Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 33 (2012) 278 282

1877-0428 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD2011doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.01.127

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Human attitudes toward error: a quest in search of scientific evidence

Bogdan Tudor Tulbure*

Babes-Bolyai University, Mihail Kogalniceanu Nr. 1, Cluj-Napoca 400084, Romania

Abstract

Unlike the usual research paper where answers to specific questions are sketched, the aim of this article is rather to device some worth answering questions. Could it be that embracing our errors (i.e., accepting the possibility to err) represents a protective factor in the effort to prevent them? A new research program intended to investigate the role of attitudes and their relationship with the frequency and amplitude of human errors is proposed. In the context where errors are not associated with serious negative consequences, the research program contains both correlation and experimental designs. In the end, the risks associated with novel approaches are briefly mentioned. 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD 2011

Keywords: human error; being wrong; (implicit) attitude; priming; research program.

1. Introduction

An error is the state or condition of being wrong in conduct or judgment (The Oxford Dictionary). Errors are deviations from external reality, accuracy or correctness. Generally, errors spring from the gap between the human mental representation of the world and the world as it really is. This gap between the objective reality and the way we perceive it can be about every aspect of reality (i.e., from verifiable facts to unverifiable memories or beliefs; Schulz, 2010). This unavoidable and profoundly human experience is spontaneous, unexpected, and undesired (Peters & Peters, 2006). Moreover, the errors we enact show that the content of our mind can be as convincing as reality itself (Schulz, 2010). Otherwise, we would not be surprised when comparing the two inconsistent perceptions.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +04 0745 753061. E-mail address: bogdan.tulbure@ubbcluj.ro; btulbure@gmail.com.

2012 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD2011Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.

Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.

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1.1. Models of error

Schulz (2010) proposed two distinct models of error displayed symmetrically on the pessimisticoptimistic continuum. According to traditional wisdom, Schultz suggests, error is considered dangerous, humiliating and/or harmful. The assumption underlying this pessimistic model of error states that humans should always strive for the truth. Any deviation from accuracy is considered abnormal, a perversion of the real order of things (Schulz, 2010). The mistakes people made (including our own) can be irritating, distasteful, deplorable and not funny at all. The pessimistic model of error tells us that errors are unpleasant, and to dismiss that fact would be insincere. However, this model reveals nothing about situations when making an error does not turn out to be harmful or disagreeable. Therefore, Schulz (2010) adequately argues that to account for the diversity of real-life experiences, we need another model. According to this optimistic model of error, realizing that we were wrong is not necessarily associated with embarrassment or irreversible negative consequences. In some circumstances, recognizing our errors can be surprisingly funny and/or illuminating, facilitating a rich learning experience. This category of errors (i.e., without serious negative consequences) should be perceived from a different perspective, and embracing them seems a better option compared to fighting against their inevitability. In support of this optimistic model, Schultz quotes William James assertion: Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf. (William James, 1896, p. 19). In this context, Schultz suggests that by considering errors as an unavoidable human experience we could better anticipate, prevent and respond appropriately to them.

2. Problem statement

Although these two models of error seem appealing and intuitive, to date no research studies tested whether they represent scientific facts or mere philosophical speculation. These models might contribute to a certain understanding of error, but in the absence of a solid scientific support to prove their reality, researchers could only hypothesize about their existence and possible implications. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to make one-step further, in an attempt to advance the scientific understanding about human error. To test whether and under what conditions embracing (i.e., accepting) our errors makes us less prone to enact them, a novel research program is proposed. Previous research efforts were directed towards clarifying the condition under which post-completion errors occur (Li, Blandford, Cairns, & Young, 2005), and whether interrupting the participants immediately after completing a task makes them more likely to produce post-completion errors (Li, Cox, Blandford, Cairns, & Abeles, 2006). To the best of our knowledge, no previous study looked at the relationship between human attitudes and the frequency or amplitude of error. Before sketching the details of the proposed research program, let us spend a few moments on another important topic: if it is impossible to be error free, what strategies are at our disposal to mitigate the occurrence of error?

2.1. Attempts to control errors

If errors are not only unavoidable, but also difficult to foresee, what strategies can we use to control their occurrence? To date, many techniques and intervention procedures have been designed to prevent, reduce or minimize the human propensity to err (Larson, 2003; Peters & Peters, 2008; Truscott, 2003; Whittingham, 2004; Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, Sarter, 2010). Two main strategies for error control (i.e., the retrospective and prospective strategies) will be briefly presented. Within the retrospective approach, the causes of error are investigated after the event occurred. By a detailed analysis

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of the situation at hand, some insights about human errors can be gained, and adequate procedures to prevent future incidents are proposed. Within the prospective approach, anticipating the occurrence of errors and eliminating them constitutes the key elements. Among the prospective approach, the quality control process called Six Sigma (Larson, 2003; Truscott, 2003) is worth mentioning. Its aim is to make product that satisfies the customer and minimizes supplier losses to the point that it is not cost effective to pursue tighter quality. By implementing this methodology, producers aim to reduce unacceptable products to no more than three defects per million parts, by constant feedback (Truscott, 2003).

Summarizing, these are just a two of the many existing strategies for error control. However, besides the deliberate effort to mitigate error, it would be interesting to know whether certain personality traits and/or implicit attitudes predispose us to, or on the contrary, protect us from making errors. More precisely, it would be worth investigating the spontaneous or automatic processes that might influence the human propensity toward error. To sketch an answer, scientists have to systematically investigate this question in different contexts and with different populations. This by now classical scientific approach called program of research is detailed elsewhere (McGuire, 1989).

3. The proposed research program

Unlike the usual research paper that struggle to sketch an answer to a specific question, the purpose of this article is rather to device some questions that are worth answering. Inspired by Schultzs (2010) work, we ventured into a novel approach of human error, proposing a new research program to investigate the possible impact of human attitude on error.

Before spelling out the details of the proposed program, it is important to briefly mention the main factors that give raise to human errors. Lack of knowledge, lack of skills, divided attention or cognitive resources, reliance on false information, emotional imbalance (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994), and possibly peoples explicit and implicit attitudes toward errors are among the most causes of human error. Besides these endogenous causes of error, the context in which the human activity is carried out might predispose or protect people from making system-induced errors (Whittingham, 2004). For example, the general work environment, the human/machine interface, and even non-physical elements like the company organizational structure, and working culture all contribute to the likelihood of human error.

In the present article we decided to focus on the endogenous or psychological causes of error not only because system-induced errors are comprehensively presented elsewhere (Peters, & Peters, 2008; Whittingham, 2004 Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johansen, Sarter, 2010), but also because, errors are the ultimate inside job (Schultz, 2010, p. 21). From among the endogenous causes of error, we selected the automatic or spontaneous ones (e.g., implicit attitudes) as they tend to reveal the way people behave in their daily life. Moreover, we would like to investigate the possible impact of attitudes on error in a context where errors are not associated with serious negative consequences. The main reason for selecting this context is that when serious damage are associated with certain behaviors, people tend to spare no effort to minimize the negative consequences. Although the role of voluntary efforts to minimize human error represents an important research topic, it might not be revealing for the spontaneity of our daily life.

Therefore, in an attempt to disentangle the factors that contribute to human error, the role of attitudes and their relationship with the frequency and amplitude of error is to be investigated. To do so, a correlation design is proposed. Within this design, peoples attitude toward error, their train anxiety level, and their actual behavior is assessed. The attitude towards error is measured by asking participants how much they accept that errors represent a normal part of life, how surprised they are when recognizing an error they made, how fearful they feel when thinking about the possibility of erring etc. After completing such a self-report, participants are ask to complete a subsequent behavioral task (e.g., a computer game) recording the number of committed errors (study one). With such a design we could test whether

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participants attitudes are related with the actual number of errors recorded during the behavioral task. It could be that, the more participants accept the possibility of erring, the fewer errors they make. In a similar correlation design (study two), we could advance our investigation by including both explicit and implicit measures of attitudes. One of the most frequently used implicit measures of attitudes is the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). The IAT indirectly measures the strengths of memory associations. In the second study we could use an IAT with the categories self, error, others, and success to assess participants memory associations between self and error as compared to the associations between self and success (i.e., the IAT effect). As a result, we could test whether participants explicit and implicit attitudes predict the amount of errors recorded during the behavioral task.

Moreover, we could investigate whether priming peoples attitudes (e.g., for error or for success) affects their error rate in a subsequent behavioral task. This would be interesting because it might reveal the relationship between cognition (activated at the explicit or implicit level) and participants behavioral performance. As a priming procedure, either subliminal stimuli (study three), or the scrambled sentences task (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Srull &Wyer, 1979) (study four) is used. By presenting stimuli at the subliminal level, the primed concept is activated, although participants are unaware of the presence of the stimulus. For one experimental condition, the concept of error will be subliminally activated, while for the other experimental condition the concept of success will be subliminally activated. Then the behavioral performance of the two conditions will be compared. With such a design we could investigate whether activating the concept of success represent a protective factor for erring while activating the concept of error represents a risk factor.

The same hypothesis could be tested using an alternative priming procedure: the scrambled sentence task (study four). Participants are presented with strings of scrambled words and asked to create a grammatically correct sentence using a subset of the words in each string (Bargh Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Srull &Wyer, 1979). The majority of the word strings will either contain words related to the concept of error (for one experimental condition) or to the concept of success (for the other experimental condition). Previous studies demonstrated that, although participants are aware of the individual words, they do not know how this task affects their behavior (Chartrand, & Bargh, 1996, Bargh & Chartland, 1999; Tulbure, 2004). After the priming procedure, participants will be asked to complete a behavioral task (e.g., a computer game) and the number of errors will be recorded. It could be that, activating the concept of success before an unrelated behavioral task would motivate participants to allocate more resources to the task, and be more confident about their own abilities.

If our hypotheses are confirmed by the data, we wondered what are the possible underlying mechanisms? For instance, if we find that participants who accept the possibility of erring make fewer errors during a behavioral task, how can we explain their results? One possible explanation is that once people accept the possibility to err, they became less anxious, and consequently are able to better process the task at hand. Another explanation is related to the fact that accepting the possibility of erring makes people less surprised when confronted with their own errors, and consequently more willing to work hard at correcting them. In the same realm, priming the concept of success could activate participants schemas related to previous successes, increasing their self-confidence. However, to ensure that we have the correct explanation, we should imagine all or at least some possible motives for which our explanation could be wrong (Schultz, 2010). That is why elaborating alternative explanations represents such a crucial step for every scientist. It could be that not accepting but fearing errors actually represents a protective, motivational factor in error reduction. Alternatively, accepting the possibility to err could actually lead participant to expect them at some point during the task, and/or to refrain any corrective or preventive efforts. Nevertheless, until scientific data are at our disposal, few conclusions regarding the relationship between human attitudes and the frequency or amplitude of error could be reliably drawn.

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4. Final thoughts

The proposed research program investigates whether thinking of success and accepting the possibility to err could represent protective factors in our effort to prevent human errors, when no serious negative consequences are involved. If the implementation of such a program will bear fruits, scientists will be able to skilfully craft a theory of error out of sound empirical arguments. However, considering the risks associated with novel approaches, the present research program might be proven terrible off the mark, leaving behind a minimal set of solid facts (possibly, about how things are not). Nevertheless, for the overall advancement of social sciences, this might be crucial when a creative future scientist is directed toward a more promising alley.

Acknowledgements

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU 89/1.5/S/60189 entitled Postdoctoral Programs for Sustainable Development in a Knowledge Based Society.

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