The Journal of Socio-Economics 34 (2005) 161–177

Income and happiness: earning and spending assources of discontent

David E. Kaun∗

Economics, E2, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA

Abstract

Richard Easterlin’s 1973 query, “Does Money Buy Happiness?” began what has become a majorsource of research among social scientist. Easterlin’s initial answer was “no,” at least in absolute terms.Subsequent research has been inconclusive regarding the extent to which money matters, ranging froma great deal to little if any. The latter conclusions fly in the face of much of human behavior, as weknow it. I argue that money matters a great deal. Problems arise, however, in the fact that it mustbe earned and spent. Two areas often neglected in the literature. Changes in both the nature of workand of consumption have themselves been the sourceof increasing dissatisfaction, particularly inthe United States over the past generation. The work of Scitvosky, Linder, and Schor, among othersprovides the background for the analysis.© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

JEL classification:I 131; D 11; J 28

Keywords:Well-being; Income; Consumption behavior; Journey to work

“More is Better.”Frank (2002), along with every other author of a microeconomicstext, from introductory to graduate, past and present.

“ . . .the economic problem is not. . .thepermanentproblemof thehuman race.” Keynes(1933)

“It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still animportant object.”Mill (1915)

∗ Tel.: +1 831 459 4745.E-mail address:nuclear@ucsc.edu.

1053-5357/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.005

162 D.E. Kaun / The Journal of Socio-Economics 34 (2005) 161–177

“The world would go much better if everyone would buy fewer and simpler things. . .”Marshall, 1890 (1956)

1. Introduction

There is an obvious disconnect between the economist’s universal assumption that “moreis better,” and the message echoing over the decades from some of the most veneratedmembers of the profession. Is “more” really “better”? One might evade the question bykeeping “more’s” content undefined. We cannot escape quite so easily, as a glance at anymicroeconomics text indicates. Invariably, the analysis of typical consumer behavior is castin terms of a specific commodity and “all other goods.” The latter, whose price is assumedto be $1.00, is quickly conflated intoincome! For most economists, then, more income isbetter—or so we preach. And by better we mean greater utility (aka happiness, satisfaction,or pleasure), or what in the broader literature has come to be known as Subjective Well-Being(SWB).

We might escape the apparent dissonance by relying on the “as if” characterization thatMilton Friedman (1953)argued in defense of theorizing that is both abstract and distant from“reality.” Doing so would suggest that sage wisdom aside, consumers are in fact behavingin a rational manner. A manner that evidences a significant correlation between a senseof satisfaction and the size of one’s paycheck. The most casual observer would be hard-pressed to deny the “as if” aspect of much human behavior. And there is ample evidence fromsurvey data to support this conclusion.1 It is not only the norm among ordinary citizens, butamong the most influential among us. Find a president who is uninterested and ineffectivein “growing the economy,” and you will likely see a virtual lame duck.

Granting this pervasive behavior, the question turns to its rationality. AsEasterlin (1973)asked a quarter of a century ago, “does money buy happiness?” His review of existing surveydata suggested an ambiguous answer, but one that certainly denied the textbook postulate.For Easterlin, happiness depended on relative but not absolute income.2 A conclusion sug-gesting futility on the part of wage earners and consumers, and one that has spawned anindustry devoted to “happiness studies.”

It is hard to believe, however, that for most individuals more isn’t better. And asScitovsky(1992, p. 207)observes, “we value income not only for the goods it will buy, but also asthe proof of our usefulness to society.” In the world as we know it then, few if any wouldreject an offer of twice one’s present income, even if everyone else had similar good fortune.Indeed, experimental data suggests that individuals might well opt for higher incomes alongwith adeteriorationin relative position.3 Easterlin’s original conclusion that only relativeincome matters would at first glance require a denial of reality, as we must imagine it.

1 Myers (2000, pp. 127–129)cites survey data indicating that the expressed desire for more money, alwaysstrong in the United States, has, at least among college students, increased significantly since the mid-1960s.

2 This conclusion was based on cross section data where a positive relationship was evident, as contrasted withboth time series and cross-country data where such a relationship was not apparent.

3 See for example,Hsee et al. (2003). They refer to experiments where while individuals would “prefer” a jobwhere their income exceeded that of their colleagues, when faced with the actual choice, a higher salary job waschosen despite the fact that the actual income was less than their colleague’s. (p. 7)

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Fig. 1. The (rocky) Path to Happiness.

But more than a glance is required. Individuals are hardly static creatures, whose tastes,reactions and aspirations are given at birth. In a recent return to the subject,Easterlin (2001)sees in the levels and changes of human aspiration an answer to the cross-section/time-seriesparadox. He analyzes data on both the commonly employed self-assessed SWB (see below),along with survey data dealing with thedeterminantsof the “good life,” and concludes:

[A]t a point in time, differences in aspirations by socio-economic status are limited byand less than differences in income. Those with higher incomes thus come closer torealizing their aspirations and are happier. . .[but] as income rises over the life-cycleso too do aspirations, negating the positive effect of income on well-being. (p. 54)

There is considerable support in the literature for this perspective.4 Independent of suchvery real mental constructs, there remains a set of concrete circumstances directly relatedto rising income that are equally relevant in solving Easterlin’s paradox. These concernthe fact that the above offer of twice one’s income rarely comes without strings attached.Strings that require theearningandspendingof one’s income, factors that themselves actindependently, as suggested in the following schematic (Fig. 1).

I will argue below that significant aspects of work and consumption—aspects oftenoverlooked in the happiness literature—have over the recent past had significant negativeeffects on individual happiness sufficient to offset some if not all of the positive effects ofrising income alone.

Before developing this notion further, it will be useful to review some of the major workthat Easterlin’s original paper encouraged. This will be followed in Sections3 and 4witha discussion of the happiness-depressing aspects of work and consumption respectively. Inthese sections, previous analysis by Juliet Schor, Stefan Linder, Tibor Scitovsky and RobertFrank will be used extensively, along with more recent and relevant data.5 The latter includechanges in the quality of work, the nature of the commute to work, both in quality and time,and the adverse effects of increasing consumption, again in terms of the increasing timedemands along with the quality of the consumption itself. A brief summary follows.

4 Stutzer (2002)finds that increases in income lead to higher aspirations, directly offsetting the increase in well-being from the income alone. (p. 16) Along similar lines,Kahneman (1999)distinguishes between the “hedonic”and “satisfaction” treadmill. In the former, “people adapt to improving circumstances to the point of affectiveneutrality,” where improvements in circumstances “yield no real benefits.” (p. 13) Akin to Easterlin’s changingaspirations, Kahnemann’s “satisfaction treadmill” derives its energy when individuals alter their conception ofgood and bad values as their circumstances change. (pp. 14–15)

5 The nature of the analysis in sections 3 and 4 is much in the spirit suggested earlier by Sen (1982). He arguedthat often, where the nature of the data limits formal econometric analysis, “empirical evidence. . .must involveintrospection and discussion.” (p. 104).

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2. The literature—a limited tour

The empirical literature dealing with the impact of income on happiness relies on muchthe same data that Easterlin first utilized; survey data done by national polling organizations,over time and across countries. The dependent variable takes the form of a subjectiveresponse to a question asking in effect, “How happy are you?” The answer can be based ona self-defined scale, say 1 to 10, or in words—“very,” “not very,” etc. (see Ruut Veenhoven,1993). Such information may seem incompatible with the economist’s desire for “hard”data, data measuring what people do—prices, quantities, hours, etc.—rather than subjectiveestimates.

As it turns out, given present knowledge, such soft data may have to suffice. Proxies forone’s sense of well-being don’t exist. Efforts to create a composite index using measurablevariables—suicide and divorce rates, health quality—would lead to a hopeless snare ofweighting problems to say nothing of variable selection. As it turns out, however, thesurvey data appear quite satisfactory, and in little need of apology. In reviewing the literaturedirected to this specific question, Alesina and his colleagues suggest that “[w]hile a healthydose of skepticism is always useful, there are good reasons why these ‘happiness’ data shouldnot be dismissed (Alesina et al., 2001, p. 8). The reasons include the widespread use amongpsychologists (understanding that “bad data” would have been rejected with continued use);and the consistency of such date with a variety of other correlates of happiness and well-being. (p. 8–9)6 In their literature review,Frey and Stutzer (2002)conclude that for manyof the questions being asked, “happiness or reported subjective well-being is a satisfactoryempirical approximation to individual utility.” (p. 408)

In many of the extant studies, researchers seek to “explain” the degree of happinessamong the population (or demographic components) of one or more countries over time. Andwhile the level of income is ubiquitous as an explanatory factor, a number of other aspects,economic and beyond are often considered. As a direct result of Easterlin’s initial emphasison “relative income,” several authors have employed the degree of income inequality (see,for example,Alesina et al., 2001andMyers, 2000). But inequality itself is just one of aplethora of variables employed in the search for the true source of human happiness. Beyondincome levels and distribution, are labor market conditions as measured by unemployment(Clark and Oswald, 1994). In a society plagued with discrimination, sex and race may wellimpact on one’s sense of well-being, independent of economic factors, such as marital status,education and age (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000). Other factors considered are socialclass and home ownership status (Bowling and Windsor, 2001), and “companionship,”the latter includes family solidarity and friendship (Lane, 2000, p. 77). Across nations,fundamental issues including the level of political and economic freedom to a variety ofcultural specific attributes have also been considered. (Diener and Oishi, 2000).

The question of what determines human happiness is of sufficient complexity to precludesimple and widely accepted conclusions, including the effect of income, the central concern

6 Frank (1985, Chapter two) provides a similar argument. For a more nuanced judgement, see Diener andSuh (1997), who argue that while subjective measures of well being (SWB) are in fact “methodologically andconceptually complementary with hard economic data and social indicators, “all three are needed in unison tounderstand human quality of life, and to make informed policy decisions.” (p. 213).

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of this paper. In their extensive review Frey and Stutzer find that despite the fact that “mosteconomists take it as a matter of course that higher income leads to higher happiness,”7

the picture is more complex. With respect to the concerns here, the following emerge fromthe numerous studies reviewed: income and happiness are clearly related on the basis ofcross section (point in time) data; no such systematic relationship exists over time amongwestern countries and Japan; and across countries, evidence of a positive if “rather small”relationship exists for those countries with per capita income “much below the UnitedStates.” (2002, p. 428)

Lane (2000a)offers a contrarian view to “what most economists take as a matter ofcourse,” and what is at least partially confirmed in the data. He argues that the “belief thathappiness is in some sense proportionate to income [to be an] economistic fallacy.” (p. 64)It is worth noting that this indictment applies uniquely to the United States, another caseof American “exceptionalism.” (p. 21) Elsewhere,Lane (2000b)suggests that the U.S. dataimplies not only a diminishing utility to increased income, but rather “negative returns” aseconomic growth reaches the “end of its journey.” The real source of happiness for Lane is“companionship.”8 While Lane’s conclusions differ from those cited above, his emphasison the time-intensive commodity, companionship, is itself apt.

It is difficult, however, to accept Lane’s position regarding income per se. Unless we arewilling to argue that most people, in most places, most of the time, are seriously misguidedin their apparent interest in “more,” and asFrank (1999, pp. 66–67)has argued, one canhardly excludeincreasingreal income from this illusive commodity as an a priori sourceof subjective well being. As suggested above, it is hard (impossible) to imagine manyindividuals not accepting twice their real income, even with no change in relative income.9

The puzzle then is why, with increases in real income over most of the last century, do wefind little change in self-professed happiness, if not an actual decline?10

It’s not the mere increase in income that has little or even (in Lane’s view) a negativeimpact on the individual’s sense of well-being. Most of individuals would gladly acceptmore,if given as a gift. That’s the point. For most of us, income must be earned. And moneyitself is of little utility, save for the miser. Rather, its utility derives from its expenditure. Itis in these two aspects, earning and spending, where I think happiness comes up short, notonly in an absolute sense, but increasingly so. And while much has been written on eachfactor, their direct impact on the income-happiness relationship has received little attentionin the literature.11

7 A view thatFrank (1999, p 66)suggests is “not as stupid as it sounds to many non-economists.”8 The real source of individual happiness is found in “family life, friendship and social esteem, and especially

a work environment that places work satisfaction first and economic gain second.” (Lane, 1993, p. 63) Elsewhere,Lane (2000, p. 105)sees the economist’s dominance over utility theory, “a grotesque accident of the history ofscience.”

9 Frank (1985, p. 36)makes the same argument.10 As noted above (footnote 4) a not infrequent argument focuses onchangingaspirations. While not denying

such a possibility, arguments that employ “changing tastes” are anathema to economists; doing so allows for anexplanation of everything and at the same time masks basic changes in society over which the individual has littlecontrol.

11 For example,Frey and Stutzer (2002)find no reference to the impact of altered working conditions onmeasures of happiness, and make only passing mention of the influence of spending behavior itself.

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3. Money doesn’t grow on trees. . .working more and enjoying it less

This venerable adage, first encountered in early youth, only hints at the reality of workyears down the road. In the standard economic analysis, work is seen as offering disutility;after all, that’s why it’s called “work.” Again, our rational consumer faces a choice between“income” which is derived from work, and “leisure.” The latter is considered a “normalgood,” which means that as incomes rise, individuals should be expected to consume more,that is,work less.This has been the conventional wisdom among economists for much of thepast century. Leisure may be taken in two ways. In the first instance, we can enter the laborforce later in life, and leave earlier, a pattern well established for men.12 The secular declinein hours from the late 1800s through the first half of the last century (from a work-week ofwell over 60 hours to one near 40) is evidence of the second.

3.1. Time on the job

However, what seemed fully consistent with the rational behavior (assuming the Beckerargument noted in footnote 12) has recently come under thoughtful criticism. In 1991,Juliet Schor (1991)questioned conventional wisdom. Predictions (and past evidence) tothe contrary, from the 1970s on, Americans were, she argued, turning economic theory onits head. Despite substantial increases in productivity, we were working more and playingless—“overworked” in Schor’s mind. SubtitledThe Unexpected Decline of Leisure, TheOverworked Americanoffered evidence suggesting that in terms of time on the “job,”earning a living has become more, not less difficult in the post WW II era. It is important tokeep in mind the reference group, Americans, as Schor finds further evidence of Americanexceptionalism (pp. 1–2). A view consistent with recent International Labour Office data.13

Schor’s work became an academic “best seller,” and as such, engendered immediatecontroversy.14 How could hours have increased in the face of a declining work-week, alongwith an increase in part-time and “temp” work? And just how reliable were self-reportedestimates of hours worked?15 Bluestone and Rose (1997)reviewed much of the Schor-induced literature, while at the same time providing additional analysis using University ofMichigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics, time-series data immune from the problematic

12 Gary Becker (1965) rejects the notion of changing tastes as an explanation for the differences in labor forceparticipation for men (decreasing) and women (increasing). Women weren’t working more, but rather, in focusingon what has been referred to as the “household production function,” they were simply shifting their work timeout of the home and into market,a rational response to changing market conditions, technology, and family size.

13 As reported in theNew York Times, the international comparisons are rather astounding. By the end of thelast decade American workers put in 137 h more than workers in Japan, 260 h more that the British, and 449 h(over twelve weeks) more than the Germans (Greenhouse, 2001).

14 A considerable portion of this debate, both in the academic and popular media is available onSouth-Western’s web site, “Policy Debate: Are Americans Overworked?” (www.swcollege.com/bef/policydebates/overworked.html)

15 Robinson and Bostrom (1994)argued that Current Population Survey data (self-reported hours worked inthe previous week) were likely to be overstated and less reliable than estimates based on time-diaries; and that thegreater the CPS estimate, the greater the overstatment, putting Schor’s assertions is serious doubt. Taking up thesame issue,Jacobs (1998)essentially rebuts Robinson and Bostrom’s conclusions’ regarding the validity of CPSestimates, implicitly supporting Schor’s analysis, in direction if not magnitude.

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aspects of the cross section survey data. They point out that a reduced work-week, andincreases in part time and “temp” work are not inconsistent with increased hours worked,but rather a case of “mixing apples with oranges. The number of contingent jobs and averageweekly hours refers to ‘jobs’, “not people.” (pp. 1–2) “Their own independent analysis drawnfrom the PSID data, was not inconsistent with Schor’s earlier conclusions. Bluestone andRose point to a statistically significant upward trend in hours worked by prime age workersover the 20 year period studied, albeit “well below” that estimated by Schor. (p. 9) However,in their analysis offamilywork effort, they find “a linear and nearly unbroken trend towardmuch greater work effort. . ..By 1988, prime age working couples were putting in an averageof 3, 450 h in combined employment, up from 2, 850 two decades before.” (p. 10) And forfamilies not headed by a worker with at least a college degree, “it turns out that theenormousincreasein work effort over the past 20 years has allowed families to maintain their oldstandard of living—but almost nothing more.” (emphasis added, p. 11)16

Beyond the impact of work effort alone, which surely has increased for many, these databear directly on Lane’s concern (above) regarding “companionship.” Reinforcing this pointis the concern expressed regarding work schedules for working women. In a recent surveydone for the AFL-CIO,Lake Snell Perry and Associates (2002), found that 40% of marriedwomen (52% of African-American women) with children wind up with work schedulesthat differ from that of their spouse, adding to the already severely stressed “traditional”household function. (p. 4)

Hours on the job, increasing as they are for many, actually tell only part of the story. Anincrease in commute time is relevant (and with the explosive use of cell phones, travel timeand hours of work may be hard to distinguish), as is the changing quality of work itself. Theevidence in both cases provides additional support to the central argument of this paper.

3.2. The trip (time) to the job

The commute (for most, alone in one’s car) for most Americans has clearly deteriorated.Travel time has increased significantly, and become more stressful. According to theTexasTransportation Institute (2002a,b)travel time increased significantly since 1982, wherethe average commute travel time (as compared to “free-flow” travel for the same trip) hasincreased by 21% across the 75 urban areas included in their sample.17 (Table A-3) The TTIstudies point up other aspects of this deterioration, including the fact that traffic delays haveincreased by over 400%—from 16 h in 1982, to 62 during the year, 2000! (Short Report, p.1) At the same time the typical “rush hour” has expanded, doubling over the period 1984to 1999 from 3 to 6 h. (TTI, 2001) Nor do smaller cities offer any relief. To the contrary,

16 Like much of the public debate regarding issues of economic well-being, there exists an ideological huecoloring the dispute over hours worked. Contrary to the conclusions generally supportive of Schor’s initial findings,those associated with conservative think-tanks see no such evidence. TheEmployment Policy Foundation’s “TheMyth of the Overworked American,” (1988)and Manhattan Institute’s WalterOlson’s (1999)response, “I don’t seea problem,” to the issue of overwork in contrast to Bluestone and Rose’sAmerican Prospectpiece are illustrative.

17 The 75 urban areas range in size from just over 100,000 (Boulder, Colorado) to 17.1 million in New York.In 1998, theTexas Transportation Institute added 25 smaller cities to the original 50 that had been the basis ofintensive analysis of roadway congestion since 1987. (November 12, 1998).

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traffic congestion has quadrupled since 1982, “a far faster rate” than in larger cities. (TTI,November 12, 1998, p. 1)

3.3. Quality of the trip

The term “road rage” was first used in a 1988St. Petersburg Timesstory, concerning aman who shot a woman passenger in a car that had cut him off. He was seen to be in a “fitof ’road rage.” New to the lexicon, but not to the roadway, this behavior has only recentlybeen uniquely identified because of its growing incidence, stimulating legislation and spe-cial programs at the state and regional level across the country. (Rathbone and Huckabee,1999)

Jerry L. Deffenbacher, a psychologist and expert in anger management, estimates thatbetween 1990 and 1995, road rage violence increased by seven percent annually, killing200 and injuring 12,000 individuals. While these numbers are relatively small, given totalhighway mayhem, the fear of encountering such violence impacts on many drivers, furtherreducing the quality of the commute. (applesforhealth, August 27, 1999)18

Perversely, the American addiction to the automobile has been on the increase. Accordingto the U.S. Census (1990), workers have been abandoning public transit in droves, decliningfrom 12.1% of all workers in 1960 to a mere 5.3% in 1990, a trend that has continuedthrough 2000. (Thoreau Institute, 2002) And even for those seeking the advantages of publictransportation, it may not be long before the relaxing train commute turns less idyllic. Theubiquitous one-sided cell phone conversation is generating its own (mild) rage. Accordingto a recent survey, cell-phone use bothered 87% of the riders to some degree, the majorityof whom were “carriers” themselves. “Cell-free” zones, similar to “no-smoking” areas mayultimately serve to keep the peace. But as in the case with the latter, such prohibitions inducetheir own anger and stress.19

Finally, near total reliance on the automobile may well have contributed, at leastmarginally to another aspect of well-being. As with public transportation, those gettingto work on foot—walking—has declined precipitously from 9.9% to 3.9% over the thirtyyears since 1960. (United States Census, 1990) The recent and growing concern with obe-sity has been linked directly to rising incomes, technological changes, and the decline inphysical exertion at work. SeePhilipson and Posner (1999).20 Surely the absence of physicalexertion on the way too work has not been helpful in this regard.

18 The one unambiguous and significant improvement in highway travel has to do safety. Both the number ofaccidents and their severity has declined significantly over the period 1980–99. (U.S. Census, 2001, p. 684).

19 The health issues surrounding the two “vices” bear a remarkable similarity. According to the BBC “using amobile pone inside a train carriage could have serious health risks for other passengers. . .[and] electromagneticradiation levels inside trains can exceed international safety limits if even a small number of passengers are usingtheir phones.” (BBC News, 1 May, 2002)

20 As indicated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the obesity epidemic has increased signif-icantly over the past decade; “the American lifestyle of convenience and inactivity has had a devastating toll onevery segment of society. . .” Among the culprits are the growth offastfood industry on the intake side—itself anaspect of the need to “save time” discussed at length above—and the increase in labor-saving machinery and thereplacement of walking and cycling by the automobile for all but the “shortest distances.” (CDC, 1999)

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3.4. And the job itself

Since “time on the clock” represents a major portion an individual’s life, we should expecta significant interaction between work and life satisfaction. But home life and work life havetheir own dynamic as well. A recent study byBlanchflower and Oswald (1999)is relevant inthis sense, and is also consistent with the broader concerns of this paper. In their analysis theauthors observe that, “Perceived levels of job satisfaction seemremarkably highin westerndemocracies [including the United States].” (emphasis added, p. 18) “Remarkably high”in contrast to results from the happiness surveys. For example, in 1998, 48% of Americanworkers were “very satisfied”with their jobs(p. 20). In contrast,Blanchflower and Oswald(2000, p. 19)find only 30 percent of those surveyed (1994–98) indicated that they were“very happy.” This same “disparity” exists for all of the periods surveyed. Most relevant,however, is the finding of “a slow but steady decline in job satisfaction in the US between1973 and [1999].”Blanchflower and Oswald (1999, p. 18)These results are consistent withthe notion that try as we might, “compartmentalizing” one’s life is easier said than done.

Under any circumstance, the unique satisfaction provided by work does seem to havediminished over the latter decades of the 20th century. There can be little doubt that in-creasing time spent getting to work and the longer hours spent on the job has certainlydone little to alter this decline, with ample evidence to the contrary. All of this self-inflictedpain and palpable discomfort does have its reward, however, in a generally rising level ofreal income. And the spending so permitted. Assuming rationality still, it is here where thetortured hours getting to and at work find justification. Perhaps.

4. Is the game (consumption) worth the candle: theoretical arguments, past andcurrent

Again, according to received wisdom, the pleasures derived from spending our hardearned income ongoodsis assumed to leave every player better off. A conventional viewthat may well be misplaced.

The insights provided by TiborScitovsky (1992)and Steffan Linder (1970) point upthe perversity embodied in American style consumerism. Scitovsky’sThe Joyless Economyis cited repeatedly in the happiness literature. This is less so with Linder’sThe HarriedLeisure Class. While unique in their respective critiques, the two arguments focus on acrucial aspect of consumption,what we do with our time.

Scitovsky’s argument flows from basic psychological theory. As individuals, we oftenfind ourselves in an uncomfortable situation (state of “arousal” in his terms). We are hun-gry, in need of companionship and often sex, or simply bored. By getting fed, loved, oramused, we move to a state of comfort. There is nothing wrong with these desires. What isoverlooked, particularly in the American pattern, is thewayin which we remove the discom-fort. American’s, hell-bent on efficiency—a product of our unique and lingering attachmentto the Puritan Ethic—opt for a pattern of consumption that is the least time consuming.What is lost in this “time is money” fixation, is all the fun (“stimulation”) in preparing themeal—from the shopping to the cooking to the lingering over the several courses; gone toois the exquisite joy/pain of a prolonged courtship. Using United Nations time-study data,

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Scitovsky finds that in contrast to Western Europeans, Americans spend more time alone(idle caf́e conversation is both time consuming, and of no pleasure to Americans who haveso little of interest to say to each other in the first place), and take shorter vacations (toavoid the “fuss and bother” of getting away from the routine). Equally disheartening (andin evidence whenever school budgets tighten) is our “disdain” for culture, and the arts inparticular. Why would anyone want to spend valuable time learning “unproductive” skills?Again, in a fundamental sense, it is a “sin” to waste time.

It’s not possible to do justice to the eloquence ofThe Joyless Economyin a short para-graph. Most readers are likely to be familiar with the work; others might want to becomeso. It should be clear, however, that spending our incomes in ways that minimize stimula-tion and pleasure will at the same time minimize conventional indices of “happiness.” Andequally obvious in the analysis is our self-imposed need to save time.21

It is this aspect of Scitovsky that is central to Linder. Unlike Scitovsky, Linder stays withinthe simple confines of micro-economic theory. In such a world, the ostensible rationalconsumer will allocate her time among various activities so as to equate the marginalsatisfaction from each. To do otherwise would represent a failure of “maximizing” behavior.Again, in simplistic terms, the two activities that Linder focuses on are work and leisure.As real incomes (wages) increase, thevalueof an hour of work increases as well, as doesthe cost of not working, leisure in the simple case. With leisure becoming morecostly, itbehooves the economic woman to seek greater satisfaction from the activity; that is, to makeher leisure time more productive. Again, thanks to a western, Puritan-like fixation, increasesin capital-intensity are sought in leisure activity, as is the case with the production of marketgoods. The “capital” equipment employed in the pursuit of enhanced leisure productivityis, for Linder, simply more market goods.

Any outdoor camper, who has witnessed the changes in typical camping over the pastdecades, will understand the argument instantly. Forty to fifty years ago, one could enjoycamping with little more than a tent, ice chest, lantern, and Coleman stove. These, along witha few books, a folding chair, and perhaps a fishing rod represented standard equipment. Nolonger. Today’s RV is decked with rafts, motorbikes, surfboards, scuba diving equipment andTV antennas. Inside, all the “comforts” of home, including TV, VCR and lap-top computer,leave little time for the Grishman novel lost somewhere in the clutter—if it was includedat all. Never mind the negative externalities imposed on one’s crowded neighbors, all ofwhom have traded one dense urban environment for another. The pleasure derived from thevast array of “goods” will surely be diminished due to the time and annoyance their simplemaintenance requires.

Linder’s harried consumer, a la Scitovsky, has little interest in labor-intensive activities.One might find a way to sit and contemplate the sunset, but certainly a better use of timewould be to bring along skies to polish, a tape player to listen to, and a copy ofTime. Asindicated above, use of time for the consumption of “culture” is anathema to Scitivosky’stypical Puritan in ways that differ from Linder’s “rational” consumer; but the results areidentical and in a sense the two theorists meet at this point. In his emphasis on the ”capital-intensity“model, Linder is referring tophysicalcapital. It is well established thathuman

21 This focus on process as distinct from outcome has received considerable attention among psychologists, asdiscussed below.

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capita plays an essential role in the process of economic growth.22 But to travel this route,perhaps via the study of art history or Shakespeare, in seeking enhanced leisure time, wouldrun afoul of the Puritan strictures so well engrained in our rational consumer. Again, as theuse of increased income focuses on excess in our desire for comfort, it fails in this senseto provide potential increases in happiness. Worse yet, as we spend more of our income inways that detract from the quality of leisure time, so too are we acting to the detriment ofperceived happiness.

This apparentrationality-run-amok central to both Scitovsky and Linder has receivedconsiderable attention among psychologists.Hsee (1999), suggests reasons why peoplemay behave in ways contrary to their own ultimate well-being, what he refers to as “thehighest consumption utility.” (p. 555) In the first instance consumers may misperceivethe anticipated satisfaction from a particular act, that is, consumers simply err in theirjudgments. Alternatively, individuals “do not always use their predictions of consumptionutility to guide their decisions. That is, consumptiondecisionsmay well be made not on“the best option, but [rather, on] the option that is easiest to justify.” In a society driven byeconomic efficiency, where “time is money,” the ultimately perverse consumption choicesLinder and Scitovsky point to are not only easy to justify, but fully consistent with socialnorms. Elsewhere,Hsee et al. (2003)characterize such behavior as “lay economism,” atendency for consumers “to focus on economic calculus, to compare options in terms ofeconomic gains and losses, and to downplay other experience-inducing factors.” The term“lay” is significant. Writing as if they had Linder and Scitovsky in mind, the authors observethat the “lay economists may well be more concerned with economic gains and losses thanwhat thereal economistwould recommend.”23 (emphasis added, p. 8)

There is at least one other source of disappointment that confronts the consumers in aworld of rising real income. Unlike the counter-productive Scitovsky/Linderesque behavior,this is a problem more of expectations than of overt behavior. I refer to “positional goods,”a term that applies to a wide range ofdesirablecommodities and opportunities that areinherently limited in supply. Such commodities always exist when defined in percentageterms, say the top ten schools, law firms, or residential neighborhoods. These goods playa central role in the discussion of relative well being, as developed thoroughly inFrank(1985). One’s position within the income distribution itself becomes a “positional good.”There is another variation on this theme that is relevant.

Consider a simple two-sector economy a la Baumol and Bowen (1966) where one sec-tor alone is amenable to rapid technological change. The second, by definition must beinherently labor or land intensive—the former for example including a live performance ofa string quartet or symphony orchestra, preceded by a gourmet dinner; the latter a choice

22 More than 12% of the growth in national income over the period 1929–69 was attributed to increases inhuman capital. (Denison, 1974, Table 9-4, p. 127) and with recent increases in technology, human capital playsan even greater role in the process of economic growth. In a sequelDenison (1985, Table 8-1, p. 111) estimatesthat human capital contributed 30% to the economic growth for the period 1973–1984.

23 Hsee, et. al., distinguish between “cold” (quantifiable) and “hot” (subjective) factors. While time saved isreadily calculated, the pleasures derived from more time intensive consumption alternatives are not. And wherethe focus is on thedecisionas opposed to theoutcome, the authors suggest that “decision makers focus too muchon cold factors, such as quantity, money and goals, and too little on hot factors, such as feelings and experiences.”(p. 20)

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lake-shore or view property. Industrialized society is capable of producing technological-friendly goods in abundance, with ever-declining cost. Labor and land intensive goods,while not strictly fixed in supply, are in fact subject to a serious dose of “Baumol’s disease,”otherwise know as rapid increases in cost.

Under such circumstances, and particularly where labor/land intensive commodities suchas those above are available only to those in the “top” of the income distribution, youngworkers or students who are successful in obtaining relatively high income in the yearsahead, will find themselves unable to live in a manner that they may well have aspired toat the start of their careers. These particular “positional” goods, consumed as a matter ofcourse for say the top ten percent of income earners in one generation are now available(if at all) to only those in the top one percent. A consequent feeling of disappointment andreduced sense of happiness may well result. This factor takes on broader implications underconditions of rapid increases in income inequality. See particularly the arguments raised inFrank (1999).

4.1. Wasting time

Linder, Scitovsky and Frank’s perspectives, as noted at the outset, are fully consistentwith the happiness survey data. Beyond these, however, is the fact that Americans arespending more and more time acquiring (shopping for) the goods that provide less and lesssatisfaction. JulietSchor (2000)suggests a number of factors leading to what she refers toas an “upscale emulation.”24

• Time with neighbors (the “Joneses” of an earlier era) has been replaced by time spent infront of TV, allowing intimate contact with the “rich and famous.” (p. 9)

• The increasing inequality of income over the past 30 years has further exacerbated theproblem. Ever greater conspicuous luxury consumption for some has increased the dis-satisfaction with one’s own (far) more modest lifestyle. (p. 9.)

• The bias in our society away from the provision of “public” goods itself requires greatertime and energy doing our own “shopping.” (p. 26)

Schor offers striking impressionistic data in support of her argument. These include amarked decline in the U.S. savings rate; a dramatic increase in consumer credit card debt;and finally, the self-reported (and near hopeless) aspirations that American citizens haveset for themselves. Aspirations regarding their income position, both absolute and relative.(p. 10)

The evidence regarding the decline in savings is clear-cut, if somewhat ambiguous as toits implication.Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002, p. 13)indicate that the personal savings rate

24 Schor is not without her detractors, as the discussion following her essay attests. James B. Twitchell arguesthat it’s the age old problem of consumer “taste” more than anything that riles Schor (p. 45); Douglas B. Holtsees “differentiation” rather than Schor’s notion of “emulation” as the driving force behind today’s consumptionpatterns (p. 64); Craig J. Thompson finds in Schor’s critique a “new Puritanism” which can be every bit as stiflingof human pleasure as its predecessor (p. 72); while Michele Lamont and Birag Molnar find Schor’s reliance oneconomictheory, and in particular its focus on the individual, a self-limiting mode of analysis as compared to a“more cultural model” (pp. 76–77).

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declined from about 11% of net national product to 1% over the period, 1980–2000. Theseofficial government estimates preclude capital gains, which exploded in the 1990s, as wellas the purchase of consumer durables, residential housing, and pension plan accumulations.The inclusion of such gains, particularly consumer durables, yields higher savings rates,but with little if any change in the downward trend. (Table 1. p. 24) The omission, however,makes the official and adjusted savings rates of “limited value for addressing many importantpolicy questions. . .” (p. 23) Equally relevant is the vast inequality in such accumulation.There is no dispute regarding the distribution of assets and net worth over the recent decades.The well-documented growth in income inequality has been accompanied by a similar ifmore extreme disparity in wealth inequality.25

The growth of credit-card debt accompanied by a commensurate growth in the “con-sumer credit card counseling” provides further evidence of the decline in savings and theaccompanying distributional impact.26 The resulting burden of consumer credit has in-creased substantially over the post war period, rising from about 10% to over 21% ofpersonal income since 1949. Much of this increase occurred by the mid 1960s, but since1980, consumer credit has risen steadily at about 2% per year. (Mishel et al., 2001, p. 276)Neway (2002), one of the thousands of “clinics” for the credit-card disadvantaged, surveysthe debacle as of 1998–1999. It’s not an attractive picture. For example:

• Every adult received 7 credit card offers, regardless of credit rating.• The average credit card balance carried on several cards from month to month was

$4000.00.• The average interest payment on these balances was 18.9%.• And 1345 million personal bankruptcies were declared, an all time high.

These several points combined have alarmed congress, prompting the introduction oflegislation designed specifically to prevent individuals from walking away from their creditcard debt. The legislation (S 1301) introduced in the fall of 1998 has yet to reach fruition,with consumer groups providing the lead opposition against what they characterize asprotection for the banking industry and the wealthy at the expense of the middle class.27

Politics aside, congressional concern with such matters attests to the worsening state ofconsumer finances. A state of affairs that can do little to increase a sense of well being.

4.2. The persuasion blitz

Two additional aspects—standard fare in economic textbooks—help explain and furthercompound the deterioration thus far discussed; these are advertising and consumer choice.

25 For example, for the period 1962–1998, the net worth of the top 1% of the population increased from over6000 to over 9000 times the net worth of the bottom 40% of the population; this growing disparity, though far lesssevere extends throughout the entire wealth distribution. (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt, 2001, p. 268)

26 A casual search of the internet suggests that such “counseling” is among the nation’s leading growth industries,expanding in tandem with the ubiquitous flood of “pre-approved” credit card offers.

27 Concerns over the extent to which evolving House and Senate bills protected the wealthy and the bankingindustry at the expense of the middle class were resolved in favor of creditors in late July, 2002, only to have arather tangential issue regarding the protection of anti-abortion organization keep the bill from final passage beforethe August recess. As of mid-July, 2003, legislation remains in limbo.

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Advertising performs a useful social function to the extent that it offers accurate and unbiasedinformation to the consuming public. Where the seller provides such information, its qualityis likely to be suspect. It is thus that government regulation (via the FDA and FTC, forexample), however limited, finds its justification.

Advertising is also designed to persuade, a function of dubious social value. Such adver-tising finds its most compatible outlet via television. From its infancy in 1956 through 2001,TV advertising has outpaced other forms of advertising, as well as GDP itself, by significantmargins. By 2001 TV advertising’s share of the entire industry amounted to 23.5%, a neardoubling since 1956, and nearly doubling the growth in GDP as well. (Television Bureauof Advertising, 2002)

Consistent with the American exceptionalism that runs through so much of the data dis-cussed here, the United States leads the world in advertising expenditures per capita. Forexample, in 1999, the United States spent 22% more than its nearest rival (Switzerland),and an astounding 391% more than Italy, land ofLa Dolce Vita. (BMF Gallup Media, 1999)There can be little doubt but that these data help explain the increasing technological sophis-tication of VCRs, and TVs themselves, as manufactures seek to shield the consumer fromsuch time-consuming and unwanted commercial intrusion. There is something wrong withthis picture. Part of the answer, aside from America’s traditional deep consumer orientedculture, may lie in the sheer number of products that have flooded the market in recenttimes.

4.3. The “optimal” number of brands

TheFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1998), documents a dramatic transformation in themarket for consumer goods. Characterized as “America’s move to mass customization,” theDallas bank provides in graphic detail the increase in product choice available to Americanconsumers. In a survey of several food, household items, beverages, health and beauty aids,and pet food products, 50 in all, we learn that consumers (as of 1998) had 24,965 productsto choose from as compared to a paltry 4414 in 1980, an increase in “choice” of 565%! (p.6) This cornucopia of “riches” tests Madison Avenue’s most creative minds, to say nothingof the consumer’s.28 And even if one finds a way to out-smart the TV commercial, it is moredifficulty to do so once confronting the super-market shelves. Little wonder the Americanconsumer is short of time, short of credit, and short of satisfaction.29

5. A brief coda

In an odd way, one might well conclude thatincome per seprovides a profound sourceof satisfaction. It’s the getting and getting rid of income where problems arise. The evi-

28 What is not lacking is American ingenuity. The more we buy, the more we have to carry. Enter “Jordan’seVest. Containing no fewer than 17 pockets, the vest promises to “hold just about everything, accessories that mennever have found a practical or ‘manly’ way to carry.” (Antonucci, 2002)

29 GaryCross (2000)does see consumerism as having played an essential and positive role, allowing Americansto move from older relatively closed communities, and to enter “the expressive individualism of a dynamic ‘mass’society.” (p. 3) He also sees these advantages as exhausted as we enter the 21st century. (p. 251)

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dence reviewed above, both theoretical and empirical, recalls the wisdom of Marshall, Mill,Keynes, and others, who saw our present obsessive desire for material growth as a fantasy,destined to sour in terms of human happiness. The recent modest downturn in perceivedwell-being may be a precursor of that souring. It may not, and what was once seen as an in-domitable sense of optimism that characterized an America of earlier times may reappear.What is clear from the data is that American’s sense of well-being is under duress. Partof the explanation lies in the undue time commitments imposed in gaining and spendingone’s income. As I have argued above, this is timeill-spent in and of itself. It is also timetaken from other labor-intensive activities—companionship and community—that are soessential to human satisfaction.30 As if to add an exclamation point to these concerns, aJuly 2003 survey done for the Boys and Girls Clubs of America found a majority of parentshaving “little or no time, or wished they had more time, to spend. . .with their kids. . .. The“primary obstaclewas parents’work schedules.” (Kerr, 2003, emphasis added)

What seemed obvious then to Mill and others remains a hard sell. Nor is there agreementregarding the values inherent in America’s money/goods fixation, as the views expressedby two prominent Americans attest:

When I use my remote key to unlock Big Red, it automatically adjusts the seat andthe mirrors for me. When my wife, Suzanne, uses her remote, it does the same forher.Is this a great country or what?(emphasis added)

Robert D. McTeer, Jr., President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

The most absurd part of my escape from the unjust system [Czechoslovakia] is that Ihave exchanged one system that suppresses free opinion for another. . .. It’s depress-ing. Decisions in America are made solely on the question of ‘how much money willcomeout of it’and not on the questions of how much health, morals or the environmentsuffer as a result. (emphasis added)

Martina Navratilova, Tennis player and gay rights activist

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