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A Presentation By LT COL LEONIDAS L HIDALGO (CAV) PA (With the ARMY EOD BN) To The Meeting of Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the CCW, Amended Protocol II to the Convention (19 - 20 April 2010)

IED Trends in the Philippines

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Philippine Army guide to current insurgents' type of IED employed

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  • A Presentation By

    LT COL LEONIDAS L HIDALGO (CAV) PA (With the ARMY EOD BN)

    To The Meeting of

    Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the CCW, Amended Protocol II to the Convention

    (19 - 20 April 2010)

  • I. Brief IED History

    II. CY 09, IED Incidents

    III. The IEDs

    IV. Analysis

    V. Lessons Learned

    VI. Actions Taken

    I. Brief IED History

    II. CY 09, IED Incidents

    III. The IEDs

    IV. Analysis

    V. Lessons Learned

    VI. Actions Taken

  • The significant use of IEDs started at the height of AFPs campaign against the MILF in CY 2000

    Frequent targets then were Natl Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line Towers in Mindanao

    Recorded IED Incidents

    60 incidents in 2000

    27 in 2001

    48 in CY 02 and 41 in CY 03

    The increase from 2001 to 2002 due to alliance of MILFshardliners with the terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)

    The significant use of IEDs started at the height of AFPs campaign against the MILF in CY 2000

    Frequent targets then were Natl Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line Towers in Mindanao

    Recorded IED Incidents

    60 incidents in 2000

    27 in 2001

    48 in CY 02 and 41 in CY 03

    The increase from 2001 to 2002 due to alliance of MILFshardliners with the terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)

  • IED incidents reduced to 24 in CY 2004 and then 15 in CY 2005

    Due to significant developments in the government-initiated peace talks

    CY 06 to CY 08

    Gradual but steady rise of IED incidents until the 1st semester of CY 08 with public places and business centers as targets

    Sharp rise of IED incidents after the failed signing of the MOA-AD in Aug 08.

    National Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power-line Towers were again one of the primary targets

    IED incidents reduced to 24 in CY 2004 and then 15 in CY 2005

    Due to significant developments in the government-initiated peace talks

    CY 06 to CY 08

    Gradual but steady rise of IED incidents until the 1st semester of CY 08 with public places and business centers as targets

    Sharp rise of IED incidents after the failed signing of the MOA-AD in Aug 08.

    National Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power-line Towers were again one of the primary targets

  • Calendar Year 2009

    Maintained rise of IED incidents with urban centers, transport facilities as targets to include NGCP Power-line Towers

    Al Khobar Group

    Claimed responsibility on the IED attacks in Southern and Central Mindanao

    Not to implicate the MILF with the terror attacks

    Lawless MILF Groups (LMG) also led to the rise of IED incidents in CY 09 which generally targets government troops.

    Calendar Year 2009

    Maintained rise of IED incidents with urban centers, transport facilities as targets to include NGCP Power-line Towers

    Al Khobar Group

    Claimed responsibility on the IED attacks in Southern and Central Mindanao

    Not to implicate the MILF with the terror attacks

    Lawless MILF Groups (LMG) also led to the rise of IED incidents in CY 09 which generally targets government troops.

  • 21

    27

    18

    1211 10

    4 31

    4 3 335

    0 0

    36

    46

    25

    18

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

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    40

    45

    50

    1stQuarter 2ndQuarter 3rdQuarter 4thQuarter

    Terrorism

    Extortion

    Political

    Feud

    Total

  • 19

    8

    0 1

    7

    1 0

    29

    12

    2 1 2 0 0

    86

    1

    7

    2 0 1

    69

    0 0 0 0 35

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    35

    1stQtr

    2ndQtr

    3rdQtr

    4thQtr

  • 2028

    16 9

    73

    16 18 9 9

    5236

    46

    25 18

    125

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    140

    1stQtr 2ndQtr 3rdQtr 4thQtr Total

    CompletedAttack

    RenderedSafe

    Total

  • 2 9 8 0196 11 20 0

    3720

    77110

    11

    218

    30

    99

    142

    11

    282

    2 2 4 80

    50

    100

    150

    200

    250

    300

    1stQtr 2ndQtr 3rdQtr 4thQtr Toital

    KIA (Mil/PNP)

    Killed (Civ)

    WIA (Mil/PNP)

    Wounded

  • Main charge MOL 50m commercial Detonating CordBooster MOL 3m coiled Commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine can Detonator Two (2) each Improvised Electric BCPower-source 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer cylindrical metal container w/ cone linerMeans of Initiation Command activated via firing wire

    Recovered in the area of Southern Mindanao

  • Main charge 23 cylinders (125 g) water gel commercial explosivesBooster MOL 3mtrs coiled commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine can.Detonator Two (2) each Improvised Electric BCPower-source - 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer Freon (Refrigerant) tankMeans of Initiation Command activated via firing wire

    Recovered in the area of Southern Mindanao

  • Main charge MOL 10Kg Aluminized Ammonium NitrateBooster MOL 3m coiled commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine canDetonator 2 ea improvised Electric BCPower-source 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer cylindrical metal container w/ cone linerMeans of Initiation Command activated via firing wireRecovered in the area of

    Northern Mindanao

  • Recovered in the area of Northern Mindanao

    Main charge kg TNT & Picric Acid Booster MOL .25m commercial Detonating Cord Detonator 1 each Improvised Electric BCPower-source 6/9V wet cell battery Container metal container fashioned to that of M18A1 APers claymore mineEnhanced Fragmentation cut corrugated steel barsMeans of Initiation Command activated via firing wire

  • Main charge One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster Tetryl (standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round)Detonator One (1) Improvised Elect BCPower-source 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container NoneMeans of Initiation Victim activated via trip wire w/ improvised slide switch

    Recovered along the main road towards Hqs 603rd Bde, Camp Abu Bakr, Barira, Maguindanao

  • Main charge One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container NoneMeans of Initiation Victim activated via trip wire w/ clothes pin

    Recovered along a foot trail in the hinterlands of Camp Abu Bakr, Barira, Maguindanao

  • An anti-lift and anti-open switch

    Main charge One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container Lunch Box (Plastic)Means of Initiation Two way (Timer rundown & Victim activated

  • Main charge Two (2) rds, Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source 2 each 9V BatteriesContainer Carton BoxMeans of Initiation Command activated via Remote Control Toy

  • IED Nr 01IED Nr 01Command detonated means of initiation via Hand Held RadioNote 1: Glass jar containing the same explosive as IED #2s main charge was used as a booster.

    Command detonated means of initiation via Hand Held RadioNote 1: Glass jar containing the same explosive as IED #2s main charge was used as a booster.

    A 20ltr plastic containerservedastheIEDcontainer

    AsackservedasdisguisecontainerfortheIED

    PossiblyTNTpowdermixedwithpicricacidandANFOasthemaincharge

    KenwoodModel:TH234Freq:173.11

    booster

    two9vbatteries

    plastic

  • cellphone

    9VbatteryCommand detonated means of initiation via Nokia 3310 cell phone. Anti-personnel with 10-12 lb main charge-Possibly TNT powder

    IED Nr 02

    4litercontainerMOL12lbsTNTpowderasMainChargewithcutrebarandballbearingsasenhancedfragmentation.

  • (3) IEDs w/ advanced circuitry(4) 4-liter plastic containers filled w/TNT(5) Improvised pressure switches(1) 200 gram can filled w/ Tetryl explosive

    (1) Plastic bottle w/schematic drawings(1) 60mm HE mortar

  • Anti-lift & Anti-open device/switches

    Use of 555 IC (Time Delay & Possible RCIED)

  • It is suspected that this device works similar to the (3) IEDs recovered from the ASG Camp at Tubora hill due to the same circuit board and components.Due to disruption of the device, exact placement of all the components could not be determined but initial analysis suggests that the device would be initiated by anti-open, anti-lift, or timewhichever event took place first.

    It is suspected that this device works similar to the (3) IEDs recovered from the ASG Camp at Tubora hill due to the same circuit board and components.Due to disruption of the device, exact placement of all the components could not be determined but initial analysis suggests that the device would be initiated by anti-open, anti-lift, or timewhichever event took place first.

  • One (1) 9Volt Battery (Power Source) 9V

    The circuit wires

    24

    Fuel Tank filled with HE (Picric Acid, TNT & Comp B)

    Improvised Elec Blasting Cap

    Quartz Table Clock w/ One (1) AA Btry

    Booster (Booster Charge for Ctg, 81mm, HE

  • VBIED with a Timer Rundown Means of Initiation

    It has various Artillery Ammunition (UXO) as Main Charge.

  • VBIED with a Timer Rundown Means of Initiation It has various Artillery Ammunition (UXO) as Main

    Charge.

  • The motorcycles Air Cleaner was used to contain the IED components.

  • Command detonated means of initiation via Cell Phone. One of the Two (2) IEDs that detonated on same day that wounded One (1) Bomb Tech from 63rd EOD Tm.

    Command detonated means of initiation via Cell Phone. One of the Two (2) IEDs that detonated on same day that wounded One (1) Bomb Tech from 63rd EOD Tm.

  • Command detonated means of initiation w/ an electronic timer arming switch (UA 741 IC).

  • Command detonated via Two-Way Radio

  • Recovered from Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members in Midsayap, North Cotabato

  • Command-detonated means of initiation via a remote control activated Doorbell as switch.

  • A papaya fruit inside a plastic bag was used as a container to hide the IED.

  • A wooden box (containing 2 RPG warheads) with a pressure type means of initiation when stepped upon

  • An IED with a Jetmatic water pump body as casing and has a command means of initiation via 3310 CP

  • An RPG 2 Launcher rigged as an IED with command means of initiation to fire the RPG round via a 3310 CP

  • New Peoples Army (NPA) IEDs are composed of two (2) types.

    Anti Tank/Material, shaped charge to harness the optimum blast effect.

    Anti personnel, patterned the design of M18A1 AP claymore mine to focus the direction of the blast to a desired target.

    Both type of IED are emplaced as a road side IED to ambush passing government troops, mounted or infantry.

    Command means of initiation via a firing wire.

    New Peoples Army (NPA) IEDs are composed of two (2) types.

    Anti Tank/Material, shaped charge to harness the optimum blast effect.

    Anti personnel, patterned the design of M18A1 AP claymore mine to focus the direction of the blast to a desired target.

    Both type of IED are emplaced as a road side IED to ambush passing government troops, mounted or infantry.

    Command means of initiation via a firing wire.

  • IEDs in Central and Western Mindanao evolved from simple to a more complex means of initiation.

    Victim activated (Electro-Mechanical)

    Timer Run down using alarm clocks

    Initiation through Cell Phones, HH Radios, Radio Controlled devices and Remote Doorbell Chimes

    Others has electronic timer arming system (555 & UA 741 IC) with remote means of initiation

    IEDs in Central and Western Mindanao evolved from simple to a more complex means of initiation.

    Victim activated (Electro-Mechanical)

    Timer Run down using alarm clocks

    Initiation through Cell Phones, HH Radios, Radio Controlled devices and Remote Doorbell Chimes

    Others has electronic timer arming system (555 & UA 741 IC) with remote means of initiation

  • Main charge of choice is generally unexploded explosive ordnance.

    Different disguise containers are used to blend the device with the environment.

    IED used in targeting Natl Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line towers has multiple main charges connected in parallel to the power source.

    Main charge of choice is generally unexploded explosive ordnance.

    Different disguise containers are used to blend the device with the environment.

    IED used in targeting Natl Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line towers has multiple main charges connected in parallel to the power source.

  • ElectCircuitsrecoveredfromMohammadBaehaqi

    Elect Circuits from TRANSCO Tower Nr 100, Bagontapay, Mlang, Ncot, 25 Jun 08 and TRANSCO Compound, New Carmen, Tacurong

    City, Sultan Kudarat, 05 June 08

    Mohammad Baehaqi, aka Salman/Latif/ Tatoh

    Indonesian JI operative captured on 17 Feb 08 in Davao Oriental Provinceelectronic circuits used in most IED attacks are the same with the recovered electronic circuits

    Mohammad Baehaqi, aka Salman/Latif/ Tatoh

    Indonesian JI operative captured on 17 Feb 08 in Davao Oriental Provinceelectronic circuits used in most IED attacks are the same with the recovered electronic circuits

  • Post Mortem Recovery fm victims

    Reference Components

    Recovered fm Jimbaran, NyomanCafe suicide bombings in Bali,

    Indonesia on 01 Oct 05

    Bandung Device, 2003, Item retained by Indonesian Authorities

    Electronic Switch, recovered from Mohammad Baehaqi

  • The similarity of IED signatures indicate that some threat groups have undergone the same training.

    The JI have conducted trainings on IED construction attended by personalities from different threat groups in order to sow greater terror

    Electronic devices used as component of IEDs are available in any electronic shops.

    Primary source of IED main charges are dud fired (Unexploded Explosive Ordnance) artillery rounds.

    The similarity of IED signatures indicate that some threat groups have undergone the same training.

    The JI have conducted trainings on IED construction attended by personalities from different threat groups in order to sow greater terror

    Electronic devices used as component of IEDs are available in any electronic shops.

    Primary source of IED main charges are dud fired (Unexploded Explosive Ordnance) artillery rounds.

  • Improper disposal of misfired artillery ammunition leads to the recovery of same by the enemy recycling it as an IED main charge.

    The use of IED by the terrorists in a firefight is a very effective counter mobility measure.

    Operating troops fell victims to IED due to limited knowledge regarding same.

    EOD Technicians have limited Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in countering the IED threat.

    EOD units are still poorly equipped to combat IEDs.

    Improper disposal of misfired artillery ammunition leads to the recovery of same by the enemy recycling it as an IED main charge.

    The use of IED by the terrorists in a firefight is a very effective counter mobility measure.

    Operating troops fell victims to IED due to limited knowledge regarding same.

    EOD Technicians have limited Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in countering the IED threat.

    EOD units are still poorly equipped to combat IEDs.

  • Rationalized the deployment of EOD personnel in order to provide continuous EOD support to Army units in priority areas.

    Conduct of in-service counter-IED operations training taking into consideration the lessons learned from past IED incidents.

    Conduct of Explosive related trainings such as Mine Countermine and IED Awareness Training in coordination with DTUs and other units in order to educate AFP personnel.

    Rationalized the deployment of EOD personnel in order to provide continuous EOD support to Army units in priority areas.

    Conduct of in-service counter-IED operations training taking into consideration the lessons learned from past IED incidents.

    Conduct of Explosive related trainings such as Mine Countermine and IED Awareness Training in coordination with DTUs and other units in order to educate AFP personnel.

  • Conduct of public information campaign and seminars on IED Awareness and Bomb Threat Management in coordination with LGUstargeting various sectors of society to protect the populace from IED hazards.

    Conduct of Ammunition Surveillance and Inspection of issued ammunition to Army Field Units in order to ensure serviceability of ammunition when used.

    Field improvisation of EOD tools & equipment

    Conduct of public information campaign and seminars on IED Awareness and Bomb Threat Management in coordination with LGUstargeting various sectors of society to protect the populace from IED hazards.

    Conduct of Ammunition Surveillance and Inspection of issued ammunition to Army Field Units in order to ensure serviceability of ammunition when used.

    Field improvisation of EOD tools & equipment

  • Conduct of Ammunition Storage and Handling seminars/trainings in coordination with DTUsand Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs) to educate AFP personnel in the maintenance of their issued ammunition.

    Active participation in the formulation and advocacy of the Inter-Agency Protocol on Explosives-related Incident Investigations under the auspices of NCTU, ATC.

    Requisition of EOD essential equipment to higher headquarters to upgrade the capability of EOD units.

    Conduct of Ammunition Storage and Handling seminars/trainings in coordination with DTUsand Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs) to educate AFP personnel in the maintenance of their issued ammunition.

    Active participation in the formulation and advocacy of the Inter-Agency Protocol on Explosives-related Incident Investigations under the auspices of NCTU, ATC.

    Requisition of EOD essential equipment to higher headquarters to upgrade the capability of EOD units.