M E T A P H Y S I C AInternational Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Editors: HANS BURKHARDT (Munich) RAFAEL HNTELMANN (Frankfurt)UWE MEIXNER (Regensburg) ERWIN TEGTMEIER (Mannheim) ___________________________________________________________ Special Issue 3 Ramseys Ontology ANNA-SOFIA MAURIN / NILS-ERIC SAHLIN Some ontological speculations:Ramsey on universals, particulars and facts7 HERBERT HOCHBERG Ramsey vs. Russell: Particulars, Universals and Truth 29 FRASER MACBRIDE Negation and Predication: A Defence of Ramseys Thesis61 ARNOLD KOSLOW Ramsey on Simplicity and Truth89 NILS-ERIC SAHLIN / MARTIN KAS PALM Ramsey sentences: an observation109 Authors Addresses: Dr. Anna-Sofia Maurin, University of Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund, anna-sofia.maurin@fil.lu.se; Prof. Dr. Nils-Eric Sahlin, University of Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund, nils-eric.sahlin@fil.lu.se; Prof. Dr. Herbert Hochberg, The University of Texas at Austin Philosophy, 1 University Station C3500, Austin, TX 78712-0310, hochberg@mail.utexas.edu;Prof. Dr. Fraser McBride, School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK, f.macbride@philosophy.bbk.ac.uk; Prof. Dr. Arnold Koslow, Faculty of Philosophy, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016-4309, akoslow@mindspring.com; Martin Kas Palm, University of Lund, Philosophy Departement, Kungshuset, Lundagrd, 222 22 Lund. EditorsAddresses:Prof.Dr.Dr.HansBurkhardt,AmEgart18,D-82418Murnau, Germany, burkhardt@metaphysica.de.* Dr. Rafael Hntelmann, Frankfurter Str. 39, D-63150 Heusenstamm,huentelmann@metaphysica.de*ProfessorDr.UweMeixner,Institutfr PhilosophiederUniversittRegensburg,D-93040Regensburg;meixner@metaphysica.de* ProfessorDr.ErwinTegtmeier,PhilosophischesSeminarderUniversittMannheim,68131 Mannheim; tegtmeier@metaphysica.de Editorial Office: METAPHYSICA, P.O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm phone +49(6104)66 57 33; fax +49(6104)66 57 34 e-mail: redaktion@metaphysica.de Guidelinesforsubmittingarticles:Articlesshouldbewrittenonacomputer(compatible with WinWord 2000 or lower, line spacing 1.5; type-size 12 pt) and submitted with an e-mail attachment to the Editorial Office of the Journal METAPHYSICA. The text should be no longer than 30 pages, including an abstract in English. 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ISSN 1437-2053 ISBN 3-937202-72-2 ME T A P H Y S I C AInternational Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Editorial Board LAIRD ADDIS IOWA, USA DAVID ARMSTRONG SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA SIGMUND BONK REGENSBURG, GERMANY BOJAN BORSTNER MARIBOR, SLOVENIA PAUL BURGER BASEL, SWITZERLAND REINHARDT GROSSMANN BLOOMINGTON, USA HERBERT HOCHBERG AUSTIN, USA INGVAR JOHANSSON UME, SWEDEN / LEIPZIG, GERMANY CHRISTIAN KANZIAN INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA WOLFGANG KNNE HAMBURG, GERMANY KEVIN MULLIGAN GENVE, SWITZERLAND FREDERIC NEF RENNES, FRANCE JERZY PERZANOWSKI TORUN/KRAKW, POLAND ALVIN PLANTINGA NOTRE DAME, USA MATJAZ POTRC LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA CHRISTOF RAPP BERLIN, GERMANY RICHARD SCHANTZ SIEGEN, GERMANY OLIVER SCHOLZ MNSTER, GERMANY HANS-PETER SCHTT, KARLSRUHE, GERMANY JOHANNA SEIBT AARHUS, DENMARK PETER SIMONS LEEDS, U.K. BARRY SMITH BUFFALO, USA / LEIPZIG, GERMANY RALF STOECKER BIELEFELD, GERMANY KTHE TRETTIN FRANKFURT A. M., GERMANY HERMANN WEIDEMANN MNSTER, GERMANY ANNA-SOFIA MAURIN AND NILS-ERIC SAHLIN Some ontological speculations:Ramsey on universals, particulars and facts* Proem ntologicalquestionsareatthecoreofmuchofRamseyswriting, whetheronnumbers,probabilities,thestatusoftheoreticaltermsor general propositions and causality. But to say that Ramsey has an ontology, or that he subscribes to a particular type of metaphysics, is to depart from historical fact. In his papers Ramsey argues for and against the theories of his friends and colleagues; he develops ideas and theories of his own, and doingthishetriesthingsout,movesfromonepositiontoanother.Inone paperhedoubtstheexistenceoffactsandpropositions(seeKoslowspa-perinthisvolume)inordertoexploretheconsequencesofthatposition, while in another, facts and propositions are the groundwork for his explora-tions.One of his many impressive contributions to philosophy is his analysis oftheproblemofuniversals.1HispaperUniversals,whichdeniesany fundamentaldistinctionbetweenuniversalsandparticulars,surmountsse-rious objections to a realist view of universals and, at the same time, solves severallong-standingproblemsaboutthem,dismissingothervenerable enigmas as nonsense.2 Various reasons for making the distinction between universalsandparticularspsychological,physicalandlogicalcanbe advanced.Ramseyarguesthatlogicjustifiesnosuchontologicaldistinc-tion. Allusion to the grammatical subject-predicate distinction will not do, sinceSocratesiswise,withthesubjectSocratesandthepredicate * TheauthorswishtothankHughMellor,KevinMulligan,andtheMiniSeminarat theDepartmentofphilosophy,LundUniversity,forconstructivecommentsandsup-port. 1SeehispapersUniversals(Ramsey,1990)andUniversalsandtheMethodof Analysis (Ramsey, 1926). 2See (Mellor, 1983), see also (Sahlin, 1994). O 8wise, asserts the same fact and expresses the same proposition (p. 12) asWisdomisacharacteristicofSocrates,withsubjectwisdomand predicate Socrates.3 Moreover,thereis,heargues,noessentialdifferencebetweenthe (in)completenessofuniversalsandthatofparticulars.Wisecan,forex-ample, be used to generate propositions not only of the atomic form Soc-rates is wise, but also of the molecular form Neither Socrates nor Plato is wise.ButSocratescanalsobeusedtogeneratepropositionsofboth these forms: e.g. Socrates is wise and Socrates is neither wise nor just. There is therefore a complete symmetry in this respect between individuals and basic properties (qualities). As Ramsey succinctly puts it, thewholetheoryofparticularsanduniversalsisduetomistakingforafunda-mentalcharacteristicofrealitywhatismerelyacharacteristicoflanguage(p. 13). AndRamseyarguesthattherecannomorebecomplexuniversalse.g. negative(not-wise),relational(wiserthan)orcompound(grue) thantherecanbecomplexparticulars.SupposeSocratesistotherightof Plato.Onecouldthenimaginethreepropositions:afirststatingthatthe relation being to the right of holds between Socrates and Plato; a second statingthatSocrateshasthecomplexpropertyofbeingtotherightof Plato;andathirdstatingthatPlatohasthecomplexpropertysomething has if Socrates is to the right of it. Thus if there were complex universals, besidesthefactthatSocratesistotherightofPlato,therewouldalsobe twonon-relationalfactswithdifferentconstituents.Butthatisnonsense, theargumentgoes;thereisonlyonefact,thefactthatSocratesistothe right of Plato. In the present paper we intend to do four things. First, we want to give a brief outline of one of Ramseys major contributions to metaphysics; and that we have already accomplished. Second, we want to focus on some as-pects of Ramseys first argument the symmetry argument. We want to see on what assumptions it is based, and to ask what it can contribute to a con-temporary metaphysical debate. Third, we want to investigate more closely one basic assumption upon which the success of Ramseys arguments rests: the assumption of a logical atomism. Fourth, and finally, we want to further investigate and assess an argument against the particular-universal distinc- 3 Quotes by Ramsey are all from (Ramsey, 1990). HERBERT HOCHBERG Ramsey vs. Russell: Particulars, Universals and Truth

n a well known controversy concerning the question Are the Character-isticsofThingsUniversalorParticular?G.E.MooreandG.F.Stout took two things for granted. First, that there were both things, which were assumed to be particulars, and characteristics of things; second, that things andcharacteristicsdifferedinlogicallyandontologicallycrucialways. Their debate concerned whether the characteristics of things were universal attributes or what are now commonly called tropes. One can fittingly la-belaviewthattakescharacteristicstobetropesmoderatenominalism. Quine,alongwithnumerousfollowers,adoptedamoreradicalformof nominalismgoing back to an 11th century view attributed to Rocelinusthattakespredicatestoreplaceproperties,andhencedeniesthatthereare any characteristics at all, whether universal or particular. F. MacBride has recentlytakenafurtherstep,invariousarticles(MacBride,1998,1999, 2004),byquestioningthepresumeddistinctionbetweenuniversalsand particulars.Indoingsohehasrecalled,reliedonanddefendedRamseys line of argument set out in the once classic paper Universals. I. Predicables, Terms and Facts Ramseysargument,nowresurrectedasachallengetothosewhowould distinguishuniversalsfromparticulars,isdirectedprimarilyagainstRus-sell and the latters purported proof of the existence of universals.To con-siderRamseyschallengeonemustsetoutacontextforconsideringRus-sells argument. Russell, like Moore and Stout, started from certain factsthatthereweretwoobjectssaytworedcircleswithan(apparently) commonattributethecolor.Calltheobjectsaandb,or,giventhe currentspeechhabits,baptizethemaandbandtherebyinitiatea causalchainthatmaylast,hopefully,forthetimeittakestoreadthispa-per. Or, in keeping with Ramseys, rather than Russells examples, we can considertheindividualsPlatoandSocratesandtheassumptiontheyare bothwise,makinguseofpresumablytemporallylongcausalchainsand ignoring,asphilosophicallyirrelevant,theviewthatthereisnotsucha chaingoingbacktotheattributeofbeingwise.Russellargued,andpur-I 30ported to establish, that a and b were particulars and red (or the color like-nessofaandb)auniversalor,inthecaseofPlatoandSocrates,thatthe celebratedAthenianswereindividualsorparticularsandthatwisdomisa universal. Thus Russell begins with what we normally take to be individu-als or objects, on the one hand, and qualities or attributes, on the other. He arguesthattheobjectsaandbmustbeparticulars,meaningthatthey arenotqualitiesorcollectionsofqualities.Healsoarguesthatwemust recognize universalsmeaning by that that the qualities (actually the simi-larityrelationorrelationsinvolved)areuniversalsandnottropes.Given Ramseysarguments,weshouldnotforgetwhatRussellsargumentsas-sume as starting points. Ramseyarguesthatthepurported(seesectionIV)atomicfactthat grounds the truth of the sentence Plato is wise can be expressed either in thestandardwayorasWisdomcharacterizesPlato.Thus,grammati-cally, either is wise or characterizes Plato can be considered to be the predicate of a version of thesentence expressing the fact and, hence, that eitherPlatoorwisdomcanbetakenasthesubjectsign.Thissuppos-edlyindicatesthatthesubject-predicatedistinctionismerelyalinguistic one that provides no ground for holding that the facts we take to ground the truths of sentences, like Plato is wise and Socrates is wiser than Plato, reflect or presuppose a purported ontic distinction between characteristics, like wisdom (and relations like is wiser than), and particulars, like Socrates and Plato. But Ramsey is actually making a stronger claim than the one he appears to make and which MacBride, commenting on Ramseys claim: it becomes clear that there is no sense in the words individual and quality; all we are talking about is two different types of objects such that two objects one of each type, could be the sole constituents of an atomic fact. (Ramsey 1960, p. 132) understands him to make: ...itwasnopartofRamseysconclusionthatparticularsanduniversalsmust enjoythesamelogicaltype.ForalthoughRamseywaswillingtocountenance thepossibilitythatthereareparticularsanduniversalsofthesametypehein-sisted only on the weaker conclusion that particular and universal need differ by no more than type: (MacBride 2004, p. 183) FRASER MACBRIDE Negation and Predication:A Defence of Ramseys Thesis 1. Introduction tcanhardlybedeniedthatanalyticphilosophyoncetookalinguistic turn, returningfor a significant period of its historydistinctively lin-guistic answers to questions about epistemology, ontology and the charac-terofthought.Butitisnolessdistinctiveofanalyticphilosophythatits practitionershavebeensuspiciousoflanguage,suspiciousofthecapacity of language to channel and control even the most fundamental judgements of speakers. Witness Russells 1924 attempttoelucidatetheessentialfea-tures of logical atomism (at least as he saw it). There he could not refrain from issuing a philosophical health warning to his co-workers: Theinfluenceoflanguageonphilosophyhas,Ibelieve,beenprofoundand almost unrecognised. If we are not to be misled by this influence it is necessary tobecomeconsciousofitandtoaskhowfaritislegitimate.(Russell1924: 330) Russelldidnotissuethiswarninglightly.ForovertwentyyearsRussell had laboured to promote the cause of relations, their novel logic, their un-derlyingreality.Russellnowrealisedthatitwasagainsttheinvidiousin-fluence of language that he had struggled. According to Russell, the tradi-tionalsubject-predicatelogicthelogicthatcomessonaturallytospeak-ersofEuropeanlanguageshassurreptitiouslyconditionedphilosophers to take for granted a substance-attribute ontology; if only philosophers had beenacquaintedwithlessfamiliarlanguagegroupsthen,Russellmain-tained, they would have been far less liable to deny the reality of relations, relations being nowhere apparent in the schedule of substances and attrib-utes more familiar languages suggest.Oneofhisco-workers,FrankRamsey,tookRussellswarningvery much to heart. But Ramsey soon came to the conviction that philosophers hadnotonlybeenmisledbylanguagetoadoptandadheretoasubject-predicatelogicandadenialofrelations.Writinginhis1925Mindpaper Universals (hereafter U) Ramsey declared: I 62 nearlyallphilosophers,includingMrRussellhimself,havebeenmisledby language in a far more far-reaching way than that; that the whole theory of par-ticularsanduniversalsisduetomistakingforafundamentalcharacteristicof reality, what is merely a characteristic of language. (U: 13) Why should Ramsey have thought of the theory of particulars and univer-salsinsuchscepticalterms,theconsequenceofalinguisticillusionthat leads unsuspecting philosophers to mistake what is merely appearance for genuinereality?Becausetraditionallyphilosophershavederivedthedis-tinctionbetweenparticularsanduniversalsadistinctionintendedtobe objective and worldly, deep in the nature of thingsfrom a linguistic dis-tinctionthe distinction between subjects and predicates. Whereas particu-larshavebeenconceivedasitemsfitonlyforsubjectexpressionstopick out,universalshavebeenconceivedasitemswhosenaturesaredistinc-tivelyrevealedintheactofpredication,inconnectionwiththepredicates that express or denote them. But the linguistic distinction between subject andpredicateenjoysnoobjectiveorworldlysignificance.OrsoRamsey maintained.Instead,heargued,thedistinctionbetweensubjectandpredi-cate enjoys a different kind of significance, arising from (variously) differ-ences in literary style or the point of view from which we approach the fact(U: 12), the presence or absence of a subjective property that de-pendsnotindeedonanyonemindbutonthecommonelementsinall mensmindsandpurposes(U:24),oreventhemathematiciansbiased interests (U: 28). If Ramsey is right about thisthat the subject-predicate distinction enjoys no worldly significancethen philosophers have indeed beenthesubjectsofanillusion.Theyhavebeendeludedtothinkthatthe subject-predicate distinction corresponds to another distinction deep in the nature of things, the distinction between particulars and universals. Butsurelysuchascepticaloutlookisincapableofbeingsustained. ForsurelyRamseysscepticismisbeliedbyoneofthefoundationalin-sights that Aristotle bequeathed to Western metaphysics, his dictum that a quality has a contrary but a substance does not. For expressed in the formal mode this dictum amounts to the claimthat scarcely seems to require an argumentinitsfavourthatpredicatesmaybenegatedbutsubjectsnot. And this claim, it may be argued, surely marks a logical, and therefore ob-jective, distinction between subject and predicate. Ramseysscepticismcannotbesocursorilydismissed.Wecan-notifwearetoactwithdueintellectualconsciencetaketheso-called ARNOLD KOSLOW Ramsey on Simplicity and Truth n the spring of 1922, Ramsey read a paper to the Apostles of Cambridge in which he discussed two related questions.1As he states it: [W]hat types of things there are, and the nature of truth.(p.1) Thetwoquestionsremainopenquestionsattheendofthepaper,butin the course of the discussion they are related to each other in ways that are surprising.Itishisdiscussionoftheinterconnectionofthesetwoissues that reveals a hidden depth to Ramseys view of truth.His claim is that the idea that true is an incomplete symbol and the idea that the world is sim-ple are part of the same view (p.8).Theaccount that is discussed in this early paper is significantly different from the redundancy theory of truth thatheisusuallytakentoendorse.Itshouldbenotedhoweverthatal-thoughhisremarksaredeftlythoughsketchilyprovided,itisacarefully consideredview,alotofwhichgetssupportfromlaterthingshewrote about truth. Sincethispaperisrelativelyearly,itsdifficulttosaythatitrepre-sents his final view on either of thesetwo subjects.Although the bulk of his paper is devoted to explaining the consequences of taking the world to be simple rather than complex, and the consequences for truth in particular isatheorythatmakestrueanincompletesymbol,itisnonethelessa view which can be held without resting on the simplicity thesis.And I be-lieve thatRamseyscontinued acceptance of theincomplete symbol ac-count helps to explain why he thought of truth as something that would be easily obtained from an adequate account of belief ascription.2 1 I am grateful to Mrs. Jane Burch, Ramseys daughter, for her most kind permission to quote from Ramseys typescriptwhich is on deposit in the Kings College Archives. The nine page typescript with Ramseys corrections inked in is dated April 29th, 1922 (FPR/4/1).Special thanks are due to Hugh Mellor, Nils-Eric Sahlin N. Rescher, Dr. R. Moad,ArchivistofKingsCollegeCambridge,andthemembersoftheSeminaron Ramsey at the Graduate Center, CUNY. 2 I hope to make this connection evident on another occasion. I 90Thefirstquestion,Whatkindsofthingsarethere?isclearlyonto-logical,butinasenseotherthanthefamiliarQuineanwayofsettingthe matter.It asks a question which Quines criterion does not pretend to an-swer.Ramseyfirstnotesthattherearelotsofthingsandtypesofthings.Simplicity concerns [t]he only things in whose existence we have reason to believe, are simple, not complex. Ramsey says that he got the view that everything is simple from Russell in conversation and doubts that he would have thought of it alone.Its a view a little reminiscent of those who think of ontology as consisting of the ba-sic furniture of the world, the simple things; not the complex ones.On-tology is concerned with the simples; anything else being made up from themorconstitutedbyorconstructedoutofthem.Noneofthese terms are used by Ramsey, but some of them were certainly used by Rus-sell.The underlying idea seems to be that nothing would exist if the sim-ples didnt. On the Quinean view, we can consider the ontology of certain properly formulated or regimented theories of the world, but those theories, no matter how well supported, do not tell you that they are the basic enti-ties. For example, according to the Quine Criterion of Ontological Com-mitment,atheoryofelectronssuchasLorentzs,Webers,Kaufmannns, or Diracs, implies that there are electrons. However, none of those theo-riesimpliesthatiftheelectronsitspeaksofdidntexist,thennothing would.Noneofthosetheoriesimpliesthattheelectronsitspeaksofare the basic simple constituents of the world.Its clear then that whatever the Quinean commitments of a theory may be, they do not automatically iden-tifyexactlythosethingsthatarethebasicsimpleexistents.Infact,it looksasiftheQuineanCriterioncouldnotbeusedtodetermineexactly thebasicsimples.Ifthatswhatthecriteriondid,thenanytwotheories exactlyoneofwhichimpliedtheotherwouldhavetohaveexactlythe same Quinean ontological commitment.There are just too many examples of scientific theories for which this just isnt so. The Quinean Criterion wont help settle what the simples are. Ram-seydoeshoweverfurnishalistofthekindsofthingsthathethinksare simpleandthosethatarecomplex.Givenhiswayofsortingthingsout there is an implication for truth.Heres Ramseys list: If you were making a list of the types of thingsthat there are you would natu-rallyenumeratethefollowing:individualsorparticularthings,classes,proper-NILS-ERIC SAHLIN AND MARTIN KAS PALMRamsey sentences: an observationIRamsey argued that the best way to understand how the theoretical termsof a theory function is to picture them as existentially bound variables.Given three such terms, the best way to write our theory according to Ram-sey is: , , (dictionary & axioms) (p. 131).1This is the theorys Ramseysentence.2Theexistentiallyboundvariablesarethecarriersofontologicalcommitment; if the Ramsey sentence is true, they tell us what there is.It is well-known that the Ramsey sentence and the original theory havethe same empirical content. That each observational consequence of the Ram-sey sentence is a consequence of the original theory follows from the fact thattheformerisanexistential generalizationofthelatterandthusimpliedbyit. Thereverseimplicationisnotthatstraightforward, butnearlyso. Letsands0betwosentencesofascienticlanguage, andassumethatthelat-ter sentence does not contain any theoretical terms. Let ET(s) be a completeexistential generalization of s with respect to theoretical terms, and AT(s) itsuniversal counterpart. If s implies s0 then (trivially) AT(s s0). Elementarylogic tells us that x((x) (x)) (x(x) x(x)), so we conclude thatET(s) ET(s0).3But ET(s) can of course be taken to be the Ramsey sentenceof a theory, and since ET(s0) simply is s0, we conclude that any non-theoreticalconsequence of the original theory is indeed a consequence of the Ramsey sen-tence.4In this paper, our point of departure is the question: does the foregoing re-sult hold also in truly dynamic contexts, where the appropriate semantics is notThe authors wish to thank Christian Bennet, Arnold Koslow, Hugh Mellor, PeterRoeper, Fredrik Stjernberg and the Mini Seminar at the Department of Philosophy, LundUniversity, for valuable input. Credit for this paper should be divided equally betweenthe authors.1All Ramsey quotes are from (Ramsey, 1990).2The theory is assumed to be nitely axiomatizable.3Modulo a little handwaving.4See (Bohnert, 1968).110quite familiar? The answer seems to be that it might, but then again might not.In order to sharpen the question and arrive at our preliminary answer, we needto say a few words about what might be dubbed experimentally interpretedquantiers.IIThe question:If (in some suitable sense) we accept, in the long run, the sen-tences in the set , will we (in the same sense) accept the sentence ?, can nodoubt be attacked in a multitude of ways. Here is one attempt.5We set up a framework for answering questions like this by providing aformal semantics,i.e. structures and a satisfaction relation,for the languageused in {}. The aim is to use the syntax of rst order logic (FOL), and alsoto construe the semantics as a dynamic version of FOL semantics. Basically, wetake an experimental structure to be an -sequence of ordinary structures (lyingalong an imagined, discrete time-line) that is subject to certain constraints. In asimplied but still reasonable version, these are: constancy of domain, eventualxation of reference for terms, and a point of convergence for every pair:(basic n-ary predicate , n-tuple of individuals). To paraphrase the last constraint:a given tuple can only pop in and out of a given predicate extension a nitenumber of times.If (Ai)iis such an experimental structure, we can proceed to dene anexperimental(dynamic)satisfactionrelation: (Ai)i E [s]. Giventheconstraints, thereisoneobviousandstraightforwardwaytodenethisforquantier-free formulas. The atomic case is:(1) (Ai)i E R(t1, . . . , tn)[s] ijj>i(t1[s], . . . , tn[s]) RAjAnd the molecular cases follow the denitions for ordinary . It is (almost) aroutine matter to check that this works out as expected.6Forquantication, however, therecertainlyisroomforvariation. Asasimple illustration, ask yourself when you would consider xFx to be true-in-the-long-run. When aijj>i(a FAj)?Or would you demand the strongercondition ijj>ia(a FAj)? Now ask the corresponding questions for exis-tentials. This is just one possible distinction between inner and outer inter-pretations of quantiers, and things tend to get quite complex when we consider5This is inspired by the mainly meta-mathematical work in (Jeroslow, 1975),andalso by (Putnam, 1965).6It must be stressed that the convergence assumptions really play a crucial role here.P h i l o s o p h i s c h e A n a l y s e P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s ______________________________________________________________________ Edited by Herbert Hochberg Rafael Hntelmann Christian Kanzian Richard Schantz Erwin Tegtmeier Vol. 1 Herbert Hochberg Russel, Moore and Wittgenstein The Revival of Realism ISBN 3-937202-00-5, 334 pp, Hardcover 94,00 Vol. 6 Wolfram Hinzen / Hans Rott Belief and Meaning Essays at the Interface ISBN 3-937202-05-6, 250 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 2 Heinrich Ganthaler Das Recht auf Leben in der Medizin Eine moralphilosophische Untersuchung ISBN 3-937202-01-3, 167 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 7 Hans Gnther Ru Empirisches Wissen und Moralkonstruktion Eine Untersuchung zur Mglichkeit von Brckenprinzipien in der Natur- und Bioethik ISBN 3-937202-06-4, 208 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 3 Ludger Jansen Tun und Knnen Ein systematischer Kommentar zu Aristoteles Theorie der Vermgen im neunten Buch der Metaphysik ISBN 3-937202-02-1, 302 pp, Hardcover 70,00 Vol. 8 Rafael Hntelmann Existenz und Modalitt Eine Studie zur Analytischen Modalontologie ISBN 3-937202-07-2, 189 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 4 Manuel Bremer Der Sinn des Lebens Ein Beitrag zur Analytischen Religionsphilosophie ISBN 3-937202-03-X,134 pp, Hardcover 58,00 Vol. 9 Andreas Bchli / Klaus Petrus Monism ISBN 3-937202-19-6, 340 pp, Hardcover 70,00 Vol. 5 Georg Peter Analytische sthetik Eine Untersuchung zu Nelson Goodman und zur literarischen Parodie ISBN 3-937202-04-8, 332 pp, Hardcover 94,00 Vol. 10 Maria Elisabeth Reicher Referenz, Quantifikation und ontologische Festlegung ISBN 3-937202-39-0, ca. 300 pp, Hardcover 89,00 Forthcoming Spring 2004 Vol. 11 Herbert Hochberg / Kevin Mulligan Relations and Predicates ISBN 3-937202-51-X, 250 pp, Hardcover 74,00 ontos verlagFrankfurt . Lancaster ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41 D-63133 Heusenstamm www.ontosverlag.com P h i l o s o p h i s c h e F o r s c h u n g P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e s e a r c h ______________________________________________________________________ Edited by Johannes Brandl Andreas Kemmerling Wolfgang Knne Mark Textor Georg Meggle (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality 3-937202-08-0, Hardcover, 478 pp., EUR 138,00 Social Facts & Collective Intentionality: the combination ofthesetwotermsreferstoanewfieldofbasic research. Working mainly in the mood and by means of AnalyticalPhilosophy,attheveryheartofthisnew approachareconceptualexplicationsofallthevarious versionsofSocialFacts&CollectiveIntentionalityand theramificationsthereof.Thisapproachtacklesthe topicsoftraditionalsocialphilosophyusingnew conceptualmethods,includingtechniquesofformal logics,computersimulationsandartificialintelligence. Yet research on Social Facts & Collective Intentionality alsoincludesontological,epistemological,normative and - last but not least - methodological questions. This volume represents the state of the art in this new field. Georg Meggle (Ed.) Ethics of Terrorism & Counter Terrorism 3-937202-68-4, Hardcover, 410 pp., EUR 98,00 We are supposed to wage war against Terrorism but exactly what we are fighting against in this war, there is nearlynoconsensusabout.And,muchworse,nearly nobody cares about this conceptual disaster the main thing being, whether or not you are taking sides with the good guys.Thisvolumeisananalyticalattempttoendthis disaster.WhatisTerrorism?Areterroristactstobe defined exclusively on the basis of the characteristics of therespectiveactions?Orshouldwerestrictsuch actionstoactsperformedbynon-stateorganisations? And,mostimportant,isterrorismalreadybyitsvery nature to be morally condemned? Mark Siebel Mark Textor (Hrsg.) Semantik und Ontologie Beitrge zur philosophischen Forschung ISBN 3-937202-43-9, Hardcover, 445 pp., EUR 93,00 DerzweiteBandderReihePhilosophischeForschung spanntzweiKerngebietederAnalytischenPhilosophie zusammen:dieSemantikunddieOntologie.Wassind dieGrundbausteineunsererOntologie?Wiebeziehen wirunssprachlichbzw.geistigaufsie?Dieseund weitereFragenwerdenvoninternationalrenommierten Philosophenaushistorischerundsystematischer Perspektive diskutiert. DieBeitrgesindinDeutschundEnglishverfasst.Sie stammenvonChristianBeyer,JohannesBrandl, DagfinnFllesdal,DorotheaFrede,RolfGeorge,Gerd Grahoff,PeterHacker,AndreasKemmerling,Edgar Morscher,KevinMulligan,RolfPuster,Richard Schantz,BenjaminSchnieder,OliverScholz,Severin Schrder,PeterSimons,ThomasSpitzley,Markus Stepanians, Ralf Stoecker und Daniel von Wachter. Ren van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser, Ron Rood (Eds.) Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge Papers in Epistemology ISBN 3-937202-70-6, Hardcover, 293 pp., EUR 89,00 Overthelasttwodecadesfoundationalismhasbeen severelycriticized.Inresponsetothisvarious alternativestoithavebeenadvanced,notably coherentism.Atthesametimenewversionsof foundationalismwerecrafted,thatwereclaimedtobe immunetotheearliercriticisms.Thisvolumecontains 12 papers in which various aspects of this dialectic are covered.Anumberof paperscontinuethetrendto defendfoundationalism,andfoundationalisms commitmenttobasicbeliefsandbasicknowledge, againstvariousattacks.Othersaimtoshowthatone importantobjectionagainstcoherentism,viz.thatthe notionof coherence is toovague to beuseful, canbe countered. ontos verlagontos verlag Frankfurt Paris Ebikon Lancaster New Brunswick www.ontosverlag.com logoj Studien zur Logik, Sprachphilosophie und Metaphysik Hrsg. von / Edited by Volker Halbach Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb Holger Sturm Vol. 1 Reinhardt Grossmann Die Existenz der Welt Eine Einfhrung in die Ontologie ISBN 3-937202-12-9 187 Seiten Paperback 15,00 Vol. 2 Georg Brun Die richtige Formel Philosophische Probleme der logischen Formalisierung ISBN 3-937202-13-7 402 Seiten Hardcover 44,00 Vol. 3 Herbert Hochberg Introducing Analytic Philosophy Its Sense and its Nonsense 1879 2002 ISBN 3-937202-21-8 280 pp. Paperback 22,00 Vol. 4 Hans Rott Vitezslav Horak (Eds.) Possibility and Reality Metaphysics and Logic ISBN 3-937202-24-2 310 pp. Paperback 32,00 Vol. 5 Timm Lampert Klassische Logik Einfhrung mit interaktiven bungen ISBN 3-937202-29-3 385 Seiten Paperback 28,00 Vol. 6 Andrea Clausen How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective? ISBN 3-937202-57-9 268 pp. Hardcover 79,00 ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41 63133 Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt Germany www.ontosverlag.com ontos verlag North and South America by Transaction Books 390 Campus Drive Somerset, NJ 07830 USA www.transactionpub.com ontos verlag United Kingdom by Gazelle Books Falcon House Queen Square Lancaster LA1 1RN www.gazellebooks.co.uk ontos verlagFrankfurt . Lancaster