ImpaxSIA 2011 Final Peer Review Browse Basin SIA-3

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Peer Review SIA Browse LNG Precinct ImpaxSIA Consulting 1

Independent expert peer review of the Social Impact Assessment component of the Browse LNG Precinct Strategic Assessment

Undertaken for the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities.

Dr Annie Holden, ImpaxSIA Consulting

March 2011

Summary Findings In relation to the SIA, the interpretation of the results and the assessment itself are inadequate. In

particular, in view of the size of the construction workforce (up to 6,000 workers for two years),

consideration of likely impacts and impact management associated with construction should be

more clearly separated out from likely impacts and impact management during the operational

phase. I am also of the view that some negative social impacts that could potentially occur at the

margins of the affected communities, associated with the presence of the construction workforce,

are either not identified at all or are seriously under-estimated.

In relation to the Strategic Social Impact Management Plan, this document needs to be rewritten. It

needs to identify overarching principles and objectives, as per a Strategic document, and it needs to

be better informed in terms of how best to manage and mitigate impacts, including through possible

project design considerations. It is evident that more relevant expertise needs to be brought to the

task. Similarly, the monitoring regime needs to be more rigorously developed and the ASIA

governance recommendations adopted. While I appreciate that more work will be done on this

once a proponent/project commences, this does not obviate the need to at this stage identify

appropriate indicators and governance and to set a standard through providing illustrative

strategies. The ASIA has more competently addressed this important matter.

In relation to the ASIA the report is thorough and comprehensive and, as discussed in more detail in

this Review Report, an excellent document in all respects. However, the summary of the ASIA in the

KLC Overview document is inadequate and does not include all relevant highlights. It should be

more carefully rewritten. Also, the SSIMP does not correctly and adequately incorporate the

strategic findings and recommendations of the ASIA.

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Acronyms The ASIA Aboriginal Social Impact Assessment (Volume 3 Aboriginal Social Impact

Assessment Report)

EPBC Act Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999

FIFO Fly in fly out

IFPIC Indigenous Free and Prior Informed Consent

KLC Kimberley Land Council

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

NTHs Native Title Holders

SAR Strategic Assessment Report (The entire set of documents and all volumes).

The SIA Social Impact Assessment (All components of Part 5 Social Assessment)

SIMP Social Impact Management Plan

The SSIMP Strategic Social Impact Management Plan (Volume 3, Part 5)

STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections

TOR Terms of Reference

UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Background In February 2008 an agreement between the Australian and the Western Australian Governments

was signed under the Strategic Assessment provisions of the Environment Protection and

Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act) relating to the selection and management of a site

for a common-user liquefied natural gas (LNG) precinct to service the Browse Basin gas reserves off

the Kimberley coast, Western Australia. Following a comprehensive site selection process, James

Price Point, located some sixty kilometres north of Broome, was selected as the most suitable site to

undergo a full assessment. This Peer Review does not include the site selection methodology or

process.

Under the EPBC Act, the strategic assessment agreement provides direction for the development of

a Strategic Assessment Report (“the SAR”) and Plan. The Minister is required to take into

consideration any relevant social and economic impacts resulting from the development.

In concert with the public review process, the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water,

Population and Communities engaged Dr Annie Holden of ImpaxSIA Consulting to undertake an

independent expert peer review of the Social Impact Assessment components of the Draft Browse

Basin LNG Precinct Strategic Assessment. In undertaking the Review Dr Holden was required to

review the Draft Strategic Assessment Report as well as peruse relevant associated background

reports.

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Dr Annie Holden is an Adjunct Associate Professor at Southern Cross University and has undertaken

over thirty social impact assessments over the past nearly twenty years across Australia. She has

taught in universities and published in social impact assessment methods and purpose. Annie

Holden manages the consulting firm ImpaxSIA Consulting which is Australia’s only dedicated social

impact assessment consultancy firm. Annie has drawn on her experiences of similar development

projects in this review. Over her extended career Annie has interviewed literally thousands of

stakeholders, supervisors, community members, service providers, government officers, company

representatives and others who have experience and concerns and aspirations in relation to

development projects. It is important to note that the potential negative social impacts on sectors

of host communities (as discussed below) associated with the presence of large construction crews

are not well researched or documented. Although there is a good deal of evidence to suggest there

are significant social impact issues requiring prudent and proactive management, the evidence at

this stage is principally anecdotal.

The potential social impacts associated with the Project were assessed separately for Indigenous

and non-Indigenous communities-of-interest. The West Australian Government project managed

and authored the non-Indigenous social impact assessment (“the SIA”), while the Indigenous

impacts were assessed and reported on by the Kimberley Land Council (“the ASIA”). Both Reports

are the subject of this review.

Best Practice SIA Methodology Social Impact Assessment is a rapidly evolving discipline and even in the last decade has changed

significantly, and continues to change, with regard to what is commonly regarded as best practice.

Australia, however, is at the leading edge of world best practice social impact assessment. The

changes in SIA methods and practice are largely a reflection of changes to the role of SIA. Whereas

in many quarters it was traditionally regarded as a desk top activity which was largely the purvey of

social planners, SIA has increasingly taken on a wider role as a tool for democracy – a way to bring

forward voices from the margins into decision-making processes. For this reason social impact

assessment increasingly relies less on demographic projections and estimates of demands on

services and more on community consultation as its basic methodology and in particular in ensuring

that project benefits are available to all parties, or that at least those likely to be disadvantaged by

the project are to be compensated. So social impact assessment is principally now about social

justice.

The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) has spent many years compiling best

practice principals and methods and the author has been involved in the development of these.

These are constantly changing and improving. These principles are attached at Appendix One and

are the reference point against which the SIA and ASIA documents are reviewed here.

It is noted that Dr Nick Taylor of Taylor Baines and Associates, who is a highly regarded social impact

assessment specialist, provided peer review to earlier iterations of the SIA. Dr Taylor’s December

2010 peer review report made particular reference to demographic profiling issues. His report also

notes correctly that “there is no single document that defines *best+ practice” (pp2).

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Separate Indigenous and mainstream SIA processes On another point, Dr Taylor’s peer review does raise concern that there could be an “unnecessary

overlap between the two assessments [the SIA and the ASIA] or, more importantly, some aspects

falling between the cracks” (7.3) and he suggests that “For future strategic assessments a shared

scoping of issues would help in defining more clearly the role of an ASIA versus a full SIA and

enhance integration of the two.” (7.3). Dr Taylor also states, however, that he did not have the

opportunity to view the ASIA as it was not available at the time he wrote his report.

While it might be possible that in future an ASIA team and an SIA team could more closely and

regularly brief one another on relevant issues, findings and methods as they progress, mainstream

SIAs and Indigenous SIAs in the Australian context are fundamentally different processes, have

different purposes (the latter ideally being the basis for negotiation of agreements), are undertaken

under different governance arrangements and for different audiences and usually end up dealing

with qualitatively different issues. If each is undertaken according to best practice there will be

nothing falling between the cracks, and overlap is not a concern since Indigenous and non-

Indigenous communities rarely respond and are rarely impacted in exactly the same way by the

same event. Furthermore, aligning the consideration and management/mitigation of impacts on

Indigenous communities with that of impacts on non-Indigenous communities regularly sees

Indigenous stakeholders being marginalized. Therefore, it is my view that the approach used in this

instance, where the SIA and ASIA were separate parallel projects, would continue to be the ideal,

and Dr Taylor’s proposal to make the KLC only one of a number of stakeholders in a proposed

Regional SIA Reference Group (7.6) would be very detrimental to the interests of Indigenous

stakeholders in the region.

Having said this, it is the case that the SIA does not adequately address issues relevant to Indigenous

members of the Broome community, in their capacity as community members. Indigenous youth,

and women and girls, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, in particular, appear to have no voice in

the SIA and this is not explained by the KLC having responsibility for the ASIA. This is discussed

further below.

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Summary Findings as per the TORS

TOR Review Finding

Ensure that each component of the SIA and ASIA has been developed in accordance with best practice standards. This will include an analysis of consistency and logical flow between SIA objectives, methods, results, conclusions and any summary documents.

The SIA is weak and does not comply with the International Principles for SIA as attached at Appendix 1. The SIA is consistent and there is a logical flow, however, major flaws relate to lack of innovation, failure to fully explore social vulnerabilities, failure to provide a voice to vulnerable community members, under-estimation of the potential negative social impacts of the construction workforce, bias towards service provision and the SSIMP is not robust. The ASIA is an excellent document and sets a new standard for Indigenous social impact assessment in Australia.

Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the Agreement and Terms of Reference.

The criteria are very broad and have been addressed in full by both the SIA and the ASIA.

Explore whether the findings of the SIA and ASIA have been adequately considered in the SAR

The findings appear to have been adequately considered in the SAR, with some minor omissions as noted in the Review. The key issue is, however, that the SAR can only be as good as the SIA, and the SIA is weak and flawed.

Provide recommendations for improvement if required.

Improvements are required and recommendations for these provided at the end of this Review.

Terms of Reference The Peer Review is to consider the following:

1. Ensure that each component of the SIA and ASIA have been developed in accordance with

best practice standards. This will include an analysis of consistency and logical flow between

SIA objectives, methods, results, conclusions and any summary documents;

2. Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the Agreement and

Terms of Reference;

3. Explore whether the findings of the SIA and ASIA have been adequately considered in the

SAR; and

4. Provide recommendations for improvement if required.

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It should be noted that the reviewer was not required to audit the findings of the social impact

assessments for non-Indigenous or Indigenous communities but to conduct a desktop review only.

Therefore the reviewed documents are assumed to accurately represent the views of those they

purport to have consulted and that the data presented in the documents are complete and

accurate.

The following table gives the structure of the reports. Those highlighted in blue are the documents

reviewed.

Part 1 Executive Summary

Part 2

Strategic Assessment Process, including Site Selection, Facilities Description and Consultation Process

Part 3 Environmental Assessment - Marine Impacts

Part 4 Environmental Assessment - Terrestrial Impacts

Part 5 Social Assessment

Section 1 Introduction

Section 2 Strategic Social Impact Assessment

Volume 1 Scope and Profile

Volume 2 Assessment of Impacts and Specialist Studies

Tourism Impact Assessment

Fishing, Pearling and Aquaculture Impact Study

Infrastructure Assessment

Volume 3 Strategic Social Management Plans

Section 3 Strategic Indigenous Social Impact Assessment

Volume 1 Overview and consolidated recommendations

Volume 2 Report on Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation

Volume 3 Aboriginal Social Impact Assessment Report

Volume 4 Heritage Impact Assessment Report

Volume 5 Aboriginal Archaeological Site Avoidance Survey

Volume 6 Ethno biology Studies Report

Section 4 Direct Social Surrounds and Socio-economic factors

Section 5 Strategic Social Impact Management Plan

Part 6

Commonwealth Matters including Precinct Plan and Matters of National Environmental and Social Significance

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Methodologies

The methodology employed for the SIA, as outlined in Part 2, Sections 8 and 9, is an acceptable

social impact assessment methodology. That is, the methodology required that the issues be

scoped, stakeholders mapped, an extensive consultation campaign undertaken, technical studies in

key areas commissioned, scenario-building undertaken, risks associated with identified potential

impacts rated, additional opportunities for community feedback and input created, and so forth.

However, an assessment is only as good as the “assessor” and the assessor in this instance appears

to have a clear bias towards planning of government services and industry support. Some parts of

the SIA and SAR are very strong, for example, the industry studies and the infrastructure studies,

but I am of the view that the SIA has failed to reach the heart of issues of vulnerability and

marginalization.

The ASIA methodology is excellent and has been comprehensively undertaken. Contrasting the

characteristics, principles, methods and parameters of the ASIA against the IAIA best practice

standards and methods, the ASIA is a good model of a quality example of what was intended by

these guidelines.

Mapping of stakeholders

A perusal of the stakeholder list suggests that while generally stakeholders were adequately

mapped, Indigenous persons who are not Native Title holders do not appear to have been

recognised as a distinct stakeholder group resident in Broome having specific vulnerabilities. While

the ASIA Report does make reference to this group (Chap 2, Page 49), this community sector

needed to be acknowledged and incorporated into the SIA assessment. Social Impact Assessment

needs to take into account power relations and gender relations in communities. While Indigenous

people are empowered through the ASIA, (leaving aside empowerment issues dealt with specifically

in the ASIA), the notion of empowerment and disempowerment itself is not adequately directly

tackled in the SIA.

Similarly, I do not feel that women and girls have been offered a real voice in this SIA Report, other

than through advocacy by service providers and, even here, concerns raised by health professionals

do not appear to have been taken seriously enough. This is discussed in more detail below. There is

an apparent lack of community engagement strategies targeting members of this group, although

there appeared to be numerous other opportunities and avenues for all other stakeholders to have

input.

Use of existing evidence base

It is not evident that enough research was undertaken on the experience of other communities

associated with similar projects, or that these learnings were shared with the relevant stakeholders

so that they might reflect on whether their community was likely to have similar issues. There is

very little documented research on the social impacts of mining on communities that addresses the

risks and such research therefore needed to be primary research (for example, trips to Wadeye and

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Gove to speak with women and community leaders in those communities on their experiences, an

attempt to access the mid-term review of the social impacts of the Blacktip LNG plant

construction). There is no mention of having undertaken any primary research, other than the

report authored by Pollard (discussed again below).

Furthermore, the evidence that was identified by the SIA team does not appear to have been

shared with those likely to be affected. For example, were the findings of Pollard’s report shared

and debated with relevant stakeholders? Given that the affected communities have limited

experience of a project of this type and of this magnitude, it would be important for them to have

information from other communities about perceived and real impacts associated with this kind of

development.

The issue of an evidence-base is a vexed one because there is surprisingly little research that I am

aware of that can provide hard evidence on the impact of construction forces in particular on host

communities. Throughout the years I have interviewed literally hundreds of police, service

providers, hospitals and health services, women’s groups, women’s rape crisis centres and women

and girls and spoken at length to PhD researchers and other consultants working in remote and

rural communities and around mining projects. Based on this anecdotal evidence I am confident

that the impacts of the presence of large construction workforces on host communities are

seriously under-estimated. The reasons for the lack of research and almost invisibility of these

impacts are:

Sexual assault often happens in private spaces or in dark public places without witnesses.

Often there are drugs or alcohol involved or illegal activities associated with assault.

Shame and fear and an expectation that there will not be any support means that women

do not formally report their experiences.

Jealousy of partners, anger of families, and blame mean women continue to keep these

things quiet.

Inability to deal with the issues, even if they were acknowledged, means that proponents

and government service providers choose to downplay or ignore them.

The relative marginalisation of women and girl’s voices.

An assumption that it is not possible to conduct this kind of research.

A belief that it is only a minor issue and therefore not worthy of attracting a research

investment.

The recent revelations of the sexual assaults and activities that some football teams appear to

embark on is shining some light on some of the unseen behaviours of young men. Some elements

of large male construction forces, fuelled by alcohol, long working hours and the heat, are

reportedly a good match for these footballers. The Browse precinct development provides an

opportunity to undertake some quality research on the impacts of construction workforces on host

communities.

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Social Risks not adequately addressed in the SIA and SSIMP

The SSIM Plan groups impacts as follows:

1. Economic Impacts 2. Demand for Land and Housing 3. Infrastructure, Social Services and Health 4. Education, Training and Employment 5. Sport, Tourism and Recreation 6. Police, Justice, Social Needs and Services 7. Community Identity and Sense of Place 8. Social Mix and Values Conflict (Part 5 Social Assessment Vol 2: Strategic Social Impact

Management Plan, Page 4)

In this grouping, concerns raised by professionals, and experience of these types of impacts of a

predominately male itinerant workforce consisting of large numbers of single persons, are buried

amongst other concerns under the heading of Police, Justice, Social Needs and Services, that are

related, such as social mix and values conflict, but are not the same. The authors identify three

“significant issues” – high natural population growth, lack of current service capacity and social and

land management issues of importance to Traditional Owners.

There is a failure here to note the following significant issues:

1. Indigenous persons who are not members of the Traditional Owner group and are resident

in non-Indigenous communities constitute a highly vulnerable population group and need to

be more clearly identified as a distinct community-of-interest requiring specific

management strategies to ensure they benefit from the Project and are not

disproportionately marginalised or further disadvantaged.

2. The impacts of construction need to be dealt with as a separate significant issue to all other

potential impacts. (As discussed above).

3. The potential for some sectors of the existing community to pay a disproportionately high

cost for the development while others not currently resident (and who, indeed, may never

reside in the locality) benefit.

With reference to the third point, Part 5 Social Assessment Volume 1, Scope and Profile (page 70),

notes that individuals in the vicinity of the Project already earn on average only 90% of average

earnings of other West Australians. On the other hand, it is known that construction jobs and

operational jobs associated with projects such as this pay well. Fundamentally, poverty is a relative

measure. As those around us become more wealthy, we feel more poor, even when our own

absolute income and buying power remains the same. The prospect of current residents of Broome

and other impacted communities perceiving themselves as relatively poorer than workers

associated with the projects (even leaving aside increased land and housing costs, or higher rents)

is a potential negative impact. A sense of marginalization and alienation, frustration and

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resentment can build followed by a sense of grief and loss. The SSIMP addresses this issue through

highlighting the need to maximise local procurement and to maximise training and employment

opportunities for local residents. The SSIMP fails to recognise the issue as significant and to

describe more fully in the Report the likely impact of failing to provide targeted support to

marginalized sectors of the local population to participate in the benefits.

Furthermore, the SIA and SSIMP are not underpinned by the Precautionary Principal which requires

that potential social risks where evidence is not available to confirm, should be treated as real risks

and managed as such, until such time as evidence is available to confirm or refute the identified

risk. In the absence of enough research on negative social impacts relating to the construction

workforce as discussed in this review, concerns based on anecdotal evidence should be treated as

real concerns until evidence is provided to refute these concerns.

Social impacts of FIFO workers

The social impacts on the families of FIFO workers living outside the region are mentioned but not

addressed.

Separate out impacts of construction from impacts once operational

While generally speaking the SIA report as it stands is well written and well structured, it would be

preferable for the impacts during the construction phase to be dealt with separately to the

anticipated impacts once the project is operational. This is a major flaw in the report.

While the assessment acknowledges that there are differences between the two project phases,

the implications of this are not drawn out adequately. The estimates are that the construction

workforce is likely to be around 6,000 while the operational workforce is likely to be 500 to 750

(page 2-15 SAR Part 5). Mitigating the potential negative impacts, preparing for and strategizing

around taking up opportunities and managing the ongoing impacts will require different resources,

different governance arrangements, the nature and magnitude of the impacts will be different and

different sectors of the population will be impacted in various ways during the construction phase

as compared with the operational phase.

These differences are not just nuances but significant. In this instance, the SSIMP could also better

identify management and mitigation strategies and principles for the construction phase as a

separate exercise for the operational phase. In particular the monitoring regime for the

construction phase needs to be of an entirely different order to that for the operational phases.

For example, the report identifies the following areas of vulnerability: housing, community identity

and sense of place, development, cost of living and community well-being. Each of these areas has

different issues depending upon whether the project is in construction or operational phase.

Taking community well-being for instance, 6,000 predominately young male workers on a site for a

short period of time will require dramatically different policies and resources to manage them

effectively and prevent harm than will managing the potential impacts on community well-being of

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long-term permanent workers, many with families. Similarly, the proponent has a greater

responsibility for management of a construction workforce and its impacts than it does for longer

term permanent employees and their families, for whom local governments might be expected to

assume a greater responsibility.

Accordingly, the proponent might partly manage the potential negative social impacts of a 6,000

construction workforce by requiring its contractors to actively recruit females to aim for a better

gender balance. However, an entirely different recruitment strategy might be needed to optimize

outcomes for the operational phase.

Under-estimation of the potential negative social impacts of the construction workforce

The Assessment, Report and SSIMP need to be amended to address the additional significant risks

associated with a large construction force. The risks described below are less apparent with an

operational workforce, first because it is significantly smaller, but also because the construction

workforce represents a sudden shock to a community when the numbers build rapidly from zero to

six thousand over a matter of months. It is more challenging for a community to respond to this

sudden impact than it is for a community to respond to a more gradual build up of a workforce who

intends to stay longer. An operational workforce has a greater stake in a smooth transition,

whereas an operational workforce is there for a short period of time and has less investment in

seeking community acceptance and modifying its own behaviour to meet community concerns.

Appropriate, experienced professional input and research need to be brought to the assessment

and there needs to be clearer articulation of issues such as:

Impact on gender relations within the existing community. For example, jealousy by

men and boys in the host community of project workers who are better paid and with

greater access to resources such as vehicles, drugs and alcohol and provide competition

for available women. Anecdotal evidence suggests men and boys become more vigilant

of their girlfriends with a resulting increase in domestic violence. Also, there have been

reports that men and boys move towards younger women and girls as the women and

girls in their own age group start to take up association with workers. Increase sexual

assault as reported by sexual assault services but not reported to the Police. These

issues are commonly overlooked because they usually occur after dark, in private spaces

or in hidden public spaces.

Increased prostitution both formal and informal. Increased pregnancies and STIs.

Greater risk of drug trafficking and increased alcohol-related issues, including increased

traffic accidents. For example, a number of deaths have occurred on the road from

Wadeye to Darwin involving contractors working on the construction of the LNG plant at

Blacktip including an Indigenous man being run over by a contractor driving after dark,

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despite strict instructions that contractors were not supposed to bring in vehicles to the

plant and were not supposed to drive after dark.

This list is not comprehensive, but illustrative only.

It is noted that while some of the professionals consulted did raise some of these concerns:

“Participants at the Health Workshop were apprehensive about an increase in informal prostitution

by some of Broome’s existing younger residents…. *and+ raised fears of increase in the level of STI

transmissions.” (Section 9.2.2 of Volume 2) But it is evident that their concerns were not taken

seriously enough. The SIA report responds by stating that “measures are expected to be put in

place which will control access into and out of the accommodation camp” and they expect this to

manage the potential problem. However, my experience from what mining companies around

Australia have told me is that that controlling access to and from camps is very difficult. Most

workers are likely to pose little risk to host communities, there is a percentage who can be anti-

social and looking to “party”. Intent on exploring their surrounds, locating drugs if they are

recreational drug users, and looking for entertainment to break up an otherwise monotonous

working break, controlled their movements is not easy to maintain.

The same participants also raised concerns about “members of workforce who ‘took breaks’ in

Broome and caused havoc in the town specifically in relation to public intoxication, sexual assault

and harassment”. The Report’s response of “this impact is likely to remain for incoming

independent contractors who service the Precinct or workers who choose to remain in Broome for

their recreational leave” is manifestly inadequate. It is noted that these concerns did not make

their way into the summary of issues listed above.

The SIA makes reference to a previous FIFO in Broome case study undertaken by Pollard (1990). In

that instance 50 to 60 people relocated to Broome which had a population at the time of 7500.

Despite noting that at the time “the hospital identified an increase in the number of outpatients on

the Saturday morning after the shift changeover” the SIA does not then take this finding and

extrapolate the implications for a workforce of 6,000 with possibly 600 being temporarily

accommodated in Broome.

In the absence of documentation of social impacts of construction workforces on host

communities, the Precautionary Principle must apply. This means that where there is any possibility

of such potential negative impacts, policy makers need to develop management and mitigation

strategies to prevent such negative social impacts even without hard evidence of their likelihood. If

there is any suggestion that the types of scenarios I have described above are alarmist, I can state

that these impacts have been described to me repeatedly by service providers, community

members, women’s groups and girls over the past twenty years in the Pilbara, Darwin, Alice

Springs, Catherine, Weipa, Nhulunbuy and other smaller communities across Australia where the

community has hosted or been adjacent to large construction projects where good mitigation and

management were not implemented or failed.

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Anecdotal evidence is the only evidence that I am currently aware of, and perhaps consideration

could be given to funding post graduate research, for example, by funding one or more PhD

scholarships, to undertake research of the impacts on the margins of large itinerant construction

workforces arriving in the vicinity of small host communities.

Bias towards services planning and government

The SIA demonstrates a bias towards the potential impacts of the project on services and the

capacity of services to deal with additional demands upon them. It is very difficult to find the voices

of those sectors of the community with the potential to be marginalized or negatively impacted by

this project. In this sense, the SIA is an older style methodological approach and does not represent

best practice.

The SIA also seems to assume that the existing social services in nature are appropriate and that it

is only the issue of capacity that needs to be assessed. New types of services with different models

of intervention will be required to meet the new demands of the potential impacts of the

development of the project, if they are to be met.

Into the future, governance and transparency will be crucial to an equitable development, yet again

there is a heavy bias in proposed governance arrangements towards service providers as

stakeholders. Accountability for successfully managing impacts is best provided independently and

an independent body to monitor and report on ongoing social impacts and the efficacy of social

management will be important. The ASIA recommendations in regard to social monitoring relate to

this also.

Strategic Social Impact Management Plan

It is acknowledged that the strategic nature of the SIA restricts the SSIMP to providing a strategic

framework only and that more detailed strategies would be developed once there is greater

certainty in relation to development. Nevertheless, unless the SSIMP is robust any SIMPs that might

follow will not succeed in maximizing opportunities and mitigating potential negative impacts.

Because of the scale of the project, both the risks and opportunities are significant, and given the

relative vulnerability of some community members, and in particular, Indigenous people in the

region, the vulnerabilities are potentially serious.

First and foremost, social impact assessment is about social justice. This assessment is heavily

weighted towards planning of services and its findings and recommendations reflect this. The

Strategic Social Impact Management Plan (SSIMP) needs to capture the principal of social justice and

equity as a guiding principal. Research has demonstrated that local people frequently pay the costs

of development while individuals and corporations from outside the region and governments share

disproportionately in the benefits. This SIA has not embraced this premise and it is reflected in the

skewed assessment and the absence of social justice as an explicit guiding principle in the SIA and

flowing through to the SSIMP.

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The following comments are specific to relevant strategies (where suggestions are made, these are

by way of illustration and not meant to be exhaustive):

1. In relation to 6.1 Managed-access construction camp – the proposed measure is not appropriate

as it does not distinguish between Broome and regional residents who have successfully

obtained employment at the project and those who have migrated in because of the project.

More appropriate monitoring measures would be, for example:

a. Survey workers on a regular basis in order to monitor the number of workers who

recreate locally.

b. Fund a police liaison officer position to monitor and report on disturbances, including

sexual assault, assaults, drunkenness, purchase and/or supply of drugs and car accidents

involving construction workers.

c. Fund a part-time position at the local hospital to collect data and report on incidences of

STI amongst vulnerable populations (young girls, Indigenous and non-Indigenous) and

anecdotal stories of incidences of sexual assault (both reported to the Police and those

not reported).

d. Fund a youth worker to monitor anecdotes of girls partying or obtaining alcohol or drugs

from workers and young males in Broome and the region displaying resentment towards

construction workers.

These are examples only. There are many other potential measures and investments in resources

needed to monitor and potentially manage direct impacts.

2. Similarly in relation to 6.1 – it is unrealistic to think that either the proponent or local

governments will be able to stop workers recreating in Broome and other regions. A more

realistic and effective strategy would be to do the following:

a. Maximise local employment

b. Encourage gender balance in the FIFO workforce

c. Create disincentives for workers to recreate locally – eg require them as a condition of

employment that on breaks they must fly to the location from which they were

recruited (eg a Perth worker must return to Perth on the company jet and sign off on

arrival at Perth in order to be eligible for payment for the work period)

d. Establish formal arrangements with tour operators (preferencing Indigenous operators

or joint venturers) to provide recreational opportunities for workers in a managed and

regulated way.

e. Impound cars being driven to site and insist that workers use FIFO travel options only.

These or something similar should not be left to later management plans but should be

articulated as strategic objectives and policies in the SSIMP.

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3. In relation to 6.2 – the aim should be to isolate the construction workforce to the extent

possible and the priority should be on closely regulating interactions. The proponent acting as

an intermediary is the only way in which local recreation, fishing and tour operators can enjoy

low risk benefits. These should principles established in the SSIMP.

4. In relation to 6.3 – “a Register of feedback from community email or hotline” is an entirely

inadequate measure to monitor access to and use of drugs, alcohol and dangerous behaviour by

construction workers. The SSIMP needs to establish a clear strategic principle – for example,

“Management policies and strategies will be put in place to ensure:

a. There is no opportunity created for construction workers to share alcohol or drugs with

local youth.

b. Workers will not be able to purchase drugs from local suppliers.

c. Workers will only have restricted access to alcohol during work periods.

d. These are examples only.

5. Given the vulnerabilities of the potentially impacted local communities, particularly the

Indigenous communities, and the magnitude of the projected construction workforce/s, 6.4 as a

strategy would be a disaster. Rather, the position of the SSIMP should be that the proponent

must provide adequate accommodation on-site for all its construction workforce – in other

words a strict policy of isolation of the work-force and insulation of the potentially affected

communities is justified during the construction phase/s of this project/s. The proposal that

“initially, there may be a small impact on accommodation during the pioneer stage of the

project as some workers may need to be accommodated in Broome while camp accommodation

is being constructed” (Volume 1, Page 14) seriously underestimates the potential social

negatives of this strategy and focuses naively on accommodation as the only area of impact.

6. In relation to 6.6 and 6.7, time is of the essence because of the long lead times involved in

upskilling local workforces. Therefore, this strategy should include a timing metric – for

example, “Within one month of the investment decision to proceed, the Australian government

will commence implementing its training and development plan.”

7. In relation to 6.8 – it is good that this potential issue has been identified and will be managed.

Workers and families simply “arriving” in a town looking for work is common and creates

problems when there are not adequate housing or services or facilities (or suitable jobs) for

these workers. There is a need to establish a strategic principle in relation to this group – eg are

they to be encouraged or discouraged? It is also noted, as discussed above, that the

management strategy is skewed towards service provision and does not adequately deal with

the secondary impacts of the presence of this group in terms of marginalization of members of

the host community.

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8. It is noted that the SSIMP contains a local procurement strategy, a transport strategy, an

Indigenous employment strategy, sense of place strategy, housing strategy, West Kimberley

socio-economic development strategy and other responses, all of which are well set out.

9. Given that this is a strategic social impact assessment, high level principles should be identified.

As examples, the Precautionary Principle should apply, as should the Principle that all sectors of

the impacted community should benefit in some way and ensuring that some sectors do not pay

a greater cost while others benefit. Other strategic principles relevant to this situation need to

be identified.

Data sharing

The Social Monitoring SSIMP component is inadequate, as discussed elsewhere in this Review. In particular it fails to pick up on a point made in the ASIA that

“Another limitation involved the reluctance of some organisations to assist the ASIA by

providing access to relevant baseline data … despite repeated written and oral requests,

declined to assist the ASIA… a small percentage of (predominately non-Indigenous) agencies

refused to engage with the ASIA because of personal views of the staff concerned regarding

the proposed LNG Precinct.” (Chap 1: Page 39).

This has been my experience also, that Government agencies are not willing to share data with a

private consultant compiling a base line data set. For example, I was forced to re-do a housing

survey in Wadeye to establish housing density in a recent SIA in that community for the LNG Plant,

despite the fact that the relevant NT Government Department had only recently conducted such a

study. Similarly, I have struggled to extract crime data, for example, from Police Services, despite

writing letters to the Senior Officers involved. The SSIMP should make statutory provision for the

sharing of information by Government agencies for legitimate purposes such as social monitoring of

impacts.

Capacity to respond

In any impact assessment, an important component of the assessment is to assess the capacity of

the affected communities and individuals to respond. For example in the recent floods in Brisbane,

we saw that some businesses were open for business as soon as the floodwaters receded and were

fully operational again within months, whereas some other businesses have never re-opened. This

is evidence that the first group of businesses had a capacity to respond to the impact of the floods,

either because they had more financial and practical resources, or because they were better able to

get help, or they were less psychologically damaged by the experience, or whatever the source of

their resilience might be.

In relation to a project such as the LNG precinct, those who have a greater capacity to respond are

better able to recognize an opportunity and act to take it up. Others with less capacity to respond

may be already experiencing a negative affect (for example such as marginalization) and find that

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the project compounds this disempowerment. These individuals have less capacity to respond to

the risk of marginalization than does another individual, for perhaps a variety of reasons.

Accordingly, identifying the capacity to respond of a potentially impacted community or sectors of

the community and looking at ways of enhancing their capacity to respond is an important outcome

for a quality social impact assessment.

The issue of capacity to respond does not appear to have been directly addressed in the SIA, and

consequently neither has the issue of ways to capacity-build and strengthen the capacity to respond

been directly addressed, although there are some capacity-building issues discussed in particular in

the industry reports. An assessment of the capacity to respond would normally take into account

some measures of social capital, or certainly some discussion of governance in the area. Political

efficacy, available resources and characteristics of the affected populations that would enhance or

undermine their capacity to respond is not addressed in the SIA. (It is noted that the ASIA addresses

capacity-building of local and regional organisations and in Volume 3, Chapter 4 also addresses the

capacity of policy-makers to respond). Building the capacity to respond should be included as a

policy imperative of the SSIMP at the very least.

Ironically, the SIA Volume 1 at page 113 includes a Table A.1 Social Impact Assessment Variables,

which lists, among others, Political and Social Resources such as Leadership capability and

characteristics, and a range of variables relating to Individual and Family Level Impacts such as Trust

in political and social institutions. I am unable to find where in the report these have been

described and assessed.

The Governance arrangement at Annexure C is heavily skewed towards government agencies and

needs to include independent specialist expertise.

Monitoring Regime

A “monitoring regime” refers to the entire package of identified indicators, governance, reporting,

determination of what is to be monitored, how it is to be monitored, how it will be resourced (both

in terms of expertise as well as finance), how stakeholders will be selected and participate and all

other aspects relating to ongoing monitoring of impacts.

The monitoring regime proposed by the SIA is weak. The failure to come to grips with what

constitutes a robust monitoring regime and the necessity for one to be in place is reflected in the

weak SSIMP, as discussed above. The proposed monitoring regime needs to be strengthened, for

example through the establishment of a relationship with a Cooperative Research Centre, or funding

of a PhD scholarship, or other means to bring specialist expertise in to the mix in an ongoing way.

The proposal of an independent authority to monitor and report on impacts proposed in the ASIA is

an excellent suggestion as it will ensure that governance of the social impact monitoring is

independent, transparent and accountable.

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KLC Overview and Consolidated Recommendations

Volume One identified a range of Overarching Themes and Issues. Given that this Volume purports

to be an Overview, it would be helpful if it were written on the assumption that readers may only

read this Volume, in which case, the authors should summarise the findings and provide illustrations

of these. For example, dot point One is self-evident, but dot point Two is indirectly referencing a

number of key events that adversely affected the consultation and agreement-making process. The

authors should summarise these briefly in order to ground this dot point in actual events. Otherwise

readers may simply believe that these are statements merely of general principle.

On Page 6, dot point Three states that there is a need for fundamental change in approach by

Governments and companies to avoid negative impacts. It would be helpful, since this is a summary,

if the concrete changes that are needed can also be summarised as part of this Overview (see

comments on Volume 2 below). Similarly, dot point Four calls for the principles of respect for IFPIC

and for Traditional Owners and their cultural and social values. The point needs to be made that the

evaluation demonstrates that these principles have not always been met in the events to date.

On page 7, dot point Six argues that areas of impact cannot be identified in an “arbitrary” way. It

would be better to remove the word “arbitrary” with another word, such as “European”. It might be

more accurate to state that areas of impact cannot be identified without reference to the way in

which Indigenous landowners view their land. Same page, dot point Seven, it is assumed that the

authors mean here that appropriately-resourced “indigenous” institutional arrangements be

created.

KLC Volume 2 Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation

Volume Two addressed the question of whether the Traditional Owners had given information

consent in a culturally appropriate manner and provided details of consultations about the proposal.

First, the authors correctly identify the principle of Indigenous Prior Informed Consent (IFPIC) as the

measure against which the Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation

process should be evaluated. IFPIC is a specific right for Indigenous Peoples as recognised in the

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

The key findings of Volume Two are provided on pages 7 to 10. While overall the Report is very

clear, and the conclusions that it draws supported by evidence throughout the body of the Report, it

would be helpful if dot point 7 on page 10 could be elaborated upon. Specifically, the authors state

that “without a change in State Government policy, any influence [the native title holders] wield

through the ILUA negotiations will not constitute an ability to provide or withhold their consent in a

manner consistent with the principle of IFPIC.” The Report has clearly established that the lack of

information, for example on land height above sea level and water depth along the Kimberley Coast

(p 35), the threat of compulsory acquisition forced a pressured and truncated and at times culturally

inappropriate negotiation process, and the compulsory acquisition of land for the proposed LNG

precinct, unequivocally disqualified the consent process from being one that is consistent with the

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principle of Indigenous Free and Prior Informed Consent (IFPIC). However, it would be helpful if the

authors could articulate the concrete Government policy changes that they consider are needed to

equip the Native Title Holders (NTHs) with the necessary influence for the future.

Similarly, the authors state that “the outcome of the Strategic Assessment process … will be an

important measure of the efficacy of consultations.” It would be helpful if the authors were more

concrete on exactly how the outcomes will measure efficacy of consultations with affected

Indigenous people. For example, it seems that the nature of management arrangements that are

eventually put in place might be one measure of the efficacy. It is presumed this means the extent

to which Indigenous people have decision-making power over management strategies and resources

is one measure of a good outcome. The tone is a little too polemical since in this instance concrete

outcomes that will indicate genuine efficacy need to be articulated.

In relation to the consultation process described in the Report that was undertaken by the KLC,

while this appears to meet world’s best practice, it is noted that it is the KLC reporting on its own

undertakings so we can only rely on what the KLC’s own consultants have reported. We understand

that there are some Traditional Owners who object to the project and who are critical of the KLC’s

consultation methods and methods for obtaining instructions. While it is problematic that it is the

KLC itself reporting on its own performance in relation to these matters, it is also the case that there

are legal processes available to these Traditional Owners through which their concerns can be

explored and if found to be with basis, able to be rectified.

The KLC arranged a number of consultative structures including the Traditional Owner Task Force

and a Senior Leadership Group. It allowed the Traditional Owners themselves to drive the design of

the consultation program and representative structures arising out of those. This represents world’s

best practice in engaging with Indigenous people. As outlined in Appendix 2, the KLC arranged a

number of opportunities for stakeholders to receive information in a variety of ways, participate in

discussion and feed into decision-making over an extended period of time from December 2007 to

December 2008. A perusal of the detailed description of the reasons for consulting in the manner

that it did illustrates appropriate and rigorous consultation methods. For example holding seven

different meetings with different ‘cultural blocs’ demonstrated sensitivity to the way in which

Indigenous people self-identify and prefer to be consulted. The discussion on page 29 describes

flexibility in delivery of information by the KLC and the organisation of consultation events in

response to different requirements of different groups, again demonstrating that it allowed those

being consulted to drive the design.

KLC Matrix of Impacts, Risks and Recommended Management Responses

Overall, the KLC ASIA and management strategies and recommendations are innovative,

comprehensive, well thought through and pertinent. Without rewriting the Matrix, there are some

minor suggestions that I have to add:

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1. The first recommendation should be rewritten to be more explicit about how this would be

demonstrated. It errs on the side of sounding polemical and needs a more substantive

recommendation.

2. I realize that this is difficult, but similarly Recommendations 2 and 3 and the desired outcomes

are too vague. Is there an objective measure by which we would know if this outcome has been

met?

3. Recommendation 3 is an excellent recommendation and should be extended to the mainstream

SIA also.

4. Recommendation 16 could possibly be strengthened to allow for Indigenous Traditional Owners

to sign off on any plans, assuming there are no other considerations that are pertinent. It could

also be strengthened by requiring the design and implementation of a Communications Strategy

rather than simply “inform”. This applies also to Recommendation 38.

5. Recommendation 18 is an excellent recommendation.

6. As per my comments on the SIA, while the ASIA is more cognizant of the risks associated with

addressing gender relations impacts, I would rate the risk as “high” rather than “medium”, and

while I agree with the three strategies of Recommendations 49, 50 and 51, I believe these will

only partly address the concerns and that additional strategies should be considered, including

aggressive recruitment drives for female workers with an aspirational target of minimum 20%

female employment. My experiences, and those of my colleagues with whom I have raised this

issue, is that workplaces where there is a higher percentage of women tend to be less aggressive

and have fewer behavior issues. Newmont’s Tanami operation, for example, has 17% female

employment, without any particularly conscious effort on the part of management to achieve

this target. This would suggest that 20% female representation in the workforce would be

achievable with the benefit of an aggressive recruitment drive. Women who work in

predominately male workplaces regularly report that as more women come into their

workplaces the atmosphere changes away from a “football locker room” mentality towards a

more mature and socially responsible work place.

There are already recommendations in the SIA to maximize local employment, which will also be

important.

7. In relation to Impact 28, which I am grateful has been recognised as an issue, the management

strategy of Recommendation 75 needs to be expanded – this is discussed below.

KLC ASIA – Social conflict around LNG development

One experience of the Blacktip LNG project at Wadeye was a strong resentment towards the project

because “the project always gets what it wants”. So while the Wadeye community might wait

weeks or months for something to be repaired or an essential part to be delivered, of if the

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community suffered certain shortages, their difficulties seemed exacerbated by the ease and speed

with which the construction team was able to “get whatever they needed” sometimes even on the

next plane. This created enormous resentment towards the project as the community’s own

relative poverty and the under-resourcing of local services came in to focus. Impact 28 identified by

the ASIA study picks up on this impact and it can be expected that the mainstream Broome

community may have similar perceptions and resentments. This is a matter for the proponent to

deal with but it needs to be raised in the SIA as a potential impact.

Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the

Agreement and Terms of Reference.

The ASIA has fulfilled all the required criteria under the Agreement and Terms of Reference.

The SIA has also fulfilled these. To the extent that the terms of reference outline what is to be

addressed, the SIA has addressed all those requirements, but not done so consistently well, as

discussed above.

Conclusion

There is a bias in the SIA towards the planning of government services. Social impact assessment is

much more than this. SIA is a tool of democracy and a mechanism for ensuring equity in

development, including inter-generational equity and protecting the vulnerable. It is a tool for

identifying opportunities to modify a project plan. Managing impacts, either through mitigating

potential negative impacts or maximizing potential benefits, needs to be innovative and principled.

There also needs to be an appropriate governance arrangement in place.

The SIA, on the other hand, has succeeded in many important ways – it has created a

comprehensive base line data set; it identified some key communities of interest and

commissioned technical studies to deepen the understanding of relevant issues, ie the tourism

study, fishing and infrastructure studies, etc; it has completed extensive work on scenario-building

and population projections.

The ASIA fully meets these criteria and is a quality document that sets a new standard in social

impact assessment in Australia, and possibly internationally.

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Recommendations

It is recommended that the following improvements are made to the SIA:

1. Recommendation: Re-design the Strategic Social Impact Management Plan to incorporate

strategic guiding principles, including the Precautionary Principle, and be more innovative

and lateral in its approach.

2. Recommendation: In order to best manage the risks identified in this Review, more

consideration should be given to adopting a policy objective of isolating the construction

workforce and insulating the potentially affected communities, to the extent possible.

3. Recommendation: Set an aspirational target of a minimum of 20% females in the

construction workforce, requiring an aggressive recruitment drive to achieve these

numbers.

4. Recommendation: Separate out the treatment of construction impacts from operational

impacts as separate chapters both in the discussion of impacts in the SIA and in the SSIMP.

5. Recommendation: Acknowledge adequately vulnerable groups including young women and

girls and Indigenous members of the Broome community not identified as Traditional

Owners, the nature of that vulnerability, the identity and prevalence of members of those

groups resident in particular in Broome. Establish their voices more clearly.

6. Recommendation: Establish a robust social impact monitoring regime (as detailed above),

including guaranteeing access to necessary data held by Government agencies, establishing

alliances with independent academic institutions or researchers and providing appropriate

resources, and ensuring that governance of the social impact monitoring is independent,

transparent and accountable.

In relation to the ASIA

7. Recommendation: Rewrite sections of the KLC Overview document to more accurately summarise the thrust of the ASIA findings and recommendations, as discussed in this Review above.

Documents

ImpaxSIA 2011 Final Peer Review Browse Basin SIA-3