Fundamentalist colonialism - the geopolitics of Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Political Geography 22 (2003) 347–380www.politicalgeography.com

Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics ofIsraeli–Palestinian conflict

R. Reuveny∗

School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Suite 430, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405,USA

Abstract

In July 2000, it looked as if Israeli-Palestinian peace was just around the corner. Althoughthe Camp David Summit did not lead to a permanent agreement, talks continued. By the fallof 2002, the peace process had all but collapsed. The two sides clash violently and almostdaily. The premise of this paper is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. Given this premise,the paper addresses two questions. First, why did the Oslo peace process fail to resolve theconflict? Second, assuming a Palestinian state were to be formed, what would be the bestgeopolitical arrangement to secure a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace? This paper argues thatat its core, the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven by Israeli colonialism: since1967, Israel has built numerous settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and has, inpractice, annexed the land. At the forefront of this colonialist movement are settlers who aremembers of Israeli fundamentalist groups that believe in the vision of biblical Israel. Histori-cally, colonialism has remained intact as long as the native population accepted its presence.When this passivity was replaced by a quest for independence, colonialism collapsed. Somecolonial rulers left peacefully. Others put up a fight. Colonial conflicts ended only when thecolonial rulers gave up the colonies. To the extent that history can serve as a model, therecan be no resolution of the conflict until Israel withdraws from all the territories and evacuatesall its settlements, and a Palestinian state forms in all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If thePalestinian state takes the form of numerous discontinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeliland, the conflict likely will continue. 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Decolonization; Settlements; Oslo Process; Conflict resolution

∗ Tel.: 812-855-4944; fax: 812-855-7802.E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Reuveny).

0962-6298/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00114-2

348 R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347–380

Introduction

In July 2000, it looked as if Israeli-Palestinian peace was just around the corner.Although the Camp David Summit did not lead to a peace agreement, talks con-tinued. Then, on September 28, 2000, a visit by the then Israeli opposition leaderAriel Sharon to the site of the Al Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem provoked Palestin-ian protests that grew into a rebellion against Israel—the second intifada. The twosides continued to talk and in January 2001 progress apparently had been made(European Union, 2002). By then, the government of Israeli Prime Minister EhudBarak had lost parliamentary support. In February 2001, Sharon formed a newgovernment and the January 2001 progress was nullified. Since then, the conflict hasescalated into a violent cycle of actions and reactions.

Most Israelis and Palestinians support negotiations toward a reconciliation agree-ment.1 Throughout the second intifada, Israeli and Palestinian officials discussedcease-fire and cooperation. This mixture of violence and cooperation has charac-terized the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1992, when the two sides began todiscuss peace. Understanding why the relationship is unstable is important for resolv-ing the conflict. Some observers believe that Palestinians want to destroy Israel.Others believe Israel wants to dominate the Palestinians. A third view is that Israeland a Palestinian state cannot coexist. Taken together, these views imply indefi-nite conflict.

The premise of this paper is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. Peace, ofcourse, can entail different levels of friendliness. In this paper, peace is taken todenote at least formal diplomatic relations and the cession of hostilities. Given thispremise, the paper addresses two questions. First, why did the Oslo peace processfail to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Second, assuming a Palestinian statewere to be formed, what would be the best geopolitical arrangement to secure astable Israeli-Palestinian peace? These questions are analyzed against a backdrop ofhistorical colonialism and decolonization.

The benefit of using a colonial framework is that it places the Israeli-Palestinianconflict in a comparative environment. Too often, this conflict is looked at in termsof its unique nature. While there are features that make the Israeli-Palestinian casedifferent from other colonial situations, there are enough similarities to make anobjective observer wonder where this conflict is leading, and how it will ultimatelybe resolved. When Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the territories)is placed within the context of colonialism, it is more often than not done as partof some polemic and using an antagonistic tone, so that any attempt to be reflectiveis immediately paralyzed.

One exception to this assessment is provided by Lustick’s (1993, 1994) compari-son of the Israeli link to the territories from 1967–1992, with the British link to

1 In July 2001, e.g., 73% of Israelis and Palestinians supported reconciliation (Ha’aretz Jul 23, 2001).In December 2001, 71% of Palestinians supported negotiations (Ha’aretz Dec 26, 2001). In April 2002,73% of Israelis supported negotiations (Yediot April 5, 2002). In May 2002, 70% of Palestinians supportedreconciliation (Center for Palestinian Studies and Research—CPRS—May 15-19, 2002).

349R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347–380

Ireland from 1886–1922, and the French link to Algeria from 1955–1962. Probinga threshold of settler activity that makes violence over state contraction likely, heconcluded that Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s attempt to leave the territories stooda better chance than the 1914 failed British attempt to leave Ireland, and the 1959–1961 successful French attempt to leave Algeria. In the mid-1990s, political geogra-phers studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were also optimistic. For example,Falah (1997) argued that Israeli-Palestinian enmity was about to be transformed intoa link characterized by “high concern for the self and high concern for the other”(1997: 310). Similarly, Newman and Falah (1997) expected that in the future thegap between the two sides would close. These expectations have not yet materialized,the explanation of which further motivates this paper.

Some studies (e.g., Newman, 2002; Klieman, 2000; Alpher, 1995) imply that thenature of Israeli-Palestinian conflict always has been about the partition ofIsrael/Palestine. However, this paper argues that the nature of the conflict changedfundamentally after 1967, when Israel occupied the territories. Israeli control of theterritories is a form of colonialism nourished by a mixture of Jewish nationalismand religion—or Israeli fundamentalism. Since 1967, Israel has built numerous settle-ments in the territories and has, in practice, annexed the land. The contemporaryIsraeli-Palestinian relationship is a conflict over Israeli decolonization; many similarconflicts occurred in the past. Historically, colonialism remained intact as long asthe native population accepted its presence. When this passivity was replaced by aquest for independence, colonialism collapsed. Some colonial rulers left peacefully.Others put up a fight. Colonial conflicts ended only when the rulers gave up the col-onies.

If the interpretation that history can serve as a model is correct, the Israeli-Palestin-ian conflict may only end following complete Israeli decolonization and the forma-tion of a Palestinian state in its place. Palestinian statehood is supported by manyIsraelis, but its borders are contested. Israeli Labor and left wing parties agree to astate covering most of the territories. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon apparently agreesto a state in the areas that the Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled at the eve ofCamp David. The Palestinian Authority wants a state encompassing the entire terri-tories.2 Importantly, if the Palestinian state would take the form of numerous discon-tinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeli land, the conflict likely would continue. Myanalysis, no doubt, will be deemed controversial. Colonialism is a loaded term. Theapproach of this paper, however, is not normative but rather empirical.

Structural instability

The questions of what caused the failure of the Camp David Summit and the onsetof the second intifada are hotly debated. One position blames the Palestinians. Some

2 Examples of statements to that effect are provided later. In May 2002, 66% of Palestinians supportedpeace with Israel, in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of aPalestinian state alongside Israel (CPRS, May 15–19, 2002). The Palestinian Islamist opposition claimsall of Palestine (including Israel proper).


argue that Yasser Arafat planned the rebellion before the summit because he fearedthat peace would diminish his stature. Others argue that the Palestinians planned theviolence in order to pressure Israel to make more concessions, because they believedthat violence triggered the Oslo process (Ha’aretz Sept 19, 2001; Ben-Meir, 2001).Another view is that the Palestinian leaders lacked the maturity to accept Barak’sgenerous offer. The failure of the summit, in turn, facilitated the violence, contra-dicting the premise of the Oslo process: peaceful negotiations (Eldar, 2002; Makov-sky, 2001; Sontag, 2001; Malley and Agha, 2001; Ha’aretz Mar 29, Sept 19, 2001;Yediot Jul 20, 2001).

A second position blames Israel. Some argue that Israel’s Camp David offer, ineffect, replaced direct Israeli control of the Palestinians with indirect control. In otherwords, Barak conspired to derail the peace process (Hammami & Tamari, 2001;Sontag, 2001; Eldar, 2002). A related view argues that the intifada is a grass rootexplosion; the Palestinians felt that the Oslo process had reached a dead end (Jahshan,2000; Dajani, 2001; Elia, 2001). Others blame Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount. Thevisit triggered Palestinian outrage; the Israeli response was harsh, and things got outof hand (Ha’aretz Mar 8, Sept 19, 2001).

A third position blames both sides: Barak generated unrealistic expectations;Arafat failed to meet his own deadlines for declaring a state, frustrating the Palestini-ans and paving the way for the intifada (e.g., Ben-Meir, 2001). A fourth positioncriticizes organizational factors: Barak and Arafat did not negotiate face to faceduring the Camp David Summit; Israel did not present a formal offer; the US broker-ing was biased toward Israel, and the parties faced an impossible timetable due toPresident Clinton’s leaving office and political pressures in Israel that underminedBarak’s government (Malley & Agha, 2001; Kimmerling, 2001; Ben Meir, 2001).

These explanations have merits, but the failure of the Camp David Summit andthe eruption of the second intifada cannot be fully understood when studied in iso-lation. The Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1994 cycles between conflict escal-ation, and cooperation. The cycles can be described by a stylized theoretical model(Reuveny, 1999). The model considers two countries—Israel and Palestine—thathave been enemies until recently and now are negotiating a compromise. Formally,the PA is not a country. But since 1994, it has exhibited a number of country-likeattributes, including controlling land and security forces, and conducting foreign pol-icy, and therefore in this model it will be treated as such. Israel is stronger and richerthan Palestine, and Palestine depends on Israel economically. Each country includesthree actors: the government, the public, and the hawks—a radical faction that rejectscompromise. The public in both countries supports negotiations.

In each cycle, the hawks or government (acting under the influence of hawks) onone side provoke or attack the other side. The hawks on the other side demand agovernment response. The Israeli government employs economic and military meas-ures against Palestine, demanding that the Palestinian government (PA) take actionagainst its hawks. The PA refuses, and the conflict escalates. The Palestinian econ-omy deteriorates since it depends on Israel. Eventually, Palestine submits to Israel’sdemands. Israel lifts punitive measures, and the two sides again cooperate. Over time,grievances rise, as does public support for the hawks, and a new cycle commences.


Empirical data generally support this model. In the 1990s, Israel imposed frequentclosures on the Palestinians in response to attacks, significantly damaging the Pales-tinian economy. The Palestinians became desperate and support for militants rose.Palestinian attacks on Israel were followed by more closures, and so on (Reuveny,1999). The second intifada can be thought of as yet another conflict cycle (or cycles).During the second intifada, Israeli closures and the conflict in general caused Pales-tinian economic conditions to worsen (The Economist, Aug 11, 2001; Ha’aretz, Feb5, 2002). In 2001, half of Palestinians were unemployed, half lived in poverty, theeconomy fell into a barter system, and per capita income fell nearly 50% (WorldBank, 2002). This economic misery provides a fertile ground for radicalism andviolence (Hamami & Tamari, 2001; Siegman, 2001; Ha’aretz, Nov 29, 2001; Yediot,Feb, 23, 2001; The Economist, Jan 20, Mar 17, Aug 11, 2001).

The economic explanation of the contemporary conflict provides an importantpiece of the puzzle, but it fails to recognize that the conflict is fundamentally overIsraeli decolonization.

Colonialism and decolonization

Colonialism has existed since ancient times.3 Over the last 500 years, there havebeen two waves of colonialism. The first wave started with the Spanish and Portug-uese expansion into the Americas. By the mid-nineteenth century, most of thesecolonies won independence from European rulers, typically following rebellions. Asecond wave of modern colonialism began in 1870, involving European, Japaneseand US expansion into Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands. The post-1945 era wit-nessed extensive decolonization. In broad terms, there were three types of colonies,in all of which native populations were subjugated. Colonies of exploitation utilizedthe natives in labor-intensive sectors. In colonies of settlement, the European settlersmaintained a privileged socio-economic position and excluded the natives from theirsocieties. Colonies of contested settlement followed a similar pattern, but the nativeseventually rebelled and won independence, at which time most of the settlers leftthe former colony (Ferro, 1997; Abernethy, 2000; Cell, 2001).

The causes of colonialism are debated. In Neo-Marxist interpretations, colonialpowers expand in order to alleviate demographic or economic pressures at home.Realist interpretations suggest that colonialism is driven by desires for security andpower. A third theory of colonialism focuses on its incremental terrestrial nature:colonial powers expand existing colonies in order to contain instabilities in borderingregions and to protect settlers and properties (Menon & Oneal, 1986).

Post-1945 decolonization had several causes. Anti-colonial indigenous nationalismwas present in all cases, but nationalism was not the only factor. Colonial powers

3 Early colonial powers include Egypt and Babylon. The Phoenicians probably were the first buildersof colonies overseas, followed by the Greeks, Carthaginians, and the Romans (Cell, 2001). In the 7thcentury, the Arabs began their great expansion (Hourani, 1991). The Middle Ages saw Viking colonialismand, beginning in 1171, English colonialism in Ireland (Smith, 1999).


were able to crush indigenous rebellions, indicating that other forces were also atwork. The changing needs of colonial powers led in many cases to the realizationthat the cost of colonialism was greater than the benefit. By denying independenceto millions of people, colonialism contradicted democratic norms. Domestically, thepublic increasingly opposed losses in battles over colonial holdings. As the impor-tance of international trade and finance grew, the colonies became less economicallyimportant. The rise of the welfare state further reduced the willingness of Europeansto invest funds in order to maintain colonies. International political forces also playeda role. The liberation of colonies inspired others to struggle against their own coloniz-ers. The conquest of European colonies during World War II by Japan, and thedecline in Europe’s power emboldened native resistance. It is also argued that as anew world leader, the US pressed to end colonialism in order to consolidate its power(Holland, 1989; Springhall, 2001).

Several post-1945 decolonization episodes involved violence between natives andcolonial rulers. The main causes of this violence were the reluctance of rulers togive up their colonies, the social-political-economic cleavages between natives andsettlers, and the pressure from settlers on rulers to maintain the colony (Wilson, 1994;Chabal, 1993). Conflicts between native factions during and after decolonization havealso occurred, reflecting various tensions, including ethnic-religious cleavages,controversies over collaboration with colonial rulers, and struggles over the powerbase in new or emerging states.

European powers built most of their colonies overseas and far from home(transoceanic colonialism). Similar to the Israeli case, however, some colonies wereestablished in nearby territories (terrestrial colonialism).4 Historically, the homeland-colony proximity had competing effects. On one hand, the colonists had somewhereto “ return to” when colonialism ended, particularly if they maintained tight links tothe homeland. On the other hand, the proximity enabled reinforcement of colonistsby compatriots in the homeland, which intensified the wealth and power differencesbetween the colonizers and the colonized, emboldened settler resistance to decoloniz-ation, and escalated colonial conflicts.

Geographical phases

Historically, colonialism involved states’ expansion beyond their borders andindigenous populations’ eventual rejection of this expansion. If the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict is colonial, then at some point in time, Israel expanded beyondwhat was generally considered to be its borders and the Palestinians eventually haverejected this expansion. This idea can be demonstrated by a longitudinal empirical

4 Examples of terrestrial expansionism include imperial Germany’s goal of creating a Mitteleuropa bycolonizing in Central Europe and Nazi Germany’s followup in Poland and the former Soviet Union(Schultz, 1989; Johnson, 1996), the US expansion in the Western part of North America, and the Russianexpansion in South-Central Asia (Abernethy, 2000). The Anglo-British colonization of Ireland and theFrench colonization of Algeria, while overseas, were also relatively close to home.


analysis of the actors’ geopolitical attitudes. It is possible to categorize these attitudesby using a seven-phase historical model, as shown in Table 1.5

Phase 1: 1882–1916

The first Zionists arrived in Palestine in 1882. Almost immediately, they grappledwith the issue of land. Of three options—purchase, expropriation, and conquest—they concluded that only purchase was viable (Ussishkin, 1903). In Phase 1, theZionists and Palestinians coexisted, but tensions were rising (Gorny, 1987). In 1916,Britain and France agreed that after WWI, the British would control Palestine andTrans-Jordan (Sykes–Picot agreement).

Phase 2: 1917–1949

The 1917 Balfour Declaration outlined British support for a Jewish home in Pales-tine. In 1919, the Zionists lobbied for a state in all of Palestine, as well as parts ofTrans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Palestinians and the Arabs argued that theBritish promised them Palestine in 1916. The British gave Trans-Jordan to the Arabsin 1922. Seeking a compromise with the Palestinians, most Zionists accepted thedecision. The Zionist revisionist minority demanded a state on both banks of the

Table 1Geopolitical phases

Phase Duration Israeli attitudes Palestinian Initial event Ending eventattitudes

1 1882–1916 Coexistence Coexistence Zionist Sykes-Picotimmigration Agreementbegins

2 1917–1949 Accepting partition Rejecting Balfour 1948 Warpartition Declaration

3 1949–1967 Institutionalizing Rejecting Israeli-Arab 1967 Warpartition partition armistice

4 1967–1977 Creeping colonialism Rejecting 1967 War Labor losespartition, electionsmoderation

5 1977–1987 Choosing colonialism Considering Likud First intifadapartition Government begins

6 1988–1992 Debating colonialism Accepting PLO recognizes Likud losespartition Israel elections

7 1992–present Debating Demanding Labor Labor losesdecolonization decolonization Government elections

5 Many studies documented the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to sources cited,see Hareven (1989); Shimoni (1990); Tessler (1994); Kimmerling and Migdal (1994); Gilbert (1998);Gazit (1999); Smith (2001), and The Middle East and North Africa (2001).


Jordan River, ignoring Palestinian claims. The growing Zionist presence enraged thePalestinians and led to clashes. In 1936, the Palestinians rebelled and demandedindependence from the British. The 1937 British government-appointed Peel Com-mission recommended the division of Palestine between the Jews and Palestinians.The mainstream Zionist party MAPAI (Land of Israel Workers Party) accepted theidea of partition, while the Palestinians and the Zionist revisionists rejected it.

In 1939, Britain decided that henceforth Palestinians would rule Palestine. TheZionists disagreed, and in 1945 rebelled against the British. Britain decided to leavePalestine and submitted the issue to the United Nations (UN). The 1947 UN PartitionPlan called for separate Palestinian and Israeli states. MAPAI Zionists accepted theplan; the Palestinians and the revisionists rejected it. In 1948, the conflict grew intoan Arab-Israeli war, in which Israel gained more land relative to the UN plan.

Phase 3: 1949–1967

At Rhodes in 1949, Israel signed armistice agreements with Arab states, but notwith the Palestinians. In Phase 3, most Israelis came to view the Rhodes ArmisticeLine as Israel’s permanent boundary (Tsur, 1982; Belin, 1985; Harkabi, 1988; Lus-tick, 1993). The revisionist Herut (Freedom) party continued to strive for all of Pales-tine and parts of Jordan, but by the 1960s it all but gave up on this idea (Isaac,1976; Seliktar, 1986). The Palestinians continued to reject partition. In 1964, theyfounded the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in order to liberate all of Pale-stine.

Phase 4: 1967–1977

In the 1967 war, Israel conquered the West Bank, Gaza Strip and other areas.Israeli attitudes began shifting toward colonialism. East Jerusalem was annexedimmediately, but the government debated what to do with the West Bank. The dead-lock led to the informal adoption of the Allon Plan. Suggested by Deputy PrimeMinister Yigal Allon, this plan called for annexation of areas along the Jordan Riverand Dead Sea, around Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip for security reasons, and thereturn of the rest of the territories to Jordan. In 1970, yielding to international press-ure, Israel accepted UN Resolution 242’s principle of land-for-peace. The PLO con-sidered accepting this resolution, if it were amended to include a Palestinian state.

Phase 5: 1977–1987

In 1977, Likud, a union of parties led by the Herut party, won its first Israelielections. In a marked shift from Phase 3, the new regime asserted that in GreaterIsrael (all of Palestine) there could be only Israeli sovereignty. The government inten-sified the rate of land confiscation in the territories, utilizing them for the buildingof Jewish settlements. The Palestinian quest for statehood was ignored. In effect,Israeli geopolitical attitudes became colonial. The Palestinians continued to leantoward accepting the idea of partition, and were inclined to accept several inter-


national peace plans that called for a Palestinian state in the territories in exchangefor peace with Israel (Shaheen, 1984; Melman, 1987; Feste, 1991).

Phase 6: 1988–1992

In December 1987, the Palestinians rebelled against Israel. Likud continued toreject a land-for-peace deal with the PLO, while the Labor party (an offshoot ofMAPAI) supported it. As the rebellion continued, Israelis increasingly supportedtalks with the PLO over Israeli withdrawal from the territories and the formation ofa Palestinian state, in return for peace. In 1988, the PLO formally accepted thepartitioning of Palestine along the 1967 border (Green Line).

Phase 7: 1992–present

In 1992, Labor returned to power and began discussing peace with the PLO. In1993, the two sides agreed to a gradual Israeli withdrawal, phased in by dividingthe territories into three area types. In Area A, the Palestinians would have fullcontrol. In Area B, the Palestinians would control civil society and the two sideswould jointly control security. In Area C, which included the Israeli settlements,Israel would have full control. The two sides signed several interim agreements thatoutlined the pace and scope of the Israeli withdrawal (Table 2). The issues of thesettlements, Palestinian statehood and the control of Jerusalem were deferred to alater, final agreement.

Israeli and Palestinian extremists resorted to violence in order to derail the Osloprocess. As the violence intensified, Israeli popular support for the Labor governmentdeclined. In 1996, Likud returned to power. The Oslo II agreement was put on hold,

Table 2Oslo process interim agreements in the West Banka

Stages West Bank Share in West Bank Share in West Bank Share inArea A (%) Area B (%) Area C (%)

Oslo I, 1994 1.1 0 98.9Oslo II, 1995 2 26 72Wye I, 1998 9.1 20.9 70Sharm I, 1999 10.1 25.9 64Sharm II, 2000 12.1 26.9 61Sharm III, 2000 17.2 23.8 59

a Source: Oslo I and II and Sharm-El-Sheikh agreements were negotiated by Labor governments. TheWye agreement was negotiated by the Likud government. The area types in the Gaza Strip have notchanged since Oslo I. The Wye agreement included two additional Israeli withdrawals that were notimplemented, after which the division of the West Bank would have been 17.2%, 23.8% and 59.0% inAreas A, B and C, respectively. Data come from FMEP, Report on Israeli Settlements, July–August2000, Isaac and Ghanyem (2001), Jerusalem Media & Communication Center (2001) and Le MondeDiplomatique (various).


and the 1998 Wye interim agreement was negotiated in its place. In December 1998,the Likud government collapsed, unable to ratify the Wye agreement, and in 1999Labor returned to power under Barak. A new interim agreement was negotiated atSharm-El-Sheikh. On the eve of Camp David, the Palestinians fully controlled 18.2%of the West Bank (Area A) and partially controlled 21.8% (Area B). The details ofthe negotiations at Camp David may never be known, as there is no agreed uponaccount of the talks. It has been reported that Barak offered that Israel would annex10% of the land; another 10%—a zone along the Jordan River—would remain inIsraeli hands for now. The Palestinians rejected the offer because it meant a frag-mented Palestinian state (Ha’aretz Jul 12, 2000; Foundation for Middle East Peace(FMEP) October, 2000; January, 2001).

In September 2000, the second intifada broke out. Talks continued in the Egyptianresort of Taba, and in January 2001 Israel apparently agreed to cede about 95% ofthe territories to the Palestinians (Fig. 1). In February 2001, Likud returned to power.The Taba informal accord was nullified, and the conflict escalated. Israeli PrimeMinister Sharon is said to support a Palestinian state in Areas A and B from Fig. 1(about 40% of the West Bank and 80% of the Gaza Strip), which the Palestiniansreject (Ha’aretz Jun 28, Nov 15, 2001; The Economist May 25, 2001; JerusalemPost Jul 21, 2001).

The empirics of the Israeli settlements

With a few exceptions (e.g., the British decolonization of Egypt), once the Europe-ans decided after 1945 to leave their colonies, their pullout was quick and permanent.In contrast, the Oslo process generated anything but a definitive Israeli pullout (seeFig. 1). Why did the Oslo process opt for a geopolitically complex decolonization?The answer lies in the Israeli settlements.

Shortly after the 1967 war, Israel began building settlements in the territories. In1977, there were about 5000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, 33,000 in East Jerusa-lem, and none in the Gaza Strip (Fig. 2). In 2001, there were 213,000 settlers in theterritories (including 6900 in the Gaza Strip) and 180,000 in East Jerusalem.6 Before1977, annual additions to the settler population were small; after 1977, the incrementsgrew, peaking at about 16,000 in 1999 and 2000 (Fig. 3). From 1993–2001, theaverage yearly settler population growth in the West Bank was 9.51% (5.65% in theGaza Strip); the (natural) average growth inside Israel proper was 2.79% (StatisticalAbstract of Israel, various).

Obviously, Israeli settlers required land. Between 1967 and 1979, land was con-fiscated by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for security reasons, and transferred tosettlers. The Palestinians protested the legality of this procedure. The Israeli High

6 Data come from FMEP (Nov, 2001; Jan, 1996), Hareven (1989); Goldberg (1993), and Ha’aretz,Jan 23, 2002. The presentation of the number of settlers in the territories and East Jerusalem in the samesentences does not imply that the two units are necessarily similar in terms of conflict resolution.


Fig. 1. Final status map presented by Israel at Taba, January 2001.


Fig. 2. Settler population.

Fig. 3. Annual additions to settler population.


Court decided that security justified confiscation, as long as the IDF stayed in theterritories. As detailed in B’Tselem (1997) and Gazit (1999), in 1979, the Palestiniansprotested the legality of the West Bank settlement of Elon Moreh. The settlers arguedthat Elon Moreh was part of Israel proper. Observing that the issue was no longersecurity, the Israeli High Court ordered the evacuation of Elon Moreh. Followingthis ruling, the Israeli government changed its approach. Basing its decision on anineteenth century Turkish law, it allocated unclaimed land to the state. To preventconfiscation, the Palestinians had to demonstrate formal ownership. This proved dif-ficult, since land in the territories typically had not been registered. The new approachhad profound effects: in 1967 the Israeli government confiscated 9.3% of the landin the West Bank (previously owned by the Jordanian government); by 2000 it hadconfiscated 49% of the land (Table 3).

Table 3 and the previous section indicate an important distinction between theacquisition of land in Israel/Palestine by Zionists before and after 1967, which isoften ignored in the literature. Prior to 1948, most Jewish land was legally purchasedfrom Palestinians. The sale of land was done willingly, and both sides benefittedfrom the trade. From 1948–1967, Israel found itself as the de facto landlord of landvacated by Palestinians in the wake of the War of 1948. The period after the 1967war, and particularly after Likud came to power in 1977, has seen a fundamentalchange: land-confiscation became the main tool in the armory of Israelis who wishedto intensify Israeli control of the territories and annex them to Israel. At this time,Israel’s practices became fairly similar to those of other colonial powers.

Israeli governments have supported settlers in various ways, including providingthem land, cheap mortgages, tax reductions, grants, subsidies and employment, anddeploying IDF to guard settlements. For example, inside the Green Line, 33% ofthe labor force is on the public payroll, while in the territories, 60% of the settlerlabor force is on the public payroll (Ha’aretz Dec 15, 1995). In per capita terms,the government has invested more in the settlements than in Israel proper. In the1990s, for example, 5.3 m of road per person were paved in Israel proper, compared

Table 3Israeli state-confiscated land in the West Bank, 1967–2000a

Year Land Size (km2) West Bank Share (%)

1967 527 9.31973 700 12.41984 1800 31.91993 2500 44.31995 2557 45.31998 2729 48.42000 2760 48.9

a Source: The 1967, 1973 and 1984 data-points are from Benvenisti and Khayat (1988). The 1993 data-point is from Maariv, Jan 22, 1993 and B’Tselem (1997). The 1995, 1998, and 2000 data points arebased on Ha’aretz, Jul 20, 2000 and Isaac and Ghanyem (2001). The shares data are computed based onthe West Bank land area of 5640 km2 (World Fact-Book, 2001).


with 17.2 m in the territories. In 2001, average per settler spending in the territorieswas 8146 New Israeli Shekels (NIS); in Israel proper it was 3000 NIS (Ha’aretzDec. 27, 2001, Mar 8, 2002; Yediot Apr 24, 2002). From 1989–June 2001, therewere 38,361 housing starts in the settlements, of which 65% were publicly financed.Inside Israel proper, only 38% of housing starts were publicly financed. From thebeginning of the Oslo process (October, 1993) to June 2001, there were 20,371Israeli housing starts in the settlements (Peace Now, 2001).

In 2001, there were 137 settlements in the West Bank: 25 were built from 1967to 1976 under Labor governments, 96 from 1977 to 1984 under Likud governments,10 from 1985 to 1990 under unified Labor-Likud governments, three from 1990 to1992 under Likud, and another three from 1996 to 1998 under Likud. In the GazaStrip, 10 settlements were built from 1977 to 1984 under Likud, and six from 1985to 1990 under unified Labor-Likud governments (FMEP-a, FMEP-b). Between 1967and 1976, most of the settlements were built far from Palestinian population centers,generally following the Allon Plan. After 1977, they were distributed throughout theterritories in order to promote their general Israelization (e.g., Rowley, 1981; Gazit,1999). Between 1996 and 2000, the settlers built 71 outposts without governmentapproval. Some outposts were dismantled by the Israeli government, but new oneswere built in their place. In the fall of 2002, there were 91 unapproved outposts inthe West Bank (Ha’aretz Sept 14, 2002). In the first year since Sharon took office(February, 2001), Israel has expanded 34 existing settlements considerably (FMEPJan 2002; Yediot Jan 25, 2002; Ha’aretz Mar 18, 2002).

The current map is complex. All of the settlements are in the Israeli controlledArea C (Fig. 1). There are 161 Palestinian “ islands” (Areas A and B) surroundedby Area C, 105 Palestinian villages are in Area C, and 216 are partly in Area C;the farthest Palestinians live from Area C is four miles (Isaac & Ghanyem, 2001).7

The land is crisscrossed by bypass roads that can only be used by settlers (B’Tselem,1997; Gazit, 1999). In 1997, there were 159.2 km of bypass roads (Peace Now,2000); in 2001, there were 316.7 km, and 24.1 km were under construction (Isaac &Ghanyem, 2001).

Israeli civil war

The Palestinian negotiators in Oslo and at Camp David insisted that the Jewishsettlements be evacuated (Ha’aretz Jul 7, 20, 2000; Savir, 1998). Taken at face value,the issue seemed manageable. Israeli Prime Minister Rabin believed the settlementshad no security value; Prime Ministers Peres and Barak also wanted to evacuatesettlements (Aronson, 1996; Savir, 1998; FMEP Sept 1999; Yediot Nov 24, 2000).By agreeing to evacuate some settlements in the interim agreements, Israel could

7 According to Goldblum (2001), there are 190 Palestinian islands, 43 permanent IDF checkpoints inthe West Bank and 40 in the Gaza Strip. The data presented here on the number of Palestinian islandsdo not reflect the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, beginning in Spring 2002.


have simplified the geopolitics and promoted Palestinian trust. Not only was this notdone, but the number of settlers grew under all the Labor governments. Moreover,during the Oslo process the Labor governments attempted to show that they werepro-settler.8 How can one explain this contradiction? It is possible to argue that thesewere negotiation strategies aimed at improving Israel’s cut in the final deal. However,this section shows that the Israeli approach to the Oslo process under Labor wasprimarily driven by fear that the evacuation of settlements would lead to an Israelicivil war.

As in other colonial situations, the Palestinian native–Israeli settler relationshiphas been hostile. For example, in 1980, settlers attacked Palestinian West Bankmayors. In 1983–1984, settlers planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock Shrine inJerusalem and bomb Arab buses (Segal, 1988; Ha’aretz Mar 7, 1984; Peri, 1982).An Israeli government-appointed commission reported that settler violence towardPalestinians was widespread (Karp Report, 1984). This violence was soon followedby settler-violence toward Israelis who were perceived as a threat to the settlementprogram. Early on, some settlers said they would forcibly resist evacuation of settle-ments (Sella & Yishai, 1986). In 1982, many settlers opposed the evacuation of theSinai settlements (called for by the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord) and clashed(unarmed) with IDF. Shortly thereafter, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the PLO.As stated by Israeli government officials, the ultimate goal of the war was to destroyPalestinian morale so as to eradicate opposition to Israeli annexation of the territories(Harkabi, 1988; Gilbert, 1998; Smith, 2001). The war became controversial in Israel.Against this backdrop, in 1983 a demonstrator was killed when a Jewish extremistthrew a grenade at a Jerusalem anti-war demonstration.

In December 1987, the Palestinians rebelled against Israel, and the Israeli publicdebate over the future of the territories intensified. The settlers became ever moreexplicit in rejecting withdrawal from the territories. They called IDF officers “kapos”(Nazi-nominated Jewish guards), called former Israeli president Yitzhak Navon (fromLabor) “Quisling” (after the Norwegian official who collaborated with the Nazis),and said that withdrawal from the territories is national treason (Jerusalem Post Apr10, 1988; Ha’aretz Jun 16, 1989). In 1989, 58% of Israelis thought that domesticstrife over the settlements could lead to civil war (Yediot Jun 8, 1989). In 1990,settler leader Yoel Ben-Nun warned that an agreement with the Palestinians couldcause civil war (Ben-Nun, 1990). Consequently, Israeli officials came to believe thatevacuating settlements would lead to civil war.9

8 For example, on Nov 22, 1995, Prime Minister Peres announced that the government would notabandon the settlers (FMEP Jan, 1996). Minister Yossie Beilin said the Labor government made sure thesettlements would remain intact in Oslo II (Ma’ariv Sept 27, 1995). Prime Minister Barak said thatsettlement activity is very important (Ha’aretz Oct 13, 1999).

9 For example, in 1980 Deputy Prime Minister Yadin said his party joined the Likud regime, becausea Labor regime raised the risk of civil war (Yediot Jun 6, 1980). In 1983, Likud officials said civil warwas possible (Jerusalem Post Feb 26, 1983). In 1985, Prime Minister Peres said the risk of civil warjustified a unity government (FBIS Jun 6, 1986: 16). Israeli presidents (Jerusalem Post Sept 7, 1983,Independence Day Speech, Apr 25, 1985) and officials (Israeli Democracy Winter 1989: 5-9) made similarwarnings. See also Talmon (1980); Benvenisti (1986); Barzillai (1990), and Lustick (1993).


The settlers’ anti-Oslo campaign was also very intense. They blocked traffic,rioted, called Prime Minister Rabin a traitor, urged IDF to refuse orders to evacuatesettlements (should such orders come), and warned of an imminent civil war (e.g.,Smith, 2001; Sprinzak, 1999). Facing this opposition, Rabin’s government debatedhow to approach the Oslo process. Foreign Minister Peres supported a quick pulloutfrom the territories, while Prime Minister Rabin feared settler violence (Smith, 2001;Makovsky, 1993, 1996). In the end, the government decided to defer the issue ofthe settlements to the final stage of the Oslo process (Savir, 1998; Makovsky, 1996).

For the Jewish people, civil war brings painful memories. About 2000 years ago,the clash between moderates who supported a compromise with the Romans andzealots who rejected it, is said to have destroyed the Second Temple and the historicalJewish nation (e.g., Yerushalmi, 1982; Rapoport, 1982; Harkabi, 1988; Ravitzky,1993). Alluding to this historical crisis, in November 1993 Peres explained the Israeliapproach to Oslo: the government wanted to “avoid a terrible clash in Israel” (FBISNov 29, 1993: 41). In December 1993 he said, “we had to choose between splittingthe nation in pieces and finding a difficult solution” (FBIS Dec 6, 1993: 34). In 1994he added, “we thought that any different approach [i.e., evacuating settlements]would split the nation beyond recognition” (Makovsky, 1996: 141). My point is notthat a 2000 year old memory makes contemporary civil war more painful, but thatthis memory affects contemporary policymaking, a point to which I will return.

The 1996 Likud regime delayed the Oslo process, and the settlers toned downtheir anti-Oslo campaign. In the period around the 2000 Camp David Summit theyrevived the campaign with marches, riots, traffic blockages, threats against Barak’slife, and threats of civil war.10 Once again, the campaign had an effect. For example,in June 2000, Peres said that the Gaza Strip settlement of Netzarim offered no bene-fits and was left in place only to prevent domestic strife (Yediot Jun 24, 2000). InAugust of that year, Minister Yossi Beilin said that Barak’s Camp David planannexed settlements to lessen settler resistance to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement(Ma’ariv Aug 18, 2000). Barak continued talks with the Palestinians despite the onsetof the second intifada. As the two sides got closer, settler leaders warned of animminent civil war.11 A few months later, Sharon’s (Labor-party) Defense MinisterBen Eliezer explained that Barak did not evacuate the unapproved outposts due tofears of settlers’ violence (Ha’aretz Jun 28, 2001).

We can say then, that Labor governments were inclined to evacuate settlementsduring the Oslo process, but did not do so out of fear of settler violence. This tensionparallels the tensions in France over pulling out of Algeria and in Britain over pulling

10 For example, settlers said, “ If Barak orders clearing of settlements, he will be murdered” (YediotMay 30, 2000), shouted at Israeli minister Ben Ami the biblical curse “destruction upon your house”(Yediot May 31, 2000), compared Barak to Hitler (Ha’aretz Jun 11, 2000), and said it is a betrayal tohand over Jewish land; “The criminal who does this is the same criminal who allowed the Holocaust tohappen” (Ma’ariv Jun 4, 2000). For more examples, see Ha’aretz (Jun 20 and 23; Jul 24, 2000), Ma’ariv(Jul 17; Aug 11, 2000), and Yediot (Jul 24 2000).

11 For example, settler leader Beni Katzover says a decision to evacuate settlers would mean the govern-ment prefers a war among brothers over a war against terror (Yediot Dec 29, 2000).


out of Ireland. The fears of civil war in France, however, did not prevent the pullout.While the British attempt to pull out of Ireland in 1914 failed, the British left a fewyears later. In contrast, in the fall of 2002 Israeli colonial grip on the territories isfirm, and the Israeli settlers’ rejection of decolonization is as strong as ever. Whyhave the settlers so adamantly rejected territorial compromise? And why have theirthreats of civil war been deemed credible? Answers to these questions lie in thegeopolitics of Israeli fundamentalism.

The geopolitics of Israeli fundamentalism

In his classic book, Relph (1976) observes that places “are fusions of human andnatural order and are the significant centers of our immediate experience of theworld... [Places] are important sources of individual and communal identity, and areoften profound centers of human existence to which people have deep emotionaland psychological ties” (Relph, 1976: 141). When a place makes people feel at home,secure and at ease, they are said to be inside it. The level of insideness varies fromexistential insideness—a sense of complete, almost subconscious immersion in aplace—to existential outsideness—a sense of alienation and strangeness. It is hardto exaggerate the emotional significance of Greater Israel to Israeli fundamentalists.Their existential insideness in (the “place” of) Greater Israel drives their geopoliticalworld view, the evolution and effects of which stand at the center of this section.Palestinian fundamentalists also feel deeply “ inside” all of Palestine (Greater Israel).Given the focus of this paper, I do not study Palestinian fundamentalism. I willreturn to this issue in the last section.

Roots and ideology

The Likud party win in the 1977 Israeli elections enabled revisionist Zionists toimplement their vision of Greater Israel. However, Likud did not have a parliamen-tary majority or the human infrastructure needed to settle a hostile land. The solutionwas logical: the revisionist Zionists formed an alliance with religious Zionists. TheLikud regime would provide military and financial muscle, and religious Zionistswould provide settlers (Weissbrod, 1985; Bauer, 1985; Gazit, 1999).

Before 1967, religious Zionists held a pragmatic world view. After 1948, theyaccepted Israeli democracy and joined the government under the mainstream MAPAIparty. The magnitude and speed of the Israeli victory in 1967 shocked many Israelis.Virtually overnight, Israel grew from a small state fighting for its life into a regionalpower. Many religious Zionists perceived the triumph as a miracle, a sign from Godthat the time had come to reinstate the Kingdom of David. Shortly after the war,several religious Zionist groups began building settlements in the territories (withoutgovernment approval). The group led by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook from Jerusalemwas particularly fascinated by the 1967 victory. This group has played a central


role in the formation of Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful), the largest Israelifundamentalist group.12

Gush Emunim was founded in 1974 with the goal of settling throughout the terri-tories. Today, about 35% of the settlers are affiliated with Gush Emunim. The groupcontrols about 48 settlements and exerts significant influence over others, as well asover Israeli society in general (Newman, 1985b; Alpher, 1995; Joffe, 1996). Israelifundamentalist leaders served as members of Knesset (Israeli Parliament), but themovement’s primary political power lies in its ability to mobilize thousands of dedi-cated settlers (Smith, 2001; Gazit, 1999).

Israeli fundamentalists believe that God chose Israel to be the place of the Jews.In the words of Rabbi Kook, there is “a prohibition in the Torah against giving upeven an inch of Israel” (Pichnik, 1968: 108). “All this land is ours, absolutely... non-transferable to others even in part... there are no ‘Arab territories’ or ‘Arab lands’here, but only the lands of Israel... to which others have come and upon which theyhave built without our permission and in our absence” (Schnall, 1984: 19). HananPorat, a Gush Emunim leader says: “For us, the Land of Israel is a Land of destiny,a chosen land, not just an existentially defined homeland. It is the Land from whichthe voice of God has called to us ever since the first call to the first Hebrew” (Hunter,1993: 35).

In rejecting Palestinian statehood and viewing the territories as homeland, Israelifundamentalists resemble several other colonial settler groups. For example, theFrench settlers rejected Algerian independence and perceived Algeria as homeland.Israeli fundamentalists, however, do not view settling in the territories as coloniz-ation, but as a “ return to the homeland.” The Israeli fundamentalist movement seesitself as a true continuation of Zionism: settling in the territories is not different fromwhat the Zionists did in Israel/Palestine over the past 120 years (Newman, 1985a).13

Its world view is primarily founded upon a “system of beliefs in which land, thepromised land, plays a central and crucial role” that can be traced to the conquestof biblical Israel by the ancient Jews (Rowley, 1981: 443). There were divine andtheological elements in other colonial settler movements (e.g., Dutch Calvinists inSouth Africa, nonconformist groups in the US), but none of these elements were sointense as in Israeli fundamentalism.

Israeli fundamentalism and the Oslo process

Given their strong emphasis on the holiness and wholeness of greater Israel, Israelifundamentalists perceive the Oslo process as the ultimate threat to their theology.In facing events that disprove their theologies, fundamentalist groups generally maycollapse, justify the events as God’s will and explain them in ways that support theirworld views, or resort to violence in order to change events in a way they believe

12 Another notable group is Kach (Thus!). On Israeli fundamentalism, see, e.g., Newman (ed.) (1985a),Harkabi (1988); Weisburd (1989); Aran (1993); Don-Yehiya (1994), and Sprinzak (1999).

13 This also is the view of Israeli extreme right-wing parties.


will please God (Rapoport, 1988; Festinger, 1989; Sprinzak, 1999). The second andthird reactions are relevant here. Israeli fundamentalists rejected the Israeli-Egyptianpeace accord because it called for the removal of settlements from the Sinai Penin-sula. In the end, they relented: the Sinai Peninsula was not part of biblical Israel,and the post-1977 settlement growth was understood as a sign of God’s approval.In reacting to the Oslo process, however, Israeli fundamentalist resorted to violence.As shown next, the level of settler violence peaked in the periods 1993–1995 and2000–2001 just as Israeli decolonization seemed likely.

Baruch Goldstein was a member of the fundamentalist group Kach. Seeking tostop the Oslo process, he killed 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron in 1994, and wasthen killed by Arab onlookers (Report Massacre, 1994; Gilbert, 1998; Sprinzak,1999; Smith, 2001). Following the massacre, Rabin’s government decided to evacu-ate settlers from Tel Rumeida (a hill in Hebron); their presence had long promotedstrife. Fundamentalist rabbis declared the decision to negate Jewish Law, urged Isra-elis to reject it, and urged IDF to disobey orders (Ha’aretz Mar 7 and 30, Apr 1 and6, 1994; Sprinzak, 1999). Israeli fundamentalists blamed Rabin and the Oslo processfor the Hebron massacre (Sprinzak, 1999). Some also praised Goldstein and his act.14

The Hebron massacre escalated the conflict. In 1994, radical Palestinians under-took suicide bombing in Israel proper, Israel imposed closures on the territories, thePalestinian economy deteriorated, and Palestinian public support for radicals rose(Reuveny, 1999). In 1995, Israeli fundamentalists claimed Rabin was a traitor. In aletter sent to 40 prominent rabbis, settler rabbis asked whether one could declareRabin a rodef and a moser (Lior, Shilo, & Melamed, 1996). According to Jewishlaw, a rodef plans to kill Jews and a moser illegally provides Jewish land to Gentiles;Jews should kill moser (since Israel’s land is sacred) and rodef (to save Jewish life).Rabin’s assassin, Yigal Amir, a religious Zionist who admired Baruch Goldstein,was convinced that God wanted Rabin dead in order to stop the Oslo process (ReportAssassination, 1996; Yediot Dec 11, 1995).

The settlers strongly rejected Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Camp David(Ma’ariv Jul 17 and 24, Aug 11, 2000). In June 2000, they called on Israeli PrimeMinister Barak: “Did you not learn the lesson from the civil war waged here duringthe days of the late [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin?” (Ha’aretz June 20, 2000).Shortly thereafter, they said that an Israeli-Palestinian territorial compromise wouldbe “ immoral, illegitimate and unlawful” (Ha’aretz June 23, 2000), and warned theywould react to it in a way they “have never acted before, with the greatest severity.”In July, settlers said they would refuse to evacuate settlements even if the evacuationwere supported by the Israeli Parliament and public. Gush Emunim officials saidthat regardless of how much support an Israeli-Palestinian agreement were to get,

14 For example, Rabbi Dov Lior said that Goldstein acted in God’s name, and therefore is a righteousman (Yerushalim Mar 4, 1994). During Goldstein’s funeral, some said: “What a hero! A righteous person!He did it on behalf of all of us.” Rabbi Israel Ariel said: “The holy martyr, Baruch Goldstein... heardthe cry of the land of Israel, which is being stolen from us day after day by the Muslims... The Jewswill inherit the land not by any peace agreement but only by shedding blood” (Yediot Feb 28, 1994). In1995, settlers published a book glorifying Goldstein (Ben Horin, 1995).


evacuation of settlements was illegitimate and the majority could not impose its willon the minority (Yediot July 24, 2000). The Israeli Shin Bet (Security Service)warned that settler extremists might attempt to assassinate Barak (Yediot Jul 24,2000).

Sprinzak (1999) predicted that by 2000 the Israeli extreme right would be increas-ingly ready for a land compromise with the Palestinians. This prediction has notmaterialized. The Israeli fundamentalist movement has consistently been at the fore-front of the resistance to a land compromise, and the issue of the settlements hasbeen a major obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

The settlements and Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Prior to 1994, Israel ran all government functions in the territories. The 1993Israeli-Palestinian agreement called on Israel to permit the Palestinians to governthemselves, provided they renounce violence against Israel. As reviewed in Reuveny(1999), it was assumed that to promote Palestinian prosperity and self governance,the PA would cooperate with Israel on security matters, as conflict is bad for businessand order. Over time, relations would improve and eventually the two actors wouldsign a peace agreement. This logic could have worked, had the issues of settlementsand Palestinian statehood not been deferred to the final stage, had the settlementsnot expanded in the meantime, and had there been Palestinian prosperity. This sectionfocuses on the effects of the settlements on the conflict since 1994.

Symbolizing the occupation

The main Palestinian grievance is geopolitical. In 1988, in their de facto recog-nition of the state of Israel, they gave up 78% of Palestine and accepted the GreenLine. The remaining 22% (the territories) are viewed as occupied land.15 Today, mostPalestinians interact with Israelis only through the settlements, the IDF defending thesettlements, and the bypass roads. The current geopolitics humiliates the Palestinians(Mitchell Report, 2001). Political geographers observe that ethnic-nationalist terri-torial conflicts generally have both symbolic and tangible effects (e.g., Newman,2002). In line with this observation, the settlements symbolize the Israeli occupationand fuel Palestinian nationalism and hostility toward Israel, as reflected, for example,by the Palestinians referring at times to the second intifada as the “settlements inti-

15 See, e.g., statements by Arafat in Die Welt, Jun 8, 1998, and Palestinain minister Nabil Shaat inMa’ariv, Jul 21, 2001. Mohammed Dahlan, head of the PA’s preventive security in the Gaza Strip says,“We wish to live in our state, based on borders of June 4, 1967, alongside the State of Israel, and notin its place or at its expense” (Ha’aretz Jan 31, 2002). For additional summaries of this point, see Newman(1996, 2002); Newman and Falah (1997), and The Economist, Apr 13, 2002.


fada” (Ha’aretz Apr 21, 2001). By May 2002, 89% of Palestinians supported armedattacks against settlers (CPRS May 15-19, 2002).16

Weakening Palestinian mainstream

The growth of settlements weakens the position of the Palestinian mainstream(i.e., the PA and its backbone Fatah party) in the eyes of Palestinians and strengthensthe position of its militant opposition (i.e., the Islamist parties). For example, Pales-tinian public support for Fatah fell from 37% in July 2000 to 26% in August 2002.In August 2002, support for Islamists was larger than for Fatah (CPRS Dec 19-24,2001; Aug 18–21, 2002). The island-like Palestinian geopolitics assists Palestinianforces that would like to derail the peace process. During the second intifada, inparticular, the Israeli closures fragmented the PA. This undermined the PA’s abilityto enforce order, and played into the hands of radicals (US State Department, 2002).

Promoting settler-Palestinian hostility

The political geography of ethnic-nationalist territorial conflicts exhibits micro andmacro aspects of hostility (Lustick, 1993; Paasi, 1996; Newman, 2002). At the macrolevel, hostile groups dispute borders and political determination. At the micro level,the hostility spills over into issues such as natural resource utilization, local economicdevelopment, and the layout of roads. In general, situations involving hostile ethnicgroups living in the same area have resulted in horrific violence. The Israeli-Palestin-ian case reflects this pattern. Settlers and Palestinians live close to each other, andboth resort to acts of terrorism.17 This does not mean to argue that it is impossibleto find cases where ethnic groups live peacefully together. For example, Israeli Jewsand Arabs get along relatively well.18 Yet in these cases, the groups agree to sharepower, a point to which I will return. The fact that much resentment has grownbetween settlers and Palestinians since 1967, further demonstrates the futility of thecurrent Israeli-Palestinian geopolitics.

Escalating the conflict

The settler-Palestinian hostility escalates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict along twointerrelated channels. One channel involves a classic conflict spiral: each round of

16 Other examples are plentiful. Sheikh Yassin, Hamas leader, said in 1998: “What does a state meanto us if it is on land that is full of settlements?” (FMEP Nov. 1998). The PA information ministry saysthe settlements are legitimate targets for destruction (Middle East Media Research Institute—MEMRI,Dispatch 153, Nov 17, 2000). A Palestinian editorial says: “The settlers are a dirty stain on our land...begin expelling them” (MEMRI, Dispatch 160, Nov 30, 2000). Palestinian official Jibril Rajub says thatthe settlements provoke violence and escalation (Jerusalem Post Jul 22, 2001).

17 Palestinian terrorism against Israelis is common. Israeli fundamentalist terrorism against Palestiniansalso is observed (Section “ Israeli Civil War” ; Ringal and Ben Haaim, 2001; Shragai, 2002). On settler-Palestinian violence since 1967, see, e.g., Weisburd (1989), Kass and O’Neill (1997); Dudai (2001), andFMEP (various).

18 This example is not optimal. Better examples include the cases of Switzerland and Belgium.


violence is linked both to the previous and next rounds (Kriesberg, 1998). Forexample, reacting to the 1994 Goldstein massacre, the Palestinian Islamists intensi-fied attacks on Israel, ushering in Israeli responses and Palestinian counterattacks.During the second intifada, Palestinian attacks on settlers and IDF units guardingthem have almost always been followed by settler and IDF responses, and settlerattacks on Palestinians have almost always been followed by Palestinian responses.19

A second channel of escalation involves the settlers’ pressuring of the Israeligovernment for strong military measures against the Palestinians, which, in turn,elicits Palestinian responses. This channel became salient during the second intifada.In 2001, Israeli settlers rallied against Sharon, protesting his policy of restraint. InMarch, they said, “we have to blow up the house of every terrorist that fires on usand deport the family out the door” (Ha’aretz March 16, 2002). In June, they blamedSharon for the deaths of settlers. In October 2001 and January 2002, they demandedthe breakup of the PA and the removal of Arafat (Ha’aretz Oct 17, 2001; YediotJune 15, 22, 2001; Jan 1, 2002). Sharon eventually changed his policy of restraint.In a meeting with settlers, he promised strong military responses to every attack(Ha’aretz Oct 17, 2001). It also has been reported that Sharon wants to replace Arafatwith a Palestinian leader whom Israel would deem more suitable for negotiations(Ha’aretz May 19, 2002).

Signaling the Israeli end game

The Palestinians argue that the settlement expansion violates the spirit of Oslo(Mitchell Report, 2001). Israel argues that the Oslo process does not require theevacuation of settlements, and their expansion does not bias the permanent statustalks. The point remains, however, that the consistently large Israeli investments inthe territories, settler demands for settlement expansion, and the government’sacceptance (after the fact) of unapproved, settler-built outposts, signal an Israeliintention to hold onto the land forever. This end game frightens and angers the Pales-tinians.20

Promoting inequality

Kriesberg (1998) stresses the role of inequitable distribution of income andresources in stimulating protracted conflicts. The settler-Palestinian economic andresource utilization disparities inflame what is already a hostile interaction. The set-tlers’ standard of living is relatively high in Israeli terms (Leibovich-Dar, 2002;Meridor, 1997). In contrast, about 600,000 Palestinians live in refugee camps in the

19 In the territories, from Sept 29, 2000 to Nov 30, 2002, 1534 Palestinians were killed by Israelisecurity forces, 25 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians, and 168 Israeli civilians and 137 Israelisecurity personnel were killed by Palestinians (B’Tselem, 2002).

20 Yasser Arafat, e.g., says the settlements’ goal is to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian Stateand undermine its geographical integrity (FMEP Jan, 2000). Palestinian leader Marwan Barguti says thesettlements frighten the Palestinians and kills their hopes for a state (Ha’aretz Apr. 4, 1997).


territories (Ha’aretz Mar 31, 2000), and, as noted, 50% of all Palestinians live inpoverty. Before the second intifada, having few options, about 10,000 Palestiniansworked in the settlements. As was true in other colonial situations, these workersare generally mistreated by settlers (Lein, 1999; FMEP, Sept, 1999; B’Tselem, 1999;Yediot Dec 8, 2000). Natural resource utilization is skewed in favor of the settlers.For example, the settlers’ water consumption per capita is almost six times that ofthe Palestinians, many of whom do not have running water (Ha’aretz Jul 31, 1998;Hass, 1999; Yediot Mar 8, 2001; B’Tselem, 2001). The settlers—about 15% of thetotal population in the West Bank—control about 42% of the land (Ha’aretz May14, 2002). In the Gaza Strip, the settlers consist of one-half of one percent of thetotal population, but utilize about 20% of the land (Haas, 1999). Roy (1995), Kadriand Macmillen (1998) and Hass (1999) argue that Israel has maintained the occu-pation by deliberately keeping the territories underdeveloped. This claim could betrue, but its full evaluation is outside the scope of this study. Regardless of thisparticular interpretation, Palestinian poverty, settler-Palestinian disparities, and set-tler-Palestinian violence are daily realities.

The geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution

The Bible tells the story of Josiah, King of Judah, who fought against Egypt.The place of the battle—Meggido—is better known by its New Testament name:Armageddon. One does not need to turn to the Bible in order to realize that theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict may lead to Armageddon. This section considers the geo-politics of conflict resolution.

The literature on political geography suggests two basic ways to resolve ethnic–nationalist territorial conflicts: power sharing arrangements between rival groups(e.g., binational state, autonomy) or territorial separation. These approaches are hotlydebated. Supporters of separation (e.g., Mearsheimer & Van Evera, 1995; Kaufman,1998) argue that it reduces ethnic friction, provides outlets for nationalist urges,and mimics an observed norm: ethnic groups typically live in separate nation-states.Opponents of separation (e.g., Schaeffer, 1990; Etzioni, 1993; Kumar, 1997) notedifficulties in implementing territorial separation. For example, groups may beattached to the land and refuse to relinquish claims to it. Or, groups may be highlyintermingled, requiring population transfers. As noted by Klieman (2000), himselfa supporter of separation, territorial fragmentation may also imply economic costsand promote a sense of external insecurity. Moreover, ethnic-nationalist territorialconflicts may continue following separation. Waterman (2002), for example, claimsthat separation may foster ethnic-nationalist conflict resolution in the short run, butit may not promote normalization of relations in the long run. Evaluating the prosand cons of separation, Horowitz (1985: 588) summarizes that when ethnic–national-ist conflicts are severe “perhaps it is a mistake to seek accommodation among theantagonists. If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogenous state,perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, evenif this necessitates population transfers.”


Mearsheimer (1997) argues that historically, power sharing arrangements estab-lished in the wake of intense ethnic–nationalist territorial violence eventually failed.21

But it also is possible to find examples in which territorial separation failed to resolveethnic–nationalist territorial conflicts, as well as examples in which rival ethnicgroups resolved their conflicts without separation.22 But we should not conflateempirics with logic. Logically, both power sharing and territorial separation canresolve ethnic territorial conflicts only if they are supported by both groups. Plansimposed by one side on the other or forced by external actors on one or both groups,will likely fail sooner or later. Empirical observations indicate that success requiresthat both groups agree to end the conflict, the opposition in each group accepts theright of the majority to decide which plan is best, and the majorities in each groupare ready to enforce their wills on respective extremists who wish to derail the con-flict resolution (Darby & MacGinty, 2000).

One may argue that the experience of Israeli Jewish and Arab citizens suggeststhat it is best to form a binational, Israeli-Palestinian state in all of Palestine (fordiscussion, see Falah & Newman, 1995; and Imsalam, 1993). However, Israeli Jewsand Arabs agreed to power sharing, whereas most Palestinians and Israeli Jews haveconsistently rejected the notion of a binational state (Newman, 2002). The mostrealistic approach to resolving the conflict is one that employs separate Israeli andPalestinian states. As shown, this also is the goal of most Israelis and Palestinians.23

I have argued that after 1967 the Israeli-Palestinian relationship became colonial.As noted, however, some scholars argue that the conflict has always been aboutpartition. In essence, many Israeli policymakers also operate under this assumption.For example, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon apparently rejects evacuation of settle-ments (Ha’aretz Apr 22, 2002). He is willing to consider a Palestinian state in about40% of the territories, provided that Israel first defeats Palestinian terrorism (Sharon,2002). Some Labor officials advocate unilateral separation from the territories. Thisidea goes back to 1995 when, following attacks, Rabin wanted to build a fence alongthe Green Line. Unilateral separation goes beyond a fence, however, as it requiresannexation of parts of the West Bank, and withdrawal from others.24

These plans are not likely to resolve the conflict. Sharon’s plan identifies Palestin-ian terrorism as the primary problem. Terrorism, however, is merely a symptom ofthe problem: Israeli colonialism. So far, military might has not defeated terrorism,and probably never will. The unilateral separation plan assumes Israeli-Palestinian

21 Contemporary Lebanon seems to refute this generalization, but, as noted by Klieman (2000), thefuture of Lebanon’s ethnic rivalries is still not clear.

22 For example, the India-Pakistan relationship since their 1947 separation has been hostile and the twofought several wars. In Belgium and Great Britain, power sharing arrangements between rival ethnicgroups were able to create a stable and peaceful political environment.

23 For a similar conclusion, see Khalidi (1992); Falah and Newman (1995); Newman and Falah (1997);Falah (1997); Klieman (2000), and Newman (2002). The conflict resolution plans suggested by the PeelCommission, UN (1947), and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon also were based on the notion ofIsraeli-Palestinian territorial separation.

24 Several unilateral separation plans have been proposed. Former Israeli Prime Minister Barak, e.g.,calls on Israel to annex strips along the Jordan River and the Green Line (Yediot Apr 5, 2002).


contact is the main problem. While this plan is closer to decolonization than Sharon’splan, it is rejected by the Palestinians (Ha’aretz Jun 11, 2002). Unilateral separationis not likely to end the conflict either, since success requires acceptance by both sides.

Resolving the conflict requires recognition of its cause: Israeli colonialism. Resolv-ing the conflict then, requires Israeli decolonization. It is possible to argue that col-onialism can also end without decolonization. For example, the colonization of theUS denied independence for the Native Americans, but today it is not thought of asa place to be decolonized. The American (or Australian or Canadian) model, how-ever, is not feasible for ending Israeli colonialism. In the US, the natives eventuallybecame citizens. If the Palestinians were to become Israeli citizens, within a fewyears Israel would become overwhelmingly Palestinian and lose its Jewish character(as the Palestinian population growth rate is much higher than the Israeli growthrate). Opinion polls show consistently that keeping a long term Jewish majority isthe most important thing for most Israelis (Newman, 2002).

To be sure, the conflict has not always been colonial. At first it was a dispute overland. Since 1967, and particularly after 1977, the relationship changed fundamentally.Although Israel never formally annexed the territories, its practice has been colonial:Palestinians are denied independence; Israel confiscates land and controls daily life;Palestinians and settlers live in separate societies; and settlers are much richer thanPalestinians and command the lion’s share of resources. Historically, colonial powershave denied independence to native populations. Eventually, the people rebelled anddecolonization soon followed. Along similar lines, at first the Palestinians were rela-tively passive when faced with rising Israeli dominance. Eventually, they rebelledand demanded statehood. The rebellion triggered an Israeli attempt at decolonization,but the process has been slow and indecisive.

Implementing Israeli decolonizatioin

In the second intifada, while talks continued under Barak, there were no Palestin-ian suicide bombings inside Israel proper. When Sharon’s government nullified theJanuary 2001 informal Israeli-Palestinian accord, the Palestinians became desperateand turned to suicide bombing. In the mid-1990s, Palestinians also used this tactic,but then the attacks were the work of a radical minority, and were not supported bymost Palestinians. In the second intifada, people from across the Palestinian politicalspectrum are responsible for attacks, and they are supported by most Palestinians.In 1996, for example, 70% of the Palestinians opposed suicide bombings againstIsraelis (CPRS March 29–31, 1996). In 2002, 68.1% of Palestinians supported suicidebombings against Israelis (JMCC May 29–31 and June 1–2, 2002).

The two sides no longer trust each other (and perhaps never fully did). Withouttrust, peace remains impossible. One may develop trust by building on the Graduateand Reciprocated Initiative in Tension Reduction (GRIT) approach (Osgood, 1971).GRIT calls for unilateral cooperative action and an invitation to respond in kind,followed by more actions as the other side reciprocates. Actions should be verifiableand stick to a schedule, and the intensity of cooperation should grow over time.


Arguably, the Oslo process was an application of GRIT that failed because it wasdeemed non credible. By continuing to expand the settlements during the Oslo pro-cess, Israel, in effect, signaled an intent to stay in the territories, which paved theroad for the second intifada.

In implementing Israeli decolonization, GRIT needs to be modified. First, the endgame of Israeli decolonization and formation of a Palestinian state in its place shouldbe clearly declared at the outset. In return, the Palestinians would formally give upon the right of return to Israel proper of Palestinian refugees displaced during the1948 Arab-Israeli war. If the refugees and their descendants were to return to Israelproper, Israel would lose its character as a Jewish state. Second, the actors shouldmove quickly and simultaneously; graduated and sequential efforts, as in the originalGRIT (and the Oslo process), are likely to fail because they enable militants to derailthe process. Following those declarations, Israel should move its forces back to theirSeptember 2000 position, and pass legislation to stop settlement expansion activities.The PA should call on Palestinians to stop attacking Israel and deploy its forces toprevent attacks. Israel would then evacuate a few settlements and announce a rela-tively short timetable for further decolonization, and the PA would collect arms heldby militants. Both sides should invite the international community to monitor andassist their activities. Importantly, however, the PA would probably not be able toimmediately stop all attacks on Israel. A decline in the number of attacks requiresPalestinian public support for militants to fall substantially. This, in turn, requiresmanifest Israeli decolonization.

Some may argue that it is not feasible to relocate many people from the territoriesto Israel proper. Historical experience demonstrates otherwise. For example, morethan a million French settlers left Algeria shortly after the French decolonization. Inthe 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Greeks left Turkey following a Greek-Turkishpeace agreement. Moreover, Israel itself evacuated several thousand settlers fromthe Sinai Peninsula in 1982, following a peace agreement with Egypt.

A stronger argument against Israeli decolonization is the risk of Israeli civil war.The fear of losing Jewish unity is rooted in Jewish collective memory, but memorydoes not necessarily produce accurate historical account. Yerushalmi (1982) con-cludes that until the 18th century, Jewish collective memory was based on Jewishtheology. Then, Jewish historiography became scientific. “For the first time history,not a sacred text, becomes the arbiter of Judaism (Yerushalmi, 1982: 86).” Jewishtheology attributes the Jewish defeat against the Romans and the destruction of theSecond Temple to Jewish civil war (Yerushalmi, 1982: 113). It is important to note,however, that while a Jewish civil war did occur, the Jews were defeated in theirwar against the Roman Empire because they were militarily much weaker than theRomans. By way of a (hypothetical) analogy, the Jews defeating the Roman Empirewould resemble the state of Israel defeating Russia. If the Jews were united, theirwar against the Romans probably would have lasted longer, but would still haveended in a Jewish defeat.

Rabin’s and Barak’s governments did not evacuate settlements, despite their incli-nations to do so, out of fear of civil war. But must internal strife over the settlementslead to civil war? And if it does, must it be so intense as to destroy the state of Israel?


Israeli decolonization requires that the settlers return to Israel proper. Historically,decolonization attempts that involved many settlers faced opposition, but the extentof the opposition varied across cases.

The evacuation of settlements will likely face some opposition, but the outcomeof civil war is not inevitable. First, most Israelis reject violence as a form of oppo-sition against the evacuation of settlements In October 1999, for example, 91.1% ofIsraelis rejected violence as a form of opposition (Mideastweb, 1999), and in Nov-ember 2000, 86% rejected such violence (Yediot Nov 3, 2000). The likelihood ofviolence is expected to decline with the rise in public support for evacuation. Pollsare showing this trend. For example, in December 2000, 55% of Israelis supportedfull or partial evacuation of settlements (Yediot Dec 8, 2000). By May 2001, 62%agreed to stop all settlement expansion in return for a cease-fire (Yediot May 4,2001). In June, 52% supported forced evacuation of settlements (Ha’aretz Jul 4,2001). Support for full or partial evacuation was 59% in February 2002 (Yediot Feb22, 2002), and in March 2002, 74% supported some evacuation, and 46% supportedevacuating most or all the settlements (Ha’aretz Mar 5, 2002). Moreover, severalGush Emunim and Yesha (an acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) Council leadersreject violence and say that the settlers would accept a Jewish majority decision toevacuate; while other settler leaders argue the Jewish people’s well-being is moreimportant than land (Ben Meir, 1995; Porat, 1994; Zarembski, 2000; Yediot June22, 2001).

Second, the settlers are not homogenous. About 45–50% of the settlers arereligious. Two thirds of the religious settlers are Zionists, while the rest are ultra-orthodox (Meridor, 1997; Zarembski, 2000). Historically, the attitude of the ultra-orthodox Jews towards the state of Israel has been ambivalent, at times hostile. Thesesettlers are waiting for the coming of the Messiah, reject the fundamentalists’ empha-sis on the holiness of Greater Israel, and do not share their unyielding vision on itsindivisibility (Zarembski, 2000; Schiff, 1992). The ultra-orthodox settlers are prim-arily concerned with living in exclusive spaces, where the focus is put on religiouseducation and the welfare of their own communities. Therefore, they are unlikely toresist evacuation.

The geographical distribution of settlers in the West Bank further reflects differ-ences in terms of their reasons for living there, and willingness to leave peacefully.In an early survey, Weisburd and Waring (1985) found that 50% of the settlersmoved to the territories because of religious-ideological reasons, 25% came in orderto improve their quality of life, and another 25% did not support either view. In arecent similar survey, 56% of the settlers—located mostly along the Green Line—cite standard of living; 4%—located mostly in the Jordan Valley—cite nationalsecurity, and 27%—located mostly in the heartland of the West Bank—cite funda-mentalist ideology (Begin-Sadat Center, 1999).

It is generally expected that the 5000 (or so) settlers in the Jordan Valley com-munities established under the Allon Plan would leave peacefully, if ordered. About60% of the settlers that live along the Green Line, which includes the ultra-orthodox,would probably leave peacefully if compensated financially. The remaining 30–35%are fundamentalists that might resist evacuation (The Economist Apr 13, 2002; Rin-


gal & Ben Haaim, 2001; Ha’aretz Nov 2, 2000; Alpher, 1995). In a recent survey,68% of settlers say they accept the right of a Jewish majority to decide on with-drawal, and 26% say they will fight the decision, but only using legal means (PeaceNow, 2002). Most settlers also believe that some withdrawal is inevitable. In 1999,80% of the settlers believed Israel would eventually evacuate about 70% of the land,and were ready to relocate (Yediot May 7, 1999). During the second intifada, somehave begun to leave on their own. In 2001, settlers were leaving the territories atan annual rate of 5% (compared with 1% before), 15% were in various stages ofleaving, and 33% of the younger generation of settlers wanted to leave (Ha’aretzJul 1 and 13, Aug, 9, 2001; Yediot Jan 4, 2002).

The effect of the settlers’ proximity to Israel proper also needs to be considered.Similar to other instances of terrestrial colonialism, Israeli settlers are supported bytheir compatriots in Israel proper in various financial and military ways. The settlersalso get preferential treatment in Israeli courts deciding cases of settler violence(Newman, 1996). This support has strengthened settler-resolve in rejecting evacu-ation. But the proximity to the homeland can also ease the evacuation. The FrenchAlgerians, for example, derived their livelihood from the colony. Since the decoloniz-ation was expected to reduce their standard of living, they became more resolute inrejecting it (Lustick, 1993). Most Israeli settlers, however, work in Israel proper(Newman, 1985b; Meridor, 1997). If forced to evacuate, the standard of living ofmost settlers is not expected to decline much. Moreover, the Israeli governmentwould likely compensate financially evacuated settlers (as it did in the case of theSinai settlers), which would further convince many to leave peacefully.

Some armed resistance to settlement evacuation, however, is possible. In a 1999poll, 14% of the settlers were ready to consider violence, and 2% said they wouldresort to armed violence (Begin-Sadat Center, 1999). In a 2002 poll, 6% said theywould reject evacuation, including through illegal means. Of this 6%, a third saidthey would resort to arms to stop the withdrawal. Moreover, while some settler rabbisreject violence, the positions of others are vague (Sprinzak, 1999; Zarembski, 2000).The fiercest resistance to evacuation is concentrated in the Gaza Strip Nezarim settle-ment, and the settlements located in hill-tops around Hebron, Nablus, and Ramallah(Peace Now, 2002). The Maon Farm unapproved outpost is a case in point. In Nov-ember 1999, Barak decided to evacuate it. Yesha Council agreed, but the evacuationstill took ten hours, there was physical (if unarmed) violence, and the ordeal requiredan IDF regiment and many security personnel (Yediot Dec 29, 2000). The angrysettler response to the evacuation of a few, mostly uninhabited, unapproved outpostsin October 2002, further illustrates the possibility of violence over the evacuationof settlements (Ha’aretz Oct 16, 2002).

Conclusions

My analysis has not elaborated on several other disputed issues in Israeli-Palestin-ian relations, including the control of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees,dealing with Palestinian Islamists, the allocation of natural resources, connecting the


West Bank and Gaza Strip, and territorial swaps. One paper, of course, cannot studyeverything. It is important to note, however, that pragmatic discussions of theseissues are predicated on Israeli decolonization and the formation of a Palestinianstate.

Three of these issues deserve special attention. First, in Camp David, the Palestini-ans demanded full control over parts of East Jerusalem, seeking to make it theircapital. Israel rejected this demand. The implications for attaining peace are clear.Jerusalem should be partitioned between the two sides, so that a major part of EastJerusalem will be under full Palestinian control. A second issue involves the rightof return to Israel for Palestinian refugees from abroad. One can certainly think ofmoral arguments in favor of the right of return. However, Israel rejects the right ofreturn because it implies the loss of its Jewish character. As noted, in return for anIsraeli commitment to full decolonization, the conflict resolution strategy discussedhere calls on the Palestinians to formally give up on the right of return and to agreeto settle the issue financially. This could promote Israeli trust and raise the likelihoodof arriving at a stable peace agreement.

Third, similar to Israeli fundamentalists, the Palestinian Islamists also claim all ofGreater Israel/Palestine. Should the Palestinian Islamists reject peace even if Israelwere to fully decolonize, the conflict probably would continue. There are reasons tobelieve, however, that the Palestinian Islamists might choose peace in exchange foran Israeli return to the 1967 borders. Israel needs to openly invite the Islamists todiscuss peace. This move could force the Islamists to make a clear choice: abandonthe armed struggle or risk losing Palestinian public support. While the possibility ofan open Israeli-Palestinian Islamist dialogue currently seems remote, pragmaticforces on both sides are receptive to the idea.25 In fact, the second half of 1995 wasa period of apparent truce between Hamas and Israel, and it has been reported thatHamas representatives participated in Israeli-Palestinian talks (Jerusalem Post May18, 1996; Smith, 2001). The PLO’s moderation suggests that the position of thePalestinian Islamists may become less radical once they are brought fully into thenegotiation process.

Even if the second intifada were to be quelled—like other colonial powers, Israelmight be victorious in this round—the conflict would not end. Without Israeli deco-lonization, it is not a question of whether a third intifada will occur, but only aquestion of when. The history of colonialism suggests that eventually Israelis willchoose decolonization. When this happens, some settlers may take up arms. Thiswould represent a clash between democracy and fundamentalism. Assuming the goalis the preservation of Israeli democracy, the Israeli government should crush violent

25 For example, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin considered talks with Hamas (Time Nov7, 1994), and Hamas officials were receptive to the idea (Christian Science Monitor Nov 4, 1994). Hamasleader Sheikh Yassin said that in return for Israeli withdrawal from the territories, Hamas is ready for acease-fire (Ha’aretz July 24, 2000). Palestinian leader Marwan Barghouti said if Israel withdrew to the1967 borders, all Palestinians, including the Islamist opposition, would stop attacking Israel (Ha’aretzNov 11, 2001). The former head of the Israeli Security Service, Ami Ayalon (Yediot Sept 5, 2000), andthe new leader of Labor, Amram Mitzna, also do not rule out talks with Hamas (Ha’aretz Nov 15, 2002).


opposition to decolonization. It makes no sense to prolong the conflict: Israel shouldget out of the territories as soon as possible. It is in Israel’s interest to evacuate thesettlements sooner, rather than later, and, if needed, be prepared to respond in force,should the settlers resort to violence to derail peace.

But what if Palestinians continue to attack Israel following a peace agreement?This possibility cannot be denied. Still, once Israel resolved outstanding geopoliticalissues with Egypt and Jordan, their borders became quiet. The Israeli withdrawalfrom Lebanon also led to a sharp decline in border clashes. There is a good chancethat Israeli decolonization would lead to peace. It is important to note, however, thatthe decolonization is not a sufficient condition for peace; it only is a necessary con-dition. The issue on the table, then, is the possibility of peace versus the surety ofprotracted conflict.

Acknowledgements

I thank the editor of this journal and three reviewers for their comments andsuggestions for revision. I also thank Andrea Bartuski for feedback and research andeditorial assistance, and Rhonda Batts for research assistance. The usual dis-claimer applies.

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Fundamentalist colonialism - the geopolitics of Israeli–Palestinian conflict