HE ISTORY OF HILOSOPHY The History of Descartes to Humeusers.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124/history.pdf · Descartes to Hume Useful collections of papers ... Vere Chappell–Locke ... Nicholas

The History ofPhilosophy

Descartes to Hume

Peter J. King [email protected]

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYDescartes to Hume

Useful collections of papers(hereafter referred to by their editors’ names)

R. Ariew, J. Cottingham, andTom Sorell – Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials (C.U.P.)

V.C. Chappell – Hume (Doubleday) — referred to as Chappell-HJ.A. Cover & Mark Kulstad – Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett)W. Doney – Descartes: Critical Essays (Macmillan)Harry G. Frankfurt – Leibniz (Notre Dame)Marjorie Grene – Spinoza (Anchor)Michael Hooker – Leibniz Critical and Interpretive Essays (Manchester U.P.)George Morice – David Hume: Bicentenary Papers (Edinburgh U.P.)Amélie Rorty – Essays on Descartes’ Meditations (U. of California P.)A. Sesonske and N. Fleming – Meta-Meditations (Belmont)Colin Turbayne – Berkeley Critical and Interpretive Essays (Manchester U.P.)Godfrey Vesey – Philosophers Ancient and Modern (C.U.P.)

Relevant Oxford Readings (referred to as: OR–<editor>):Vere Chappell – LockeJohn Cottingham – DescartesJonathan Glover – The Philosophy of MindI.C. Tipton – Locke on Human UnderstandingR.S. Woolhouse – Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science

Relevant Cambridge Companions (referred to as CC–<editor>):Vere Chappell – LockeJohn Cottingham – DescartesDon Garrett – SpinozaNicholas Jolley – LeibnizDavid Fate Norton – Hume

Frequently Used Abbreviations:A.P.Q. – American Philosophical QuarterlyJ.H.P. – Journal of the History of PhilosophyJ. Phil. – Journal of PhilosophyP.A.S. – Proceedings of the Aristotelian SocietyP.A.S.S. – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary VolumePhil. Q. – Philosophical QuarterlyPhil. Rev. – Philosophical Review

As you’ll quickly discover, there are far more topics here than we could cover in a term; in fact thereare nearly enough for three terms. Yet I’ve skimped on Leibniz and Berkeley, and have condenseda number of immense questions into single essay-topics. Clearly we’ll have to make some choices— but they don’t have to be the same for everyone. As long as both members of each tutorial pairwork on the same topics every week, I’m almost completely flexible as to which topics you choose.‘Almost’, because concentrating entirely on a couple of writers or spreading the eight essays toothinly over the different writers won’t do you any good when it comes to Schools.

Note that some of the topics aren’t relevant to the Oxford paper; I use this hand-out for anumber of courses at different universities.

S

C

L

P

P

Some notes on writing essays

PHILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can’t just set down your answer — you have to showhow you got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such a hurryto get her ideas down – to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory – that she

forgets to argue. Without arguments, all you have is a set of opinions, however interesting; witharguments, you have philosophy. With good arguments, you have good philosophy.

TRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from theamount of work put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesn’t only make

it difficult for the reader to follow what you’re saying — it can make it difficult for you to keep trackof what you’re saying, leading to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance. Make an essay planbefore you start writing, and try to stick to it. It shouldn’t be too detailed, otherwise it’ll be toorigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including an introduction to and explanationof the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and some sort of conclusion. Whatever yourposition, be sure to treat the positions with which you disagree as fully and sympathetically aspossible before you start to criticise them; apart from anything else this will help you to avoidknocking down straw men. Don’t strive too hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (ifthey do) as you think and write about other people’s ideas and arguments. If you do come up withwhat you think is an original idea or argument, don’t be too protective towards it; be at least ascritical of it as you would be of anyone else’s.

RITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to allowthe reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author, title, and

page number; in the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give the editionyou’re using, and if possible use a standard reference system (often found in the margins or at thetop of each page). If you’re unsure, check to see how other authors do it, or ask me. Never useother writers’ words or even ideas without acknowledgment (see under plagiarism below). Detailsshould be given in a separate bibliography; the reference in the text is to author and page.

ANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language — and this includesspelling and grammar. Don’t underestimate the problems caused by misspelling (the differences

between ‘intention’ and ‘intension’, or ‘ingenious’ and ‘ingenuous’, are more important than thesingle letters involved). This is even more true of grammar and punctuation. Keep your languagesimple: don’t use three syllables where one will do, or ‘had it not been written by him’ instead of‘if he hadn’t written it’. Make sure that quotations fit into their new contexts (avoid, for example,‘Descartes said that “I can be certain”’; write either ‘Descartes said: “I can be certain”’ or ‘Descartessaid that he could be certain’).

LAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to suggestavenues of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not there to be

repeated parrot-fashion. If you need to quote from another writer, mark the quotation clearly (seeabove, under Critical apparatus) — but again, don’t overdo it.

RACTICAL MATTERS. N.B.: occasionally I give more than one essay question; these are alternatives,so choose one. Don’t read too much (or, of course, too little); three or four items from the

relevant reading list is usually about right (one introductory or general work, and two or threeothers). If you want to (or have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to me about it; too oftenI find that essays have suffered because students have depended upon what are frankly bad andmisleading books. If you use a word-processor (and I’d advise it), use the spell-checker, but don’trely upon it; read through (preferably aloud) what you’ve written, at least once. Don’t bother withgrammar-checkers — I’ve yet to see one that works properly.

* * *

Descartes and doubt

What was the purpose of Descartes’ method of doubt?

René Descartes – Meditations — I— – Discourse on the Method — Parts 1–5

A.J. Ayer – The Problem of Knowledge — chapter 2 (and in Doney)

Norman Malcolm – ‘Dreaming and Skepticism’ (Phil.Rev. LXV, 1956; and in Doney; andin Sesonske & Fleming)

H.G. Frankfurt – Dreamers, Demons, and Madmen — I

Bernard Williams – Descartes — chapters 2 and 7, and Appendix 3

Robert Nozick – Philosophical Explanations — pp 197-211, 217-227, 240-245

Francisco Sanches – ‘That nothing is known’ (in Ariew, et al.)

Barry Stroud – The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism — 1 and 2

Michael Williams – ‘Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt’ (in Rorty [ed.], Essays onDescartes’ Meditations; reprinted in OR–Descartes)

Questions you might bear in mind

How many arguments to bring his beliefs into doubt does Descartes offer? What exactly are they,and how many of them work? Has the method of doubt excluded too much, and if so, how couldit be improved? Is the method possible even on its own terms — that is, can one throw out allone’s beliefs in order to sort them out? Indeed, what exactly does he do with the beliefs he usedto hold — does he throw them out (albeit temporarily), or does he simply withhold assent?

* * *

The first certainty

Can Descartes really reach the cogito using the method of doubt? And if so, what use is it?

René Descartes – Meditations — II– Discourse on Method — Part 4

E.M. Curley – Descartes Against the Sceptics — chap. 4

André Gombay – ‘“Cogito Ergo Sum”: Inference or Argument?’ (in Butler)

Jaacko Hintikka – ‘Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?’ (Phil.Rev. LXXI, 1962;and in Doney; and in Sesonske & Fleming)

H.G. Frankfurt – ‘Descartes’ Discussion of His Existence in the Second Meditation’(Phil.Rev. LXXVI, 1966)

Norman Malcolm – ‘Descartes’ Proof That His Essence Is Thinking (Phil.Rev. 1965; andin Doney)

Peter Markie – ‘The Cogito and its Importance’ (CC–Descartes; reprinted inOR–Descartes)

Jean de Silhon – ‘The immortality of the soul’ (in Ariew, et al.) — second discourse

S. Tweyman – ‘The Reliability of Reason’ (in Butler)

John Watling – ‘Doubt, Knowledge, and the Cogito in Descartes’ Meditations’ (inVesey [ed.] Philosophers Ancient and Modern)

Bernard Williams – Descartes — chapter 3


Could we replace ‘cogito’ with some other verb? Any other verb? And anyway, what exactly does‘cogito’ cover? What is the logical status of ‘ergo’? Is the whole thing an argument — can we infer‘sum’ from ‘cogito’?

If the cogito is a proposition, is it necessary or contingent? What sort of certainty does ithave?

* * *

Clarity and distinctness

Evaluate Descartes’ suggestion that he “could take it as a general rule that whatever we conceivevery clearly and distinctly is true” (Discourse on Method, IV)

René Descartes – Meditations — II, III, & V– Replies to second objections– Discourse on Method — Part IV

E.J. Ashworth – ‘Descartes’ Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas’ (in Butler)

E.M. Curley – Descartes against the Skeptics — chapter 5

Eustachius a Sancto Paulo– ‘A compendium of philosophy in four parts’ (in Ariew, et al.) — part

1

H.G. Frankfurt – Demons, Dreamers and Madmen — chapter 3

A. Gewirth – ‘Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes’ (Philosophy 13, 1943;reprinted in Doney and in OR–Descartes)

A.K. Stout – ‘The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes’ (in Doney)



Is Descartes’ argument for the reliability of clear and distinct ideas sound? Is it the only reason hehas for accepting clarity and distinctness as marks of certainty? What can be said in favour of sucha notion? Is there a better argument available — one that Descartes missed, or omitted tomention? If clarity and distinctness don’t do the job Descartes requires, would anything? Andwhat are clarity and distinctness marks of?

* * *

God: the argument from ideas

Outline the structure of the argument used by Descartes in Meditation III,attempting to be as clear as possible about the assumptions upon which the itrests and any subsidiary arguments used by Descartes to defend these assump-tions. Does the argument work? If not, where does it go wrong?

René Descartes – Discourse on the Method – IV

—— – Meditations – III

—— – The Principles of Philosophy – I, 13–22

John Cottingham – Descartes – chapter 3

E.M. Curley – Descartes Against the Sceptics – chapter 6

Georges Dicker – Descartes — chapter 3

J.L. Mackie – The Miracle of Theism — chapter 2

J.-B. Morin – ‘That god exists’ (in Ariew, et al.)

Francisco Suárez – ‘Metaphysical disputations’ (in Ariew, et al.) — pp 30–41

Bernard Williams – Descartes – chapter 5


It’s important to be clear as to the metaphysical and conceptual framework within which Descartes’argument is situated. In particular, make sure that you’ve understood (and that you explain) thenotion of degrees of reality, the Causal Adequacy Principle, and the distinction between formal andobjective reality. Unless you’re absolutely clear as to the rôle in the argument of each of these,you’ll not be able to understand why the argument is supposed to work, nor why it doesn’t.

It might seem obvious to you where Descartes goes wrong. I don’t think that it’s at allobvious, in fact — so if you think that it is, you’ve probably got the wrong answer.

* * *

Error and the will

Does Descartes manage to defeat scepticism and leave room for human error?

René Descartes – Meditations — IV

H. Caton – ‘Will and Reason in Descartes’ Theory of Error’ (in J.Phil. 1975)

Pierre Charon – ‘Wisdom’ (in Ariew, et al.) — Bk II, chap. 2 (pp 56–67)

John Cottingham – Descartes

Anthony Kenny – ‘Descartes on the Will’ (in Butler; reprinted in OR–Descartes)

Anthony O’Hear – ‘Belief and the Will’ (in Philosophy 1972)


Margaret Wilson – ‘Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation’ (in Cover &Kulstad [ed.] Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy)

— – Descartes — chapter 4


What can Descartes mean by saying that the human will is infinite? Is his account of judgementsatisfactory? What is the connection between this problem and the definition of knowledge withwhich he’s working?

There are clear parallels between Descartes’ approach to error and a common theologicalapproach to the problem of evil — in both cases god’s supposed power, knowledge, and rôle ascreator, are at odds with certain facts about the world. If you’ve done any work on the latterproblem, it might be applicable to this essay (but be careful not to overdo the parallels).

* * *

God: the ontological argument

Can Descartes show that god’s existence follows from his essence? If he can,does this mean that Descartes has proved that god exists?

René Descartes – Meditations – V

William P. Alston – ‘The Ontological Argument Revisited’ (Phil.Rev. LXXIX, 1960; and inDoney; and in Plantinga)

Jonathan Barnes – The Ontological Argument – see especially pages 15–18, 39–66

John Cottingham – Descartes – chapter 3

J.N. Findlay – ‘Can God’s Existence Be Disproved?’ (Mind 1948; reprinted in hisLanguage, Truth, and Value, in Plantinga, and in Flew & MacIntyre)— interesting mainly for his ontological argument against the exist-ence of god

John Hick – ‘Ontological Argument for the Existence of God’ (in TheEncyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards)

Anthony Kenny – Reason and Religion – chapters 3 and 4

Anthony O’Hear – Experience, Explanation, and Faith – chapter 4:3

J.-B. Morin – ‘That god exists’ (in Ariew, et al.)

Alvin Plantinga – The Nature of Necessity — chapter 10 (pp 196–205) —— [ed.] – The Ontological Argument — readings from the main historical

philosophers, plus some important 20th-century papers

James F. Ross – ‘On Proofs for the Existence of God’ (Monist 54:2, 1970; also inDonnelly)

Francisco Suárez – ‘Metaphysical disputations’ (in Ariew, et al.) — pp 45–47

Richard Swinburne – The Coherence of Theism – chapter 14

Bernard Williams – Descartes – chapter 5


The various advocates of the ontological argument anticipate some objections, and attempt tomeet them; what are they, and do they succeed? What objections do you think they haven’tanticipated? Not anticipating an objection isn’t the same as not being able to meet it; whatanswers might they have offered?

Of what kind of god do the ontological arguments claim to prove the existence? How usefulwould such a concept of god be to religion?

* * *

The real distinction between mind and body

State and criticise Descartes’ argument for a real distinction between mind and body.

René Descartes – Meditations — II and VI— – Passions of the Soul — I

David Armstrong – A Materialist Theory of the Mind — chapters 1 & 2

Andrea Christofidou – ‘Descartes’ Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions’ (J.H.P. 39,2001)

Paul Churchland – Matter and Consciousness — chapter 2

John Cottingham – ‘Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science’ (inCC–Descartes)

E.M. Curley – Descartes Against the Sceptics — pp 193–206; pp 227–234

John Foster – The Immaterial Self — chapter 7 and passim

R.C. Richardson – ‘The “Scandal” of Cartesian Interactionism’ (Mind 91, 1982)

Geneviève Rodis-Lewis – ‘Descartes and the Unity of the Human Being’ (trans. Cottingham;OR–Descartes)

Gilbert Ryle – The Concept of Mind — chapter 1

Eustachius a Sancto Paulo– ‘A compendium of philosophy in four parts’ (in Ariew, at al.) — part

3

Bernard Williams – Descartes — chapters 4 and 10

Margaret D. Wilson – ‘The Epistemological Argument for Mind–Body Distinctness’ (NoûsX, 1976; reprinted in OR–Descartes)

R.S. Woolhouse – Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (Routledge) — chapters 8 & 9


What part does the notion of god play — is such a concept necessary to the argument, and if so,how?

Be very careful with the reading: don’t take anybody on the reading list without question,especially Armstrong, Churchland, and Ryle. This is, of course, true for any essay, but these threehave very particular axes to grind, and should be read with great caution and mistrust.

One of the most common mistakes made by casual commentators is to treat Descartes’argument as being complete by the end of Meditations II. Make sure that you read Meditations IVcarefully; what might Descartes need that he isn’t entitled to until the end of his project?

* * *

Descartes: a beast to the beasts?

Does Descartes’ view of mind and body imply that we have no moral responsibilities towardsanimals?

René Descartes – Meditations — passim (and other works as relevant (especially theletters); use indexes, and references in the secondary literature)

Stephen Clark – The Moral Status of Animals

John Cottingham – ‘“A Brute to the Brutes?” Descartes’ Treatment of Animals’ (in Philo-sophy 53, 1978; reprinted in OR–Descartes)

Peter Harrison – Descartes on Animals (in The Philosophical Quarterly 42/167, 1992)

D. & M. Radner – Animal Consciousness — pp 60–4

Tom Regan & Peter Singer [edd] – Animal Rights and Human Obligations

Jean de Silhon – ‘The two truths’ (in Ariew, et al.) — pp 188–193

Peter Singer – Practical Ethics — chapters on animals


Descartes has often been accused of being the philosophical father of a certain set of views aboutanimals — that they don’t really feel pain (or that they feel it significantly less than we do), thatthey have no consciousness, no minds or souls. We’re not really concerned here with the truth ofsuch views, nor with the logical connection between these views and the conclusion that we haveno, or much reduced, moral obligations towards animals (though we might well discuss these topicswhen we meet). We’re concerned primarily with the question: does what Descartes says commithim to any such attitude towards animals? To what is he committed?

The Cottingham and Harrison papers offer (different) defences of Descartes, and should beespecially helpful with regard to references to Descartes’ writings.

* * *

Mind and body

Assess Spinoza’s success in solving the mind/body problem.

Baruch Spinoza – Ethics — Part II, up to proposition xiii

Jonathan Bennett – A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics — chapter 2, sections 12 and 13; chapter6

— – ‘Spinoza’s Metaphysics’ (in CC–Spinoza)

Stuart Hampshire – Spinoza — pp 58–81

Genevieve Lloyd – Spinoza and the Ethics — pp 48–55, 114–123

Roger Scruton – Spinoza — pp 53–63

G.N.A. Vesey – ‘Agent and Spectator: The Double-Aspect Theory’ — in The HumanAgent (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. I)


Again, going back to Descartes should provide useful background (see your essay on Cartesiandualism from week two of Trinity). Is Spinoza’s account as intuitively attractive as that ofDescartes? If not, why not?

We’ll be looking at Spinoza’s account of knowledge and error next week, so for the momentconcentrate on his basic position concerning mind and body. If he has succeeded in avoiding theproblems which the dualist faces, what (if any) new problems has he come up with? Do hisproblems serve to highlight problems to be found, though not so obviously, in Descartes?

* * *

Knowledge and error

Critically discuss Spinoza’s account of knowledge.

Baruch Spinoza – Ethics — Part II, from proposition xiv to the end (referring back topostulates and lemmas when necessary)

Jonathan Bennett – A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics — chapter 2, section 14; chapter 7

R.J. Delahunty – Spinoza — chapter III

Guttorm FlNistad – ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics’ (Inquiry 12, 1969;reprinted in Grene)

Stuart Hampshire – Spinoza — chapter 3

Genevieve Lloyd – Spinoza and the Ethics — pp 55–70, 109–114

Roger Scruton – Spinoza — pp 63–71

Margaret D. Wilson – ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge’ (in CC–Spinoza)


Descartes set out to try to show how knowledge was possible — how does Spinoza’s project differfrom this initially? How does his different problem, and the resulting difference in approach, affectthe attractiveness and usefulness of his account?

Despite the differences, Spinoza was well aware of Descartes’ work, had written about it, andwas influenced by it in many ways. What are the connections between Spinoza’s approach toknowledge and that of Descartes? Would Spinoza have been better off without some of theCartesian concepts?

What exactly is the difference, for Spinoza, between error and ignorance? Betweenknowledge and mere true belief? He seems to say, with Descartes, that error is the result of ourbeing embodied, and that seen purely in terms of itself, the mind doesn’t err (Ethics II, xvii, Schol.).Is this really what he means? Can it be made sense of within his philosophy?

* * *

Freedom

Critically discuss Spinoza’s views on human freedom. Does the concept of a free person makesense even on his terms?

Baruch Spinoza – Ethics — Part I, def. 7, prop. xvii, and prop. xxxii to the end (incl.Appendix); Part II, prop. xxxv Schol., prop. xlviii, and prop. xlixScholia ; Part III, prop. 2 & Schol.; Part IV, prop. lix to lxxiii; Part V,from Preface to prop. xx

Jonathan Bennett – A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics — chapter 13


— – ‘Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom’ (in Grene)

Genevieve Lloyd – Spinoza and the Ethics — chapter 3

Roger Scruton – Spinoza — chapter 5


Given the immediate strangeness of Spinoza’s position (a strangeness echoed at some point inmany, if not all, philosophers who try to build grand metaphysical systems), you need to beespecially careful when describing and explaining his account of freedom. Try to keep separate thetwo questions implied by the essay title — is Spinoza’s view internally consistent, and is itconsistent with what we consider to be minimal conditions for an adequate account of freedom?

* * *

Substance

Explain and compare the views of Descartes and either Leibniz or Spinoza on substance.

René Descartes – Principles — I, 51 ff— – Replies — II, IV

G.W. Leibniz – Monadology— – Discourse on Metaphysics — §§8–16— – The Leibniz–Arnauld Correspondence— – Letters to de Volder of 6th July & 27th December, 1701

Baruch Spinoza – Ethics — Part I, from the definitions through to proposition xx; PartII, to proposition 7.

— – Letters 2, 27 at end, 68

Jonathan Bennett – A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (difficult, and inclined to treat Spinoza asa 20th century philosopher, but rewarding nevertheless) — ch. 3

— – ‘Spinoza’s Metaphysics’ (in CC–Spinoza)— – ‘A Note on Descartes and Spinoza’ (Phil.Rev., 1965)

Edwin Curley – Spinoza’s Metaphysics — chapter 1

Montgomery Furth – ‘Monadology’ (Phil.Rev. 1967; and in Frankfurt)


Joshua Hoffman &Gary S. Rosenkrantz – Substance: Its Nature and Existence — chapter 1 and passim

Genevieve Lloyd – Spinoza and the Ethics — chapter 2

Benson Mates – Leibniz — chapter 2

Donald Rutherford – ‘Metaphysics: The late period (in CC–Leibniz [see also the Mercer &Sleigh paper on Leibniz’s early metaphysics])

Roger Scruton – Spinoza — chapter 3

R.C. Sleigh – Leibniz and Arnauld — chapter 5

R.S. Woolhouse – ‘The Nature of an Individual Substance’ (in Hooker)— – Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz — passim

Catherine Wilson – Leibniz’s Metaphysics — especially chapters II, III, & V

J.M. Young – ‘The Ontological Argument and the Concept of Substance’ (A.P.Q.,1974)


Leibniz and Spinoza can be seen very much as following in the footsteps of Descartes — thoughthe ways in which they do so are clearly very different. It can be useful, therefore, to keepDescartes’ (and, indeed, Aristotle’s) notion of substance in mind.

It’s also useful to keep in the back of your mind the question: why do the two authors go forthe concepts of substance they do? How do those concepts fit into their general logical andmetaphysical systems?

* * *

Leibniz’s logical armoury

1. Does it follow from the principle of sufficient reason that two things perfectly indiscerniblefrom each other do not exist?

2. Discuss the Necessary/Contingent distinction in Leibniz's metaphysical system.

G.W. von Leibniz – Monadology — §§33-46— – Discourse on Metaphysics — §§8–13— – The Leibniz–Arnauld Correspondence— – The Nature of Truth— – Necessary and Contingent Truths— – Primary Truths

C.D. Broad – Leibniz: An Introduction — chapter 2

Stuart Brown – Leibniz: Reason and Experience — chapters 2 & 3

S. French – ‘Why the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is not contin-gently true either’ (Synthèse 78)

Dennis Fried – ‘Necessity and Contingency in Leibniz’ (in Woolhouse)

Hidé Ishiguro – Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language — chapter 7

Benson Mates – The Philosophy of Leibniz — chapters 5 & 6

G.H.R. Parkinson – ‘Philosophy and Logic’ (in CC–Leibniz)— – Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics — chapters 3 and 5 (§§1

and 2)

Nicholas Rescher – Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy — chapters III & IV

R.C. Sleigh – Leibniz and Arnauld — chapter 4— – ‘Truth and Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz’ (in

Hooker)

David Wiggins – ‘The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate’(in J.J. Thomson [ed.], On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard L.Cartwright)

Margaret Wilson – ‘On Leibniz's Explication of “Necessary Truths”’ (in Frankfurt)


Are Leibniz's Principles of Sufficient Reason and of Perfection consistent with each other, and withthe rest of the metaphysical system? What does Leibniz draw out of the Principle of SufficientReason? Is the incompleteness of an infinite analysis due to our epistemic limitations? How, andin accordance with what, does god select the world that he actualises? What is Leibniz'sconception of a possible world (see also the question on god and evil, below)?

* * *

Leibniz on space and time

1. Does it make sense to suppose that god might have created the universe sooner than he did?

2. What does Leibniz think the relationship is between the claim that space and time are notabsolute and the claim that they are ‘mere ideal things’?

G.W. von Leibniz – Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence — III, 2–6; IV, 8ff; V, 27–32, 36–65,79–80, 104–106

— – Discourse on Metaphysics — §§8–18— – Monadology — especially §§56–57, 60–64— – New Essays Concerning Human Understanding — Book II, especially

chapters xiii–xv— – A Specimen of Discoveries about Marvellous Secrets

C.D. Broad – ‘Leibniz’s last controversy with the Newtonians’ (Theoria 12, 1946;also in Woolhouse)

Gerd Buchdahl – Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science — chapter 7

Daniel Garber – ‘Leibniz: Physics and philosophy’ (in CC–Leibniz)

Alexandre Koyré – From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe — chapters 11 & 12(reprinted as ‘Leibniz and Newton’ in Frankfurt)

Ernst Mach – ‘Newton’s views of time, space, and motion’ (extract from TheScience of Mechanics, in Problems of Space and Time, ed. Smart)

Isaac Newton – Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Scholium to theDefinitions; also in Smart)

Jonathan Powers – Philosophy and the New Physics — pp 20-32

Catherine Wilson – Leibniz's Metaphysics — chapter VI


There are two main strands of thought in Leibniz: first, his account of space and time as well-foundedphenomena, and the explanation of this in terms of his theory of monads; secondly, his debate withClarke (and hence Newton) over whether space and time are relative and absolute. You willprobably only have time in the essay to deal with one of these strands, but you should make surethat you know enough about the other strand to be able to comment on any tensions between thetwo approaches.

Can Leibniz consistently maintain that space is relational and that the non-existence of vacuais contingent? Is he right to claim that if space is a ‘real, absolute being', then it must be eternaland infinite? What does he mean by ‘ideal'? Why didn’t he consider the possibility that space andtime might be relational but real? Must space be a substance if there are quantities of it?

* * *

Leibniz extract 1 (from Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Pre-Established Harmony contained in the Second Edition of Mr Bayle’s Critical Dictionary,

Article Rorarius [1702]; transl. & ed. Loemker)

I acknowledge that time, extension, motion, and the continuum in general, as we understand them in mathematics, are onlyideal things — that is, they express possibilities, just as do numbers. Even Hobbes has defined space as a phantasm of theexistent. But to speak more accurately, extension is the order of possible coexistence, just as time is the order of possibilitiesthat are inconsistent but nevertheless have a connection. Thus the former considers simultaneous things or those whichexist together, the latter those which are incompatible but which we nevertheless conceive as all existing; it is this whichmakes them successive. But space and time taken together constitute the order of possibilities of the one entire universe,so that these orders – space and time, that is – relate not only to what actually is but also to anything that could be put inits place, just as numbers are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated. This inclusion of the possible with theexistent makes a continuity which is uniform and indifferent to every division.

Leibniz extract 2 (from letter to de Volder, 19 viii 1702; transl. & ed. Loemker)

I had said that extension is the order of possible coexistents and that time is the order of possible inconsistents. If this isso, you say you wonder how time enters into all things, spiritual as well as corporeal, while extension enters only intocorporeal things. I reply that the relations are the same in the one case as in the other, for every change, spiritual as wellas material, has its own place [sedes], so to speak, in the order of time, as well as its own location in the order of coexistents,or in space. For although monads are not extended, they nevertheless have a certain kind of situation [situs] in extension,that is, they have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through the machine which they control.I do not think that any finite substances exist apart from a body and that they therefore lack a position or an order inrelation to the other things coexisting in the universe. Extended things involve a plurality of things endowed with position,but things which are simple, though they do not have extension, must yet have a position in extension, though it isimpossible to designate these positions precisely as in the case of incomplete phenomena.

(see also his letter to de Volder of 30 vi 1704)

* * *

God, freedom, and creation

1. ‘To say that god can only choose what is best is effectively to deny him freedom of choice.’Can Leibniz meet this objection?

2. Can it be true that god has rendered every event certain and determined, without derogatingfrom the liberty of his creatures?

G.W. Leibniz – Discourse on Metaphysics — especially §§30–31— – Necessary and Contingent Truths— – On Freedom— – Theodicy

R.M. Adams – ‘Must God Create the Best?’ (Phil.Rev. 81, 1972; also in Morris [ed.]The Concept of God)

— – ‘Leibniz’s Theories of Contingency’ (Rice University Studies 63:4;reprinted in Hooker)

David Blumenfeld – ‘Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World’ (in CC–Leibniz)

George Gale – ‘On What God Chose: Perfection and God’s Freedom’ (StudiaLeibnitiana 8, 1976)

Michael Hooker &Mark Pastin – ‘Leibniz and Duhemian Compatibilism’ (in Hooker)

John Hostler – Leibniz’s Moral Philosophy — chapter 8

Anthony Kenny – The God of the Philosophers — chapter 7 (reprinted in Morris [ed.]The Concept of God as ‘The Definition of Omnipotence’)

J.L. Mackie – ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ (Mind 64, 1955; also in Mitchell [ed.] ThePhilosophy of Religion)

William E. Mann – ‘God’s Freedom, Human Freedom, and God’s Responsibility for Sin’(in Morris [ed.] Divine & Human Action)

Alvin Plantinga – ‘The Free Will Defence’ (in Black [ed.] Philosophy in America; also inMitchell [ed.] The Philosophy of Religion)

R.C. Sleigh – Leibniz and Arnauld — chapter 5

Quentin Smith & L. NathanOaklander – Time, Change, and Freedom — dialogue 10

Catherine Wilson – Leibniz’s Metaphysics — chapter VIII


This is a topic in which it’s easy to get lost. Much of the secondary reading concerns the problemof evil in anon-historical, non-Leibnizian way; be careful not to get side-tracked, but to use thesediscussions in order to throw light on what Leibniz is saying.

Compare Leibniz’s problems here with those of Descartes (when dealing with error) andSpinoza; whose approach is more promising?

* * *

Leibniz and Locke on innate ideas

One member of each pair should write an essay defending the notion of innate ideas, the otherattacking it.

G.W. Leibniz – New Essays Concerning Human Understanding — Book I

John Locke – Essay Concerning Human Understanding — Book I

Margaret Atherton – ‘Locke and the Issue over Innatenes’ (in OR–Chappell)

Michael Ayers – Locke: Epistemology & Ontology — volume I passim

Martha Brandt Bolton – ‘Leibniz and Locke on the Knowledge of Necessary Truths’ (in Cover& Kulstad)

René Descartes – Comments on a Certain Broadsheet — sections 357-361

E.J. Lowe – Locke on Human Understanding — chapter 2

Hidé Ishiguro – Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language — pp 24–27

Nicholas Jolley – ‘Leibniz and Malebranche on Innate Ideas’ (Phil.Rev. 97, 1988)

Ian Hacking – Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy? — chapter 6

John Harris – ‘Leibniz and Locke On Innate Ideas’ (in OR–Tipton)

Robert McRae – ‘The Theory of Knowledge’ (in CC–Jolley)

J.L. Mackie – Problems From Locke — chapter 7

Grenville Wall – ‘Locke’s Attack On Innate Knowledge’ (in OR–Tipton)

Catherine Wilson – Leibniz’s Mewtaphysics — chapter VII, sections 41 and 42

R.S. Woolhouse – Locke — chapter 1


Is Locke really attacking innate ideas, innate principles, or innate knowledge? What exactly does herule out, and what might he allow (see Extract 1 below for one opinion). Is he entitled to rely onthe principle that we can’t have knowledge of which we’re unaware (see the rôle of memory)?

Are Locke’s reason’s for attacking (and Leibniz’s for defending) innatism purely epistemo-logical and metaphysical? What political and religious factors might there have been, and shouldsuch factors have played a significant part in the philosophical debate?

Leibniz attacks Locke’s account of knowledge, but what exactly does he want to put in itsplace?

If you spend any time on Chomsky’s ‘Cartesian linguistics’ (for example, via Hacking’s book),you should ask yourself whether Locke or Leibniz would have been happy with such a theory. IsChomsky really resurrecting the notion of innate ideas, as he seems to think? (What wasDescartes’ version innatism?)

* * *

Extract 1 (from R.I. Aaron, John Locke, p.95)

To begin with, Locke is not denying prenatal experiences. He recognises that the child in the womb may experiencehunger. But such an experience is not different in kind from the post-natal experience of feeling hungry. Nor, again, doesLocke deny what psychologists today term innate dispositions. He nowhere discusses such things as tropisms, reflexes, andinstincts. Once, when Pierre Coste mentioned instinctive knowledge in animal life as needing explanation, he replied a littletartly: ‘Je n’ai pas écrit mon livre pour expliquer les actions des bêtes.’ His attitude here may be criticised. It is possible thatmuch insight might be gained into the cognitive side of our nature by studying the lowlier forms of psychical activity. Butin Locke’s opinion, as in the opinions of his opponents, the theory of innate knowledge was meant to explain cognition atits highest and best, something far beyond the reach of animals. Indeed, it was just because this cognition was thought soexcellent that it was necessary to introduce a fresh, non-natural faculty, pertaining to the inner essence of the soul of man,in order to explain it. Nothing that Locke says here in any way affects instinctive knowledge, if it exists, or, again, innatedispositions. He admits the latter, for instance, the innate disposition to seek the pleasant and avoid the painful. It is notheory of innate dispositions which he attacks in attacking innate knowledge. He is there concerned with what claims tobe supra- rather than sub-rational.

Extract 2 (from a sermon by Berkeley, 1751)

But neither is the use of our reason, the only natural means, for discovering the will of God, the same being also suggestedby a natural conscience, and inward feeling implanted in the soul of every man, previous to all deductions of reason, therebeing nothing more natural to our minds, than that distaste, disquiet, and remorse attending evil actions, and on the otherhand, that joy and satisfaction which is the constant encouragement and reward of good ones.

That there are appetites and aversions, satisfactions and uneasinesses, inclinations and instincts, originallyinterwoven in our nature, must be allowed by all impartial and considerate men. It is, I say, evident that the Soul is soconstituted, in her original state, that certain dispositions and tendencies will not fail to shew them selves, at properperiods, and in certain circumstances; which affections, because they are universal not confined to any age or country, andnot to be accounted for by custom or education, but alike in all nations and all times, are properly said to be natural orinnate.

Thus, for example, the fear of death and the love of one’s children are accounted natural, and the same may be saidof divers other instincts and notions, such as the apprehension of a superior being, the abhorrence of many crimes andvices, the relish of things good and vertuous, which are to be looked on as natural inbred dispositions, resulting from thenatural make of our minds, inasmuch as, though they do not appear in our earliest infancy, yet in the growth and progressof the soul, they are sure to shoot forth to open and display themselves as naturally as leaves and blossoms do from a tree.And all these natural tendencies and impressions on the conscience, are so many marks to direct and inform the mind, ofthe will of the author of nature. God therefore is not without a witness, even among the Gentiles of whom Saint Paulobserveth that not having the revealed law they are a law to themselves, which shew the work of the law written in theirhearts.

* * *

Hobbes & Locke: covenants & contracts

a) How could people in a Hobbesian or a Lockean state of nature come to make a covenant ora contract?

b) Is Hobbes’ justification of the power of the sovereign compatible with his conception of aperson in the state of nature?

Thomas Hobbes – Leviathan — chapters 1–15

John Locke – Two Treatises of Government — especially II §§ 330–366

Richard Ashcraft – Locke’s Two Treatises of Government— – ‘Locke’s political philosophy’ (in CC–Chappell)

J. Dunn – The Political Thought of John Locke

D.P. Gauthier – ‘Morality and advantage’ (Phil.Rev. 1967; & in Practical Reasoning,ed. Raz)

David Lloyd Thomas – Locke on Government

Michael Oakeshott – Hobbes on Civil Association

G. Parry – John Locke

John Rawls – A Theory of Justice — section 52


What are the rôles of the stories each writer tells of the origins of society? Are we dealing withparables or simplified history? How might this affect what we say in each case?

* * *

Locke: property

a) Does Locke succeed in justifying any property rights with his argument from labour? If so,which?

b) Does Locke show that, if persons own themselves, they must be able to own things externalto themselves?

John Locke – Two Treatises of Government — I §§ 29, 39–43, & 86–93; II §§ 1–16,25–51, 134–135, 149, 183

L.C. Becker – Property Rights: A Philosophical Analysis — chapter 4

G.A. Cohen – ‘Marx and Locke on land and labour’ (Proceedings of the BritishAcademy 71)

— – ‘Nozick on appropriation’ (New Left Review 150)

J. Dunn – The Political Thought of John Locke — especially chapters 1 & 7

J.W. Harris – Legal Philosophies — chapter 7 part 1

C.B. Macpherson – The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism — chapter 5

Robert Nozick – Anarchy, State, and Utopia — pp 174–183

K. Olivecrona – ‘Locke’s theory of appropriation’ (Phil.Q. 24)

G. Parry – John Locke — especially chapters 3–6

Alan Ryan – Property

L. Strauss – Natural Right and History — chapter 5B

J. Waldron – The Right to Private Property — introduction & chapter 6

S. Wolin – Politics and Vision — chapter 9


What metaphysical and epistemological issues arise if we treat property rights as Locke suggests?Do the conditions he places upon such rights undermine the claim that they’re genuine rights orstrengthen it?

* * *

Locke: primary and secondary qualities

What exactly is the distinction? Why does Locke make it, and should we accept it?

John Locke – Essay Concerning Human Understanding — II,iv,viii; IV,iii

George Berkeley – Principles of Human Knowledge — sections 9–15— – Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous — First Dialogue

Peter Alexander – ‘Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities’ (in OR–Tipton)

Michael Ayers – Locke: Epistemology & Ontology — volume I passim; see especiallypp 29–31, 62–65, 183f., and 207–17.

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume — chapter 4

Gerd Buchdahl – Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science — chapters 3–5

E.A. Burtt – The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science — chapters 4 (A–B),6 (B,C), & 7 (§§1–5)

A. Butterfield – The Origins of Modern Science — chapter 6

R.E. Butts & J.W. Davis – The Methodological Inheritance of Newton — chapters 1 & 4

John Campbell – ‘Locke on Qualities’ (Canadian J.Phil. 10, 1980; also in OR–Chappell)

John W. Davis – ‘Hume on Qualitative Content’ (in Morice)

Galileo Galilei – Il Saggitore (The Assayer) — trans. Danto in his Introduction toContemporary Civilisation in the West, vol. I [2nd ed.], pp 719–24, &in Danto & Morganbesser [edd] Philosophy of Science

John Losee – A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science — chaps 8–10


Edwin McCann – ‘Locke’s Philosophy of Body’ (in CC–Chappell)

Colin McGinn – The Subjective View — pp 5–23, 129–145


Isaac Newton – Principia — General Scholium

Margaret Wilson – ‘Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?’ (in Turbayne)

R.S. Woolhouse – Locke’s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge

J.W. Yolton – Locke and the Compass of the Human Understanding — chapters 1–6


Does Locke think that he can prove or demonstrate that objects have certain qualities and, in somesense, lack others, or is he content with probability here?

Locke takes it that he’s correcting a common error we make about the nature of the world;what exactly is that error?

What rôle do models play in Locke’s view of the world? Is he forced into his theory ofprimary and secondary qualities because he’s adopted a particular model? What model has headopted?

Many of the commentators are somewhat misleading when it comes to Locke’s account; payclose attention, not only to the passages in Locke where he’s talking about the distinction, but alsoto how he defines ‘quality’ in general.

* * *

Locke: substance and essence

1. Critically examine the way in which Locke interprets the distinction between real and nominalessences.

2. What exactly does Locke think about substance?

John Locke – Essay, II,xxi; xxiii,1–11; xxii,6–11: III,vi,1–9; ix,12–13 and 17–20:IV,iii,11–16 and 23–26; vi.

Michael Ayers – Locke: Epistemology & Ontology — volume II passim; see especiallypp 40–42, 56–58, and 66–76

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume — pages 120–123– ‘Substratum’ (History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, 1987; also in

OR–Chappell)

Martha Brandt Bolton – ‘Substances, Substrata, and Names of Substances in Locke’s Essay’(Phil. Rev. 85, 1976; also in OR–Chappell)

— – ‘The Idea-Theoretic Basis of Locke’s Anti-Essentialist Doctrine ofNominal Essence’ (Mind, Ideas, and Objects, edd Cummins & Zoeller;also in OR–Chappell with a new, even longer title)

I.M. Copi – ‘Essence and Accident’ (J. Phil. LI, 1954; also in Naming, Necessity,and Natural Kinds, ed. Schwartz)

Saul Kripke – Naming and Necessity — pages 116–144; also as ‘Naming andNecessity’ (The Semantics of Natural Language, edd. Davidson andHarman, pages 314–327)



Hilary Putnam – ‘Is Semantics Possible?’ and ‘Meaning and Reference’ (both in Mind,Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol II; also in Schwartz)

R.S. Woolhouse – Locke’s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge — chapters 6–8

John Williamson – ‘Boyle and Locke: on Material Substance’ (in Philosophers of theEnlightenment, ed. Peter Gilmour)


In terms of the ideas of his time, what is the point of Locke’s account of real and nominal essences?Could it be restated in terms of modern ideas?

This topic, as is hinted at in the reading, is more interesting as a problem for the philosophyof the last thirty years than as a problem for Locke — nevertheless, it’s useful to see theconnections and the differences, so don’t neglect the Essay.

* * *

Locke & Hume: personal identity

What is personal identity? How do you know?

John Locke – Essay — II,xxvii

David Hume – Treatise of Human Nature — I,iv,6 and Appendix

Michael Ayers – Locke: Epistemology & Ontology — volume II, part III

Jonathan Bennett – ‘Locke’s Philosophy of Mind’ (in CC–Chappell)

John Bricke – ‘Hume on Self-Identity, Memory, and Causality’ (in Morice)


J.L. Mackie – Problems From Locke — chapters 5 and 6

Thomas Nagel – ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’ (Synthèse 22; alsoin OR–Glover)

Harold Noonan – Hume on Knowledge — chapter 5

Derek Parfit – ‘Personal Identity’ (Phil. Rev. 71; also in OR–Glover)

David Pears – Hume’s System — part II, chapters 8 & 9

Terence Penelhum – ‘Personal Identity’ (in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards)

Barry Stroud – Hume — chapter 6

Bernard Williams – ‘The Self and the Future’ (Phil. Rev. 70; also in his Problems of theSelf, and in OR–Glover)


This week the so-called primary reading is probably best treated as a (necessary) adjunct to themodern discussions. I don’t think you’ll find Locke and Hume at all irrelevant or unuseful. The‘secondary material’ specifically on Locke and Hume should help to bridge any gap, as willPenelhum’s article in the Encyclopaedia.

Perhaps the best tip I can give you is not to be too ambitious; zero in on one of the topicsmentioned in the essay titles, working out the implications of the philosophical discussion in justthat area. When we come to discuss the issues (as a group, incidentally), I hope that you’ll havegained sufficient grasp of the general principles to be able to see their applications to the areascovered by other people.

* * *

Idealism (Ronald Knox)

There once was a man who said, ‘GodMust think it exceedingly odd

If he finds that this treeContinues to be

When there’s no-one about in the Quad.’

A Reply (Anon., but possibly BertrandRussell)

Dear Sir, Your astonishment’s odd,I am always about in the Quad;

And that’s why this treeWill continue to be,

Since observed by Yours faithfully, GOD.

Berkeley’s idealism

Discuss Berkeley’s arguments for idealism. How much force do they have?

George Berkeley – Principles of Human Knowledge

— – Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

Edwin B. Allaire – ‘Berkeley’s Idealism’ (Theoria 29, 1963; also in his Essays in Ontology[Iowa Publications in Philosophy 1, 1963])

— – ‘Berkeley’s Idealism Revisited’ (in Turbayne)

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes — especially chapters V andVI

M.F. Burnyeat – ‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and BerkeleyMissed’ (Phil. Rev. 91, 1981; also in Vesey)

Jonathan Dancy – Berkeley: An Introduction — especially chaps 2, 5, & 6

Thomas Nagel – The View from Nowhere — chapter 6, sections 1 and 2

George Pitcher – Berkeley — passim, but see especially chapters VIII–X

G.J. Warnock – Berkeley — chapters 5 and 6

Margaret Wilson – ‘Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?’ (in Turbayne)


Much of Berkeley’s argument for idealism is actually an attack on realism — for our purposes wecan treat it as an attack on Locke’s realism (though Berkeley had scientists such as Newton andBoyle at least as firmly in his sights). To what extent do his arguments depend upon hismisunderstanding of Locke’s position with regard to primary and secondary qualities, and toperception?

* * *

Hume: ideas and impressions

1. Are all our thoughts copies of impressions? How would one know?

2. Can I know what ‘sour’ means if I’ve never tasted anything sour?

3. ”When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without anymeaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what impression is thatsupposed idea derived?“ — Has Hume any adequate basis for this manoeuvre?

David Hume – Enquiry — sections I–III

— – Treatise — I,i,1–7; I,iii,4 (1st paragraph); I,iii,5 (including the para-graph added in the Appendix)

— – Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature


R.J. Butler – ‘Hume’s Impressions’ (in Impressions of Empiricism, ed. Vesey)

Peter Geach – Mental Acts — sections 5–10

D.G.C. MacNabb – David Hume — chapter 1


John Passmore – Hume’s Intentions — chapter 5 (6)

David Pears – Hume’s System — part I, chapters 1–3

Barry Stroud – Hume — chapters 1 & 2

R.P. Wolff – ‘Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity’ (Phil. Rev., 1960; also in Chappell-H — especially pages 98–108)


Are all the contents of the human mind (ie impressions and ideas) rightly to be called perceptions?Including, say, memories of anger, complex abstract ideas like the idea of justice?

Note the distinction (drawn more clearly in the Treatise) between simple and complex ideas.Just how should this be drawn? Reflect on the distinction, and see if it helps get Hume out of hisown ‘missing shade of blue’ counter-example to his thesis.

How could Hume show the distinction between the idea of ancestry and the idea of progeny?‘Ideas or thoughts’ — can Hume assimilate all thoughts to complex ideas? In other words,

is the complexity of a ‘virtuous horse’ really comparable to the complexity of a proposition such as:‘If he’s not in College, he’ll be late for the meeting’?

Are force and vivacity enough to distinguish impressions from ideas? Why are the ideas ofa man diseased or disordered still called ideas, if they are as vivid as impressions?

Are there memory impressions? And is the idea of pain a faint pain?

* * *

Hume on belief

1. “Hume’s account of belief is satisfactory if it is interpreted as an account of what it is to bethinking about something”. Discuss.

3. ‘An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea’. Discuss this statement in the contextof Treatise I,ii,7.

David Hume – Enquiry — passim, and especially sections IV, V, IX, XI

— – Treatise — I,iii,7–10 and Appendix (pages 623–633)

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume — pages 299–304

Edward Craig – ‘Hume on Thought and Belief’ (in Vesey)

R.J. Fogelin – Hume’s Scepticism in the The Treatise of Human Nature — passim

Peter Geach – ‘Assertion’ (Phil. Rev., 1965; also in Logic Matters, Geach, pp 263–5)

Harold Noonan – Hume on Knowledge

John Passmore – Hume’s Intentions — chapters 2, 5, and 6, and especially pages94–104

David Pears – Hume’s System — part I, chapters 3 & 4

A. Phillips-Griffiths [ed.] – Knowledge and Belief — especially the papers by Malcolm, Price, andPritchard

R.P. Wolff – ‘Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity’ (Phil. Rev., 1960; also in Chappell-H)


Keep the notion of memory in mind throughout. In general, would what you want to say aboutbelief hold for memory too?

How does the claim that force and vivacity distinguish belief from the imagination hold up?Compare the essay on ideas and impressions. Bear in mind that one usually believes that p — thatis, the object of a belief is a proposition.

Forceful and vivacious feelings are occurrences. Is believing an occurrence? How, on Hume’saccount, would you know that somebody else believed something? Does one say ‘I am believingthat p’? If you reject Hume’s account, how would you like to explain belief?

Is Hume’s a causal account of the origin of beliefs? How do reasons differ from causes? DoesHume leave any room for reasons? Or evidence?

Does Hume, in the Appendix to the Treatise, more or less admit that he hasn’t really got offthe ground with the whole issue?

* * *

Hume: relations of ideas and matters of fact

1. Is the contrary of every matter of fact possible?

2. Is Hume’s distinction the same as the modern one(s) between necessary and contingent, analyticand synthetic, or a priori and empirical?

David Hume – Enquiry — sections IV, VII, XII

— – Treatise — I,iii,1; I,ii,2 (first three paragraphs only); I,iii,3–4

John Locke – Essay — IV,iii–iv; IV,vi; IV,viii

A.J. Ayer – Language, Truth, and Logic — chapters 4 and 5


R.J. Fogelin – Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature — chapters IVand VI

Harold Noonan – Hume on Knowledge — pp 92–95

W.v.O. Quine – ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (Phil. Rev., 1951; also in his From aLogical Point of View)

Anthony Quinton – ‘The a priori and the analytic’ (in Strawson [ed.], Philosophical Logic)

Aaron Sloman – ‘”Necessary“, ”A Priori“, and ”Analytic“’ (Analysis, 1965)

Smithurst – ‘Hume on Existence and Possibility’ (P.A.S., 1980–1) — pp 23–30

Galen Strawson – The Secret Connexion

Barry Stroud – Hume — pages 46–50


What are the various rôles played by Hume’s different criteria: intuitive/demonstrative certainty;discoverability by the mere operation of thought; independence of what is anywhere existent inthe universe; the conceivability of the contrary; not implying a contradiction; conceived withfacility; founded on the relation of cause and effect; demonstrative certainty; discoverability of truthby abstract reason or reflection?

Is conceivability a test of possibility? Is conceivability just a matter of forming mentalpictures? See the Stroud and Smithurst references for this; what do you think of the Goldbach’sConjecture example?

Should one distinguish (and does Hume distinguish) between (a) what makes a propositiontrue and (b) how we come to know whether a proposition is true?

* * *

Hume on causality

1. Expound and assess Hume’s view of the relation of cause and effect.

2. Is it possible to distinguish between a coincidental constant conjunction and a causal one?

David Hume – Enquiry — sections IV–VIII, and XII parts 2 and 3

— – Treatise — I,iii,14–15

Annette Baier – ‘Real Humean Causes’ (in Cover & Kulstad)

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume — chapters 11 and 12

R.J. Fogelin – Hume’s Scepticism in The Treatise of Human Nature — chapter IV

John Foster – Ayer — III, 6

— – [reviewing Mackie] (Inquiry 75)

J.L. Mackie – The Cement of the Universe — chapter 1

John Stuart Mill – System of Logic — book III, chapter 5

George Morice – David Hume — papers by Khamara & Macnabb and by Robison


David Pears – Hume’s System — part II, chapters 5–7

J.A. Robinson &Thomas J. Richards – ‘Hume’s Two Definitions of ”Cause“’ (Phil. Q. 1962; and in Chappell-

H)

Bertrand Russell – Mysticism and Logic — chapter 9



How is Hume using the term ‘necessary’? Is this logical necessity? Is there another kind ofnecessity — e.g. ‘physical necessity’? If so, how should we characterise that? Is Hume after thekind of necessity that would ground a priori inference from cause to effect?

Hume’s definition of ‘cause’ cites contiguity in the Treatise, but not in the Enquiry; why do youthink he drops it?

Why are there two definitions? Are they equivalent? In the first definition, is Hume’s ”inother words“ really the same statement in other words? Note that the first definition makes nomention of minds, or reasoning, or necessity at all. What is his ambition: (a) to say what we meanby ‘cause’; (b) to explain how it is that we give the word that meaning; (c) to say what it is for A tocause B?

When we have a causal sequence, why do we pick out one feature rather than another as thecause? E.g., when there’s a fire, why don’t we usually cite as the cause the presence of oxygen in theair?

* * *

Extract (taken, with minor modifications, from John Losee,A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp 104–106)

Bacon and Locke had discussed the question of a necessary knowledge of nature from a scholastic standpoint. Both hadrecommended the study of the coexistence of properties. Hume shifted the search for necessary empirical knowledge tosequences of events. He asked whether a necessary knowledge of such sequences was possible, and decided that it wasnot. Hume held that to establish a necessary knowledge of a sequence of events one would have to prove that thesequence could not have been otherwise. But Hume pointed out that it was not a self-contradiction to affirm that althoughevery A has been followed by a B, the next A will not be followed by a B.

Hume undertook to examine our idea of a ”causal relation“. He noted that if we mean by a ‘causal relation’ both‘constant conjunction’ and ‘necessary connection’, then we can achieve no causal knowledge at all. This is because we haveno impression of any force or power by means of which an A is constrained to produce a B. The most that we can establishis that events of one type invariably have been followed by events of a second type. Hume concluded that the only ”causal“knowledge that we can hope to achieve is a knowledge of the de facto association of two classes of events.

Hume conceded that we do feel that there is something necessary about many sequences. According to Hume, thisfeeling is an impression of the ”internal sense“, an impression derived from custom. He declared that ”after a repetitionof similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and tobelieve that it will exist (Enquiry VII,ii,59). Of course, the fact that the mind comes to anticipate a B upon the appearanceof an A is no proof that there is a necessary connection between A and B.

Consistent with this analysis, Hume stipulated definitions of ‘causal relation’ both from an objective and from asubjective standpoint. Objectively considered, a causal relation is a constant conjunction of the members of two classes ofevents; subjectively considered, a causal relation is a sequence such that, upon appearance of an event of the first class, themind is led to anticipate an event of the second class.

These two definitions appear in both the Treatise and in the Enquiry (Treatise I,iii,14 (p.172); Enquiry VII,ii,60).However, in the Enquiry, Hume inserted after the first definition the following qualification: “or in other words where, if thefirst object had not been, the second never had existed” (Enquiry VII,ii,60). Replacing the term ‘object’ by ‘event’, which isconsistent with Hume’s own usage, it is evident that this new definition is not equivalent to the first definition. Forinstance, in the case of two similar pendulum clocks arranged to be 90° out-of-phase, the ticks of the two clocks areconstantly conjoined, but this does not imply that if the pendulum of clock 1 were arrested, then clock 2 would cease totick.

Hume’s inclusion of this qualification in the Enquiry may indicate that he was not quite satisfied to equate causalelation and de facto regularity. Another likely indication of his uneasiness is the fact that he included in the Treatise, terselyand without comment, a list of eight “Rules by which to judge of Causes and Effects” (Treatise I,iii,15). Among these rulesare versions of the Methods of Agreement, Difference, and Concomitant Variations, later made famous by Mill.

The Method of Difference, in particular, enables the investigator to judge causal connection upon observation ofjust two instances. It would seem, in this case, that Hume contradicted his “official position” that we term a relation“causal” only upon experience of a constant conjunction of two types of events. Hume denied this. He maintained thatalthough belief that a succession of events is a causal sequence may arise even after a single observation of the sequence,the belief nevertheless is a product of custom. This is because the judgement of causal connection in such cases dependsimplicitly on the generalisation that like objects in like circumstances produce like effects. But this generalisation itselfexpresses our expectation based on extensive experience of constantly conjoined events. Hence our belief in a causalconnection invariably is a matter of habitual expectation.

Having thus accounted for the origin of our belief in causal connection, Hume was quick to point out that no appealto the regularity of past experience can guarantee fulfilment of our expectations about the future. He stated that “it isimpossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since allthese arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance” (Enquiry IV,ii,32). Hence it is not possible to achievea demonstrative knowledge of causes from premisses which state matters of fact.

Hume thus completed a sweeping attack on the possibility of a necessary knowledge of nature. Such knowledgewould have to be either immediate or demonstrative. Hume had shown that no immediate knowledge of causes is possible,for we have no impression of necessary connection. He also had shown that it is not possible to achieve a demonstrativeknowledge of causes, either from premisses which state a priori true relations of ideas, or from premisses which statematters of fact. There seemed to be no further possibility. No scientific interpretation can achieve the certainty of astatement such as ‘the whole is greater than each of its parts’. Probability is the only defensible claim that can be made forscientific laws and theories.

Although Hume’s scepticism was apprehended as a threat to science by those who were not satisfied with “merelyprobable” knowledge, Hume himself was quite ready to rely on the testimony of past experience. On the practical level,Hume was not a sceptic. He declared that “custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone whichrenders our experience useful to us.... Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter offact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses” (Enquiry V,i,36).

* * *

Hume on induction

1. Is there a sound inductive argument for the existence of the external world?

2. Has anyone proved to your satisfaction that induction is rational or that it is not rational?

3. ‘Hume has only shown that induction isn’t deduction’. Discuss.

David Hume – Enquiry — sections IV–VIII, and section XII parts 2 and 3

— – Treatise — I,iii,1–9

John Locke – Essay — IV,vi; IV,xii; IV,iii,22–31

Jonathan Bennett – Locke, Berkeley, Hume — chapters 11 and 12

Max Black – ‘Induction’ (in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards)

R.J. Fogelin – Hume’s Scepticism in The Treatise of Human Nature — chap. IV


David Pears – Hume’s System — part II, chapters 10 & 11

Karl Popper – Objective Knowledge — chapter 1

Bertrand Russell – The Problems of Philosophy — chapter 6 (also in Swinburne)

Tom Stoppard – Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead — pages 7–15

Galen Strawson – The Secret Connexion — especially chapter 7

P.F. Strawson – Introduction to Logical Theory — chapter 9, part ii


R.G. Swinburne [ed.] – The Justification of Induction — Introduction and paper by Edwards


How is Hume using the terms ‘reason’ and ‘reasoning’ here? (For this you will find the section ‘Ofthe Reason of Animals’ helpful.) Is reasoning any movement of the mind (rationally justifiable ornot) from one idea/thought to another, or is it a movement of the mind that can be rationallyjustified? What, for Hume, counts as rational justification?

Is Hume saying (a) we can never know for certain that the sun will rise tomorrow, or (b) wenever have any more reason to suppose that it will rise than that it won’t? If (a), why isn’t what heis saying simply boring? If (b), what can you do about it?

(a) Necessarily [If x knows that p, then p];(b) If x knows that p, then necessarily p.

One is true, the other isn’t (which is which?). Is Hume tacitly taking the fallacious reading, whendenying that inductive inferences are justified?

* * *

Hume on freedom of the will

1. Does Hume regard the character and dispositions of people as causes?

2. If determinism is true, can we justly be blamed for anything?

David Hume – Enquiry — especially section VIII

— – Treatise — II,iii,1–3

A.J. Ayer – ‘Freedom in Necessity’ (in his Philosophical Essays; also in Watson)

Paul Edwards – ‘Hard and Soft Determinism’ (in Determinism and Freedom, ed.Hook)

Philippa Foot – ‘Free Will as Involving Determinism’ (Phil. Rev., 1957; also in FreeWill and Determinism, ed. Berofsky)

H.G. Frankfurt – ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ (J. Phil., 1971;also in Watson)

Jonathan Glover – Responsibility — especially chapter 2

Stuart Hampshire – ‘Freedom of Mind’ (in his Freedom of Mind and Other Essays)

Ted Honderich – How Free Are You?

P.F. Strawson – ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (in his Freedom and Resentment andOther Essays; also in Watson)

R.G. Swinburne – ‘Physical Determinism’ (in Knowledge and Necessity: Royal Instituteof Philosophy Lectures, Vol.3)

J.O. Urmson – ‘Motives and Causes’ (P.A.S.S 1952; also in Philosophy of Action, ed.White)

Godfrey Vesey – ‘Hume on Liberty and Necessity’ (in Vesey)

Gary Watson [ed.] – Free Will

[This is one of the most-discussed areas of philosophy — and consequently there’s a vast literature. I’ve mentioned papersfrom four collections — others include Freedom and Determinism (ed. Lehrer) and Essays on Freedom of Action (ed. Honderich).You’ll find more referred to in the papers and books. Don’t be intimidated. Don’t try to read too much; read the Hume(more as secondary than as primary material in this case), and perhaps two or three other items.]


If free will isn’t compatible with determinism, what would it be? How, for example, would oneexplain free actions?

What distinguishes the ‘free’ action of the professional thief from that of the person forcedat gunpoint to steal, or from the kleptomaniac?

What, if anything, has predictability to do with freedom (note that the weather is fairlyunpredictable)?

Is there a distinction worth noting between freedom of spontaneity (roughly: you’re free if youdo what you want) and freedom of indifference (roughly: you’re free if you could have doneotherwise)? Which is Hume talking about — one, both, neither? ‘I could have done otherwise ifI had chosen otherwise’ — but could I have chosen otherwise?

Why might it be that we don’t tend to think that animals have free will?Spell out carefully what you take determinism to be (are there several varieties?), and how

and where the claim that we have free will conflicts with it.

The existence of god

Examine Hume’s arguments concerning the existence of god in the Enquiry. What precisely is hetrying to show?

David Hume – Enquiry – especially sections VII, X, XII, and pp 344–346 (“AdditionalNote”)

— – Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

René Descartes – Discourse on Method — IV

W.P. Alston – ‘Teleological Argument for the Existence of God’ (in Edwards [ed.]The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy)

Brian Davies – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion — chapter 6

John Donnelly [ed.] – Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism

A.C. Ewing – ‘Two “Proofs” of God’s Existence’ (Religious Studies I, 1966;reprinted in his Non-Linguistic Philosophy)

Antony Flew – David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science – chapter 4

— – ‘Hume’s Philosophy of Religion’ (Godfrey Vesey [ed.] PhilosophersAncient and Modern)

Anthony Kenny – Reason and Religion – chapter 5 — – What is Faith? – chapter 6


Ninian Smart – ‘The Existence of God’ (in Flew & MacIntyre)

Tom Stoppard – Jumpers — especially pages 24–30

Richard Swinburne – ‘The Argument from Design’ (Philosophy 43, 1968; also in Donnelly)

Bernard Williams – ‘Hume On Religion’ (in Pears)


Look at the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Which are the most powerful arguments? Cananything be salvaged from Hume’s attack?

Can the believer accept that we can make no extrapolation at all from humans to god — e.g.,that ‘what we imagine to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect’?

Can one get round the point, made by both Hume and Stoppard, that there seems no reasonwhy a creator need be benevolent, nor a benevolent god a creator?

* * *

Miracles

1. Could there ever be good grounds for believing in a miracle?2. Could the occurrence of miracles be used to prove the existence of god, or the claims of aparticular religion?

David Hume – Enquiry – sections VII and XII give some of the philosophicalbackground, section X and pages 344–346 (“Additional Note” tosection X) is the central text. Section X (‘Of Miracles’) is available asa separate volume, and is reprinted in Swinburne.

Robert M. Adams – ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature, and Causation’ (PASS LXVI, 1992)

John Beversluis – C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion – chapter 4. Containsa salutary discussion of Lewis’s arguments against naturalism inMiracles

Paul J. Dietl – ‘On Miracles’ (A.P.Q. 5, 1968; also in Donnelly)

John Donnelly [ed.] – Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism (Fordham)

Antony Flew – God and Philosophy – chapter 7 — – Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science – chapter 5 — – ‘Hume’s Philosophy of Religion’ (Godfrey Vesey [ed.] Philosophers

Ancient and Modern) — pages 140–146 — – ‘Miracles’ (in Edwards [ed.] The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy)

R.F. Holland – ‘The Miraculous’ (A.P.Q. 2, 1965; also in Donnelly, and inSwinburne)

Chris Hughes – ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature, and Causation’ (PASS LXVI, 1992)


Patrick Nowell-Smith – ‘Miracles’ (in Flew and MacIntyre [edd] New Essays in PhilosophicalTheology)

Douglas Odergard – ‘Miracles and Good Evidence’ (Religious Studies 18, 1982)

Richard Swinburne – The Existence of God – chapter 12

Bernard Williams – ‘Hume On Religion’ (in Pears)


Is Hume’s argument empirical (experience has shown us that there never have been good enoughgrounds for licensing belief in miracles) or a priori (there could never have been such grounds)?When thinking of this, take note of the description of the miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris.

Hume doesn’t mention (a) one’s own testimony (is that more trustworthy than hearsay?) or(b) physical traces (e.g. the Turin shroud). Should he have?

How would you want to define a miracle? Are instances of black magic miraculous? Areincredible coincidences miraculous?

* * *

Entries from A Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Flew)Miracle. A term that has been variously understood, but is most commonly taken to mean an act that manifests divinepower through the suspension or alteration of the normal working of the laws of nature. The idea of laws of nature is thusessential to the idea of the miraculous, but is also, clearly, a major barrier to belief that miracles actually occur.

Much philosophical discussion stems from the claim by Hume (Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, especiallysection X) that belief in such occurrences is never rationally justified, since it must always be more probable that thefavourable testimony is erroneous than that regularities confirmed by countless observations have been interrupted. If so,acceptance of miracles, while still logically possible, must be based on faith and so cannot provide independent support forit.

Argument from (or to) design. By far the most popular and widely persuasive of all the traditional arguments for theexistence of god, also called the teleological argument. It is usual to proceed not from admitted instances of designdeductively, but from observations of regularity and integration, by some sort of argument from experience, to theconclusion that these must be the work of a Designer. It is therefore better, and now becoming more usual, to say notargument from but argument to design.

Among the classic statements of this kind of argument are those found in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the NaturalTheology of William Paley, and the fifth of the Five Ways of St Thomas Aquinas. It was assailed by Hume first in Section XIof his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding and then in the posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.The first important distinction is between, on the one hand, appealing to divine intervention and contrivance in order toexplain some phenomenon for which it is believed that a purely secular science will forever prove unable to account and,on the other, urging that even the most universal and fundamental regularities uncovered by scientists cannot be intrinsicto the Universe itself, but must be imposed and sustained by god. Contentions of the former sort, which are not necessarilyinconsistent with the latter, are at any time apt to be discredited by the latest news of successes on the science front; thisis one reason why contemporary theologians sometimes speak disrespectfully of the idea of a god of the gaps. A thesis ofthe latter kind, which some find in Aquinas, is not similarly exposed. It can, on the contrary, afford to hail the triumphs ofscience as enriching its own premises. Darwin’s theory of the origin of the species by natural selection would be immenselyupsetting to spokesmen of the former sort of design argument, yet could be welcome to those committed only to the latter.

The second important distinction is between those who appeal to some supposed synthetic a priori principle ofcausation, guaranteeing that things of such and such a sort either must be or cannot be caused in this or that way and thosewho, following Hume, insist that for all that can be known a priori “Anything may be the cause of anything”.

Without that kind of guarantee, which the Humean will maintain that we neither can nor do have, we must bereduced to arguing from our accumulated experience of gods and universes. But such experience is, of necessity, entirelylacking, for both the god whose existence it is desired to prove and the universe from which the whole argument must startare, by definition, unique. There can be no question of arguing that (experience of other cases teaches!) it is eitherimmensely probable or immensely improbable that the universe could have whatever regularity and integration it is foundto have if that regularity and integration were not imposed upon it and sustained by god. Nor are we entitled to infer,without benefit of revelation, what sort of universe, if any, a being utterly beyond human comprehension could reasonablybe expected to create. Indeed the Humean would go further, suggesting that the burden of proof must always lie uponanyone wanting to say that any characteristics that the universe appears to have cannot be intrinsic to it. This is preciselythe Stratonician atheism that Hume found so sympathetically presented in the Dictionary of Pierre Bayle, and that manybelieve to have been Hume’s own final stance.

It should be noted that the idea of design or contrivance, though compatible, sits uneasily with that of an almightybeing.

***

Aquinas — extracts from the Summa Theologia (I, Q2A3)

[Objection] It seems that god does not exist. For [...] what can be accounted for by fewer principles is not the product ofmore. But it seems that everything which can be observed in the world can be accounted for by other principles, on theassumption of the non-existence of god. Thus natural effects are explained by natural causes, while contrived effects arereferred to human reason and will. So there is no need to postulate the existence of god.

*

The fifth way begins from the guidedness of things. For we observe that some things which lack knowledge, such as naturalbodies, work towards an end. This is apparent from the fact they always or most usually work in the same way and movetowards what is best. From which it is clear that they reach their end not by chance but by intention. For those thingswhich do not have knowledge do not tend to an end, except under the direction of someone who knows and understands:the arrow, for example, is shot by the archer. There is, therefore, an intelligent personal being by whom everything innature is ordered to its end, and this we call god.

*

[Reply to Objection] To [this objection] it has to be said that since nature works towards a determinate end under thedirection of a superior agent, then necessarily those things which happen naturally must be referred to god as their firstcause. In the same way too those things which come about by contrivance must be referred to some higher cause thanhuman reasoning and will. For these are changeable and can cease to be and, as we have seen, everything which ischangeable and can cease to be requires some first principle which is not subject to change or liable to cease to be.

***

Extract from An Introduction to Western Philosophy by Antony Flew

Way Five is as it stands so lamentable that the devout apologist is reduced quickly to pretending that Aquinas never thoughtof it as being what he has just quite explicitly said that it is, a proof: “We must say that it is possible to prove the experienceof god in five ways.” If we waive value questions about the cosmic complacency expressed in the claim that things “alwaysor most usually... move towards what is best”, the first thing for us to notice is that Way Five [...] is expressed in terms of

a fundamental concept of Aristotelian science. In this case it is that of an end. Aristotle thought of everything as tendingto its own appropriate end, in the way that we in our time might still see the natural end of an acorn as being to becomean oak. So for Aristotle one universal sort of explanation becomes explanation in terms of ends (Greek, tele); teleologicalexplanation; and, since all things have an inherent natural tendency to develop towards their ends, to refer somedevelopment to its Final Cause is to explain it in terms of an Aristotelian fundamental law.

But now, as Aquinas of course knew better than we, such Aristotelian ends are as such not supposed to benecessarily intended by anyone, neither man nor god. So Aquinas is moving beyond – indeed against – Aristotle inmaintaining that “those things which do not have knowledge do not tend to an end, except under the direction of someonewho knows and understands”. Yet to claim this here, as Aquinas does, as one of his premises is both flagrantly to beg thequestion against the [objection quoted] and to fly in the face of apparent fact. For suppose we consider organisms, as themost plausible candidates for the application of teleological ideas. Still the apparent facts are that organisms, unlikeartefacts, grow and are not made; and that, whereas the production of a computer requires “the direction of someone whoknows and understands”, the growth of an acorn or even of an oak does not. Certainly appearances may be, here aselsewhere, deceptive. But it must remain one of the most remarkable cases of the fascination of an Ostensibly Counter-evidential Intuition that Arguments to Design are so often based primarily on just those organic phenomena which at leastappear to constitute a refutation of their conclusion.

(p.207)

* * *

Objectivity of value in ethics & aesthetics

1. “Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions” What does Hume mean by this, and doyou agree?2. Has Hume provided a sense in which an object may be said to merit an aesthetic or a moralresponse?

David Hume – Treatise of Human Nature — 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 — – ‘Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion’ and ‘Of the Standard of Taste’

(both in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary — pages 3–8 and pages226–249)

— – Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals — esp. Appendix I

Philippa Foot – ‘Hume on Moral Judgement’ (in her Virtues and Vices, and in Pears)

J.L. Mackie – Hume’s Moral Theory — chapters 3–5– Ethics — chapter 1

G. Sayre-McCord [ed.] – Essays on Moral Realism — Introduction

John McDowell – ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (in Honderich [ed.] Morality andObjectivity)

— – ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’ (inSchaper et al. [edd] Pleasure, Preference, and Value)

D. McNaughton – Moral Vision — chapters 1, 3, 5, and 10

Thomas Nagel – ‘Subjective and Objective’ (in his Mortal Questions) — – The View from Nowhere

Michael Smith – ‘Realism’ (in Singer [ed.] A Companion to Ethics)

David Wiggins – ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’ (in his Needs, Values, Truth) — – ‘Moral Cognivitism, Moral Relativism, and Motivating Moral Beliefs’

(PAS 1990/91)


How should subjectivism be formulated? Consider, for example: ‘Human beings are the measureof moral and aesthetic things’, ‘statements of value are ultimately answerable only to humanresponses’, x is good iff I/we like it’, and ‘x is good iff it’s such as to arouse approbation’.

Must a Humean moral philosophy deny that moral judgements (even such judgements as:‘that action was cruel’ or ‘slavery is wrong’) can be true or false? In what sense, if any, are valuespart of the fabric of the world?

Is there a problem for Hume about what might be called the normative dimension ofaesthetic judgements? What in Hume’s account grounds the authority of the critics? Does he giveanything more than a causal, psychological explanation of why we do, as a matter of fact, defer tothe judgement of the critics?

* * *

Documents

HE ISTORY OF HILOSOPHY The History of Descartes to Humeusers.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124/history.pdf · Descartes to Hume Useful collections of papers ... Vere Chappell–Locke ... Nicholas