12
Journal of Psychology and Theology 2010, Vol. 38, No. 3, 163-174 Copyright 2010 by Rosemead School of Psychology Biola University, 0091-6471/410-730 163 R ecent efforts to introduce spiritual and reli- gious elements into psychology have opened the door to theistic approaches to psy- chotherapy (Miller & Delaney 2005; Richards & Bergin, 2004, 2005). Many researchers and psy- chotherapists have attempted to incorporate theistic features into psychotherapy, including prayer, moral values, and scripture readings (Richards & Bergin, 2004). However, several scholars have argued that a strong notion of theism rarely penetrates very deeply into the theories and practices that are labeled theis- tic (cf. Griffin, 2000; Jones, 2006; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Slife & Melling, 2006; Slife & Reber, 2009). These scholars have made various arguments that the naturalistic worldview of traditional science has deflected thoroughly theistic conceptions, even among those who personally embrace religion and/or spirituality. If this contention is true, then it has important implications for the progress of theis- tic approaches in the discipline. Indeed, it begs the question: what is a thoroughly theistic approach to psychological conceptualization and intervention? Beginning to address this question is the purpose of the article. We first attempt to conceptualize theis- tic psychotherapy by discussing the relationship of theism to naturalism. Many psychologists have assumed that naturalism and theism can be com- bined in various ways, so we describe the more prominent of these combinations at the outset. We argue not only that these mixtures are “weak” (i.e., they restrain God in some way) but also that they ultimately assume naturalism is incompatible with theism in many ways. We then compare “weak” the- ism with a “strong” theism that does not restrain God or rely on naturalistic assumptions. This com- parison is elaborated by distinguishing a published example of strongly theistic psychotherapy from three common types of weakly theistic psychothera- py, with corresponding published examples. THEISM AND THEISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY In order to clearly define theism, especially in a science such as psychology, we must first understand its relation to the fundamental worldview of tradi- tional science—naturalism. As the historian of psy- chology Thomas Leahey (1991) put it, naturalism is “science’s central dogma” (p. 379). It directs psychol- ogists to appeal to and study only natural events and processes, not “supernatural” events and processes, to understand and explain psychological phenome- na (Collins, 1977; Griffin, 2000; Gunton, 1993; Lea- hey, 1991; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Russell, 2002; Smith, 2001). As we will discuss, this dualism of nat- ural and supernatural can itself be problematic, but the point here is that the naturalism at issue in this INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: STRONG VS. WEAK THEISM The authors first attempt to conceptualize theistic psychotherapy by discussing the relationship between theism and naturalism. Many psychologists have assumed that naturalism and theism can be combined in various ways, so the authors review the more prominent of these combinations at the outset. They argue not only that these mixtures are “weak” (i.e., they restrain God in some way) but also that they ultimately assume naturalism is incompatible in many ways with theism. The authors compare “weak” theism with a “strong” theism that does not restrain God or rely on naturalistic assumptions. This comparison is elaborated by distinguishing a published example of strongly theistic psychotherapy from three common types of weakly theistic psy- chotherapy, with corresponding examples from the theistic literature. BRENT D. SLIFE Brigham Young University TIFFANI D. STEVENSON University of Maryland DENNIS C. WENDT University of Michigan Brent D. Slife, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602; Tel: 801-442-3657; Fax: 801-442- 0204; Email: [email protected].

Including God in Psychotherapy: Strong vs. Weak Theism · to deism (Taylor, 2007), the autonomous operation of natural, physical laws is not disrupted and science can proceed without

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Journal of Psychology and Theology

2010, Vol. 38, No. 3, 163-174

Copyright 2010 by Rosemead School of Psychology

Biola University, 0091-6471/410-730

163

Recent efforts to introduce spiritual and reli-gious elements into psychology have openedthe door to theistic approaches to psy-

chotherapy (Miller & Delaney 2005; Richards &Bergin, 2004, 2005). Many researchers and psy-chotherapists have attempted to incorporate theisticfeatures into psychotherapy, including prayer, moralvalues, and scripture readings (Richards & Bergin,2004). However, several scholars have argued that astrong notion of theism rarely penetrates very deeplyinto the theories and practices that are labeled theis-tic (cf. Griffin, 2000; Jones, 2006; Richards &Bergin, 2005; Slife & Melling, 2006; Slife & Reber,2009). These scholars have made various argumentsthat the naturalistic worldview of traditional sciencehas deflected thoroughly theistic conceptions, evenamong those who personally embrace religion

and/or spirituality. If this contention is true, then ithas important implications for the progress of theis-tic approaches in the discipline. Indeed, it begs thequestion: what is a thoroughly theistic approach topsychological conceptualization and intervention?

Beginning to address this question is the purposeof the article. We first attempt to conceptualize theis-tic psychotherapy by discussing the relationship oftheism to naturalism. Many psychologists haveassumed that naturalism and theism can be com-bined in various ways, so we describe the moreprominent of these combinations at the outset. Weargue not only that these mixtures are “weak” (i.e.,they restrain God in some way) but also that theyultimately assume naturalism is incompatible withtheism in many ways. We then compare “weak” the-ism with a “strong” theism that does not restrainGod or rely on naturalistic assumptions. This com-parison is elaborated by distinguishing a publishedexample of strongly theistic psychotherapy fromthree common types of weakly theistic psychothera-py, with corresponding published examples.

THEISM AND THEISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

In order to clearly define theism, especially in ascience such as psychology, we must first understandits relation to the fundamental worldview of tradi-tional science—naturalism. As the historian of psy-chology Thomas Leahey (1991) put it, naturalism is“science’s central dogma” (p. 379). It directs psychol-ogists to appeal to and study only natural events andprocesses, not “supernatural” events and processes,to understand and explain psychological phenome-na (Collins, 1977; Griffin, 2000; Gunton, 1993; Lea-hey, 1991; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Russell, 2002;Smith, 2001). As we will discuss, this dualism of nat-ural and supernatural can itself be problematic, butthe point here is that the naturalism at issue in this

INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY:STRONG VS. WEAK THEISM

The authors first attempt to conceptualize theisticpsychotherapy by discussing the relationshipbetween theism and naturalism. Many psychologistshave assumed that naturalism and theism can becombined in various ways, so the authors review themore prominent of these combinations at the outset.They argue not only that these mixtures are “weak”(i.e., they restrain God in some way) but also thatthey ultimately assume naturalism is incompatible inmany ways with theism. The authors compare“weak” theism with a “strong” theism that does notrestrain God or rely on naturalistic assumptions.This comparison is elaborated by distinguishing apublished example of strongly theistic psychotherapyfrom three common types of weakly theistic psy-chotherapy, with corresponding examples from thetheistic literature.

BRENT D. SLIFEBrigham Young UniversityTIFFANI D. STEVENSONUniversity of MarylandDENNIS C. WENDTUniversity of Michigan

Brent D. Slife, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham YoungUniversity, Provo, Utah 84602; Tel: 801-442-3657; Fax: 801-442-0204; Email: [email protected].

164 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

article, whether it is labeled metaphysical or method-ological,1 makes the pre-investigatory assumptionthat God is not necessarily needed to conceptualize,conduct, or explain scholarship and psychotherapyin psychological science.

The relation between this form of naturalism andtheism is controversial, with many scholars contend-ing the two worldviews are incompatible (e.g.,Collins, 1977; Gunton, 1993; Leahey, 1991; Richards& Bergin, 2005; Smith, 2001) and many others treat-ing these two worldviews as completely, if not primari-ly, compatible (e.g., Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998;Griffin, 2000; Russell, 2002; Wacome, 2003). Mostagree that there are important differences. Naturalismtypically assumes that the natural, physical processesof the world, such as natural laws and physical princi-ples, operate autonomously and are currently suffi-cient to account for all relevant natural phenomena,including phenomena of interest to psychologists(Collins, 1977; Griffin, 2000; Leahey, 1991; Nelson,2006; Reber, 2006; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Slife &Whoolery, 2006). Theism, on the other hand, tradi-tionally supposes that these laws are not sufficientalone; theism, by definition, assumes that God is alsoimportant in understanding the world, perhaps eventhe psychological world. For this reason, these world-views have two different types of explanations. Oneassumes God is at least a necessary condition for psy-chological events, and the other denies this assump-tion—a logical incompatibility, at least on this issue(Griffin, 2000; Hunter, 2007; Philipchalk, 1987;Plantinga, 2001; Richards & Bergin, 2005).

The main source of controversy is that many peo-ple, including many psychologists, have presumed thatthe two worldviews are compatible on most otherassumptions. This presumption is understandable,considering that there are seemingly two great sets oftruths in modern Western society—the truths of sci-ence, which typically assume naturalism, and the truthsof religion, which often assume theism (Smith, 2001;

Taylor, 2007). The notion that such truths are ultimate-ly unified has led many to assume that the two world-views are compatible, even if this compatibility is rarelymade explicit. It is not surprising, then, that many psy-chotherapy researchers and practitioners would like-wise presuppose that theism and naturalism are essen-tially compatible. After all, many psychologists areprofessionally or personally committed to naturalisticscience and believe in God, or at least have clients whodo. Thus, psychologists have often assumed that it ispossible to conceptualize psychotherapy approachesthat are true to both the naturalism of traditional sci-ence and the theism of many religions.

For us to clarify the relation between naturalismand theism, we need to look at the main ways inwhich this compatibility has been conceptualized.Before doing so, we should note that the natural-ism/theism issue is not a debate about differentworlds—the natural and the supernatural. It is,rather, a debate about different worldviews orphilosophies (Richards & Bergin, 2005; Slife,Mitchell, & Whoolery, 2004; Taylor, 2007). The for-mer (worlds) typically concerns the existence orimportance of spiritual factors or variables, whichwe do not discuss in this article, whereas the latter(worldviews) is about two intellectual frameworkswith different sets of assumptions. A root issue,then, and a primary focus of this article is the ques-tion: are the two interpretive frameworks of natural-ism and theism compatible and thus combinable forsome integrated form of theistic psychology?

Attempted Compatibility

Two categories of conceptions are typically con-sidered the primary candidates for compatibility:deism and dualism. Deism is the notion that Godcreated the world, along with its natural laws, butthat God is no longer involved in the world (exceptperhaps in extraordinary instances), allowing its

1 The question of methodological naturalism is: does the scientisthave to assume the nonexistence of theistic entities to study onlynatural events and processes? In other words, can we assume amere epistemological (or methodological) naturalism without alsoassuming an ontological or metaphysical naturalism? These ques-tions get complicated, as we later show, but many scholars recog-nize that all epistemologies are underlain with ontological assump-tions and vice versa (e.g., Nelson, 2009; Richardson, Fowers, &Guignon, 1999). Why, for example, would epistemological natu-ralists focus on just natural events and processes unless theyassume, for the purposes of their investigation, that supernaturalevents and processes are not relevant, or do not functionally exist

(ontology), for that study? Another way to put this is that if super-natural events and processes were considered to functionally existin a difference-making way, and thus be important to the phenom-ena of study, then the methods derived from studying only naturalevents and processes would be considered inadequate to the task(Slife & Reber, 2009). The point is that the epistemological/onto-logical distinction is not an issue for the purposes of this article.All that matters is whether the particular conception assumes thatGod is not necessary (for conceptualizing, conducting or explain-ing studies), in which case it is considered naturalistic, or whetherthe conception assumes that God is necessary, in which case it isconsidered theistic.

SLIFE, STEVENSON, and WENDT 165

natural laws to operate autonomously (Griffin, 2000;Taylor, 2007). This approach would seem to affirmthe existence of God without compromising thedemands of naturalism. Because God does not inter-fere in the world after its original creation, accordingto deism (Taylor, 2007), the autonomous operationof natural, physical laws is not disrupted and sciencecan proceed without considering God’s activity(Slife et al., 2004, p. 37).

The second common category for attempting toharmonize theism and naturalism is dualism. Accord-ing to variations on this conception, the world isdivided into two spheres, one that is spiritual orsupernatural and the other that is natural. God wouldbe involved in the spiritual sphere, but not the natural(Plantinga, 2001; Slife & Richards, 2001; Wacome,2003). This way, the natural sphere is fully explain-able through natural laws, while still allowing for aspiritual sphere in which God is important (Taylor,2007). There are many variations on dualism, fromDescartes’ soul/body dualism to natural/supernatu-ral distinctions to “god of the gaps” approaches(Hall, 2004; Plantinga, 2001). In all these dualisticvariations, theistic explanations are useful for “myste-rious” or “miraculous” events (in the soul or thesupernatural) that cannot be explained by naturallaws (Griffin, 2000).

These dualistic and deistic approaches demon-strate that it is certainly possible to talk about Godin relation to naturalism. The question remains,however: how satisfactory are these attempts atintegrating the fundamental assumptions of natu-ralistic and theistic worldviews? In addressing thisquestion, we first need to consider whether impor-tant assumptions of these worldviews are beingintegrated at all. Although deistic and dualisticexplanations certainly include theistic and natural-istic assumptions, it appears that the two world-views are semantically confined to unrelated cor-ners of the world. For the deist, God and naturallaws are never actively involved in the world at thesame time; for the dualist, the two are never activelyinvolved in the same place.

Incompatible Assumptions

This lack of integration may suggest that there isan important sense in which theism and naturalismare incompatible. If the two were compatible, thenwhy would explanations that expressly attempt com-patibility need to be compartmentalized into sepa-

rate autonomous realms, with neither requiring theother for explanation? The answer to this questionmay lie in the assumptions that each of the twoworldviews presumes. Although these worldviewsare often viewed as having many common assump-tions about the world (e.g., both assume that orderor regularity exists in the world; D’Souza, 2007; Tay-lor, 2007), this type of commonality would not pre-clude the possibility that they differ on many otherassumptions, such as whether God is currently andactively involved in the natural world.

What would these differing assumptions mean?Perhaps most importantly, there is always a relation-ship among worldview assumptions; otherwise, theycould not coherently imply a “worldview.” If, forexample, a currently active God is a fairly superficialassumption, or an assumption that is already com-patible with the other assumptions of a worldview,then it can be “added on” without disturbing theongoing system of thought, and thus other assump-tions, such as order. If, on the other hand, theassumption of a currently active God is central andpervasive, not superficial or an “add-on,” then theinclusion of this assumption changes the nature ofthe other assumptions, sometimes radically.Although the labels of other assumptions may notchange (e.g., label of “order”), their meanings couldbe qualitatively different, such as the differencebetween a law-governed and thus essentially mecha-nistic and determined order (naturalism), and aGod-inspired and thus divine and obedient order(theism; Nelson, 2006).

It is this latter relation among assumptions—thatGod is not merely an add-on—that we believeprompts the compatibilist to restrict theistic and nat-uralistic worldviews to separate times and places indeism and dualism. In other words, the inherentincompatibility of the two worldviews means thatthe only approach to “integrating” them is to rec-ognize their incompatibility and confine them toseparate corners of the universe. We realize thatthis incompatibility may be surprising to some,considering that naturalism is often seen as a “rela-tively nonpartisan and objective philosophy” thatis compatible with theism (Slife et al., 2004, p. 35).However, it is telling that wherever naturalism is—innature or following its original creation—God’s activi-ty is considered unnecessary. With deism, God’s activ-ity was needed to create the natural laws, but once cre-ated, the operation of these laws does not requireGod’s current activity. With dualism, God’s current

166 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

activity is limited to the spiritual realm, presumablybeing inactive or superfluous in the natural realm. Ineither case, naturalism is incompatible with theism,insofar as it assumes that God is not currently neededto explain the natural world (Griffin, 2000).

A naturalist might challenge this incompatibilityby contending that God is not only the creator ofnatural laws (deism) but also the upholder of them.With this conception, God is continually involved,but involved in a lawful manner that is consonantwith naturalism. Understanding this conception, ofcourse, hinges on the meaning of terms such as “law-ful.” Many theists would also view God as involved inthe regularities of the world. However, if lawful ismeant in the conventional sense of naturalism (Slife,2004), this conception is little more than anotheradd-on approach to compatibility—adding God on tonatural laws. As Griffin (2000) and other scholarshave argued, the notion that God merely upholds nat-ural laws does not allow God to be “active” in anymeaningful theistic sense because merely upholdinglaws does not allow God to act otherwise than thelaws. Because this ability to “act otherwise” is thebasis of any freedom of action, God can enjoy nosuch freedom. Moreover, God cannot uniquely min-ister or modify divine actions in the light of changingcircumstances, because naturalistic laws of nature arethe same for everyone, regardless of their situations.The bottom line is that such add-ons never “inte-grate” or make compatible theism and naturalism.

It is not surprising, then, considering psychology’scommitment to naturalism, that God is rarely men-tioned in psychology textbooks (Miller & Delaney,2005; Slife & Reber, 2009). These textbook authorsmay argue that the absence of God is a reflection of aneutral or unbiased methodological position on the-ism, that is, they are neither affirming nor denyingGod (see Slife & Nelson, 2006; Slife & Whoolery,2006). However, Porpora (2006) has shown that thisposition is akin to a “methodological atheism,” inwhich God is not required in the application or inter-pretation of psychological (naturalistic) methods (p.57). Still, God is required for a theist; hence, thedenial of this requirement is itself be a type of bias,and thus violates the supposed neutrality. The logicalincompatibility of “required” and “not required” high-lights, once again, an incompatibility of naturalismand theism. The result, considering psychotherapy’scommitment to naturalism, is that God’s currentactivity is either severely limited or irrelevant.

Weak versus Strong Theism

These understandings of God’s activity (or inac-tivity) allow us to distinguish between two forms oftheism in psychology—weak and strong. The adjec-tives “strong” and “weak” do not mean “good” and“bad”; rather, they are philosophical or conceptualdistinctions that indicate the extent or degree towhich some assumptions or ideas are applied to theparticular conceptual system. The adjectives “hard”and “soft” are frequently used in a similar manner, asin hard or soft naturalism (e.g., Griffin, 2000; Haber-mas, 2008). Deistic and dualistic psychotherapyapproaches can be described as “weak” forms of the-ism, in that God’s active influence in the world ispresumed to be relatively weak. Weakly theisticapproaches limit God in some way in terms of timeand space. These limitations are often a result ofattempts to combine theism and naturalism.

A strongly theistic approach, by contrast, wouldnot automatically place limitations on God’s activeinfluence in the world. Consider, for example,Plantinga’s (2001) understanding of a strong theism:“God is already and always intimately acting innature which depends from moment to moment . . .upon divine activity” (p. 350). In this sense, a strongtheism would not necessarily require that God beunlimited (e.g., self-limitations would be permitted),but the strong theist would require that God not belimited a priori in a particular way. God’s activitywould be seen as potentially unlimited at any giventime and at any given place, including the here andnow of a psychotherapy session.

From a strongly theistic perspective, a potentiallyunlimited God is an assumption made, not a variableto be measured. God’s activities could perhaps beoperationalized, just as the manifestations of unob-servable natural laws and principles have been opera-tionalized. However, recall that these conceptualframeworks are worldviews, not variables per se.Strong theism, in this sense, asks the question: Whatif psychotherapy were to begin with the assumptionof a potentially unlimited and active God? This“beginning” would apply to the formulation ofmethod as well as theory and practice (Slife &Reber, 2009). In other words, what if God truly mat-tered in the “here and now” of psychotherapeuticevents, rather than merely in the “there and then” ofthe supernatural or creation of the world (dualismand deism)?

SLIFE, STEVENSON, and WENDT 167

CONCEPTUALIZING STRONGLY

THEISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

From this core starting point,a strongly theisticapproach to psychotherapy would need to be explic-itly conceptualized in the non-naturalistic assump-tion of an active God, rather than the naturalisticpresumption that God’s activity is not directly rele-vant. Again, the issue here is conceptualization ofpsychotherapy, not God’s involvement in therapy.We readily grant that God could be involved in psy-chotherapy, regardless of whether the conceptualiza-tion included this divine influence. Moreover, theissue is not about whether strong theism makes forbetter (or worse) psychotherapy than weak theism.We are concerned, instead, about what a conceptual-ization of a strongly theistic psychotherapy would belike, if it is even possible.

One of the primary challenges of this conceptionis that a strongly theistic therapist would not acceptthe God assumption as a mere “add on” to nat-uralistic psychotherapy theories and practicesthat are (incorrectly) presumed to be theologicallyneutral. By denying deistic and dualistic concep-tions, a strongly theistic approach cannot commit tothe a priori assumption that there is a portion of theworld that is independent of God’s influence. Thisdoes not mean that a strongly theistic therapistwould have to view God’s activity as a sufficientcause or condition of all events; it could certainlyhold that other psychological factors are also neces-sary, including, for example, a client’s own will. God,in this sense, would have to be viewed as at least oneof several necessary conditions—part of a largerwhole, but as necessary as any other part to under-stand the whole and all the other parts or factors(Taylor, 2007). Indeed, the reluctance to speak of oraffirm God’s potentially necessary activity is itself atheological position that strong theism is not willingor able to take, especially since this assumption can-not be merely an add-on assumption.

Another issue that distinguishes weak and strongtheism concerns peripheral aspects of theism, aux-iliary characteristics that are often correlated withtheism but do not require an active God to explainor understand. Peripheral aspects might include cer-tain moral or ethical values such as altruism, compas-sion, and humility (VanderStoep, 2003; Sperry &Shafranske, 2005; Jones, 2006); philosophicalassumptions such as free will, holism, and transcen-dence (Richards & Bergin, 2005, chap. 4; Vander-

Stoep, 2003); or “spiritual” activities such as medita-tion, mindfulness, and forgiveness (Hardman,Berrett, & Richards, 2004; Krejci, 2004). Althoughthese characteristics can be closely related to theism,conceptually and historically, they are not uniquelyor inherently theistic (Taylor, 2007). Even somethingas theistically charged as prayer can be presumed tooperate according to “change mechanisms” that con-sider God’s possible involvement to be irrelevant(e.g., prayer is part of a naturalistic mechanism thatfacilitates the correction of thinking errors). From atheistic perspective, however, God’s involvement isnot irrelevant; prayer and other peripheral aspectshave a unique meaning from their relation to a Godwho is already present and functionally active (seeSlife & Ellertson, 2004; Slife & Melling, 2006).

Given the centrality and necessity of an activeGod for a strongly theistic psychotherapy, we wouldexpect strongly theistic researchers and practitionersto be upfront and explicit about God’s activityin the psychological world. Yet, it is surely truethat the therapeutic theories and practices which areconsidered theistic do not routinely feature God’sactivities in the psychological literature (cf. Slife &Ellertson, 2004; VanderStoep, 2003). The authors ofthese theories and practices might claim to assume astrong theism, and thus a currently active God, with-out being explicit about it. They might know, forexample, that editors or reviewers are not open tothis kind of “God talk,” especially perhaps in Ameri-can Psychological Association and other mainstreamjournals and publications. We are open to this possi-bility, of course, and hope that other authors willcomment on their own experiences. Nevertheless, asunderstandable as this omission is, we feel obligatedto note it violates the spirit of strong theism, whereGod’s centrality is too important to be left to silentassumption, especially in explicitly “theistic” render-ings of psychotherapy. Here, the very nature of thesubject matter, we believe, requires the author to beclear about the therapeutic conditions that involvedivine influences.

This issue is especially relevant in a secular disci-pline like psychology, where the disciplinary pre-sumption is that God is not considered to beinvolved, unless the conceptualization states other-wise. One should also be wary of the common mis-conception that a lack of explicit talk about God is asign of neutrality. Unless this core assumption isclearly reflected at all levels of theory, method, andpractice, one cannot assume that an approach is

168 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

either theistic or a true alternative to the current nat-uralistic and secularist models of psychotherapy.

From this basic conceptualization of strong the-ism, we can summarize four general requirements ofa strongly theistic psychotherapy. First, God’s activitywould not be limited a priori to a particular time(deism) or sphere (dualism) but would be potentiallyunlimited any place and time. Second, God wouldnot be seen as an optional “add on” to otherwise sec-ular and/or naturalistic therapies and explanations;rather, God’s activity would be a core and permeat-ing constituent of the worldview and assumptionsthat guide psychotherapy research and practice.Third, peripheral aspects of theism, though possibleimplications of God’s presence, would be insuffi-cient in themselves and only theistically meaningfulin light of an active God. Fourth, the assumption ofGod’s activity would be clearly reflected in the thera-py at all levels of theory, method, and practice.

Strong Theism in Practice:The Alldredge Academy

Many psychologists may question whetherstrong theism is even possible in a pragmatic sense,perhaps seeing these requirements as unrealistic forprofessional practice. It is one thing to conceptual-ize a strongly theistic approach; it is quite anotherto see it in practice. Here, the first author was fortu-nate to develop a relationship with the AlldredgeAcademy, a West Virginia school for troubled youththat seemed to meet the general requirements ofstrong theism (above) in its therapeutic approach-es. This relationship led to a report of the theoryand methods of the Academy through the case ofan actual client (Slife et al., 2004), so as to providean illustration of how a strongly theistic conceptual-ization might be manifested in a therapeuticapproach. We briefly describe the Alldredge Acade-my’s approach here to demonstrate how strong the-ism can form the conceptual basis of a therapeuticcommunity’s theory and methods, at least as theAcademy existed at the time of the 2004 article.(We understand that this Academy is now undernew management.)

First, unlike weak theism, the Alldredge Academydoes not automatically limit God’s activity to a cer-tain time or place. Rather, God is seen to be alreadypresent in the world and is potentially involved at alltimes and in all places—the first of the four require-ments of strong theism. God’s activity is conceptual-

ized to be the center of therapeutic change; indeed,no change is possible without “the Source,” All-dredge’s term for God (Slife et al., 2004, p. 41). Theterm “Source” is used to accommodate several wide-ly varying theistic traditions—an accommodationbased on the strongly theistic assumption that Godcan be active in the lives of all people. At every stageof Alldredge’s therapeutic model, instructors“assume the Source is already present; their only jobis to facilitate ‘spiritual’ experiences and loving rela-tionships that help the students to sense andacknowledge the Source” (p. 46). Because the Sourceis already assumed to be present, there is no need forinterventions that presume God’s activity is limitedto a certain time or place (weak theism).

As a second requirement of strong theism, God’sinfluence is conceptualized “all the way down” atAlldredge rather than viewed as an add-on to natu-ralistic theories and practices. In other words, theAcademy’s practices cannot be made naturalisticwithout fundamentally changing the way they areperformed. For example, in the “Mountain Searchand Rescue” phase of the therapeutic program,“instructors routinely assemble the group for amoment of silence.” The ultimate purpose of thispractice, like all other Alldredge practices, is to“help students to sense and acknowledge theSource” (Slife et al., 2004, p. 46).

Although there is no question that weakly- andnon-theistic approaches could advocate or practice amoment of silence, the rationale and meaning of thispractice, as explained to Alldredge students andunderstood within the therapeutic system, would bequite different. A non-theistic approach, for example,might advocate a moment of silence for the self-bene-fit of clear thinking (see Slife et al., 2004, pp. 46). Onthe other hand, the aim of such practices for theAcademy is not the student’s self-benefit; it is ultimate-ly for the sake of the Source, which implies in this con-text the mission of the Search and Rescue team (pp.50-51). In this respect, God is not simply added ontoan otherwise naturalistic practice, but rather is inextri-cably connected with the practice. Indeed, the veryconceptualization and development of this practice,like all Alldredge’s theories and practices, is guidedfrom the conceptual beginning by the non-naturalisticcore assumptions of strong theism (p. 41).

Similarly, the Alldredge Academy includes activi-ties and values that can be viewed as peripheralaspects of theism. Alldredge students, for example,are encouraged to engage in “spiritual” activities such

SLIFE, STEVENSON, and WENDT 169

as meditation and prayer. Unlike weak and non-the-istic accounts, however, these aspects are viewed asmeaningful only in light of an active God workingthrough them—the third requirement of strong the-ism. As a result, these aspects are understood and, tosome degree, performed differently (e.g., prayer con-tent). The same can be said for values endorsed bythe Academy, such as love, integrity, hope, and valor.These values are only understood in light of an activeGod. In fact, “instructors model these values andfacilitate experiences that aid the students in comingto their own values by and through the Source”(Slife et al., 2004, p. 43).

As a fourth and final requirement of strong theism,the assumption of God’s necessary activity is clearlyreflected at all levels of theory, method, and practice.Alldredge instructors see God as “uniting all their ther-apeutic interventions” (Slife et al., 2004, p. 46). Foreach phase of therapy, “the fellowship of the Source”(p. 52) is not seen as simply one possible benefit ofthe Academy, but rather its ultimate purpose, as wellas the active power of a divine necessary conditionthat runs through everything. According to this reporton the Alldredge Academy, there is no intervention,however small or implicit, for which an active God isnot considered necessary or even central. This clearand pervasive reflection of strong theism is not sur-prising, because the Academy explicitly avoids theassumptions of naturalism (Slife et. al, 2004).

If the Alldredge Academy embodies a viableapplication of a strongly theistic approach, then thequestion of whether this conception can be translat-ed into practice would seem to be answered: psy-chologists can conceptualize and implement strongtheism in their practices. Some therapists may desireto see a strongly theistic example that is more con-ventional, in the sense of outpatient or individualwork, rather than a therapeutic community such asthe Alldredge Academy. In this case, we are aware ofother possible examples of strongly theistic therapiesthat might meet these desires (e.g., Jankowski, 2003;Olthuis, 2006). The Alldredge example was chosenbecause its literature explicitly contrasts strong theis-tic with naturalistic approaches, both theoreticallyand practically. Moreover, our primary purpose hereis to show that a strongly theistic approach to thera-peutic intervention is possible. Of course, its merepossibility says nothing about its effectiveness. Still,for a strong theist, the explicit inclusion of God inthe formulation and practice of therapy cannot helpbut facilitate effectiveness. All formulations and

practices that exclude God, even to some degree, areincomplete and inadequate by theistic definition.

THREE TYPES OF WEAKLY THEISTIC

PSYCHOTHERAPY APPROACHES

The existence of both the conception and prac-tice of a strong theism begs an intriguing question:what approaches that claim to be theistic are strong-ly theistic? Again, we hasten to remind our readersthat the adverb “strongly” is philosophical, as instrong (or hard) naturalism (e.g., Griffin, 2000). Ourdistinction between strong and weak is not meant todistinguish between good and bad psychotherapy orgood and bad theology. It is intended only to clarifythe construct of theism, especially as it might applyto “theistic” forms of therapy. This aim of clarifica-tion is also the reason we proffered a concrete exam-ple of strong theism in the Alldredge Academy.

At this juncture, the same purpose prompts us todescribe (below) three concrete types of weak the-ism: compartmentalized, peripheral, and incon-sistent. To illustrate each type, we describe a pub-lished work that may exemplify some of the featuresassociated with the specific type. We offer these illus-trations, again, for the sake of clarity and furtherdevelopment; they are not intended to represent thetheistic literature.2 We would argue that these areprominent categories of weak theism, but we do notclaim that no others exist or that only weak theismexists in this literature. We would welcome othertypes and examples of either weak or strongapproaches.

1. Compartmentalized Theism

For the first type of weak theism, compart-mentalized theism, the therapist’s private theisticbeliefs are “compartmentalized” from his or herprofessional theories and practices. These thera-pists may consider themselves to be strong theistspersonally, perhaps disclosing their religious affili-ation and/or theistic beliefs in order to attract or

2 In particular, we should note that we constructed this typologylargely on the basis of theistic psychotherapy articles and chap-ters from mainstream psychology publishers (e.g., APA). We rec-ognize that the theistic psychotherapy literature is diverse andthat differing typologies might be made, especially for publica-tions where theological language and theories are more acceptedor even encouraged. Still, we believe that our types and examplesare helpful for distinguishing common aspects of weakly theisticpsychotherapies, along with their differences from strongly theis-tic psychotherapies.

170 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

build rapport with theistic clients. However, theirprofessional theories and explanations do notreflect strong theism as a core philosophy, and, infact, are often identical to secular and naturalisticapproaches. We are open to several secular prac-tices being virtually indistinguishable from certainstrongly theistic practices (e.g., caring), but theauthor’s explanation or theory about how thesepractices change or heal clients should not be iden-tical, given the incompatibility of strong theismand naturalism.

A possible example of compartmentalized theismis Lovinger’s (1996) “denominational framework”for psychotherapy with religious clients. Lovinger,who identifies himself as Jewish (p. 352), asks thera-pists to understand how various religious denomina-tions impact the “attitudes, values, and worldview[s]”of their clients (p. 328). His approach is similar topsychotherapists who seek understanding and sensi-tivity toward “ethnic, socioeconomic, and culturalinfluences” (p. 327). Considering that a denomina-tional impact might include theistic beliefs,Lovinger’s approach implies a degree of opennessand respect for the client’s beliefs about God.

Similar to many therapeutic approaches to cultur-al sensitivity, however, Lovinger’s approach does notadvocate that the cultural or religious beliefs formthe theoretical foundation for the therapeutic sys-tem. Therapeutic systems are frequently presumedto be relatively neutral to cultures or religions, andthus not biased against them. Yet, as we havedescribed in our discussion above, this presumptionis problematic because all inter ventions arepremised upon theoretical presuppositions that arevalue-laden and thus biased in some way or other(Rychlak, 1981; Slife, Williams, & Barlow, 2001). Notherapeutic theory is neutral or unbiased.

If Lovinger’s therapeutic approach is not unbiased,then what is the nature of its biases? Even if we pre-sume that Lovinger has a personal bias in the favor ofstrong theism (e.g., as a practicing Jew), this does notnecessitate that his therapy approach is strongly theis-tic as well. He could have professional and personal“compartments,” where he uses naturalistic theoriesof change and healing that he learned in his profes-sional training, but he uses strongly theistic under-standings in other parts of his life. No conventionaltherapeutic approach assumes the necessity of God’sinfluence in its mechanisms of change, so the practiceof a conventional approach, as Lovinger advocates, isnot guided by a strongly theistic theory.

Nor can Lovinger merely “add on” a client’s (orhis) God to a conventional approach, merelybecause it is important to the client (or him). We donot doubt that “God talk” can occur in the contentof a conventional therapeutic conversation; indeed,this addition may help the client relax and relate(e.g., using language that is familiar to the client).Still, to practice the process of conventional therapyis to practice as though God’s influence is unneces-sary to the mechanism of client change. Lovingeressentially admits this lack of necessity when heclaims that “psychotherapy with religious clients isnot essentially different from nonreligious clients”(p. 353). Unless he uses a strongly theistic approachwith nontheistic clients, Lovinger’s understanding ofthe process of therapy is likely to presume either aweak theism or a naturalism. In this way, the distinc-tion between content/process is similar to the dis-tinction between personal/professional; God isinvolved in one or the other “compartment” but notboth, reflecting the dualism discussed above.

2. Peripheral Theism

The second type of weak theism, peripheral the-ism, shares many of the same basic qualities as com-partmentalized theism. The major difference, how-ever, is that this second type includes what we havecalled (above) “peripheral aspects of theism” withinthe context of therapy, such as prayer and forgive-ness. As described, these peripheral aspects can beconceptualized either as requiring an active God oras working through more conventional psychologi-cal mechanisms, and thus not requiring an activeGod. In peripheral theism, therapy strategies mayinclude and even focus on these peripheral aspects,but their relation to or need of an active God is notpart of their understanding or significance.

One possible example of peripheral theism isKrejci’s (2004) case study of an “anger-filled” (p. 100)religious couple, in which Krejci incorporates spiritu-al themes and activities into a marital therapyapproach. Krejci is a practicing Roman Catholicwith a “private practice at a local Roman Catholicchurch” (p. 87). His therapeutic orientation is “influ-enced by both humanistic and cognitive-behavioralapproaches to psychotherapy” (p. 87). In his casestudy, Krejci’s approach includes several peripheralaspects of theism such as prayer, forgiveness, spiritu-ality, and “faith beliefs” (pp. 95, 101). However, hedoes not mention or even imply that this approach

SLIFE, STEVENSON, and WENDT 171

or these aspects require an active God in an under-standing of their effectiveness.

Here, of course, we have to allow the possibilitythat Krejci is merely towing a particular rhetoricalline in his report and avoiding theistic language.Krejci’s approach could even be viewed as similar tothe Alldredge Academy’s approach, which alsofocuses on empathy and altruism—commonly con-sidered to be peripheral aspects of theism (cf.Richards & Bergin, 2005). As we have discussed,however, these aspects and the change mechanismsby which they are presumed to operate can beunderstood in many other ways than theistic. Ourmain point here is that the mere inclusion of theseaspects does not ipso facto imply a strongly theisticpsychotherapy. God is not a “peripheral” aspect ofprayer or forgiveness for the strong theist. If God iscentrally involved and even required for theseaspects to be meaningful, then good scholarshiprequires the explication of this involvement in a pub-lished description of the therapy.

As an example, Krejci (2004) uses a “model offorgiveness” in which he views forgiveness as asequential process of ceased resentment followed byunderstanding, empathy, and altruism (p. 96). Itwould not be difficult to understand this modelfrom the naturalistic tenets of his orientation, usinghumanistic and cognitive behavioral principles. Thiskind of naturalism is also likely because Krejci (2004)did not develop his model as a uniquely theisticapproach (p. 96). As he explains, religious aspectswere incorporated into his model because they wereimportant to the clients—to help them build “some-thing positive” into their marriage (p. 100)—notbecause they brought God into play and were neces-sary for change.

We understand that therapists might view God asplaying a vital role in their theory of change but notnecessarily explicate this role in the therapy sessionitself. Similar to other health-care professionals (e.g.,physicians), therapists rarely articulate their theory ofchange with their patients, so strongly theistic profes-sionals would probably not differ in this regard. How-ever, good scholarship would dictate that all the vitalconditions of healing be explicated in a formal or pub-lished description of a case. Krejci could explain, forexample, how God’s enabling grace helped couples toforgive one another. Such an explanation would allowthe reader to understand all the conditions the thera-pist considers necessary to the healing process.

3. Inconsistent Theism

The final type of weak theism is probably theclosest of the three types to strong theism. Unlikecompartmentalized and peripheral theism, this thirdtype of psychotherapy clearly advocates the vital andpresent activity of God, not just in privacy or inperipheral aspects. Rather, this divine influence isproclaimed to some degree in published accounts ofthe theories, methods, and practices of this thirdtype. Moreover, these publications are often sensi-tive to the problems of a secularized or naturalizedpsychology from a theistic perspective (e.g., Bartz,2009; Hardman et al., 2004; Richards & Bergin,2004, 2005). For these reasons, this third type ofweak theism may bear a striking resemblance to thestrong theism of the Alldredge Academy.

However, we consider this type to be weakly the-istic and label it inconsistent theism because thereare many other aspects of the therapy’s theories,methods, and practices that do not require or evenrelate to an active God. In this sense, inconsistenttheism is an attempt to combine—within the contextof therapy—the incompatible assumptions of natural-ism and theism, resulting in a dualistic form of weaktheism where God’s activity is limited to a certainrealm or set of factors. The theistic components oftherapy are thus inconsistent with the naturalisticcomponents. One could say, of course, that com-partmentalized and peripheral theism also are incon-sistent in certain respects (e.g., the therapist’s privatebeliefs are inconsistent with the naturalistic assump-tions of therapy). However, the term “inconsistent”here (for the third type) refers to inconsistenciesamong the elements of psychotherapy per se.

A possible example of inconsistent theism isHardman et al.’s (2004) article about “an integrative,multidisciplinary inpatient treatment program forwomen with eating disorders” (p. 55). In theirdescription of this approach, the authors are explicit-ly theistic, claiming, for example, that “relationshipswith self, God, and others are interconnected andneed to be addressed and included together in suc-cessful therapeutic change” (p. 56). In addition, whenHardman et al. provide a case study of an individualpatient, God’s activity is seen as integral to thischange, including the patient receiving “personal spir-itual witnesses that God loved her” and feeling “deepreassurances of God’s love come into her heart andmind” (p. 67). In fact, when such patients “open theirhearts to God’s love and healing presence, then

172 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

psychotherapists simply become facilitators and wit-nesses to a healing process that transcends ordinarypsychological change processes” (p. 71). These state-ments are remarkably similar to the way the All-dredge Academy staff conceptualizes its facilitatingrole with an already present and active God (Slife etal., 2004, p. 46).

On the other hand, these strongly theistic expla-nations are inconsistent with many of Hardman etal.’s (2004) specific theories and practices ofchange, for which God is not clearly included oreven implied. This inconsistency is possibly due tothe authors’ integrative approach, which “followedthe recommendations of numerous professionalsthat spiritual interventions should not be usedalone, but integrated with standard psychologicaland medical interventions” (p. 59). This approach issurely reasonable, given many common ways ofunderstanding theism and naturalism, and also isinnovative in light of the overwhelming dominanceof naturalistic psychotherapies. Nonetheless, theapproach is still dualistic because it assumes thatspiritual interventions are somehow separable fromthe nonspiritual interventions of psychology andmedicine. In other words, there is a spiritual realmand a nonspiritual realm, as though God is notinvolved in the nonspiritual or naturalistic. In thissense, the authors’ approach is integrative onlybecause both types of interventions are permitted,not because the authors formally consider God tobe vital to both types.

In this respect, the spiritual portion of Hardmanet al.’s (2004) therapy, in which God’s activity isclearly described, could be viewed as an “add on” tothe naturalistic theories and methods that are pre-sumably seen as neutral to God’s activity. We say“presumably,” because if the authors viewed God’sactivity as incompatible with these naturalistic the-ories and methods, then they would be less likely toconceptualize the spiritual components as coher-ently integrated with the nonspiritual componentssuch as medicine. We are aware that medicine, suchas medical evaluations and prescription drugs, isnot typically viewed as spiritual, so we can readilyunderstand Hardman et al.’s (2004) reasoning. Yet,this is the challenge and provocative nature ofstrong theism; it does not allow for the weaktheisms of either dualism or deism. It wouldassume that God is a necessary condition even inthe successes of medicine.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In conclusion, we have attempted to clarify hownaturalism and strong theism rest upon incompati-ble assumptions concerning the potential activity ofGod. Strong theism, we have argued, requires God’sactivity; naturalism denies this requirement. Thisincompatibility is rarely appreciated in psychologybecause naturalism is widely considered a relativelyneutral or unbiased philosophy concerning God(Slife & Reber, 2009). Consequently, naturalistictherapies are often viewed as not conflicting with thebeliefs of theistic clients or theistic therapists. Even ifsome therapists recognize the incompatibility of thisone assumption—the requirement of an active God—they may suppose that other assumptions, such asorder and truth, are compatible.

Our conclusion, however—after examiningprominent understandings of this compatibility—isthat the necessity of God is not an add-on assump-tion for the strong theist. It is an altering assump-tion, implying that its inclusion changes the mean-ings, sometimes dramatically, of even supposedlycommon assumptions such as order and truth (Slife& Reber, 2009; Taylor, 2007). Because of this moregeneral incompatibility, many types of theistic psy-chotherapy may be weakly rather than strongly theis-tic. We have attempted to clarify this distinction bycontrasting the strong theism of the AlldredgeAcademy with three types of weak theism: compart-mentalized, peripheral, and inconsistent. It is ourhope that these categories of weak theism, alongwith their illustrations, will aid those who are inter-ested in constructing psychotherapies that are eitherstrongly or weakly theistic. Again, this article doesnot speak to the efficacy or ethical issues that maysurround this distinction; our interest is clarificationonly, both at the conceptual and practical levels.

Before closing, we need to discuss two concernsthat some readers may have regarding this clarifica-tion. First, we suspect that some psychotherapistswill claim that what we have identified as strong the-ism is simply too strong or radical (for science, psy-chology, therapy, or whatever). One form of thisclaim is that strongly theistic therapies, such as theAlldredge Academy, are not really therapies. Thistack attempts to resolve the issue through defini-tional fiat: only naturalistic forms of therapy aretherapy. However, we do not understand why a dis-cipline would restrict itself to only one category orphilosophy of healing, especially if it cares about

SLIFE, STEVENSON, and WENDT 173

effectiveness. Why not allow strong theism to takeits place in the market of potential ideas and strate-gies? We freely admit that strong theism is radicallydifferent from the naturalistic theories, practices,and methods that dominate psychology; this differ-ence is part of our main thesis. For this reason, wecan readily understand why many theistically orient-ed therapists may desire or need to practice a morecompatible type of weakly theistic therapy. We sim-ply suggest that it ought to be represented appropri-ately, both to clients in therapy and readers of schol-arly publications.

As a second concern, some professionals mayargue that not every client will agree with theassumptions and biases of a theistic approach,which is surely an important point. It is also impor-tant to note, however, that this point applies withequal force to naturalistic approaches. Naturalism isitself a set of assumptions and biases about whichmany clients, both theistic and non-theistic, mightnot agree (Richards & Bergin, 2004). For this rea-son, we believe it is ethically imperative to identifythe conceptual assumptions of all psychotherapiesin order to provide clients with the informationneeded to allow some type of informed consent. Alengthy discourse would rarely be necessary. Asmentioned, therapists do not typically providedetails about their model of change. Still, we sus-pect that many theistically inclined clients will beinterested to know that many conventional therapytheories are not unbiased with respect to their the-ism (Slife & Reber, 2009), and, in fact, do notinclude a currently active God in some portion oftheir conceptions. Without this type of informedconsent, and perhaps even consumer education,psychotherapy becomes a kind of Trojan horse thatsurreptitiously employs worldviews of which clientsare unaware.

REFERENCES

Bartz, J. D. (2009). Theistic existential psychotherapy. Psycholo-gy of Religion and Spirituality, 1, 69-80.

Brown, W., Murphy, N., & Malony, H. (1998). Whatever hap-pened to the soul? Scientific and theological portraits ofhuman nature. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.

Collins, G. R. (1977). The rebuilding of psychology: An inte-gration of psychology and Christianity. Wheaton, IL: TyndaleHouse.

D’Souza, D. (2007). What’s so great about Christianity. CarolStream, IL: Tyndale House.

Griffin (2000). Religion and scientific naturalism: Overcom-ing the conflicts. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Gunton, C. (1993). The one, the three, and the many: God,creation, and the culture of modernity. Cambridge, MA: Cam-bridge University Press.

Habermas, J. (2008). Between naturalism and religion: Philo-sophical essays. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.

Hall, M. E. L. (2004). God as cause or error? Academic psycholo-gy as Christian vocation. Journal of Psychology and Theology,32, 200-209.

Hardman, R. K., Berrett, M. E., & Richards, P. S. (2004). A theis-tic inpatient treatment approach for eating disorder patients: Acase report. In P. S. Richards & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), Casebook fora spiritual strategy in counseling and psychotherapy (pp. 55-73). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Hunter, C. G. (2007). Science’s blind spot: The unseen religionof scientific naturalism. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

Jankowski, P. J. (2003). Integrating postmodern therapies andspirituality: A solution to the contemporary crisis of the self. Jour-nal of Psychology and Christianity, 22, 241–249.

Jones, S. L. (2006). Integration: Defending it, describing it, doingit. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 34, 252-259.

Krejci, M. J. (2004). Forgiveness in marital therapy. In P. S.Richards & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), Casebook for a spiritual strate-gy in counseling and psychotherapy (pp. 87-102). Washington,DC: American Psychological Association.

Leahey, T. H. (1991). A history of modern psychology. Engle-wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Lovinger, R. J. (1996). Considering the religious dimension inassessment and treatment. In E. P. Shafranske (Ed.), Religion andthe clinical practice of psychology (pp. 327-364). Washington,DC: American Psychological Association.

Miller, W. R., & Delaney, H. D. (Eds.). (2005). Judeo-Christianperspectives on psychology. Washington, DC: APA Books.

Nelson, J. M. (2006). Missed opportunities in dialogue betweenpsychology and religion. Journal of Psychology and Theology,34, 205-216.

Nelson, J. M. (2009). Psychology, religion, and spirituality.New York: Springer.

Olthuis, J. H. (2006). With-ing: A psychotherapy of love. Journalof Psychology and Theology, 34, 66-77.

Philipchalk, R. P. (1987). Psychology and Christianity: Anintroduction to controversial issues. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America.

Plantinga, A. (2001). Methodological naturalism? In R. T. Pen-nock (Ed.), Intelligent design creationism and its critics:Philosophical, theological, and scientific perspectives (pp.339-362). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Porpora, D. V. (2006). Methodological atheism, methodologicalagnosticism and religious experience. Journal for the Theory ofSocial Behaviour, 36, 57-75.

Reber, J. S. (2006). Secular psychology: What’s the problem?Journal of Psychology and Theology, 34, 193-204.

174 INCLUDING GOD IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Richards, P. S., & Bergin, A. E. (Eds.). (2004). Casebook for aspiritual strategy in counseling and psychotherapy. Washing-ton, DC: APA Books.

Richards, P. S., & Bergin, A. E. (2005). A spiritual strategy for coun-seling and psychotherapy (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: APA Books.

Richardson, F. C., Fowers, B. J., & Guignon. C. B. (1999). Re-envisioning psychology: Moral dimensions of theory andpractice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Russell, C. A. (2002). The conflict of science and religion. In G. B.Ferngren (Ed.), Science and religion: A historical introduction(pp. 3-12). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rychlak, J. F. (1981). Introduction to personality and psy-chotherapy: A theory-construction approach (2nd ed.).Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Slife, B. D. (2004). Theoretical challenges to therapy practice andresearch: The constraint of naturalism. In M. J. Lambert (Ed.),Handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change. NewYork: Wiley.

Slife, B. D., & Ellertson, C. F. (2004). Dogma and dialogue: Theinterface of Christianity and psychology. Contemporary Psy-chology, 49, 677-679.

Slife, B. D., & Melling B. S. (2006). Psychological method and theactivity of God: Clarifications and distinctions. Journal of Psy-chology and Theology, 34, 280-285.

Slife, B. D., Mitchell, L. J., & Whoolery, M. (2004). A theisticapproach to therapeutic community: Non-naturalism and the All-dredge Academy. In P. S. Richards & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), Case-book for a spiritual strategy in counseling and psychothera-py (pp. 35-54). Washington, DC: APA Books.

Slife, B. D., & Nelson, J. M. (2006). Implications for the psy-chology of religion. Journal of Psychology and Theology,34, 289-291.

Slife, B. D., & Reber, J. S. (2009). Is there a pervasive implicit biasagainst theism in psychology? Journal of Theoretical andPhilosophical Psychology, 29, 63-79.

Slife, B. D., & Richards, S. P. (2001). How separable are spirituali-ty and theology in psychotherapy? Counseling and Values, 45,190-206.

Slife, B. D., & Whoolery, M. (2006). Are psychology’s main theo-ries and methods biased against its main consumers? Journal ofPsychology and Theology, 34, 217-231.

Slife, B. D., Williams, R. N., & Barlow, S. H. (Eds.) (2001). Criti-cal issues in psychotherapy: Translating new ideas into prac-tice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Smith, H. (2001). Why religion matters: The fate of thehuman spirit in an age of disbelief. New York: Harper Collins.

Sperry, L., & Shafranske, E. P. (Eds.) (2005). Spiritually orientedpsychotherapy. Washington, DC: American Psychological Asso-ciation.

Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

VanderStoep, S. W. (2003). Science and the soul: Christianfaith and psychological research. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America.

Wacome, D. H. (2003). Evolutionary psychology. In S. W. Vander-Stoep (Ed.), Science and the soul: Christian faith and psycho-logical research (pp. 183-208). Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica.

AUTHORS

SLIFE, BRENT, D. Address: Department of Psychology, BrighamYoung University, Provo, UT 84602. Title: Professor of Psycholo-gy. Degree: Ph.D. Specializations: clinical psychology, philoso-phy of social science.

STEVENSON, TIFFANI, D. Address: Department of Family Sci-ence, University of Maryland, 1142 School of Public Health, Col-lege Park, MD 20742. Title: Doctoral student in family science.Degree: M.S.

WENDT, DENNIS, C. Address: Department of Psychology, Uni-versity of Michigan, 530 Church Street, 2256 East Hall, AnnArbor, MI 48109-1043. Title: Doctoral student in clinical psychol-ogy. Degree: B.S.