Guinea at a Crossroads

8/3/2019 Guinea at a Crossroads

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WacSeries Vol. 1 Num 4, Guinea at a Crossroads: Opportunities for a More Robust Civil Society

Kalie Sillah and Charles Kojo VanDyck Page 1

Guinea at a Crossroads:

Opportunities for a More RobustCivil Society

Kalie Sillah & Charles Kojo VanDyck

WacSeries Vol. 1 Num 4 January 2010


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About WacSeries

WacSeries is a quarterly publication of the West Africa Civil Society Institute. Its objectiveis to emphasise the contribution of civil society organisations (CSOs) to the promotion ofdemocracy, good governance and the socio-economic development of West Africa, and to

create in-depth debates on issues of interest to civil society. The series covers all the areasof intervention of CSOs in the sub region.

To subscribe, please send an email titled subscription WacSeries to [email protected].

Please complete the short questionnaire at the end to share your views on this edition ofWacSeries.

About WACSI

The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) was created by the Open Society Initiative

for West Africa (OSIWA) to reinforce the capacities of civil society in the region. TheInstitute was established to bridge the institutional and operational gaps within civilsociety.

Vision: To strengthen civil society organisations as strategic partners for the promotion ofdemocracy, good governance and national development in the sub region.

Mission: The objective of the Institute is to strengthen the institutional and technicalcapacities of CSOs in the formulation of policies, the implementation and promotion ofdemocratic values and principles in West Africa. The role of WACSI is to serve as a resourcecentre for training, research, experience sharing and political dialogue for CSOs in West

Africa. The Institute makes its plea through policy dialogue to discuss current issuesaffecting West African States. Reference documents are regularly published by the Instituteand distributed to political leaders.

www.wacsi.org

About OSIWA

The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) was created in December 2000 as partof the world network of 32 autonomous foundations founded and supported by GeorgeSoros. These non-profit-making foundations share in the commitment to work for an open

society. Based on the principle that no one has monopoly of the truth, an open societyrecognises the different points of view and always remains open to improvement. Inpractice, open societies are characterised by the priority of law, democracy, respect ofdiversity and human rights, liberalisation of markets, information to the people and thedynamism of civil society.

www.osiwa.org


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Kalie Sillah is a Sierra Leonean researcher who has lived and worked in Guinea. He has anintellectual and operational interest in Early Warning Systems and Conflict Prevention,Post conflict Peacebuilding, Community Development and Transitional Justice. He is a PhD

candidate at the Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, where he also completed his MSc inDevelopment Practices. His area of research interests include criteria for measuringperformance in external-led post-conflict reintegration intervention and triangularconflict management; managing cross border violence in the Mano River Basin Countriesusing traditional methods.

Sillah joined the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) as a Lead Researcherfor the Transitional Justice Research Project titled Popular Perception of TransitionalJustice Experience and the Rise of Truth and Reconciliation Model in Africa. Since thecompletion of the 18-month research project, Mr. Sillah has written various researchpapers, including: Democracy as a Pathway to Peace and Human Security in Ghana and

Criteria for measuring performance of Post Conflict Reintegration Intervention for theInstitute for Security Studies (ISS).

Charles Kojo VanDyck is the Capacity Building Officer at the West Africa Civil SocietyInstitute (WACSI). He has experience in designing and implementing targeted trainingcourses to build the institutional and technical capacity of civil society organisations inWest Africa. He has been involved in developing strategic partnerships and collaborationsbetween civil society, government and the private sector. Also, he has expertise indesigning indigenous and context specific learning resources (manuals, modules, toolkits,handbooks and resource packs) for a cross section of civilian actors in West Africa. Heholds a Master of Development Management from the Ghana Institute for Management and

Public Administration (GIMPA).


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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU African UnionECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesCBOs Community Based Organisations

CNDD National Council for Democracy and DevelopmentCNTG Confederation of Guinean WorkersCSOs Civil Society OrganisationsMDDR Mouvement Dadis Doit ResterNGOs Non Governmental OrganisationsOIF International Organisation for the French-Speaking WorldPT Post and TelecommunicationsREFAMP Rseau des Femmes Africaines Ministres et ParlementairesREFMAP Rseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano pour la PaixUSTG Guinean Workers Union


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1. INTRODUCTIONThe economic, social and political crisis in Guinea is a source of concern for the whole ofWest Africa. The Guinean people are caught between hope for a new era after years ofmisrule and fear of how the military leaders may conduct themselves. Meanwhile, the

mood on the street is hardening against the junta, says Richard Moncrieff, InternationalCrisis Groups (ICG) West Africa Project Director. Guineans are desperate for democraticchange and an end to economic misery, while security forces are ready to use lethal force toremain in control. More trouble is likely unless combined domestic and internationalpressure is applied to find a sustainable solution to the problem1.

The military junta took control of the country hours after President Conts death on 23December 2008 and has tightened its grip on power. The junta leader, Captain MoussaDadis Camara, and his group of mid-ranking officers of the National Council for Democracyand Development (Conseil national pour la dmocratie et le dveloppement, CNDD), haveshown little sign of moving towards elections by the end of 2009, as they had promised on

seizing power. Rather, they have devised strategies to consolidate their grip on power byreplacing high ranking government personnel with persons loyal to their government.

This edition of WACSERIES will highlight the historical and political dynamics of the Conteand Dadis regimes and the consequences of their actions which have led to the currentpolitical crisis. Also, this monograph will interrogate the factors that have contributed toweaken civil society in contemporary times, in comparison to factors that contributed tothe attainment of self-rule in Guinea.

Civil society has become stronger in the years after colonialism but much will depend onthe outcome of the democratic election due in the first quarter of 2010. Any attempt to

appreciate the nature of civil society in Guinea should emanate from a largerunderstanding of the historical context of their emergence and their relationship with thestate.

The objective of this approach is to better situate the governance realities of post-colonialGuinea. In addition, the monograph provides an in-depth assessment of the social basis oftraditional and informal associative relationships strongly embedded in the Guinean polity.This assessment is made in order to determine the neutrality of civil society from the state,and how the state has contributed to weakening its institutional structures and policyinfluencing capabilities.

In light of this, this edition will also address issues of a struggling civil society sector andhow it can be strengthened to contribute to the transition process and democraticgovernance in Guinea.

1See full crisis report, at http://www.crisisgroup.org


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2. BACKGROUNDThe Republic of Guinea is located in West Africa and shares borders with Guinea-Bissau,Senegal, Mali, Cte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The French claimed the region as aProtectorate in 1849 and called it Rivire du Sud. In 1891 the Protectorate was

rechristened French Guinea as it became part of the French West African Empire.

Guinea wrestled independence from France in 1958 under a charismatic former trade

unionist, Sekou Tour, who declared defiantly, We, for our part, have a first andindispensable need, that of our dignity. Now, there is no dignity without freedomWeprefer freedom in poverty to riches in slavery. In the event, however, Guineans soon learntthat poverty was no condition for freedom or human dignity. The French reaction to this

act of defiance was perplexingly brutal: they withdrew immediately from the country,

leaving behind a population that was over 90 per cent illiterate, with only three university

graduates.2 Newly independent Ghana loaned Guinea a handy 10 million and Eastern Bloc

states rushed in to help. But the ravages of the French were such that only sustainedassistance could make any difference; there was even talk that the new nation would not

survive its first anniversary.

It did, but at the cost of both freedom and wealth. Tour imposed an autocratic regime

which banned all opposition, made his Democratic Party of Guinea the dominant factor in

the country, directing, in his own words, the life of the nation; the political, judicial,administrative, economic and technical aspects of Guinea. He died in 1984, and Army ChiefLansana Cont took over the impoverished state, and initially tried to liberalize both the

politics and the economy. However corruption grew in all sectors, and his rule became only

marginally less autocratic that his predecessors.

In 1993, Conte oversaw the conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections, which was

perceived to be massively rigged; and in 1996, the President, now old and ailing, crushed

an army pay mutiny.

Lansana Cont was re-elected President in 1998 and again in 2003, though the polls weremarred by irregularities. History repeated itself in December 2008 when Captain MoussaDadis Camara led a military coup following the death of President Cont. After seizingpower, he suspended the constitution and any political and union activity. Camara hassince promised a return to democratic rule but his resolve to run for presidency shows

that, much like his predecessors, he plans to hold onto power indefinitely. He has steadilyconsolidated his grip on power despite widespread opposition.

2 See Lansana Gberie, Destabilising Guinea (Partnership Africa Canada, 2001)


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In September 2009, soldiers apparently on the orders of Camara massacred 157 people at amass protest organised by the opposition. This event attracted global condemnation.ECOWAS threatened sanctions, and France, the former colonial power, announced thesuspension of military and other cooperation. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,described the Guinean regime as vile and criminal. Clinton called for appropriate

actions against Camaras junta, which she said cannot remain in power.3

Following this bloodshed, on October 20 2009, the Network of African Womens Ministersand Parliamentarians of Guinea (Rseau des Femmes Africaines Ministres etParlementaires de Guine, REFAMP-GUINEE), and the Mano River Womens Network forPeace (Rseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano pour la Paix, REFMAP) as well as otherwomens organisations issued a declaration to condemn the violent atrocities perpetratedagainst civilians especially women and children.

Tracing Authoritarian Rule The Tour Regime

Guineas bold decision to defy France and opt for immediate independence resulted from

several years of Ahmed Skou Tours spearheading of grassroots political mobilisation.

The movement he eventually led was a uniquely progressive civic movement that sprungfrom the grassroots to challenge and defeat France in a crucial referendum to decide thedestiny of the country. The struggle was pioneered by trade unions and numerous informalassociations including educated elites, womens associations and leaders of religiousorganisations. They were actively involved in various protests against the colonial state.

During that period, many voluntary associations became openly political.4 Massmovements mobilised with a unified voice to fight against the colonial administration.

Ahmed Skou ToursWe prefer dignity in poverty to riches in slavery"5became a popularslogan that catalysed liberation struggles across the continent to a new crescendo in thelate 1950s and 60s. Tour adopted a socialist style of governance that repressed civilianand political activists through various restrictive authoritarian measures. He declared thecountry a one party state and suppressed the freedom of speech, freedom of associationand freedom of movement leading millions of civil society members and political activistsinto exile.6 State driven allegations were concocted and selectively imposed on thosesuspected of having the intent to support mass mobilisation or political activism againstthe government. There were numerous disappearances, public executions andimprisonment without trial of civil society and political actors.

3Adam Nossiter, US Envoy Protests Violence in Guinea, New York Times, 7 October 2009

4Smith, Anthony D. (1987) State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism; New York: St. Martin's Press5 Camara, Soriba, S. (1956) La Guine sans la France (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiques, 1976), 116.6Gray Cowan, L. (1962) Guinea, inAfrican One-Party States, ed. Gwendolen M. CarterNew York: Cornell University Press.


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Tour's primary allies in the region were President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and ModiboKeita of Mali. After Nkrumah was overthrown in a 1966 coup, Tour offered him refuge inGuinea and made him co-president. As a leader of the Pan-Africanist movement, Toureconsistently spoke against colonial powers, and befriended leaders from the AfricanDiaspora such as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, to whom he offered asylum.

Meanwhile, there were unhealthy power struggles between Skou Tour and the educatedelite in Guinea. This struggle spilled over into post-independence governance.7 Tour'sincreasing suspicion that local and international actors were plotting to overthrow him ledhim to arrest large numbers of suspected political opponents and imprison them in camps,such as the notorious Camp Boiro National Guard Barracks.

Despite his work as a leader of Guineas trade union movement, Secretary-General of theGuinean RDA (Rassemblement Dmocratique Africain), and Deputy Mayor of Conakry8, theeducated elites continued to argue that Skou Tour had neither the right nor the capacityto rule Guinea because of his level of education and lack of experience.

The Western-educated Guineans characterised Skou Tour as a low class citizen, callinghim disparaging names like illiterate or a semi-illiterate with a sixth-grade education.9Consequently, as his policies continued to fail, Skou Tour filled the vacuum withcentralised rule and social tyranny. By the time of his death in March 1984, life expectancyin Guinea dropped to 40 years, private business had nearly evaporated and the per capitaGDP dropped to US $290.00 from US $200010.

The Legacy of the Iron Fist The ContRegime

Lansana Conts arrival onto the Guinean political landscape marked the beginning of anew chapter in the countrys political history. There were high expectations and hopes that

Guinea had finally gotten the opportunity to establish viable democractic institutions. Thejubilation that followed the bloodless coup was short-lived as Lansana Cont begantransforming himself into a dictator under the cloak of a quasi democracy.

During Cont's 24 year rule, poor governance and the brutality of the security forces drovethe country to near-anarchy. The consequences were general misery, poverty, oppressionand deprivation of the average Guinean whose quest for freedom dwindled away.

7Johnson, R.W. (1970) Sekou Tour and the Guinean Revolution,African Affairs, vol. 69, no. 277 (Oct. 1970), 357-358;8Kaba, L (1977), Guinean Politics: a Critical Historical Overview,Journal of Modern African Studies , vol. 15, no. 1 33.9Professor Elezabeth Schmidt, The Ghana-Guinea Legacy; Paper pr esented to the Conference on Black Liberation and the Spirit of 57Binghamton University November 2-3, 2007. http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/schmidt.pdf

10 Available at http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/cm/africana/sekou.htm (accessed 14 September, 2009)


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Ironically, although Guinea is blessed with one of Africas richest soils and a seeminglyendless supply of water, fish and forest produce, its citizens rank among the poorest in theworld and living standards have continued to fall11. However, the populace were generallyincapacitated from confronting the authoritarian government.

The government was bankrupt, the result of systematic corruption over recent years thatearned Guinea a ranking as the second most corrupt country in the world.12 Those inposition of power stole money meant to fund projects and development to satisfy their e.The country languished in poverty and failed to provide basic services, such as electricityand portable water, in its capital and major cities. The over 10 million people who sufferedunder the yoke of oppression for 50 years under French colonization, and then for 50 moreunder dictatorship, stood up for what they believed in and did whatever they could to bringan end to a kleptocracy, risking their lives and those of their families 13. The outcome wasindeed a radical quest for political transformation spearheaded by the Trade Unions, whichmobilised the entire populace to defy President Conts policies and actions.

The general strike actions that took place in March and June 2006 and then January andFebruary 2007 made a significant political impact. A platform for dialogue was createdwith broad-based stakeholder participation. This initiative was further strengthened by atwo-day conference organised by the trade union movement creating an avenue for intensedebate and reflection regarding the consolidation of democracy in the country. Theparticipants at the conference, which comprised of representatives from neighbouringcountries and international agencies, expressed their admiration for the Guinean TradeUnions and civil societys determination to preserve peace, democracy and social justice inGuinea.

Guineas current woes emanated from the rule of President Cont who left a country with

divided political parties and civil-society groups creating a vacuum that has enabled themilitary to seize power14.

11 Available at; http://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Guinean%20Civil%20Society,%20Unions%20Prompt%20Political%20Change;Consulted on October 29, 2009.12 source: Transparency International study, 2006

13 Quoted from an essay written by Chris Kirchgasler, who was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Guinea from 2004-06, Available at:http://blackstarjournal.blogspot.com/2007/02/situation-in-guinea-guest-essay.html

14 Quoted from an interview with Richard Moncrieff, the West Africa Project Director for International Crisis Group, Available at:

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.html
http://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Guinean%20Civil%20Society,%20Unions%20Prompt%20Political%20Changehttp://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Guinean%20Civil%20Society,%20Unions%20Prompt%20Political%20Changehttp://blackstarjournal.blogspot.com/2007/02/situation-in-guinea-guest-essay.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5678&l=1http://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.htmlhttp://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5678&l=1http://blackstarjournal.blogspot.com/2007/02/situation-in-guinea-guest-essay.htmlhttp://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Guinean%20Civil%20Society,%20Unions%20Prompt%20Political%20Change


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3. THE POST CONTE ERA- GUINEA AT A CROSSROADSThere were speculations and concerns regarding who would succeed Lansana Conte as hishealth continued to deteriorate. President Lansana Conte's death spelt the end of years ofmisrule in Guinea. When he was alive, few Guineans had any hope of their lives improving

in what is a mineral rich country but as the military took over, Guinea faced an uncertainfuture.

The president had relied increasingly on the military for support as the population grewangrier with the fact that his government was barely functioning and the economy was intatters. The clearest indication of this was the military response to the nationwide strikeand demonstrations in early 2007. More than 150 demonstrators were shot dead andmartial law was declared.

Many analysts had predicted that the military would take over at the end of Conte's rule -the army was increasingly showing signs that it was in charge. These concerns became a

reality by the sudden announcement of the death of President Cont and the appointmentof Aboubacar Sompar, the President of the National Assembly, as the interim Head of Stateon 23 December 2008.

According to the Guinean Constitution, Aboubakar Sompar, the President of the NationalAssembly, had the responsibility to lead the interim government and organise legislativeand presidential elections. Political parties and civil society groups have argued that theconstitution was so manipulated under Cont that it could not provide a way out of thecrisis he left behind.

This is evident as the constitutional transition was swiftly intercepted by a military coup by

the National Council for Democracy and Development (Conseil National de la Dmocratie etdu Development, CNDD), led by Captain Mousa Dadis Camara. The CNDD immediatelysuspended the Constitution and all political activities as a strategy to consolidate its grip onpower.

The CNDD

A significant number of CNDD members met in the army in 1990, when some, includingDadis Camara, were at the beginning of their military careers, and others were doing theirmandatory one-year military service. The group coalesced during the disturbances andmutinies that have characterised the army since 2005. The mutinies were eventually ended

through direct negotiations between Dadis Camara and Lansana Cont. However, duringthe second half of 2008, discipline and respect for rank in the army deteriorated further.


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The exact composition and hierarchy of the CNDD was, however, uncertain until at least 24hours after Conts death. Dadis Camara was quickly able to bring on board other parts ofthe military. In particular, he won over the presidential guard (Bataillon autonome desecurit prsidentielle, BASP), by offering a high position in the junta to the senior officer,Colonel Fodba Tour. However, the absence of Colonel Skouba Konat, later named

number three in the junta, from the initial CNDD roster broadcast on the radio on 23December is indicative of the tense negotiations that preceded publication of the definitivelist.

The CNDD rests on an uneasy balance of power between its four most powerful members.Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, now self-proclaimed leader, is from the Guerza, one of theindigenous ethnic groups in the south-east that are frequently referred to as the Forestierethnic family.

Lieutenant Claude Pivi, also a Forestier from the south-east, but from the Toma ethnicgroup, is the CNDDs enforcer. The junta characterises his ministerial-rank responsibility

for presidential security as a way of keeping him from extensive contact with thepopulation. His presence at the heart of power and close relations with Dadis Camarashould be of serious concern to civil society and the international community.

General Toto Camara, like former President Cont a Soussou from the south west, is themost senior soldier in the junta, but it is unlikely that he was party to the putchists plansuntil late in the day. He is known to have fallen out with Cont in April 2004 over an allegedcoup plot involving former Prime Minister Sidya Tour. Appointed Defence Attach at theWashington embassy in late 2007, he was brought back to Conakry in November 2008 andmade head of the army. On 23 December, he provided the link between the emerging juntaand the presidential family, almost certainly helping to negotiate its safety, and between

the junta and the officers based in the Almamy Samoury Tour camp in central Conakry. Hethereby earned himself a place as number two in the junta.

The juntas number three, Colonel Skouba Konat, worked, like Dadis Camara, in thelogistics wing of the army and is also from the BATA. A Malink whose family origins are inthe north east, he was based in Macenta in the south east. In late 2008, senior officersbrought him back to Conakry to balance Pivis growing power. Both Konat and Pivi havecombat experience from the Liberian border war of 2000-2001.

The CNDD took over with unexpected ease and has not faced any significant challenge fromwithin the armed forces. In justifying the military takeover, the CNDD prosecuted former

politicians and State officials for the misuse of state funds, general corruption, and lack ofstructure to combat drug trafficking. These amongst others were reasons espoused to beresponsible for plunging the country into endemic poverty and social fragmentationthroughout the 24 years of Lansana Conts regime. Ironically, the coup detat used thesame method the late President Lansana Cont used to access political power in Guinea.


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Dadis Camara was embraced at the early stage of the coup by ordinary Guineans on thepremise that he had come to liberate and redeem the country from the decay of LansanaConts authoritarian regime. The junta was welcomed as a sign of change.

Sompar was perceived as a direct continuation of Conts rule, having been a key fig ure in

his regime, and even in that of Skou Tour before him. The constitutional path was alsorejected by Guinean political parties and civil society groups on the basis that as themandate of the National Assembly had expired in December 2007; its president had noright to take over as Head of State. Cont left a legacy of abusive security forces, a collapsedeconomy and lack of trust among a divided civil society and quarrelsome political parties.

Guineans saw the succession to power of President Moussa Dadis Camara to power, as anera that will salvage them from the conspicuous economic misery and decade-long politicaldisarray. Despite the promises made to urgently restore constitutional order by the end of2009, many actors doubt his genuineness to carry out these intentions. These concernsstem from the lack of a clear roadmap and consensus on how to conduct legislative and

presidential elections. Guinea remains suspended from the regional organisations (AfricanUnion, Economic Community of West African States and the International Organisation forthe French-Speaking World).

Currently, there is no assurance that Camaras junta will honour promises of organisinglegislative and presidential elections in the shortest possible time. The army's decision todissolve parliament and the constitution was generally welcomed by Guineans inanticipation that it would bring peace.While Guineans are desperate for a break from thechaotic rule, there are concerns over possible in-fighting to fill the power vacuum.

Most observers believe that to maintain national sovereignty, consolidate peace and win

back the confidence of Guineans, the junta must drop any plans to contest the elections inany form. It should handover to a civilian coalition government that includesrepresentation from the Forces Vives, the umbrella group of opposition parties and civilsociety and accept the offer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)to mediate talks on its exit from power. The key now is whether the army and thepoliticians can agree on a way forward and whether they will be willing to actively involvecivil society in the process.

Any power struggle would be extremely dangerous given the ethnic divisions that exist.Lansana Conte was from the Soussou ethnic group which makes up 10% of the population.While the Soussou have benefited during the past 25 years of his rule, some fear a possible

struggle for supremacy between the two largest ethnic groups, the Peul and the Malinke.


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Rival cliques within the presidential circle have been fighting to preserve their political andfinancial interests for some years by maintaining the status quo. Those competing forpower include businessmen, senior army figures and the president's wives.15 The future ofGuinea is also of great concern in the region. After conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia andCote dIvoire, West Africa badly needs a dose of peace. The fact that ethnic groups live

across the national borders of these countries means any conflict can all too easily becomeregional. Therefore, it is urgent to devise an exit strategy for the junta, says the CrisisGroups Africa Programme Director, Francois Grignon. Unless immediate and concertedefforts are made by the Forces Vives and the international community to wrest thetransition process away from the military, further violence threatens Guinea and then itsneighbours, which are just beginning to recover from years of civil war, notes theInternational Crisis Group16.

4. CIVIL SOCIETY IN GUINEACSOs are a vital part of assuring that democracy in Africa truly becomes deeply rooted.

Democracy is not just a matter of voting; it must involve open debate on policies, vigilanceon actions, public accountability, widespread human rights and insistence on the rule oflaw. Achieving these attributes of democracy almost always requires a lot of internal andexternal pressure, and it is in this context that civil society is particularly needed now17.Often, literature and academic discourse have viewed the concept of civil society as aWestern socio-political ideology18. However this approach does not fully explain therealities of non-Western societies19. Misunderstandings often occur when Western notionsand norms are used to define civil society in Africa. Of the plethora of sociological andpolitical definitions of civil society by both western and non-western scholars20, an idealconceptual clarification of the typography of civil society found in Guinea was defined by awestern author.

According to political scientist David Held, civil society retains a distinctive character tothe extent that it is made up of areas of social life the domestic world, the economicsphere, cultural activities and political interaction--which are organised by private orvoluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of thestate.21

15Available at, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7798079.stm?ad=1

16 See full Crisis Group report at: http://www.crisisgroup.org17 Opening Statement by K. Y. Amoako, OAU-Civil Society Conference on 11 June 2001. See full document at:http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/speeches/amoako/2001/061101speech_oau_civil_society_conference.htm18Harbeson, John W. (1994); Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa, in Civil Society and the State in Africa eds. John W.Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan; Boulder: Lynne Rienner19 Orji, N. (2009) CivilSociety, Democracy and Good Governance in AfricaCivil Society, Democracy and Good Governance in Africa CEUPolitical Science Journal (CEU Political Science Journal), issue: 01 / 2009, pages: 76101, on www.ceeol.com.20See Ibid, Nelson Kasfir, The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique, in Civil Society and Democracy in Africa ed. Kasfir, N.(1998) London: Frank Cass.21 David Held, Models of Democracy(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 281.


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This definition has diverse elements that are common to civil society particularly in Guinea.The definition encompasses concepts such as political interaction cultural activitiesvoluntary arrangementoutside the direct control of the state, all of which collectivelydescribe the wide range of associational groups found in Guinea. Civil society in Guineatends to take the form of an active associational life with strong social, traditional and

religious roots.

High expectations have led to a proliferation of uncoordinated demands and proposals forreform, but if civil society groups and political parties are to play a constructive role in thetransition, they need to overcome their historical differences and concentrate on thepriorities of the next ten months. However, contemporary civil society in Guinea consists ofcomparatively modern associations and civic institutions with an informal traditionalcharacter. Some of these groups include: professional associations, occupational bodies,student and youth groups, labour unions, religious associations, women's organisations,cooperatives or self-help associations, as well as those that deal with contemporarydemocratic challenges such as human rights issues and good governance which are mostly

pioneered by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations(CBOs).

Thus far, civil society in Guinea has managed to survive difficult historical epochs. In theSeptember 1958 plebiscite, Guinea was the only territory to reject the constitution of theFifth French Republic. This caused immediate severance of political and economic ties withFrance. During this historical period, civic movements were in the form of popularresistance groups against the colonial administration. However, during the reign of SekouToure civil society groups in Guinea radically shifted towards a popular civic movementagainst his regime to foster the promotion of democratic governance and the rule of law.Throughout this period, civil society actors were victims of state and non-state repression.

The persistent state sponsored harassment, intimidation, and violence contributed to theworsening conditions under which civil society organisations operated. This led tothousands of civil society members being exiled, imprisoned without trial or evenmurdered.

The 1990s witnessed civil society in Guinea crystallise around powerful Trade Unions. TheUnion-led movement was able to unite Guineas previously weak and fractured civil societybecause Guineans perceive it as more legitimate than the political opposition. The strikes inMarch and June 2006 and again in January 2007 were organised by the NationalConfederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) and the Guinean Workers Union (USTG), twoformerly rival unions that united in 2005 to protest 30 percent inflation, tripling fuel prices

and worsening standards of living for ordinary Guineans. Following the 2006 strikes,opposition political parties and other civil society members remarked that if they had beenconsulted by the unions beforehand they could have contributed to the process.

Consequently, in 2007, two non-governmental organisations, the National Council of CivilSociety Organisations, an umbrella group for NGOs, and the Civic Alliance, a relatively newgrouping with branches nationwide, coordinated nationwide strikes with the unions.


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Guinea's unions are perceived to be symbolically important because of the key role theyplayed in ending colonisation in Guinea and installing the country's first post-independence president, former union leader Skou Tour.

The Patron-Client Nature of Civil Society

Guinea is a very traditional society. Informal functional arrangements are stronglyembedded in the fabric of the society with strong beliefs common among many Guineans.Guineans are also strongly fatalistic - the belief that man has no control over his destiny, assuch whatsoever happens to him is the will of God. It is more strongly believed in Guineathat benefits derived from the subjugation of leaders (elders, local chiefs and authority) area reciprocal blessing.22 This is because leaders are exercising the roles and responsibilitiesbestowed upon them by God. It is from these combined beliefs that the worst form ofpatron-client relationships is firmly rooted and negatively influencing the countryspolitical system. This weakens the role of civil society in changing perceptions and the lives

of Guineans.

The in-built patriarchal patron-client networks in Guinea stem from the premise that bothpatrons and clients will gain spiritual and material benefits if one achieves political power.It was not surprising to hear President Lansana Cont saying, Guineans must accept myrule as the will of God 23.

In modern times, politicians take advantage of these beliefs to manipulate the populace fortheir own selfish reasons. This is why in Guinea senior government officers often createpatron-client networks with civil society to consolidate their grip on power. This practicein many respects has contributed to the silent observers role being played by civil society

particularly as resources trickle down through patronage networks.

Successive governments, both civilian and military regimes installed clientele policies thatrewarded loyal supporters with opportunities while the majority remained marginalisedand impoverished.

Throughout Conts presidency, senior government officials were not accountable for theiractions, therefore the government was perceived as being insensitive to citizens needs,interests and expectations. However, some anti-corruption crusaders endeavouredpointing out corrupt practices; some of whom were beneficiaries of the patron-clientsystem.

22 Reciprocal Blessing is a term coined to explain a divine reward for being submissive to a leader.

23 Quoted from an essay written by Chris Kirchgasler, who was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Guinea from 2004-06, Available at:

http://blackstarjournal.blogspot.com/2007/02/situation-in-guinea-guest-essay.html


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The organisational capacity of many associations weakened and fell prey to Statemanipulation because of their dependence on government funds. Many professionals,intellectuals and civil society organisations expressed difficulties in maintaining neutrality.

Further, the majority of working classes were dependent on government for employment,

while civil society autonomy had become extremely questionable. The overwhelmingdegree of corrupt practices did not only weaken the capacity of civil society, but made theadministrative machinery of the state inefficient.

In addition, professionals and intellectuals in Guinea were more preoccupied with dailysurvival, thus limiting institutions like the judiciary, academia, security and anti-corruptioninstitutions from helping to expose corrupt practices in the country. For instance,politicians, judges and even religious leaders were dependent on government for economicsurvival. They argued that they had no alternative survival option other than to benefitfrom patron-client networks.

The Roles of Civil Society in Guinea

However, civil society in Guinea historically drew strong support from the United NationsResolution 1514 that permits colonial states the opportunity to exercise self-determination.24 Thus, this became the core political philosophy and ideal foremancipation. More than 50 years after independence, self-governance in itself is only self-expressive and not synonymous to self-determination.

Resistance movements against colonial domination characterised by civic engagement atthe grass roots level had already started gaining ground prior to the adoption of the UnitedNations Resolution permitting self-rule.25 By then, the less organised local movementsagainst the colonial authorities began to create a pathway to engender the rise ofstructured nationalist movements.

As members of trade unions became increasingly conscious of the common socio-economicstrangulation imposed by the colonial administration, self-mobilised broad-basedassociational groups began to champion the same cause, hence, the acceleration in thequest for self-definition, self-expression and self-determination.

24Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People: Adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), 14 December 1960.

25 Schmidt, E (2005); Mobilising the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea 1939-1958; Portsmouth,NH: Heinemann


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The quest for self-rule, democracy and good governance has been the fundamentalmotivating factor behind the emergence and proliferation of civil society institutions inGuinea. However, debates on their roles and responsibilities have assumed greaterattention in contemporary times due to the complex governance challenges facing thecountry. There has also been significant discourse on their potential contribution towards

the entire political transformation of the country. Civil society organisations (CSOs) havegrown in number and vitality since 1990, when the current national constitution wasformulated which paved the way for multiparty democracy.

This new dispensation created a revitalised civil society that advocated for liberal

constitutionalism, institutional reforms, human rights protection, social and administrativejustice, gender mainstreaming and good governance. Like many countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica, the driving forces and interest of CSOs in Guinea was complete transformation topolitical pluralism and democratic governance.

This engagement in many respects goes beyond the definitional meaning of the differencesbetween pre-independence and earlier post-independence associational civil society.Interestingly, the emergence of CSOs coincided with the increased unconstitutionalcompetition for state resources by various political actors.

This situation combined with economic difficulties was a result of the structuraladjustment policy and led to the politicisation of civil society who benefitted from elite andpolitical patronage. Thus, civil society found it difficult to be neutral, impartial andindependent from the State. Also, they became over-dependent on donor organisations andstate funding.

Nonetheless, civil society has been the pioneering force behind significant political changein Guinea. There has been a proliferation of ideas and propositions, from both recognised

bodies and less well-known associations in towns and villages, where the countryspolitical future has been the subject of intense debate. This is, in the longer term, awelcome sign of the underlying strength of civil society. Improved coherence will requirebetter internal democracy in civil society groups and political parties, to discouragedissatisfied members from breaking away and adding to the existing proliferation ofentities. Significantly, various sociological schools of thought, including the groundbreakingstudy of African history by Walter Rodney How Europe Underdeveloped Africa confirmsthat associational life in African societies preceded the inception of the colonialadministration.26

Civil Society - State Relationships

Civil societys relationship with the state has been weak since independence in 1958, as aresult of the widespread human rights violations propagated by state institutions;including the security apparatus and judiciary. Moreover, the lack of national consensus toenhance civilian-military relations in Guinea has undermined contemporary politicaldiscourse in the absence of national consensus to sustain continuous dialogue.

26Rodney, W (1973) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London
http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/guinea.htmlhttp://www.loc.gov/law/guide/guinea.html


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The need to pay special attention to the balance of power from military to civilian ruleunder current circumstances is increasingly stirring intense debate about the role ofgovernment, political parties and civil society. There is a widespread belief that statesecurity will ultimately depend on the military junta remaining neutral throughout thepolitical transition. However, civil society is very sceptical about the willingness of the

military junta and the security institutions to genuinely maintain neutrality and transferpower to a democratically elected government. Most non-state actors strongly argue thatunless the security institutions are reformed and their capacities enhanced, there will notbe a sustainable transfer of power without the security apparatus monopolising thepolitical situation.

A cross section of Guineans remain pessimistic about CNDD and President Mousa DadisCamaras political will to transfer power to a civilian government, despite the promises hehas made. It also appears to be very difficult to curtail President Dadis Camaras politicalambition should he present himself as a candidate for the Presidency. This is because of theconspicuous absence of strong political party cohesion, and the incapacity of political party

leaders to rally broad-based grassroots coalitions to challenge the military government.This weakness has continued to undermine the potentials of the collective force of civilsociety which is desperately needed at this historic time.

The Contribution of Civil Society to the Transition Process

Domestic legal and political environments have a profound impact on the existence andpractice of non-state actors27. Civil society in Guinea has steadily become vibrant since theunion strikes that called for Lansana Conts departure in March and June 2006, as well asin January and February 2007. Civil society has helped to expand popular participationthrough continuous mobilisation of various associational groups towards theestablishment of democratic governance since the death of President Cont. Also, civilsociety organisations have been raising awareness of the protection of citizens againstpotential predatory behaviour of the military regime, whilst performing monitoring andaccountability roles.

Despite the enormous efforts to foster democratic transition in Guinea, their neutralityremains questionable taking into consideration the history of patron-client relationshipsamong politicians and senior government officials. They are increasingly raising awarenesson collective action which is important in this political climate with the overarching aimof searching for best practices and strategies for tackling some of the key bottleneckswithin the framework of a peaceful democratic transition in Guinea. These are practical

realities linked to committing the CNDD Government to commence the implementation ofrecommendations within the previously articulated roadmap.

27 Ahmed, S and Potter, D (2006); NGOs in International Politics: Kumarian Press Inc, Bloomfield


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Civil society remains committed to the political transformation agenda. One of the mostsignificant and positive contributions to the transition process is the collective rallying cryto the international community and regional organisations to intervene with decisivesanctions to rid the country of the military junta. In addition, civil society organisations areplaying a crucial role in ensuring that the transformative agenda and the political transition

are constantly monitored and information is shared with regional and internationalstakeholders. Whilst such important contributions to the quest for political change is worthacknowledging, there is no substantial evidence of consensus between civil society,political parties and the military junta around the advancement of the democratic agendain Guinea. This creates a great sense of doubt as the junta continues to strengthen its gripon power.

Furthermore, civil society has started playing a leading role in relation to the work of thenewly established electoral commission. Partnerships have been developed with thecommission to monitor and consult widely with communities on various overarching socio-political issues including voters registration and the screening of political parties. This

relationship of cooperation is evident in the continued formal and informal alliancebetween the trade unions and the other associational groups in the promotion of a peacefuland credible election. The challenge is how to maintain the delicate balance betweenencouraging the junta to leave power peacefully whilst maintaining a neutral positionduring the presidential and legislative elections.

Despite the absence of an established unified overarching reform movement, vast networksof CSOs continue to attract global attention to help establish sustainable peace,development and democratic governance. This is a reflection of a new political culturewhich is gradually re-awakening the conscience of the citizens to understand theirfranchise rights and responsibilities within the political space. For instance, the massive

resurgence of demands for political accountability and reform are a clear indicator ofprogress in the nurturing of democracy, peace and stability in the sub-region. Whilstopportunities exist for progress, there is also a significant fear of political instability if aconstructive platform is not created for continuous facilitative and transformative civil-military dialogue.

Many Guineans continue to display commitment to the movement in order to oust themilitary junta. Amidst low levels of trust and tolerance, state and non-state actors remaindivided along ethnic, ideological, geographical and political party lines. For instance, thenewly emerging groups like the Mouvement Dadis Doit Rester(MDDR) calling for PresidentDadis Camara to stay in power are increasingly undermining civil societys commitment toensure that the junta restores constitutional order and creates an enabling environmentfor international and regional actors to express opinions and challenge the unconstitutionalregime.


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Opportunities for Civil Society Engagement in the Transition Process

The death of President Cont has paved a new direction for CSOs across the country tovigorously engage in numerous interconnected policy issues including human rights,judicial and security sector reforms. His death has created a positive political atmosphere

that is conducive for civil society to contribute to the building of strong and neutral civicinstitutions. Civil society is expected to shift the scope of engagement from being loose,informal groups to a more structured and organised entities. To a larger extent, the groupsare now highly motivated and gradually confident to debate subjects that were not openlydiscussed during the past regimes.

Despite civil societys growing capacity and resource constraints, it is increasinglyprojecting its preferences into the policy process. A coalition of CSOs to give a push towardspolicy advocacy will give an impetus to a successful transition process. Keck and Sikking28postulate that advocacy networks including CSOs, can engage in four kinds of politics:information politics, in which networks provide and re-interpret information on issues of

concern; leverage politics, in which networks attempt to gain moral or material leverageover more powerful actors; accountability politics, in which networks try to compel statesto live up to norms to which they have formally agreed.

Recently, Guinea's trade unions embarked on a nationwide strike which began on October12, 2009 to mourn the more than 150 demonstrators who were shot dead by soldiers onSeptember 28, for protesting the possible candidacy of junta leader Captain Moussa DadisCamara for the presidency in the January 2010 general election. The country's youth hasalso called for a five day hunger strike aimed at encouraging an agreement between allparties to resolve Guinea's crisis.

These courageous developments among Guineas civil society for peace and democracy, inresponse to the despicable political situation in which Guineans find themselves, must besupported by immediate intervention of the international community, regional bodies, andcivil society organisations in West Africa and Africa generally29.

The pending elections provide the opportunity for civil society to gain a much-neededspace within the framework of the democratically elected government. This allows civilsociety an opportunity to play its traditional role as a neutral political watchdog ofgovernance and social justice on behalf of the citizenry.

28 Available at: www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5960&l=1

29 Available at; http://www.mediafound.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452
http://www.mediafound.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452http://www.mediafound.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452


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The political parties and civil society in Guinea need to be given the opportunity to provewhat they can do. For that to happen, the military needs to be contained. One option is thatthe junta should be encouraged to withdraw their political ambitions for a civiliantransition government to be established, whilst an international intervention secures thecivilian government30.

There is an assumption that civil society can persuade the military government torelinquish power and create a platform for full socio-political transformation. If thetransition is well managed as anticipated, a new democratic structure will be created, newconstitution written and a new breed of political actors encouraged to contribute to nationbuilding. This will create a roadmap for the facilitation of the brain drain to brain gain byencouraging Guineans living in Diaspora to return home and invest in national building.

5. CONCLUSIONDemocratic governance involves the building up of legitimate, capable and responsive

institutions. For many historical reasons, Guinea inherited weak institutions. This adds thecomplexity to Guineas journey towards the consolidation of democracy. The seriousness ofthe situation is further highlighted by the fear that instability in Guinea might create anegative contagious and multiplier effect that will threaten the stability of its neighbouringMano River Basin countries, namely; Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote dIvoire.

It is clear from this that civil society has long existed in Guinea even before independence.However, this sector became dormant during Skou Tours 26 years of centralised andauthoritarian governance. Civil Society only became prominent during Lansana Contsadministration, re-emerging as massive grassroots civic movements which promotedmulti-party politics and democratic values.

Evidently, Guinea like many African states has been deprived of the visionary leaders andprogressive national policies required to strengthen democratic governance and the rule oflaw. This also explains that civil-political patronage has been another contributing factorfor the steady decline of state institutions since independence. The two successiveauthoritarian regimes (Skou Tour and Lansana Cont) strangulated and silenced thenatural enthusiasm for associational life and active engagement as avenues for rectifyingsocial injustice, or holding public officials accountable.

The time has come for the Guinean State to invest in institutional reform, in civil societyand in the empowerment of Guinean citizenry. It is imperative that decision makers invest

in bottom-up strategies that will empower Guineans to hold their leaders accountable andcompel them to listen to the voices of the deprived segments of society. This is an essentialstrategy that will help overcome the challenges of entrenching democratic governance inGuinea.

30 Quoted from an interview with Richard Moncrieff, the West Africa project director for International Crisis Group, Available at:

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.html
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5678&l=1http://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.htmlhttp://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/richard-moncrieff-guinea.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5678&l=1


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6. RECOMMENDATIONSEnhancing civil societys capacities to engage with the State to promote a peacefuldemocratic transition requires addressing a number of challenges. Therefore, thismonograph provides the following strategic recommendations for strengthening civil

engagement and collaboration with the State.

The recommendations outlined below are directed at Decision-Makers, Civil Society andRegional and International Policy Actors.

Decision-Makers

Constructive dialogue must be facilitated among diverse state and non-state actors,including all political parties. The aim will be the building up of trust and promotingnational consensus to collectively exploit all windows of opportunity for a peacefulpolitical transition;

Building democratic institutions is critical to a democratic transition. Therefore,institutional, security and judicial sector reforms must be instituted to rid Guinea of itsbureaucracy, create political stability and strengthen judicial processes. These reformswill deepen and consolidate good governance before, during and after the transitionalperiod;

There is a need to develop more effective integrative approaches to promote peace andstability, as well as empowering and cooperating with community stakeholdersincluding religious leaders, elders, women and youth;

Stakeholders and institutions must endeavour to identify innovative ways of buildinginclusive political spaces that embrace all ethnic groups.

Civil Society

Broad-based political and civil society actors and groups must have the opportunity tocontribute to political dialogue in order to strengthen the democratic process;

Political parties and civil society must promote working consultations and engagementwith state institutions and regional organisations.

Regional and International Policy Actors

Regional Institutions must help to facilitate a transformative dialogue process topromote and enhance government, civil society and political parties collaborationaimed at increasing the effectiveness of national level partnerships;


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The international community must collaborate with local stakeholders to developcomprehensive strategies that will pay special attention to issues most crucial to theadvancement of a peaceful democratic transition;

The international and regional community must contribute to ensuring that the MilitaryJunta conducts free, fair and credible national elections as soon as practicable.

Joint Recommendations

An effective partnership between civil society and the government must be ensured sothat the transitional efforts to achieve a peaceful political transformation would berealised through collaborative interventions; and

Opportunities for networking and communication between civil society actors andpolicy makers must be facilitated as a basis to promote effective collaboration betweencivil society organisations and the State.


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REFERENCES

Camara, Soriba, S. (1956) La Guine sans la France (Paris: Presses de la Fondation NationaleDes Sciences Politiques, 1976), 116.

David Held, (1987) Models of Democracy; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press

Gray Cowan, L. (1962) Guinea, inAfrican One-Party States, ed. Gwendolen M. CarterNew York: Cornell University Press.

Harbeson, John W. (1994); Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa, in Civil Societyand the State in Africa eds. John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan;Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Johnson, R.W. (1970) Sekou Tourand the Guinean Revolution,African Affairs, vol. 69, no.277 (Oct. 1970), 357-358;

Kaba, L (1977), Guinean Politics: a Critical Historical Overview, Journal of Modern AfricanStudies, vol. 15, no. 1 33.

Mamdani, M (2007), Political Violence and State Formation in Post-Colonial Africa;International Development Centre; Working Paper Series; Paper No.1 October 2007.

McGowan, P (2005). Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part I, TheoreticalPerspectives.Armed Forces & Society, vol. 32http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/Contnt/abstract/32/1/5

Nelson Kasfir (1998), The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique, in Civil Societyand Democracy in Africa ed. Kasfir, N. London: Frank Cass.

Orji, N. (2009) Civil Society, Democracy and Good Governance in Africa Civil Society,Democracy and Good Governance in Africa CEU Political Science Journal (CEU PoliticalScience Journal), issue: 01 / 2009, pages: 76101, on www.ceeol.com.

Professor Elizabeth Schmidt, The Ghana-Guinea Legacy; Paper presented to the Conferenceon Black Liberation and the Spirit of 57 Binghamton University November 2-3, 2007.http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/schmidt.pdf

Rodney, W. (1973) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications,London

Rotimi S, (2007) Nigerias Muddled Elections, Journal of Democracy18 (October 2007):95110.


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Sawyer, A. (2003) Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case ofthe Mano River Basin Area; Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Indianapolis:Indiana University

Schmidt, E (2005); Mobilising the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist

Movement in Guinea 1939-1958; Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann

Smith, Anthony D. (1987) State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State andAfrican Nationalism; New York: St. Martin's Press.

Souar Issaka K. (2009) Explaining the December 2008 Military Coup dtat in Guinea;Issue 1; ACCORD


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FEEDBACK FROM READERS

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Guinea at a Crossroads