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Integrity Management: Lessons Learned, Challenges. A Presentation by the Hazardous Liquids Pipeline Industry to the OPS Public Meeting on Integrity Management May 17-18, 2005. Overview. Marty Matheson American Petroleum Institute. The National Network. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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11
Integrity Management:Integrity Management:Lessons Learned, Lessons Learned,
ChallengesChallengesA Presentation by the A Presentation by the
Hazardous Liquids Pipeline IndustryHazardous Liquids Pipeline Industry
to the to the
OPS Public Meeting on Integrity OPS Public Meeting on Integrity ManagementManagement
May 17-18, 2005May 17-18, 2005
22
OverviewOverview
Marty MathesonMarty Matheson
American Petroleum InstituteAmerican Petroleum Institute
33
The National NetworkThe National Network
160,000 miles national transmission 160,000 miles national transmission networknetwork
Crude oil to refineriesCrude oil to refineries Refined products to end usersRefined products to end users
Volumes per yearVolumes per year 1.6 trillion barrel miles crude oil1.6 trillion barrel miles crude oil 1.7 trillion barrel miles refined products1.7 trillion barrel miles refined products 0.4 trillion barrel miles HVLs0.4 trillion barrel miles HVLs
1,600,000,000,000 barrel-miles crude oil
1,700,000,000,000 barrel-miles refined
400,000,000,000 barrel-miles HVL
44
BenefitsBenefitsEnergyEnergy HeatingHeating
Home heating oilHome heating oil PropanePropane
FuelsFuels AutomotiveAutomotive AviationAviation RailroadsRailroads Ships and bargesShips and barges Power plantsPower plants Military basesMilitary bases
Raw materialsRaw materials PharmaceuticalsPharmaceuticals PlasticsPlastics CosmeticsCosmetics FertilizersFertilizers Construction Construction
materialsmaterials
55
What do we do?What do we do?
We transport We transport flammableflammable, hazardous, , hazardous, usefuluseful products to customers under strict products to customers under strict
federal and state requirements through federal and state requirements through townstowns, cities, , cities, neighborhoodsneighborhoods, and cross , and cross
country where country where peoplepeople live, work and live, work and play.play.
We MUST do it safely and reliably.We MUST do it safely and reliably.
66
Energy Pipeline OversightEnergy Pipeline Oversight
PipelineOperators
Federal Oversight
State/Local Oversight
Stakeholders/Consumers
PIPELINEOPERATORS ANDTHE PRIVILEGETO OPERATE
77
Our vision is an oil pipeline Our vision is an oil pipeline industry thatindustry that -- -- conducts operations safely and with conducts operations safely and with
respect for the environment;respect for the environment; respects the privilege to operate respects the privilege to operate
granted to it by the public; andgranted to it by the public; and provides reliable transportation of the provides reliable transportation of the
crude oil and refined products upon crude oil and refined products upon which America and all Americans which America and all Americans rely.rely.
88
Industry GoalsIndustry Goals NoNo deaths deaths NoNo injuries injuries NoNo releases to the environment releases to the environment NoNo operating errors operating errors Reliable serviceReliable service to our shippers, to our shippers,
customers and communitiescustomers and communities Full complianceFull compliance with requirements with requirements
99
Oil Pipeline Releases & Safety Oil Pipeline Releases & Safety Incidents Reported to DOTIncidents Reported to DOT
0
50
100
150
200
250
30019
8819
8919
9019
9119
9219
9319
9419
9519
9619
9719
9819
9920
0020
0120
0220
0320
04
Three Years Ending
Num
ber
50
100
150
200
250
300
Thou
sand
s of
Bar
rels
Barrels
(3-Year Moving Average)
Number
1010
Oil Pipeline Fatalities & InjuriesOil Pipeline Fatalities & Injuries(Public, Employee, Contractor)(Public, Employee, Contractor)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Three Years Ending
Num
ber
Injuries
Fatalities
(3-Year Moving Average)
1111
Baseline Assessments – Baseline Assessments – Voluntary CertificationVoluntary Certification
U.S. mileage – 160,000U.S. mileage – 160,000 Companies/systems certifying – 73 Companies/systems certifying – 73 Certifying companies –Certifying companies –
System miles – 130,113 (81% of US miles)System miles – 130,113 (81% of US miles) HCA “could affect” – 59,364 milesHCA “could affect” – 59,364 miles Baseline complete – 37,990 milesBaseline complete – 37,990 miles Additional miles assessed – 33,890 milesAdditional miles assessed – 33,890 miles
Total miles assessed – Total miles assessed – 71,880 miles71,880 miles
1212
Baseline Assessments – Baseline Assessments – Voluntary CertificationVoluntary Certification
100%100% of companies have completed 50% of companies have completed 50% 59%59% of companies have completed 65% of companies have completed 65% 27%27% of companies have completed 75% of companies have completed 75% 9%9% of companies have completed 80 - 100% of companies have completed 80 - 100%
of HCA “could affect” mileageof HCA “could affect” mileageAt half way point (Sept 2004)At half way point (Sept 2004)
of baseline assessment period (2001-2007)of baseline assessment period (2001-2007)
Of certifying companies --Of certifying companies --
1313
Results from AssessmentsResults from AssessmentsSource: PPTSSource: PPTS
10,000 conditions addressed per year10,000 conditions addressed per year Immediate repair conditions – Immediate repair conditions – 7%7% Other rule-based conditions – Other rule-based conditions – 21%21% Operator-definedOperator-defined conditions – conditions – 72%72%
AllAll injurious conditions injurious conditionsare addressed!are addressed!
1414
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
<5 Barrels 5-49Barrels
50+Barrels
System Location:System Location:Share of Releases by Spill Share of Releases by Spill
SizeSize
Updated 08/04Combo for All to OPS.xls
Includes only incidents that are reportable to OPS under criteria established 2/2002.
Location: Facilities piping & Location: Facilities piping & equip.: 52%; Onshore pipe: 40%equip.: 52%; Onshore pipe: 40%
Percent, 1999-2003
Facility Piping/Equip.
59% 44% 25%
Onshore Pipe
32% 50% 63%
Location by size: Facilities piping & Location by size: Facilities piping & equip.: 25% of 50+ bbls; Onshore equip.: 25% of 50+ bbls; Onshore pipe: 63% of 50+ bbls pipe: 63% of 50+ bbls
1515
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 113322 130 135 110 5599
Equipment/ non-pipe 3333 43 26 25 2255
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 1199 12 16 7 99
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 3311 30 16 13 99
Third party damage (curr./ past) 3355 47 39 30 1199
Rest of Causes 1199 17 22 11 1111
Total 226699 279 254 196 113322
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
1616
Onshore Pipe Incidents, Onshore Pipe Incidents, '99-'03'99-'03
050
100150200250300
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
50
100
150
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
5
10
15
20
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
10
20
30
40
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
TOTAL, ALL CAUSES CORROSION THIRD PARTY
EQUIP./NON-PIPE OPERATOR/OPER'N MAT'L/SEAM/WELD
1717
Line Pipe Accidents byLine Pipe Accidents byCause Category Cause Category (1999-2003)(1999-2003)
Corrosion accidents Corrosion accidents downdown 33rdrd party damage accidents party damage accidents downdown Equipment/non-pipe accidents Equipment/non-pipe accidents downdown Pipe material/seam failures Pipe material/seam failures downdown Operator/operational error Operator/operational error downdown
Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the public and public safety impacts arepublic and public safety impacts are
1818
IMP is a Success StoryIMP is a Success Story Accelerated risk-based approachAccelerated risk-based approach Accelerated use of ILI toolsAccelerated use of ILI tools Accelerated investments in GIS, Accelerated investments in GIS,
information and data management toolsinformation and data management tools Accelerated investments in pipeline Accelerated investments in pipeline
assetsassets Finding conditions and fixing themFinding conditions and fixing them Identifying emerging integrity issuesIdentifying emerging integrity issues
1919
Integrity Management: Not Integrity Management: Not Just Inspection and Testing Just Inspection and Testing
---- Public awareness and communicationPublic awareness and communication Security awareness and physical Security awareness and physical
upgradesupgrades Third party damage efforts and Third party damage efforts and
Common Ground AllianceCommon Ground Alliance Operator focus on performanceOperator focus on performance Stakeholder/public expectationsStakeholder/public expectations And much more …And much more …
Public awareness and communicationPublic awareness and communication Security awareness and physical Security awareness and physical
upgradesupgrades Third party damage efforts and Third party damage efforts and
Common Ground AllianceCommon Ground Alliance Operator focus on performanceOperator focus on performance Stakeholder/public expectationsStakeholder/public expectations And much more …And much more …
2020
Onshore Pipe Incidents, Onshore Pipe Incidents, '99-'03'99-'03
050
100150200250300
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
50
100
150
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
5
10
15
20
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
10
20
30
40
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
TOTAL, ALL CAUSES CORROSION THIRD PARTY
EQUIP./NON-PIPE OPERATOR/OPER'N MAT'L/SEAM/WELD
2121
2222
Lessons LearnedLessons Learned
API/AOPL Pipeline Industry API/AOPL Pipeline Industry PanelPanel
2323
Where do the LessonsWhere do the LessonsCome From?Come From?
Operator’s own systems and experienceOperator’s own systems and experience PPTS data collection and analysisPPTS data collection and analysis OPS OPS (data, audits/inspections and enforcement (data, audits/inspections and enforcement
actions)actions) Meetings/conferences Meetings/conferences (OPS, API, AOPL, ASME, PRCI)(OPS, API, AOPL, ASME, PRCI)
R&D R&D (company, OPS, PRCI)(company, OPS, PRCI) Standards work Standards work (1110, 1160, 1163, and more)(1110, 1160, 1163, and more) NTSB reports and accident investigationsNTSB reports and accident investigations OPS/EPA/DOJ investigations/consent decreesOPS/EPA/DOJ investigations/consent decrees
2424
Step ChangesStep ChangesProcessProcess Institutionalizing risk-based approachesInstitutionalizing risk-based approaches Institutionalizing data integrationInstitutionalizing data integration Institutionalizing knowledge sharingInstitutionalizing knowledge sharing
OperationalOperational More (lots more) miles assessedMore (lots more) miles assessed Standardization of dig criteriaStandardization of dig criteria Application of data lessonsApplication of data lessons
Information SharingInformation Sharing Operator cooperation and workshopsOperator cooperation and workshops IMP data work (in progress)IMP data work (in progress)
Risk-based
Data Lessons
Practice Sharing
Data Integration
Standardization
Miles Assessed
Knowledge Sharing
2525
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
2626
Onshore Pipe Incidents, 1999-Onshore Pipe Incidents, 1999-20032003
All Sizes 50 Barrels or More Number of Incidents
‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59 15 20 17 14 13
Equipment/ non-pipe
33 43 26 25 25 1 5 4 1 4
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n
19 12 16 7 9 2 1 4 3 2
Pipe material/ seam/ weld
31 30 16 13 9 6 7 2 4 5
Third party damage (curr./ past)
35 47 39 30 19 25 29 18 15 11
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11 7 4 3 1 1
Total 269 279 254 196 132 56 66 48 38 36
2727
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
2828
Lessons: CorrosionLessons: CorrosionObservationsObservations Dropped by over 50% Dropped by over 50% in 5 yearsin 5 years Vast majority are small and Vast majority are small and
getting smallergetting smaller Very little public safety impacts Very little public safety impacts
LessonsLessons Tools find corrosion; mature tech.Tools find corrosion; mature tech. Manageable and predictable; risks Manageable and predictable; risks
from corrosion are being reducedfrom corrosion are being reduced Returns on MFL technology will Returns on MFL technology will
diminish related to detecting diminish related to detecting corrosioncorrosion
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03N
um
ber
of In
cidents
<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls
2929
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past)
35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
3030
Lessons: Third Party Lessons: Third Party DamageDamage
ObservationsObservations Incidents >50 bbls have Incidents >50 bbls have dropped dropped
by ~50% by ~50% in 5 yearsin 5 years Public safety impacts are Public safety impacts are
greatestgreatest ILI tools do not address ILI tools do not address
preventionprevention
LessonsLessons Assessing line condition is only Assessing line condition is only
part of the answerpart of the answer Understanding where to look for Understanding where to look for
threats is importantthreats is important Greatest potentials for Greatest potentials for
improvement …improvement …
(Current and past damage)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03N
um
ber of In
cidents
<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls
3131
Example: Example: Frequency of ROW PatrolFrequency of ROW Patrol
Prevention strategyPrevention strategy: : Increased frequency of Increased frequency of ROW ground patrol ROW ground patrol (1997)(1997)
ResultResult: ILI indications of : ILI indications of top side deformations top side deformations fell from 22 in 1997 to fell from 22 in 1997 to 4 in 2004 4 in 2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
1997 2004
ILI Data Indications
Top Side Deformations
3232
Example:Example:Centralized “One Call” Centralized “One Call”
SystemSystem Assists Operator in processing of:Assists Operator in processing of:
One call NoticesOne call Notices Direct call-insDirect call-ins Aerial reportsAerial reports
Benefits:Benefits: Positive response conformancePositive response conformance Standardize one call practicesStandardize one call practices Centralized one call ticket archivalCentralized one call ticket archival Optimization in one call processingOptimization in one call processing
3333
Centralized “One Call” Centralized “One Call” SystemSystem
3434
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe failures
33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
3535
Lessons: Equipment/Non-Lessons: Equipment/Non-PipePipe
ObservationsObservations ILI does not address this type ILI does not address this type
of failure (valves, valve seats, of failure (valves, valve seats, traps)traps)
Data and industry focus on Data and industry focus on small spills has paid offsmall spills has paid off
LessonsLessons Incident investigation in Incident investigation in
addition to data and analysisaddition to data and analysis 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03N
um
ber
of In
cidents
<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls
3636
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
3737
Lessons: Lessons: Material/Seam/WeldMaterial/Seam/Weld
ObservationsObservations ERW seam failure has been ERW seam failure has been
successfully addressedsuccessfully addressed Types and availability of crack Types and availability of crack
tools expandingtools expanding
LessonsLessons Crack tools are still in “proof Crack tools are still in “proof
of concept” phaseof concept” phase Pipe body, seams, welds can Pipe body, seams, welds can
be managed effectivelybe managed effectively
0
5
10
15
20
25
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03N
um
ber
of In
cidents
<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls
3838
ExampleExample
8.625” x 0.203” 5LX 8.625” x 0.203” 5LX X52 seamlessX52 seamless
Deformation & Hi Res Deformation & Hi Res MFL indicated no defectMFL indicated no defect
Hydro to test seams in Hydro to test seams in adjacent ERWadjacent ERW
Seamless pipe failed at Seamless pipe failed at 1830 PSI1830 PSI
Investigation indicated Investigation indicated re-rounded re-rounded construction-era dent construction-era dent w/ stress concentratorw/ stress concentrator
Dent & metal loss Dent & metal loss dimensions were below dimensions were below threshold for ILI toolsthreshold for ILI tools
Lesson: Lesson: There may be times when hydro is There may be times when hydro is more appropriate to the risk than ILI.more appropriate to the risk than ILI.
3939
Onshore Pipe Incidents of 5 Onshore Pipe Incidents of 5 Barrels or More, by Cause, Barrels or More, by Cause,
1999-20031999-2003Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion minus SCC 48 56 55 51 23
Stress Corrosion Cracking 2 2 1 0 2
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 11 14 7 5 6
Remaining Causes 56 63 55 39 31
Total 117 135 118 95 62
Incidents involving a release of 5 barrels or more (or a death, injury, fire or explosion)that occurred on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported to Pipeline Performance Tracking System. Stress Corrosion Cracking detail is not available for smaller releases.
4040
Lesson: SCCLesson: SCCObservationsObservations SCC industry-wide knowledge has now SCC industry-wide knowledge has now
been aggregated and sharedbeen aggregated and shared SCC awareness has been raisedSCC awareness has been raised R&D now a priorityR&D now a priority
LessonsLessons Don’t over-react to “emerging” integrity Don’t over-react to “emerging” integrity
issuesissues Don’t under-react to “emerging” integrity Don’t under-react to “emerging” integrity
issuesissues
4141
Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003
Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59
Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25
Operator error/ incorrect operation
19 12 16 7 9
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9
Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19
Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11
Total 269 279 254 196 132
Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”
4242
Lessons: Lessons: Operator/OperationOperator/Operation
ObservationsObservations People People ANDAND procedures procedures
LessonsLessons Don't assume improper Don't assume improper
trainingtraining Incident investigation in Incident investigation in
addition to data and analysisaddition to data and analysis0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03N
um
ber
of In
cidents
<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls
4343
Step ChangesStep ChangesProcessProcess Institutionalizing risk-based approachesInstitutionalizing risk-based approaches Institutionalizing data integrationInstitutionalizing data integration Institutionalizing knowledge sharingInstitutionalizing knowledge sharing
OperationalOperational More (lots more) miles assessedMore (lots more) miles assessed Standardization of dig criteriaStandardization of dig criteria Application of data lessonsApplication of data lessons
Information SharingInformation Sharing Operator cooperation and workshopsOperator cooperation and workshops IMP data work (in progress)IMP data work (in progress)
Risk-based
Data Lessons
Practice sharing
Data integration
Standardization
Miles assessed
Knowledge sharing
4444
Data Integration – A Giant Data Integration – A Giant StepStep
Identifying conditions that cannot be Identifying conditions that cannot be identified from a single data set.identified from a single data set.
This concept is now engrained in This concept is now engrained in pipeline integrity managementpipeline integrity management ILI Data AnalysisILI Data Analysis Risk Assessment Risk Assessment Direct Assessment (ECDA, ICDA, SCC)Direct Assessment (ECDA, ICDA, SCC)
Driving integrity-related IT Driving integrity-related IT advancementsadvancements
4545
4646
4747
4848
Organizational Changes to Organizational Changes to Support IMP – Support IMP – Before:Before:
Operating division resources responsible for Operating division resources responsible for pipeline integrity pipeline integrity (NACE-certified Corrosion (NACE-certified Corrosion Specialist, reliability engineers, corrosion Specialist, reliability engineers, corrosion technicians, inspectors, etc.)technicians, inspectors, etc.)
Efforts led by Division IM Leader reporting to Efforts led by Division IM Leader reporting to Division Operations VP.Division Operations VP.
For the most part, division resources For the most part, division resources operated independently.operated independently.
Corporate support resources from parent Corporate support resources from parent company provided integrity-related capacity company provided integrity-related capacity and some coordination efforts.and some coordination efforts.
4949
Organizational Changes to Organizational Changes to Support IMP – Support IMP – Today:Today:
Division support organization Division support organization (IM expertise & (IM expertise & superior local knowledge).superior local knowledge). Fosters asset-specific Fosters asset-specific knowledge sharing & accountability.knowledge sharing & accountability.
Corporate support team reassigned to Corporate support team reassigned to pipeline operations group.pipeline operations group.
Coordinated by corporate IM Capability Coordinated by corporate IM Capability Leader reporting to VP of Pipeline Support.Leader reporting to VP of Pipeline Support.
Technical teams – subject matter Technical teams – subject matter development, improvement, assessment development, improvement, assessment and results. Representatives from each and results. Representatives from each division and corporate.division and corporate.
5050
Work Flow DiagramWork Flow DiagramProcessing Vendor ILI Reports
ILI Vendor Revise Draft ILI ReportIssue Revised
Draft ILI Report Issue Final Report
Confirm Tool's Operational Performance
Legal Dept. Receive Final Report
Verify values, equations, andcriteria used by vendor
Verify calcuations performed by vendor
Senior Engineer
Can issues be rectifed with vendor?
Rectify issues with vendor and request revised Draft ILI Report
Receive revisedDraft ILI Report
Notify vendor that Draft ILI has been accepted
Immediate Condtions Identified?
Perform prelim validation of anomaly calls
Validation digs identified? Draft ILI Report Accepted?Create Company ILI Report: 1. Identify Conditions (Immed, 60, 180, Other). 2. Identify if in HCA. 3. Identify if previously dug.
Review recommended digs, dismissals, and
engineering analyses
Post Preliminary ResponsePlan and Notify Integrity
Assessment Team
Prepare for IAT Meeting
Complete "Dismiss" documentation or
receive from assigned party
TP-600/700feedback from excavation and
direct examination
Integrity EngineerDetermine appropriate response(excav, eng analysis, dismiss)
Prepare Dig Packages Review validation dig findingsRectify issues with vendor and request revised Final Report
Can issues be rectified?
Receive Final Report Final Report Accepted?
Initiate pressure reductionsand/or shutdown
IntegrityAssessment
TeamMeeting
Assign responsiblities for documentation of dismissal
justificationAssess level of risk associatedwith missing or inadequate data
Level of risk acceptable?Document justification for
conclusion
Integrity Assmt Team Review amd Approve Immediate Conditions
Assign responsibilities for Immed Conditions requiring Engineering
Analysis
Review and approveILI Response PlanRe-run ILI tool
(TP-200)
Assign responsiblities for documentation of dismissal
justification
Assign responsibilities for Immed Conditions requiring
Engineering Analysis
Construction Supervisor Prepare Dig PackagesReview recommended digs,
dismissals, and engineering analyses
Prepare for IAT Meeting
GISReview recommended digs,
dismissals, and engineering analyses
Prepare for IAT Meeting
Program Admin.Make OPS Notification
if Necessary
Review recommended digs, dismissals, and
engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting Track
Pipeline Inspector & Excavation Crew
Excavate TP-600Submit Documentation
TP-600
CorrosionSupervisor
Review recommended digs, dismissals, and
engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting
RiskReview recommended digs,
dismissals, and engineering analyses
Prepare for IAT Meeting
Director, Corrosion & Maintenance
Review recommended digs, dismissals, and
engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting
Manager, Project Eng.Reduce pressure or shutdown
TP-XX
N
NY Y
NY
N Y
N
Y
Y
Excavate, Eng Analysis,
or Dismiss?
N
Y
Analysis
Dismiss
Excavate
N
Excavate,Eng Analysis, or Dismiss?
Analysis
Dismiss
25 26
28
2929
29
29
30
28
31, 32
30
33 33 3534
3738
40
36
36
39
42
44
43
49
50
51
55
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
57
ILI VendorLegalSenior Eng.Integrity Eng.Integ. Assess. TeamConst. SupervisorGISProgram Admin.Pipeline InspectionCorrosionRiskDir., Corr. & Maint.Mgr., Proj. Eng.
ILI VendorILI Vendor
Integrity Eng.Integrity Eng.
5151
Corrosion
Pipeline Data
RiskMapping
SME’s, Data OwnersManagement, Engineering, Operations
View, Analyze, ConfigureView
GIS
Integrity Mgmt RDBMS
ILI Data Repairs
Integrity Data IntegrationIntegrity Data Integration
5252
Tapping Organizational Tapping Organizational Knowledge:Knowledge:
Never Learn It Never Learn It TWICETWICE Shared electronic tracking and Shared electronic tracking and
documentationdocumentation Photo documentationPhoto documentation Cross-functional Steering TeamCross-functional Steering Team Internal ConferencesInternal Conferences
Repair ConferenceRepair Conference Safety SummitSafety Summit
External ConferencesExternal Conferences
5353
050
100150200250300
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
50
100
150
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
10
20
30
40
50
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
0
5
10
15
20
'99 '00 '01 '02 '030
10
20
30
40
'99 '00 '01 '02 '03
TOTAL, ALL CAUSES CORROSION THIRD PARTY
EQUIP./NON-PIPE OPERATOR/OPER'N MAT'L/SEAM/WELD
Onshore Pipe Incidents, Onshore Pipe Incidents, '99-'03'99-'03
5454
Line Pipe Accidents byLine Pipe Accidents byCause Category Cause Category (1999-2003)(1999-2003)
Corrosion accidents Corrosion accidents downdown 33rdrd party damage accidents party damage accidents downdown Equipment/non-pipe accidents Equipment/non-pipe accidents downdown Pipe material/seam failures Pipe material/seam failures downdown Operator/operational error Operator/operational error downdown
Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the public and public safety impacts arepublic and public safety impacts are
5555
5656
ChallengesChallenges
API/AOPL Pipeline Industry API/AOPL Pipeline Industry PanelPanel
5757
IMP Will Continue to be a IMP Will Continue to be a Success StorySuccess Story
Operators are committed to Operators are committed to risk-basedrisk-based approachapproach
Operators are committed to Operators are committed to zero incidents zero incidents and to continuing improvementand to continuing improvement
Technology will continue to evolve and there Technology will continue to evolve and there will continue to be limitations will continue to be limitations
Technology and IMP rules must be applied in Technology and IMP rules must be applied in the real worldthe real world
Greatest additional improvements may still lie Greatest additional improvements may still lie in in integrating and understandingintegrating and understanding information information
5858
Step ChangesStep ChangesProcessProcess Institutionalizing risk-based approachesInstitutionalizing risk-based approaches Institutionalizing data integrationInstitutionalizing data integration Institutionalizing knowledge sharingInstitutionalizing knowledge sharing
OperationalOperational More (lots more) miles assessedMore (lots more) miles assessed Standardization of dig criteriaStandardization of dig criteria Application of data lessonsApplication of data lessons
Information SharingInformation Sharing Operator cooperation and workshopsOperator cooperation and workshops IMP data work (in progress)IMP data work (in progress)
Risk-based
Data Lessons
Practice sharing
Data integration
Standardization
Miles assessed
Knowledge sharing
5959
Challenge: Enforcement and Challenge: Enforcement and ComplianceCompliance
Observations: Observations: ProcessProcess Performance rule migrating toward Performance rule migrating toward
prescriptive; impact of protocolsprescriptive; impact of protocols Over-emphasis on inspection and testingOver-emphasis on inspection and testing Over-emphasis on HCA identification; Over-emphasis on HCA identification;
reinvention of oil spill planning detailreinvention of oil spill planning detail
Need: Need: DialogDialog
6060
Challenge: Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement and Complianceand Compliance
Observations: Observations: OperationalOperational Lack of inspection focus on “critical path” Lack of inspection focus on “critical path” Corrosion based understanding is not Corrosion based understanding is not
sufficientsufficient Company overall performance not part of Company overall performance not part of
enforcement view enforcement view
Need: Need: DialogDialog
6161
Challenge: Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement and Complianceand Compliance
Observations: Observations: Information SharingInformation Sharing Lack of opportunities for honest and open Lack of opportunities for honest and open
discussions about what works and what discussions about what works and what doesn’tdoesn’t
Second round of comprehensives feels like Second round of comprehensives feels like starting overstarting over
Most knowledgeable inspectors seem to be Most knowledgeable inspectors seem to be moving to enforcement of natural gas rulemoving to enforcement of natural gas rule
Need: Need: DialogDialog
6262
Request:Request:
The hazardous liquid industry would The hazardous liquid industry would like to sit down with OPS like to sit down with OPS
headquarters, OPS regions, and headquarters, OPS regions, and OPS contractor for open exchange OPS contractor for open exchange
of concerns and suggestions of concerns and suggestions related to inspection and related to inspection and
enforcement.enforcement.
We need to listen to each other!!We need to listen to each other!!
6363
Challenge: Plain DentsChallenge: Plain Dents
ObservationsObservations Current rule repair criteria are unsupported Current rule repair criteria are unsupported
technicallytechnically Remediating some dents may do more harm than Remediating some dents may do more harm than
good depending on service, metallurgy, D/t ratiosgood depending on service, metallurgy, D/t ratios
NeedsNeeds Better methods for evaluating deformations and Better methods for evaluating deformations and
separating injurious from stable/non-injuriousseparating injurious from stable/non-injurious Flexibility from OPS in application of the rule to Flexibility from OPS in application of the rule to
some dent situations some dent situations
6464
Example: What is a Dent?Example: What is a Dent?
SHARP A reduction span not exceeding 50% of one pipe diameter and containied mainly to one side of the pipe.
FLATA reduction span that exceeds the sharp specification and is contained mainly to one side of the pipe with little or no ovality present.
This figure depicts the local reported by the vendor. The local is the change in the pipe radius minus the ovality. The ovality is determined by the amount the pipe radius increases 90 degrees from the deformation.
LOCAL =Depth-Ovality
“Sharp”
“Flat”
Ovality
6565
Example: What is a Dent?Example: What is a Dent?
No industry method on calculating No industry method on calculating when a deformation is injurious (i.e., when a deformation is injurious (i.e., RSTRENG)RSTRENG)
Little correlation between depth of a Little correlation between depth of a dent and the damage to the pipedent and the damage to the pipe
Deformation may reround when Deformation may reround when excavated and residual dent depth is excavated and residual dent depth is affected by the line pressure at the affected by the line pressure at the time of measurementtime of measurement
6666
Example: Determining Example: Determining Injuriousness of DentsInjuriousness of Dents
Field Bends Identified as DentsField Bends Identified as Dents Multiple dent-like indications later Multiple dent-like indications later
determined to be field bendsdetermined to be field bends
Smooth dents in low stress pipelinesSmooth dents in low stress pipelines No technical basis for repair No technical basis for repair
6767
Example: Determining Example: Determining Injuriousness of DentsInjuriousness of Dents
Examples of dent indication that turned out to be a field bend!
6868
Example: Determining Example: Determining Injuriousness of DentsInjuriousness of Dents
Hydrotest immediately followed by Hydrotest immediately followed by caliper caliper ‘‘Actionable’ dents identified which Actionable’ dents identified which
survived Subpart E hydrotestsurvived Subpart E hydrotest Repair and/or pressure reduction versus Repair and/or pressure reduction versus
operating pressure hard to justify - dent operating pressure hard to justify - dent survived higher test pressuresurvived higher test pressure
6969
Example: Determining Example: Determining Injuriousness of DentsInjuriousness of Dents
Examples of dents that survived Subpart E Hydrotest
7070
Challenge: Analysis of ILI Challenge: Analysis of ILI DataData
ObservationsObservations Equivalency of data and analysis vendor to Equivalency of data and analysis vendor to
vendor is not good enough vendor is not good enough (many formats, (many formats, different integration requirements)different integration requirements)
NeedsNeeds More standards setting for quality of ILI data More standards setting for quality of ILI data
and analytical methodsand analytical methods Better understanding of what tools can and Better understanding of what tools can and
cannot accomplish (inspectors and cannot accomplish (inspectors and operators)operators)
7171
Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL in 1998in 1998
Same section experienced two corrosion leaks Same section experienced two corrosion leaks in two weeks in late 2003in two weeks in late 2003
Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same vendorvendor
No consistent correlation between reportsNo consistent correlation between reports 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because
vendor no longer supported the software.vendor no longer supported the software.
Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL in 1998in 1998
Same section experienced two corrosion leaks Same section experienced two corrosion leaks in two weeks in late 2003in two weeks in late 2003
Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same vendorvendor
No consistent correlation between reportsNo consistent correlation between reports 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because
vendor no longer supported the software.vendor no longer supported the software.
Example: ILI ChallengeExample: ILI Challenge
7272
Challenge: Challenge: Applying IMP to FacilitiesApplying IMP to Facilities
ObservationsObservations Risk to the public is low: 90% remain on co. Risk to the public is low: 90% remain on co.
propertyproperty Already being addressed without enforcement focusAlready being addressed without enforcement focus
NeedsNeeds Data-based recommendations for IM (underway)Data-based recommendations for IM (underway) Discussion/dialog between operators and inspectors Discussion/dialog between operators and inspectors
before compliance audits specific to facilitiesbefore compliance audits specific to facilities
7373
Facilities Piping and Facilities Piping and Equipment: High Numbers, Equipment: High Numbers,
Low ConsequencesLow Consequences Account for 52% of PPTS releases Account for 52% of PPTS releases Generally small: 76% <5 barrels Generally small: 76% <5 barrels DIVERSE: 56% caused by failure of DIVERSE: 56% caused by failure of
equipment or non-pipe componentequipment or non-pipe component
5-49 bbls5-49 bbls
<5 bbls 76%<5 bbls 76%
By SizeBy SizeRangeRange
50+ bbls50+ bbls
Oper. Err.Oper. Err.
By CauseBy CauseAll OtherAll Other
Corr.Corr. Equip/Equip/Non-PipeNon-Pipe
56%56%
7474
Challenge: EFRDsChallenge: EFRDsObservationsObservations EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the
pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk overalloverall
Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specific
EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the
pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk overalloverall
Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specific
7575
Onshore Pipe Incidents, 2003Onshore Pipe Incidents, 2003
Number of Incidents All Sizes
50 Barrels or More
500 Barrels or More
Corrosion 59 13 3
Equipment/ non-pipe 25 4 2
Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 9 2 1
Pipe material/ seam/ weld 9 5 3
Third party damage (curr./ past) 19 11 4
Rest of Causes 11 1 0
Total 132 36 13
7676
Challenge: EFRDsChallenge: EFRDsObservationsObservations EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the pipe and EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the pipe and
thus add as well as reduce risk overallthus add as well as reduce risk overall Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specific
NeedsNeeds Simplified analysis that is sufficientSimplified analysis that is sufficient Reasonable expectations for EFRDs Reasonable expectations for EFRDs (installation, (installation,
capability to reduce spills size, and document)capability to reduce spills size, and document)
NeedsNeeds Simplified analysis that is sufficientSimplified analysis that is sufficient Reasonable expectations for EFRDs Reasonable expectations for EFRDs (installation, (installation,
capability to reduce spills size, and document)capability to reduce spills size, and document)
7777
Challenge: Preventive and Challenge: Preventive and Mitigative ActionsMitigative Actions
ObservationsObservations Operators have never done just the minimum; so Operators have never done just the minimum; so
existing actions may be enoughexisting actions may be enough Existing actions have resulted in the long term Existing actions have resulted in the long term
trend in accident reductionstrend in accident reductions
NeedsNeeds Reasonable expectations based on an already Reasonable expectations based on an already
improving record industry-wideimproving record industry-wide Don’t go overboard on evaluation or Don’t go overboard on evaluation or
documentation; let the operator’s performance be documentation; let the operator’s performance be a significant portion of the documentation.a significant portion of the documentation.
7878
Challenge: Challenge: Continuing ImprovementContinuing Improvement
ObservationsObservations PPTS and analytical capability in placePPTS and analytical capability in place Trends currently in the right directionTrends currently in the right direction
NeedsNeeds Fight complacencyFight complacency Exploit data and informationExploit data and information Encourage experimentation and Encourage experimentation and
innovationinnovation
7979
What do we do?What do we do?
We transport We transport flammableflammable, hazardous, , hazardous, usefuluseful products to customers under strict products to customers under strict
federal and state requirements through federal and state requirements through townstowns, cities, , cities, neighborhoodsneighborhoods, and cross , and cross
country where country where peoplepeople live, work and live, work and play.play.
We MUST do it safely and reliably.We MUST do it safely and reliably.
8080
Our vision is an oil pipeline Our vision is an oil pipeline industry thatindustry that -- -- conducts operations safely and with conducts operations safely and with
respect for the environment;respect for the environment; respects the privilege to operate respects the privilege to operate
granted to it by the public; andgranted to it by the public; and provides reliable transportation of the provides reliable transportation of the
crude oil and refined products upon crude oil and refined products upon which America and all Americans which America and all Americans rely.rely.
8181
1990-2004
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