India's Green Revolution

India's Green RevolutionAuthor(s): Biplab DasguptaSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 6/8, Annual Number (Feb., 1977), pp. 241-243+245+247+249+251+253+255+257+259-260Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4365324Accessed: 18/09/2010 04:24

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India's Green Revolution Biplab Dasgupta

This paper examines the social and economic consequences of the introduction of high-yielding varieties in Indian agriculture.

I ;)a irtictilatr, it tries to, identify the factors wthich explain the initial success of the HYV as well as the stagnation following the peak year of 1971.

The author attempts, in the light of this examiniation, to indicate the future scope of the high- yielding varieties programme in solving India's food problem.

THE main objective of this study is to examine the social and economic consequences of the introduction of high- yielding varieties to India. In particular it seeks to identify the factors which explain the success of the initial period with HYV as well as stagnation of the period following the peak year of 1971 and then, in the light of this examination, to indicate, subject to the constraints of data, the future scope of the high-yielding programme in solving India's food problem. This study is a part of a bigger worldwide study on the social and economic impact of high-yielding varieties sponsored by the United Nations Re- search Institute for Social Development.1

DATA BASE

The main data base of the study consists of seven micro-level studies wndertaken in different parts of India under the auspices of the UNRISD Global 2 project. Four of these micro- studies were undertaken in wheat producing areas: Ferozepur (Punjab), Kar- nal and Hissar (Haryana), Muzaffar- nagar (Uttar Pradesh) and Kotar (Ra- jasthan); in rice producing areas -

North Arcot (Tamil Nadu) and Burd- wvan, Sambalpur and Sahabad (three eastern region districts) - and one on rice from a wheat-producing area -

Gurdaspur (Punjab). While these studies contain many common elements and cover c, common set of issues, these were conducted more or less indepen- dently in terms of research design and methodology.

There is no standardised data format applieable to all the studies, which im- plies that the results from individual micro-studies are not easilv amenable to statistical manipulation excepting for crude averages. It is also important to note that these studies do not consti- tute a random sample of India's rural area. These have been purposely selected to highlight some of the essential features of the areas where the new varieties have been introduced on a relatively large scale. The conclusion

drawn from these studies are indicative of the main trends, but their statistical significance remains suspect. However, we have tried to be cautious in our in- terpretation of data, and have refrained from jumping to conclusions without corroboration from a good number of other studies. Among the crops, rice and wheat have been extensively examined in these studies, while the coverage of other crops is not too good.

In addition to Global 2 micro-studies, we have used evaluation reports prepared by PEO and various AERCs.

BACKGROUND

The economic conditions in India during the mid-sixties, on the eve of the introduction of the new high yielding seed varieties, were the worst ever during the post-Independence period: per capita income reached its low water mark; major industries were severely hit by recession; unemployment was mounting. The country was heavily dependent on food imports from the Uni- ted States, for which India had to pay a heavy political price. Besides, there was uncertainty about the ability of the food-surplus countries in the world to continue to supply the nieeds of the food deficient countries. In India's case this uncertainty turned into horror when the Paddock brothers put forward their thesis that by 1975 there would be widespread famine in different parts of the world, and the only way to save the maximum number from death would be for the United States, by then the only food surplus country, to adopt a policy of discriminating in favour of only those countries who could be saved.2 The Paddock brothers considered India a hopeless case, and listed her under 'can't be saved' category. Not everyone took the Paddock brothers' thesis seriously, but it was clear that the supply and demand conditions in the world food market was decidely turning against India.

There was therefore virtually no option but to seek self-sufficiency in food production. However, the possibility of

increasing food production through ex- tension of land under cultivation was limited; for the future, an overwhelming part of the increased production had to come by way of increase in the prod- uictivity of land. One way of achieving this was by arranging a more egalitarian distribution of land under the given technology, as many of the empirical studies conducted during the sixties showed the smaller holdings to be more productive than their larger counterparts; but this could not be accomplished without hurting the rural elite, the 'vote banks', who formed the backbone of the ruling party's support in the countryside. The government was therefore looking for an alternative which, while increasing land productivity and food surplus, could be pursued without upsetting the existing agrarian structure.

It was against this background that the new varieties, imported from Mexi- co and Philippines, were introduced. Because of their very high yields, these were greeted as 'miracle seeds'; their arrival was expected to herald an era of growing prosperity. Hopes were raised of achieving at long last the cherished goal of self-sufficiency in foodgrains, of winning the war against the unpredictable monsoon by stabilising food production, and of producing enough both to match the population increase and to clear the enormous backlog of nutri- tional deficiency. With a decade's experience with the new seeds behind us, we are now able to assess its performance objectively; to identify its strong poin-- as well as the weak ones.

The first and foremost question is, is the new technology 'revolutionary' in the limited sense of making a rapid increase in food production possible? Since the protagonists of the new technology have made production their strongest argument, hoping that increased production through a technological revolution would eventually take care of the other problems, such as poverty, unemployment, maldistribution of resources and benefits, it is only fair

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that its success or otherwise would be largely judged against the criterion of production. It is true that the results from controlled field experiments fully justified this claim. One study went as far as suggesting the possibility of producing ten tons per irrigated hectare; on that basis, less than half of India's irrigated acreage would have been needed to fulfil the fifth-five-year-plan target of producing 140 million tons by 1978-79. Figures from real life experience are much less dramatic, but, even these confinn the considerable production potential of the new high yielding varieties. If the production conditions prevailing in the wheat production in Ferozepur or Ludhiana were universal in the country as a whole, or even in the irrigation tracts, the miracle in food production anticipated in the mid-sixtieN could have happened.

THiREE PHASES

The period since the introduction of high yielding varieties can be conveni- ently divided into three phases. The first phase, from 1966 to 1971 was characterised by a rapid increase in the area under HYVs, and the overall food production increased from a low 72 million tons to 108 million tons. The fourth plan target of 129 million tons of food by 1973-74 looked feasible. Imports declined from 10 million tons in 1966 to 2 million tons in 1971.

The literature of the period, however, expressed two types of worries; the relative failure of the HYV programme among non-wheat crops, particularly rice which is the main food item in the country; and the growing inequality in the countryside largely because of the early adoption of new varieties by the larger farmers and the institutional bottlenecks which were preventing the small farmers from participating in the programme. In the case of rice, the res- ponse of the government was to inten- sify its research programme for breeding viable high-yielding rice varieties, while attempts were made through the establishment of specialised agencies, like the Small Farmers Development Agency, to cater for special needs of the underprivileged sections in the countryside. It was expected that, in time, with better access to credit and information, the smaller farmers would succeed in overcoming their initial dis- advantage, while a technological breakthrough in breeding viable rice varieties would widen the scope of the pro-

gramme. In general, the first phase of the HYV programme was characterised by a mood of optimism, there was widespread feeling that at long last In- dia's food problem could be solved with the aid of 'miracle seeds' and the country's dependence on imports of food would end.

Despite the impressive performance of the new varieties in some regions, there was no solid statistical foundation for the uncontrolled optimism of the government in the early seventies. As the Agricultural Prices Commission in the heady days of 1970-713 noted, although the bumper crop of that year had swung the pendulum 'full length from the psychological trough of the exceptional drought years of 1965-66 and 1966-67 to a new peak of optimism marked by a certain pre-occupation with the problems of plenty, there seems little basis here for the inference that the foodgrain output of the country in recent years has moved away to a higher growth path'. Not only that the experience with the new varieties until then was too short, and the available observations therefore too few, to war- rant any confident assertion with regard to the new trend rate of growth in foodgrains output, in fact, the state- wise figures suggested that most of the 8.3 million ton increase of that year came from the states which are poorly endowed with irrigation water and which had not been subjected to the influence of the new technology: Rajas- than (4 million tons), Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat (another 2.7 million tons). In contrast, the production increase in Punjab, the heartland of the new technology, was no more than a hundred thousand tons in that year. The conclusion the Commission drew from these figures was that the high figure of 1970-71 reflected the unusual- ly favourable weather of that year. On the negative side, it showed the continued vulnerability of the Indian agriculture to bad weather: "if nature can be bountiful in one year, it can be niggardly in another", it concluded.

The second phase, from 1972 to 1975 characterised by unfavourable weather, vindicated the cautious stance of the Agricultural Prices Commission.

While the overall acreage under HYV increased substantially, the spread of the new technology to less resourceful areas and farmers, a serious shortage of inputs and a consequent deterioration in their qual ty, affected the yield

from the new varieties. The food production consistently declined, from 108 million tons to 101 million tons, food imports began soaring again, from a low figure of 0.45 million tons in 1972 to 7.41 million tons in 1975. The high yielding varieties programme, as viewed at the end of 1975, seemed to have reached a state of stagnation. All the familiar problems of pre-HYV era, dependence on imports, harvest failure, and famine conditions in various parts of the country, were visible again. The objective of self-sufficiency in foodgrains seemed as elusive as ever.

The third phase, limited to only one year, 1975-76, with an estimated food production of 116 million tons, marked an end to the declining trend in food production with the highest ever production figure for the country. As in 1971, the previous peak year, those in authority are presently claiming the in- auguration of an era of plenty; but with the experience of one full decade under the new technology behind us, and with the full knowledge of the continued dependence of India's agriculture on monsoon, we should be cautious in reading too much from the data for only one year.

Taking the entire HYV period into account, including the latest and the best year, the rate 'of growth in food production (at 2.5 per cent a year) is less than the historical growth rate during the pre-HYV period with a less advanced technology.

This is not to suggest that India would have been better off without the high yielding varieties or that without these the country's food production figures would have followed the historical trend. Whereas most of the increase in the food production in the fifties came from an expansion of ac- r-eage under cultivation during the sixties only a marginal increase in production could be accomplished by extending acreage. The modest production increase during the late sixties was largely a product of increased land productivity, a great deal of it through the adoption of high yielding varieties and their associated inputs. Without the contribution of the new varieties to land productivity, and given the country's socio-political structure, In- dia in the late sixties and the early seventies cpuld have been visited by large-scale starvation and famines. In that sense the new seeds have prevented a disaster, at least for

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the time being; but this is as far as one could say to their credit. On the other hand, the hopes raised by the new varieties in the early years have been dash- ed by the reality of their performance. The agriculture in India is almost as much a prey of the unpredictable monsoon today as it was until the mid-sixties; the path followed by food production figures continues to run almost parallel to the graph of weather index.

What explains the dismal performance of the new varieties? WVas there some- thing wrong with the seeds themselves? Or with the complementary inputs? Should the explanation for this be sought in the new agricultural strategy accompanying the new seeds and inputs? Did the fauilt lie with the institutional framework within which the new strategy was ptut into operation? A re- lated question is, how does one explain the differences in performance of the new varieties between the period up to 1971 and the subsequent period? Why the technology was more successful with wheat, and in Punjab?

'MIRACLE SEEDS'

Considering the seeds first it is clear from the experience over the past ten years that the high yielding wheat seeds have, on the whole, acquitted themselves well in terms of productivity, pest- resistance and culinary characteristics; although over the last two years there have been reports of some decline in production due to rust. The experience with rice varieties tells a different story. The first seed variety, Taichung Native 1, was an unmitigated disaster and, although varieties introduced in subsequent years have proved themselves less vulnerable to pest attacks and diseases, the variability of their output - over seasons, years and regions - is still qtuite hiigh. A major problem with HYV r-ice seeds is that these are cultivated in an environment which helps the breeding of insects and pests. The unsuitability of the dwarf rice varieties in flooded monsoon conditions is another major problem. Efforts to produce breeds which can adapt themselves to the monsoon has so far met with limited success, which largely explains the hiigh uncertainty and low profitabiliLy of HYV rice cultivation compared to HYV wheat cultivation. Given the im portance of rice in Indian agriculture - both in terms of acreage and the proportion of population for whom it is thoe main food item - the success of

the new technology in future is conditional on its ability to achieve a breakthrough in breeding a new rice variety which will combine the high yielding properties with a high degree of resistance of pests with ability to grow with rain water, and with desirable culinary characteristics to make its production worthwhile to the great: majority of subsistence farmers. The high-yielding varieties for the oth three major crops - maize, sorghum and millet - also suffer from the high variability of output due to their susceptibility to pest- attack.

The battle with pests and diseases canniot be won overnight, even with wheat varieties which have so far performed quite satisfactorily in this res pect. Whereas the traditional varieties have passed through nature's selection process under a variety of conditions over hundreds of years and have bz- come a part of the eco-system, for the new varieties the tests and trials have just begun. Varieties equipped to cop" with one set of pests might be con- fronted after a few years of success with another set which had remainedi dormant for many years and for whom the former created favourable conditions for growth. As the human experience in other fields shows - e g, the problem of malaria control with the growth of DDT-resistant mosquitoes - the scientists can ill afford to relax their guard in this continuous battle with nature.

The new seeds also face three other sets of problems. Firstly, the high turn- over rate of the varieties, particularly in cases of rice and hybrid varieties. Most varieties are being replaced by the new and better ones within two or three years of their introduction. This in one sense indicates the rate of progress with research in breeding and is important from the point of view of future production. However, the high tumover confuses the illiterate and traditional farmer who is forced to re- vise his crop calendar and learn a new set of agricultural practices every timo a change is made. Secondly, the new varieties require regular renewal, particularly in cases of hybrids, whereas the traditional farmer is not used to buying seeds. The neglect of this need for the renewal of stock is an important factor behind the declining yield of high yielding varieties. Thirdly, the new seeds are often of low quality due to inadequate germination tests and seed-treatment arrangements, and a lack of a

proper machinery for the certification of seeds for preserving their quality and guaranteeing against adulteration.

NENv INPUTS AND PRACICELS

The technology of 'green revolution the name given to the technology associated with the new seeds, can be defined in terms of a package of agricultural inputs and new agricultural practices. The core of this package is the 'miracle seed' discussed above. with yield figures much higher than those for both traditional and locally improved varieties, which have been developed through selective breeding to be highly responsive to fertiliser input. The vulnerability of the nev seeds (particularly of rice and hybrid crops) to pest attacks and -the fertiliser- induced growth of weeds, have led to increased use of pesticides and weedicides with the HLVs. A controlled water supply is another essential inputt since even too much water is bad for the new dwarf varieties unsuited tc flooded conditions. While the shortei maturing period of the new varieti'as permits double-cropping, the bottleneck created by the need to complete the land preparation for the new crop soon after the harvesting of the previous crop can be more easily re- moved with machines, particularly tractors.

All these inputs together form a 'package'. New seeds without wa-er and fertiliser would be unable to realise its full potential, without insecti- cides and weedicides its output would be highly variable, and without resort to mechanisation its potential for multiple cropping would remain underutilised. The 'package approach' is a major feature of the 'new agricultural strategy associated with HYVs.

The 'green revolution' also incorpo- rates a package of new agricultural practices, and the two together form the technology of the high-yielding varieties. The new technology follows a new crop calendar, given the shorter maturing period of the new varieties and the possibilities of multiple cropping. Each new input brings with it a new set of cultural practices. The farmer should now know how much fertiliser to use in which- type of soil, when and in what proportion between nitrogen, phosphate and potash. Simi- larly, the farmer should now know which type of insecticide to use and by how much according to the type of insect to which the particular variety

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of seeds is vulnerable. Farmers using tractors, seed drills, threshers, and so on should learn their use and maintenance.

Compared with traditional agricultural inputs, some of the major characteristics of the new inputs are as follows:

(a) Market-orientation. Unlike the traditional cultivation, where the farmer largely uses the last year's seed, manure produced bv farm animals, home-made tools, family-owned bullocks, and family labour as the major inputs, the new technology makes him dependent on the market for the supply of new seeds, chemical fertiliser, pesticides and herbi- cides, hired labour and hired agricultural machinery.

(b) High cost. In the case of wheat, the high cost of HYV cultivation is more than neutralised by high productivity per unit of land and a lower cost per unit of output than its traditional counterpart. The picture is hazy with respect to the other crops, particularly rice. In terms of profitability also, while the cultivation of HYV wheat seems worthwhile, the picture is unclear with respect to rice.

Most of the money for financ- ing the purchase of new inputs has come from the farmers themselves, institutional credit being responsible for less than one-tenth 'of the total. How- ever, with further expansion of HYV programme, particularly among the poorer sections who cannot afford the heavy financial demands of the new technology, it is imperative that institutional credit bears a significant proportion of the total cost. At the village level, the primary co-operative societies are responsible for allocating credit; and largely because of bureaucratic formalities associated with their functioning a large part of the inodest amount made available through them has not been disbursed; many fairmers, particularly the poor landless and tenants, have faced institutional difficulties in gaining access to the benefits being distributed by the co-operatives. Similarly, the rigid lend- ing practices followed by the land mortgage banks and commercial banks, particularly their

insistence on security have made it almost impossible for the poorer farmers to get financial support for buying indivisibles. Among the inputs the prices of 'indivisibles' like tractors and tubewells are too high for any- body but the richest among the farmers to afford. WVhile the use of these inputs is spreading among small farmers, this is making them increasingly dependent on their richer counterparts. Be- sides, the small farmers do not always obtain these inputs in time, the owners naturally pre- ferring to give priority to their own needs.

(c) Impoit and energy intensity. Not only that the modem input, are market-oriented, these are often dependent on markets outside the country. The domestic production of fertiliser, although growing, is a long way behind the domestic need even at a much lower level of input per unit of land than many other countries of the world, notably Japan. The same is true of the other petro-chemicals, and the oil needed for driving the tractors, irrigation pumps and other farm machinery, and of modern farm machinery. Therefore, their availability in the country is largely conditional on the com- peting demands on the scarce foreign exchange resources of the country from various sectors of the economy and on their price.

Given the above three characteristics of the modem inputs, it is not surprising that the progress of the new varieties came to a halt after 1971. In the first phase the available inputs were applied to a selected number of areas which were known for their developed infrastructure, particularly irrigation and credit facilities as well as a developed transport and communication network, and the presence of a group of rich farmers who were prepared to experi- ment with the new technology. The success of the new varieties during this phase largely reflected the rich endow- ment of the host areas, the intensive application of inputs, and a remarkably favourable run of good weather for three years. In contrast, in the second phase, the new strategy faced a seri-s of difficulties.

First of all, the new technology was now spreading to arreas which were not

so fortunate with respect to water availability and other resources. A kind of Ricardian Law was in operation, as more of the less developed areas were being brought under cultivation.

Secondly, the input constraint, which was not so serious in the first phase, now became a major obstacle to growth. The production and import of fertiliser, tractors, and other inputs were not expanding as fast as the spread of the new technology. In particular, the oil crisis of 1973 dealt a heavy blow to the new technology, dependent as it was on imported energy; in the case of fertiliser, the four-fold increase in prices following the oil crisis discouraged demand by so much that the country even managed to show a surplus out of the available meagre supply. As for irrigation, the estimates showed that even by the end of the seventies more than two-thirds of the cultivated land would remain unirrigat- ed, while even a most optimistic esti- mate of the available tractors showed that by the end of the seventies only about 3 per cent of the total cultivated land would be covered.

Thirdly, the scarcity of inputs led to a deterioration in their quality. (If account is taken of adulteration, the amount of input available per unit of land would appear even less satisfactory in the second phase.) The maintenance of the standard of inputs which was not easy, since the administrative ap- paratus - not known for its efficiency in the best of times - came under considerable strain with the spread of the new technology. Not only was the dos- age often inadequate, and the quality poor, the scarcity of inputs also had its effect on the timeliness of their supplies. In the absence of storage facilities at the village level, it was necessary that the inputs would be supplied at the right time. Often bad transport systems prevented the timely arrival of the inputs; villages where the new varieties were introduced in the second phase were more likely to suffer from this untimely arrival as their transport and storage facilities were comparatively less developed.

These three factors, in addition to several bad monsoons, largely explain the failure of the new technology during the second phase.

It is often argued, on the basis of field experiments, that the new seed varieties are more productive than the traditional ones even when these are not applied in conjunction with fertiliser.

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Even if this is true its implication cannot be that the new technology can (lo without fertiliser. In the first place given the heavy investment required for introducing the new seeds plus the uncertainty associated with it, the smaller farmers could not be expected to give tip the traditional varieties and practices unless the yield differential was substantial. Secondly, given the heavy loss of soil nutrient caused by HYV cultivation (which is barely compen- sated by the present level of fertiliser use), and the tendency towards double cropping and a declining share of fallow land, to cultivate the new seeds withb out fertiliser might lead to an alarming decline in soil fertility in the long run.

No less important is the impact of the new technology on another highly important natural resource: under- grouind water. The unregulated, widespread installation of tubewells and pump sets in some areas of Punjab has caused the water table there to fall, which puts the future production possibilities in these areas at risk. The environmentalists also argue against the use of pesticides which pollute the environment and cause the death of non-target organisms (like birds, fishes and many other living crea- tures), although, given the present low level of pesticide use in the country, this argument need not be taken too seriously.

Perhaps the most serious environ- mentalist argument against the new technology is that it disrupts the existing ecological balance. This by itself cannot be a strong argument against the new technology since too much concern for the prevailing eco-system is inimical to any measure for change and progress. But to the extent this argument is a warning against experimentations whose likely consequences on the eco- system are unknown, it deserves serious attention. For example, it is important to know to what extent the new varieties, while resistant to one set of pests and diseases, are vulnerable to another set of pests and diseases. It is important to know to what extent the drastic decline in the number of planted varieties with the large-scale adoption of the standardised new varieties is exposing the globe's agriculture to a serious risk of a gigantic crop failure due to an epidemic. s

Our study clearly shows that even on purely technical grounds the new technology is not viable in the Indian context. This is largely because of

various constraints on the supply, quality and timing of inputs which arise when the HYV acreage is extended beyond a small number of richly endowed enclaves. In the light of these factors it is ques- tionable whether in a country wlhich is deficient in energy and capital and whose capacity to import is limited, an import-intensive, energy-intensive, and capital-intensive technology, like the one associated with the HIWs can ever work.

It may also be asked whether a more viable alternative would not have been to seek a technology which largely relied on indigenous inputs and recy- clable resources, and which could be more easily blended with local land- scape, culture, and vast human resources.

SELECTIVE STRATEGY AND DISTBUIION

OF GAEs

Having examined the major limitations of the 'green revolution' technology in offering a lasting solution to India's food problem, let us now briefly examine the 'new agricultural strategy' within the framework of which it was introduced.

The cornerstone of the new agricul tural strategy of 1965, was its selective approach: selection of areas endowed with a favourable inf* astructure, and within these areas the selection of 'progressive farmers' (who were usually the larger farmers) for the distribution of inputs. The allocation of inputs at each level of administrative hierarchy -from state, through district to block - was dependent on its resource endowments, past performance and fulfilment of other criteria set up by the government. At the village level, the allocation was done on the basis of a list of farmers prepared by the Village Level Worker. The rationale behind this strategy was quite simple: given the limitations of supply of modern inputs, these should reach those areas and people who are likely to make their most optimum use. Rather than thinly spreading the inputs over a large area and among many farmers, this strategy called for the intensive use of 'package' of inputs.

The selective approach of the new agricultural strategy stood counter to the declared objectives of the commu- unity development or co-operative movement of involving the masses in rural development. It presented a technical solution to the country's food problem and bypassed the insiitutional issues. Rather than smashing or even

weakening the village power structure through land reform and other measures, attempt was made to enlist their support to the exclusion of the rest of the village population. Through the new agricultural strategy, the govemment chose to rely on modem inputs and 'progressive farmers' for increasing land productivity; if this strategy succeeded, the calculation was, there would be plenty of food and employment for the poor. The question of distribution was considered a separate issue to be hand- led through suitable fiscal and relief measures, and the creation of special agencies for target groups.

While this selective strategy was successful in the resourceful wheat areas of Haryana and Punjab, and some other pockets of India, it was realised by the late-sixties that the food problem for the country as a whole could not be solved without extending HYV cultivation to new areas, and perhaps also to less prosperous farmers. But when attempts were made to extend HYV coverage, the severe limitations on input supply, whit were not so apparent as long as the HYV cilltiva- tion was restricted to a small area, became evident.

In areas where the new strategy has been successful in terms of food production, it is argued by several researchers that its introduction has favoured the richer farmers.

Some argue that the bias against the small farmers is built into the new technology by the very costly nature of the inputs, the role of indivisibles like tractors and also by the selective strategy accompanying the new technology. Some, while accepting that the technology is 'scale neutral', put forward the view that the 'access to resources' is not scale neutral. The arguments put forward by the protagonists of the new technology on this issue are as follows:

(a) While it is true that initially the new technology is adopted by the large farms, over time its use would 'percolate down' to even the smallest of farmers. Therefore, the Inequality evi denced in the early years would gradually disappear.

(b) The new technology, with its strong emphasis on mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture, which helps to increase output and employment, brings additional income to all sections of the rural population including

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the very poor and landless, although it might bring relativelv more income to the richer sections.

Taking the first argulment first, it is true that over time the new technology is spreading to smaller farmers. Not only the use of divisible like seed, fertiliser or insecticide, even the use of tractors, threshers and other farm machinerv are expanding among the smaller farmers in areas where the new techlnology has been relatively successful. Our studv also slhows that once thevy decide to adopt the new seeds they usually put a higher proportion of their acreage under it than their larger counter parts. But this by itself does not con- stituite firm evidence in suippo-rt of the 'per-colation' tlheory.

Ouir studv shows that, unlike traditional agriculture, wbere the smaller farnmers cuiltivate their land more inten- sively in terms of both family laboum and other inputs and show a higher production figure per unit of land than their larger counterparts; under the new technology, the tendency is for the larger farms to input as much as, or even more than, the smaller farms and to secure a yield which is no worse, than the yield figures for the smaller farms. Among various size ca- tegories, in the case of rice cultivation, the profit is largest for farms of 10 acres plus size category, which is large by standards of rice cultivation in India and other par-ts of South and South East Asia; and in the case of wheat, the mechanised farms above 30-40 acres enjoy a clear advantage in terms of costs and profits than their smaller neighbours. The cost advan- tages of the larger farms would seem greater if the imputed cost of maintaining family labour is added to the accounts of smaller farms.

To what extent this relatively low pr-ofitability of snmaller farms has affect- e.( the distribution of land, asset and income in the 'green revolution' areas? Otur study clearly shows that the skew- ness in the (listribution of land is increasing; and tllis is despite the following, factors which would tend to shiow, at least statistically, a more egalitarian land distribution:

(a) Oxver time, because of thc operation of inheritancce laws, the lholdings woluld be getting frag- menited.

(b) Since the land distribution fi- glures cio not usually take into

account the landlless househlolds,

and assuming the possibility of some of the landowning households (usually the ones with smaller holdings) dropping off the list of such households through transfer of their land, there would be tendency towards a more egalitarian land distribution among the landowning households, although the concentration of land measured by taking into account all households would show an increase.

(c) The tendency among the large landowners to conceal a part of the land under their ownership or operation, to avoid the ceiling laws or to make them eligible for concessions and benefits given to smaller holdings.

The significance of our findings on the growing inequality in the land distribution is partly tempered by lack of any positive finding on the impact ol the new- technology on income distri- bufion. Since the smaller holdings usuiallv earn from many diverse sources, whlile the larger farmns depend nearly exclu-sively on farm business income, other things remaining the same, one would expect a somewhat less skewed distribution in terms of household income, compared to the figure for land distribution. However, one should be careful about reading too much from figures of income of rural households, which is probably by far the most difficult item to measure in the contpxt of the economy of a poor country. And, irrespective of whether the income distribution has worsened withn the introduction of the new technology, one shotuld note that the distribution foi any given time period or region is very

higlhly skewed indeed. The most damaging piece of eviden-

ce against the 'percolation theory' pro- luced by our study is the growing skew- nless in the distribution of assets, particularlv of farm assets like tubewells and tractors. This shows that in future the larger farms would be able to re- tain their advantage over the smaller farms partly because of their greatei credit-worthiness and risk-bearing capacity based on the high value of 'heir asset holdings, and partly because of the higher earning capacity generated by their ownership of productive farm assets.

Attemupts made by the government to remove the handicaps of the smaller farms by creating special agencies to lookd after their interests have mzade

very little impression, partly because of administrative drawbacks and partly be. cause of the hindrances created by socio-political structures of the v'llage life in India. The Small Farmer's De- velopment Agency is no more than a subsidy-giving agency which operates with an inadequate administrative back- up through the existing credit institutions, which are knowin for their bias against the small farm.ers and 1anants. Furthermore, as most evaluation reports on SFDA show, many of the benefits of the agency have been rc'aped by richer farmers who, by manipulating records and the administration, lhave presented themselves eligible as bene- ficiaries. It is very clear from. the cx- periences of SFDA and similar othei agencies set up to cater for the special needs of the' unprivileged sections of the population that suclh administrative actiolns for target groups have little clhanice of success as long as the existing village institutions remain unre- formed.

SoIm1e of the studies for which data exist show that the percentage of agricultural labour households is much higher than the percentage of households with agricultural labour as their traditional occupation, but these do not indicate the time span over which such occupational shift had taken place. Although the Census data for 1971 indicate a radical increase in the percentage of households for which agriculture is the occupation, again it is not clear bow much of it has been -'e result of the agricultural crisis of thte first half of the sixties and how mucl a product of the 'green revolution', leaving aside the question to what extent the increase reflects definitional changes between the two census years. In the absence of alternative employment opportunities in the village o r outside, it is highly unlikely ihat a small farmer would part with tne land in his possession excepting as a last resort. It is clear that a large pio- portion of the new entrants to the ag- r icultural labouir force are former tenants who have been evicted by tlhe resumption of land by self-cultivating owners. Some of the small farming households encage in ag-icultuiral labour as a subsidiary oocuption: over tinme with population increase and frag- mentation of small holdings, some of them move to agricultural labour as the primary occupation.

WVhat has been the effect of the new technology on the life and work of the

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agricultural workers? As regards employment, our study suggests that, while the mechanisation of ploughing operation has displaced human labour this has been more than offset by addi. tional employment created through a greater labour need for application of fertiliser, weeding and harvesting, and other activities, and also due to increase in the area under double crop. While the amount of work has increased, largely because the degree of mechanisation of agriculture is still not high and in many places bullocks are still used alongside tractors, in the long run, with a wider application of tractors, and particularly of harvesters, there is a serious risk of a sudden decline in the nurner of labour days needed per unit of land. The introduction of machines has induced changes in the pattern of work. The richer houselholds are now dispens- ing with the services of their farm ser- vants, particularly in view of the increase in the participation of family iaS bour in cultivation, and are relyirng more on casual or contract lal-our. Even the smaller households are being constrained to hire labour during haxr- vesting, both because of the sheer vo- lume of work associated with highei productivity and also because of the time constraints when they are under- taking double cropping.

Two other phenomena are worth. noting. MWhile the amount of work in terms of labour days has increased, such work is now being performed by a smaller number of hired people. elie participation rate of the village population i-n the work force is declining, particularly of the women and children, as well as the old, who are opting out of work. Secondly, the areas wkich have been successful in their application of the new technology are at. tracting workers from the neighbouring areas who are working as casual oi contract labour and are moving from village to village particularlv during harvest time. Wages are being paid mostly in cash. While the money wages have undoubtedly increased, thete is conflict between studies undertaken in different areas which used different cost of living deflators regarding the movement of real wages as a resuXlt of the 'green revolution'. To summarise while the new technology has expanded employment in the short run, in the long run, with further advance in mechanisation, there is a serious risk of a negative employment effect from it. While the new technology has increas-

ed the money income of all sections of the population, and probably also real income in some 'green revolution' areas (e g, Punjab and Haryana), as most studies confirm, there is no doubt that their relative position vis-a-vis 'the richer sections of the rural population has weakened over this period.

WHY IS IT 'WHEAT REVOLUTION'?

In the view of the failure of the new technology in meeting the expectations of the officials, academics and lay pub- lic alike on an aggregative basis, it is important to explain the success achieved with wheat, and in certain regions of the country.

It was the spectacular performance of the new technology on wheat production which earned it its nickname 'wheat revolution'. By 1971-72 about two-fifths of the wheat area was brought under the new varieties; by 1973-74, the last year of the fourth five- year plan, the actual acreage unn'ls HYV wheat at 11.30 million hectares far exceeded the targeted 7.20 million hectares. In terms of yield per unit of land, whereas virtually no progress was registered at the aggregate level in the case of rice, the achievement with the high-yielding wheat varieties was tremendous. The aggregate wheat production increased from 10 to 24 million tons in five years between 1965-66 and 1970-71, a consider. able achievement by almost any standards.4 Even the cautious report of the Agricultural Prices Commission refer- red to above noted that the performance of wheat during the 'green r!(vo- lution' period was at a much highlex level than suggested by the trend line based on the production figures for 1949-50 to 1964-65. But why wheat, when the other crops, notably rice, failed? The credit for this should go foremost to the breeders of the high- yielding wheat varieties, both in Mexico (who first developed them) and in India (who through cross-breedirng made them suitable to Indian concli- tions). No less significant was perhaps the location factor. To quote V S Vyas,5 "The wheat belt is more or less a continuous area with a lar ge degree of ecological and agro-climatic uniformity, unlike the rice or millet zones which are interpersed all over the country". This made the adaptive research in wheat relatively simpler. The wheat growing areas are also co-tn paratively more developed in terms of

infrastructure, particularly irrigation, and are economically more advanced than the rice or millet growing tracts. Wheat being a 'rabi' crop also helped. To quote Vyas again, "In most of the areas, wheat, even though the principal crop, is a second crop, which makes it possible for the growers to depend on funds obtained from the sale of the first crop."8 This enhances the capacity of the farmers to innovate and take risks. In addition, the 'rabi' wheat did not have to face the problems of monsoon cultivation, such as the survival of dwarf crops in flooded conditions, or the harvesting of the crop under rain, due to its short-maturing period, or the risk of massive attacks of insects which thrive in damp conditions.

WHY IS PUNJAB ITS HEARTLAND?

It was fortunate that the new wheat varieties were first introduced in Pun- jab. For a variety of reasons, this state was ideally suited to make the best of the new technology.

It is almost unbelievable today that at the time of the country's Indepen- dence, Punjab was a food-deficit state, a state which is today freely described as the 'granary of India'. But over the two decades following Inde- pendence an infrastructure favourable to modem agriculture was built in that state.

The first to contribute to agricultui-al development in Punjab was the Ianid reform legislations passed during the early and the middle fifties, which took away land from the very large in- termediaries and vested those In nwn- er-occupiers.7 Traditionally, Punjab agriculture was always dominated by tli owner-occupiers, because of the preva- lence of the ryotwari system but these reforms increased the area under the owner-occupiers from 51.4 per cent in 1947 to 66.4 per cent in 1957. By 1969- 70, the percentage of owner-occupiers had increased further to 80.89 per cent, largely due to the phenomenon of resumption of land by the owners and eviction of tenarnts; the percenitage of tenancy holdings dropped from 47.2 per cent in 1947 and 32.5 per cent in 1957 to a small 19.11 per cent in 1969- 70. So the new technology was first introduced in a state where cultivation was largely undertaken by the owners themselves with the help of their em- ployees.8

The development of agriculture in the state was prompted in no smnal

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ineasure by the relative prosperity of the state; both in terms of the rich enl dowment of land as wvell as in terms of the motivation and ability of its people. The average holding size in Pun- jab is larger than in the rest of the country,9 and a higlh percentage of the cropped area is irrigated,10 two of the necessary conditions for the successful application of the niew technology. Be- sides, the degree of mechanisation was very high compared to other states, even before the introduction of the n-ew seeds. Whereas there was not a sinig,le thresher in 1947, their number stood at 20,000 in 1964, and in 1970 it increased further to 80,000 whiclh ac- counted for the threshing of 98 per cent of the state's wheat area. Similar progress was achieved with tubewells, tractors and other farm machinery.t1 The mechanisation was partly helped by the larger size of the land holdiings anid partly by the fact that owner- occuipiers dominatecl the tenurial system, whlo were interested in economis- ing on labour costs and in reducing the problems associated with the supervi- sion of a large labour force. Thb in- t-roduction of machines, in its turn, encouraged the familv members of even quite rich houLseholds to undertake cultivation, whereas previously they shun- ned manual labour.'2 The availability of repair service facilities for farm rna- chinerv in most of the medium-sized towns of the state meant that the su-b- stitution of bullock and manual labour could be carried to a much greater extent in this state than was possible in other Indian states. The availability of electricity, largely from the hydro- electricity generation plants of the river valley projects, was another contributo-

ry factor.13

On the financial side, Punjab's agricultural progress w7as facilitated by the following two features of Punjab"s socio-economic life. First, is the high mi- gration propensity of the population and the practice of the miiigrants to send remittances in bulk back to theii villages for the purchase of land and maclhinery. Orver the years, the migratory flows have increased to other states of India, mainly in the transport business, as well as to countries outside India. The actual amounit of remittance sent back by the Punjab workers in the Ulnited Kingdom, Canada, East Africa and the United States can never be properly estimated in view of the role played by the 'black market' in foreign currency, hut there is no doubt about

the impact of remittances sent by relatives working abroad on the purchase of farm machinery. Secondly, no less significant has been the long tradition of Punjabi village folk of work in the army, which again creates the opportuni- ty for saving and remitting it back to the vilage for buying machinery. The experiences of Punjabis working in the army or living abroad but maintaining a regular contact with the village, have also been valuable in widening their ho- rizons, in bringing them into contact with new ideas, and in makiing them aspire for a better life. The technological awareness of a Punjabi villager, a product of work in the army, or in other states with transport trade, or abroad as a factory hand in the found- iies, by himself, or his relatives or ac- quaintances, is also an important factor botlh in the adoption of farm machinery and in the growth of their servicing in- dlustries. Credit facilities also have been more generous and much less ob- structive, even to the small farmers, than in the other states.14

It is the combination of all these factors which has made Punjab the heartland of green revolution in India. It is surprising that, despite Punjab's pre- eminent role in this field, very little r esearch has been done so far to ex- plore tlhe sociological, economic and political explanations behind this state'5 success. The relative success achieved in Harayana and some parts of Uttar Pradesh in tlhe successful adoption of the new technology can also be largely explained by the existence of some of the factors enumerated above in con- nection with Punjab: the high share of owner-occupier holdings, the development of credit and irrigation facilities, and the pr-esence of an enterprising group of rich farmers with a background in the army or outside the state with a high propensity to save and in- vest in productive farm assets.

It is also important to remember that, despite its spectacuilar success in the earlier years, even in Ptunjab, the rate of growth of prodluction has slowed down after 1970-71. W17ithin the state, some areas have been more receptive of the new technology than others (e g, Ludhiana or Ferozepur). WVith the spread of the new technology to newer areas, all the problems discussed in re- lation to limitations of input capacity have also cropped up in Punjab. In addition, the state has been severely affected by the power crisis, but Punjab is mzore vulnerable to it than others

partly because of the degree of mechanisation of its agriculture and partly because its chief source of electricity is river-valley hydro-electricity projects whose power production suffered from low rain-fall.

No doubt the agriculture in Punjab will be on its way up again in the near future. But the prosperity of Punjab's agriculture is now creating another problem: the widening disparity be- tveen regions in terms of their living stan dards. WVhereas at the tine of In- dia's Independence, Punjab's position was hlardly better than the average among the states, by the early seventies tlhis state has emerged as the most prosperous among them. The prosperity built on the solid base of its agriculture has enabled the state to diversi- fy its economn by promoting many industries, and to move further away fromn its rivals in the hierarchy of states. A village in Punjab today, with brick-built houses, developed roads, electricity, schools and hospitals, be- longs to a different world from its po- ver-ty-stricken, dark counterparts with muddy roads and mud-walled thatched roofed houses and very few social ame- nities in most other parts of the coun- trn, particularly in the eastern region. WVhat has been said here about Punjab applies to enclaves of new technology in other parts of the country (e g, West Godavari in Andhra).

The issue here is not simply one of differential living standards between regions. It raises the fundamental issue about the exchange price between food and industrial goods and raw materials in inter-state dealings; the issue of state autonomy, to what extent the food- deficit states (e g, West Bengal and Kerala) which produce foreign exchange earning crops are to be allowed to encourage a shift in the cropping pattern in favour of food crops and against commercial crops in order to achieve state self sufficiency in foodgrains; or how the procurement and distribution of food crops would be regulated, and hiow income generated from agricultural income would be taxed, and so on. If the inequality widens, this will, on the one hand, encourage the more prosperous states to ask for more autonomy, particularly fiscal autonomy, while it will generate demand in the poorer states for a redistribution of gains through the national fiscal system. Given India's experience of many l)attles fought between the states on border, location of industrial plants,

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allocation of river water, the issue of priority given to the members of a given state to employment there, and so on, there is no doubt that the growing inequality between areas, which benefit- ed from the new technology and which did not, would lead to growing tension among various nationalities and groups. The phenomenon of migratory movement of landless labourers from less privileged areas to 'green revolution' areas for jobs, particularly during the harvest time, is another source of tension of this type.

POLIIICAL ECONOMY OF GREFN RE:VOLUIoN

Although this paper has highlighted the main causes behind the failure of the new technology to substantially increase land productivity, this should not be interpreted as suggesting that India's prospects for achieving self- sufficiency in foodgrains are non-existent. On the contrary, compared to most other countries in the world the amount of cultivated land as a proportion of the total land mass is surprisingly high in India. With one-third of China's total land mnass, the aggregate cultivated area in India is larger. If the yield figures in India were as high as those in Japan, the United States or Belgium, for example, it would be well within the capacity of the available cultivated area to feed a population three times as large as the current population. A technological breakthrough in the breeding of rice varieties adaptable to flooded conditions and pest-resistant can by itself push food production figures to new heights. The increased food production, however, would not by itself solve the major social and economic problems created by this new technology.

Nor would it be fair to conclude from the above discussion that the modern inputs are by themselves responsible for the adverse distributional effects of the new technology. Selec- tive breeding of seed varieties which are both robust and high-yielding, is an important task of agricultural planners irrespective of the prevailing social system in the country concerned. Simi- larly, tractors and threshers can play a useful role in removing seasonal bottlenecks -tnder different social svs- tems. Fertilisers, we have already noted, would be required to replenish the fertility of the soil which loses an enormous amount of nutrient every time the new high-yielding varieties are

cultivated. The main criticism against the strategy incorporating these inputs is its selective approach and reliance on imported, capital intensive inputs, whose supply is inadequate in compari- son with the overall needs of the country's agriculture, coupled with its failure to use the most abundant indigenous resource: human labour, which is grossly undertilised in the countryside. An altemative strategy of encou- raging social participation of all sections of rural masses in rural development, and social ownership of major agricultural inputs is expected both to opti- mirse the social use of their limited supply and to prevent the growth of inequality which arises from their private ownership.

The technology associated with the new seed varieties needs to be evaluat- ed in the specific socio-political context in which it is operating. It is important to note that our conclusions regarding some of the major social and economic consequences of the new technology- proletarisation of the peasantry and a consequent increase in the number and proportion of landless households, growing concentration of land and assets in fewer hands and widening disparity between the rich and the poor households, and a fall in the rate of participation of the village population in work alongside a substantial increase in the total work load - closely correspond to those reached by the author's other study based on village level data of the pre-HYV period on the impact 'of agricultural modernisation.15 In other words, what our present study suggests as consequences of the adoption of HYV technology, can be generalised as the consequence of agricultural modem- isation in a particular socio-political context characterised by the domination of village life by a powerful elite.

The new agricultural strategy, we have already noted, can be seen as an attempt by the government to solve the food problem of the country without upsetting tht existing land relations. It r elied heavily on those who had to lose most from a policy of radical land reform. One leading advocate of the new technology commented, "the major constraints on India's agricultural growth has been technical rather than institutional" 16 Another leading proponent of the new technology argued, "at this stage of economic growth and development in India, an overriding 'objective should be the enhancement of agricultural production, and mobilisation of

agricultural surpluses", while the lower- ing of ceiling might lead to reduction of output, surplus, and employment.17 Another argued, "If redistribution assumes the shape of a process of ato- misation of land holdings, there will be little scope for the intsoduction of the elements of modernisation and improved production methodology".'8 It is note- worthy that very often those who dis- pute the large farmer bias of the new technology argue in the same breath against land reform on the ground that the new technology would lose its efficiency in the hands of smaller holdings, without recognising the inconsistency in their argument.

Our study shows that, while the relationship between farm size and yield under the new technology is not negative as under traditional agriculture, there is no firm evidence excepting in cases of very highly mechanised farming of the relationship turning positive. Since agriculture in India would continue to be subjected to severe capital constraints for quite some time to come, the empirical evidence does not justify large holdings on grounds of larger output. As regards marketed surplus, both the traditional and the new technology demonstrate its positive relationship with farm size; but a significant feature of the data under HYV is that the proportion marketed by the small farmers is increasing with time and further adoption. In the case of HYV wheat, the data suggest that the larger, particularly highly mechanised, farms enjoy an advantage over the smaller farms in terms of cost per unit of output. How- ever, since the data was collected in 1971-72, these do not account for the increased costs of modem inputs since October 1973. Furthermore, cost considered here is 'private cost', - which does not allow for the subsidy element in the credit and input concessions at- tained by the farms purchasing machinery, 'or the 'social cost' - of low participation rate in the work force in the modern, mechanised agriculture. A radical land reform measure, on the other hand, would provide the necessary psychological support to the village small farmer and landless to look for a better life, to participate on an equal basis in the community activities, and to gain access to resources which were so far denied to them by the dominant village elite. Experiences in Kerala and West Bengal suggest that radical land reform is likely to be followed by an inlcrease in food production due to more

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intensive family labour input and care. Experience in these two states, and outside India in Japan, also suggest that even the most egalitarian distribution of land among the rural households would not necessarily make the farming units too small and non-viable. Lastly, the smashing of the village power structure through land reform would also provide the basis for the development of co- operative activities in the field of farming, while under the present set up the inequality of power makes such activities unworkable at the viLlage level.

Given the inability of the new technology to make much headway under conditions of severe shortage of capital and foreign exchange, and the need for an alternative technology with a high labour-land and labour-capital ratio, as we have argued above, it is all the more necessary that such land reform takes place and both land and capital is widely distributed among the rural households. The issue now is not so much whether a radical land reform is necessary, but whether the government has the necessary political will to implement it. The main opposition to a radical land reform programme comes, understandably, from those who are likely to be affected most by it: the rich peasants and landholders, the 'co- operative' rural elite which has replaced the big zamindars and jagirdars after the first round of land reform. Unlike the landed gentry which lived in the city and took no interest in cultivation, the present rural elite is enterprising and very muchl rooted in the village socio-political system, and so is much more difficult to remove. Moreover, in addition to the economic power it holds, the rural elite wields an enormous amount of political and social power through its control over village institutions such as co-operatives and pancha- yati raj and through its contacts with the administration at different levels. Furthermore, through its association with various political parties including the ruling party, the rural elite its cap- able of makina its voice heard at the highest level of the government. The partial election debacle of the ruling party during the fourth general election in 1967 was largely a consequence of the support given by a section of this elite to the dissident organisations because of their annoyance with the food procurement policy of the government. The nationalisation of commercial banks, which were controlled by the industrial finance capital, in 1969, and the

decision to make a larger provision for rural credit could be interpreted as an attempt by the government to win over the largest possible section of this particular group. The failure to impose an effective tax on the agricultural earnings of this class, despite repeated pledges by the ruling party over the past decade, is another indication of the considerable influence this particular group exerts over the government of the country.

Often, some scholars have attributed India's failure in achieving self-sufficiency in food production to the supposed neglect of the country's agriculture by the Indian planners, and to the mobilisation of a surplus from the countryside by the government through procurement policies, for feeding the population in the cities. This view has been extended further to give an impression of a continuing 'class conflict' between the entire urban population, on the one hand, and the entire rural population, on the other, where even the poor sections of the urban population have sided against the villagers.'9

The major weakness of this approach is that it describes the rural population as a whole as the 'undexprivileged', ignoring the powerful class of rich peasants and small landlords who have amassed a huge fortune from cultivation and exploitation of poor peasantry and the landless, while it describes the entire urban population as 'privileged', ignoring the slum dwellers, pavement traders, and the participants in the city's huge 'informal sectors', many of whom live in more miserable conditions than the poorest in the village. This approach also ignores the necessity to squeeze the rich in the village in order to finance long term projects and to provide subsistence to the indusuturial workers without which the country would not develop; and wrongly equates a policy of procuring food from this class or taxing their income with the exploitation of the countryside. It is true that many poor farmers are forced to make 'distress sales' at the time of the harvest, but this they will continue to do as long as the inequality in the countryside persists and the rural elite is able to tie their poor neighbours with debt and other obli- gations independent of the procurement policy. Moreover, there is no factual evidence - in terms of the percentage share of planned investment going to industry or urban areas - that the latter is favoured by the gov-

emment; nor is there any evidence that the terms of trade between the city and the countryside are in the former's favour. On the contrary, all through the sixties, the food prices in India have increased faster than the prices of manufictured goods; and more often than not it is the increased food prices which have forced the manufacturing concerns to hike their prices in order to meet the inflated wage bill. These higher food prices have not helped the rural community as a whole, but only particular sections: rich farmers who contribute a large share of the marketed surplus, and the middlemen who either own storage capacity or are able to hire such capacity with their own or borrowed finance. While the question of urban- rural balance is not unimportant, this is certainly not the major issue in Indian agriculture, as Lipton or Griffin would like us to believe.

Nevertheless, one should recognise the role of the Indian industrial elite in the formulation of the country's food policy. The industrialists in India are deeply interested in a food policy which would provide their workers with a regular food supply at a cheap price, and would reduce the cost of food import so that more of the precious foreign exchange could be made available to import materials for industrial development. Which explains the support traditionally given by the industrialist lobby of the country to radical agricultural programmes, based ion large- scale food procurement, co-operative farming, land reform and taxation of agricultural income. The very fact that the policy declarations of the Central government often include these elements reflects the influence of the industrial lobby over the government at the cenral level, while their non-implementation is evidence of the influence of the rural elite over the government machinery at the state level, agriculture being a 'state subject' under the Indian constitution. The conflict between these two most powerful economic groups in the country - the industrial and rural elite - is an important factor in the policy decisions of the government.20

The new agricultural strategy can be viewed as having been devised by the policy makers for resolving the essential conflict of interest between these two power groups on this issue. Under this, while the food production is increased and distributed at a cheap-

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price, this is accomplished without upsetting the existing correlation of forces in the countryside. To the extent the new strategy makes demand for manu- factured produucuts like fertiliser, pesticides and farm machinery, and provides encouragement to the establishment of workshops and distribution networks, it is compatible with a programme for industrial development. Furthermore, the increased concentration of surplus in the countryside in the hands of a small elite (a result of the growing inequality in the income distribution) also helps in expanding the market for con- stumer goods produced by the indigenous industrialists.

The new technology has not only brought about a convergence of interests of these two power groups - the rural elite which is powerful at the local level, and the industrial elite which is powerful at the national level - it is also compatible with the interess of a large section of the international capital, particularly the multinational fLrms wsNhich specialise in produsing petro- chemicals and farm machinery. In some countries 'of Asia (e g, Indone- sia), the multinational firms have play. ed an active role in sponsoring the new technology with the blessings of the government. In India, although the adoption of the new technology has expanded the market for imported fertilisers, pesticides, and various types of farm machinery, the multinational cor- porations have not been allowed to play any part in the implementation of the HYV programme.

WN,hatever the influence of the industrial capital and the multinational firms on the formulation of the new agricultural strategy, there is no doubt that its adoption has strengthened the position of the ruling elite in the countryside. Firstly, it has increased the profit and assets, and consequently the economic power of this group. Second- ly, through this new technology a new type 'of patron-client dependency relationship of the small farmers on the rich farmers has been created for the use of means of production which are owned by the latter, especially tractors and other farm machinery. Thirdly, the rural elite has emerged as an interme- diary through whose hands the inputs supplied by the government are deli- vered to the village. We have already noted the control of the rich farmers over co-operatives; in addition, in most villages retail shops for fertiliser, seed and other inputs are owned by the rich

farmers. No less important is the role of the village level worker in this respect, who is usually a matriculate and a member of a rich farmer family, and is often eager to maintain close contact with the rich families, 'providing them with useful information and services in return for small favours'.21 Rather than undermining the existing rural in. stitutions by bringing about a radical transformation in the agricultural scene, the new technology has strengthened them and the groups in control of them. Whereas it was a difficult political task to antagonise the rural elite before, it is even more difficult today as the former is now deeply entrenched in power in the Indian countryside.

Interpreting the rural situation this way leaves very little scope for economic arguments. The radical land reform we so strongly argued about above, and which has been repeatedly pledged by the Indian government in the past, becomes almost an impossibility within the existing socio-economic set up.

Notes [This paper is mainly based on the author's forthcoming book, "Agrarian Change and the New Technology in India", UNRISD, Geneva. I am grateful to UNRISD, particularly Andrew Pearse, D Macgrananlan, Wolf Scott, Bridget Dommen, and many others in UNRISD who encouraged me to undertake this study and provided the necessary financial and secretarial support. I am particularly grateful to H Laxminarayan, Roshan Singh, A S Kah- lon, Gurbachan Singh, S L Bapna, G C Mandal, M G Chosh, and V Sanmug- sundaram, who undertook seven micro- level studies in different parts of the country under the auspices of the UNRISD Global 2 proiect. Also thanks are due to Susan Simmonds who typed the manuscript of this paper.]

1 Biplab Dasgupta, "Agrarian Change and the New Technology in India", UNRISD, Geneva (forthcoming).

2 William Paddock and Paul Pad- dock, "Famine-1975", Boston, 1967.

3 Mlinistrv of Agriculture, Report of the Agricultural Prices Commission on Price Policy for Kharif Cereals for the 1971-72 season, 1971.

4 Ministry of Agriculture, op cit. 5 Vyas. 6 Ibid. 7 Randhawa. 8 Ibid. 9 More than half the holdings are

bigger than 4 hectares, and about 10 per cent are bigzer than 12 hectares. See Randhawa.

10 By the early seventies, 70 per cent of the net sown area of the state was irrigated, compared to about 20 per cent irrigated area for the country as a whole. More thain half the total irrigated area is serv-

ed by wells and tubewells. See Randhawa.

11 Whereas there were no tubewells in Punjab in 1950, between 1968- 69 and 1971-72 the number of T)ri- vate tubewells increased from 112, 280 to 232, 280. The fertiliser use, at 29 kg per hectare in 1968-69 was much higher than the national average of 9.63 kg. See Randhawa.

12 Hanumant Rao. 13 In terms of annual per capita elec-

tricity consumption for irrigation, Punjab with 10.86 kwh stood third to Tamil Nadu and Haryana. See "Statistical Abstract of Punjab", 1969.

14 By 1963-64 all the villages of Pun- jab were covered by the co-operative societies, and by 1965-66 all the cultivator households were covered. The loan recovery rate, at 82 per cent, is surprisingly high, compared to a national average of 67 per cent. (Randhawa.) Hanu- mant Rao found that for Punjab the correlation between the co- efficient of concentration of co- operative credit in Punjab was one of the weakest amonig the Indiain state.s. (See Rao.)

15 Biplab Dasgupta, "Village Society and Labour Use", IDS-ILO publi- cation, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

16 Sen. 17 Randhawa.

18 S S Johl, "Mechanisation, Labour Use and Productivity in Indian Agriculture", Ohio State Universi- ty (mimeoed draft), 1974.

19 Keith Griffin, "The Political Eco- nomy of Agrarian Change: An Es- say on the Green Revolution", Macmillan, 1975: Michael Liplon, "Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Develop- ment", Temple Smith, 1977.

20 See K Mathew Kurien, (ed), "India - State and Society", Ori- ent Longmans, 1975, for an analy- sis of the correlation of class forces and the contradictions amongst them in the Indian society.

21 Joan P Mencher, "Conflicts and Contradictions in the Green Revo- lution: the Case of Tamil Nadu", Economic and Political Weekly (Annual Number), February, 1974; S M Hale, "Barriers to Free Choice in Development", (mimeoed draft) 1973.

Bibliography

(1) AERC, Allahabad, High yielding varieties programme in Vara- nasi district, 1967-68, Kharif.

(2) AERC, Delhi (1), An evaluation of the high yielding varieties programme, Kharif, 1968 (a study of IR8 paddy in Karnal district, Haryana).

(3) AERC, Delhi (2), Report on high yielding varieties programme in Saharanpur district, Utta Pradesh, Rabi, 1968-69.

(4) AERC, Jabalpur (1), A study of higzh yielding varieties pro-

259

Annual Number February 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

gramme, Rabi 1968-69 (wheat), Tikamgarh district.

(5) AERC, Jabalpur (2), A study of high yielding varieties programme, Kharif (paddy), 1968- 69, in Raipur district.

(6) AERC, Jorhat, A report on high yielding varieties programme in paddy in Sibsagar district, 1968-69.

(7) AERC, Madras, (1), An evaluation of the high yielding varieties programme in West Go. davari district (IR8-Rabi-1967- 68).

(8) AERC, Madras (2), A study of high yielding varieties programme in Thanjavur district, Rabi, 1968-69.

(9) AERC, Viswabharati, A study of high yielding varieties rro- gramme in the district of Cuttack., Orissa, with special reference to credit, 1967.

(10) AERC, Waltair (1), A study of high yielding varieties programme, Kharif 1968-69, Phase 1, Preliminary report.

(11) AERC, Waltair (2), A study of high yielding varieties programme, Rabi, 1968-69, East and West Godavari.

(12) Bhalla, G S, "Changing Structure of Agriculture in H;aryana: A Study of the Impact of the Green Revolution", Chandigarh, Punjab University, 1972.

(13) Desai, B M, "An Evaluation of Some Aspects of Hybrid Maize, Programme in Dohad Taluka (Panebmahal), Vallabh Vidyana- gar", AERC, 1967, Research study No 12.

(14) Frankel, Francine R, "India's Green Revolution - Economic Gains and Political Costs", Princeton, 1971.

(15) Ghosh, M G, "A Study of High Yielding Varieties Programme in the District of Birbhum, West Bengal, with Special Reference to Kharif Paddy., 1968-69".

(16) Hanumantha Rao, C H, "Techno- legical Change and the Distribu- tion of Gains in Indian Agricul- ture", Delhi, 1975.

(17) Juglekar, M V, "A Study of the High Yielding Varieties Pro- gramme (Bhandara District, Maharashtra), Paddy, Kharif, 1968-69", AERC, Poona.

(18) Muranjan, S, "A Study of the High Yielding Varieties Pro- gramme in Maharashtra, 1967- 68", Poona, AERC, (Kharif baira in Nasik, and Rabi jowar in Poona).

(19) Parthasarathy, G, "Changes in Rice Farming and their Econo- mic and Social Impact: Case Study of a Delta Village, Andhra Pradesh, India", (mimeo), 1973.

(20) Randhawa, M S, "Green Revolu- tion", Delhi, 1974.

(21) Rao, A P, "An Evaluation of High ,Yielding Varieties Pro- gramme, Rabi, 1967-68" (A study of. Meoxican wheat in Amritsar district), Delhi AERC.

'22) Rao, P V G K, "Economic As- pects of High Yielding Varieties Programme in Punjab" (A study of 1R8 paddy in Amritsar district), Kharif, 1968-69.

'23) Rao, P V G K, "Economics of High Yielding Wheat in Pun- jab" (special reference to Arnitsar district, Rabi, 1968-69).

'24) Sen, Bandhudas, "The Green Revolution in India", Delhi,

1974. (25) Shah, N R, "A Study of the

Hybrid Baira Programme in the Kaira district, Gujarat, Sum- mer, 1967 68". AERC, Vallabh Vidyanagar, 1967, Research study No 18.

(26) Vyas, V S, "Progress and Per- formance of HYV Wheat Pro- gramme in India (1966-67 to 1971-72)", CIMMYT, (mixneo), Mexico, 1973.

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