Gangs Remedies

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    YOU TH GANGS AND UNION S:CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIESLorine A. Hughes and JamesF. Short, Jr.

    This paper revisits James Jacobs' interest in prison gangs. We first address crimi-nolo gists' neglect of labor corruption , then discuss the street and prison ga ngs w ithwhich Jacobs was concerned and societal responses to them. Subsequent trends instreet gangs and efforts to control them are reviewed and com pared to recent orga-nized crime control efforts. Special attention is given to civil gang injunctions (C GIs),the most popu lar civil remedy for street gangs, and special problem s they create forprison gang members who return to their communities. Research and policy in thisarea require that the great variety among communities as well as street and prisongangs be recognized.Introduction

    Before he becam e interested in union corruption and racketeering, James Jacobs 'historical and sociological study, Statesville, was a landmark examination of insti-tutional and social change as seen through the evolution of a maximum securityprison in Illinois. Among the major factors influencing the prison was a large in-flux of street gang members during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Jacobs, 1974,1977).' Although Jaco bs' work changed conventional views of this population andof the role of street gangs in prisons, the challenge to traditional understandingsabout what would happen when those prisoners returned to their comm unities w aslargely unrecognized (Fleisher and Decker, 2001a, 2001b). Today, after decades o funprecedented growth in prison populations, community re-entry of incarceratedfelons is again a hot topic, and gangs are an im portant but largely unexplored partofthe problem.Mobsters, Unions, and Feds provides an opportunity to revisit Jacobs' interestin gangs in light of subsequent developments, and to assess the feasibility andpossible effectiveness ofthe types of legal remedies he recomm ends for labor unioncorrup tion and racketeering as they might apply to street gangs. Here, again, Jacobs

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    44 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006conclusion that, in com bination with approp riate criminal prosecutions, civil trust-eeships have been the most effective of proposed rem edies. This paper briefly d is-cusses the gangs with which Jacobs was concerned, exploring the reasons behindtheir failure to achieve the type of sophistication, success, and power of Cosa Nostra.We then compare the war on organized crime to recent gang-control efforts, in-cluding civil alternatives to the traditional sole reliance on criminal sanctions ofstreet gang mem bers, giving special attention to civil gang injunctions (CG Is), thecivil remedy most often employed by local jurisdictions. We conclude with obser-vations concerning special and growing problems posed by gang mem ber re-entryto society following incarceration.

    Criminologists, Union Corruption/Racketeering, Street and Prison GangsEarly inM obsters, U nions, and Feds, Jacobs notes that "Sutherland and Cressey'sbest-selling general criminology text does not even mention labor corruption orlabor racketeering" (Jacobs, 2006: xii). A later edition of that classic text (co-authored by David Luckenbill) notes only that organized crime operations haveinfiltrated some unions and businesses, observing that officials may conspire "witha businessperson or labor leader to cheat the public" (Sutherland, Cressey, andLuckenb ill, 1992: 229). Mo re recent texts do little better.Donald Cressey's neglect of this issue is puzzling in light of the critical role heplayed as a consultant to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement andAdministration of Justice, his authorship of "The functions and structure of crimi-nal syndicates" (Cressey, 1967), and his influence on legislation that resulted inenactment of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1979(RICO). Cressey appears later to have repudiated RICO perhaps because he felt itwould be more subject to abuse than traditional criminal and civil remedies. Somebroad statutes have in fact been struck down on constitutional grounds. Cresseymight also have been troubled by the focus of RICO on individual responsibility

    rather than organizations as legal actors. Discussing "Symbiotic Relationships be-tween Criminals and Others," Cressey (with David Ward, 1969) noted that manycriminal behaviors and behavioral characteristics "might well be the properties oforganizations, subcultures, and groupsnot of individuals . . ." (p. 915). Argu-ments and docum entation in Theft of a Nation (Cressey, 1969) and Criminal Orga-nization (Cressey, 1972) also take the position that entities such as criminalorganizations were more than the sum of participating individuals.Jacobs' early work on street gangs in prison clearly indicated that the gangswere more than the sum of their individual members: "in Illinois prisons the in-

    mate organization is best understood as an extension of an identical organizationimported from the streets of Chicago"' (1974: 397); and, discussing the adjust-

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    Youth Gangs andUnions 45

    Once established in the prison, Chicago's major street gangs recruited activelyamong unaffiliated inmates. By virtue of superior num bers and increasing organi-zational sophistication and political consciousness, minority gangs soon came todom inate inmate social organization."* They dom inated p rison staff, as well. Afterseveral mo nths of observing and interviewing inmates and prison staff, Jacobs con-cluded that the gangs had been able "to force their definition of the situation ontothe lower levels of the staff" (p. 407). Importantly, he later noted that the gangs"brought with them a sense that they -WQve political prisoners, together with highexpectations about the kinds of deference they could demand of institutional au-thorities" (Jacobs 1977: 146; emp hasis added to original).Political alliances of street gangs are not new, as muckraking journalists and

    Chicago School sociologists noted many years ago (Landesco, 1929; Riis, 1890,1902; Steffens, 1931; Thrasher, 1927/1963). Although early accounts em phasizedthe mutual interests and usefulness of gangs to politicians and political m achines,studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s reported little political conscious-ness or interest in politics among street gang members in Chicago (Short, 1976;Short and Mo land, 1976). Change o ccurred w ith the emergence of the supergangs,the civil rights movement. President Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty," and sig-nificant support from private foundations and institutions andgovernmental agen-cies. Interpretation of these changes vary greatly, however, depending upon theperspective of the interpreter (Dawley, 1979; Fry, 1969,1973; Miller, 1974; Skolnick,1969; Sherman, 1970; Short, 1976; United States Senate, 1968).

    W hat is not in dispute is that the expansion of three black gangs the BlackstoneRangers (later the Black P. Stone Nation), the Devil's Disciples (also referred to asthe Black G angster Disciple Nation), and the Vice Lords, who renamed themselvesthe Conservative Vice Lordswas accompanied by their stated intentions to "goconservative," that is, becom e legitimate.^ These g oals received m aterial andmoralsupport from a variety of public and private institutions, including grants fromfoundations, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare(HEW), and the federal O ffice of Economic Opportunity (O EO ). HE W and privatefoundations provided support for Youth Organization U nited, which was organizedto promote and coordinate self-help programs among minority youth in severalcities. An OEO grant of nearly a million dollars funded the Youth Manpower Projectin Chicago, designed ostensibly to provide academic skills to ghetto youth and tosecure job s for them in private industry (Jacobs, 1977; Short, 1976).

    The theory on which these and other programs were developed was that streetgangs, indigenous to their comm unities and p ossessing at least minimal leadershipand organizational structure, had the potential to lift their mem bersand perhapsother young peopleout of poverty and crime by means of education and jobtraining andplacem ent. P rojects such a s Youth Manpower clearly failed, however,

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    46 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006(Dawley, 1979; Short, 1976). Critics charged that the projects were riddled withfraud and that the gangs used government resources as a front to their continuingcriminal activities. The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcom mittee on Investigations ofthe Comm ittee on Government Operations (named the M cClellan comm ittee, afterits chairman. Senator John McClellan) documented massive fraud in the Man-power project and the tortured path by which the grant from the Office of Eco-nomic Opportunity was secured (United States Senate, 1968).'' Running throughoutthe comm ittee hearing documents are the political struggles between TheWoodlawnOrganization (TWO, which received the grant). Reverend Fry (minister ofthe churchin which many gang m eetings occurred), and Chicago officialdom, including thePolice Departm ent and the Mayor's office. Although the com mittee's findings weretainted by charges of comm ittee bias and harassm ent by police and o ther authori-ties (Skolnick, 1969),'' the troubles it highlighted were followed shortly after, in1969, by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's "war on gangs" (gangresearch.net).*Controversy continues concerning both the program s and official responses to them,including charges that some prominent gang leaders were "framed" by officials.

    The extent of political consciousness and activity among gan gs, past and present,is a matter of much conjecture and little concrete information. During the periodimmediately preceding Jacobs' prison researchthe late 1960sChicago streetgangs grew rapidly and changed dramatically, as race-related rioting occurred inthe city and in many other U.S. cities. The behavior of street gangs during theseriots provided am munition for both sides of arguments concerning the performanceand motivations of gang mem bers. W hen the Blackstone R angers allegedly helped"co ol" Chicago's south side following the death of Martin L uther King, supportersof the gang s and their critics reacted. Reverend Fry averred, with approv al, that thiswas the ga ng s' "way of saying 'You have to reckon w ith us because, if we cannotstop one (a riot), well, you know the alternative.' This was a naked display of p ower"(quoted in Skolnick 1969:168 ). TheViolence Commission Report (Skolnick, 1969)considered gang behavior, along with student militancy (black and wh ite) and BlackPanther demands for political and cultural autonomy, as reflective of the blackliberation m ovement. Meanw hile, in order to document gang m isbehavior and re-fute the rationale of the program and the rationalizations of local supporters, theMcClellan committee produced testimony ofa former member ofthe BlackstoneRan gers, a reported interview ofthe president ofthe Rang ers (from the Cook CountyJail), and a psychologist who had worked briefly w ith the O EO p rogram. Althoughnot addressing the role of gangs specifically, the Chicago Tribune chimed in bycondemning all black student protest as "designed to keep the schools in convul-sion" and as a tool "to generate a revolutionary climate" (Skolnick, 1969: 374).Perhaps the most balanced appraisal of what happened during the late 1960s wasprovided by Walter Miller, who distinguished between the "m ilitant m odel" (e.g.,

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    Youth Gangs and Unions 47the predicted transformation of American youth gangs never occurred. Even during thepeak period of politieization, the actual proportion of youth gangs involved was small,with the great majority of gang youth remaining essentially unaffected by political/social activism. Even among those most affected, there is little evidence that activismreplaced illegal and/or violent pursuits; rather, traditional activities such as theft, as-sault, extortion, and various "hustles" were carried on in conjunction with, and fre-quently as an intrinsic part of, political and social reform undertakings (pp. 232-233,emphasis in original).The prospect of politically militant gangs, or of gangs aggressively pursuingsocial betterm ent, clearly threatened entrenched po litical power outside of, as wellas within, the prison. However, the extent to which members of street gangs who

    were not incarcerated shared the beliefs, expectations, and militancy of the gangleaders and members observed by Jacobs in the prison is unclearor, if they did,how long such comm itment lasted. W hile Miller (1974,1 976) believed it was short-lived, John H agedorn and others argue that the social upheavals ofth e 1960s werefollowed by even more massive changes that "created fertile conditions for thegrowth of gangs" and in some cases their institutionalization as "permanent socialactors in communities, cities, and nations...." (Hagedorn, 2005: 154; see alsoHagedorn 2 006). 'W hen incarcerated militant gang m embers returned to their comm unities, some

    became politically involved. Political activism of gangs peaked during the 1980sand 1990s, when the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGD N, with the "Gan gsterDisciple" changed to "Growth and Development"), under the leadership of LarryHoover, launched and actively participated in 21st Century Voices of Total Em-pow ermen t (VOT E), wh ich prom oted voter-registration and other types of politicalactivism and com munity betterment prog ram s.'" Except for the most extreme cases,however, political activism by street gang members has occurred within the politi-cal system rather than in opposition to it." Perhaps the most well-known contem-porary example of political transformation among street gangs involved theAlmighty Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN) in New York. Between 1995and 1999, hundreds of Latin K ings and Q ueens rallied around a charismatic leaderemerging out of prison, Antonio Fernandez (a.k.a. King Tone), anti-establishmentsentim ents, self-betterment, and a newfound sense of ethnic identity and righteous-ness (Brotherton and B arrios, 2004). Ultimately, however, the AL KQ N was unableto sustain itself as a sociopolitical movement. As happened to its predecessors inChicago, the Nation finally succumbed to mounting external pressures, inadequatecommunity support, and internal contradictions. Since then, no street gang hascome close to achieving the same level of politicization.

    Contemporary Street Gangs

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    48 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006with organized crime groups and subjected to criminal sanctions without regard tosuch variation. Although some gangs are akin to Cosa Nostra and other criminalorganizations in that they have long histories, are primarily comprised of "others,"and engage in crime and violence, few resemble the labor racketeers described byJacobs and targeted by civil RICO trusteeships. While the latter were politicallywell-connected and focused primarily on manipulating legitimate businesses andpublic trust in order to exact large mone tary pro fits, today 's street gangs are m ainlyabout belonging, identity, and status (Klein, 1995).'^

    "Criminal organizations such as the Gangster Disciples, Crips, Bloo ds, M S -1 3 ,and Latin Kings are dangerous entities. But these groups are an anomaly in thegang world; they represent the worst of what gangs can become, not what mostgangs are" (Papachristos, 2005: 55). Most modern-day gangs, like their counter-parts in the 1960s and 1970s, appear to have little access to the political and eco-nom ic power structure. Gangs typically develop in marginalized contexts, and mostgang members participate in small-time and relatively unorganized street hustles.Few contemporary gangs attempt to penetrate conventional businesses or other-wise present a legitimate front; even fewer have succeeded.

    Street gangs typically are not tightly knit groups o f criminals, but like organ izedcrime they constitute a significant social problem. Large and important variationsexist among gangs, however, and what works to control criminal organizationsmay not work for the majority of street gangs, and vice versa. "Treating all gangmembers like mafia kingpins or terrorist masterminds is overestimating peoplewho, more often than no t, are petty delinq uents" (Papach ristos, 2005: 55). Althoughstreet gangs that most closely resemble organized criminal groups present speciallaw enforcement and comm unity problems, it would be unwise and perhaps coun -terproductive to focus primarily on those few.

    Community and Law Enforcement Strategies of Gang ControlWyrick and Howell (2004) note that although a very large num ber of gang co n-trol program s and strategies have been mounted, continuing gang problems make itclear that neither easy nor quick solutions exist. They advocate a "comprehensivecom munity-wide approach" involving long-term prevention, intervention, and sup-pression efforts, combined with "sound program documentation and evaluation"(p . 25). Malcolm Klein and Ch eryl Maxson 's (2006) masterly review of nearly 60of the best-documented programs (some ongoing, others no longer operating) re-ports that few if any of these have been rigorously evaluated. Moreover, suppres-sion of existing gangs or preventing young people from joining gangs were primary

    goals of most programs, with intervention occurring in only about one-third ofthose examined. The majority of the programs have focused on changing individu-

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    Youth Ga ngs and Union s 49

    Klein's thoughtful assessment of approaches to handling gang problems, putforth more than a decade ago, remains salient. While conceding that some pro-grams have achieved temporary reductions in gang membership and prevented som eyoung people from joining gangs, he concluded that "(e)ven if the whole reservoirof potential gan gs were exhausted in the next yea rs, other group formations . . .provide a new potential supply for the proliferation of gangs" (Klein, 1995: 212).Klein's rationale, reflecting consensus among those who have studied gangs mostcarefully, wasand remainsthat gangs reflect universal needs among youngpeople for status, identity, and companionship. When legitimate means of achiev-ing these are not found in the community, the seeds for troublesome youth groupsare sown. Indeed, even when legitimate avenues for the expression of such needsare available, unsupervised youth group s form as a norm al part of growing up. It isthe manner in which communities react to them that is most critical to how theseyoung people choose their identities and how they organize and establish statuscriteria. The fact that large numbers of gang m embers have been convicted of crimes,as is now the case, poses special problems for law enforcement and for communities.

    Despite the relative neglect of community contexts, Klein observed that gangcontrol programs ap pear to have cycled through from an early em phasis on com -munity-level programming to prevention, treatment, and then suppression, and backagain to focus on communities (Klein, 1995: 136-137, 152 ff). To the extent thatthis is the case, comm unities residents, institutions, businesses, and so on bearspecial responsibilities for gang and crime control. Among law enforcement andothers steeped in the tradition of suppression, civil remedies are perhaps the clearestrealization of the importance of the commu nity in addressing the gang problem.

    Criminal vs. Civil Remedies asApplied to Street GangsThe suppression model of gang control reached its zenith in the 1980s, whenallegations of a gang-crack nexus coincided w ith a growing tendency amon g fed-

    eral and local law enforcement agencies to blur the distinction between organizedcrime and youth street gangs (Klein, 1995). At abou t the same time that state legis-latures throughout the country began enacting anti-gang laws modeled after crimi-nal RICO statutes,'^ "several early civil remed y cases captured the attention of thepublic and law enforcement community, and catapulted the use of civil remediesfrom relative obscurity to mainstream crime prevention" (Mazerolle and Roehl,1998: 3-4). Recognizing that criminal sanctions had failed to stop the advance ofgangs and gang crim e, a number of jurisdictions determined to supplement use oftKe" criminaf law with civil remedies. Rather than triisteesffips^ civil gang injuric-tions (CGIs) have been the favored civil alternative.'''Pioneered in California during the early 1980s, CGIs are an increasingly popu-

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    50 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006tions" gathered from police and community residents (Maxson, Hennigan, andSloane, 2003). "The suit asks that named members (and usually the rest of thegang) be prohibited, within a specified geographic area, from a range of activities,"both legal and illegal (Maxson, 2004: 377). If legal criteria are met, the presidingcivil court judg e issues a preliminary injunction, which beco mes perm anent if thedefendants fail to file a response to the lawsuit within the specified tim e period ordo not prevail in civil court proceedings.'^ Gang members who then violate theconditions of the injunction may be incarcerated and/or fined. In some cases, theprosecuting attorney also pursues "probation conditions" that were not specifiedin the CG I. These include "search and seizu re" provisions, prohibition of associa-tion with other gang members, and even "exclusion" from neighborhoods (L.A.City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section, 1995: 327).In what may be the latest trend in the "w ar" against gang s, CGIs are being im ple-mented or sought in a growing n umb er of u risdictions in California and elsewherein the country (M axson, Henn igan, and Sloane, 2003). Much of their appeal stemsfrom the shift of proceedings from criminal to civil courts, where legal safeguardsfavoring defendants are less burdensom e (Geis, 2002). Criminal justice agents andothers in the field also believe that the injunctions provide them with a powerfulnew tool against enjoined gangs (and perhaps other gangs in the area), signifi-cantly reducing their criminal activities and the fear and aggravation they inspireamong law-abiding com munity residents.'*As with civil remedies to organized crim e, CGIs are intended to break up offen-sive groups and prevent crime by eliminating the type of activity that typically"precedes and furthers" such behavior (L.A. City Attorney Gang P rosecution Sec-tion, 1995: 326). The stated goals and arguments of CGI supporters reflect Wilsonand Kelling's "Broken Windows" theory and its emphasis on problem-orientedpolicing, quality of life concerns, and "prevalent and low-key troubles" rather thanserious crimes (Stewart, 1998:22 52). Beyond these, however, the hope is expressedthat CGIs may also achieve their effects through a process of deterrence, bothgeneral and specific, and by promoting collective efficacy in the community, re-ducing criminal opportunities, and/or disrupting criminogenic group processes(Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2005; Mazerolle and Roehl, 1998), includingweakening gang identity and decreasing "levels of participation in gang-relatedbehavior, especially am ong nonco re me m bers" (M axson et al., 200 5: 582).

    Although civil gang injunctions have been heralded by some media and localautho rities as an "unqualified success," they remain controversial (see Boga, 1994;M axson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2003; W hitbread and M azza, 1999). Because gangmembers may be prosecuted for otherwise legal behaviorsloitering, carryingpagers, flashing gang signs, wearing gang clothing, associating with other gangmembersand are not granted the same due process protections as in criminal

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    Youth Gangs and Unions 51civil liberties of a few in favor of enhanced public safety and reclaiming publicspaces. Concerns over the disproportionate impact o f CG Is on black and Hispanicyouth have likewise failed to create substantial legal waves; and they are unlikelyto present significant challenges in the future p rovided they effectively coun ter thepublic nuisance posed by gangs and are widely supported by comm unity residents,most of whom are themselves people of color (see Stewart, 1998).

    Unfortunately, the issuance of CG Is has far outpaced systematic program evalu-ation, and the few existing studies have produced conflicting results. Two of thethree studies that com pared preand post-CGI crime rates reported discouragingfindings, with substantial increases in crime following the issuance of an injunc-tion (Maxson and Allen, 1997; Am erican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU ) of South-ern California, 1997). However, the Inglewood injunction studied by Maxson andAllen "was not enforced because of the department's failure to provide resourceswhen federal funds w ere depleted," and the ACLU study of the San Fernand o Val-ley injunction has been challenged on methodological grounds (Maxson, Henn igan,and Sloane, 2003: 256). The third study, conducted in Los Angeles County, re-ported a five to ten percent reduc tion in violent crimes but not property crim esacross 14 injunctions sites (Grogger, 20 02 ). There was no evidence of displacementto neighborhoods outside the targeted areas. Only one study (Maxson, Hennigan,and Sloane, 2005) has examined the commu nity impact of CG Is. Survey responsesfrom residents in five San Bernardino neighborhoods revealed "positive evidenceof short-term effects in the disordered, primary injunction area [Upper Flats], in -cluding less gang presence, fewer reports of gang intimidation, and less fear ofconfrontation with gang me m bers" (Maxson et al., 2005: 578). Yet, few intermedi-ate or long-term effects were observed . There w as also evidence of increased gangactivity and heightened concern with gangs in the less disordered, secondary in-junction area.

    Given the shortage of rigorous program evaluation, definitive co nclusions aboutthe efficacy of CGIs and community support for them are not possible. However,Jacobs' review of civil RICO suits suggests that the effects of CGIs are probablymore variable than is suggested by the volum es of anecdotal ev idence employed intheir defense. When applied to unions corrupted by organized crime, civil rem-edies produced disparate results, with success largely dependent on a fortunate"confluence of factors, some well planned and executed, others merely fortuitous"(Jacobs: 182). CGIs can be expected to have equally diverse effects in the gangworld, with its even greater variability in organizational structures and patterns ofbehavior. Althoug h flexibility is one of the primary strengths of civil remedies, asJacobs notes (see also Maxson, H ennigan, and Sloane 200 3), CGIs are not a silverbullet, to be put into action and left to finish the job on their own. As is the case ofcivil RICO trusteeships, "success is very hard to achieve" (Jacobs, p. 252).

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    52 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006settlement; proper empowerment and financing of the trusteeship; shrewd choice of atrustee; a well-thought-through program of reform; an evaluation strategy and patience.The dem ands of comm unity-based gang problems are no less daunting. In addi-tion to long-term investment of time, personnel, and resources, intimate knowl-edge of communities as well as enjoined gangs and commu nities is necessary, andsuccess is by no means assured. It is clear, as well, that promotion of collectiveefficacy in communities requires the active participation of local residents (seeSampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbasch, and Earls, 1997).Lip-service is often paid to "community mobilization" and "restoration of criticalmunicipal services which are essential for improving the quality of life for resi-

    dents of the neighborhoo d" (L.A . City Attorney G ang Prosecution Section, 1995:329), but there is little evidence of its achievement following the issuance of CGIs.Jacobs observes that RICO trusteeships attempt to democratize the unions and thecontexts in which organized crim e flourishes. In con trast, CGIs tend not to be em-bedded within a larger program of neighborhood reform. L ike most anti-gang strat-egies, the perception underlying CGIs is that gangs are the cause, rather than asymptom, of poor neighborhood health, and their elimination will be curative.Ap proaches that address the underlying cond itions that give rise to gangs and gangbanging clearly involve more than superficial signs of neighborhood disorder anddisrepair. CGIs aimed primarily at fixing "broken windows" are little differentfrom previous gang suppression efforts that have failed repeatedly (but see M axson ,Hennigan, and Sloane, 2003).

    Prisoner Re-Entry, Communities, and CGIs: Paradox or Opportunity?Jacobs' study of Statesville Penitentiary was prescient of what was to come inprisons and in the larger society as gangs proliferated in communities throughoutthe land and cam e to dominate inmate organization in many p risons.'* For a variety

    of reasons, however, neither prison gangs nor their mem bers ' homecom ing experi-ences have received much scholarly attention (Fong and Buentello, 1991). MarkFleisher and Scott Deckerboth with extensive research and policy-related gangexperience note that little, if any, prison gang data exist and that data concerningwhat happens to former prison gang m emb ers when they return to their com mun i-ties are rarer still (Fleisher and Decker, 2001a, b)."David E. Olson and Brendan D. Dooley's (2006) critical review of studies of thelatter type is instructive, however. Olson and Dooley note that:First, only juvenile offenders have been studied, and juveniles account for a relativelysmall proportion of those arrested and are an incomplete representation of the gang

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    Youth Gangs and Unions 53tently operationalizes recidivism, ranging from rearrest to reincarceration to self-re-ported involvement in delinquent behavior (p. 248).Olson and Dooley compared 3,364 adult probationers and 2,534 adult paroleesreleased from supervision or incarceration in the state of Illinois in November,2000. Controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and criminal and substanceabuse histories, they found that gang mem bers among probationers were more thanthree times as likely to be arrested after two years than were non-gang probation-ers. In contrast, parolee gang m embers w ere only 20 % m ore likely to be rearrestedthan their non-gang counterparts. O lson and Dooley note that probationers consti-tute a much more heterogeneous population than parolees, especially in their criminal

    and drug abuse h istories, and that this may accoun t for the large recidivism differ-ence between the populations. G ang mem bership was less prevalent am ong proba-tioners (6 percent) than among parolees (24 percent), thus providing law enforcementwith a more distinctive gang target population among probationers, especially inurban areas where gangs tend to be concentrated. The study had no data on pos-sible police targeting of gang m em bers. Neverthe less, it is clear that gang member-ship poses special problems for law enforcement and for crime control.A m ajor weakness of studies on what happens to gang m embers w hen they re-turn home, including Olson and Dooley's, is their exclusive focus on recidivism.

    The studies tell us little about why gang membership is associated with higher ratesof rearrest. Although po lice crackdow ns surely are part of the answer, Fleisher andDecker (2001a, 200 1b) point to special problems associated w ith the integration o fgang members into the community following incarceration, including limited jobprospects, substance abuse problems, poor neighborhood conditions, and contin-ued gang identification. M ore research is needed concerning how com mu nity cul-tures and available economic and social niches vary among racial and ethnicpopulations and how they affect the problems and integration of returning felons(see, e.g., Finestone, 1967). In addition, more than "only a rudim entary know ledgeof the . . . interplay between street gangs and prison gang s" is required (Fleisherand Decker, 200 1b: 2). Some prison gangs m ore closely resemble criminal organi-zations than the street gangs of their origin, but some of the most infamous con-tempo rary street gangs trace their origins to an institutional setting. Although prisongangs and their street counterparts often operate quite differently and have onlylimited contact with one another (see, e.g., Brotherton and Barrios, 2004 for adescription of the New York City Latin Kings), the extent of communication be-tween the two may be increasing and influencing both the nature of street gangsand what happen s to prison gang mem bers upon their release. As Jacobs (2001: vi)notes, "[t]he worst-case scenario is that prison gangs serve to strengthen gangs onthe street." As more street gang members are incarcerated, this may well happen.

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    54 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006bated when they are enjoined from associating with known gang members, someof whom may be family m em bers and the only readily available resource for hous-ing, finding employment, and social support. Private association is also inherentlydifficult to police effectively. To the extent that a CGI strategy is employed to aid inthe suppression of gang activities, community alternatives to association w ith gangsalso must be provided. Failure to do so may make it impossible for the returningprison gang member to adjust to his (or her) life on the outside without turning tonegative street elements, thereby furthering the connection between gangs insideand outside prison walls.

    W here Do We Go from Here?

    The limited success of governmental "wars" against organized crime, as well asdrugs, is likely to be replicated w ith respect to ongoing efforts to eradicate gangs.Just as corrupted labor unions experienced widely differing impacts of civil RIC Otrusteeships, the ubiquity and diversity of unsupervised youth group formation andthe persistence of forces associated w ith their criminal behavior do no t lend them-selves to blanket policies and solutions. In Mobsters, Unions, and Feds, Jacobsbuilds a strong case for more careful fact-finding and better understanding of tar-geted unions prior to the implementation of a customized program of control andreform. We concur with regard to gangs.Viewing gangs as simply another type of organized crime (or, more recently,terrorist units) requiring "g ang busting " (akin to "union b usting") m ay be appro-priate for the small subset of gangs that conform most closely to images popular-ized by the media and some law enforcement officials. The problem with such anapproach, however, is that it neglects the vast majority of gangs and the wide diver-sity among them. Rather than conflating street gangs with organized crime andtreating them all alike, the historical and contemporary contexts, as well as thebehavior, structures, leadership, and prison connections, of particular gangs mustbe understood if gang control programs are to be effective. Although the crimino-logical research literature on street gangs is vast and growing (see, e.g., K lein andM axson, 20 06; Short and Hughes, 2006; Spergel, 1995), knowledge of these im-portant issues has been limited by inadequate conceptualization and methodolo-gies that characterize the study of gangs. Mo bsters, Unions, and Feds exemplifiesthe type of analysis needed to move gang, as well as union , research forward. Gangresearch also requires comparative designs (Klein, 2006), sensitivity to issues ofcausality (Katz and Jackson-Jacobs, 2004; Short and Hughes, 2006) in thecontextualist tradition associated with Frederic Thrasher and the Chicago School(Hughes, 2006 ), as well as rigorous evaluation of intervention efforts across mu l-tiple sites and at different points in time. We are once again indebted to James

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    Youth Ga ngs and Union s 55

    Notes

    1. Jacobs published other important research concerning problems in prisons and of prison life,e.g., stratification and conflict among inmates (1976), race relations and prisoner subculture(1979), prison ers' rights (1980), the guard's world and the implications of these and other de-velopments (1983).2. Another early text, published originally in 1943, discusses "racketeering" among both businessand labor organizations, observing that "If capital is the grandparent of the racket, labor is atleast its uncle" (Barnes and Teeters, 1945: 30). The treatment is more anecdotal than system-atic, however, and focused primarily on violations of criminal laws.3. The consensus among street gang researchers suggests that this statement overestimates theorganizational character and strength of street gangs. The prison gangs studied by Jacobs seemclearly to have been better organized, and with greater control over their members, than werethe same gangs on the street (see Klein 1995; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965), a function largely of

    the general level of control that is possible in such "total institutions."4. Jacobs notes that "the percentage of black inmates increased from 47 percent in 1953 to 75percent in 1974" (Jacobs, 1977: 160).5. The gang world during this period was in fact more fluid than this comment suggests, withmany branches of these and other gangs in the mix. Most were focused primarily on defendinglocal turf. However, the goals and ambitions of the Stones, Lords, and Disciples also stirredinterest among other gangs which felt that they, too, deserved a part of the action. In 1967, theConservative Vice Lords were incorporated in the state of Illinois as a non-profit organization,"claiming 8,000 members in 26 divisions" (Sherman, 1970: 29). Similar membership claimswere made on behalf of the Stones and the Disciples.6. Am ong those whose assistance Senate comm ittee acknowledged was Virgil Peterson, long-time chairman of the Chicago Crime Commission. Peterson's report for the year 1968 is alitany of street gang attacks on rivals and on community citizens (Peterson, 1969). Earlier, he,too, had written a book about Chicago crime and politics, including substantial material onlabor corruption and racketeering (Peterson, 1952).7. Following hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor orManagement Field, McClellan wrote a book about the committee's findings, vigorously de-fending the role of Congressional investigating committees and discussing its findings(McClellan, 1962). No such book followed hearing on the activities of street gangs, althoughthe hearings were equally sensational.8. Chicago Gangs (gangresearch.net), a web cite developed by John Hagedorn, features newsstories, interviews, lectures, and other research on the history of gangs.9. Thes e change s include "w orldw ide urbanization," the retreat of the social welfare state, global

    economic changes, and the "redivision of space in cities" (Hagedorn, 2005: 154). The result,Hagedorn argues, is that "(g)angs and other groups of armed young men occupy the vacuumcreated by the retreat of the social welfare policies o f the state," and there is a "strength ening ofcultural (resistance) identities" among marginalized young people (including gang members)and others (Ibid.). Hagedom 's 2005 article is reprinted, with minor chan ges, in Short and Hu ghes2006, which in addition to reviewing other relevant developments and literature attempts to"move gang research forward" in this and other respects.10. 21 st Century VOTE, formed as "a vehicle for gang political involvement firmly in the Chicagotradition," ran an unsuccessful aldermanic campaign for "a former enforcer for the GangsterDisciples" in 1994 (Donaldson, 2006).11. The most notorious examples of former gang member opposition to the system are al Qaedaterror suspect Jose Padilla and Jeff Fort, who perhaps was the most charismatic leader of the

    Blackstone Rangers and was in Statesville when Jacobs conducted his study. After his releasefrom Statesville, Fort embraced Islam, formed a new organization (El Rukn), and was impli-

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    56 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 200612. Fleisher's (2001; also 2006) study ofthe adult female Stones, Disciples, and Lords in NorthChampaign, Illinois, found that although gang membership promoted bonding, friendshipseasily crossed gang boundaries. Moreover, no gang member knew all of the members of her

    gang. Regrettably, we do not have comparable research on m ale gang mem bers.13 . The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act is one example of anti-ganglegislation modeled after RICO. It was developed in California and subsequently adopted byFlorida, Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana (Johnson, Webster, and Connors, 1995; see alsoBjerregaard, 2003).14 . Given the typically fluid nature of gang organization, trusteeships would in any case have beeninappropriate.15 . Since most gang members lack sophistication in the ways of lawyers, and street gangs rarelyare organized in such a way as to respond to lawsuits, this very likely removes effective legalprotection of gang members targeted by CGIs.16. See Mazerolle and Roehl (1 998) for a discussion of the "rapid development and acceptance ofcivil remedies for crime prevention and control" more generally (p. 3).17 . The Supreme Court has struck down statutes that are too vague to provide sufficient notice asto what constitutes inappropriate behavior and/or are so broadly written as to provide policewith unlimited discretion (e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 1999) (Geis, 2002; S trosnider, 2002).18. Mark Fleisher, a foremost student of contemporary prisons, warns against generalizing fromearly prison gang studies because prisons now are more professionally governed, and the be-havior of prison gangs is more effectively controlled than in the past. The more severe pro blem ,he argue s, is to be found in large city jails, which are even more over-crowded than prison s, andless effectively administered (personal communication).19. Regrettably, the effects of gang mem bership are rarely, if ever, considered in general studies ofprisoner reentry (e.g.. Urban Institute, 2006).References

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