Implementing the precautionary principle

The Science of the Total Environment 288(2002) 155–165

0048-9697/02/$ - see front matter� 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.PII: S0048-9697Ž01.01107-X

Implementing the precautionary principle

Peter L. deFur*, Michelle Kaszuba

Center for Environmental Studies, Virginia Commonwealth University, P.O. Box 843050, Richmond, VA 23284-3050, USA

Received 26 July 2001; accepted 20 November 2001

Abstract

The precautionary principle can be found in international treaties that protect human health and the environmentfrom a variety of pollutants and perturbations. One of the earliest forms of the precautionary principle was used inthe 1980s in Europe to protect the North Sea. In 1992, the Rio Declaration specifically included the precautionaryprinciple in calling on nations to protect the environment. The US articulation that best embodies this approach toenvironment and human health protection is the Wingspread statement: ‘When an activity raises threats of harm tohuman health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken, even if some cause and effect relationshipsare not fully established scientifically.’ The key element is the matter of acting in the face of uncertainty. Applicationsof the precautionary principle are not, however, new to US environmental policy and management. The present paperuses case studies to examine the application of the precautionary principle to environmental decisions. These casesrange from ecosystem protection on the Charles River, Massachusetts, to the effort to prevent computer crashes atthe end of the year 2000. These cases deal with the problem of uncertainty, whether concerning the cause, effect,systemic condition or multiple factors. Uncertainty represents one of the features that provoke controversy over theseissues and the precautionary principle.� 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Precautionary principle; Uncertainty; Decision-making; Environmental protection

1. Introduction

The precautionary principle articulates a basisfor taking action in cases with insufficient scien-tific understanding, including extreme complexity,especially when outcomes are irreversible andyorwidespread(deFur, 2000). The connection amongenvironmental and issues such as health and soci-etal infrastructure extends the application to abroader field, but here we focus on the environ-

*Corresponding author. Tel.:q1-804-828-1760; fax:q1-804-828-1622.

E-mail address: [email protected](P.L. deFur).

ment. The precautionary principle has been artic-ulated in several national and international fora(see Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999). We use thestatement from the Wingspread Conference heldin January 1998: ‘When an activity raises threatsof harm to human health or the environment,precautionary measures should be taken, even ifsome cause and effect relationships are not fullyestablished scientifically.’ (Raffensperger andTickner, 1999).

The precautionary principle can be traced toGermany in the late 1970s. Germany was grap-pling with the best and most appropriate approach

156 P.L. deFur, M. Kaszuba / The Science of the Total Environment 288 (2002) 155–165

to dealing with a series of large-scale environmen-tal problems that included acid rain, pollution ofthe North Sea and global climate change. Thishistory is covered in few reviews, one of which isthe chapter by Jordan and O’Riordan(1999) inthe publication that resulted from the WingspreadConference. Other publications document the caseof the North Sea, the role of scientific informationand analysis, and the resulting rise of the precau-tionary principle as the dominant basis for envi-ronmental management decisions for the NorthSea. Ducrotoy(1997) gives a quite careful anddetailed history of the North Sear proceedingsthrough the completion of the work of the NorthSea Task Force that articulated the precautionaryprinciple.

Haas(1997) further examined the interactionsamong science, politics, and economic forces inone of the more enlightening pieces on the precau-tionary principle. Haas addressed the interplayamong these forces in several cases, one of whichis the North Sea, and particularly how policy isset and management conducted for science-domi-nated situations. He concludes that it is rare indeedfor science to weigh heavily in such policy situa-tions, albeit he refers to ecological scientific infor-mation (in theory, experts from other areas mayargue that such is not the case for health, engi-neering, etc.). Haas(1997) observed that manage-ment and policy entities do not deal well withsituations in which the data are uncertain, incom-plete and changing. It is in this context that theprecautionary principle best guides managers andpolicy makers, according to Haas(1997).

Since the application to the North Sea, theprecautionary principle has been used in otherinternational agreements, notably the Rio Decla-ration of 1992. But the US experience with theprecautionary principle is quite different fromEurope(see Bishop, 2000), where it is regularlyused in cases with less than certain scientificinformation for decision-makers(Rogers, 2000).US business and corporate interests have arguedvociferously against the precautionary principle(Jones, 2001); largely on the basis of cost. Theapplication of the precautionary principle to genet-ically modified organisms seems to have drawnthe most vitriolic attacks. This turn of events in

the US is regrettable for many of the same reasonsthat the environmental community was advised toaccept risk assessment — it is now one of thestandard methods(Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, 2000).

Attacks on the precautionary principle seem toarise from two distinctly different camps(Tickner,1998). On the one hand are interests concernedover the implementation costs(investments, sales,etc.), environmental protection vs. profits, and forwhom the underlying principles are not the centralissue. This paper does not argue the economicissues; for that topic the reader is referred to theabundant literature on environmental economics.

On the other hand are critics who are unfamiliarwith the precautionary principle, its use and appli-cations, andyor who have yet to evaluate its utility.This paper intends to offer this group a perspectiveand understanding of how the precautionary prin-ciple is used and has been used judiciously in anumber of environmental decisions.

The largest audience for this paper may be thescientists who are unfamiliar with the precaution-ary principle. With that in mind, we address themajor elements of the precautionary principle andhow they are applied in decision-making. Next wepresent a series of case studies showing how theprecautionary principle has been used. These aresummarized around the element of uncertainty. Weconclude with some observations on the future ofthe precautionary principle in US environmentallaw and management.

The present paper was given in the precaution-ary principle session at the conference on ‘Issuesand Applications in Toxicology and Risk Assess-ment’, Dayton Ohio, April 23–26, 2001.

2. Approach

This paper focuses on uncertainty in environ-mental decisions, and the role of the precautionaryprinciple. Uncertainty is, in fact, a prime motivat-ing factor in the origin and application. When theNorth Sea convention was under discussion, theeffects of pollution on the ecosystem were clearlyevident (Ducrotoy, 1997), but the data did notallow dose–response analysis or quantitative causeand effect relationships. In the US, government

157P.L. deFur, M. Kaszuba / The Science of the Total Environment 288 (2002) 155–165

agencies declined to take action on the largehypoxic water mass in the Gulf of Mexico despitethe knowledge that excess nutrients cause suchcoastal conditions(NRC, 2000; Rabalais et al.,1996). Decision-makers were faced with compet-ing socioeconomic interests — fisheries in theGulf and nutrient sources in the Mississippi drain-age basin.

We analyzed the occurrence and significance ofuncertainty in a range of applications of the pre-cautionary principle. The cases were drawn fromsome present-day issues(Y2K computer issues)and older cases that pre-date the present articula-tion of the principle and the resulting discussionon its use and applicability(Charles River inMassachusetts). Some of the cases were explicitin their application of the precautionary principle(BGH in Europe), while there is substantial dis-cussion over whether other cases are precautiousor based on well-founded science(striped bass inthe Chesapeake). We do not attempt to justifycases that were specifically denoted as precaution-ary-based. The uncertainties in the seven casestudies are summarized and discussed in light ofthe decision. Nor was it possible to examine theoutcomes and full set of consequences of eachdecision. In particular, it was not possible toexamine the socio-economic changes that mayhave resulted from the use of the precautionaryprinciple; these issues are important and beyondthe scope of this paper.

3. The precautionary principle

The Precautionary Principle consists of fourbasic elements, regardless of the formulation.These elements are:

● There is a threat of harm, either credible orknown

● The situation presents a lack of scientific cer-tainty or evidence

● Cause and effect relationships are not yet proven● There is a necessity or duty to act.

These elements deserve some explanation. Thefirst criterion in such cases is the presence of areal threat of harm to human health or the envi-ronment. Some versions include specific language

that the harm is serious or irreversible, or both, asin the Rio Declaration. Vague notions and ground-less fears are not evidence of harm; the threat ofharm needs to be based on information, rather thansimple speculation.

The second element, uncertainty or paucity ofevidence, addresses situations in which knowledgeis incomplete, and the available scientific infor-mation is simply not enough. This point is extend-ed in the third element, focusing on the relationshipbetween cause and effect. Here, the precautionaryprinciple acknowledges both the importance ofcause and effect relationships and the uncertaintyof some lines of evidence. The threat of harm andthe duty to act need to be linked with someplausible causal hypothesis as the basis for deci-sions that protect the public health and welfare,including financial resources. The North Sea pres-ents an excellent example of this uncertainty, asdescribed below. The specific role of industrialand municipal waste in causing problems in theNorth Sea living resources was acknowledged.

The final element of the precautionary principleis the duty to act. Lack of certainty or specificcause and effect relationships should not preventthe responsible parties from protecting the environ-ment or human health and welfare. Some deci-sions, as the hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico,present competing welfare or financial interests.Several essays in Raffensperger and Tickner(1999) argue this point on the general duty pro-visions of existing laws, and the reader is referredto that volume for an elaboration of general dutyissues.

Uncertainty addressed by the precautionary prin-ciple may be in one of several different aspects ofthe situation, including:

● Causal factors or sources of threats● Effects or nature of the threat of harm● The cause and effect relationships● Long-term or secondary consequences of the

decision.

The case study analysis focused on discerningthe nature of uncertainty in each of the situations.


4. Case studies

4.1. The North Sea

The North Sea was one of the early explicitapplications of the precautionary principle; wide-spread damage had already been done to thisecosystem by the time precaution was introduced(Ministerial Declaration, 1987). Thousands ofseals were dying from disease, huge carpets ofalgae floated in coastal seas and swimming hadbeen banned on many beaches. For decades theNorth Sea served as the dumping grounds fornitrogen and phosphorous wastes and for many ofEurope’s polluted rivers(Glover, 1988). The NorthSea is also a production ground for the oil and gasindustries. However, uncertainty surrounding thepotential impacts of continued waste dumping andthe ineffectiveness of existing pollution controlspushed governments of the North Sea to seek jointsolutions.

In 1987, the Second International Conferenceon the Protection of the North Sea brought togetherrepresentatives from the North Sea states of Bel-gium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Nether-lands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom ofBritain and Northern Ireland, and the Commissionof the European Communities. That meeting pro-duced a Ministerial Declaration, which embracedthe ideology of the precautionary principle. Thedeclaration states ‘Accepting that, in order toprotect the North Sea from possibly damagingeffects of the most dangerous substances, a pre-cautionary approach is necessary which mayrequire action to control inputs of such substanceseven before a casual link has been established byabsolutely clear scientific evidence.’ The statementrecognizes the ‘better safe than sorry’ approach ofthe precautionary principle(see also Ducrotoy,1997).

The action plan for precaution implementationcalled for a reduction of pollution at point sources,use of best available technology, and restrictionson the manufacture and marketing of some sub-stances. The action plan also called for the estab-lishment of strict quality objectives as a guide tocontrol decisions and as references for assessingenvironmental quality. The implementation of pre-

caution also recognized the need for nations to actmore quickly in preventing pollution of the NorthSea. The main goal of the measures outlined wasto prevent the further pollution and degradation ofthe North Sea.

To accomplish the goal of no further harm, thenations needed a strict policy restricting all harmfuldischarge into the waters of the North Sea. Therestriction on all point source discharges appliedeven if there was no hard scientific evidence thatthe specific substances were harmful to the envi-ronment. The goal was to prevent future harm, sothe only way to do that was to encourage furtherscientific study to prove that substances were notharmful. This last provision reversed the burdenof proof.

4.2. Bovine growth hormone

European governmental organizations havewidely implemented the precautionary principle inthe area of food safety. Majewski(2000) of theEuropean Commission explained the frameworkfor applying the ideas of the precautionary princi-ple. The implementation of a precautionaryapproach should start with scientific evaluation, ascomplete as possible, and where possible, identi-fying at each stage the degree of scientific uncer-tainty. One of the most controversial andwell-publicized cases of this precautionaryapproach to food safety in Europe is the ban ofBovine growth hormone, BGH.

Invoking the precautionary principle, in 1990,the European Union prohibited its member statesfrom administering bovine somatotrophin to dairycows. The ban was based on the underlying notionthat the various effects of new substances such asbovine somatotrophin are not yet sufficiently clearto protect human health and the environment,including livestock(Council of the European Com-munities, 1990). The original ban was temporaryuntil December 31, 1999, allowing member statesto test for adverse effects of bovine somatotrophin.In December 1999, the European Union reaffirmedthe original decision(European Union 1999).

This controversial decision intended to protecthuman health, livestock and, to a lesser extent,wildlife from health effects of BGH. The US and


many US scientists opposed the ban. Some concernis related to an increase in the incidence of mastitisin cows, but other implications of BGH use playedan important role. These include effects to theenvironment, the quality of milk, and the economicand social consequences to agricultural practices,industrial competitiveness and trade implications(European Commission, 1999). The animal wel-fare movement in Europe may also have had someinfluence on the EU decision. The Scientific Com-mittee on Animal Health and Animal Welfareconcluded that there was an increase in the rate ofmastitis as well as incidences of foot and legdisorders, that could eventually lead to adversereproduction effects(European Union, 1999).

4.3. International Joint Commission

In 1991, the International Joint Commission(IJC; dealing with issues concerning the watersforming the border between the US and Canada)recommended that the two nations designate LakeSuperior a demonstration area for their policy ofzero discharge(IJC, 1992). As the demonstrationmodel for the policy, no point source discharge ofany persistent toxic chemicals would be permittedin the lake. The US and Canadian governmentsaccepted the initial challenge, and emphasizedspecial regulatory programs. The US required bestmanagement practices in areas where non-pointsource were significantly degrading water qualityand began to phase out the use of dilution practicesto meet toxic discharge standards. Ontario beganto prepare new regulations and revise existing onesto reduce and eliminate point source discharges ofpersistent toxic substances.

The 1992 and 1994 Biennial Reports by the IJCare both filled with the words and ideas of precau-tion. They look at the current approaches by theUS and Canada, and acknowledge the ‘good starts’by both governments. However, the ultimate goalof the IJC was to eventually implement the zerodischarge policy in all of the Great Lakes. The IJCdetermination for precaution was once again reit-erated in 1994, in the Seventh Biennial Report(IJC, 1994). The IJC’s policy approach continuedwith the reinforcement that ‘persistent toxic sub-stances are too dangerous to the biosphere and to

humans to permit their release in any quantity andall persistent toxic substances are dangerous to theenvironment, deleterious to the human condition,and can no longer be tolerated in the ecosystem,whether or not unassailable scientific proof ofacute or chronic damage is universally accepted.’The precautionary principle applied here is basedon the idea that there is currently not enoughacceptable scientific evidence about the damageand risks associated with toxic substances, there-fore the only acceptable level for such pollutantsis zero. The other important statement made in thespirit of precaution was the call for manufacturersto be responsible for the burden of proof and thatsociety should no longer accept the ideas of dose–response and ‘acceptable risk’ as good scientificpractices by producers of persistent toxicsubstances.

4.4. Lake Pontchartrain

Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana provides habitatfor an extensive population of clams that only livein waters ranging from freshwater to low salinity.For more than 40 years, commercial dredge oper-ations harvested old shells of dead clams for usein construction. The dredging permits were chal-lenged by local crabbers, citizens and non-profitgroups, charging the dredge operations withdegrading the lake ecosystem. In 1990, the Assis-tant State Secretary in the Louisiana Departmentof Environmental Quality(DEQ) denied waterdischarge permits for dredge companies of theDravo Basic Materials Company(DRAVO) andPontchartrain Materials Corporation(PMC). LADEQ denied the permit based on the damage tothe lake ecosystem generally, and specifically tothe shrimp and crab populations from the turbidityand sedimentation caused by dredging.

A previous case law in the Louisiana SupremeCourt (452 SO. 2d. 1152 La. 1984) determinedthat certain issues must be considered andaddressed by DEQ to insure that the environmentis protected. First, there must be maximum avoid-ance of potential and real adverse environmentaleffects of the activity. Then a cost benefit analysismust balance environment with the social andeconomic benefits of the activity. Alternatives to


the activity must also be addressed, especiallythose offering better environmental protection.Finally, DEQ must consider mitigation measuresto ensure that they offer more protection to theenvironment than the proposed activity.

Dravo and PMC appealed the permit denialbased on four specific issues. The first issue wasif the companies were required to obtain statewater discharge permits for their shell dredgingoperations in Lake Ponchartrain. The second wasthat the assistant secretary’s decision was a resultof unlawful procedures. The third issue was if acost benefit analysis was used in the assistantsecretary’s findings. The fourth issue was if DEQwas in error regarding the damage to theecosystem.

The court upheld the denial of the permit; thedecision hinged on a number of elements. Thestate showed that the dredging caused harm to theecosystem in the Lake, and to some specificresources(e.g. crabs and shrimp). This damagewas confirmed in subsequent ecological studies ofrecovery (Porrier, 2001). The final decisionacknowledged some uncertainty over the long-term consequences, although the state had dem-onstrated an increase in water turbidity anddecrease in living resources over several decades.The initial decision to deny also recognized thatlong term damage(perhaps 100 years) could notbe offset by short-term gain — especially gain toprivate parties. Despite the uncertainty over exactlywhere and how much damage could be expected,the precautionary approach was taken to err on theside of protecting the long-term viability andrecovery of the Lake Pontchartrain ecosystem.

4.5. Striped Bass in the Chesapeake Bay

Striped bass are considered one of the mostdesirable commercial and recreational finfish inthe Chesapeake(Setzler-Hamilton and Hall, 1991)and along the US Atlantic Coast. Striped basslandings steadily declined from the high levels inthe late 1950s through the mid-1970s. In 1981, theAtlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission(ASMFC) completed a Management Plan forStriped Bass that responded to declining harvestsand called for severe restrictions on commercial

and recreational fishing(ASMFC, 1981). Theoverall management goal was ‘to perpetuate thestriped bass resource in fishable abundancethroughout its range and generate the greatestpossible net economic and social benefits from itsharvest and utilization over time.’

Many factors contributed to the decline instriped bass including over-fishing, physical andchemical impacts on spawning areas, climatechange, and loss of submerged aquatic vegetation(ASMFC, 1981). These factors, combined withthe popularity of commercial and recreationalstriped bass fishing, contributed to the populationdecline. Although the ASMFC placed most of theblame on over-fishing, political aspects of thedecision forced greater consideration of the addi-tional factors.

The Commission found that the current manage-ment practices varied among the states; local andcounty ordinances only made the situation morecomplex (ASMFC, 1981). The ASMFC recom-mended several management practices includingminimum and maximum size limitations, inlandand coastal water fishing restrictions and closingsome fishing grounds to protect spawning stocks.These controls were viewed as extreme by thefishing industry.

In this case, the uncertainty of which factorscaused striped bass population declines led to hugefishing restrictions as the quickest and most viablemanagement tool. The Commission realized thatmany of the factors could contribute to the popu-lation decline, but would be harder and would takelonger to manage. With twenty years of hindsight,it is clear that over-fishing was the determiningfactor.

4.6. The Charles River, Massachusetts

The New England District of the US Corp ofEngineers(ACOE, 1976) released the ‘CharlesRiver Study Massachusetts’, recommending theacquisition of 8422 acres of natural riparian areasin the middle and upper watershed. These areaswere to be maintained in ‘their natural state inperpetuity’ as natural water storage areas for floodcontrol. For the first time, the Army Corps ofEngineers recommended a flood control plan with


no man-made structures. Instead, the ACOE con-cluded that existing natural flood control areaswould better serve the needs of protecting againstfloods.

The Charles River Study stemmed from growingconcerns over the increasing urbanization in areasof the Charles River Watershed during the 1960sand 1970s. Urbanization and development of thelower watershed area had increased run-off intothe Charles River, resulting in severe floodingduring periods of high precipitation(Charles RiverStudy, 1976). Urbanization and development hadnot yet significantly affected the middle and upperwatershed, but seemed inevitable. The ACOE pro-posed preserving seventeen undeveloped naturalvalley storage areas, 8422 acres, in the upper andmiddle Charles River Watershed. Preventing futuredevelopment of these areas would provide theflood control needed and avoid the future need forthe construction of dikes, levees, channelizationand flood storage impoundments, most of whichare harmful to the natural environment.

The ACOE knew that urbanization increasedrun-off and consequent flooding, and that floodscaused substantial damage to health, welfare andthe environment. Furthermore, ACOE predictedflooding problems under several possible scenari-os, but acknowledged uncertainty over the extentof flooding and likelihood of future developmentsand needs.

The decision by the Corp of Engineers preventedfuture harm from floods and from loss of naturalresources. The protected wetlands not only help tomanage floodwaters, but also serve as habitat formany species of organisms. Unlike the North Seaor Great Lakes, the system was not severelyimpacted, but the present trajectory would lead tofurther harm to the environment and human health.In the case of the Charles River, however, theCorps was acting with more than a little foresightin seeking to avoid the anticipated problems. Inthis sense, the Corps acted on the German principleof forecaring that presaged the development of theprecautionary principle(see Tickner, 2001).

4.7. New Millennium preparation: the Y2K bug

One of the recent cases where the precautionaryprinciple was widely utilized almost to the point

of hysteria, was the uncertainty of worldwidecomputer system crashes at the new millennium.Everyone from the average home computer ownerto the small business owner, to the US NuclearRegulatory Commission(NRC) prepared for theunknown. It has been estimated that the US privateand government organizations spent at least onehundred billion dollars to minimize potential errorscaused by the new millennium(United PressInternational, 1999).

The concern and readiness for the new yearwere well merited. Computers designed wellbefore the year 2000 did not include features torecognize the date change from 1999, recorded astwo digits, 99, to 2000, which required adding twomore digits. The consequences could have beendevastating if computerized equipment malfunc-tioned or failed entirely. Today, almost every elec-tronic device, from coffee pots to cars and publicutilities run on some sort of computer or chip.

The greatest threats to health and safety camefrom the world’s utilities, factories and transpor-tation systems that are for the most part fullycomputerized. The potential for nuclear disasterfrom a failed power plant was related to a com-puter glitch. As early as 1996, the US NuclearRegulatory Commission(NRC) prepared for theuncertainty of Y2K(NRC, 1999). The US NuclearRegulatory Commission described their readinessplans to the Senate Special Committee on the Year2000 Technology Problem on Year 2000 Readi-ness, and explicitly formalized the use of precau-tion for Y2K preparedness.

The NRC issued report GL 98-01 entitled ‘Year2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at NuclearPower Plants’ and in 1998 began an audit of thereadiness of 12 plants. A full readiness review ofall 103 nuclear facilities was completed in 1999.The NRC made decisions on the need for plantspecific Y2K action in September of 1999, and inOctober NRC ran a Y2K exercise and finally, inDecember of 1999 the NRC Contingency Plan wasimplemented.

As an afternote, we note that we did not researchthe effectiveness of the Y2K readiness programs.Our personal experiences were unremarkable inthe millennium computer event. Anecdotal reportswere less comforting, both in the US and interna-


Table 1Summary of uncertainties in the seven case studies presented in the text

Issue Known Uncertainties Unknownsconditions

North Sea Whole Long-term Long-term effectsecosystem and effectsspecific sourcesof pollution

Bovine Nature of Long-term Specific health effectsgrowth action; effects on to look for in humanshormone biological human health

function of BGHInternational Chemical Application of Long-term systemJoint contamination; lab results to response to no-actionCommission effects in lab field responses; and pro-actionon the Great studies specific causes alternativesLakes of observed

effectsLake Lake Specific nature Long-term response toPontchartrain deterioration of cause and no-action alternativeshell dredging and value to effects

recreation and responses incommerce the Lake

Striped Bass Population Causes of Long-term effectsin the condition; population CausationChesapeake effects of declineBay certain stressesCharles River Status of Consequences Long-term effects

ecosystem of status quoSources ofstress

Y2K Status of Effects Long-term effectscomputersNature of thethreat

tionally. A careful examination of the power, chem-ical and transportation industries and utilities maywell document failures in the readiness efforts.

5. Discussion

The uncertainties were categorized in the sevencase studies presented here for the purpose ofdetermining patterns and common features(Table1). The cases intentionally represent a variety thatincludes older ecological cases to quite moderntechnology cases. In categorizing the uncertainties,we identified what was known, uncertain andunknown in each case. Our analysis centered onthe state of knowledge or uncertainty of:(1) thesystem in question;(2) the causes of the threat;

(3) the consequences, harm or effects; and(4) thecause and effect or dose–response relationshipbetween the sources and consequences(Table 1).For example, in the Great Lakes and North Sea,the discharges contained wastes known to be toxic,and the effects had been documented. Uncertaintycentered on which chemicals cause which condi-tions. Compelling or over-riding issues in thesituation were noted.

In all cases, there was imperfect knowledge ofthe ecosystem or human health system. In five ofthe seven cases, an ecosystem or resource wasdegraded, but the scientific basis for the functionof the system, how it would respond and whatmight happen next were all the subject of contro-versy among the experts. In the cases of BGH and


the Y2K computer situation, the actions were takento prevent damage, in the former case to livestockand human health, and the industrial infrastructurein the latter.

The most common aspect of the cases thataffected the decisions was the long-term conse-quences. In fact, the long-term resource conditionor outlook seemed to be the most compelling issuefor many, if not all of the decision-makers in theseven cases we studied. The earliest decisionswere made in the cases of the Charles River andStriped Bass in the Chesapeake Bay, predating theNorth Sea deliberations by 10 and 5 years. Theresource managers weighed the ecological andeconomic status and outlook for a river systemand a coastal fishery, respectively. Both resourceswere degraded and declining; the prospects forimprovement were slim. Recovery of the resourcehad far-reaching positive consequences that werenot uncertain. The resource managers knew thatthe affected economies as well as the ecologicalresource would be improved as a result of theresource recovery or restoration.

In every case, the long-term prospects played akey role in the final decision. One reason forconcern over long-term outcomes of the decisionswas the limited experience for many of thesesituations. The modern era has seen alterations ata scope and scale that was never considered morethan a few decades ago, from demographic shiftsof the human population, to depletion of resourcesonce considered endless, to alteration of the plan-etary climate. Thus, both the impacts of humanactivities as well as the long-term patterns ofresponse are not well understood for many of thesesituations. That information gap is narrowing andshifting at the same time.

The other significant feature of these cases isthe cause and effect relationship — the doseresponse function. Much is made of the doseresponse function in toxicology and public healthas well. The Wingspread statement of the precau-tionary principle specifically singled out dose–response functions for special mention—‘even ifsome dose response functions are not fully estab-lished scientifically.’ The dose response functionswere uncertain or unknown in most of these cases.The most controversial one, BGH in Europe, pre-

sented the most uncertain cause and effect forhuman health. The North Sea and Great Lakeschemical pollution, on the other hand, was directlyresponsible for damaging the natural resourcesbecause laboratory investigations provided sub-stantial supporting evidence. In the case of theY2K computer situation, if computer systems forpower plants, chemical facilities and transportationsystems failed, all at once, a series of disasterswere expected.

Contrary to popular criticism that the precau-tionary principle has no scientific or evidentiarybasis in decisions(Jones, 2001; Goldstein, 2000),the precautionary principle is now used and hasbeen used in cases where there is substantialinformation on the status of the resource or systemin question(USDA, 2000; Tickner, 2001). Whenthe striped bass moratorium was instituted in themid-Atlantic, commercial and recreational catcheshad been declining for many years. State agenciesregularly conducted surveys of the population, thespawning and recruitment of young of the year.The European Union had up-to-date informationon health statistics in the member countries beforebanning BGH(even if the decision was based oneconomics as much as health, as argued in theUS). In the US, the Y2K initiative was based oncertain knowledge of how computer programs hadbeen written and the operating features ofthousands of programs. The US undertook adetailed assessment of the systems that weredependent on vulnerable computer elements.

The knowledge of the system, whether ecosys-tem or human health, included more than a currentstatus. The vulnerability of each system was under-stood in some detail as well. This vulnerabilityaddressed the ecological, health and economicconditions and processes.

The precautionary principle cannot lessen thecontroversy of difficult decisions(Durnill, 1998);the BGH ban, striped bass fishing moratorium, orclosing the Hart Senate Office Building followingthe discovery of anthrax in October 2001, wereopposed before the basis of the decision was everknown.

The case of the North Sea was in some wayssimpler and more direct for the governmentalbodies than the early and present day cases. The


North Sea has long been a key resource for all thebordering countries; fishing has been a way of lifeand principle source of food for centuries. Thus,as the fishery resource declined, there was littlequestion that restoration and recovery was neces-sary and important to all the parties. The lessonhere is that the decision is easier and more widelyaccepted when the resource being protected iscommonly valued.

The long-term prospects for the use of theprecautionary principle to protect the environmentand human health are excellent(Kirschenmann,1998; O’Brien, 1998). Society has become increas-ingly technological and scientific with estimatesof errors, analysis of trends and new information.Yet, science will only reduce uncertainty, nevereliminate it, thus requiring tools and guidelines fordecisions in which the science is inadequate.

There are two types of cases in which theprecautionary principle will be most useful, thoselike the present cases with key uncertainties; andcases in which new information radically alterswell-known situations. Those decisions similar tothe original ones examined here — with little orno history or experience on which to draw — willalways be addressed with precaution. As societyseeks to correct some past errors, solve old prob-lems, we can expect to find the precautionaryprinciple an invaluable tool.

When other health and environmental issueschange dramatically as a result of knew knowl-edge, the precautionary principle will be of greatuse. One such case is the effects of chemicalexposures on human health and wildlife. In recentyears, scientists have come to recognize that somechemicals act at low doses over long periods, toalter endocrine and developmental processes andfunctions in wildlife and humans(Colborn andClement 1992). These chemicals called endocrinedisrupters, are now the subject of intense investi-gation and controversy. As Colborn et al.(1993)observe, some chemicals are able to exert powerfuleffects even at doses once considered ‘safe’ whenexposure occurs at a sensitive time in life. Newinformation now reveals that what was once notconsidered serious can pose significant healthissues.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a grant from theScience and Environmental Health Network toVCU. The authors are grateful to the ExecutiveDirector, Carolyn Raffensperger for support andinspiration during the project.

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Implementing the precautionary principle