German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-1933

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German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-33

Heinrich August Winkler

Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 11, No. 4, Special Issue: Theories of Fascism. (Oct.,1976), pp. 1-16.

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ournal o ontemporary History, 1 1 197 6). 1-16

German Society, Hitler and theIllusion of Restoration 1930-33

Heinrich ugust Winkler

Most historians are now agreed that the National Social is ts achievedthei r growth in to a mass movement thanks to a dual s t ra tegy whichno other par ty in the Weimar Republ ic had so perfec t ly mastered .On the one hand, individual socia l groups were wooed wi th promiseswhich could only have been ke pt a t the expense of a l l th e o ther groups .On the other hand, confl icts of interest were universal ly denouncedand ap pare nt ly removed by a mo vem ent which c la imed to s tand aboveclasses. The contradict ion between the two levels of National Social is tagi tat ion was str iking but did not prove to be disturbing. The partyleaders obviously fel t that the individual groups were interestedpr imar i ly in what had been promised to them, ra the r than wha t theNational Social is ts promised o thers . In th e last phase of th e WeimarRepubl ic the NSDAP included such heterogenous e lements tha t i tcould jus ti fi ab ly be called a People s ~ a r t y . ~ conv incedt had amajori ty of social gro ups tha t i t was th e only al ternative t o th e poli ticals t a t us q u o .

There were , however, sec tors of German socie ty which remainedlargely immune to National Social is t propaganda before 1 9 3 3 . Thisis t rue above al l of Catholic circles, which, from t he t im e of Bismarck ses tabl i shment of the Germ an Reich an d th e u l t u v k a m p f h a d f o r m e da communi ty of defence wi th i t s own meta-economic ideology ofintegrat ion. I t is their awareness of being a minori ty which accountslargely for the relat ive constancy of their behaviour in elect ions, forth e loyalty w hich th ey sho wed th e part ies of poli tical Catholicism,th e C ent re p arty and i ts Bavarian equivalent , th e Bavarian People s

Par ty. Catholic G erm any had part icipated in the general changesof th e pol it ica l c l imate and f rom the twent ies onwards moved dist inc t lyto the r ight , bu t only small minori ties w ent so far as t o vote for Hi tle r smovement or t o jo in h is par ty. The NSDAP did no t ma ke grea terinroads in to Catholic terr i torie s unti l th e March elect ions of1933



Journa l o f on tempora ry His to ry

th at is af ter t he seizure of power.2Th e o the r sec tor which showed res is tance t o Nat ional Socia li sm,

though no t a s s trongly as the Cathol ics , were the workers . Th e reasonsfo r the i r d ivision f r om th e res t of socie ty are in par t th e same as thoseci ted for the Catholics: persecution and discrimination under Bismarckhad had an in tegra ting effec t on th e Socia l Democ ra t ic workersmovem ent . In addi t ion to th is , of course , and in cont ra s t to pol it ica lCathol ic ism, there was th e inf luence of a n ideology which d id no t i rono ut confl ict ing social in terests , but , o n the cont ra ry, acce ntuate dthem. German Catholics had resisted National Social ism becausethe integration of different interests, which National Socialismpromised t o bring t o i t s Protes tant e lec tora te , was a l ready par t ofCatho lic social doct r ine . T he working class, which was influenced b yMarxist theories, for i ts part remained unimpressed by NationalSocial is t s logans because i t had learnt th at real confl icts of interestca nn ot be removed on an ideological basis . In contrast to poli ticalCatholicism, the Germa n workers mo vem ent was, however, spl i tdow n the midd le . W hereas the move t o the r igh t wi th in t he Ca tho l ic

camp me ant only a change of course for the Centre Par ty, thecor responding move t o th e l e ft wi th in the workers movement mean ta s t rengthening of the Communis ts a t the expense of the Socia lDemocrats . Another sec t ion of the workers , however, found the i rway in t o Hi tler s mov em ent , a f ac t which was more forc ib ly expressedin the structure of the NSDAP membership than in i ts electorate. Ifthe re was a com mon denomina to r fo r tha t minor i ty o f German workerswh o w ere w on over b y N ational Social ism, the n i t lay in i ts

comparat ively low degree of t rade un ion organization. This wascharacteris t ic of far m worke rs, rai lway worke rs, postal and o th ercom mu nity traffic and service worke rs; i t was characteris t ic , to o, ofho m e workers in Saxo ny an d Thuringia, as well as emp loyees inme diu ms ize d an d small t rad e enterprises; of wo men workers, especial lyin th e text i le indust ry, and a lso of the unemployed youth who hadbeen prevented f ro m beginning their working l ives b y th e out bre akof th e world ec ono mi c cris is and wh o ha d, therefore, hardly beenin contac t wi th the t rade union^.^

Numerous inves tiga tions have shown th at the major i ty of theNat ional Socia l is t e lec tora te came f ro m t he Prote s tant m iddle classes .But in these e lec tora l groups , too , the NSDAP had in i tia lly to overcomeconsiderable resistance. The predominantly middle class supportersof the early Hit ler movement in Munich, Swabia and Franconia, wereby n o means representat ive of th e German popula t ion as a whole.



inkler: German Soc ie ty 1930 33

In Nor th Germ any, du r ing the tw o Re ichstag e l ec t ions o f 19 24 , th eGerman National is ts were able as a radical ant i-republican protestmovem ent to ca tch the voters wh o had been d isappointed by thel iberal part ies . In Baden a nd W urt temb erg, where th e Germ an Nation alPeople s Party was held to be to o Prussian, peasant andMittelstandassociat ions benefi ted fr o m dissatisfact ion with th e establishedbourgeois part ies . The National Social is ts and their viilkisch alliesin Northern Germany were usual ly regarded as a social revolunonaryforce outside their early regional s trongholds: If t he Ger m an NationalFreed om Par ty ado pts a sensible econom ic programme , wro te the

leading No rth West Germ an craftsmen s paper in Apri l 19 24 , thenwe shall have n o cause t o oppose i t . B ut so long as i t makes Marxis tges tures in sp i te of a l l it s assert ions t o th e con t rary, i t mus t expectus t o oppose i t a s we oppose any o the r Marxi st pa rty. A t the sametim e, th e paper noted th e growing at t ract iveness of t he radical r ightwing volkisch mo vem ent for young ar ti sans .4

Indeed, th e Nat ional Socia l is t s had to m ak e considerable exer t ionsto f re e themselves of th e image of a social ly revolu t ionary movement .

The combinat ion of nat ional ism and social ism, as proclaimed in theparty s nam e and program me, fo un d confl icting responses in bourgeoiscircles . There was certainly a current in the academical ly educatedbourgeoisie which wished to oppose the Marxist workers mo vem entwith a synthesis of Prussianism a nd Social ism and th ere by hopedt o overcom e a class-based soc iety. By socialism , how ever, i tunder stood a s t a t e o f mind ra the r than a fo rm of eco nom y; the concep twas directed towards work discipl ine not expropriat ion. Similar ideasalso played a certain role in para-military associations. The largestgro up , however, which show ed i tself susceptible t o th e s logan of anational Socialism was th at of the wh ite collar workers. A vague

kind of social ism corresponded t o th e resentment fe l t b y th e mem bersof the so-called new middle-class in relat ion t o the tradi t ional sociale l i tes ; the i r a rdent na t ional i sm impl ied a marked separa t ion f rom thein terna t ional i s t pro le tar ia t in to which the ngestel l ten did not wishto s ink. The economical ly independent s trata such as the bigindus t r ia l i s t s and la rge landowners , the mediumscale ent repreneurs

and mem bers of the profess ions , dow n to the master c raf t smen,merc hants and peasants reacted qu ite differe nt ly to everything whichsmacked of soc ia li sm. F o r the economical ly indepe nden t , th is conceptwas inextr icably bou nd up with the aboli t ion of private prop erty.If th e Nat ional Socia l is t s wished t o win over these s t ra ta , they had t ooffer an interpretat ion of socialism less op en to misunderstanding



Jou rna l o f Con tempo ra ry Hi s to ry

tha n their defini tive party prog ram me of 19 20 . This is preciselyw h a t h a p p en e d t o a n i nc re as in g e x t e n t f r o m 1 9 2 7 o nw a r d s, w h e nHit le r rode roughshod over the opin ions of the Nazi le f t , l ed by theStrasser brothers . T he wo rkers w ere s t il l being wooed b y anti-capital is ts logans, m ore radically by G oebb els in Berlin and som e oth erGaulei tersin the industr ial dis tr icts than by party headquarters; but vis-a-visthe independent middle c lass , the soc ia l i sm of the NSDAP wasre in terpre ted as a mere econom ic s lant , as a genera l fee ling fo r theco m m on weal. F ive weeks before the Reichs tag e lec t ion of 2 0 May19 28 , Hi tl er r emoved one pa rt icu la r o ffend ing i t em. T he Nazi l eade robligingly expla ined th a t th e expropr ia t ion of land for co m m on usewi thou t compensa t ion , u rged by the pa r ty p rogramme under Po in t17 , re fer red only t o land w rongful ly acqui red and pr imar i ly ow nedb y J ew ish p ro p er ty s pe cu la tio n ~ o m p a n i e s . ~

When the wor ld e con om ic .c ris is se t in , the NSDAP had a l readyrem oved certain reservat ions fel t by th e mid dle classes part icular lyin area s which ha d, s ince 1 9 2 7 , suffered under th e agrarian crisisand had bec om e nucle i of N at ional Socia l is t propaganda . Bit terness

in re la t ion to the par t ies in power, especia l ly the ru l ing Socia lDemocrats , who were held responsible for the so-cal ledmismanagement in the Re ich , p rov inces and com mu nes , rose t o

such a p i tch th a t f rom t he beginning of the year 1 9 3 0 the regionalelectora l successes of th e N ationa l Socialis ts were occasionallywelcomed by the press representing small businessmen. The break-th rough o f the NSDAP t o a na tiona l leve l on 1 4 Sep tem ber 1 9 3 0received a c lear explanat ion in t he column s of theNordwestdeutscheHandweuks-Zei tung I t was by no means the case , the paper sa id ,tha t a l l t he 6 4 million National Socialist voters agreed with itsprogramm e in every aspect , fo r ins tance in th e area of econom ic pol icy:The menta l re jec t ion of cer ta in poin ts of the programme never the less

weighs less heavily w i th these voters than th e ho pe tha t only Nat ionalSocial ism is st il l s trong enoug h t o pull the car t ou t of the mud. Bu tu p t o the end o f 1 93 0 renewed dou b t s were expressed as t o therel iabi l i ty of N ational S ocial ist assurances with regard t o the r ete nt io nof prop er ty. Th e t reasurer of the No r th West Ge rm an Art isansAssocia t ion , master mason Ku che nbu ch, dec lared a t a local meet ingtha t t he NSDAP would n ot b e in a pos i tion to br ing order t o theGerman s t a t e . I t had too o f t en been as soc ia t ed wi th the ex t remeleft .=

T h e ig ent repreneurs remained scept ica l as to the pol i t ica l a ims of



inkler: German Soc ie ty 1930 33

th e National Social is ts mu ch longer tha n t h e master ar t isans. In July

1 9 3 0 , t h e Arbei tgeber,the right wing conservative journal of th e

Con federat ion of Germ an Employers Associat ions, did aff irm th ata num ber of National Socialis t s logans, l ike the c om m on good beforethe individual goo d or property is an obligat ion no t an end in itselfwere approved by a wide cross-section of big business. But there wereoth er uto pia n dem ands and an aggressive host i li ty t o emp loyersas represented by Feder, Gregor Strasser an d Goebbels . If these ideaswere t o win t he uppe r h and (an d earl ier on the paper had tried toestablish tha t the c entre of act ion was being moved f ro m Munich toBer lin , f r om Hi tler to Goebbels and St rasser ) then th e NSDAP wouldb e b a sic ally o p p os e d t o t h e a im s of big b ~ s i n e s s . ~h e c o m m e n t a r yof the Arbei tgeber was t o a certain ex te nt typical of th e relationshipbetw een big industry and th e rise of Nationa l Social ism. Th e emp loyerswere n ot mad e uneasy by ant isemit ism or ant iparl iamentarian ism,bu t rather by th e ant icapital is t rhetoric of th e Nazi lef t and by th egeneral muzziness of their eco no m ic and social program me. Th e lat terwas part icular ily t rue with regard to on e i tem : the vague corporative

promises of th e N at ional Social is t s. Poin t 25 of t he 1 9 2 0 programmedem ande d the form at ion of es ta tes S t a n d e ) and professional chambersto ca r ry ou t t he f r amework o laws issued by the Reich in the federalstates . Since Bismarck s t im e, a parl iam ent based on estate s had beenadvocated by the ant i -par liamentary r ight ; i t was to ac t as counter-weight t o th e Reichstag elected by universal suffrage, if no t t o replacei t en t i re ly, and to secure the influence of the economy overlegislat ion. O n th e r ight wing of the business cam p, abov e al l in th ecircles of Rhine land heavy industry, th ere had long be en sym pa thyfor a co rpora t ive reform of the Weimar c ons t i tu t ion . On ce th e cri sisof th e par l iamentary sys tem had become manifes t in 19 30 , in teres tgrew among other industr ial groups in a pol i t ical upgrading of thcexecut ive power and the provis ional Reich Economic Counci l , whichhad h i the rto on ly been the advisory Th ird House of the WeimarRepubl ic . Bu t in th e eye s of mo st en t repreneurs ,chiefly those involvedin t he expor t -or ienta ted branches of la rgesca le commerce and banking,the d iscuss ion ab ou t corpora t i sm was burdened by t he fac t th a t Nazi

advo cates of su ch a system l ike O tt o Wilhelm Wagener (h ead of th eEconomic Pol icy Sect ion of the NSDAP) wanted much more thanmerely a weakening of the polit ical parl iam ent: they were seekinga comple te ly new organiza tion of th e econom y.

The major i ty of employers feared th t such plans might lead to



6 J o u r n al o f C o n t e m p o r a r y H i s t o r y

stagnat ion and dir igisme. This aspec t was expla ined in October 1 9 3 2b y t h e Deut sche Wi r t s cha f t s ze i t ung organ of the German Federa t ionof Chambers o f C om me rce , a s fo l lows :

The economy, employers and workers, may at best express their wishes;they have n o mea ns of seeing that these will be me t even in their o w n organs.Their organizations will be turned into government departments, whoseheads will be civil servants, and tho se th ey re present will have no legal rightto choose or remove them. In the National Socialist programme the all-powerful total state becom es a reality, econ om ic selfgovernment a mereform.8

T he Nazi slogans concerning professional estates did no t evenfin d w hole-hearted ap proval am on g those social grou ps which hadlong recom men ded the ir own corpora t ive s t ruc ture as the mo delfo r a new socia l order i . e. the c raf t smen. W hat th e leading assoc ia t ionsof cr af tsm en d em ande d w as a system in which the interests ofinde pen den t producers would re ta in th e upper hand against workersand cons um ers, in the guild-l ike organizat ions of individual branc hes

as well as in th e federa l cham bers of estate s responsible for quest io nso f economic po l i cy. The s t a t e was on no accoun t to in t e r f e re wi ththe dec is ions of e mploy ers . A de legation of th e Nat ional Confedera t ionof G erman Cra f t s and o f t he German Fede ra t ion o f Chambers o fHand icraf t was m ade aw are a t the beginning of 1 9 3 1 in ta lks wi thWagener th at th e plans of the NSDA P were directed towa rds justthis , that they were s tate social is t through and through. lg I t was,the re fo re , good news fo r all sect ion s of th e business world w hen on1 7 S e p t em b e r 1 9 3 2 Hit le r d iv ided the Eco nom ic Pol icy Sec t ion of theNSDA P in to on e main sec tion IV A for s ta te en terpr i se under Got t f r iedFeder, and Sect ion IV B for pr iva te en terpr i se under Wal ter Funk.Th us a m an t rus ted by indus tr ial is t s rece ived the sam e s ta tus as thepa rty ideologist, and Wagener s inf luence as head of th e E cono m icPolicy Sect ion was great ly diminished. Even earl ier, in August 1 9 3 2 ,i t had been ru m ou red in leading industr ial circles th at Wagener hadbeen muzzled by Hi t ler w i th regard to ma t te rs a ffec t ing thereorganiza t ion of profess ional bodies. O ne m ay a t leas t presume th a t

the anxious com m ents f ro m business c ircles regard ing NSDAPeconom ic policy d id not remain w i thou t inf luence .1°

Even that current within heavy industry which t radi t ional ly hadbeen especial ly an t iparl iam entarian and nat ion al is t ic , had s tron greserva t ions in the au tumn of 1 9 3 2 w ith regard t o a N ational Social is ts e izu re o f power. W ha t had s t reng thened sympa thy fo r t he NSDAP



inkler Germarz Soci ety 1930 33

in par t s of the K uhr indu s t ry was the provis ional to le ra t ion of Papen scabine t by H i t le r. F ro m th e s tand poin t of the r ight-wing of Germ anheavy industry, to have the National Social is ts providing a mass basefor an authori tar ian regime fr iendly to big business , was an ent icingperspective . Bu t since 1-fit ler had relinquished this course again inAug ust 1 93 2 in favour of a confronta t ion wi th the Cabine t of Baronsan d, in ad dit ion, the possibil ity of a coal i tion betw een the NSDA Pand the Cent re Par ty had becom e s tronger, th e employers cam pbecam e increasingly worried tha t th e Nazis were swinging toward sthe le f t .11 A t the beginning of November 19 32 the t ranspor t s t rike ,

dem onst ra t ing a spec tacular coopera t ion be tween com mu nis ts an dNat ional Socia li s ts in Berl in , re inforced such fears . So th a t on e cann otspeak of the N at ional Social is t s mak ing a cons is ten t move tow ardsbig indus t ry in the summ er and au tum n o f 19 32 ,o r of a rapproch em en tby the l a t t e r w ith the NSDAP.

The pol icy of General K urt von Schleicher, th e last Chancel lorof the Weimar Kepub lic , created a new si tuat ion . Schleicher s plansfo r c rea t ing emp loym ent , which m any indust r ia l is t s regarded as s ta te

social is t , h is contac ts wi th the t rade unions , a nd h is e f fo r t s to for ma par l iamentary labou r axis s t retching fro m the lef t wing of th eNSDAP to the Socia l Dem ocra ts was ca lcula ted t o a la rm large sec t ionsof the em ployers cam p. Th e a l te rna tive mod el of a Hi t le r-Papenal liance seem ed th e lesser evi l, a t least t o tho se industr ialis ts , especial lyin mining, w ho had previously given f inancial su pp ort to the Nazisin th e ho pe th a t t hey wou ld s t reng then the na t iona l cam p .12I t was,however, ano the r soc ia l g roup which much more d i r ec t ly andsuccessfu lly influenced Hi t le r s coming t o power o n 30 Janu ary 19 33.Th i s was the Reichs l andb~ /~d l ready cont ro l led by the Nat ionalSocial is ts to a large ex ten t , w hich in fac t repres ented the interestsof t he grea t ly indebted East Elb ian landowners . T he landed gen t ry,unl ike the industr ial is ts , enjoyed the privi lege of imm ediate accesst o th e decis ive pol i t ical fac tor , President Paul von H indenburg. Th eym ad e use o f this pr ivilege w hen in Jan ua ry 1 9 3 3 a parl iamentarydisclosure of the Osthilfe scanda l , compromis ing fo r many Junker sas well as the President himself , seemed to appro ach closer. In th e

f ina l phase of the Weimar Republ ic economic and pol i t ica l powerc lear ly proved t o be incongruous s t rengths .13

T h e Keicbslaizdbz~~d hough the mo s t i n f luen t ia l was no t t he on lyorganizat ion a t th e disposal of th e N ational Social is ts as a pol it icalins t rument before the se izure of power. With in th e urban an d rura lm iddle classes, too, the re was ant icipated co-o rdinat ion an d i t was



8 J o ur n al o f C o n t e m p o r a r y H i s to r y

act ively encouraged by such party sect ions as the agrarian pol i t icala p p a r a t u s a n d t h e K a m p f g e m e i n s c b a f t Agains t Depar tment S toresand Consum er Coopera t ives , f rom whose ranks th e F ighting Leagueo f t h e C o m m e r c i a l M i t t e l s t a n d was fo rm ed in December 1 932 . TheNational Social is ts had m ad e their imp act ear liest in regional interestg roup ings among the peasan t ry in p redominan t ly p ro te s t an t a reasand had , s te p b y s te p , driven exis t ing off ic ia ls f rom the ir pos i t ions .Fro m 19 31 , the c raf t gu i lds were d isbanded. The off icers of local andprovinc ia l associa tions , w ho f requ ent ly belonged to theWir t scbaf t spar te i a pu re in terest grouping of house ow ners and smallt raders , had to g ive way t o mem bers of the NSDA P. In Nov emb er193 2 t he Na t iona l Soc ia li st s b roke in to the Fede ra tion o f G erm anReta i l Bus iness : th e de par tm ent s tores which had a lways beencons idered un welcom e com pet i t io n by smal l shopkeepers and werea t tack ed by th e Nat ional Social i st s as being Jewish were in fac t forcedto leave th e um brel la organ izat ion of th e retai l t rade ; a representat iveof t he National Social is ts Fight ing League Against D ep artm en t Storesand C onsum er Coopera t ives took over. The N at ional Social i st s a l so

succeeded in achieving a massive break throu gh into the largest wh ite-col la r t rade union , the D e u t s c b n a t i o n a l e r Handlungs Gebilfenverband.Th ey were n ot ab le , i t is t rue , t o take over i ts leadersh ip b u t theydid win over large numbers of the membership and bureaucrat icappa ra tus . A f t e r t he se izu re o f power they had on ly to comple te thewo rk having a l ready ga ined th e su ppo r t of th e in terest gro ups on th eland as well as in th e o ld and new ~ i t t e 1 s t a n d . l ~y systematicallyinfiltrating these interest-group s, th e National Soc ialists increasinglydeprived the leading organ izat ions of the rural and urban m iddlestrata of their base. Whereas th e official leadership of these associat ionsado pted a compara t ive ly mo dera te policy towards governm ent andpar l iament , th ose funct ionar ies adher ing t o th e N SDAP successfu llyexp lo it ed t he ex i st ing g rou pego i sm .

Th e campaign agains t dep ar tm ent s tores had th e same effec t asthe p ropaganda fo r compul so ry gu i lds and mas te rexamina t ions inthe t rades and craf t s : the reserva t ions which the leadersh ip of theassocia tions cont inued to feel ab ou t the econom ic policy of th e NSD APwere shared less an d less by their mem bers. As far as th e broad stra taof the middle-c lasses were concerned , there were only two fac torswhich car ried an y weight a t the he ight of t he ec onom ic cri sis . F i rs tly,the Nat ional Socia l i s t s ident i f ied themselves more than any o therpa r ty wi th the mo s t ex t r em e d em ands of t hese g roups . Second ly,the y had d iscove red the com m on denom ina to r to wh ich the desi re s



9inkler: German Societ y 1930 33

of all grou ps could be reduc ed nam ely a consis tent s truggle againstth e Weimar sys tem which was made the scapegoat for the misfor tunesof t h e c o m m o n m a n .

he deeper historical reasons for the success achieved by NationalSocia li sm in n on-prole tar ian Protes tant Ge rma ny donot lie in theWeimar Republic . Those social s t rata which played the largest partin Hit ler s r ise t o pow er considered th e polit ical system of ImperialGerm any a t th e least as a fa r lesser evil than Weimar. F or the Prussianlandowners, the poli t ical ly most privi leged group in German societybefore th e f i rs t world war, a llegiance to th e Hoh enzo llerns was asmuch a m at ter of course as i t was f o r those mem bers of th e off icercorps , who came f rom the same socia l background. What theconservat ive wing of private enterprise wanted was summed up bythe pow erful industr ialis t Alb ert Vogler a t a confere nce of leadingindust r ia l organiza tions in 1 9 2 4 : The supra-par ty s ta te is a th ingof the pas t . Let us hop e tha t we succeed in recrea ting i t for thef u t u r e . l 5

The commerc ia l Mittelstand and peasant ry for the i r par t regardedthe patr iarchal Sta te of Imperial Germ any as a system which hadintrodu ced certain prote ct ive measures in favo ur of small businessand agricul ture, and which would not have accepted an outvotingof prope rty-ow ners by workers and consumers. M any, part icular lyamong th e higher civil se n7 an ts , a long with th e representat ives ofprivate enterprise, saw in the Kaisevveicb a supra -party s tate , inwhich the impar t ia l i ty of the adminis t ra t ion had been paramountand where the social s tatus of bureaucracy had st i l l been unchallenged.White collar w orke rs certainly had reservations with regard t o theru ling e l it e o f Imper ia l G erm any ; bu t neve r the le s s they owed to themonarchy their special posi t ion in social securi ty, which different iatedthem f r o m indust r ia l workers. Thei r c laim t o an e levated socia l pos it ionseems a t any ra te to have been respected more in Imper ia l Germanythan in th e Marxist republic .

he orientation towards the authoritarian system of the pre-1918per iod d id no t necessari ly imply preference fo r the M onarchy, bu ti t was in an y case a mor tgage on par l iamentary d emocracy . This ist rue not only of those s t ra ta which turned towards Nat ional Socia l i smaf ter 1 9 2 9 o r e lse cont r ibu ted to i ts r ise ; i t is al so t rue to a cer ta inex ten t of the representa t ives of Weimar demo cracy . Th e con cept ion ,which had i t s or ig ins in cons t i tu t ional monarchy, tha t the chief task



of par l iament was to c r i t ic ize the governm ent , surv ived the Novemberrevolut ion of 1918 The most impor tant charac ter i s t ic of apa r li amen ta ry sys t em , the conf ron ta t ion be tween the gove rnmen ta lmajor i ty and the oppos i t ion , was cons tant ly obscured by th isanachronis t ic dual i sm. T he tend enc y of the par t ies , no t least the Socia lDemocrats , to disclaim governmental responsibi l i ty in cr i t icals i tua t ions , can u l t imate ly be t raced back t o an unconsc iou s f ixa t ionvis-i-vis the polit ical system of the Kaiserreicb This system had fai ledto mot iva te the par t ies to cons is ten t ly f ight for a major i ty of thevoters ; the ir exc lus ion f ro m ac t ive par t ic ipa t ion in govern m ent hadfavoured instead the ideological or ientat ion of pol i t ical part ies andtheir restr ict ion within a part icular social mil ieu.16 Ini t ia l ly, theWeimar p arty system was scarcely differen t fro m th at of RismarckianGe rman y. I t was no t pa r l iamen ta ry, bu t an tipa rl i amen ta ry fo rces theGerm an Nat ional is t s and then the Nat ional Socia li s ts who wereth e f i rs t to grasp th e logic of th e parl iamentary system and to ta i lorthe i r propaganda ent i re ly tow ards becom ing the people s par ty .

Th e N ational Social is ts did n o t , as is well kn ow n, ful ly succeed

in becoming a mass movement unt i l Bri ining became Chancel lor,an d he consc ious ly car r ied on the governm enta l prac tices of theimperial bureaucracy. But i t was precisely the experiences of thef i r s t pres ident ia l governm ent of the W eimar Repu bl ic which madei t c lear th a t a s imple re turn t o t he pre-par liamentary d iv is ion of pow erbetw een Reichstag and executive was n o longer possible . A cabin etwh ich govern ed in op po sitio n to society was sti ll less in a positionto take the wind ou t of the sa ils of an ant ipar l iamentary massmov eme nt than a weak par liamentary governm ent could have don e .No schem at ic res tora t ion of th e pre-republican regime cou ld , there fore ,be the r ight answer t o the c ri sis of the Weimar sys tem, bu t only apopu lar ant iparl ia m entarian ism . If o ne was successful ly t o declarewar o n dem ocracy, t hen i t cou ld on ly be done in the name o f thepeo ple. Th e only possible al ternative t o parl iamentary dem ocrac ywas th e rule of the charismatic leader, legi timized by plebisci te .

Such a sys tem seemed t o possess a spec i f ic advantage for the middleclasses. If they wished to make their influence effective, they had

t o ac t in conce r t . Th e snag here was tha t m any of the ir in te res ts seemedirreconci lable . For instance, peasant demands for higher agricul turalpr ices ran counter t o the in terests of the consumer and t o theprotec t ionis t l imi ta tions on co m pet i t io n , backed by ar ti sans andsmall t raders. A n umbre l la m ove m ent of th e m iddle s t ra ta could no ttherefore push d iv is ive econom ic ques t ions in to the foreground, b ut



had to concentrate on pol i t ical s logans which t ranscended theseconfl ic t s. T he a dopt io n o f dem ands m ade b y spec if ic soc ia l groupscould only serve therefore as one aspect of the National Social is ts t rategy fo r winning pow er and th e party leadership wisely delegatedthis role to i ts special organizat ions. This procedure had a doubleadvantage. Firs t the NSD AP throu gh i ts part icular associat ions andtheir publicat ions reached only th at pa rt of th e electorate which wascruc ia l a t th e t ime so th a t the ir r ita tion of o the r group s could inthis way be l imited. Secondly, the party leadership, by thls divis ionof labour, avoided tying themselves to an y narrow special interests .

Th e task of th e par ty leadership, and , in part icular, th at of Hit lerh imsel f , was the other part of the National Social is t dual s t rategynamely the in tegrat ion of the groups they were try ing to recru it .I t may be considered a general rule , that a mass movement wil l beth e m ore l ike ly to produce mi l i tan t reac t ive ideologies, th e m orehete roge neo us its social basis and th e bleaker th e pro spe cts of i tsindividual co nst i tuent g rou ps to maintain or increase their sh are inthe social product . The success of National Social ism was ul t imately

founded on the fac t tha t i t seemed to provide an answer to suchchallenges. I t m ade possible th e bringing together of th e intermediateclasses, which th e liberal, conservative an d so-called interest partieshad fai led to achieve because the y we re ei ther half-hearted abo uttaking up the dem and s of individual group s, or because the y hadno chance , due to th e l imi ta tions imposed by nar row in teres ts , o fever mobilizing all sections of t h e bourgeoisie. O nly the NationalSocial is ts show ed themselves determin ed to grasp the evil by i ts root .They promised the radical l iquidat ion of al l factors which they heldresponsible for the dissolut ion of the natural harmony of interests :namely, the organizations and ideologies involved in the class struggle,and all inst i tut ions which sanct ione d th e pol it ical resolut ion of socialconf l ic ts . Th e des t ruc tion of the marxis t labour movem ent , of theparliamen tary system of gove rnm ent, an d of polit ical pluralism wasth e undisguised expression of everything th at National Socialismpromised to cont r ib ute towards th e recons t ruc t ion of the Germ anVolksgemei~zscbaft (people s com m uni ty) . What o ne might descr ibe

as symbol ic or secondary in tegrat ion served th e same purpose : t hediversion of aggression against a diabolical en em y, intern ation alJewry, and the fabricat ion of a supra-material is t ic sphere in whichthe n at ion recovered i ts un i ty. Th e cul t of th e leader and th eVolksgemeinscbaft extreme nat ional ism and racial ideology hadtheir social fun ct io n in precisely this at te m pt to myst ically overcom e



1 2 Jou rna l o f C on tempora ry Hi s to ry

economical ly de termined contradiction^.^

I t is diff icul t t o est ima te the value of each individual part of thisideological conglomerate for the electoral success of the NationalSocial is ts . There are indicat ions, however, that i t was not mil i tant ,ant isemit ism which made National Social ism into a mass m ov em en t .Even a journal as far t o t h e r ight as th e Nordwestdezl tscbeHandwerks Z e i tung spoke in 19 24 o f the volkisch and Nat ionalSocial is t mo vem ent as being tainted with a fanat ical ant isem it ismwhich s to od in th e wa y of object ive w or k . ls Even if on e assumes

tha t an t i semi t i sm was s t ronger among farmers and pe t ty t raders thanamo ng ar ti sans (o ne th inks of th e campaign agains t the ca t t le andmoney- lending Jew s and against the Jewish de par tm ent s tores )never the less , dur ing the 192 0s an d 193 0s o the r resentmen ts , namelyagainst th e M arxists and an on ym ou s big capi tal , played a largerpa rt as far as all sect ions of th e intermed iate classes were con cerned .Th ere is n o evidence t ha t th e National Social is ts inf luen ced largerMit te l s tand grou ps beyo nd th e radical ant isem ites with their asser t ion

tha t these enemies were on ly tw o faces of one and th e sam e WorldJewish Conspiracy .

On the o th er hand i t m akes jus t as l it tl e sense t o a rgue tha t Naziant isemi ti sm exercised a de ter r ing effec t o n the m iddle and upperclasses during th e years 1 93 0-3 2. I t was certainly n o accide nt tha tin t he propaganda of th e NSDAP during these years wholesaleaccusa t ions agains t the sys tem too k up m ore space than de ta il sconcern ing th e Jewish ques t ion . Ext r em e na t ional i sm, by i tse lf , isalso no t eno ugh to explain th e rise of National Social ism. T h etradi t ional part ies of the r ight were hardly less nat ional is t ic than theHi t le r m ovem ent , ye t th ey los t the m ajor i ty of the ir voters . If thecause of the success of the NSDAP among the middle classes is to beput in a nutshe l l , then i t was the combinat ion of two promises whichproved decisive: th e National Socialists agreed in principle t o ma intainthe t rad i t iona l sys tem of proper ty re la tions and a t the same t imepromised to radically l iquida te the pol i tical system wh ich no longerguaranteed th e preserva tion of th is order.

T he ma jo r i ty o f t hose who b rough t th e Na tiona l Soc ial is ts t o p ow er,e i ther by giving them the i r votes or the i r mo ne y, wanted some thingdi fferent f rom that which becam e rea l ity in the Thi r d Reich . Boththe middle and upper classes assumed that National Social ism wishedto res tore and modernize the pol i t ica l subs tance of the pre- republ icansys tem. T ha t d id no t necessari ly mean res tora t ion of the Empire , bu t



3inkler German Societ y 1930 33

i t did mean depriving th e victors of the Novem ber revolut ion of theirpow er. In o th er w ords , th e suppor ters of the Nat ional Socia li s tsexpec ted the des t ruct ion of t he Marx is t l abour mo vem en t and thepar ty s ta te ; they hop ed fo r a rig id au thor i ta r ian reg ime, which wouldcease t o tolerate class s t ruggles and ideological conf l ict . But so faras the N at ional Socia l is t l eadersh ip was concerned , these were n ot theaims but merely essent ial pre-requisi tes for the real izat ion of theiraim s. Hit ler s long-term aspirat ions could no t be diverted in accordan cewi th th e econ om ic needs of an y soc ial gr ou p; ne ither th e f ight aga ins tthe Jew s, nor the essentially unl imited co nqu est of Leb ensra umsprang f r om a concre te pressure of in teres ts . Ra ther i t was a q ues t ionof prejudices becoming autonomous, which had their social or iginsin th e m iddle classes, bu t w hich had been radicalized t o such an ext en tth at th ey had beco m e a pol i tical fac tor sui generis . Obviously, thisau ton om iza t ion of ideologies was closely bo un d u p with a far-reachingsocial process of d eracin at ion, which the f i rs t world war had se t inm otio n, with the for m atio n of a class of mil i tary desperadoes (W.Sauer) who could not f ind the i r way back in to c iv i l ian l i fe a f te r 1918

and wh o p layed an im por ta nt pa r t in the fasc is t mo vem ents in I talyas in G erm any . Th isg ro up , to which Hi t ler h imself be longed, com binedpro foun d ly bourgeo is anx iet ie s wi th a fundam en ta l co n tem pt fo r t hebourgeoisie. The nihilistic turn against all concrete interests withwhich Nat ional Socia l i sm ended up was implanted in the menta l i tyof the mi l i ta ry desperadoes .19

Such a cl ique could only r ise to power because broad sect ionsof German society s t i l l c lung to concepts which had their or igin in

the long-livedAncien Regime.

They measured the cr is is-r iddendem ocra t ic sys tem by th e yards t ick of t he apparent ly hea l thy worldof Imper ia l Ge rm any and re jec ted i t. T he assump t ion tha t theNat ional Socia l i s t s would do no more than res tore an author i ta r ianorde r proved t o be a to ta l m is in terpre ta tion of Hi t le r s m ove m ent ;b u t the spread of such au thori tar ian i llusions form ed an essent iale lement of h is torica l cont inu i ty be tween the Kaiserreich and theThird Reich . I t m ay very well be th a t th e Weimar Republ ic couldhave survived fo r a long t im e had ther e no t been t he econom ic cri si sof 1929. But i t i s jus t as l ike ly tha t German democracy could havesurvived the great cr is is without the authori tar ian heri tage of the past .



Joz lrna l o f on t em pora ry H i s to ry

NOT S

1. For an explanation of the thesis that the NSDAP was an antidemocraticVolkspartei see my cont ribu tion , Mittelstandsbewegung oder Volkspartei?

Zur sozialen Basis der NSDAP in Wolfgang Schi eder, ed ., Faschismus als sozialeBewegung. Deutschland und ltalien if71 Vergleich (Hamburg 197 6).

2 See Gunt er Plum, Gesellschuftsstruktuu und politisches Rewusstseirr inezlzeu ka tholische n Region 192 8-1 933 . Untersuchung a m Reispiel desRegierungsbezirks Aachen (Stuttgart 1972) and M Rainer Lepsius. EvtrerneuNatio?~a lismus. Struktuu bedi~zgu ngen uor dev nat io~ralsozia l is t ischenMachtergreifir~~g Stuttgart 1966). 31-36.

3. Th e numbe r of trrorkers who were members ot th e NSDAP in September193 0 was 26.3 per cent com pared with a percentage of the general workingpopulation of 46.3 per cent (Paiteistatistik, ed. by the organizational head ofthe NSDAP, Bd. 1 , Berlin 1935 , 6 9 ff.). For t he other groups the figures areas follows: white collar employees 24 (1 2. 5) ; self-employed 18. 9 (9.6 ); farmers13.2 (20. 7); civil servants 7.7 (4 .6 ); othe r groups 9.9 (6. 6). For the par t playedby workers in electing the NSDAP see Samuel A. Pratt, The Social Raszs ofNazism a91d Communism in Urban Ge rm a? ~y . Coirelational Stud,y of the Ju ly31 1932 Reichstag Election in Geumat~y M. A. Thesis, Michigan State College,East Lansing 19 48 ), 1 6 4 ff. ; Werner Kaltefleiter, IViutschaft u91d Politik inI>eutschland, Konjrrnktz~r als Bestimmun gsfaktor des Parteiensystems (Cologne1968) , 46-49; R I McKibbin, The Myth of the Un empl oyed : Who Voted forHitler? in ,-11lstralian Journal of Politics and History, 25 (19 69), 25-40; AlexanderWeber, Soziale .Merkmale der NSD.4P-Wahlev. Eine Zusammenfassuizg bisherigerempi rischer Linters~lchunger2 un d eine A nal yse in den Gemeiriderr 'lev 1-underRaden und Hessen (Ph.D. Thesis, Freiburg 1969) as well as Carl MierendorffGesicht und Charakter der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung in Die Gesellschaft,7 ( 19 30- 31 ), 489- 504. Fo r the early years of t he NSDAP especially Michael H.Kater, Zur Soziographie der fruhen NSLIAP in Vieuteljahrshefte fhrZeitgeschichte [hereafter VfZl 1 9 (19 71 ), 124-59. For the relationship betweenworker s and National Socialism before 19 33 see also Wilfried Bo hn kr , L)zeVSL A P in? Huhrgebiet 1920-1 933 (Bonn 19 74) . Methodologically unsatisfact ory,because i t constantly blurs the differences between manual workers, craftsmenand white collar employees is .Max H. Kele, Nazis and 12'oukers (Chapel Hill 1972).

4 . ~or dwe std ezr tsc he Huezdwerks-Zeitung [hereafter NHZ] 29, No.17(2 4 April 1 92 4) ; No.1 3 (2 7 March 1924) . See also Heinrich August Winkler,\,littelstarzd, Demokuatie ~ Va t i o r r a l s o z i a l i s n ~ ~ ~ s ~rrd Die poli tisc t~e Entw ick lung

vo n Handwerk rtrrd Kleinhandel in der Il'eirnarer Kepub lik (Cologne 1972).5. Fo r this t hem e see Oswald Spengler, Weussentunr und Sosialismus

(Munich 19 20 ); Dietrich Orlow, The Hzstory o f the Nazi Party. 1 919-1 933(Pittsburgh 196 9) ; Jere my Noakes, The :Vnsi Partj~ n Lower Sa xon y 1921 -1933(Oxford 19 71 ); ~ u r g e n Kocka, Zur Problematik der deutschen Angestellten1914- 1933 in Hans Mommsen and others, Industrielles System und politischeEntwicklung in der IVeimarer Republik ( ~ h s s e l d o r f 1974 ), 792-811; Henry A.Turn er, Hitler s Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists 1 927 in The Jourizal of



Wi n k l e r G e r m a n Society 1930 33 5

h l o d e r n H i s t o r y, 40 (1968) , 348-73 ; Keinhard ~ G h n l , ie na t ionalsozia l i s t i scheL i n k e 1925-1 93 0 (Meisenheim 19 66) . Kuhnl s work suffers from numerous

distortions. T he characterization of th e Nazi left-wing as kleinburgerlich ignores

the fact tha t small craftsmen feared it far more than the Munich party leadership.

Moreover, t he influence of the left-wing did no t end with the elimination of O tt o

Strasser s group in 1 93 0.6. NHZ, 35 No.38 (19 September 1930): No.41 (1 0Oct ober 1930) .7. Georg ~ c h r z d e r , Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftsprogramm in

I )er Arbei tgeber, 2 0 No. 1 4 (15 July 193 0: Der Sozialismus der nationalen

Jug end , in ibid, No. 8 (15 April 19 30 ). For a mor e detailed analysis see Heinrich

August Winkler, ~nte rneh merv erha nde zwischen ~t an de id eo lo ~i e undNationalsozialismus in VfZ, 1 7 (1 96 9) , 341-71 (also in revised for m inHeinz-Josef Varain, ed., In tevessenuerbande in Deu t sch land [Cologne 19731,

228-58).8. Das Wirtschaftsprogramm des Nationalsozialismus in I l e u t s c h e

U i r t schaf tsze i tung, 29 No. 4 0 ( 6 October 19 32). Th e article, part of a longer

series of essays, af ter detailing t he social and fiscal aims of t he Nationa l Socialists,came to the verdict t ha t th e economic programme of the NSDAP is a mixture

of resentment and obs cur ity . The weightiest objec tions against t he Naziprogramme wo uld have t o be directed against its econ omic dem ands .

9 , Deutsches Zen t ra l a rch iu (Potsdam), Keichskommissar fur denMictelstand, Han dwerk 1 1 , Bd. 1 , No. 2 6. Th e horror which state socialist

plans inspired among t he official representatives of t he crafts an d trades revealshow misleading is the c onc ept of Werner So mb ar t, revived by Ar thur Schweitzerin Bzg Husiirrss i n th e Th ird R eic h (London 1964) , 1 10 ff. concerning

Handwerkersozialismus (artisan socialism).10 . Winkler, op. cit., 36 1 f.11 . Very revealing in this connection is th e lett er by th e editor and head

of the Rhenish-Westphalian economic service, August Heinrichsbauer, to GregorStrasser, th e organizational he ad of the NSDAP, dated 2 0 September 1 93 2(reprinted in Plum, o p. cit., 301-04).

12 . With regard to financial suppo rt for the NSDAP by big industry see

abov e all the works of Henr y A. Tur ne r, Big Business an d th e Rise of Hitlerin T h e ..\meviean His tod eal Revie w (hereafter AIfR), 75 (196 9), 56-70; TheR u h r l a d r : Secr et Cabin et of Heavy Indus try in the Weimar Republic in Cent ra lE u r o p e a n H i s t o r j ~ , (1 97 0) , 19 5- 22 8; C;rossunternehmertum undNationalsozialismus 1930-1933 in H i s t o n s c h e Z e i t s c h r i f t [hereafter HZ] 221

(1 97 5) . 18- 68. In the last-named essay Tur ner criticizes Dirk Stegmann sobjections; Zum Verha ltnis von Grossindustrie und Nationalsozialismus

1930-1933 in r \vch iu f u i Soz ia lgesch ich te , 1 3 (1973) , 399-482.13. On the role of the land owners in Hitler s coming to powe r, see most

recently Heinrich Bruning, M e m o i r e n 1918-1934 (Stuttgart 197 0) , 639-45.

14 . With reference t o agriculture see Rudolf Ileberle, L a n d b e v o l ke r u n g u n dIVa t iona l sozia l i smus . E ine soz io log i sche Unte vsuch ung in Sch leswig-Hols te in1918-1 932 (Stut tgar t 1963) Horst Gies, NSDAP und landwirtschaftlicheOrganisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik in VfZ, 1 5 (19 67) ,341-76. On the trading Mitte ls tand see Winkler, o p. cit. , 166-7 1; Peter Wulf,Die po l i t i s che Ha l tung des schleswig-holsteinischen H a n d w e r k s 1918-1932(Cologne 19 69 ); Heinrich Uhlig, Die Cliavenhauser im Dri t t en Re ich (Cologne



16 Journa l o f on tem pora ry History

195 6). On white collar employees see Iris Hamel, Volkischer Verband undnationale Gewerkschaft. Der Deutschnationale Handlungsgehilfeiz Verband1893 1933 (St utt gar t 19 67 ). Less research has been don e on National Socialistpenetra tion of th e civil service associations, c.f. Hans Mommsen, Die Stellungder Beamtenschaft in Reich, Landern und Gemeu ldrn in der Ara Briining inVfZ, 21 (1973), 151-65. On the Il irtschaftspartei, which in the Reichstagelecti ons of May 19 28 received 4.5 per c en t of th e valid votes cast, see MartinSchumacher, Mittelstandsfront und Republik. Die WirtschaftsparteiReichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919 1933 (Diisseldorf 1972).

15 . Veroffeentlichungen des Keichmerbandes der Deutschen Industrie, Heft

21 (Berlin 1 924) , 35.16. See especially M . Kainer Lepsius, Parteiensystem und Soz ial str ukt ur:

Zum Problem der Dernokratisierung der deutsch en Gesellschaft in Wirtscbaft,Geschicl~te und Wirtschaftsgeschicbte. Festschrift i r r Friedrich Lutge (Stuttgart

1966 ), 371-93.17 . O n the con cept and meaning of secondary integration in Germa n

societ y since t he ninete enth cen tur y see Wolfgang Sau er, Das Problem desdeutsch en Nationalstaates in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed. , Moderne derltscheSozialgescbichte (Cologne 197 0), 406-36.

1 8 . N H Z 29, No.13 ( 27 March 1 924) .19 . See Wolfgang Sauer, National Socalism: Totali tariani sm or Fascis m?

in AHR , 73 (1 967 ), 404- 24; Klaus Hildebrand, Hitlers Ort in der Geschichtees preussisch-deutschen Nationalstaates in HZ, 21 7 (1973 ), 5 8 4 6 3 2 ; Henry

A . Tur ner , Hitlers Einstellung zu sozialen un d okonomi schen Fragen vor 19 33in Ceschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976).

Documents

German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-1933