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Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

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Page 1: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Historical Study Of Distributed Operations

Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq

4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Page 2: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Overview of Distributed Operations

• Taking Dispersion to another level

• Present a less defined target to the enemy

• Operations in smaller units

• More autonomous small units

• Leadership and decision making at lower levels

Page 3: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Why study Fallujah?

Operation Vigilant Resolve is

one of the closest real life

examples of U.S. Marines

conducting distributed-like

operations.

Page 4: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Why study Fallujah?

• Patrols conducted by squad sized units

• Units dispersed all around Fallujah

• Squad Leaders taking more control of situations

• Varying patrol routes and times, trying to present ambiguous targets to the enemy

• Relying on fire support

Page 5: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq

4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Overview of Combat Model

Page 6: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the

Fallujah Model

Page 7: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

Page 8: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

Page 9: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

Page 10: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

Page 11: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

• Each blue agent represents a fire team with an M16,M203, and an M249

• Blue agents typically operated in squad-sized units (3 agents)

Page 12: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Designing the Combat Model

• Red agents were designed to blend in with the local population, giving them a first shot advantage.

• Move in teams of 3-4

• Carry AK47s and RPGs

Before and After Engaging

Page 13: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720)

• Marines push into city with Tanks and Helos

Page 14: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720)

• Marines attack a mosque in NW corner.

Page 15: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineThroughout (Step 0-3600)

• Insurgents fire from towers of Central Mosque as Marine snipers patrol SE perimeter

Page 16: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Two (Step 720-1440)

• Heavy fighting in NW neighborhood

• AC130 called in for support

Page 17: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)

• Gunfight at train station

Page 18: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)

• Fighting in the South

Page 19: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)

• Small skirmishes along Marine Defensive positions on the Northern Perimeter

Page 20: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Four (Step 2160-2880)

• Gun battle between 200 Marines and 800 insurgents in NW.

• Fire support

called in.

Page 21: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)

• Building to building raids with fire support

Page 22: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)

• Insurgents try to run road blocks

Page 23: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)

• More skirmishes on Northern perimeter

Page 24: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Stealth and Red Kills

Blue Stealth doesn’t effect Red Kills

Red Stealth greatly reduces Red Kills

Huge decrease in number of Red Kills at 90 Red Stealth

Page 25: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Stealth and Blue Killed

Blue Stealth significantly reduces blue kills

Red Stealth significantly increases blue kills

Page 26: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Red Force Size

Increasing size of red force leads to much greater rate of increase in Red Casualties than in Blue Casualties

Page 27: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Communications Accuracy

Communications Accuracy has little effect

Page 28: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Communications Latency

• Comms Latency has even less effect

Page 29: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Lessons Learned

• Impact of Red Stealth emphasizes the value of having first-shot advantage. It is possible that we could use DO to attain a similar advantage or to take that advantage away from our enemies.

Page 30: Historical Study Of Distributed Operations Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004

Lessons Learned

• In a very distributed force (the red force) throwing more numbers at the enemy doesn’t result in a significant advantage. This is an argument for DO at the squad level (smaller units).