Infantry - benning.army.mil · Infantry • INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2006 Volume 95, Number 6

PB 7-06-6

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKICommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers from the 2ndSquadron, 9th CavalryRegiment head to a fightingposition during a gunnery rangein Iraq. (Photo by Staff SergeantRussell Klika)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0631903

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion,35th Infantry Regiment, 25thInfantry Division watch for suspicious activity during anoperation in Iraq. (Photo by Staff Sergeant Samuel Bendet,USAF)

FEATURES26 THE BRADLEY MASTER GUNNER COURSE AND ARFORGEN

Sergeant First Class Matthew HinkleyFirst Sergeant Timothy TerpakLieutenant Colonel Robert Cerjan

32 TRANSITION TEAMS AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION IN IRAQMajor Patrick T. CollotonMajor Tommy E. Stoner

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS6 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER: THE NEED FOR A STRYKER MASTER

TRAINER IN THE SBCTSergeant First Class Michael HertigMajor Mark S. Leslie

10 PROFESSIONAL FORUM10 COMBINED ARMS WEAPONS PROFICIENCY FOR THE HBCT

Sergeant First Class Tommy Howard13 PRELIMINARY AND BASIC GUNNERY FOR THE HBCT

Staff Sergeant Philip Mandile16 TRUCK CREW GUNNERY

Sergeant First Class William Simons19 RIFLE SQUAD GUNNERY

Sergeant First Class William Simons22 ADVANCED GUNNERY FOR THE HBCT

Sergeant First Class William Simons38 TRAINING NOTES

38 FSCOORD CHALLENGES FOR FIRE SUPPORTERS IN THE BCTMajor Christopher W. Wendland

42 A CASE AGAINST BATTLE DRILL SIXMike Forman

45 AAEF: AIR ASSAULT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAMPAIGN OFEXPERIMENTATIONLieutenant Colonel (Retired) Paul E. Snyder

47 CO-WITNESSING LASERS TO OPTICS: A FASTER MORE ACCURATE WAYTO ZERO LASERS FOR THE NIGHT FIGHTMajor Darren R. LoRé

49 WEAPONS CORNER: BAYONETS51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Commandant’s Note

Today’s contemporary operational environment (COE) isfast-paced and unforgiving. As a brigade combat teamcloses with the enemy and brings its firepower to bear,

leaders must focus on hitting enemy targets while avoidingfratricide and limiting unnecessary collateral damage. Thetechniques of fire distribution and knowledge of combatidentification that our Soldiers learn and apply are useful in doingthis successfully. The gunnery proficiency and the tactical skillsSoldiers learn in our service schools and reinforce at home station,ensure we can better destroy the enemy’s will to resist while theyshoot, maneuver, and survive in the COE. Based on the dynamicchanges on the battlefield and after coordination with the Chiefof Armor, we are changing our approach to Heavy Brigade CombatTeam (HBCT) gunnery. In this Commandant’s Note I will discusssome of the measures we have undertaken to improve gunnery,and which are outlined in the new Draft FM 3-20.21, CombinedArms Weapons Proficiency for the Heavy Brigade Combat Team.

The U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) focuses on supportingthe Army’s and the Infantry’s training requirements. Weaponstraining and proficiency remain top priorities as we prepare tostand up the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning.We are working closely with the Armor Center to make sureour tankers and infantrymen receive the best training possible.One initiative in that direction is the formation of an HBCTworking group staffed by the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Officeat Fort Benning and the Gunnery Doctrine Branch at Fort Knox.One of their products is a set of comprehensive FMs for thegunnery training of all Soldiers within a BCT. One of these,FM 3-20.21, builds upon the gunnery manuals for crews ofAbrams tanks, as well as those for gunners in Bradley andCavalry Fighting Vehicles. This is designed to standardizetraining and evaluation standards for all elements within a BCT.This FM discusses in detail vehicle and ammunitioncharacteristics, training devices, gunnery training programs,range operations, and the engagement process. It also dealsextensively with squad and crew gunnery and evaluation,advanced collective gunnery training, and Abrams and BradleyFighting Vehicle live-fire preparation. The HBCT gunnery manualwill provide a comprehensive training strategy for commandersand complements the training received by Soldiers and crewmembers who are returning to their units from training, or whoare joining the unit for the first time.

Our functional weapons training is conducted by experiencedinstructors, many of whom are recent combat veterans. We have

GUNNERY TRAINING:THE KEY TO TOTAL WEAPON SYSTEM PROFICIENCY

November-December 2006 INFANTRY 1

modified the residentcourses, in some casesshortening them byrefining tasks to beaccomplished andconducting evening andweekend training whereverpossible. This means thatSoldiers are still trained to standard, but with a shorter time awayfrom home station. All USAIS weapons training courses — fromsmall arms to Stryker and Bradley gunnery — are now exportableto units. The Infantry School has trained and staffed mobiletraining teams (MTT) to deliver training to units when andwhere they need it. While it may be difficult to replicate theexperience, environment, and resources of institutionaltraining, the MTT offers units an option with greater flexibilityto support their training needs. MTT scheduling takes placesix months prior to execution, with initial coordination throughUSAIS G-3 and a formal request through FORSCOM toTRADOC. Commanders may also schedule Soldier and leadertraining through the Army Training Requirement and ResourceSystem or coordinate to schedule or block a functional courseto provide focused and resourced instruction for units. TheInfantry School also offers weapons training on a menu basis,depending on a unit’s training requirements. USAIS will workwith units to support their training needs. In the moretechnically demanding courses such as Master Gunner, unitsmay coordinate for USAIS master gunner training support todevelop home station master gunner training and unit Sabotacademy training. Our goal is to help units train Soldiers tosucceed in training, and in combat. We are actively workingwith TRADOC and FORSCOM to prioritize the demands andresources needed for infantry weapons training. Thefundamental changes we have made to our functional trainingcourses allows the Infantry School to better support unit weaponstraining. This is essential if we are going to meet Army ForceGeneration unit training standards.

We are a nation at war, and our Army must be able to strikeswiftly, deliver the decisive blow at the right time and place, andredeploy safely. The best gift we can offer our Soldiers is tough,realistic training that addresses the demands and challenges theywill face in combat. We owe them no less, and we will give themno less.

Follow me!

USAMU LOOKINGFOR PISTOL SHOOTERS Here is the latest list of newly published U.S. Army field

manuals (July-October 2006):• FM 4-02.51- Combat and Operational Stress Control• FM 4-30.51 - Unexploded Ordnance Procedures• FM 3-04.104 - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures forForward Arming and Refueling Points• FM-I 4-30.50 - Modular Explosive Ordnance DisposalOperations• FM 3-19.50 - Police Intelligence Operations• FM 4-20.197 - Helicopter Sling Load• FM 3-04.300 - Flight Operations Procedures• FM 4-20.105-1 - Air Drop of Supplies and Equipment:Volume I• FM 4-20.105-2 - Air Drop of Supplies and Equipment:Volume II• FM 3-04.500 - Army Aviation Maintenance• FM 3-09.8 - Field Artillery Gunnery• FM 3-05.160 - Army Special Operations ForcesCommunications Systems Support• FM 5-19 - Composite Risk Management• FM 7-15 - The Army Universal Task List, change 2• FM 3-05.40 - Civil Affairs Operations• FM 4-30.31 - Recovery and Battle Damage Assessment/Repair• FM 1-06 - Financial Management Operations• FM 3-05 - Army Special Operations Forces• FM-I 6-02.70 - Army Electromagnetic SpectrumManagement Operations• FM 2-22.3 - Human Intelligence Collector Operations• FM-I 6-02.60 - TTP for Joint Network Node - Network• FM 3-20.96 - Reconnaissance Squadron• FM 3-06 - Urban Operations• FM 6-22 - Army Leadership

INFANTRY SCHOOL:• FM 3-90.6 - The Brigade Combat Team• FM 3-21.10 - The Infantry Rifle Company FM 3-22.9 - RifleMarksmanship, change 4• FM 3-22.27 - MK 19, 40mm Grenade Machine Gun, MOD 3,Change 1• FM 3-25.26 - Map Reading & Land Navigation, Change 1

These publications can be viewed on AKO at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/136361 which will direct you to“TRADOC - Doctrine New/Revised Announcements” site.

Doctrine CornerDoctrine CornerDoctrine CornerDoctrine CornerDoctrine Corner

The U.S. ArmyMarksmanship Unit islooking for a few good

shooters. The highly competitive unitis putting out its annual call forSoldiers who are interested incompeting in pistol competitions inthe summer of 2007.

“We do this every year,” saidSergeant First Class Jason M. St.John, NCOIC of the USAMUService Pistol Team. “Soldiers whowish to represent the U.S. Army in pistolcompetition, marksmanship instruction and recruiting assistanceare welcome to apply. This is a highly visible, fast-paced mission.”

Formed in 1956 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to raisethe standards of marksmanship throughout the U.S. Army, theArmy Marksmanship Unit is assigned to the Accessions SupportBrigade of Fort Knox, Kentucky, which is under the U.S. ArmyAccessions Command.

The Marksmanship Unit trains its Soldiers to win competitionsand enhances combat readiness through train-the-trainer clinics,research, and development. The world-class Soldier-athletes ofthe USAMU also promote the Army and assist recruiters inattracting young Americans to enlist in the Army.

The Army Pistol Team is always looking for active Armysoldiers who are highly motivated, disciplined and competitiveby nature, St. John said, adding that no previous competitiveshooting experience is required.

Soldiers in the rank of staff sergeant and below with fewerthan 15 years of service who obtain approval from theircommanders can travel to Fort Benning in April at the expense ofUSAMU to participate in the initial training. The Soldiers aretrained in advanced marksmanship skills.

Once that is complete, pistol team officials will select shootersto participate in the Interservice Championships in June and theNational Matches in July.

After the three-month tour, Soldiers return to their units withinvaluable marksmanship training that can be harvested by unittrainers to improve the marksmanship skills of their Soldiers, St.John said.

Soldiers who are interested in the developmental pistol shooterprogram can contact St. John at (706) 545-7022 or 545-3893 orDSN 835-7022 or e-mail [email protected].

2 INFANTRY November-December 2006


29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT OFFERS MTTSThe following mobile training teams (MTTs) are currently available through the

1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment1/29 2/29

• Master Gunner M2A2• Master Gunner M2A3• Mechanized Leader M2A2• Mechanized Leader M2A3• Stryker Leader• Stryker Transition

• Sniper• Sniper Employment Leader• Long Range Marksmanship• Small Arms Weapon Expert• Advanced Infantry MarksmanshipStandards and Strategies• Combatives Level III & IV• Infantry Mortar Leader• Javelin• Anti-Armor Leader

Timeline/Process:• Unit checks MTT POI fact sheet/POI to determine ability to meetminimum support requirements• May be able to tailor some courses to meet needs such as LRMwith 5.56mm only or SNIPER shooting, ballistics, and no stalking; ***note ASI may not be awarded***• NLT 90 days out: Contact 29th Infantry Regiment S3 for possible open dates and more information concerning MTTs;priority goes to deploying units• Send official request thru FORSCOM G3 for TRAP (Training Resource Arbitration Panel)• FORSCOM G3 forwards to DA G3 and monthly TRAP Council• If TRAPed, resources allocated; unit informed thru FORSCOM; 29th IN informed thru TRADOC to USAIS who inputs intoATTRS (700 series [on site] or 500 series [resident - Fort Benning])• If not TRAPed and unit still wishes to conduct, all resources (funds/ammo/etc...) will come from unit; CDR 29th IN GO/NOGO for course on case-by-case basis• During 90-day period, 29th will provide POI and requirements and conduct concurrent planning; to include a recon visit ~1month out to ensure facilities meet requirements

COURSE/UNIT NAME PHONE E-MAIL

29th IN REGT S3 LTC Kevin Holt (706) 545-8660 [email protected]

(DSN 835-XXXX)

2/29th IN S3 CPT Tim Ungaro (706) 545-8449 [email protected]

Sniper, LRM, SAWE, 2LT Ariel Correa-Betancourt (706) 545-2138 ariel.ivan.correabetancourt@AIMSS, Sniper Employment us.army.milLeader

IMLC CPT Dan Hines (706) 545-9729 [email protected]

Anti-Armor Leader, Javelin CPT Dan Rogne (706) 545-7529 [email protected]

Combatives SFC David Barron (706) 545-2811 [email protected]

1/29 IN S3 CPT Shawn Seffernick (706) 544-6436 [email protected]

Master Gunner SFC Matthew Hinkley (706) 544-7321 [email protected]

Mechanized Leader SFC Brian Lalley (706) 544-6950 [email protected]

Stryker Leader/Transition SFC James Cantrell (706) 544-6529 [email protected]

INFANTRY NEWS


The Army is accepting design ideas through March 31for the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insigniaand motto for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE).

The Infantry and Armor schools will collocate and become theMCOE at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the next five years. Thecenter will be responsible for all Army land-based maneuvertraining development, doctrine, and capabilities development forarmor and infantry proponencies.

“Throughout the history of modern warfare, Infantry and Armorhave fought side-by-side as brothers in arms,” said Major GeneralWalter Wojdakowski, Chief of Infantry. “With the creation of theManeuver Center of Excellence, Infantry and Armor will nowtrain together forging an Army Strong partnership which producesAmerica’s best Soldiers, more capable than ever. The selectedpatch, crest and motto must reflect the historic strength of thispartnership and the future strength of our Army.”

Personnel assigned to the Infantry and Armor Schools willcontinue wearing current shoulder sleeve and distinctive unitinsignias that reflect the contributions, sacrifices and spirit of eachbranch.

Soldiers assigned directly to the MCOE will wear the newinsignia.

“The challenge in designing the new insignia will be to capturethe historic essence of each branch and their collective embodimentof maneuver as a principle of war,” said Major General Robert M.Williams, Chief of Armor. “We’re looking for innovative ideas tocapture the significance of both Armor and the Infantry lineage.”

Current and retired military personnel and Department of theArmy civilians may provide input for just one or all of the items.

Submission guidelines:RequirementsA clear, hand-drawn or electronic sketch of the shoulder sleeve

insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and a short, succinct motto.The motto must be written in English and is limited to 26characters (letters and spaces). Individuals may provide asuggestion for just one or two of the desired items if they prefer.

FormatDesigns should be drawn on paper or provided as electronic

files. Electronic files should be in JPG or BMP format, and maybe sent on diskette or CD-ROM via normal mail or as an e-mailattachment. All submissions must include the name, phone

Army Seeks Recommendations forMCOE Patch, Crest, Motto

number, e-mail address, and mailing address of the individualsubmitting the designs and motto.

SubmissionsSubmissions will be accepted through March 31, 2007, and

may be sent via e-mail (no larger than 3 megabytes) to:[email protected]

Alternatively, input may be sent via normal mail to either:ARMOR MagazineATTN: ATZK-DAS-A (MCOE Patch)201 6th Ave., Ste. 373, Building 1109AFort Knox, KY 40121-5721,ORHeadquarters, U.S. Army Infantry CenterATTN: ATSH-ATHBuilding 4, Room 451Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000

Selection processSubmissions will be screened by the Maneuver Center of

Excellence Board of Directors, which is chaired jointly by theChief of Armor and the Chief of Infantry. The most suitable andacceptable concepts will be considered for forwarding to theInstitute of Heraldry for final production of the patch and crest.

AcknowledgementThe individuals who submit the shoulder sleeve insignia,

distinctive unit insignia, and motto design that are selected by theboard of directors will receive a framed final patch, while the topentries in each category will also receive an MCOE coin withcertificate of recognition for top entries. These acknowledgementswill be issued in the fall of 2008.

Disclaimer: The Department of the Army (Army) will acquireownership of all entries, and each submitter agrees that submissionof a design constitutes (1) assignment to the Army of any and allrights in the design, including copyright, and (2) a disclaimer ofany trademark rights. All entries become the property of the Army,and the Army will have the sole right, at its discretion, to alter ormodify any submitted design. By submitting a design, the submitterwarrants that the design is original; that it has not been previouslypublished; and that it does not infringe upon the copyright of anyother person or entity.

Did you know Infantry Magazine is online?All of our issues dating back to 1982 are posted at https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine(AKO login required). There is also an index where articles are listed by topic and author.


SOLDIER WHO SACRIFICED HIMSELFFOR CREW RECOMMENDED FOR MOH

STAFF SERGEANT W. WAYNE MARLOW

McGinnis

FORWARD OPERATINGBASE LIBERTY, Iraq —Specialist Ross McGinnis couldbecome the third U.S.servicemember to be awardedthe Medal of Honor for heroismin Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Officials at the 2nd BrigadeCombat Team, 1st InfantryDivision, and McGinnis’sbattalion, 1st Battalion, 26thInfantry, confirmed that arecommendation has beenforwarded to posthumouslyaward McGinnis America’s highest honorfor heroism in battle.

McGinnis, a private first class at thetime of his death in Baghdad Dec. 4, hasalready been awarded a Silver Star for thedeed that cost him his life, and wasposthumously promoted to the rank ofspecialist.

McGinnis and his team were on amission in the Iraqi capital’s Adhamiyahsection when an insurgent tossed a grenadefrom a nearby rooftop. McGinnis, who wasmanning the gunner’s hatch of the squad’shigh mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle(HMMWV), tried in vain to deflect thedeadly missile, which passed through thehatch and into the vehicle, lodging near theradio mount.

Platoon sergeant Sergeant First ClassCedric Thomas recounted what happenednext.

“PFC McGinnis yelled, ‘Grenade! ... It’sin the truck,’” Thomas said. “I looked outof the corner of my eye as I was crouchingdown and I saw him pin it down.”

McGinnis did so even though he couldhave escaped.

“He had time to jump out of the truck,”Thomas said. “He chose not to.”

“He gave his life to save his crew andhis platoon sergeant,” Thomas said. “He’sa hero. He’s a professional. He was just anawesome guy.”

Lieutenant Colonel Eric O. Schacht,commander of the 1-26th, spoke during thememorial, and had high praise for

McGinnis’s courage.“Specialist McGinnis did

what I consider the mostselfless act of any man I haveknown,” Schacht said. “Hewillingly sacrificed his lifeto save the lives of the restof his crew. What anabsolutely incredible,selfless act to protect hiscomrades. There is no doubtin my mind about thepersonal courage displayedby Ross McGinnis.”

The award of the Silver Star putsMcGinnis in the ranks of an elite group ofSoldiers. According to records kept by theU.S. Army Human Resources Command,of the quarter million-plus wartime awardspresented in the Army for OIF through July2006, only 201 have been Silver Stars.

If McGinnis is awarded the Medal ofHonor, he would join an even more elitegroup. U.S. Army Center of MilitaryHistory records list more than 3,400Americans honored with the medal sincethe Civil War, but McGinnis would be justthe third servicemember to earn it forcombat action in Iraq. All are posthumousawards.

Sergeant First Class Paul Ray Smith ofthe 3rd Infantry Division was awarded thehonor in April 2005 for his actions duringcombat in the opening weeks of OIF, andPresident George W. Bush announced lastmonth that Marine Cpl. Jason L. Dunhamwill be awarded the medal for saving thelives of fellow Marines by covering agrenade with his body in April 2004.

Because the recommendation processinvolves strict accuracy and intensescrutiny, it could be months or even yearsbefore such an announcement could bemade for McGinnis. Smith’s Medal ofHonor was awarded two years after theaction for which he earned it; theannouncement of Dunham’s came two anda half years after the Marine’s death.

(Bill Roche of the V Corps Public AffairsOffice also contributed to this story.)

Center Announces WritingCompetition — The Army Center ofMilitary History invites Army officers inthe rank of major or below (includingwarrant officers) to take part in the 2007James Lawton Collins Jr. Special TopicsWriting Competition.

Participants can submit original,unclassified essays that describe the actionsof a small U.S. Army unit or team, no largerthan a company, engaged in the Global Waron Terrorism. The essay should focus on adiscrete action, such as a single patrol,firefight, battle, convoy, air support mission,advisory team operation, medical mission, orengineer support action, but the effortdiscussed need not involve combat. Papersshould generally not exceed 5,000 words andmay not have been published or submittedfor publication elsewhere. Submissions frommultiple authors will be accepted.

The essays will be evaluated by a panelat the center. The first prize winner will beawarded $500 and the winner of the secondprize will receive $250. Submissions mustbe received by April 1, 2007. Competitionenrollment forms and further informationabout the competition are posted atwww.army.mil/cmh-pg/2007Contest.htm.

2007 Best Sapper Competition set— The Sapper Leader Course will host theBest Sapper Competition May 1-3 at FortLeonard Wood, Missouri. Thecompetition’s events will include MOUTbreach missions, weapons and grenaderanges, and a demolition calculationwritten exam among other events.

For more information, visit www.wood.army.mil/sapper.

Registration open for 2007 BataanMemorial Death March — Registrationis now open for the 2007 Bataan MemorialDeath March, to be held March 25 at WhiteSands Missile Range, New Mexico.

Participants may choose either the 26.2-mile route or the 15-mile route. Forinformation, call (505) 678-1256 or visit themarch’s website at www.bataanmarch.com.Questions and comments may be e-mailed [email protected].

NEWS BRIEFS

The operational demand for a Stryker master trainer inthe Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is a demandthat must be met. Almost every Stryker unit in the Army

has identified and tasked an NCO, usually one with master gunnerexperience in a mechanized or armor unit, as their Stryker mastertrainer or master gunner. The need for a Stryker master trainer isclearly apparent with the Stryker units. As an Army, we must bewilling to embrace this requirement from the units in the field asit needs to be immediately addressed. Stryker units, by the modifiedtable of organization (MTOE), have no allocation for a Strykermaster trainer. This is in stark contrast to mechanized infantryunits and armor units. Both types of units have master gunners atthe corps, division, brigade, battalion, company, and some at theplatoon level. They are a critical part of ensuring quality training,sustainment, and proficiency for the commander. They are thesubject matter experts on every gunnery-related issue not just atthe individual and crew levels, but more importantly and oftenoverlooked, at the collective level as well. Both the Infantry andArmor Schools have recognized the need for formal training ofthese individuals to ensure a safe, even plane of training acrossthe Army. Master gunner schools were developed long ago, andit is required attendance for an NCO in order to fill these MTOEpositions. Yet no formal master gunner or master trainer schoolhas been required for Stryker units, as of yet. To underscore, mostunits are filling this void with Bradley or Abrams master gunnersfrom within their unit.


One issue that many have with the establishment of a mastergunner course for the Stryker is the fear that the focus would shiftaway from the primary focus or real weapon of Stryker units, whichis of course, the infantryman. There are several ways to approachthis argument. The attitude of the Army in relation to Strykerunits, the platform, and the weapon itself is captured in Chapter 3of FM 3-22.3: “A Stryker platoon’s strength comes from the skill,courage, and discipline of the individual Soldier. Eachinfantryman’s capabilities are enhanced by teamwork andcohesion in squads, crews, teams, and platoons. This groupdynamic is an essential ingredient to a platoon’s success in closecombat. Platoon training must therefore focus on developingtough, combat-ready platoons. The individual Soldier must havethe skill and will to not just participate in a close fight — but todominate it. Training events that require subordinate leaders’ useof initiative to take independent actions are essential whenpreparing for the decentralized operations of the modernbattlefield.”

Many light infantry units have adopted the master gunner inrespect to small arms and are using it effectively. It is essentiallythe same mission as a mechanized or armor MG, just without thebig bullets. One counterargument is that the units have alreadyidentified the need and are filling the void with other mastergunners. This validates the fact that the weapons system itself isnot the focus or the bulk of knowledge that the master gunner isable to contribute; it is his knowledge of gunnery, gunnery-relatedskills, knowledge of individual and collective training at all levelsand how to form all of this into a streamlined, efficient gunneryprogram that focuses on all training from 9mm to MK-19 andM2. Or, what is essentially the Merriam Webster’s definition ofgunnery, “[the] branch of military science that comprehends thetheory of projectiles, and the manner of constructing and usingordnance.” To avoid the “system-focused mindset” we simply donot call the position a master gunner — though as defined as,“the art of shaping Soldiers into cohesive teams with the abilityto systematically destroy everything in sight” — the position couldbe designated as Stryker master trainer. A simple efficient Strykermaster trainer mission statement would resemble something likethe following:

“To train select NCOs to design and implement weapon systems

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS MICHAEL HERTIG AND MAJOR MARK S. LESLIE

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEYCORNER

THE NEED FOR A STRYKER MASTER TRAINERIN THE SBCT

STRYKER MASTER TRAINER COURSE. This courseis designed to train selected NCOs who assist unit leaders inplanning and implementation of Stryker weapon, gunnery,and vehicle maintenance training. The Stryker Master TrainerCourse trains basic and advanced marksmanship and trainingmanagement techniques required for SBCT in the followingareas: remote weapons station (RWS); advanced infantrymarksmanship strategies and skills (AIMSS); Javelin; Strykerfamily of vehicle weapons system training; SBCT weaponstraining; preliminary gunnery; and target engagement.

— FM 3-22.3, Stryker Gunnery, Chapter 3

gunnery and maintenance trainingprograms. A trained Stryker master trainercan: Establish and conduct individual

and crew gunnery training; Develop a short-range training

program (SRTP) for a battalion-sized unitfrom preliminary gunnery through platoongunnery; Execute maintenance, maintenance

training and maintenance management oforganic weapons systems and components;

Establish and execute rangeoperations; and Be knowledgeable in the use and

training of all Stryker-related training aids,devices, simulators, and simulations(TADSS).

The Stryker master trainer is the NCOa commander or S3 turns to and says “Ineed more gunners for my ICVs,” to whichhe replies, “the whole company sir, or didyou have a smaller number in mind?”

The Stryker master trainer’s abilities arebuilt from the foundation of an NCO’s corecompetency to train individuals, crews, andteams. Stryker master trainers can be yoursubject matter experts in Stryker training

to include: vehicle operation, maintenance,weapons training, gunnery, ammunitionmanagement, building and fully utilizingranges, live-fire development, trainingdevice use and implementation, andtraining management. Stryker mastertrainers, like their master gunner brethren,are able to contribute more than just vehicleknowledge and how to run gunnery.

A Stryker master trainer is the Strykercommander’s walking continuity book foreach company, battalion, and/or brigadestaff. Working from that NCO corecompetency, the master trainer can take anindividual and shape him into a gunner orpart of a crew. He is also ever mindful ofthe need to get Soldiers and crews readyfor collective live-fire training withminimal impact on the ever decreasingwhite space on a calendar. Eachcommander’s master trainer knows whatresources are needed and how to requestand use them. He knows the necessarytraining devices and how to train others intheir use. He can run a program to alwayshave ready a pool of available gunners orcrewman. He can be that NCO whoconducts the initial training a new Soldierreceives upon arrival to an SBCT. With his


expertise and training management skills,he can develop the plan for individualthrough crew weapons and vehicle training(9mm-105mm and ICV-MGS) and presentit to the commander for approval. He thencan help execute the training, constantlyadvising the commander thus allowing himtime to prepare his collective training plan.

The need in the operational Army for amaster trainer brings to light the possibleneed for an additional skill identifier (ASI)for those that have completed the StrykerMaster Trainer Course. This in no waywould limit the commanders on the groundor require that it would be mandatory forone to be Stryker master trainer certified;it would simply assist the Army in ensuringcontrol and management over those trainedand assist them in the assignment of “theright man for the right job assignmentcriteria.”

The Stryker master trainer is notfinished when the unit transitions intocollective training. He continues to advisethe commander on areas of resources,ranges, and live-fire training. While theunit has moved on from individual tocollective training, he continues to monitorthe status of individual and crewqualifications. He is prepared to plug a holewhere needed either by establishing aqualification range or recommending a

replacement from the pool of trained Soldiers hehelped develop in the individual/crew trainingphase. Home station or deployed commanders canturn to their Stryker master trainer and say, “Ineed more gunners,” and he can make it happen.

Ideally, commanders would want every NCOin their unit to have these skill sets, but this isnot realistic or possible with today’s operationaltempo (OPTEMPO). The question that rises nowis how many master trainers are needed and atwhat level. In mechanized infantry, the mastergunner position goes down as far as platoon level.The complexity of BFV systems necessitates aneed for smaller ratio of master gunners toSoldiers to be trained.

Stryker systems — while complex — allowfirst line NCOs to execute the majority ofindividual training and maintenance supervisionwith a Stryker master trainer acting as the rightguide. At company level, the Stryker mastertrainer can be the one who helps develop the planfor training and helps conduct the training; hisfocus is to develop the Soldiers behind the triggersand the operators of the systems.

Stryker master trainers at battalion would focusmore on the management of training. They wouldwork very closely with the S3 and commander todevelop the plan and preparing for platoon live-fire training. They ensure that the resources areavailable to the companies to execute theirindividual and crew training. He would conducttraining on new devices or doctrine and certifyevaluators. The battalion Stryker master trainerswould mentor the company Stryker master trainerand help develop future Stryker master trainers.

At brigade, the Stryker master trainer wouldbe more a training/resource manager. This Strykermaster trainer would work with the SBCT S3 toensure that the commander’s training guidanceis fully supported with the right resources andwould advise the commander on weapons trainingwithin the SBCT. He would develop and executenew Stryker warrior training for recent arrivalsinto an SBCT. He would be a supporter and not asupervisor for battalion Stryker master trainers.He keeps them up-to-date on new doctrine andguidance and conducts train-the-trainers asneeded for new devices.

It is necessary that we fulfill the need of oneStryker master trainer at company, battalion, andbrigade levels. This will only enhance the level ofproficiency and execution of weapons and vehicletraining in an SBCT. Commanders and operationsofficers will only benefit from having a highlytrained NCO next to them that can advise andsupport a critical piece in the training strategy.

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER


MODULES DESCRIPTION

1. Small Arms IntegrationModule

Training in optics and devices for smallarms and crew served weapons

2. Force XXI Battle CommandBrigade and Below (FBCB2)Training

FBCB2 systems and integrationtraining

3. Remote Weapon StationTraining (RWS)

Hands-on maintenance andoperational training to include live-fireexercises with the RWS for both MK-19 and M2.

4. Training Management Integrated training strategy for anSBCT, individual soldier weaponstraining strategy; crew served weaponstraining strategy; mounted soldiertraining strategy; cross training; squad,platoon and company trainingstrategies; combined arms training;and long, short and near termplanning.

5. Variant Characteristics Capabilities, limitations, and trainingstrategies of each Stryker variant.Hands-on training with availablevariants.

6. Range Operations Establish a range, construct a surfacedanger area diagram, develop firingand non-firing data, conduct trainingarea/range recon, develop a LFXscenario, execute range operations,train key range personnel, superviserange operations and conduct formalafter action reviews.

7. SBCT Employment How an SBCT fights, MGSemployment, ATGM employment,SBCT in urban operations, SBCT instability operations.

8. Training Aids, Devices,Simulators, and Simulations(TADSS)

Training in the use of EST, MILES XXI,LMTS, Drivers Training, Javelin BST/FTT, ATGM BST/FTT, ONESAF andMGS COFT

9. Short Range Training Plan Students will prepare a short rangetraining plan encompassing allweapons and vehicle specific trainingfrom individual through platoon LFXtraining.

Sergeant First Class Michael Hertig is the Stryker doctrine and systemslead for the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office. He has served for 17 years inthe Army and is a combat veteran; his previous assignments include servingas a squad leader, section leader, platoon sergeant, and battalion and brigadeBradley master gunner. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sniper School, theBFV Master Gunner Course, and the Battle Staff NCO Course,.

Major Mark S. Leslie is the deputy chief of Training and Organization forthe Stryker Transformation Team at Fort Benning. Leslie is a veteran ofOperations Just Cause, Desert Shied/Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. Hehas served as a Long Range Surveillance team leader, Ranger instructor andcommander of A Company and HHC, 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st CavalryDivision, and as the Senior Iraqi Army Advisor for 2-7 CAV, 1CD. He can becontacted at (706) 545-1651 or [email protected]

Dissemination of information andmentoring of the company’s Stryker mastertrainers from brigade and battalion will beessential to success. A similar effort would berequired at the company level down to theplatoon-level Stryker master trainer. Thepurpose is threefold:

·Ensures that the standards are known andcomplied with;

·Ensures professional development of allStryker master trainers and builds depth in ourrelatively new Stryker master trainer programto ensure continued excellence; and

·Ensures that the most relevant doctrine,TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) andbest practices, common to the threat faced byStryker units are trained on throughout theforce.

A program of instruction (POI) exists forthe Stryker Master Trainer Course and wasdeveloped between the 29th Infantry Regimentand U.S. Army Infantry School Directorate ofOperations and Training. The table on page 8is a snapshot of the key areas of training.

“It seems to me that a common standardset might be useful in a modular organization to precludeconfusion. It also seems to me that we need to get serious aboutdefining how we train mixed platoons and teams since it seemslike that is the manner in which the field intends to use our Soldiersand systems.”

— General William S. Wallace Commander, TRADOC

The above quote by General Wallace, although referring to theneed for some type of clear standards in gunnery, clearly definesthe need for the Stryker master trainer in the Stryker community.The Stryker master trainer would be the common thread of


standards in the Stryker community in regards to “gunnery.” Italso gives some left and right limits in how a Stryker master trainerwould be useful to the commanders at the tactical level indeveloping more lethal units and what his duties would be.

The need for a Stryker master trainer has been clearly identified,both academically and by the units that employ the Stryker. Strykermaster trainers can be a key asset to the commander in shapingthe elements of an SBCT into a formidable and lethal combinedarms team that has and will continue to be successful in combat.

We encourage commanders to assist in developing thisrequirement and ask them to contact the Stryker/Bradley ProponentOffice with recommendations. The point of contact is SergeantFirst Class Michael Hertig, the Infantry Center’s lead for theCombined Arms Weapons Proficiency for the Stryker BrigadeCombat Team, Draft FM 3-22.3. He can be reached at (706) 544-6201 or Michael.Hertig@ us.army.mil.

The SBCT’s lethality is derived from its abilityto focus overmatching combined arms support tothe infantry assault at identified decisive points. Itsarray of direct and indirect fire systems allows theSBCT to shape the AO and achieve decisiveoutcomes using the MGS; TOW IIA/B antiarmormissiles; Javelin antiarmor missiles; 120-mm, 81-mm, and 60-mm mortars; and 155-mm artillery.Direct fire systems focus on destroying hardenedand or fortified positions in support of infantryassaults.

— Chapter 1, FM 3-21-31,The Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Specialist Jeremy Crisp

A Soldier with the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade CombatTeam, watches for suspicious activity during a patrol in Mosul, Iraq in November 2005.

As the Army transforms itself intoa modular configuration, it is imperative that we look at the

way we train gunnery to ensure that weprovide the commanders of the brigadecombat teams (BCTs) the tools necessaryto train and evaluate their Soldiers, crews,and platoons. To that end, a heavy BCTworkgroup was formed composed primarilyof the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office (S/BPO) from Fort Benning, Georgia, and thegunnery doctrine branch at Fort Knox,Kentucky. The determined end result is afour volume set of manuals with a differentVolume 2 for the respective heavy, Stryker,and infantry BCTs.

This set will provide a comprehensivedocument for training gunnery to all Soldierswithin a BCT. In this article, I concentrateon the HBCT gunnery manual (Draft FM 3-20.21) and provide a general overview of thechanges in gunnery strategy that Soldiers andcommanders will use. Additionally, a seriesof accompanying articles have been providedin this issue of Infantry Magazine to discussin greater detail important aspects of thismanual. It is noteworthy to point out that theCombined Arms Weapons Proficiency for theHBCT will provide a blueprint forsubsequent BCT manuals.

COMBINED ARMS WEAPONSPROFICIENCY FOR THE HBCT

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS TOMMY HOWARD

HBCT Manual OverviewThe HBCT gunnery manual is designed

to provide a comprehensive trainingstrategy for commanders and trainingmanagers that encompasses all Soldiersoperating in combined arms battalions(CABs) and reconnaissance squadrons.Current gunnery doctrine is split amongthree different gunnery manuals. There isa manual for the Abrams tank, BradleyFighting Vehicle (BFV), and Scouts. Eachmanual has its own organization, trainingstrategy, and even evaluation procedures forthe elements that use each particularmanual. The HBCT manual will bring allthree manuals under one document andstandardize training and evaluations for allelements within a BCT. Yes, Abrams tanksand Bradleys will use the same overallgunnery methodology. Keeping in mind thateach platform has its own characteristics, theprimary differences between current BFVand Abrams gunnery are flexibility versusprescription in table development andpoints versus TPU (trained, needs practice,untrained) evaluation criteria. Draft FM 3-20.21 will address these differences placingall members of the BCT under the samegunnery methodology. At the end of theday, the HBCT commander will be able to

WEAPON PROFICIENCY FOR BCTS


Volume 1 Small Arms Proficiency Published TBD Volume 2 Weapon Proficiency Strategy for the BCT

FM 3-20.21 Heavy Brigade Combat Team Published 1OCT07

FM 3-22.X Stryker Brigade Combat Team Published QTR 4 FY07

FM 3-22.X Infantry Brigade Combat Team Published QTR 1 FY08

Volume 3 CS/CSS Weapons Proficiency Published TBD

Volume 4 Field Artillery Weapons Proficiency Published TBD

look across his brigade and have standardterminology, methodology, evaluation, andtraining tables. However, commanders willalso have the ability to personalize thetraining their units receive.

Flexibility vs PrescriptionThe current Bradley gunnery manual

(FM 3-22.1) contains a very flexible type ofgunnery model. For each gunnery event, thereare some guidelines for table development,but the tables can look very different fromunit to unit based on commanders’ guidanceand intent. Conversely, current armor andscout gunnery are much more prescriptive.As an example, range bands and targettypes are spelled out for the unit; there isvery little room for command guidance andthe implementation of a unit’scontemporary operational environment(COE) into its gunnery program. WithBCTs being developed as “plug-and-play”type organizations deployable with any oneof the division headquarters and into anytype of environment, it is important toempower the HBCT commander and hisCAB and squadron commanders with theflexibility to develop their gunneryprograms for their impending missions.With this in mind, the HBCT gunnerymanual has implemented a flexible gunnerymethodology. This will allow thecommanders to implement their ownelements such as range bands, target types,vehicle posture and even environments(such as urban operations) into all levelsof gunnery.

Although flexibility is important, thegunnery doctrine teams from both FortBenning and Fort Knox agreed that one ofthe most important aspects of gunnery isto maintain a minimum proficiency level

(MPL) within gunnery in order to sustain the critical skillrequirements across the fleet. As an example, the manual statesthat on each gunnery table, a crew must fire a minimum of oneoffensive engagement, one defensive engagement, and one shorthalt engagement for each day and night. The remainingengagements can be fired from whatever posture the commanderwants to train. If his upcoming mission will include a large numberof cordon and search-type missions, then he may want to train onmore short halt engagements. A commander in Korea may wantto emphasize defensive engagements, etc. The correct answer willalways be what the commanders in the field know they need totrain on, and it is the HBCT gunnery manual that provides themthat framework using minimum proficiency levels as a guide.

Points vs TPUThe other area of gunnery that had to be mediated was scoring

and evaluations for all three phases of gunnery as Abrams uses a1,000 point system to evaluate while Bradleys use the TPUmethodology. While both have their pros and cons, the decisionwas made to use the points system with the addition of flexibility.A staple of BFV gunnery has always been that regardless of crewerrors (with the exception of safety violations) the crew wouldpass the engagement if it killed the target before exceeding thethreat time. We have incorporated this mentality into the newpoints system, only reducing engagement scores due to safetyviolations and/or failure to kill all targets within the designatedthreat time. Crew cuts, such as fire commands and response terms,will be deducted at the end of the phase (day/night). This reducesthe crew’s overall score and if enough mistakes are made, it cancause the crew to fail the table. It will not, however, cause thecrew to fail any single engagement within the table as long as thecrew killed the targets within the allowable threat time. For amore detailed explanation on crew gunnery, see Staff Sergeant

Philip Mandile’s article “Preliminary and Basic Gunnery for theHBCT” on page 13.

Evaluating collective gunnery was another issue that wasrefined. Each platform in the BCT had it own scoring model.What was important for the gunnery doctrine team was thatcommanders would assess their platoons in accordance withapplicable training and evaluation outlines (TE&O) and with whatwas important to the commander. Additionally, it was decidedthat the regimented mathematical system used by the armorcommunity was dated and was not advantageous to the flexibilityand MPL precepts established in the earlier chapters. Therefore,collective tables will be scored using a TPU model with bothgunnery and mission training plan (MTP) scoring standards. Fora detailed explanation on advanced gunnery, see Sergeant FirstClass William Simons’ article “Advanced Gunnery for the HBCT”on page 22.

Threat TimingOne of the pillars that forms the foundation for evaluating the

HBCT is threat-based timing matrices. The time a crew has toengage and destroy a target on the range is tied to a threat model.This model is based off the time it takes for the threat to get firstburst on the friendly vehicle. This makes the worst case assumptionthat when a vehicle gets hit first it begins to do other things (suchas survivability moves) besides the direct fire engagement process.With data supplied by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity(AMSAA) and the Army Research Laboratory, threat matrices forall platforms in the HBCT have been developed. These times havebeen altered to make them unclassified and are based off a threatcrew that is as well trained as U.S. Army Soldiers. Factors thatwent into the development of the times were acquisition, rangesto target, capabilities of the threat vehicle, and in the case of theTOW missile, flight time of the round. Each target presented has


MSG Johancharles Van Boers

its own threat time, meaning the clock is ticking for eachtarget as the friendly vehicle exposes itself to the threat.A basic tenant of this evaluation system is even thoughyou can receive partial credit for killing a target after threattime has expired, you cannot pass the engagement.Again, it’s threat based — who got first burst ontotarget, the threat or the Bradley, Abrams, or truckcrew?

Non-Standard MissionsFor at least the last 12 years, since the

operational tempo greatly increased as a resultof the Balkans and now Operation Iraqi Freedom,HBCT Soldiers have conducted missions in wheeledvehicles instead of their Abrams tanks and BFVs. Today,this also includes engineers and artillerymen, who are alsoconducting infantry-style missions. The HBCT gunnery manualrecognizes this and includes examples on how any type of unitcan use the rifle squad strategy as well as the HMMWV strategyto train their Soldiers to perform missions in their COE. Thereare also examples for use by combat support (CS) and combatservice support (CSS) units until Volume 3 (CS/CSS gunnery) iscompleted. For a more detailed explanation on truck gunnery,see the related article on page 16.

The Infantry Rifle SquadFor too long rifle squad training has suffered within the

mechanized community. Squads are often an afterthought becausemanpower shortages require the manning of the four Bradleyswithin an infantry platoon, leaving squads short of personnel.While the HBCT gunnery manual cannot ease manpowershortfalls, it has placed more emphasis on the training of riflesquads. This process began by simply moving the squad into achapter as opposed to an appendix. By having the squad as anappendix, the thought process is already in place that they are aleftover element. The rifle squad is the reason Bradleys exist inthe first place. With this in mind, the squad gunnery model wasreorganized. The overarching idea is that as the SBCT and IBCTgunnery manuals come on line, the squad basic model used in theHBCT manual will be a common thread throughout the Volume 2series. Although each type of BCT will have its own missionessential task list (METL), commander’s intent and differentdelivery systems (airborne, air assault, etc.), the terminology and

training model remain consistent. This also keeps thegunnery doctrine relevant and familiar to the new

infantryman who is stationed in a Bradley unitat Fort Hood today and reassigned to a Strykerunit at Fort Lewis tomorrow. The reorganization

of the vehicle tables will also be beneficial inplacing more of an emphasis on the rifle squad.

For a detailed explanation on rifle squadtraining, see the article titled “Rifle Squad

Gunnery” on page 19.

Table Organization andAdvanced Gunnery

The gunnery tables in the HBCT have beenreorganized to place emphasis on the collective

rather than the individual or crew. The strategy contains a total of12 tables with the first six being crew tables. When a crew hascompleted Table VI, they are qualified. However, they are onlyhalf way done with gunnery and have six collective tables left tonegotiate. Tables VII-IX are section tables. The feedback that wehave received from the workgroups conducted with operationalunits is that Table IX must be a qualification table for all weaponsystem platforms. Additionally, to meet the demands from thefield, commanders can task organize however they choose, whetherit is one BFV, one Abrams, and a rifle squad or a more pureorganization. Again, the commander decides what his unit needsto train. Based on COE, level of proficiency (ARFORGEN cycle)and commander’s intent, the collective gunnery starting at thesection level is inherently flexible. Tables X-XII are platoon tablesleading up to platoon qualification. Commanders develop theirplatoon qualification and have the flexibility to include all elementsfrom engineers to CS/CSS, mortars, etc., into their tables.

In summary, the HBCT gunnery manual will be a flexible,comprehensive document that provides commanders, mastergunners, and training managers with a framework to train squads,crews, and platoons. It also provides examples and MPLs to assistcommanders in training all elements of the BCT for both missionswithin and outside their typical scope.

We encourage commanders, master gunners, and trainingmanagers to read the coordinating draft of FM 3-20.21 and askthem to contact the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office with theirrecommendations for the gunnery manual. The point of contactis SFC Simons, the Infantry Center’s lead for Combined ArmsWeapons Proficiency for the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (DraftFM 3-20.21). He can be reached at (706) 544-6201 [email protected].

Sergeant First Class Tommy Howard has been the chief of the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office for three years and will soon retire from active dutyafter 20 years of service to the Army and BFV communities. He is a combatveteran; his previous assignments include serving as a squad leader, platoonsergeant, battalion master gunner, and division master gunner. He is a graduateof the BFV Master Gunner Course, the Battle Staff NCO Course, the AdvancedNCO Course and holds a bachelor’s degree in Social Science.

CHAPTER OUTLINEChapter 1 - IntroductionChapter 2 - Platform Capabilities and CharacteristicsChapter 3 - Training Devices and SimulatorsChapter 4 - Training Management StrategiesChapter 5 - Range OperationsChapter 6 - Engagement ProcessChapter 7 - Rifle Squad TrainingChapter 8 - Crew Gunnery EvaluationsChapter 9 - Preliminary Gunnery TrainingChapter 10 - Basic Gunnery TrainingChapter 11 - Advanced Gunnery Training

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Field Manual (FM) 3-20.21 was written to standardizethe evaluation process for all weapon system platformsincluding Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles

(BFVs), and armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles(HMMWVs). Moreover, it ensures a progressive trainingmethodology for each type of unit’s weapons proficiency strategy.Bradley gunnery, originally conceived from FM 23-1 and laterFM 3-22.1, was designed to train BFV crews. During the crawlphase, individually assigned and crew-served weapons use Volume I(Small Arms Weapons Training Strategy) and the appropriate 3-22.Xseries manuals for qualification. The walk and run phases ofqualification for the weapon system platform crews are covered inthe heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) gunnery manual. The walkphase is for crew gunnery, and the run phase is collective gunnery.

BFV crew gunnery trains the crew members throughout theprocess, culminating in an evaluated event which tests their abilityto take knowledge and skills learned during preliminary gunneryand apply it to the basic gunnery tables. Bradley crews exercisethe weapon systems in both fully operational and degraded modes.

PRELIMINARY AND BASIC GUNNERYFOR THE HBCT

STAFF SERGEANT PHILIP MANDILE

Inherent flexibility in FM 3-20.21 allows the commanders totailor the engagements to support their anticipated contemporaryoperational environment (COE). For example, a unit deployingto an urban area with a threat of infantry and unarmored vehiclesmight focus on short range engagements with targetry placed inand around urban facades. In the event a unit may not have acontingent area of operation, commanders may opt to designscenarios to support a variety of threats at all range bands in anyenvironment. In this article, I discuss the preliminary and basiccrew gunnery concepts as they apply to the BFV.

Heavy Crew Gunnery ConceptHeavy crew gunnery is transforming. As the Army stands up

HBCTs with their inherent modularity and task organization, thereis a need for a common scoring system. Currently, armor unitsscore using a 1,000-point system, while Bradley units score using


Shane E. Cuomo

Soldiers in an M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle fromthe 1st Infantry Division search for insurgents in Iraq.

a TPU (trained, needs practice, untrained)system. Armor commanders have limitedlatitude to modify their ranges toaccommodate their individual andsometimes unique missions, whereasBradley commanders have substantiallatitude.

In an HBCT, the BCT, CAB, and squadroncommanders will be able to assess all heavyfighting vehicle assets on a very similarscoring system with an extensive degree offlexibility to tailor gunnery to suit the unit’sCOE or area of responsibility (AOR).

The goal of crew gunnery is to train andcertify a crew’s ability to operate effectivelyusing the direct fire engagement process.Crew gunnery leads to section and platoonqualification. This training consists ofprogressive tables to develop crew gunneryskills, which include engaging anddestroying single and multiple targets froma stationary or moving BFV in a wide varietyof conditions and environments. The tablesand their evaluations focus on the individualcrew’s collective ability to operate the BFVin all of its configurations, that is, with all ofits common and specialized systems andcapabilities. Commanders can tailor theevents based on their anticipated COE. Theiroptions extend to target type and targetengagement ranges.

The Engagement Process: DIDEAThe engagement process is a series of

deliberate steps which aid in detecting,identifying, engaging and assessing targetson the battlefield to ensure their rapiddestruction. The detect, identify, decide,engage, and assess (DIDEA) processprovides an iterative, standardized, andsystematic approach to target engagementactivities across the user spectrum, from theindividual infantryman to indirect firecontrollers. The individual actions of theDIDEA process are summarized below:Detect – The acquisition and location

of an object in the operational environment.Identify – A systematic process

supporting the characterization of detectedobjects as friend, enemy, or neutral.Decide – Determination of appropriate

application of military options and weaponsresources on identified objects.Engage – Specific application of

military options/weapons resources.Assess – Did the applied weapons

resources bring about the desired effect?Chapter 6 of FM 3-20.21 outlines the

techniques used in the engagement processfor all crews. The chapter is divided intosix main sections with the first two sectionsbeing common to all weapons systemsplatforms. Section I discusses in broaddetail the DIDEA process. Section IIfocuses on the combat identification processencompassing the detect, identify, anddecide processes of DIDEA. Section III isdivided into three subsections referencingspecific weapon system platforms andspecifically discussing the direct fireengagement techniques for each combatplatform. Section IV discusses theengagement process for fire support whileSection V outlines the final step in theDIDEA process of assessment. Though thelatter sections of Chapter 6 are usedthroughout gunnery, the last section(Section VI) completely details fire controland distribution.

Table Design and DevelopmentOutlined below is the new table layout

for crew gunnery.To underscore, FM 3.20-21 uses

• 1 25mm point target 800m or less -day and night

• 1 COAX target 300m or less - dayand night

• 1 25mm point target (BFV ODS[Operation Desert Storm]) 1,400m orgreater - day and night

• 1 25mm point target (BFV A3)1,600m or greater - day and night

• 1 call for fire engagement (CFV andBFIST) - day or night

• 1 lateral dispersion target greaterthan 1.5 WFOV - day and night

Preliminary Crew GunneryPreliminary crew gunnery tables are

primarily device-based tables, designed tobe used by the commander to eitherindoctrinate new crews into the first stepsof Bradley gunnery or to train assessedstrengths and/or weaknesses in establishedstabilized crews. These tables are usedextensively in new equipment training(NET) and are cost effective in that theyplace crews into Bradleys and trainfundamental skill requirements without thereoccurring and potentially prohibitivecosts of ammunition, range time, materialsand staff, and vehicle operational tempocosts, thus saving full-caliber ammunitionto train high payoff critical skillrequirements. However, recentdevelopments have made it evident thatthose conventional devices used throughtoday to train device-based precisiongunnery are soon to be gone. The life cyclesupport (WCLS) for the precision gunnerysystem (PGS) has been terminated, and thedevices will rapidly erode until pulled fromservice. These tables will be resourced forsub-caliber ammunition with the use of asub-caliber device. They can also be firedusing the PGS until the systems are nolonger functional but should not be firedusing current MILES (Multiple IntegratedLaser Engagement System) or dry fire. Ifthe weapons and visual effects and ballisticsolution become a threshold requirementfor the future MILES system (currently anobjective requirement maintaining itsinadequacies as a gunnery trainer), thatsystem will replace the use of sub-caliberammunition.

Preliminary crew gunnery training teststhe crewmembers’ ability to take knowledge

CREW GUNNERY TABLES

Table I — Preliminary Crew PracticeTable II — Preliminary Crew ProficiencyCourseTable III — Crew Practice ITable IV — Crew Practice IITable V — Crew Practice IIITable VI — Crew Qualification

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

minimum proficiency levels (MPLs) tomaintain the critical skill requirementsduring crew gunnery. The following are theMPLs that must be conducted, at aminimum, from the crew proficiency coursethrough the crew qualification tables duringtable development:

• 1 friendly or 1 neutral target - dayand night

• 1 defensive engagement - day andnight

• 1 offensive engagement - day andnight

• 1 short halt engagement - day andnight

• 1 CBRN (chemical, biological,radiological, and nuclear) engagement -day and night


and skills learned during classroom instruction, simulation training,and hands-on training and apply it to device-based gunnery tablesthat exercise the fire control and weapon systems in both fullyoperational and degraded modes.

Table I introduces crews to engaging stationary and movingtargets (placed in a tactical array) from a stationary Bradley undernormal and degraded conditions. Each engagement is designedto train crew duties and engagement techniques against stationaryor moving targets, with each type of ammunition and sight. MPLconditions are implemented for both day and night engagementsto evaluate the crew’s ability to operate the weapons and fire-control systems. Friendly targets should be included to give thecrew practice in combat identification.

Table II is designated as a gate-to-live-fire (GTLF) event. Itevaluates the crew’s ability to engage stationary and moving targetsthat are placed in a tactical array, from a stationary and moving Bradleyunder normal and degraded conditions. Each engagement is designedto test crew duties and engagement techniques against stationaryor moving targets, with each type of ammunition and sight.

Basic Crew GunneryBasic crew gunnery training tests the crewmembers’ ability to

take knowledge and skills learned during preliminary gunneryand apply it to basic gunnery tables that exercise the fire controland weapon systems in both fully operational and degraded modes.Crewmembers, to include the platoon leader’s backup, mustcomplete the following prerequisite training events prior toconducting full-caliber, live-fire gunnery training: Vehicle commanders, gunners, loaders, and drivers must

pass all GSTs (gunnery skills tasks). A crew must pass Table II, Crew Proficiency Course.

Table III trains Bradley crews to engage stationary and movingtargets using the coaxial machine gun. Various tasks are presentedusing single and multiple machine gun targets requiring the gunneror commander to employ point target engagement techniques.Table III is a newly designed table in BFV gunnery in which sub-caliber ammunition is replaced with 7.62mm 4:1 ammunition andcrews are given the table authorization in order to train on machinegun engagement techniques. As is the case for all basic crew tables,MPL conditions are implemented for both day and nightengagements to train and evaluate the crew’s ability to operatethe weapons and fire-control systems.

Table IV trains crews on firing all weapons for their platformsystem. This table measures the crew’s ability to engage stationaryand moving targets, placed in tactical arrays, from a stationaryand moving combat vehicle under normal and degraded conditions.Friendly targets will be included to give the crew practice in combatidentification.

Table V trains crews to engage stationary and moving targets,placed in tactical arrays, from a stationary and moving BFV. TableV consists of five day and four night tasks with single and multipleweapon system engagements. Various tasks require the crew touse precision or degraded-mode gunnery techniques against maingun and machine gun target arrays. Crews on digitally-equippedvehicles will complete the minimum requirements for digitalgunnery stated in Chapter 8. One day and one night engagement

CREW QUALIFICATION RATINGS

Distinguished Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 9 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 900 to 1,000 points overall.

Superior Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 8 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 800 to 899 points overall.

Qualified Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 7 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 700 to 799 points overall.

will be fired in a CBRN environment. Crews will fire the twoCBRN tasks with protective masks on. Friendly targets will beincluded to give the crew practice in combat identification.

Table VI is the culminating event for crew gunnery. Table VIis a single-vehicle qualification table. It evaluates the crew onthe entire engagement process in various firing conditions. TableVI evaluates the crew’s ability to put steel on target quickly, whileensuring proper combat identification on a course that presentsfriendly, neutral, and threat target arrays at realistic ranges. TheBradley crew engages single and multiple weapon systems, anddelayed target presentations from a moving and stationary BFV. TableVI consists of five day and five night firing tasks. Various tasks willbe presented requiring precision or degraded-mode gunnerytechniques against main gun and machine gun targets. Crews ondigitally-equipped vehicles will complete the minimum requirementsfor digital gunnery stated in Chapter 8. One day and one nightengagement will be fired in a CBRN environment. Crews will firethe two CBRN tasks with protective masks on. Friendly targetswill be included to give the crew practice in combat identification.

Evaluating Heavy Crew GunneryBradley crews will be held to threat-based timing (except during

use of the TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided]family of missiles). They will have to meet the established targetthreat times to receive a 70 percent, which will be considered asthe minimum score for passing an engagement. The 100-pointscore line is based on the mechanical operating rate of the platform/weapon plus time of flight of specific rounds fired, to includesensing and killing bursts. This assumes the worst case scenarioon the crew’s behalf with regards to ammo change for 25mm.There is also a one second allowance at each 100-point line fornon-crew induced variables. This is to account for a wide varietyof inconsistencies, including but not limited to turret slew ratesand gun/cannon cycle rates.

A crew earning only 70 points based on time can still pass theengagement if all tasks, conditions, and standards are met. Anypoint deductions resulting from crew cuts, such as fire command andengagement techniques, will be applied at the end of the table phase.

Scoring for Crew Qualification Table is as follows:

The modern battlefield is not always as convenient as we wouldlike; therefore, the result is that not all engagements must be firedfrom an own vehicle posture of a dug-in defensive position or on


Staff Sergeant Philip Mandile has been the Synthetic TrainingEnvironment subject matter expert and Training/Doctrine Developer forthe S/BPO for three years. SSG Mandile is a combat veteran; his previousassignments include serving as an instructor for the Bradley A3 MasterGunner Course and Bradley Master Gunner Course, battalion mastergunner, section sergeant, squad leader, and operations sergeant. Hecan be contacted at (706) 544-6201 or [email protected].


the offensive. A new own vehicle posture is being instituted; itis the short halt. In the short halt, the BFV crew must engageand destroy vehicles faster than ever before as the BFV is fullyexposed as in the offense, but no additional time is allowed.

In an effort to maximize the commander’s flexibility,engagements within the tables are no longer defined by prescriptedoffensive, defensive or CBRN definitions. The commander mayopt to vary the number of offensive, defensive, short halt or CBRNevents within his gunnery to tailor it to their COE/AOR.

TOW scoring is being revised. In keeping with TOW missiledesign specifications and Bradley operational requirementdocuments, a BFV must have an uninterrupted 30 inches ofclearance from the bottom of the missile tube to impact at thetarget. In order to achieve this, a Bradley in a dug-to-standard,proofed two or three tier fighting position must move into andremain in the hull down position to fire and track a TOW missile.For more on this, refer to the staffed and published white paperon Warrior University under Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office(pending). To reinforce this training, a crew cut will be assesseda zero-point engagement for disregarding to follow the task,conditions, and standards.

Delayed targetry is also being added. This had been thepurview of the A3 community but is being brought to the ODSand A2 community as well. Delayed targetry, known as a“Hunter Killer” task in A3 circles, keeps the BFV ODS andbelow variants in the fight beyond their previous simultaneousexposure of multiple targets.

As the Bradley community continues to mature, thedetermination has been made to eliminate single targetengagements where possible. TOW engagements are the exception,as they are based on missile flight times. The focus in basic gunnerywill be on multiple target engagements as they are a higher payoffskill set. Single target engagements are a building block towardsthis goal and are addressed in simulations, preliminary gunneryand Crew Practice I. All engagements in Crew Practice II, III, andCrew Qualification will be multiple engagements

In summary, crew gunnery is, as it has always been, thefoundation of a successful gunnery program, but it is only theprecursor to section and platoon gunnery. As crew gunnerycontinues to be refined and migrates into its final form for thisiteration, the need for feedback from the field is a valuable toolto the training developer.

Commanders, master gunners, and training managers areencouraged to read the coordinating draft of FM 3-20.21 andask that them to contact the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Officewith recommendations for the gunnery manual. The point ofcontact is Sergeant First Class William Simons. He can bereached at (706) 544-6201 or [email protected].

Truck gunnery, originally conceived from FM 17-12-8 andlater FM 3-20.8, was designed to train reconnaissanceelements in the same crawl-walk-run methodology as other

weapon system platforms. During the crawl phase, MK-19, .50caliber, and M240B gunners fire using Volume I, Small ArmsWeapons Training Strategy, and the appropriate 3-22.X seriesmanuals through tripod-mounted qualification. The walk and runphases of qualification for the gunners are covered in the HBCTgunnery manual. The walk phase is crew gunnery, and the run phaseis advanced gunnery.

Truck crew gunnery trains the crew to take the knowledge andskills learned during preliminary gunnery and apply it to the basicgunnery tables exercising the crew and the weapon systems in bothfully operational and degraded modes. Truck crew gunnery tablesshould also be utilized by all combat support (CS) and combat servicesupport (CSS) elements within the HBCT until Volume III, CombatSupport/Combat Service Support Gunnery, is released. Theculmination of truck crew gunnery is Table VI, crew qualification.

The inherent flexibility built into FM 3-20.21 allows thecommanders to tailor the engagements to support their anticipatedcontemporary operational environment (COE). For example, unitsdeploying to an urban area with a threat of infantry and unarmoredvehicles could focus on short range engagements with targets placedin and around urban facades. Some units may not have a contingentarea of operation. In this case, commanders may opt to designscenarios to support a variety of threats at all range bands in anyenvironment.

Truck Crew Engagement Process: DIDEAThe engagement process is the process of detecting, identifying,

engaging and assessing targets on the battlefield to ensure theirrapid destruction. The detect, identify, decide, engage, and assess(DIDEA) process provides an iterative, standardized, and systematicapproach to target engagement activities across the user spectrum,from the individual

Truck CrewTruck CrewTruck CrewTruck CrewTruck CrewGunneryGunneryGunneryGunneryGunnery

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS WILLIAM SIMONS

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

infantryman to indirect fire controllers.The individual actions of the DIDEAprocess are summarized below:Detect – The acquisition and location

of an object in the operational environment.Identify – A systematic process

supporting the characterization of detectedobjects as friend, enemy, or neutral.Decide – Determination of appropriate

application of military options and weaponsresources on identified objects.Engage – Specific application of

military options/weapons resources.Assess – Did the applied weapons

resources bring about the desired effect?Chapter 6 of FM 3-20.21 outlines the

techniques used in the engagement processor DIDEA for all truck crews.

Truck Crew Gunnery ConceptThroughout FM 3-20.21 there is an

inherent flexibility for the commander to trainfor his anticipated COE. In the developmentof FM 3-20.21, the gunnery doctrine teamfrom both the Armor and Infantry Centersremoved all task prescription from thegunnery manual and established onlyminimum proficiency levels (MPL) tomaintain critical skill requirements and tohave a standard evaluation methodology forevery weapon system platform in the HBCT;therefore, regardless of unit type (combatarms, CS, CSS), every truck crew will beevaluated in the same manner for bothpreliminary and basic gunnery.

Though truck crew gunnery wasspecifically designed for scout/reconnaissance units in the combined armsbattalions (CAB) and reconnaissancesquadrons, the tables have two furtherpurposes. First, these tables should be usedthroughout the brigade for both CS and CSSunits. Elements such as distribution platoons,transportation companies, and military policeplatoons, for example, now share a commonevaluation process with their combat armscounterparts. Commanders should tailortruck crew gunnery with similar engagementsthat the latter units can expect while incombat; for example, transportation unitstraveling at actual rate of march speedsengaging close range targetry.

Second, these tables are also used forunits that will deploy in nontraditionalroles. For example, artillerymen can beorganized as dismounted rifle squads or

armor and infantrymen deployed to an AORwhere they will have two vehicle sets orwill be on HMMWVs exclusively. It isnoteworthy that these truck crew tables willbe replicated in the two subsequent weaponsproficiency manuals: SBCT and IBCT.

Table Design and DevelopmentIn order for truck crews to conduct crew

gunnery, the crew members must completethe following prerequisite training prior toconducting full-caliber, live-fire exercises:

Crewmembers must pass allgunnery skills tests (GST) tasks; and

A crew must pass Table II — crewproficiency course.

Outlined below is the new table layoutfor truck crews during basic gunnery.

engagements with task conditions similarto those on Table VI.

Table VI is a single-vehicle qualificationtable. It evaluates the crew on the entireengagement process outlined in Chapter 6in various firing conditions. Table VI isdesigned to evaluate the crew’s ability toput steel on target quickly, while ensuringproper combat identification on a coursethat presents friendly, neutral, and threattarget arrays at realistic ranges. The firingvehicle crew engages single, multiple, anddelayed target presentations from a movingand stationary combat vehicle. Table VIconsists of five day and five night firingtasks.

To underscore FM 3.20-21 uses MPLsto maintain the critical skill requirementsduring truck crew gunnery. Below are theMPLs that must be conducted, as aminimum, on both the crew proficiencycourse and crew qualification tables: 1 friendly or 1 neutral target

during the day and night for all tables; 1 defensive engagement during

the day and night for all tables; 1 offensive engagement during

the day and night for all tables; 1 short halt engagement during

the day and night for all tables; 1 CBRN (chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear) engagementduring the day and night for all tables; 1 call-for-fire target during the

day and night for all tables (Cavalryunits); .50 cal./MK-19/M240B:

1 point target 900m orgreater during the day and night for alltables;

1 point target 200m or lessduring the day and night for all tables; and MK-19:

1 area target 1,500m orgreater during the day and night for alltables.

Truck Crew EvaluationsFor the development of FM 3-20.21,

both the Armor and Infantry Schools cametogether to develop one standard forevaluating gunnery within the HBCT forall of its weapon system platforms. Thegreatest change that the reader will discoveris the decade long reversal from the TPU(trained, needs practice, untrained) system


Table III trains crews to proficiencyusing the assigned weapon system on astationary vehicle against stationary singletargets. The inherent flexibility of FM 3-20.21 allows commanders and mastergunners to arrange targets in a realisticarray. The crews will fire four day and threenight engagements. As a common themethroughout crew gunnery, friendly targetsare included in all crew tables to give thecrew practice in combat identification.

Table IV trains crews to employ directfire to destroy threat targets from astationary or moving vehicle. The crewsengage stationary area and point targetsduring day and night conditions. Table IVis a building block toward Table V. Theunit commander can modify Table IV totrain weak gunnery areas or to sustain orimprove the crew’s strengths orweaknesses.

Table V trains the truck crew to engagemoving and stationary targets with theplatform weapon systems. It requires thecrew to call on all the knowledge gainedand lessons learned during Tables I throughIV and employ those skills against varioustargets during day and night operations.Table V prepares the truck crew for TableVI, crew qualification, by presenting

Table III — Section Proficiency ExerciseTable IV — Section PracticeTable V — Section QualificationTable VI — Platoon Proficiency Exercise

Truck Crew Tables: Chapter 10

of scoring to point scoring. For readers that understand bothmechanized infantry systems of scoring (past and present), it isimportant to note that the future point scoring system is similar tothe TPU in that the MPL for the future crew gunnery is directlytied to the 70-point line on the timing matrixes. Just as the formerpoint scoring system and current tank point system are evaluated,crew-duty penalties are imposed to ensure that crews practiceproper engagement techniques and system procedures. There arefive categories of crew-duty penalties:

*Applied immediately to each engagemento Immediate disqualification — Crew operates with

hazardous conduct.o Automatic zero point — Crew disregards a requirement

for an announced task, conditions, and standards.o 30-point penalty — Crew fails to adhere to basic safety or

force protection precepts.*Applied as a total at the end of each phase (day/night)

o 10-point penalty — Crew fails to perform fundamentalleader/crew tasks.

o 5-point penalty — Crew fails to employ correct engagementtechniques or respond properly to fire commands.

Essentially, crews receive a numerical score based on theirexposure to the threat matrix. Once the score is obtained from anengagement, the crew receives 100 points if there were no crew-duty penalties to assess. The crew will receive a lesser score forthe engagement if an immediate crew-duty penalty is assessed.For example, immediate disqualification penalties are assessedfor the negligent discharge of the weapon system and firing outsidethe range fans; an automatic zero applies when a crew engages afriendly target or fails to fire a CBRN engagement in MOPP; or a30-point penalty occurs when crews fail to destroy both targets inaccordance with the threat timing matrix. Ten and five-point crewcuts are cumulative for a table phase. For example, a 10-pointpenalty is assessed against thecrew for fundamental leaderand crew-type tasks, such asimproper fire command,using improper ammunition,etc. Five-point penalties areassessed if the crew usesimproper engagement techniques,responds improperly to firecommands, etc.

The table above shows the truck crewratings that will be received by the crew aftercompleting Table VI, crew qualification.

Truck crew gunnery tests the crewmembers’ability to take knowledge and skills learnedduring preliminary gunnery and apply it to thebasic gunnery tables exercising the crew and theweapon systems in both fully operational anddegraded modes. Though truck crew gunnerywas developed for the reconnaissance elementscommanders should utilize it for all wheeledsystems in the HBCT to include combatsupport and combat service support

elements until Volume III, Combat Support/Combat ServiceSupport Gunnery, is released. Flexibility in FM 3-20.21 allowsthe commanders to tailor the engagements to support theiranticipated COE. Training managers are encouraged to developthe basic gunnery tables similar to their in-theater threat.

We encourage commanders, master gunners, and trainingmanagers to read the coordinating draft of FM 3-20.21 and askthem to contact the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office withrecommendations for the gunnery manual. The point of contactis Sergeant First Class William Simons. He can be reached at(706) 544-6201 or [email protected].


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Sergeant First Class William Simons is the BFV doctrine and systemslead for the S/BPO and future chief. He has served for 19 years in the Armyand is a combat veteran; his previous assignments include serving as squadleader, section leader, platoon sergeant, and battalion master gunner. SFCHe is a graduate of the BFV Master Gunner Course, the Battle Staff NCOCourse, the Advanced NCO Course and holds a bachelor’s degree inManagement with a minor in Political Science and is nearing completion of amaster’s degree in Public Administration.

CREW QUALIFICATION RATINGS

Distinguished Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 9 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 900 to 1,000 points overall.

Superior Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 8 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 800 to 899 points overall.

Qualified Crew scored at least 70 points on at least 7 of 10 engagements. Crew scored 700 to 799 points overall.

Rifle Squad GunneRyRifle Squad GunneRyRifle Squad GunneRyRifle Squad GunneRyRifle Squad GunneRySERGEANT FIRST CLASS WILLIAM SIMONS


When holding terrain orsecuring a foothold in anurban environment, no other

weapon system is more important to thesuccess of a heavy brigade combat team(HBCT) than the infantry rifle squad. Forfar too long the rifle squad has beenovershadowed by mechanized infantry unitsand their Bradley Fighting Vehicles(BFVs); it is the intent of Field Manual 3-20.21 to realize the key role of the riflemanand his weapon by developing a crawl,walk, run methodology for the rifle squadto enhance the squad’s gunnery proficiencystrategy.

One of the primary efforts of FM 3-20.21was to ensure that the emphasis for gunnerywas placed on the advanced tables; to doso involved creating a paradigm shift in thetable methodology which includedmirroring the rifle squad tables with thecrew tables (for both the tank and Bradley)to prepare them to operate together inadvanced tables. Therefore, the rifle squadgunnery tables are only the first half ofgunnery (Tables I-VI) while collectivegunnery is the second (Tables VII-XII).Chapter 7 of FM 3-20.21 will allow

company commanders the flexibility toincorporate both tactical training andgunnery. It will assist the commander bytraining the squad to use the direct fireengagement process using DIDEA andteach the squad and fire team leader firecontrol and distribution. The culminatingevent for the rifle squad is Table VI - riflesquad qualification.

Photo by Specialist Ben Brody

Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion,15th Infantry Regiment, practice

live-fire squad movementtechniques in Kuwait in

September 2005.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


The reader of FM 3-20.21 will immediately recognize a fewchanges in the gunnery manual. Throughout the manual there isan inherent flexibility for commanders at all levels to train fortheir anticipated contemporary operational environment (COE).Commanders should tailor their tables to replicate their anticipatedenvironment as best possible. However, the one constant betweenthe manuals is the reminder of resource constraints. Rifle squadtables must be designed using the same frequency and ammunitionallocations from DA Pamphlet 350-38. In the paragraphs below,this article will discuss the methodology of rifle squad gunneryfor the HBCT to include the basic gunnery concept, table resources,table design and development, and evaluations. Commandersshould also note that this chapter will be redundant in thesubsequent BCT manuals for both the Stryker and infantry brigadecombat teams. Additionally, Chapter 7 can also be used as ablueprint of training for units that are deploying in nontraditionalroles such as artillerymen and tankers mounted on high-mobilitymultipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) tasked to executedismounted operations.

Rifle Squad Basic Gunnery ConceptRifle squad training measures the squad’s proficiency in

executing specified squad collective tasks and battle drills. Theidea behind rifle squad tables is to train the squad as part of alarger operation with concentration on one or two collective tasksfrom the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)Mission Training Plan (MTP). Moreover, the training tablesshould replicate a unit’s anticipated COE, involve the squadleader’s and fire team leaders’ decisions, demonstrate a cause andeffect result for the leadership’s decisions, and be executed as amulti-echelon and combined arms event. This means that foreach table developed, the construction of the table should havenotional maneuver units and radio traffic incorporated to trainthe platoon leader (a multi-echelon focus) on making stresseddecisions. For example, a squad table can be designed to wherethe platoon is the maneuver effort in a meeting engagement. Withnotional BFV radio traffic, adjacent maneuvering squads or squadsin a near support-by-fire position can call situation reports to theplatoon leader. As the squad begins its assault, the platoon leaderorchestrates the massing of fire onto the objective. Though onlythe rifle squads are assessed, the platoon leader receives trainingas well. Additionally, this would maximize already constrainedresources with accelerated deployment schedules and decreasingcalendar space in today’s training environment. In keeping withthe new modularity structure of the HBCTs, units shouldincorporate other CAB and HBCT assets into collective gunnerytables. One effective method is to combine similar collectivetables and tasks from mortar, scout, armor, and engineer unitsand incorporate them into Tables IV, V, and VI. Lastly,commanders should incorporate organic and nonorganic vehicleplatforms on the rifle squad tables. For example, as the riflesquad enters and clears a room, the squad leader cross talks withthe tank commander in support. As the tank commandersuppresses the building with his .50 caliber, COAX or the loader’sM240B, the squad leader calls the tank commander to shift fire toanother building or window in accordance with the unit’s SOP.

Table ResourcesTo underscore, FM 3-20.21 was developed using DA Pamphlet

350-38, and there are no anticipated changes to the strategy. Thetable above shows how rifle squads are currently resourced forcertain events.

Throughout FM 3-20.21 the virtual, constructive, and livemethodology has been used to maximize training resources. Thevirtual device of choice is the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST)2000, while the constructive devices of choice for rifle squadtraining on non-firing tables for the preliminary, basic, andadvanced gunnery phase is MILES (Multiple Integrated LaserEngagement System) with blank ammunition.

Table Design and DevelopmentOutlined below is the new table layout for rifle squad gunnery

training.

Rifle Squad Ammunition Resources

Frequency Recommended Table

Fire and MoveLFX

4 (2x Buddy Teamonce per gunnery)

(2x Fire Teamonce per gunnery)

Rifle Squad Table I

Rifle Squad Table II

Squad/Platoon LFX

4 (2x SquadQualification onceper gunnery)

(2x SectionQualification onceper gunnery)

Rifle Squad Table VI

Table IX

Preliminary rifle squad gunnery tables should be conductedusing the crawl (dry fire), walk (blank fire with MILES) and run(live fire) method of training. Once a squad has completed thebattery of rifle squad tables in the basic rifle squad gunnerytraining, it is ready for advanced gunnery training with the tanksand Bradleys. This training model can also be used by units thatare deploying in nontraditional roles. Finally, Rifle Squad TableVI is a prerequisite for Table IX.

The purpose of Table I is to train and evaluate individualmovement techniques as part of a buddy team in a live-fire andmaneuver exercise. Example tasks to evaluate include:

Individual: Movement under direct fire (0713260502)o High crawlo Low crawlo Rush

Rifle Squad Gunnery Tables: Chapter 7Table I - Buddy Team/Fire and Maneuver Exercise (LFX)Table II - Fire Team Maneuver Exercise (LFX)Table III - Squad Battle Drill Exercise (Blank)Table IV - Squad Situational Training Exercise (Blank)Table V - Squad Practice (Blank)Table VI - Squad Qualification (LFX)


Select temporary fightingpositions (0713260513)

Buddy Team: Move over, through, or around

obstacles (0713260503) React to indirect fire while

dismounted (0713260510)The purpose of Table II is to train and

evaluate a fire team’s ability to live fire andmaneuver. This is the first table that thefire team leader is able to maneuver andcontrol the fire of his team in a live-fireevent. Example tasks to evaluate include: Move as a member of a fire team

(0713260510) Control movement of a fire team

(0713265605)The purpose of Table III is to train and

evaluate a rifle squad’s ability to exercisebattle drills in a field setting. A battle drillis a collective action executed by platoonor smaller element without applying adeliberate decision-making process andgenerally supports other collective tasks.This is the first opportunity for squadleaders to fire and maneuver both fire teamsduring a new gunnery density as anevaluated event. Example tasks to evaluateinclude:

• Battle Drill 2 - React to Contact• Battle Drill 2A - React to Contact• Battle Drill 3 - Break Contact• Battle Drill 3A - Break Contact• Battle Drill 4 - React to AmbushThe purpose of Rifle Squad Table IV is

to train and evaluate a squad’s ability toexecute collective tasks in a situationaltraining exercise (STX). This is the firstopportunity for new squad leaders tomaneuver both fire teams as an evaluatedevent. Tasks evaluated include but are notlimited to those found in Chapter 5 ofARTEP 7-7J MTP. Collective trainingevents for the rifle squad should beorganized as part of a larger element.

The purpose of Rifle Squad Table V isto train and evaluate a squad’s ability toexecute collective tasks in a live-firetraining exercise. Tasks evaluated includebut are not limited to those found inChapter 5 of ARTEP 7-7J MTP and/or thebattle drills found in ARTEP 7-7J Drill.Collective training events for the rifle squadshould be organized as part of a larger

element. This table is the building blockto Rifle Squad Table VI (squadqualification) and should focus oncollective tasks or battle drills identified asa firing task for subsequent tables.

The purpose of Rifle Squad Table VI isto qualify rifle squads. This table shouldencompass an entire operation fromtroopleading procedures throughconsolidation and reorganization. Riflesquads should be evaluated on their abilityto effectively move tactically, controlorganic fires, and report/communicate as asquad and as part of a BFV platoon. Wellprepared squad qualification tables areinteractive (forces squad and team leadersto make clear decisive decisions) and multi-echelon (trains platoon leaders to fight bothdismounted and notional mountedelements).

Evaluating Rifle Squad GunneryAll weapon systems in an HBCT will be

assessed utilizing the training andevaluation outlines (T&EOs) that supportthe mission or table being conducted.Evaluation for rifle squad gunnery tablesis the same as it is for advanced gunneryand is outlined in Chapter 11. The seniorevaluator will assess the overallperformance of the rifle squad as eithertrained (T), needs practice (P), or untrained(U) using the collective task scoring model.The greatest change in advanced gunneryscoring is how scoring is tabulated. First,there is no mathematical solution to thescoring process. Second, the gunnery scoreis tied to the task standard of each trainingand evaluation outline, meaning gunneryis much like an additional line in the T&EOtask standards. The squad must kill,capture, or force the withdrawal of theenemy, which forces attrition to a point ofcombat ineffectiveness. Therefore in aT&EO, the gunnery standard minimumproficiency level (MPL) that should be metis half of the enemy force has been killed,which results in no less than a needspractice or P for the firing element. Lastly,using the overall T&EO assessment and theoverall gunnery assessment, the seniorevaluator is able to assign an overall tableassessment.

FM 3-20.21 was written to standardizethe evaluation process for all weaponsystems in mind for the HBCT. For far too

long the rifle squad hasbeen at a disadvantagewith mechanizedinfantry units and theirBradleys in thattracking crewqualificationwas moreimportant therifle squadt r a i n i n g .It is theintent ofthis publication to realize thecriticality of the rifleman anddevelop a crawl, walk, runmethodology for the riflesquad’s training to enhancethe squad’s gunneryproficiency strategy. Riflesquad gunnery trainingconsists of six tables, withthe first two (orpreliminary gunnery)concentratingon buddyand fire-team maneuverand the last four (orbasic gunnery) honing the effectiveness ofthe squad.

We encourage commanders, mastergunners, and training managers to read thecoordinating draft of FM 3-20.21 and askthem to contact the Stryker/BradleyProponent Office with recommendations forthe gunnery manual. For more information,contact the author at (706) 544-6201 [email protected].

Sergeant First Class William Simons is theBFV doctrine and systems lead for the S/BPO andwill serve as chief of the S/BPO beginning February2007. He has served for 19 years in the Army andis a combat veteran; his previous assignmentsinclude serving as a squad leader, section leader,platoon sergeant, and battalion master gunner. Heis a graduate of the BFV Master Gunner Course,the Battle Staff NCO Course, the Advanced NCOCourse and holds a bachelor ’s degree inManagement with a minor in Political Science andis nearing completion of a master’s degree in PublicAdministration.

AAAAADDDDDVVVVVANCEDANCEDANCEDANCEDANCED G G G G GUNNERUNNERUNNERUNNERUNNERYYYYY FORFORFORFORFOR THETHETHETHETHE HBCTHBCTHBCTHBCTHBCT

SERGEANT FIRST CLASSWILLIAM SIMONS

One of the primary efforts of Field Manual 3-20.21 wasto ensure that the emphasis for gunnery was placed onthe advanced tables; to do so involved creating a

paradigm shift in the table methodology. Therefore, the crewgunnery tables are only the first half of gunnery (Tables I-VI)while collective gunnery tables are the second (Tables VII-XII).Though crew qualification is important in training on the directfire engagement process using DIDEA (detect, identify, decide,engage, assess), the collective tables are where company, battalion,and brigade commanders make their true assessments for combatreadiness and expound on the DIDEA process using fire controland distribution.

Those reading FM 3-20.21 may immediately recognize a fewchanges in the gunnery manual. Throughout the new manual,there is an inherent flexibility for the commander to train for hisunit’s anticipated COE. In the development of FM 3-20.21, thegunnery doctrine team from both the Armor and Infantry Centersremoved all task prescription from the gunnery manual andestablished only minimum proficiency levels (MPLs) to maintainthe critical skill requirements and to have a standard evaluationmethod so every weapon system platform (tank, Bradley, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV], and evenheavy expanded mobility tactical truck [HEMTT]) in the HBCTwill be evaluated in the same manner for both crew and collectivegunnery. In advanced gunnery, there are no longer a minimumnumber of specific collective tasks that units must execute, whichmainly affected units other than infantry. However, the constantsbetween the manuals are resource constraints. Advanced tablesmust be designed using the same frequency and ammunitionallocations from DA Pamphlet 350-38. This article will discussthe methodology of advanced gunnery for the heavy brigade combatteam (HBCT) to include the advanced gunnery concept, tableresources, table design and development, and evaluations.

Advanced Gunnery ConceptAdvanced gunnery training measures a maneuver element’s

proficiency in executing specified platoon missions in accordancewith the commander’s guidance and intent. Although missionsare outlined differently for both infantry and armor platoons intheir respective Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)Mission Training Plans (MTPs), Chapter 11 of FM 3-20.21 doesnot prohibit training managers of units to establish commoncollective tables for both infantry and armor units, if that is desiredby commanders. Moreover, as will be further discussed, itencourages commanders to train with mixed formations (forexample: a one tank, one Bradley, and one rifle squad-mixedsection or a two tank, two Bradley, and two rifle squad-mixedplatoon.) When mixed sections and platoons are executing anadvanced gunnery table, the ARTEP MTP used is specific to thebranch of the senior leader for the maneuver element. If thathappens to be an armor lieutenant for a platoon table, the armorMTP would be used for the platoon assessment; however, theinfantry training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) are still usedas supporting tasks for the rifle squads.

Too often advanced gunnery tables are designed with one, two,or more missions and are supported with several ARTEP MTPcollective tasks that train every platoon in the battalion using thesame table design with the same number and type of T&EOs.There are generally two problems with that design. First, there isnever enough time to train on everything, and it is important forcommands to choose the mission that specific platoons will fight in acombat theater and an appropriate number of collective tasks thatsupport the mission. Second, advanced gunnery does not need to bea one-size-fits-all event. Though it is understandable that the lattertechnique is used to manage range time and resources, it assumesall 12 platoons have a common battle task or that the table isdesigned to train a single high payoff battle task.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Katrina Beeler, USN


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

In the development of FM 3-20.21, the premise behind advancedgunnery was to allow commanders the flexibility to tailor the tablesto the unit’s anticipated contemporary operational environment(COE) and to conduct the table exercising task-organizedformations. The intent behind this methodology is not to createan all-encompassing table, but for units to create tables around aspecific mission with a manageable number of collective tasks.

What is important in advanced gunnery is that in a singlegunnery density, it does not have to be a one-size-fits-all densityor collective table. Well-designed collective tables should replicatea unit’s anticipated COE; additionally, they are interactive to theplatoon leadership’s decisions, demonstrate a cause and effectresult for the leadership based on their decisions, and are executedas a multi-echelon and combined arms event. This means that foreach table developed, the construction of the table should havenotional maneuver units and radio traffic incorporated to trainthe next higher level of leadership. For example, a platoon tablecan be designed to where the company is the decisive effort in ameeting engagement. A notional platoon would find and fix theenemy force while the firing platoon would maneuver and finishthe enemy. Additionally, units should incorporate other combinedarms battalion (CAB) and HBCT assets into collective gunnerytables to maximize already constrained resources with accelerateddeployment schedules and decreasing calendar space in today’straining environment. This is also in keeping with the newmodularity structure of the HBCTs. One effective method is tomarry similar collective tables and tasks from mortar, scout,engineer, field artillery, and/or even aviation tables and incorporatethem into Tables IX or XII.

Units that already know their area of responsibility (AOR) in atheater of combat and have conducted an initial military decision-making process (MDMP) should design their advanced gunnerytables to replicate it. CAB and squadron commanders, their

Photo by Corporal Justin L. Schaeffer, USMC

operations and intelligence officers, and master gunners shoulddesign the training environment and organize in the formationsthat they will fight. For example, units deploying with a missionto secure main supply routes and logistical convoys may wish todevelop their advanced gunnery tables with mixed platoons (twoBradleys and two tanks) while escorting their distribution platoonincorporating both long and short range targets in both desertand urban terrain.

Table ResourcesTo underscore, FM 3-20.21 was developed using DA Pamphlet

350-38. Listed in the table above are the proposed changes thatwill be briefed at the March Standards in Training Commission(STRAC) Council of Colonels.

Throughout FM 3-20.21 the virtual, constructive, and live

Advanced Gunnery Training Ammunition Resources

Frequency Recommended Use

Table IX 2 (1x LFX)

(1x Device)

96 AP each section97 HE each section200 7.62mm each section

MILES

Table XII 2 (1x LFX)

(1x Device)

96 AP each section97 HE each section200 7.62mm each section

MILES

Table

Rifle squads will use their current programmed allocation forplatoon/company LFX.


Advanced Gunnery Tables:Chapter 11

Table VII - Section ProficiencyExerciseTable VIII - Section PracticeTable IX - Section QualificationTable X - Platoon ProficiencyExerciseTable XI - Platoon PracticeTable XII - Platoon Qualification

Commanders and training managers should notethat Army-wide budgetary constraints have ceasedfunding for the life-cycle maintenance of PGS as of1 Oct 07.

methodology has been used to maximizetraining resources. Unfortunately, theClose Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)does not afford units the ability to trainadvanced gunnery techniques in a virtualenvironment or fully incorporate riflesquads. As a result of these inadequacies,the CCTT may not be implemented into themechanized infantry platoon trainingstrategy for advanced gunnery untiladvancements are made to provide asolution with accurate weapons and visualeffects for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle andhave a near-full incorporation of riflesquads. Therefore, the devices of choicefor advanced gunnery (in order) areprecision gunnery systems (PGS) (untilPGS has been completely phased out of theinventory), sub-caliber in-bore like devices,Multiple Integrated Laser EngagementSystem (MILES), and least preferably dry.Commanders and training managersshould note that Army-wide budgetaryconstraints have ceased funding for the life-cycle maintenance of PGS as of 1 Oct 07.

Tables VII, VIII, X, and XI can beexecuted on gunnery ranges; however, thesetables are best trained in local or maneuvertraining areas using PGS or MILES. Onepossible solution for training on live-fireranges is to use sub-caliber devices, muchlike those used by the armor community.Although they are not currently fielded oryet authorized with ammunition by DAPamphlet 350-38, the Stryker/BradleyProponent Office is researching the possibleinclusion of a sub-caliber device into thetraining strategy as PGS is discontinued.Feedback from the field is needed on thisissue. Though these tables may be dry-firedif sufficient training devices or sub-caliberand/or blank munitions are not available,it is the least preferred method and isdiscouraged. It is noteworthy that armorunits make effective use of in-bore devicesin both preliminary and advanced gunnery.When operating with armor units, everyattempt should be made to use like devicesin order to minimize resource requirementsand to standardize evaluations.Tables become resourceintensive when mixing sub-caliber and MILES, as two setsof targets must be emplaced.There is also an increasedpossibility of unnecessarily

damage to the device equipment.Though Tables VII and XI can model

their qualification events, to include allcollective and mission essential task list(METL) tasks for the anticipatedoperational environment, these tables canalso be used to train identified in-theatersupplementary/contingency tasks thatsections or platoons may perform such as aTable XI (convoy security) versus a TableXII (raid).

Table Design and DevelopmentOutlined below is the new table layout

for advanced gunnery.

Table VII (section proficiency exercise)has the crews and squads collectively fireand maneuver, for the first time, as asection. The objective is to developproficiency working as an integratedsection. Sections should initially executeTable VII as pure sections thoughsubsequent iterations of Table VII may beexecuted as mixed or combined armssections based on task organization and thecommander’s guidance and intent. Thesection should practice the fire control anddistribution techniques it will use as aplatoon. This table is device-based utilizingtraining devices such as PGS, sub-caliberdevices, or MILES.

Table VIII (section practice) prepares thesection for qualification. The objective isto enhance the skills developed in Table VIIin preparation for the section for Table IX.As with all advanced gunnery tables, thesections should initially execute Table VIII

as pure sections though subsequentiterations of Table VIII may be executed asmixed or combined arms sections based ontask organization and the commander’sintent. Table VIII can be executed on thesame range as Table IX using PGS (ifequipped), in-bore devices (if equipped), orMILES. Again, this table can be run dry,though it is the least preferred method.

Table IX, (section qualification), whichis an MPL for the mechanized infantry,evaluates the section’s ability to executecollective tasks in a tactical live-fireenvironment. Collective task evaluationsprovide an accurate assessment forcompany commanders to measure thesection’s combat proficiency. All elementswithin the section are integrated and areevaluated on their ability to fight as acohesive maneuver force.

Table X (platoon proficiency course)introduces sections and squads to fire andmaneuver as a platoon. The objective is todevelop proficiency working as anintegrated platoon. Platoons will initiallyexecute Table X as pure platoons, thoughsubsequent iterations of Table X may beexecuted as mixed or combined armsplatoons based on task organization and thecommander’s intent. In Table X, theplatoon begins to hone its standardoperating procedures and practice the firecontrol and distribution techniques it willuse during qualification and in combat.Though this table is device-based utilizingtraining devices such as PGS and/orMILES, the same holds true as in earliertables. FM 3-20.21 will outline the amountof ammunition needed if sub-caliberdevices are being used. This table may bedry-fired if sufficient training devices and/or sub-caliber and/or blank ammunition arenot available. Even though this table is aprecursor to Table XII (platoonqualification), it does not necessarily haveto model the qualification table but caninclude supporting or contingent missionsthat are anticipated in future operationalenvironments.

Table XI (platoon practice)prepares the platoon forqualification. The objective isto enhance the skills developedin Table X in preparation forTable XII. Platoons shouldinitially execute Table XI as


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Sergeant First Class William Simons is the BFV doctrine and systemslead for the S/BPO and will serve as chief of the S/BPO beginning February2007. He has served for 19 years in the Army and is a combat veteran; hisprevious assignments include serving as a squad leader, section leader, patoonsergeant, and battalion master gunner. He is a graduate of the BFV MasterGunner Course, the Battle Staff NCO Course, the Advanced NCO Courseand holds a bachelor’s degree in Management with a minor in Political Scienceand is nearing completion of a master’s degree in Public Administration.

pure platoons though subsequentconduct of Table XI may beexecuted as mixed or combinedarms platoons based on taskorganization and thecommander’s intent.

Table XII (platoonqualification) assists the CABcommander in evaluating hisplatoon’s ability to executecollective tasks in a tactical live-fire environment. Table XIIevaluates every weapon systemplatform in the HBCT againstone evaluation standard. Duringthe execution of Table XII,mounted (tank and Bradley) andrifle squads are integrated andevaluated on their ability to fightas a cohesive platoon. Tounderscore, collective tablesshould replicate a unit’santicipated COE, be interactiveto the platoon leadership’sdecisions that demonstrate a cause and effect result, and beexecuted as a multi-echelon and combined arms event. This savesprecious training hours by pairing like collective events withinTable XIIs.

Evaluating GunneryAll weapon system platforms in an HBCT will be assessed

utilizing the training and evaluation outlines that support themission being conducted. The senior evaluator will assess theoverall performance of the section or platoon as either trained(T), needs practice (P), or untrained (U) using the collective taskscoring model. The greatest change in advanced gunnery scoringis how scoring is tabulated. First, there is no mathematical solutionto the scoring process. Second, the gunnery score is tied to thetask standard of each firing T&EO. This means that gunnery ismuch like an additional line in the T&EO task standards. Theplatoon must kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the enemy,which forces attrition to a point of combat ineffectiveness.Therefore, in a T&EO the gunnery standard MPL that should bemet is half of the enemy force killed, which results in no less thana needs practice or “P” for the firing element. Lastly, using theoverall T&EO assessment and the overall gunnery assessment,the senior evaluator is able to assign an overall table assessment.

SummaryAdvanced gunnery from Table VII through the combined arms

live-fire exercise (CALFEX) are commander’s tables. Thoughcrew qualification is important in training the direct fireengagement process using DIDEA, the collective tables are wherecompany, battalion, and brigade commanders make their trueassessments for combat readiness and expound on the DIDEAprocess using fire control and distribution. The advanced gunnery

tables should be tailored to the unit’s anticipated COE and shouldbe exercised with its task-organized formations. Additionally, thecollective tables should be designed so they are interactive to theplatoon leadership’s decisions, which demonstrates a cause andeffect result for the leadership based on its decisions, and beexecuted as a multi-echelon and combined arms event. Moreover, tomaximize already constrained resources with accelerated deploymentschedules and decreasing calendar space in today’s trainingenvironment, and in keeping with the new modularity structure ofthe HBCTs, units should incorporate other CAB and HBCT assetsinto collective gunnery tables by pairing like tables to be fired on onerange simultaneously as a single event. Finally, all weapon systemplatforms in an HBCT that are conducting advanced gunnery willbe assessed utilizing the collective scoring model.

We encourage commanders, master gunners, and trainingmanagers to read the coordinating draft of FM 3-20.21 and askthem to contact the Stryker/Bradley Proponent Office withrecommendations for the gunnery manual. For more information,contact the author at (706) 544-6201 or [email protected].

Sergeant Matthew Acosta

Soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division patrol an area of Iraq in June 2005.



The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) was introduced to the Army in1981, and the first Bradley Master Gunner Course was established in1983. The 10-week course, modeled after the 11-week Armor Master

Gunner Course, focused on skill levels I through III tasks and instructed 20 and30-level maintenance on the M240C machine gun and the M242 Bushmastercannon.

Over the last 25 years, the instruction for the Bradley Master Gunner Coursehas undergone 10 evolutions, growing from 11 to 14, to 13 to eight weeks. Thesechanges occurred to meet the needs of the force and return highly trained NCOswho possess the technical expertise to implement BFV gunnery and turretmaintenance training programs.

The introduction of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) necessitated thatthe 29th Infantry Regiment examine what critical tasks a master gunner mustpossess, how long it takes to train those tasks, and how to best support theoperational force. This article explains not only the Bradley Master GunnerCourse, but also what challenges and trends have been observed duringARFORGEN and how the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment hasadjusted and continues to adjust to support units.

Because of challenges within ARFORGEN and the needs that havebeen identified by the field, the course has now undergone its eleventhchange in the last 25 years to return highly skilled, technicallyproficient NCOs to units. To that end, beginning in January 2007, theBradley Master Gunner Course will increase from 49 training days to55 training days, or 11 weeks, beginning with Class #1-07.

MissionThe current mission of the Bradley Master Gunner Branch is to

train select NCOs to design and implement BFV gunnery and turretmaintenance training programs. A trained master gunner can executemaintenance and maintenance management of all turret weaponssystems and components; establish and conduct Bradley Tables Ithrough XII; develop a short-range training program (SRTP) for abattalion-sized BFV unit from preliminary gunnery through platoongunnery; and execute turret gun system malfunctions andtroubleshooting.

The BFV Master Gunner Course is structured into two distinct phases:maintenance and gunnery. To earn the title of master gunner and theadditional skill identifier J3, a student must attain 80 percent in all writtenexaminations and a “go” in all hands-on testing, which includes the SRTP.

Maintenance PhaseThis phase is broken down into three sub-phases. Maintenance I focuses

TTTTTHEHEHEHEHE BBBBBRADLEYRADLEYRADLEYRADLEYRADLEY M M M M MASTERASTERASTERASTERASTERGGGGGUNNERUNNERUNNERUNNERUNNER C C C C COURSEOURSEOURSEOURSEOURSE ANDANDANDANDAND

ARFORARFORARFORARFORARFORGENGENGENGENGENSERGEANT FIRST CLASS MATTHEW HINKLEY

FIRST SERGEANT TIMOTHY TERPAKLIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT CERJAN


Photo by Staff Sergeant Suzanne Day

transition to the gunnery phase and learn all the steps necessary toexecute a successful Bradley gunnery. This phase begins with trainingdevices and focuses on the proper employment and capabilities ofnumerous devices such as the precision gunnery system (PGS),targetry, target lift mechanisms, and thru-site video (TSV).

Once the student understands how to use these devices duringgunnery, he then becomes intimately familiar with his coredocument Field Manual 3-22.1, Bradley Gunnery. This manualprovides the student in-depth descriptions of the three phases ofgunnery: preliminary, device, and live fire. Preliminary gunneryand range operations are where the student will learn theresponsibilities and duties of the personnel that are key to anysuccessful Bradley range — from the officer-in-charge (OIC) toammo NCO — and the initial crew hands-on training that shouldbe conducted prior to any live-fire event.

The preliminary phase consists of numerous training steps tobuild or reinforce the crew’s ability to act as one unit. In theprocess of becoming a master gunner, the student will learn thatthis phase is extremely important in forming successful cohesivecrews. With the completion of preliminary training, the studentswill now learn the behind-the-scenes intricacies of crew gunneryand crew gunnery scenario development.

This portion of the course will provide the Soldier with theknowledge of how to establish a full-caliber, live-fire range fromthe placement of targetry, scenario development, and certificationof evaluators to the final execution of a live-fire range.

Upon completion of crew gunnery, platoons now come togetherto execute gunnery on a far larger scale. Again, the students learnhow to establish a proper range for this training, includingcollective task selection with the support of their operations officers(S3s), targetry placement, dimensions of targetry, evaluator criteria,and ammunition requirements.

With the use of the BFV by a number of Army branches, studentsmust understand military occupational skills (MOS) gunnery andlearn the standards, requirements, methods and means to establishvarious gunnery tables that focus on scouts, engineers, and thefire support elements of a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT).

Following this classroom instruction, students execute their


on turret components and functions (TC&F), and Maintenance IIfocuses on organizational maintenance of the M240C coaxialmachine gun and the M242 25mm chain gun. Maintenance IIIfocuses on surface danger area diagrams (SDAD), creation of arange overlay, safing of range targetry, Bradley weapon systemsammunition capabilities, and the ballistic firing tables for 25mmammunition.

Maintenance IThe TC&F focuses the students on learning all aspects of the

mechanical and electrical components within the turret andprogresses to the components of the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile system (TOW). After initialfamiliarization training, the students study the schematics of theelectrical components, the workings of the turret drive system,and the inner workings of the integrated sight unit (ISU). At theend of the Maintenance I block of instruction, students mustsuccessfully pass a graded examination to progress to theMaintenance II portion of this phase.

Maintenance IIThis portion of the course transitions the student to

organizational maintenance of the M240C coaxial machine gunand M242 Bushmaster. These lesson plans are based on 10- and20-level maintenance from complete teardown of the weaponssystems to a complete rebuild.

During these lessons, students learn some of the most used andcritical skills required of a master gunner. A total of 11 days aredevoted to this portion of the course, which covers all aspects of bothweapon systems from troubleshooting faults, inspections, repair, andreplacement of components to maintaining round count cards.

This portion of the course is historically one of the mostchallenging for the students and should be included in anypretraining that is conducted at the home station to help increasethe chances of overall success.

Maintenance IIIStudents then transition to learning about the ammunition

capabilities of the BFV. Emphasis of this portion is placed onammunition effects, characteristics and capabilities; ammunitionidentification; and numerous additional lessons for 7.62mm, 25mmammunition, and the TOW missile. The ballistics portion of thecourse instructs students on how to properly use the ballistic firingtable’s manual for 25mm ammunition (FT25-A-2). This lessonenables a Soldier to find the point of impact of a single round usingmath and the FT25-A-2.

The surface danger area diagram, range overlay, and safinglessons test a student’s ability to properly draw an ammunitiontemplate and range overlay that will be used to ensure that specifictargets within a range are safe to engage from specific firingpositions. This lesson greatly enhances a unit’s ability to safelyestablish live-fire ranges while deployed in contingency areas ofoperation. This skill also assists brigade combat teams (BCTs)and combined arms battalions to execute diverse gunneryoperations of each unique weapon system across the unit.

Gunnery PhaseAfter successful completion of the maintenance phase, students

1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment

A Bradley Master Gunner Course instructor shows a student the electricmotor of the M242 25mm Bushmaster chain gun during themaintenance phase of the course.


live-fire gunnery on Fort Benning ranges,using Bradley crews from the 1st Battalion,29th Infantry Regiment. A rifle companygun-line is replicated, showing the studentshow gunnery should be executed upthrough Bradley Table VIII crewqualification. At the completion of live-fire, students are tested on the gunneryphase of instruction.

Short Range Training Plan (SRTP)This portion of the instruction spans 11

training days and serves as the culminatingportion of the gunnery phase and thecourse. This phase is a check on learningand ties all previous lessons in themaintenance and gunnery phases to assessthe student’s technical abilities to earn theJ3 ASI - master gunner.

The phase begins with students learningammunition forecasting and trainingmanagement. The emphasis for this blockof instruction is placed on resourcing timeand equipment (ammunition) from riflequalification through a Bradley Table XIIgunnery for a Bradley-equipped battalion.

During SRTP, students workindividually on their gunnery plan. Thisplan will require the students to incorporateall of the information that they have learnedthroughout the gunnery phase of the courseand establish a gunnery plan that they willbrief to a panel of instructors.

Each student is assigned an instructor/mentor who acts as the student’s operationsofficer. The S3 provides training guidanceand the collective tasks to be trained andthe student master gunner develops the

gunnery. During SRTP, the instructors willconduct several in-progress reviews (IPRs)to ensure that the students are progressingproperly and to demonstrate the planningprocess found within battalions. Theinstructors are available to the students 24hours a day to assist students as required.

A student who has the highest academicaverage and first-time “GOs” in all hands-on testing and SRTP is awarded the title ofdistinguished honor graduate. In July 2006,the distinguished honor graduate trophywas named after Staff Sergeant Jason A.Benford, the distinguished honor graduatefrom Class #4-04, who was killed in Iraqin 2005. Since 1983, there have been morethan 3,000 graduates, and only 66 have

earned the title ofdistinguished honorgraduate.

Master GunnerTrends (FY05 / 06)

Over the last year anumber of trends haveemerged as NCOs areattending the BradleyMaster Gunner Course.In particular, thehistorical 74 percentgraduation rate hasdropped to a 61 percentrate during FY06.

— During exitinterviews, the studentswho did not meet theacademic or technical

standards identified that the majority of thecourse prerequisites had not beencompleted.

Course prerequisites include thatstudents: Be instructor/operator certified, Be certified on Bradley Gunnery

Skills Test (BGST) within six months andBradley Crew Evaluator (BCE) withinthree months, Complete formal train-up by the

unit, Qualify on Bradley Table VIII

from a gunner or BC position (withinnine months for AC Soldiers, 12 monthsfor NG enhanced brigades, 18 months forNG non-enhanced Soldiers).

These prerequisites were adjusted inJanuary 2006 to reduce the amount of timethat a student was at Fort Benning as wellas to set the conditions for success for anNCO prior to his arrival at the MasterGunner Course.

— Current execution of ARFORGENresults in BCTs returning to the fight inless than a year; this results in battalionssending the most available NCO to theMaster Gunner Course and not necessarilythe best qualified NCO. This is directlycorrelated to the decrease in the graduationrate over the last two years.

— NCOs who are being sent to theBradley Master Gunner Course havelimited experience on the BFV; in manycases, they were dismounted squad leaderswho have not received any pretraining. Thislack of experience creates a steep learningcurve that many NCOs cannot overcometo meet the intense technical or academicstandards of the course.

— Very few units provide pretraining(Sabot academies) to NCOs prior to arrivalat the Bradley Master Gunner Course.

o Some units have been flooding thecourse with the most available NCOs andnot the most qualified NCOs. Historically,the candidate who completes a pre-coursetwo to three weeks prior to the start of theBradley Master Gunner Course has greatlyincreased his chance of success. The focusof this type of course should be on 25mmorganizational maintenance (TM 9-1005-200-23&P), Plotting of eight-digit gridcoordinates as a refresher (overlay), crewgunnery, and platoon gunnery.

— There are not enough instructor/operators (I/Os) or senior instructor/

1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment

Master Gunner Course instructors evaluate students’ SurfaceDanger Area Diagrams.

Annette Fournier

Kimberly Benford was present in July 2006when the Master Gunner Course named itsdistinguished honor graduate trophy after herhusband Staff Sergeant Jason A. Benford, whowas killed in Iraq in 2005.


operators (S/IO) in the field; many NCOs whocome to the course fail to have this prerequisitetraining.

— The force does not have enough mastergunners to support transformation and modularity.According to the 2nd Quarter, FY06 careermanagement field (CMF) review, there were199 11B3OJ3 Soldiers in the Army. TheArmy requirement is 456. This deficit furtherdemonstrates the need for qualified mastergunners in the force.

How we can help the forceBased on the identified trends from across the

force and ARFORGEN challenges, Fort Benningand the 29th Infantry Regiment developed a plan ofaction to provide the ways and means to assist theoperational force achieve master gunner graduates and preparefor combat.

The six-day increase includes the addition of the I/O and S/IOcourses, increased hands-on training and practical exercises, anda modification of the prerequisites to attend the master gunnercourse.

– Instructor/Operator (I/O) course (two-day increase):Currently, units are unable to produce I/Os internally to meet theirtraining needs. Additionally, units were unable to conduct I/Oinstruction at home station and, therefore, were unable to meetthe old prerequisite for the master gunner course. The inclusionof the I/O instruction in the course will help alleviate that issuefor units.

– Senior/Instructor Operator course (two-day increase): Theoperational force does not have enough S/IOs to train I/Os in theunit. This also inhibits a Soldier from meeting the prerequisitesto attend the Bradley Master Gunner Course. Inclusion of the S/IO instruction will allow graduates to return to their units withthe capability for them to train and certify I/Os.

o Increase hands-on training and practical exercises (+two days). While training efficiencies were gained when the

course moved from 13 weeks, the net result wasa compression of technical data that the studentmust understand and attempt to master in a

short period of time. To counter this negativeeffect, additional hands-on training and practical

exercises are being added to the MaintenanceII, III, and Gunnery examinations. This time

will allow the student to comprehend all ofthe technical data or master the skill setsrequired to progress to the next lesson plan.

o Prerequisite adjustments. Effectivewith Class #1-07 (January 2007) the

prerequisites for attendance in the course willonly require the following:

- Formal pretraining by the unit,- Certified on BGST within six months,

- BCE certified within three months, and- A minimum GT score of 100.

Enabling ActionsThe battalion is assisting Fort Benning to establish a hot loop

that allows the Infantry Center to push information to BCTbattalion commanders (AC/RC, Infantry and Armor) to arm themwith the latest information and points of contact to assist themduring ARFORGEN and while deployed.

We will work with the U.S. Army Human Resources Commandto manage the additional skill identifier J3 to ensure qualifiedSoldiers are manning critically short positions within units,especially during reset. The operational force is severely shortmaster gunners, and it is critical to ensure that these NCOs arepositioned to support ARFORGEN requirements.

Units are encouraged to pool resources at the BCT level andimplement a Sabot academy (pre-master gunner training) toprepare candidates for the master gunner course. We can assistunits with subject matter expertise from 1/29 Infantry during thedevelopment of a Sabot academy. The focus of this course shouldbe 25mm organizational maintenance (TM 9-1005-200-23&P),plotting of eight digit grid coordinates as a refresher (overlay),

crew gunnery, and platoon gunnery. Werecommend that BCT commanders be theapproval authority for sending students tothe Bradley Master Gunner Course. Weencourage brigade and battalion mastergunners to use the Fort Benning websiteas well as contact the Master GunnerBranch for assistance. The website containsan updated Sabot academy trainingprogram as well as points of contact forthe 1/29 Infantry.

We will communicate with battalioncommanders who have Soldiers on ATRRSprior to the beginning of each course toprovide feedback on current trends ortraining issues to assist. We will also sustaina communications link with battalioncommanders to provide feedback on theirNCOs’ progress during the course.

Due to the large number of NCOs who


U.S. Army photo

Soldiers in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle conduct live-fire training on Fort Benning.

do not have mechanized experience, werecommend that commanders use theMechanized Leaders Course (MLC) as ameans to mitigate training experience.While the Master Gunner Course isdesigned to be a graduate-level class, theMLC provides an opportunity for units tosend NCOs (staff sergeants through mastersergeants and lieutenants through majors)who are new to Bradley units to help themgain hands on experience and training. Theresident Fort Benning course is four weeks(20 training days) in length and can beexecuted as an MTT at a unit’s homestation. The course has a modular capabilitywhen being executed as a MTT that allowscommanders to meet the ASI requirementswhile adjusting the training to meet theirspecific needs.

The center of gravity in the ARFORGENmodel is a BCT; therefore it should be theprimary headquarters that coordinate formobile training teams (MTTs). Resourcerequirements for most MTTs exponentiallysurpass what a battalion can support; apooling of assets at the BCT level will setthe conditions for success.

Mobile Training Teams (MTTs)The capability exists to export the

resident instructional capability to thelocation that best suits a unit’s needs; MTTsare the best method to do this. MTTs areflexible because they can be brought to aunit’s home station or executed at FortBenning by blocking an existing course,called “buying the course.”

The benefit of bringing the course to aunit’s location allows Soldiers theopportunity to go home each night andreduces the turmoil brought on bytemporary duty. However,


executing an MTT at the unit’s location isalso resource intensive. By blocking acourse at Fort Benning, a unit can leveragethe existing resources (equipment, rangesand ammunition), minimize distractions onthe Soldier, and allow him to be immersedin the course focusing his attention. Theoverall intent is to provide a unit the mostamount of flexibility to support theirARFORGEN efforts.

We recommend that a brigadeheadquarters be the organization tocoordinate for an MTT. The general rule isthat MTTs (resident to Fort Benning or ata unit’s location) must be coordinated andlocked in one training quarter beforeexecution. For MTTs going to a unit’slocation, the initial planning factor is for12 instructors to train 20 students. Basedon a unit’s needs, these parameters can beadjusted. When a MTT comes to a unit’slocation, unit master gunners are used asassistant instructors.

There are three options that can beoffered to a unit for MTTs to meet theirtraining needs:

51 Training Days (10 Weeks). Thistraining module can be used by a unit thathas the ability to pretrain Soldiers bycertifying and validating training beforeinstruction begins. Student prerequisites forthis module include the following:

– Formal pretraining (Sabot academy),– Instructor/operator certified (I/O),– BGST certified within six months, and– BCE certified within three months.55 Training Days (11 Weeks). This

training module can be used by a unit thathas the ability to certify and validate sometraining prior to instruction beginning butis not capable of training I/Os before

instruction begins. Student prerequisitesfor this module include the

following:–Formal pretraining

(Sabot academy),– BGST certified

within six months, and–BCE certified within three months.65 Training Days (13 Weeks). This

training module can be used by a unit thathas not had the capability to executepretraining or the ability to train and certifySoldiers on the prerequisites for the course.This module includes a Sabot academy as partof the module and trains and tests BGST. Theonly prerequisite for this module is that theunit must train and certify Soldiers as BCEs(within three months from the start of theBradley Master Gunner Course)

Other training menu options. Whileexecuting an MTT at a unit’s home station,the 1/29 Infantry has the capability to assistunits with other potential training. Theinstructors can assist units executing a BCEor I/O course for those students not in theBradley Master Gunner Course.

We encourage feedback from theoperational force (AC/RC) to refine and makethe course better to support a unit’s needs.We remain committed to providing the forceNCOs with the best technical training on theBradley fighting vehicle to train Soldiers,leaders, and units in their preparation forcombat and to save lives once deployed inharm’s way.

Sergeant First Class Matthew Hinkley is thebranch chief of the Bradley Master Gunner Courseat Fort Benning, Georgia. He is responsible forleader training on all variants of the Bradley. He isthe honor graduate of Master Gunner Class #4-99and has served in numerous leadership positions.Most recently, he was a platoon sergeant with ACompany, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment,Fort Riley, Kansas.

First Sergeant Timothy Terpak is the firstsergeant and acting commander of the Stryker/Bradley Instructor Company at Fort Benning. Heis responsible for leader training on the BradleyInfantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) and Stryker InfantryCarrier Vehicle at Fort Benning. He is thedistinguished honor graduate of Master GunnerClass #2-97. Most recently, he was a platoonsergeant with C Company, 3rd Battalion, 15thInfantry Regiment, Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cerjan is thebattalion commander of the 1st Battalion(Mechanized/Stryker), 29th Infantry Regiment,responsible for leader training on both BradleyFighting Vehicles and the Stryker Infantry Carrierfor the United States Army Infantry Center &School. He has served in a variety of mechanized,light, Joint and Special Operations assignmentsin Europe, the Pacific, OIF and OEF. Mostrecently, he was the Chief of Strategy - J5 for theSpecial Operations Command Central,USCENTCOM.

“We are embedding coalition ‘transitionteams’ inside Iraqi units. These teams aremade up of coalition officers andnoncommissioned officers who live, work,and fight together with their Iraqicomrades. Under U.S. command, they areproviding battlefield advice and assistanceto Iraqi forces during combat operations.Between battles, they are assisting theIraqis with important skills, such as urbancombat, and intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance techniques...”

— President George W. Bush June 2005

Since 2004, the main effort ofcoalition forces in Iraq has beenthe establishment and

development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)and their transition to independentoperations. Success has been achieved inIraq once the ISF have assumed the leadrole in security with supporting assistancefrom coalition forces. It is critical for U.S.units to understand that history has shownthat foreign forces cannot normally win aprotracted war against insurgents. It is alsoimportant to understand that the ISF werehandicapped before they began due to thedisbandment of the previous military forcesin 2003 and the subsequent limitations onwho could rejoin the new ISF. For thesereasons and others, the ISF have had toeffectively start from ground up not onlyin developing systems and infrastructure,but also knowledge and experience in itspersonnel. The most effective method ofinfluencing and assisting the ISF is thesame method used to influence U.S.Soldiers: personal example. Coalitionpersonnel must become embedded in theISF organization to set that example,identify issues, and assist in theirresolution. Those personnel comprise thetransition team (TT).

This article is designed to give company,battalion, and brigade commanders and

TRANSITION TEAMS ANDOPERATIONAL INTEGRATION IN IRAQ

MAJOR PATRICK T. COLLOTONMAJOR TOMMY E. STONER

their staffs a better understanding ofexternally sourced transition teams in orderto facilitate better integration of efforts,improve working relationships, andsuccessfully develop the ISF.

Composition and Purpose ofTransition Teams

TTs are either generated in theater out-of-hide (OOH) by the coalition unitpartnered with the ISF or sourced from thecontinental United States (CONUS) withthe Secretary of Defense’s approval of arequest for forces (RFF). Because OOHpersonnel are organic to the unit partneredwith the ISF on the ground, the structure,composition and capabilities of those teamsare inherently understood by the chain ofcommand. Externally sourced (RFF) TTs,however, are generally more challenging tounderstand for coalition units as theirstructure, personnel, and purpose are oftenforeign to them until they meet on thebattlefield. The coalition unit that the TT

is working with is known as the partnershipunit (PU).

There are many transition teamsoperating in Iraq today. There are militarytransition teams (MiTTs), special policetransition teams (SPiTTs), police transitionteams (PTTs), border transition teams(BiTTs) and Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Ministry of Interior (MOI)-level transitionteams. Although this article will mainlydiscuss MiTTs, the information here canbe applied when considering or workingwith other types of TTs. TTs are nowpresent at all levels of ISF command fromtactical battalions to MOD/MOI-level staffsections. Each level of TT above thebrigade has a different structure andpurpose.

TTs are groups of personnel broughttogether from across the military that areassigned to Fort Riley, Kansas, and formedinto 10-person teams. The teams undergoindividual and collective training withinCONUS for three months and are then


Courtesy photos

Members of a military transition team observe an Iraqi Army and partnership unit rock drill.

deployed to the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater wherethey receive further training in Kuwait and Iraq. Training focuseson language, cultural, tactical, and equipment operations. Uponcompletion of training, these teams are deployed to the locationof their ISF unit.

The TTs have collective and individual tasks that support theoverall purpose of the mission of training and advising the ISF.The collective tasks are to provide broad advisory support to theIraqi commander and staff and enable direct access to coalitioneffects (artillery, rotary and fixed-wing air), quick reaction force(QRF), intelligence, and logistics. TTs are expected to assist theappropriate level staffs in tactics, military decision-making process,counterinsurgency warfare, leadership, teamwork,communications, and urban combat. At brigade and battalionlevels, the TT’s overall focus is on enhancing the ability of theISF commander and staff to plan, execute, coordinate, direct, andsupport operations. The TTs must advise and assist the ISF unitcommander and staff with training, planning, and decision-making. On a personal level, as advisors, TT members must actas role models and provide mentorship and leadership for ISFunit commanders, staff officers and personnel while helping fostera wartime ethos and service ethos in those units. TTs shouldprovide coalition leadership with ground truth assessment of thecurrent ability of the ISF unit leadership and future capability andpotential of those units and leaders.

The 10 personnel assigned to a TT are a mix of officers andNCOs. Each has a different task and therefore a different area ofbackground experience. Functional areas that are covered downon are command, intelligence, operations, and logistics. Theintelligence, operations, and logistics elements have an officerand NCO to provide these functions. Additionally, each team isassigned an effects officer and NCO and medic in theater. Eachmember of the TT “wears many hats” and performs multiplefunctions during his tour on a TT. These duties include advisingthe NCOs in the unit, advising the support companies that existin the battalions and brigade, and assisting in personnel functions

to name but a few. How the TT specifically divides up duties withregards to the additional functions will vary with each team.

The success of TT members depends on their scope ofexperience and maturity more than their rank and MOS. Amember’s ability to demonstrate competence to and develop apersonal relationship with a senior-ranking ISF officer isproportional to the amount of success he will experience. Thecloser the personal relationship becomes the greater resolutionthe advisor will gain into the workings of the ISF staff sectionand greater the influence the advisor will have with the counterpartofficer or NCO. Establishing and maintaining this rapport, aswell as providing competent advice is the full-time and highestpriority job for the TT. Any additional tasks assigned by the TTleadership or PU leadership serve only to take away from thesepriority tasks and can quickly result in the lack of ability to identifyand assist in the resolution of issues within the ISF unit staff orcommand.

The number and scope of tasks for a TT and its members canbe overwhelming to experienced personnel let alone those withless experience in these areas. Depending on the situation andthe requirements of the ISF, a TT member can be a teacher, anadvisor, a rifleman, a provider of effects, or a friend. Often, severalroles are required at the same time. PUs must understand thechallenges that the TTs face and support them as necessary. Thebottom line is that the overall purpose is to enhance the ability ofIraqi forces to operate independently. This is not only the purposeof the TT but the purpose of the PU as well. The two must cometogether and develop an integrated and coordinated plan to achievethis goal.

Command and Control Structure of Transition TeamsIt is critical for the maneuver commander working with the

externally resourced (RFF) TTs to understand the commandrelationship in order to ensure unity of effort. The relationship isconvoluted somewhat in that command is different for operationalcontrol (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and administrativecontrol (ADCON). Additionally, there is often one “pseudo” chainof command that exists for TTs.

Before we look at the command relationship, it is worthwhileto review the definitions for ADCON and TACON. Army FM 3-0,Operations, defines ADCON as:

“Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authorityover subordinate or other organizations with respect toadministration and support. It includes organization of serviceforces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management,unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included inoperational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.”

TACON is defined as:“The authority normally limited to the detailed and specified

local direction of movement and maneuver of forces to accomplisha task. It allows commanders below combatant command level toapply force and direct the tactical use of CSS assets but does notprovide authority to change organizational structure or directadministrative or logistic support. The commander of the parentunit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwisespecified in the establishing directive. Combatant commandersuse TACON to delegate limited authority to direct the tactical use


With the help of an interpreter, a transition team advisor conductstraining for Iraqi Army staff.

of combat forces. TACON is often thecommand relationship established betweenforces of different nations in a multinationalforce. It may be appropriate when tactical-level Army units are placed under anotherservice headquarters. Army commandersmake one Army force TACON to anotherwhen they want to withhold authority tochange the subordinate force organizationalstructure and leave responsibility foradministrative support or CSS with theparent unit of the subordinate force.”

The Iraqi Advisory Group (IAG) isassigned ADCON of the externallyresourced RFF TTs in Iraq. The IAG is aone-star command with a joint support staffunder the Multi-National Corps-Iraq(MNC-I). The primary mission of the IAGis to provide administrative and logisticalsupport to the TTs. Previously, TTsassigned to work with MOI elements wereassigned to the Multi-National Security andTransition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I). AllTTs were assigned to the IAG in the springand summer of 2006 in order to unify theadvisory effort.

The IAG is responsible for alladministrative processes to include awardsand evaluations. They ensure that the TTsare resourced by providing personnel anddurable, nonexpendable items needed toaccomplish their missions. Examples ofthese items include weapons, vehicles,radios, computers, and personal gear. TheIAG is not required to provide maintenancefor these items other than replacement ofdestroyed or damaged equipment. As theadvisory effort in Iraq expands andeventually becomes the primary mission forcoalition forces, the IAG will assume agreater and more tactical relationship in theoperations of the TTs.

The MNC-I has retained OPCON of theTTs but has given TACON of the TTs tothe major subordinate commands (MSCs)throughout the Iraqi theater of operations.Specifically, TACON of the TT is normallyassigned to the U.S. battalion or brigade-level element in the area in which the TTis working. Since the TTs are assigned toan Iraqi unit vice a regional command, theTACON will change if the Iraqi forcesmove. For example, the Iraqi NationalPolice Commandos, an MOI unit, arefrequently moved from one crisis area toanother. As the Iraqi unit moves, the TTmoves with that Iraqi unit, and the TACONrelationship shifts to the MSC of the unit

in the area in which the TT has moved to.TTs may have a higher TT chain of

command that is important for MSCs tounderstand and respect. A previouscommander of the 2nd Iraqi Army DivisionMiTT called this semiformal relationship“MiTTCON.” The TT chain exercisesADCON of the TTs underneath it.Additionally, the TT chain of command isresponsible for ensuring that TT operationsfall within the directives and guidance setforce by the IAG and MNC-I commandersand that the TTs are being usedappropriately by the MSCs. The commandstructure helps ensure that there is multi-echelon unity of effort on the part of theTTs in the development of the ISF. Thisstructure allows issues to be tracked fromsubordinate units to the headquarters unitsand has proven critical in the developmentof accountability processes and procedureswithin the ISF. Not all TTs will have thisform of a higher TT chain of command.As an example, one TT had a formalizedchain of command that went from thebattalion TTs up through a brigade TT to adivision TT. Another had a battalion tobrigade TT chain of command but did nothave a higher RFF-resourced TT divisionchain of command and, therefore, reporteddirectly to the IAG from the brigade forADCON affairs.

Transition Team Relationship withthe Partnership Unit and the IraqiSecurity Force

As stated previously, a TT’s primarypurpose is to advise, assist and providecoalition effects (QRF, medical evacuation[MEDEVAC], and fire support) to ISFforces. PUs should view the TT as a“bridge” between the coalition forces andISF. The TTs not only advise and assistthe ISF, but they advise and assist the PUon the capabilities and limitations of theIraqi unit they are working with.

It is critical that TTs should not beviewed as extensions of the PU staff. PUsoften require TTs to provide detailedinformation on the ISF which can oftenoverload the TTs with staff-type work whichdetracts from their advisory mission. Duringone of the author’s tour in Iraq, the PUrequired daily formatted products to includecharts, briefs, and presentations. Theseproducts took valuable time and effort toproduce that could have been better usedin training and advising the ISF element.

The TTs may require assistance inmanning from the PU in order toaccomplish their mission. TTs at thebrigade and battalion levels are 10-manteams. Leave, injuries, and othercommitments often reduce the manninglevels on the teams to eight or ninepersonnel. This is critical since once theteam falls below nine personnel they cannotman more than two vehicles withoutassistance from the PU. Daily duties canalso stretch TT capabilities. TTs oftenmaintain a U.S.-only tactical operationscenter (TOC) when located on a remote ISF


An MiTT advisor conducts train-the-trainer training for an Iraqi Army headquarters company.

base due to secure communication systems and networks. Full-time manning of an additional ISF TOC liaison element is normallyonly possible with PU augmentation. There are many differentoperational methods for PU and TT integration. Though thecommand relationships are often well defined, the interaction ofthe TTs and the PU are often not. PUs must evaluate the capabilitiesand limitations of each TT individually and adjust interactionaccordingly. Due to varying degrees of leadership, experience andcompetence, some will be better than others. In one of the author’sexperience, TTs were sometimes treated as “step children” and asecondary effort to the overall mission. PUs should work to avoidthis and, if necessary, assist the TTs in overcoming any personnelshortfalls they have.

TTs should be viewed as the coordinator for efforts to train andassist the ISF. One successful method of operation is to view theTT, PU, and ISF relationship as a triad effort. The “triad” occurswhen all three elements partner together for the common goal ofadvancing the capabilities of the ISF.

Using the triad concept, information should be given directlyto the ISF by the PU. For example, operations orders should begiven by the PU to the ISF directly. This ensures that the ISF aretreated as true partners and helps in the process of establishingcredibility and relevance. TTs should be included in the processin almost an observer/controller (OC) manner instead of the typicalliaison and communication channel that most PUs view TTs asbeing. In his article “Forging the Sword: Conventional U.S. ArmyForces Advising Host Nation Forces” (Armor, September-October2006), Major Todd Clark, an advisor on a TT with the 1st SpecialPolice Commando Brigade said, “Western thoughts and the Easternmind do not combine to form a common picture.” TTs advise andassist both the ISF and PU to ensure common understanding byboth elements. Much is often lost in translation and having TTswho are in tune with the situation and culturally aware of theplayers (ISF and coalition) can go a long distance to ensure thatthis does not happen. Open and effective communication channelsmust be maintained between the TT and the PU. It must beemphasized again that the ISF should be the operational focus.

It should be clear to this point that TT personnel must be fully

integrated into the ISF unit in order to perform their duties to thefullest extent. The advisor must establish a strong personalrelationship with the counterpart ISF officer through competence,reliability, and dedication. The advisor and PU must alwaysremember one thing: it is the ISF commander that is in charge ofhis unit and must be perceived by his subordinates, superiors, andpeers as such. It is the task of the TT advisor to influence the ISFcounterpart in a way that achieves success and allows them tomaintain their own authority. The only time it is acceptable for aTT or PU to attempt to command ISF is when the lives of advisorsare at risk or the situation has become critical. Each ISFcommander or staff officer must feel like they are the final decisionmaker and feel they are perceived in that light. Treating the ISFas an equal will make great inroads in this effort.

When it comes to training, the ISF do not possess, and won’tlikely possess for some time, the capability to effectively runindividual and collective training at the unit level without directU.S. oversight and support. A TT’s training focus is normally onthe individual and collective skills for the ISF staff. TTs havelimited ability to conduct training at lower levels. Multi-echelontraining can only be effectively executed with PU assistance.Success has been found in Iraq by having the TTs focus on thestaff-level training and having the PU focus on training companies,platoons, and squads. It is critical that the PU understands thattraining is not limited to only combat skills, but combat supportand combat service support skills as well.

Training needs should be identified by the TT, the ISF, and thePU. After the required training is identified, the TT and PU candetermine how best to support those training requirements withtheir elements. As with American units, it is critical that thefocus on training the ISF remains in preparing to train themselves.The Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA), the document thatidentifies ISF unit capabilities, can be used to identify some of thetraining shortfalls, but it should not be the only document.

TT advisors are responsible for planning and conductingcollective staff training with the ISF command and staff. Theseevents may come in the form of planning classes and exercises, oractual operations that force the ISF leaders to put what they havebeen taught into action. The benefit of training in an operationalenvironment is that actual large scale operations can be conductedto have a tactical impact while achieving training goals andimproving performance. As the ISF begin to see the benefits fromtraining, they tend to internalize the concept and push it down tosubordinate levels.

TTs and the ISF leadership must evaluate their unit anddetermine the training requirements. Below the battalion level,the PU has the responsibility to train individual and collectivetasks. There are, however, schools and training within the ISFsystem for specialty skills and leadership development. The TTadvisor must work with the ISF commander and training officerto decide who should attend this training. The TT advisors mustinfluence the critical step of sustainment training or Iraqis trainingIraqis. By sending ISF soldiers and officers to ISF-run schools,the idea of self-sustaining training becomes more achievable tothe ISF personnel. The TT and PU must help develop theinfrastructure and multi-echelon programs of instruction for theISF to use and manage independently. PUs can help secure criticaltraining resources such as ranges, classrooms, ammunition, and


An Iraqi Army officer and transition team advisor coordinate operationsin Abu Ghraib.

administrative materials such as paper and pens. The TTleadership must work with the ISF and PU leadership to protecttraining time from the high operational tempo, in order to sustainthe Iraqi unit for long term operations.

Planning for all operations involving ISF should be conductedas a combined element. If the mission originates with the PU, thePU operations officer should notify the TT operations officer ofthe mission. This will allow the TT operations officer to study themission and provide initial advice to the PU operations officer onbest use of the ISF. This is critical to identify any capabilities orlimitations that the ISF may have at that time. The PU shouldthen work directly with the ISF to develop the operation as theynormally would with a subordinate or adjacent unit. The processof direct involvement between the PU and the ISF is critical as ithelps establish their relevance and build confidence as truepartners. When required for time sensitive operations, the TTcan act as the conduit of information to expedite the process, butthis should only be done as a last measure.

The process should work similarly in ISF-generated operations.The ISF leadership should notify the TT of the upcoming operation.The TT then, in turn, notifies the PU of the operation. If timepermits, the PU should be directly briefed by the ISF. If not, theTT can use its communication channels to ensure that the ISFplan is communicated to the PU.

If the PU does not directly plan with the ISF unit, the TT shouldassist in ensuring the ISF understands the concept and purpose ofthe overall operation, and help them plan the mission. The TTshould also ensure that any issues found during planning areimmediately relayed to the PU. While the ISF unit is planning, it

is the responsibility of the TT to ensure that all coalition effectsare understood by and made available to the ISF leadership. TheISF does not have similar systems and is not normally familiarwith their capabilities, limitations, and requirements for use. Theprocess of providing coalition effects to ISF begins with assistingin the planning for, the request of, and the integration in theexecution of those assets. By repeating this process, the ISF andcoalition effects providers become more familiar and comfortableworking with each other and eventually develop their own systemsand processes. The TTs span the capability gap until the ISF candevelop its own capability to provide the necessary effects.

The primary purpose of the TTs during mission execution is toprovide PU situational awareness to ISF operations, give adviceto the ISF elements, and provide coalition effects. The PU shouldunderstand that if the operation is mounted, the TT will normallyonly be able to embed with one element (normally the commandelement) due to vehicle manning. TTs should not normally beexpected to embed at the squad, platoon, or company level on ahabitual basis. Effects that TTs must be able to provide are coalitionQRF, fire support, and MEDEVAC. PUs should ensure they arefamiliar with the true request capabilities of the TTs they areworking with, as training in basic fire support procedures andemergency close air support (CAS) at Fort Riley is often theironly experience.

TT elements, like leaders, move to where they best can provideassistance to the ISF during operations. Normally, this will belocated with the HQ element, but the task to provide effects oftenrequires that the TT move to more forward elements. Operationsby the authors in Iraq during 2004-2005 can be used as examples.


Military transition team advisors provide assistance during combined mission planning.


Major Patrick Colloton is currently pursuinga master’s degree in Irregular Warfare at the NavalPostgraduate School. He was previously assignedas a brigade-level transition team operations advisorwith the 3rd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Division at AbuGhraib. His past assignments include serving ascommander of Special Forces OperationalDetachment Alphas 752 and 754, and also groupassistant operations officer for the 7th SpecialForces Group (Airborne). He also completed tourswith the 2nd Infantry Division’s Long RangeSurveillance Detachment and the 1st Battalion,506th Infantry Regiment.

Major Tommy Stoner is currently pursuing amaster’s degree in Irregular Warfare at the NavalPostgraduate School. He previously served as abrigade-level transition team operations advisor withthe 2nd Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Division in Mosul, Iraq.Other past assignments include serving ascommander of Special Forces OperationDetachment Alpha 751 and group assistantoperations officer for the 7th Special Forces Group(Airborne). He has also served with the 82ndAirborne Division’s 3rd Battalion, 504th ParachuteInfantry Regiment and 1st and 3rd Battalions ofthe 75th Ranger Regiment.

During operations the TTvehicles would collocate withthe ISF HQ element andvehicles, and if required theTT would dismount a smallelement to move with the ISFforces if they conducteddismounted operations. The TT vehiclesserved as a relay station for the dismountedground element. The dismounted groundelement would move to where they couldbest provide effects for the ISF and providethe PU with situational awareness byensuring a two way flow of information.These TT members become most criticalwhen U.S. forces are conducting acombined operation with the ISF and themovements and fires of ground forces mustbe de-conflicted in a rapid but accuratemanner.

Due to the number of personnel, TTsoften have to divide their effort duringoperations. Battle tracking of ISFoperations is best done through the ISFTOC. TTs require augmentation toaccomplish this task while they areembedded with ISF units on missions. Amethod that has proven successful in Iraqis to provide personnel from the PU unit toestablish a liaison element in the ISF TOC.These elements can then battle track withthe ISF and keep U.S. forces appraised ofISF reported locations or issues. The PUliaison element can also help the ISFmaintain situational awareness of PUelements. A successful package was a BlueForce Tracker (BFT) TOC kit with at leastone radio on the PU operational net. Caremust be taken to ensure that thesecryptographic items are secure. Thisaugmentation is a small price for the addedvalue and combat power of an ISF unit.Through continual use and positiveinfluence by the TT and the PU, the ISFTOC will become more and more functionalwith time and achieve a critical steptowards conducting independentoperations; the ability of the ISF to battletrack its forces, other friendly forces, enemyactivity, and use that information tomaneuver its forces successfully. As theTTs and PU identify that the ISF isprogressing to the point that it is takingcontrol of the fight, they can begin movinginto more of a supporting role. A successfulstep is when the ISF exchange tacticalinformation through their TOC with the PUand identify and request specific coalition

support when needed.TTs and the IAG have no inherent CSS

capabilities and require support from thePUs that they are assigned to. The ordersthat assign the TTs to MSCs specificallyspell out that PUs are responsible forproviding CS and CSS support to the TTs.The exact support requirements for TTsfrom PUs will vary depending on thelocation of each team. Typically, TTs arecollocated and live with the ISF that theysupport. Much of the Class I support comesfrom the IA with limited supplements fromthe PU. Class IX and maintenance areprovided by the PU. TTs also receivelimited funds to purchase items off thelocal economy in a self supporting role.

The support structure is the mostunderdeveloped element of most ISFunits. A deliberate decision was madeby U.S. commanders to develop thetactical capabili ty to conductcounterinsurgency first and then developthe ability for ISF to support themselves.It was thought that US units couldcontinue to provide the support while theISF conducted operations and took thelead role in security of the country.Unfortunately, the ability to conductindependent support operations andindependent tactical operations are tiedtogether. If the ISF unit has justifiable,critical shortages, for example in bodyarmor or authorized weapons systems, theTT logisticians must ensure the parent PUis informed and can therefore forward therequirements and apply pressure to theirhigher command to secure the necessaryequipment. The lack of support can leadto the loss of personnel, equipment andtherefore a fall in morale and uniteffectiveness.

CSS training is being conducted for theISF at national level schools. If specifictraining is not available or shortfalls exist,the TT should arrange the support skilltraining through the PU unit and its supportelements. PU elements must understandthat this training is as important as anyother type of support they give to the ISFunit and resource it appropriately.

One of the first priorities of a new unit incountry should be to determine how it can best

support the transition of operations to theIraqi Security Forces.

ConclusionOne of the first priorities of

a new unit in country should beto determine how it can bestsupport the transition ofoperations to the ISF. The keyto this transition is the TT and

PU integration to support the ISF. Thecloser and more productive the relationshipbetween the ISF, the TT, and the PU is, themore integrated and coordinated combinedtraining, planning, and mission executionbecomes. This allows coalition and ISFtactical leaders to effectively use the fullpower available to them against the enemy.Together the leadership of the triad shoulddevelop a plan to provide security in thearea of operation and develop the ISF unit.The investment of a few personnel andsome equipment on the part of the PU willpay great dividends in the form of effectiveISF integrated in the fight.

The ISF leaders must be treated and madeto feel as equals to the PU leadership by alllevels of the PU. Maneuver leaders thatunderstand the composition and purpose oftransition teams, their command and controlstructure, and relationships with PU and ISFwill be able to maximize the productivity ofthose relationships and achieve the goal ofindependent ISF in the lead. The onlyremaining hurdle is having the faith in theISF unit to truly independently lead andconduct operations. It is this leap of faiththat must be made for the coalition to succeedin our counterinsurgency efforts.

Today’s brigade combat team (BCT) fire supportcoordinator (FSCOORD) faces many new challengescommensurate with BCT transformation and the

evolving roles of fire supporters in the field artillery. The BCT’sFSCOORD (traditionally the title applied to the direct supportfield artillery battalion commander) is now applied to the FAlieutenant colonel billet on the brigade staff — one of threelieutenant colonels on the BCT staff (executive officer [XO], andthe S3 are the other two).

The FSCOORD is responsible for properly manning, equippingand training all fire support personnel in the brigade on both

traditional fire support tasks as well as non-traditional civil-military operations (CMO) and information operations (IO) tasks.He also builds a fusion cell in the BCT headquarters, the firesupport cell (FSC). This FSC is comprised of traditional lethalfires and the Air Force tactical air control party (TACP) personneland integrates IO, CMO, public affairs (PA) and the staff judgeadvocate (SJA) personnel and functions.

In these changing times, the FSCOORD must develop methodsto work with maneuver commanders and their senior NCOs toseamlessly integrate all fusion cell enablers from the brigade tothe platoon levels by way of the maneuver battalion fire supportchannels in support of an evolving brigade campaign plan.

To help current and future FSCOORDs, this article explainsthe processes and challenges within the fire support channels ofthe 2nd Infantry BCT (IBCT), 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID),Fort Carson, Colorado, during the last 10 months as it preparedfor its Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deployment.

Transformation. In 2004, the 2nd IBCT, 2nd ID, deployed toIraq from Korea. After a one-year tour, the unit

FSCOORD CHALLENGES FORFIRE SUPPORTERS IN THE BCT

MAJOR CHRISTOPHER W. WENDLAND

This article first appeared in the November-December 2006issue of Field Artillery.


Photo by Staff Sergeant Jeffrey A. Wolfe, USAF

deployed to Fort Carson in August 2005. Soonafter, the brigade began transforming from aheavy brigade to a modular IBCT. Withrestructuring, reflagging and the introductionof six new battalion commanders and one newbrigade commander, “muddy boots” trainingdid not begin until January 2006. Part of thisrestructuring included the movement of allfire support personnel from the fires battalionto their respective maneuver battalions.

The new modified table of organizationand equipment (MTOE) for the IBCT hasa battalion FSC in both the BCT’s infantrybattalions and in the reconnaissance,surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)battalion. (See Figures 1, 2 and 3, the lattertwo on Pages 40 and 41, respectively.) Inaddition to the FSCs, each battalion alsohas a fires platoon made up of three to fourcompany-level fire support teams (FISTs)along with their respective forwardobservers (FOs). Even the brigade specialtroops battalion is allocated three firesupport personnel to augment its S3 shop:an E7 (battle staff), E6 and E5.

Headquarters and HeadquartersCompany (HHC), 2nd IBCT, has a robustbrigade FSC led by the IBCT FSCOORDthat includes four combat observationlasing teams (COLTs) and a nonlethaleffects cell.

In the transformation process, the 2ndIBCT maneuver units were eager to accepttheir fire supporters. Each maneuverbattalion then dissolved its fires platoonsand quickly attached each company FISTdown to its companies.

The challenge is evident. How does theBCT FSCOORD ensure all fire supportpersonnel are adequately manned, equippedand trained to support the traditional firesupport mission as well as the nontraditionalIO and CMO missions?

The answer is “Carefully.”Manning. In the 2nd IBCT, the fires

battalion commander, in conjunction with thebrigade commander, coordinates all FA officermoves. The FSCOORD makesrecommendations, but the fires battalioncommander decides which officer in the BCTenters or leaves the fire support world andwhich enters or leaves the artillery world.

Initially this was a sticking point withmaneuver battalion commanders whoinadvertently may have approved personnelactions (branch transfers, career course

attendance, etc.) for “their” FA officerswithout consulting with the fires battalioncommander. Also maneuver commandersbecome attached to their FA officers and maynot want to lose them when the fires battalioncommander, for example, thinks an officer’smovement to the fires battalion is optimal forthe officer’s career progression.

Enlisted personnel manning is moreproblematic. In the 2nd IBCT, the firesupport operations NCO (senior 13 seriesNCO in the BCT FSC) works closely withthe brigade command sergeant major(CSM) to recommend enlisted sourcing tospecific battalions for inbound gains andalso recommends senior NCO moves forprofessional development.

We’ve found that the maneuver battalion

CSMs are very concerned about their firesupport NCOs and Soldiers, especially inreference to moves for NCO professionaldevelopment, i.e., moving an NCO to aCOLT at brigade or moving a promotablesergeant to another battalion to assume therole of company fire support NCO. We’vefound that a move is facilitated when thefinal decision comes from brigade CSM tothe maneuver battalion CSM.

A unique challenge with the new MTOEstructure is the battalion FSC NCOs often arenot fulfilling their roles as platoon sergeantsbecause their platoon is dispersed throughoutthe maneuver company. In addition, theseFSC NCOs have limited visibility of theircompany fire support NCOs and platoon FOs.This makes fire support mentoring from

)!



TRAINING NOTES

senior NCO to junior NCO extremely difficult.Equipping. If you are a new BCT FSCOORD, don’t assume

everyone follows the MTOE. The allocation of fire supportpersonnel down to the company level causes additional frictionbecause fire support equipment comes from the battalion’s HHCMTOE authorizations. Without proper coordination, usually theFSCOORD’s face-to-face meeting with a battalion XO, equipmentintended for a battalion FSC, company FIST or platoon FO teammay never make it to the intended user—especially optics, vehiclesand radios.

The MTOE may address the need, but the maneuver commanderat the battalion or company level can quickly reassess the need tofit his mission. On more than one occasion, unless the FSCOORDwas specific about radio/vehicle/optic requirements, FISTs arrivedat a training event under-equipped.

Training. Training is more of a challenge today because firesupport personnel are expected to know their traditional roles(calling for and adjusting indirect fires) as well as their non-traditional roles (understanding and implementing IO and CMO).All this training must occur in the BCTs new decentralizedstructure.

Coordinating the training for fire support personnel in 11separate maneuver companies and five headquarters companiescan be problematic. Early planning solves many problems. Whenthe FSCOORD works closely with the BCT S3 to ensure all trainingis included on the long-range training calendar and is followedup with an operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order(FRAGO), most personnel attend.

As the FSCOORD, I focused the BCT training into threequarters. First quarter (January to March) was dedicated to the13F Fire Support Specialists’ validating their traditional firesupport tasks. Second quarter (April-June) was dedicated to IO/civil affairs (CA) training and the employment of both lethal firesand nonlethal effects in maneuver platoon- and company-leveloperations. Third quarter (July-September) was dedicated toestablishing the brigade FSC and systems to fuse all the BCTenablers (lethal fires, TACP, IO, CMO, PA and SJA) in support ofbrigade- and battalion-level operations at the National TrainingCenter (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. Wethen took those lessons learned to develop arefined azimuth to prepare for thedeployment.

Always a Fire Supporter. First quartertrained the fire support fundamentals. Eachcompany FIST underwent an arduouscertification process composed of a writtentest, guard unit armory device, full-crewinteractive simulation trainer(GUARDFIST); and pre-combat checks(PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs);followed by an exercise in dismountedmilitary operations in urban terrain (MOUT).

We conducted the certification exercise onFort Carson’s main post and had the opposingforce (OPFOR) dress in civilian clothes anddrive around in privately owned vehicles

(POVs) to blend in with the local population. We tested each team’sobservation and situational awareness abilities as well as theirfundamental fire support skills. A compass, binoculars, radio, mapand heavy rucksack were the only authorized items for thiscertification.

After FIST certifications, in February, we took all the FISTsand FO teams to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for a week of joint fires andeffects simulator training. Building on their FIST certification,the teams were ready to use the new simulators and video after-action review (AAR) facilities to drill further on their fire supportfundamentals.

In conjunction with this training, the BCT and battalion FSCsreceived their new advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS)tadpoles and effects management tool (EMT) new equipmenttraining (NET) while the BCT fires battalion was fielded itsM119A2 howitzers. These events set the conditions for the BCT’sfirst artillery live-fire exercise in March, finishing the quarterwith all fire supporters trained and validated.

IO and CMO. Second quarter trained IO and CMO skills.Building on the current operations in theater, we provided IO andCA training to each maneuver battalion FSC and maneuvercompany FIST, including those in the BCT’s fires battalion andtwo line batteries. (The fires battalion transitioned its battalionFDC to into an FSC after it was determined it would perform as amaneuver mission in theater.)

Our brigade and battalion FSC leadership took advantage ofthe 1st Cavalry Division’s mobile training team (MTT) from the1st IO Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, while battalion targetingofficers and company fire support officers (FSOs) took Fort Sill’sthree-week Tactical IO Course. The BCT had the 1st IOCommand’s MTT at Fort Carson in late May for fire supportpersonnel new to the BCT. We provided additional IO trainingdown to the battalion level during this time frame, includingelectronic warfare (EW) training (EC-130H and EA-6B) to onemember of each maneuver battalion FSC at the Navy’s ElectronicWarfare Officer (EWO) School in Whidbey Island, Washington.

To exploit this training, the BCT conducted a pre-NTC missionrehearsal exercise (MRE) at Fort Carson. One of the training

modules was designed around integratingIO at the company level. Also, to retain thefundamental fire support skills learned inthe first quarter, another training moduleincluded kinetic operations in which eachcompany conducted both day and nightMOUT raids with live close air support(CAS), artillery and mortar fires. The BCTprovided both the CAS and artillery indirect support roles to each of the evaluatedmaneuver battalions.

Development and Integration of theBrigade FSC. Third quarter’s focus was ondeveloping the BCTs FSC and integratingthis cell with the battalion FSCs down tothe company FIST and platoon FO levels.Most nonlethal staff enablers did not arriveuntil just before the July NTC rotation. Thechallenge was to integrate them into acohesive group without inundating thebattalion FSCs with new requirementsinitiated by such a robust brigade staff.

Today’s Challenges and the WayAhead. Today’s FSCOORD coordinatesand synchronizes all efforts within the FSCand integrates those efforts with the BCTS2 for collection assets and the BCT S3 toensure required actions are supported indaily FRAGOs. The BCT FSC fuses allenablers, including the battalion FSCs thatprovide the linkage from the Soldiers onpatrol to the BCT for further analysis andintegration into future operations.

The battalion FSC is more robust thanthe pre-transformation battalion firesupport element (FSE), and its functionsare much more complicated. Maneuvercommanders today expect their battalionand company FSOs to understand IO andCMO. Aside from a few classroom hoursin the schoolhouse, most FSOs (and NCOs)were unaware of their new nonlethal role,unless they recently redeployed from OIFor Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

The brigade has an IO officer, a CMOofficer, a PA officer (PAO) and an SJAamong many other functional areaspecialists. These positions are notreplicated at the battalion or company level.The FSCOORD coaches and mentors hisbattalion FSC personnel to understand andimplement these new functions daily ontoday’s battlefield.

In theater, every company or battalionoperation will require some sort of bilateralnegotiation, IO application, possible damage

Major Christopher W. Wendland is the brigadefire support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the 2ndInfantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 2nd InfantryDivision, from Fort Carson, Colorado, that recentlydeployed to Iraq. In his previous assignments, he wasa fire support officer, fire direction officer, firing platoonleader and service battery executive officer with 4thBattalion, 1st Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division, atFort Riley, Kansas; the Combined/Joint Forces G3Deep Operations Division Fire Support/DirectionOfficer in Seoul, Korea; and a battalion S2,maintenance officer and battery commander with 1-27 FA, 41st FA Brigade, in Germany. During OperationIraqi Freedom I, he commanded HHB, 41st FABrigade, V Corps Artillery.


claim to a local civilian, quick-turn anti-propaganda story or exploitation of a recentsuccess in the company or battalion area ofoperation (AO). All are synchronized by thebattalion FSC or company FIST. These FISTsprovide data from their FOs attached to eachmaneuver platoon up to the brigade FSC. TheBCT experts analyze the data and produceproducts for the battalion, keeping the BCTfocused on the overall campaign plan.

The 2nd IBCT is ready for our futuredeployment. The Strike Force firesupporters are practiced in the fundamentalsof integrating lethal fire support fromtraditional artillery and mortar. This trainingincluded employing precision munitions,such as CAS and guided multiple-launchrocket system unitary (GMLRS-U) in anenvironment respectful of collateral damage.Our fire supporters are also rehearsed in thepractical application of IO and CMO at thetactical level. Our battalion FSCs areintegrated with the brigade FSC and haverehearsed the process of turning complexdata from the maneuver company FISTsinto an analyzed and synchronized productfor future operations in concert with the

brigade’s campaign plan.The BCT FSCOORD, charged with

some new responsibilities and a newdecentralized manning, equipping andtraining structure, has many challenges thatrequire careful and dedicated coordinationacross the BCT and the successful coachingand mentoring of junior maneuver andartillery officers as the new modular BCTscontinue to take shape.

TRAINING NOTES


An overemphasis on training for close quarter combat(CQC), or close quarter battle (CQB), in recent years has resulted in its overuse in combat, often in situations

where more appropriate options exist.Platoon by platoon, the Army is learning the hard way how

hazardous it is to fight room to room against a well prepared andoften suicidal opponent. We can no longer afford to learn the lessonindividually. It is time for a candid discussion on this subject, andto address the problem as a responsive, learning, and adaptiveArmy.

Roots of CQCSpecialized units developed and refined CQB tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTPs) over many decades. The Armygradually adopted these methods, renaming them CQC, and inrecent years they have been put to the test extensively in the realworld. Unfortunately, little in the way of methodology and riskassessment has been transferred along with the tactics.

A CASE AGAINST BATTLE DRILL SIXMIKE FORMAN

These special mission units developed these TTPs almostexclusively for hostages rescue operations. It was understood thatany such operation would be of great strategic importance andtherefore worth great risk and cost. It was also understood that tohave any reasonable chance of success, the assault must beconducted with complete surprise, simultaneously entering thecritical point from as many unexpected directions as possible,ending the fight almost immediately. It was assumed that if theoperation failed to accomplish this in the opening seconds and aprotracted fight resulted, the opportunity for a successful resolutionwould quickly evaporate, hostages would be lost, and casualtieswould mount.

It was also understood that this would be a onetime operation,and that the units involved would have years to recover from theircasualties before being called on to perform again, if ever.

How often do our day-to-day operations fit the above criteria?Rarely do conventional units find themselves conducting hostagerescue operations, yet it is disturbingly common to see units utilizethese CQC techniques as if it were an in extremis situation.

It is a challenge for any unit to train its Soldiers to an acceptablelevel of proficiency in the necessary individual tasks, then to traincollectively as teams, squads, platoons, etc. This can also meanroutinely starting over as new individuals are integrated andleadership changes take place. Battle Drill Six requires a lot oftime and effort in training to get it right. The hardest tasks alwaysdo require more training time. The elite origins of CQC add appealand may also contribute to overtraining. All of this emphasis intraining conditions a response. We go into autopilot mode, defaultto what we are most familiar with, “close with and destroy theenemy, eliminate the threat at close range” We find ourselvesemploying high-risk tactics against low-payoff targets.

Historical perspectiveAs students of military history we are familiar with past armies

who dismissed new technologies, fortifications, artillery, etc., andfocused on the offensive spirit and the bayonet as the core of theirmilitary doctrine, as if spirit alone were the decisive factor in warfare.

We are also familiar with what happened when their infantryassaults as well as their élan were shattered by an army who hadembraced technology and firepower. How often have you seensquads dismount Bradley fighting vehicles, leave them lined inthe street with all the firepower and protective armor they offer,to enter and clear buildings on an equal footing with the occupants?In truth, when the occupants turn out to be hostile, they have hadample time to plan and prepare their defense for the purpose ofachieving successful escape or martyrdom, whichever they prefer.This puts the attacking troops at a decided disadvantage no matterhow perfectly they perform their CQC drills.

When MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System)and simunitions scenarios produce light casualties, we shouldrealize that live bullets will over penetrate bodies and many walls.They will ricochet and create secondary casualties further downrange than our training weapons can produce, and grenades andimprovised explosive devices will cause carnage impossible toreplicate in training. Those “light casualties” in training scenariosshould be interpreted as the tip of an iceberg that will fully revealitself only in the real world.

Use of fire and maneuver have been fundamental to the U.S.Army for decades. Have we now come full circle? Is CQC themodern equivalent of the bayonet charge? Should CQC be ourlast resort, utilized only after all other options have been exhausted?

More than 100 years ago, General Philippe Petain, strugglingto get his army to accept his modern theories on firepower said,“Cannon conquers, infantry occupies.” He once made a promiseto a decimated regiment: “You went into the assault singing theMarseillaise. It was magnificent. But next time you will not needto sing the Marseillaise. There will be a sufficient number of gunsto ensure your attack’s a success.”

No responsible commander would order troops to assault a pieceof terrain without giving them supporting firepower sufficient toensure their success. A building is a piece of urban terrain, andgiven its potential as a defensive position, deserves at least thesame respect as any other defended terrain.

Clearly, flattening a building with firepower at the drop of a

hat is not the first option unless the assessed threat is high enoughto justify it. Neither should the bayonet charge be the first optionunless the assessed threat is low enough to justify it. Somewherein between, depending on the situation, is the right answer.

Threat assessmentCQC training is a high-risk training event. Before any such

event, a leader is expected to do a risk-assessment. He will identifyhazards associated with the event, establish control measures andprovide assets to mitigate the risks and to ensure a reasonabledegree of safety. A threat assessment could be considered a riskassessment with the addition of the enemy capabilities and intent,with careful thought given to risk vs. benefits.

When a building is empty or occupied by a non-hostileopponent, our CQC techniques work well. How could they not?

When specific intelligence indicates that a bad group or a high-value target occupies a site, we need to reassess our methods. Anycombative group of insurgents will have planned and rehearsedactions on contact in preparation for a coalition raid.

Our raid objective will usually be kill-capture. The decisivepoint of the operation is containment or preventing escape, notrapidly eliminating the threat as it would be if hostages were atstake.

CQC training conducted against inanimate paper targets hasnot conditioned us to anticipate the enemy’s response. It is this


Gary L. Kieffer

Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade practice building clearingprocedures during training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Centerin Hohenfels, Germany.

enemy course of action that is critical tothe threat assessment. They will anticipatethe most likely avenues of approach, chokepoints, etc., and prepare their defensesaccordingly. His purpose will likely be tobuy time to facilitate escape, to inflict asmany casualties as possible as he martyrshimself, or both. Foiling his plan is ourhighest priority. Falling into his trap is thelast thing we want to do.

Given all of the resources available tous, is there no way to separate thecombatants from the noncombatants, andto drive the combatants from their defensiveposition? The enemy’s escape is ourmission failure. Trapping him is success.Identifying his potential escape routes isour planning priority. Blocking them is ourexecution priority. Once he is effectivelytrapped, we have many safer options thanCQC to finish the fight. Selecting theappropriate level of force is our next move.

Target Discrimination andEscalation of Force

We will always have the legal, moral,and ethical responsibility to separatecombatants from noncombatants, to engagepositively identified threats with forceproportional to the threat, and to take everyreasonable measure to safeguard innocentlives. We are obligated to take some risksin order to accomplish this. This does notmean that conducting CQC in and around

civilians is the safest way to separate themfrom the combatants, despite the greaterrisk to our own troops.

Escalation of force is more than a rigidset of procedures. It is more than trafficcontrol. It is the principle of alerting andwarning innocent civilians, allowing themto avoid potentially hazardous situations.It is forcing a hostile enemy to show hishostile intent earlier than he would havechosen. It is accomplishing this whilekeeping our own troops at a safe distancemaking use of available cover, concealment,and stand-off. It should be the philosophythat guides every operation we conduct.

Whether in traffic or in a building,escalation of force requires getting theattention of the subjects in question, andthen giving them clear instructions tocomply with. Compliance demonstratesnon-hostile status. Lack of compliance withclear instructions triggers each subsequentlevel of force, until compliance or clearhostile intent is achieved.

Given the opportunity, mostnoncombatants will choose to depart abuilding and comply with the instructionsof an interpreter. They will answer aninterpreters questions as to whether anyoneelse or any hazards exist in the building.Based on the consistency of the variousstories obtained, we can continue our threatassessment and determine our next courseof action.

Determining Hostile IntentIf we are satisfied that the building has

been emptied of all occupants, sending anelement to clear it by CQC may be anappropriate course of action. If we are notsatisfied that the building has been emptied,jumping to CQC is probably premature.

Is noncompliance at this point to beconsidered hostile intent? Or must weprovoke any remaining occupants to fireon us first? If so, how should we probe themto prompt a clear hostile act? A single highexplosive (HE) round into the front doormay be enough to cause an insurgent to losehis nerve and announce his presence. Apause and a final warning will ensure thatwe have done everything possible toseparate the innocents.

The ultimate goal is to give innocentsevery opportunity to escape, and to avoidsending troops into a trap until we are satisfiedof no hostile intent, or we have positivelyidentified that hostile intent, and eliminatedthe threat with the appropriate fire power.

In any event, at the first sign ofresistance, the only appropriate response isto back off, and once again reapplyappropriate firepower.

How many levels of escalation satisfy ourlegal and moral obligations? Only acommander, under the advice of his JAG,can answer that.

ConclusionIf we make it our goal to surprise, close

with and destroy the enemy faster than hecan defend and/or escape, how fast can werealistically be? What price will we pay ifwe miscalculate and lose the criticalelement of surprise?

How often will we trigger a fight orflight response in innocent home owners,and how often will that result in a fightthat would not have otherwise happened?

If our goal is to trap and surround, andthe enemy chooses to fight, what have we lost?

Shouldn’t we assume that we will neverhave the right conditions necessary toconduct low-risk CQC until we have takensteps to create those conditions ourselves?

Mike Forman is retired from the U.S. Army with16 years in special operations assignments. Sinceretiring, he has served with the Joint IED DefeatTask Force, Joint IED Defeat Organization, and theAsymmetric Warfare Group.

Gary L. Kieffer

Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade practice building clearing procedures during a trainingevent at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany.

TRAINING NOTES



The Air Assault ExpeditionaryForce (AAEF) experiment is theArmy’s principal live,

prototype, discovery experiment thatbegan in 2004 at the direction of the U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) and is in the third year(Spiral C) of a four-year campaigndesigned to evaluate emergingtechnologies and operational concepts inorder to inform development effortsrelated to both current and future forcesand enhance risk reduction for the FutureCombat System Program of Record.

AAEF brings numerous governmentand Army organizations along withindustry partners together in a uniquevenue that places more than 40 emergingtechnologies, linked through a network,in the hands of Soldiers during theconduct of 10 tactical missions. Thistype of collective experimentationproduces synergy, shared learning andsignificant cost savings to both thegovernment and industry. AAEFprovides operational insights that impact and influencedevelopment decisions and assist in the risk reduction to futuredevelopment efforts including the modular force, the FutureCombat System, and other major Army programs.

Since its inception AAEF has provided valuable operationalinsights to the Army demonstrating the power of leveragingtechnologies and an integrated multi-tier network to enhancesmall unit mission success and survivability. As depicted inFigure 1, the experimental force was seven times more effective,as measured in terms of survivability, follow-on capability, andmission accomplishment equipped with the emergingtechnologies.

These findings are a result of the in-depth analysis and datacollection efforts associated with the performance of the basecase (current force/current organization) and the advance case(future force/technology enhanced). This analysis has led toDOTMLPF findings related to the ways units of the future,and current forces employing these concepts/technologies,might organize, train and fight as well as to the ways units in

AIR ASSAULT EXPEDITIONARYFORCE CAMPAIGN OF

EXPERIMENTATIONLIEUTENANT COLONEL (RETIRED) PAUL E. SNYDER

AAEF:

the future might be manned, supplied, trained and even howinstallations and equipment may need to be built to support suchforces.

Specifically the AAEF Spiral C Experiment (October-November2006) will be focused on garnering insights in the followingDOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,education, personnel, and facilities) areas:

DoctrineHow does the information made available through the

implemented C4ISR architecture impact decision making atcompany and platoon levels?

How does the suite of sensors, implemented fusion processesand information management protocols impact the quality ofinformation at company and platoon levels?

Organizations and PersonnelWhat organization, equipment and personnel changes are

required in the company headquarters and in the infantry platoon

Figure 1

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Paul E. Snydercurrently serves as a project officer for the AirAssault Expeditionary Force (AAEF) Campaign ofExperimentation in the Soldier Battle Lab at FortBenning. He joined the AAEF Team aftercompleting over 20 years of active duty service invarious command and staff positions from platoonto division culminating as the Commander of theUnited Nations Command Security Battalion – JointSecurity Area in the Republic of Korea.

Figure 2

to properly conduct sensor planning, sensoremployment and recovery, sensor fusionand security?

Training and Leader DevelopmentDocument the increased complexities

and mental demands on leaders that occursfrom increased situational awareness, therequirements of sensor planning,employment and management, andaccelerated decision cycles in a network-enabled force.

Codify training requirements of newtechnologies (UGVs, UAVs, sensors, battlecommand systems and communications).

MaterielWhat battle command interface

functionality and decision aids are essentialat the company, platoon and squad levels?

How well does the network enable theflow of data and information throughoutthe experimental force? Whichtechnologies enhance the effectiveness ofthe network and contribute to increasedlethality and survivability?

Beyond the currently planned spirals,AAEF provides a critical capability as avenue to continue experimentation alongthe critical prototyping path and torecognize solutions to identified capability

TRAINING NOTES

gaps in current and future forces. (Figure2) AAEF is a critical link within theArmy’s Concept and CapabilityDevelopments Plan (AC2DP) and ensures

small unit experimentation complementslarge-scale, system-centric futureexperimentation centered on the EvaluationBrigade Combat Team. The EBCT andlive, small-unit field experiments, likeAAEF, are both key components of theArmy Concept Development Plan.

The US Army, TRADOC, and FortBenning have made significant investmentsto explore new concepts, ideas and insightsinvolving emerging technologies and theiremployment on the battlefield to ensure thatSoldiers continue to dominate land combatin the future. AAEF capitalizes on theseinvestments and fills a critical need in theArmy Experimentation Campaign.

Courtesy photo

Soldiers of the Experimentation Force (EXFOR) assault the Fort Benning MOUT facilityduring TRADOC’s Air Assault Expeditionary Force (AAEF) experiment.


I have searched the Army’s manuals and Center for ArmyLessons Learned (CALL) literature for a night-fighting technique that many infantry units use. I’ll call this

technique the “co-witnessing” technique for lack of a better term.I have yet to find this technique described in any manual orprofessional journal. This article is intended to put a little morein our kit bag and put into published word a very effective nightfighting technique that our Army’s literature has so far omitted.

Co-witnessingThis technique is most often

associated with the use of back-upiron sights to assist us in zeroingour Close Combat Optics (M-68) orEo Techs. The Soldier zeros hisback-up iron sights in the normalfashion. After he is zeroed, theSoldier mounts his CCO on theappropriate rail, assumes a goodsupported firing position, sightsdown his iron sights. He then turns on his CCO. The Soldierthen has his coach adjust the red dot of the CCO until it is“lollipopped” onto the front sight post. (See Figure 1.)

The Soldier then folds down his rear sight aperture and hisCCO is “mostly” zeroed. He will still need to confirm his zerousing only the red dot, ignoring his front sight post.

This same concept can be applied at night when using infrared(IR)-capable optics, an aiming laser, and a set of monocular nightvision goggles. The technique is simple and can be done almostanywhere in less than a minute.

Setting the conditionsa. Zeroed CCO, Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG),

or M-145 Machine Gun Optic (MGO) with laser filter removed.b. Properly adjusted PVS-14, mounted on firing eye. (Switch

it to your nonfiring eye later if you like.)c. Mounted PEQ-2A, PAC-4C or other laser aiming device.d. Distant aiming point, 200 meters or more, (100 meters will

work if that’s all you have).

ProcessSoldier gets into a supported aiming position, kneeling, or

standing supported work best. Soldier switches his optic to theIR mode, usually position 2 and 3 on the CCO. (The ACOGChevron will also be visible and significantly brighter.) Soldierwill have to modify his cheek-to-stock weld so that he can look

through his optic with his PVS-14s. With a little practice he willbe able to see his IR aiming dot as quickly as he can acquire hisiron sights. Soldier then picks a known distant aiming point, thefurther the better, stabilizes his weapon and activates his laser.The Soldier will now see two IR dots down range, he then directshis coach to adjust his laser onto the CCO dot or ACOG chevron.Bold adjustments initially, then slowly as the laser gets closer tothe CCO’s IR dot or ACOG chevron. Once the two dots havemerged, the laser is ready to be fired at a field fire range, knowndistance targets, or if in a rush go on a mission. That’s all there isto it; it works very well and can be done in a minute or less if youpractice.

CO-WITNESSING LASERS TO OPTICS

MAJOR DARREN R. LORÉ


TRAINING NOTES

A FASTER MORE ACCURATE WAY TO ZERO LASERS FOR THE NIGHT FIGHT

Figure 1 - LollipoppedCCO Red Dot

Techniques for better accuracyAlign the laser offset to the right of the CCO IR dot/ACOG

Chevron, checking to make sure it’s horizontally flush. (SeeFigure 6.)

Once the dots get close, start counting the clicks. Once thelaser becomes visible again to the left of the IR dot, count back inthe other direction, the middle number is the zero point. (SeeFigure 7.)

Figure 2 - Step 1: FindCCO dot/ACOG chevronat a distant aiming point.

Figure 3 - Step 2:Stabilize weapon and

activate laser.

Figure 4- Step 3: Coachadjusts laser onto CCO

dot/ACOG chevron.

Figure 5 - Step 4: Oncethe dots merge the laser

is mostly zeroed. .

TRAINING NOTES


For the ACOG, align the laser offset tothe right and count it to the left until thelaser is set between the two legs of thechevron. It may be necessary to cover thefiber optic filament of the ACOG, dimmingthe chevron to a more acceptable light level.(See Figure 8.)

For the M-145 MGO, the Soldier mustremove the laser filter that is attached tothe front of the MGO. Once the Soldier isfinished zeroing his laser, he will put thelaser filter back on. (See Figure 9.)

Just as in daylight, keep the CCO dot asdim as you can, while still being able toidentify it.

Range to zero your laserThis is a source of debate, obviously the

farther the range of your distant aimingpoint the more accurate the shot will be. Ibelieve the best guidance to give is that theSoldier should zero the laser at a range fromwhich he can identify a target. A M-240gunner with PVS-14s and a 3x magnifier maybe able to identify a target out to 500 meters,while a rifleman with a set of PVS-7Bs canonly identify to 150 meters in good lighting

conditions. I think the CALL Own theNight Two Table 1-4 has overly ambitioustables for what our IR phase lines reallyare. Go with what Joe tells you he can see.The bottom line is to zero out as far as youcan identify an enemy to engage; 200meters and further is more than sufficientto ensure that you have removed the boreaxis, laser aiming light disparity.

If you can see your CCO without usingyour laser, why not just omit the laser andnot present a laser signature you ask? Goodquestion, and you’re right; don’t use thelaser if you don’t have to or if you areidentifying a target or directing fires.

To ensure you are getting the accuracy

Figure 6 - Viewing with ahorizontally flush plane.

Figure 7 - Once the dots merge,the Soldier can refine his

accuracy by counting clicks leftand right uncovering the laser byone full click in both directions.

Figure 8 - It may be easier to workthe IR aiming point from the

bottom into the legs of the ACOGchevron.

Figure 9 - Remove the laser filter fromthe MGO and replace after the weapon

is zeroed.

you want to better kill at night you’ll needto fire at KD targets, making minoradjustments to the IR aiming light. Pop-up targets will work and are much fasterbut unless you get hit location feedback youwon’t be able to refine your zero. A goodtechnique is to put a small swatch of glinttape, or use a 1/2 by 1/2 inch square cutfrom a PT reflective belt, and place it centermass of the target’s kill zone.

Unfortunately, you will still have toteach and utilize the laser borelightingtechnique for those Soldiers who only haveiron sights.

This technique is much faster than thecurrent doctrine of laser borelighting at 10meters, and the 25-meter offset zero, fieldfire confirmation then qualification.Additionally, it is more accurate and easyto teach; good hunting!

Major Darren R. LoRé served with the 2ndBattalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment as arifle platoon leader, mortar platoon leader and HHCexecutive officer. He commanded C Company, 1stBattalion, 21st Infantry Regiment. He is currentlyserving with the 3rd Battalion, 196th InfantryTraining Support Battalion in Guam.

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BAYONETS

The No 1 Mk 1 Bayonet (Pattern 1907) (Fig. 4)was the standard bayonet for British forces armedwith the .303 caliber Short Magazine Lee Enfield(S.M.L.E.) No 1 Mk III rifle in both World Wars, andthe blade measured 17". Even though the S.M.L.E.Mk III had been superseded by the No 4 Mk 1 rifleby World War II, the old S.M.L.E. and its bayonetsaw service around the globe. The Czech VZ24, alarge-ring 8x57mm Mauser variant rifle, had a knifebayonet with a blade of 11.65" (Fig. 5), while thebayonet of the Yugoslav M48 8x57mm Mauserdesign of World War II had a 9.84" blade (Fig. 6).Both closely resemble the 8x57mm German Kar.98 Mauser bayonet of World War II (Fig. 7), with its9.84" blade.

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The U.S. Model 1905 bayonet (Fig. 1) was designedbased upon lessons learned during the Russo-JapaneseWar of 1904, as well as the American Infantry’s ownexperience in close combat with the .30/40 Krag rifleand its bayonet in the Philippines at the turn of theCentury. Most nations favored long bayonets at the time,and the M1905 with its 16" blade was certainly noexception. The M1905 was issued for both the .30/06M1903 Springfield and the M1 Garand rifles and servedus into World War II. In 1942 blades of many existingM1905 bayonets were shortened to 10" and the bayonetwas designated the M1905E1 (Fig. 2). From 1943 on, allGarand bayonets were manufactured with 10" blades andstandardized as the Bayonet M1. In 1955 the Bayonet-Knife M5 (Fig. 3) was adopted for the Garand.

The most-manufactured of all U.S. rifles, the .30caliber M1 carbine, had its own bayonet: the M4 (Fig. 8),with a 6.75" blade. The first bayonet for the 5.56mmM16 rifles was the U.S. M7 (Fig. 9), which likewise had a6.75" blade.

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Nothing embodies the spirit of the Infantry as well as the bayonet, and this extension of the infantryman hasbeen in use at least since the early 17th century. It is the cold-steel aggressiveness of American infantry that hasserved and defended this nation since her birth, and which is still a part of the Soldier’s kit as we prosecute theglobal war on terrorism. This issue’s Weapons Corner highlights a select number of bayonets that have beenused by our Soldiers, by our allies, and by our adversaries, many of which are still to be found in service todaywherever men settle the important issues at close range. If you have a topic you’d like to see covered in WeaponsCorner, e-mail us at [email protected].


TRAINING NOTES

Bayonet Origin Rifle Blade Length

During World War II, one of the main infantry riflesof Soviet ground forces was the 7.62x54mm M44carbine, a variant of the Mosin Nagant long rifle. TheM44 is still to be found all over the world, and mountsa 12.25" permanently attached cruciform bayonet witha screw driver-type tip (Fig. 10). Another Soviet shortrifle is the 7.62x39mm SKS Simonov carbine, whichhas a permanently affixed hinged bayonet (Fig. 11)with an 8.75" blade.

The bayonet currently issued to U.S. Soldiers is theU.S. M9 (Fig. 12) with a robust 7" multi-purpose bladewhich can be used as a wire cutter in conjunction withits scabbard. The M9 bears some resemblance to theRussian Model 1968 SVD bayonet (Fig. 13), whose 6"blade closely resembles that of the countless AK47bayonet variations of the former Soviet Union and itssurrogates. The SVD bayonet shown, for example, wascaptured in action against Iraqi forces during OperationIraqi Freedom.

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COMPARATIVE BAYONET DATA

M1905E1 U.S. M1 Garand 10"

M1905 U.S. M1903 Springfield 16" and M1 Garand

M4 U.S. M1 Carbine 6.75"

M5 U.S. M1 Garand 10"

M7 U.S. M16 Series 6.5"

M9 U.S. M16 and M4 7"

M1907 Great Britain Rifle #1, Mk. III 17" and Rifle #4, Mk. I

S84/98 Germany Kar. 98 Mauser 9.84"

Bodák vz/24 Czechoslovakia VZ24 Mauser 11.65"

M1924 Yugoslavia M48 Mauser 9.84"

M1968 Russian SVD Rifle 6"

M1944 Russian M44 Carbine 12.25"

M1949 Russian Simonov Carbine (SKS) 8.75"

Bayonet photos arecourtesy of the NationalInfantry Museum, Fort

Benning, Georgia.

In the nextissue ofINFANTRY,Weapons

Corner willfeature

COMBATSHOTGUNS.


Germany and the Axis Powers: FromCoalition to Collapse. By Richard L.DiNardo, Lawrence, KS: UniversityPress of Kansas, 2005, 282 pages, $34.95(cloth). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel(Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

There is certainly no shortage of WorldWar II literature on the Allies’ conduct ofcoalition warfare. Historians and writershave long analyzed the strengths of therelationship and keyed on the Allies’difficulty in synchronizing operations nearthe end of the war. However, treatment ofGermany’s ability to conduct coalitionwarfare with its partners is severely lacking.In fact, this lack of discussion could givemany the erroneous impression thatGermany did not practice coalition warfareat all. Richard DiNardo realized this voidand seeks to dismiss these thoughts in hisoutstanding book, Germany and the AxisPowers.

It would be easy for DiNardo (a professorof National Security Affairs at the U.S.Marine Corps Command and Staff Collegeand author of several other books onGerman operations in World War II) tosimply rehash campaigns conducted duringthe war. Fortunately, he gives readers justenough background to set the conditionsfor the true focus of his book. Specifically,he seeks to answer the following:

First, did the Germans attempt toimplement any lessons learned from WorldWar I in regards to coalition warfare duringtheir conduct of World War II?

Second, overall was Germanysuccessful in conducting coalition warfare?

Third, were there specific periodsof the war or services in which coalitionwarfare worked more effectively?

Finally, did Germany face thesame problems or did they encounterdifferent issues than the Allies in executingcoalition warfare?

In answering these questions, the authorrelies heavily on detailed research and hissuperb writing abilities. In regard toresearch, DiNardo utilizes manyunpublished sources (mainly German) and

in most cases reinforces his arguments withseveral distinct sources. A highly detailedannotated notes section (60 pages) allowsreaders to determine the credibility of thesesources and provides them information foradditional study if desired. DiNardotransforms this research into highlyreadable copy. A writer of lesser skills couldhave easily taken this research and made itinto a very dry and dull read. However,DiNardo possesses an engaging writingstyle and the ability to make strong pointsin a minimum of words. Thus, his study isconcise, yet complete.

As expected, the focal point of the bookis Germany’s relationship with Italy.Certainly, there is much discussionrevolving around North Africa and theMediterranean operations. Yet, the authordoes not neglect their connection in theBalkans and the Eastern Front. However,most readers will find the most informativesections of the book are the discussions ofthe operations of Germany with Finland,Hungary and Romania, which generallyreceive little or no treatment by historians.Each of these had a unique experience withGermany in coalition warfare and DiNardodetails these experiences. DiNardo devoteslittle copy to Japan since their relationshipdealt almost exclusively with strategicissues.

The results of DiNardo’s analysis aremost interesting. In particular, two pointsespecially stand out. First, the authorcontends that of the three services, it wasthe German navy that was most successfulin waging coalition warfare. Following thenavy, the Luftwaffe had some minor successin operations with the Italian andRomanian air forces and the German armywas an abysmal failure (except in someinstances in North Africa). Second,Germany did not take to heart lessons fromWorld War I in conducting coalitionwarfare. These included creating unifiedcommand structures, a complete disregardof coalition warfare in the German militaryeducation system, and a critical shortageof interpreters. The end result wasGermany repeating many of the same

mistakes. In each point, DiNardo lays outstrong compelling arguments for hisreaders.

In DiNardo’s introduction he writes,“Taken together this study hopes toexamine as fairly as extensively as possibleGermany’s conduct of World War II as acoalition at a variety of levels. Whether itwill say anything ‘new’ is a matter thatultimately must be left to the discretion ofthe reader. If it broadens yourunderstanding of the Second World War or,more important, makes you rethink muchof what you had heretofore held to be true,then this book served its purpose.”

I have no doubt readers of Germany andthe Axis Powers will find that DiNardo hasuncovered some new nuggets and that theiroverall perspective of the War issignificantly broadened. Truly, DiNardohas achieved his purpose.

Military Power: Explaining Victoryand Defeat in Modern Battle, by StephenBiddle. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2004, 312 pages, $37.50hardcover. Reviewed by LieutenantColonel (Retired) Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

“Major warfare since 1900 has actuallyseen much less real change than most nowsuppose,” asserts Stephen Biddle in thisscholarly treatise, “and that the future, too,should bring far more continuity than manynow expect.” The author argues that theemphasis on a “revolution in militaryaffairs” and its impact on warfare areexaggerated. The employment of forcesand the doctrine and tactics used by theseunits on the battlefield are, according toBiddle, more important than materielfactors alone.

To support this thesis, Biddle (associateprofessor of National Security Studies at theU.S. Army War College) uses a variety ofmethods, “ranging from carefulhistoriography to formal theory, archivallybased case research, large statisticalanalysis, and experimental testing using aDefense Department simulation model.”


BOOK REVIEWS

Three historical case studies test thistheory. The first is Operation Michael, theGerman offensive fought in March-April1918 on the Western Front during WorldWar I. Operation Goodwood, thepenultimate Allied (mainly British) attemptto break out of the Normandy beachheadin July 1944 is the second paradigm. Lastly,Biddle examines the air and groundoffensive in Operation Desert Storm,January-February 1991. Biddle enumeratesthe key independent variables oftechnology, numerical strength andimbalances, and force employment of theopposing armies in these operations.Analyses and assessments derived mainlyfrom the case studies are then modeled andcompared.

This provocative study will be invaluablefor military strategists, theoreticians, andpolicy makers. It makes a significantcontribution to strategic studies.

Given Up For Dead: American GI’sIn The Nazi Concentration Camp AtBerga. Flint Whitlock. Cambridge, MA:Westview Press, 2005, 283 pages, $16.95.Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel MichaelA. Boden.

Recent scholarship on the Second WorldWar has focused a great deal on the actionsand experiences of the common Soldier,and accounts of “The Greatest Generation”have been increasingly common. FlintWhitlock’s book, Given Up For Dead:American GI’s In The Nazi ConcentrationCamp At Berga, falls in this genre bydetailing the experiences of a group ofAmerican Soldiers captured either duringthe early stages of the Battle of the Bulgeor in the Vosges during the GermanNordwind offensive. But instead of humanetreatment at the hands of their captors,these Soldiers, mostly Jewish and relativelyunknown until a PBS television special in2003, experienced all the miseries of theNazi concentration camp system.

Whitlock cites primary archival sourcesand secondary works seldom, and reliespredominantly on survivor accounts andfirst person testimony from a core group ofabout 20 men. He pieces together theirpersonal stories of induction, combat, and

capture. The majority of the book revolvesaround this final experience, when thesemen were a part of the German prisonerof war camp system. Following a briefperiod at German Stalag IX-B in BadOrb, 350 prisoners, many of them Jewish,were separated form their comrades, sentto the labor camp at Berga, and subjectednot to the rules of the GenevaConvention, but to the rules of the Naziconcentration camp system. After twomonths at Berga, the surviving prisonerswere sent on a grueling 20-day death-march until liberated by U.S. forces inEastern Bavaria; of the original 350, only160 were present at liberation.

Whitlock is a plainspoken writer, andonly deviates from the prisoners’narrative when discussing the Germanexecutors of the crimes committedagainst the American internees. Theauthor’s animated discussion of the postwardeliberations of these perpetrators, thoughdistinct in method and genre from the restof the book, is a necessary and welcomeelement of his narrative.

Though interesting and straightforward,because of his reliance on personal accountswithout the enhancement of thorougharchival research, Whitlock’s narrative willnot be considered as one of the mostprofound in its genre or at the forefront ofhistorical scholarship. There are caseswhere reference to higher headquarters’communication and/or German sourcescould have enhanced his story significantly.But, as a survivor account, it is better thanmany, and will be welcomed by attractedreaders.

Soldiering: Observations from Korea,Vietnam and Safe Places. By Henry G.Gole. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 255pages, $27.50. Reviewed by BrigadierGeneral (Retired) Curtis H. O’Sullivan.

I became acquainted with Henry Goleas an author when I reviewed his work onour shared alma mater, the Army WarCollege. I gave it high marks with a fewcaveats. This effort is different. It is acollection of individual reminiscences. AsGole himself states, participants normallysee only a part of the action. Memories may

be self-serving, purposely misleading,sometimes just careless, and alwaysretrospective and subject to the erosion oftime. Personal accounts at the lower levelstend to have limited value. As you go upthe chain-of-command, there is a chanceof learning something about the big picture.

This is an assemblage of vignettes andanecdotes, which deliberately lackcontinuity and cohesion. The early ‘50sto the late ‘80s is the time frame. Thebook is in roughly five chronologicalparts which may be of varying interest tothe reader — depending on personalexperience and interests. For suchreasons, I particularly enjoyed thedisconnected takes of his two tours withSpecial Forces in Vietnam. Gole is a goodstoryteller, and I found enoughsufficiently familiar to bring twinges ofnostalgia. Amidst some deadly matters heuses a light tone, with an occasional flashof rollicking humor. He has a streak ofcynicism with some blasts at the flaws ofthe establishment. This may come fromthe unfulfilled idealism that led to hisunusual service record. He performed hispatriotic duty as an enlisted man duringthe Korean War and later married and hada promising career as a teacher. Then heexperienced an epiphany from JFK’sinaugural address and decided to “do forhis country” by returning to the Army.Luckily, there was a provision forsomeone with his qualifications to comeback as an regular Army second lieutenant.Once back, Special Forces seemed the idealplace for his dreams and he describes histime there well. Selfishly, I wish he’d givenmore space to Benning, Leavenworth, andCarlisle so I could compare our impressionsof those formative institutions.

The two maps are adequate for theirpurposes, and the pictures are the usualassortment of group and individualportraits with some not so standardized.The glossary is a helpful reminder of notrecently used terms.

Overall, this was worth reading andshould appeal to others who served duringthe period covered. However, I recommendit especially to those starting a career inthe combat arms. There are some insightsabout small unit leadership worthpondering.


A squad of soldiers from Bulgaria, Romania and the United States attempts to evacuate a simulated wounded soldier during convoy-ambushtraining in Bulgaria July 19, 2006. The training was conducted as part of Immediate Response 06.

Gary L. Kieffer

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Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 102nd InfantryRegiment patrol areas of Afghanistan in December 2006.

Documents

Infantry - benning.army.mil · Infantry • INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building