such an
alternative source of power. With that said, some countries, such as Germany, have
already considered stopping the construction of future nuclear power plants to prevent
further disasters from happening, according to a report from The Economist (Gauging
the pressure, 2011).
Two years after the incident happened, Japans nuclear crisis seemed to have
gotten worse. On August 21, 2013, there was news from the nuclear regulator saying
that there have been fears that more tanks were leaking contaminated water. The
nuclear regulator also announced that TEPCO might not be able to have the capability
to handle the disaster. The severity of the crisis increased from a level 1 to a level 3,making the situation a serious incident based on the international scale for radiological
releases. This called out the attention of other countries since Japan have not increased
its scale since after the disaster occurred last 2011. Countries like China were shocked
to hear about Fukushima still leaking contaminated water after two years. It was stated
that the water from this leak would cause a person standing close to it for an hour to
receive five times the recommended limit for nuclear workers in a year.
On a lighter note, sellers of atomic reactors are still continuing to persuade
buyers by promising them that their company has learned the consequences from the
previous Fukushima disaster and that their latest technology has been renewed to be
safer than ever before. Barbara Judge, a nuclear expert appointed by TEPCO promisedthat after everything that has happened, TEPCO would continue to improve its safety
culture. Safety would be their top priority. This has also become the main priority of all
reactor developers. Many designs were reviewed after the Fukushima to prevent future
disasters.
Due to many additional safety requirements created by the regulators after the
Fukushima, many companies such as Frances Areva or Toshibas Westinghouse unit
have lost potential sales and have increased the cost of their new plants. Even the
International Energy Agency scaled back their nuclear capacity by around 50 gigawatts
due to policy changes. There were also many countries that stopped using nuclear
reactors after the incident and switched to other safer technologies like Arevas
renewable energy technology.
Although TEPCO is still trying to fix the disaster that happened back on 2011,
Japan decided to look into solar energy. On September 16, 2013, Japans Kyocera
Corp. released their newly built 70- megawatt Kagoshima Nanatsujima Mega Solar
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
8/11
Plant in its southwest region, which will produce enough energy for around 22,000
houses.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
As per the recommendations, it is but necessary to be specific. With steadfast
resolve, it is recommended that those who maintain the plant and who are directly
involved, especially those for future power plants, to be active and consistent in
checking and affirming the plants conformity with the rules and regulations of the
Nuclear Regulation Authority.
Referring to the 10 meter seawall against a 14 meter tsunami wave and the
failure of the emergency generators due to the flooding on the floors where the
emergency generators were placed, a higher seawall must be constructed. This is so
whilst taking into account the foreseeable susceptibility of Japan to earthquakes,
tsunamis and flooding and the statistics on the highest recorded or highest possibletsunamis. It is best to note that the highest recorded, and video-taped, tsunami was at
37.9 meters that hit the coast of Miyako, Iwate Prefecture, Japan as a result of the 2011
Tohoku earthquake. The possibility of a tsunami that high to hit a power plant is
extremely disastrous or worse.
Regarding the location of the power plant, it is most appropriate to research more
on the earthquake faults running near or directly under their facilities, to identify
whether such faults are active or not and to act on such findings. These could have
warned and prepared them more on the statistical possibilities of the recurring natural
disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons in the Pacific Rim. It is but
necessary to retain the location of the power plant at the coast for easier access to freshseawater. This is so because the plant utilizes fresh seawater for the plants coolants
that maintain the temperature and prevent the overheating of the fuel rods and the
reactors.
The evaluation of nuclear (power plant) safety standards is a cyclical process
that is improved and regenerated as disasters and events happen of which lessons are
learned from. Although these are just recently required, it is recommended that movable
pumps, water discharge systems, and waterproof doors, and the like, be provided and
installed as soon as possible. If the aforementioned, along with other newly specified
requirements, were identified before the disaster, these could have had largely
mitigated the impacts of the disaster and withstand natural events. The safety and
backup facilities of a nuclear power plant must always be consistent with the standards
and the changes that occur in the natural environment, especially now that there is
change in the climate and atmosphere.
It must be noted that the workers and employees involved in the Fukushima
power plant stayed inside the area to facilitate and shutdown the plant during and after
the disaster. Although their stay in that area is necessary, this could potentially have
8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
9/11
after-effects to their health and their environments, especially with the leakage of
radioactive material. It is highly recommended that a remote secondary control room
must be installed so that in emergency cases when the site cannot be reached, the
plant can be safely shut down without the need to personally go within the disaster-
stricken area. Again, the safety and backup system of the plant must be updated and
maintained so that leakages and explosions be avoided.
The entities involved in establishing the nuclear power plant should have taken
into account the possible dangers before investing in it. Although, nuclear energy serves
as a cheap and sustainable alternative for power, it is always important that positive and
negative factors should be taken into account before entering into a decision of
providing a nuclear energy source for a country. The after-effect of a nuclear meltdown
that can have a high economic cost on repairs, clean-up, lost of livelihood, and human
rehabilitation and evacuation can be traded off by investing highly on the safety
measures in nuclear facilities.
VII. REFERENCES
Anzai, K., Ban, N., Ozawa, T., & Tokonami, S. (2011). Fukushima daiichi nuclear power
plant accident: facts, environmental contamination, possible biological effects, and
countermeasures. Journal of Clinical Biochemistry and Nutrition, 50(2012), 2-8.
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246178/
Dedman, B. (2011, March 13). General Electric-designed reactors in Fukushima have
23 sisters in U.S. Retrieved from NBC News:
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-
designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-us
Fackler, M. (2012, October 12). Japan power company admits failings on plant
precautions. Retrieved from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/tepco-admits-failure-in-
acknowledging-risks-at-nuclear-plant.html?_r=1&
Jiji press. (2014, January 7). Safety screening sought for nuclear fuel plant.The Japan
news. Retrieved from http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000921892
McCurry, J. (2012, October 15). Fukushima disaster could have been avoided, nuclear
plant operator admits. Retrieved from The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/15/fukushima-disaster-avoided-
nuclear-plant
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246178/http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246178/http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000921892http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000921892http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000921892http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-ushttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246178/8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
10/11
Rogers, S. (2011, March 18). Nuclear power plant accidents: listed and ranked since
1952. Retrieved from The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-
accidents-list-rank
Testa, B. M. (2014). Comparison of gen 2 and gen 3 nuclear power plants: New nuclear
plant designs promise benefits. Retrieved from
http://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-
Compared.htm
Vincent, J. (2013, June 19). Japan finalises new nuclear safety regulations. The
independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-
finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.html
Wolchover, N. (2011, March 17). Timeline of Events at Japans Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant. Retrieved from LiveScience: http://www.livescience.com/13294-
timeline-events-japan-fukushima-nuclear-reactors.html
Boiling water reactor systems. (2013, December 6). Retrieved from the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-
ref/teachers/03.pdf
Fukushima disaster could have been avoided: TEPCO takes blame in strongest terms
ever. (2013, March 29). Retrieved from RT: http://rt.com/news/japan-nuclear-crisis-
blame-053/
Gauging the pressure. (2011, April 28). Retrieved from The Economist:
http://www.economist.com/node/18621367?story_id=18621367
How Nuclear Reactors Work. (2011). Retrieved from Nuclear Energy Institute:
http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/How-Nuclear-Reactors-Work
More suspected and confirmed cases of thyroid cancer diagnosed in Fukushima
children. (2013, November 13). Retrieved from The Asahi Shimbun:
https://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201311130066
Nuclear Power Plants. (2013, February 11). Retrieved from Ready:
http://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plants
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Compared.htmhttp://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Compared.htmhttp://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Compared.htmhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.htmlhttp://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plantshttp://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plantshttp://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plantshttp://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plantshttp://www.ready.gov/nuclear-power-plantshttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/japan-finalises-new-nuclear-safety-regulations-8665506.htmlhttp://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Compared.htmhttp://energy.about.com/od/nuclear/a/Gen-2-And-Gen-3-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Compared.htmhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rankhttp://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rank8/12/2019 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessment
11/11
Outline History of Nuclear Energy. (2010, June). Retrieved from The World Nuclear
Association: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-
Generation/Outline-History-of-Nuclear-Energy/
Radiation Effects on Humans.(2011, September 14). Retrieved from Oracle ThinkQuest
Education Foundation:
http://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.html
Safety of Nuclear Reactors. (2013, October). Retrieved from World Nuclear Association:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Safety-of-
Nuclear-Power-Reactors
What is Nuclear Energy. (2014). Retrieved from Westinghouse:
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Community/WhatIsNuclearEnergy.shtm
http://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.htmlhttp://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.htmlhttp://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.htmlhttp://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.htmlhttp://library.thinkquest.org/3471/radiation_effects_body.html