Introduction: Ramus, Perelman and Argumentation, aWay Through the Wood

In the same year as Walter J. Ong brought out his two seminal studies on thecontroversial sixteenth-century French philosopher and educator, Peter Ramus(Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue and Ramus and Talon Inventory,Ong 1958a and 1958b), Chaim Perelman, together with Mme Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, published La Nouvelle Rhe'torique. Traite de l'argumentation (Perelman1958), which incidentally attaches some importance to Ramus. Since that timeresearch in both of these areas, and also in the history of logic and rhetoric, hascontinued to flourish, more often than not independently.

Ten years later Cesare Vasoli opened his major work on Renaissance dialecticand rhetoric (Vasoli 1968) with an epigraph taken from Perelman's book,concerning the relation between natural or rational order and the abstractaudience, and in his preface he made the following comment:

Le indagini di un moderno teorico dell'argomentazione, come Chaim Perelman,possono infatti insegnarci che molti dei problemi dibattuti dai maestri umanistici delRinascimento tornano di nuovo a presentarsi, sia pure entro confini assai pit definitidi una teoria generale e compiuta della scienza logica, e che con essi debbono ancorafare i loro conti gli studiosi della society, i teorici della "communicazione", i giuristi, ifilosofi della morale e della politica. Per non parlare, poi, di altre attivith o professionidi grande importanza in una society sempre piu aperta alla temibile suggestione ditutte le tecniche di propaganda, sempre piu bisognosa di "registrare" e di "ordinare"une massa immane di nozioni e di notizie, ma anche di criticarle e discuterle. (p. 4)

There is something quite appropriate in this association of Perelman's namewith that of Ramus, since Perelman's foundation and elaboration of the 'NewRhetoric' in the 1950s has much in common with Ramus' reorganization ofrhetoric and dialectic four hundred years earlier.

We are pleased therefore to be able to open this special number devoted toRamus with an article by Perelman, the last one he wrote. In this article hedescribes how Ramus removed from rhetoric two of its traditional parts(invention and disposition) and placed them in logic, thus ensuring the ultimaterestriction of rhetoric to elocutio, and effectively to ornamentation, and also howhe confused the subject-matter and purpose of logic and dialectic. The result ofthis was, firstly, that he blurred the distinction between what is certain and whatis probable, thus aggressively rejecting Aristotle's careful analyses, and,secondly, that Ramus may be seen as instrumental in bringing about the declineof rhetoric and in delaying by several centuries the revival of the study ofargumentation theory. It is fascinating to notice that this objection about theconfusion of logic and dialectic was of concern to some of Ramus' contem-poraries, and was already formulated in 1554 by his principal critic, JacquesCharpentier, in his Aninmadversiones in libros tres Dialecticarum institutionumPetriRami (cf. Ong 1958a, pp. 221-3; Vasoli 1968, p. 469).

Argumentation 5: 335-345, 1991.© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Perelman was right to underline the importance of Ramus for argumentation.Ramus was a beneficiary of the late medieval scholastic tradition in logic, afollower of the new humanist topical logic originating in Germany, and, on thesurface at least, a prominent critic of Greek and Roman logic and rhetoric; hewrote extensively on the subject and so provocatively that in spite of hislimitations, not to say his inadequacy, he came to be considered as dialectic andmethod personified. The same could be said about rhetoric, though this honourusually goes to his close collaborator Omer Talon. There is, however, somethingnegative about Perelman's thesis here, and in his many articles in which Ramusfigures over thirty years. If Ramus caused the disintegration of rhetoric andsabotaged argumentation, why does he deserve so much attention? The answer, Ibelieve, is to be found in the broad historical sweep presented by the articles inthis volume. Ramus is not to be held solely responsible for such a vast culturaland educational transformation, which had been going on for centuries; asPerelman hints quite plainly, here and elsewhere, Ramus is often not theoriginator of the new ideas he popularizes. He emerges from the present pagesas a writer and thinker who is shaped by the thought of his own time every bit asmuch as he shapes it. His true importance lies in his positive treatment of bothdemonstration and persuasion, as will become clear, and in the influence heexercised in his own day, and in the following two centuries, on the study ofdiscourse and communication. Perelman's article helps to define Ramus' placein a long intellectual tradition; the following articles analyse Ramus' thought initself, in its antecedents and in its influence.

Kees Meerhoff writes about the European world of learning of the 1530s and1540s from which Ramus drew much of his inspiration. This detailed, well-documented account of his predecessors in Germany and the Low Countries,principally Agricola and Melanchthon, but also Sturm, Latomus and others whoprovided the link with Paris, gives an insight into the contemporary debatesabout dialectic and logic (to which it was by then normally assimilated), andalso rhetoric, at the meeting-place of which one may discover the Renaissanceview of argumentation. An incidental feature of Meerhoff's study is that itinforms us about specialist publishing and bookselling which helped to nourishthe lively academic discussions on the subject, and the spread of the new ideas.

Meerhoff rightly sees Ramus as a product of his time and not merely as anisolated innovator. His implied claim that he was self-taught cannot be sus-tained: his continuing dialogue with the texts of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian andothers contradicts this, as does the permeating presence in his work, generallyunacknowledged, of his immediate forerunners, and even of his contemporariesin Paris. An excellent example of this is the central doctrine of krypsis, whichunderlies his theory of the method of prudence; the doctrine was to be found inAristotle, and, as Meerhoff demonstrates, was well-known to Ramus' Germanmasters. Meerhoff goes on to show that however important Ramus was he mustnot be seen as the great illuminator that his first biographer would have likedhim to be.

The wide range of Ramus's interests is further exemplified by Philippe

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Desan's analysis of a little-discussed ethical work, the Traite des meurs etfalcons des anciens Gaulois, in which Ramus attempts to establish an historicaland sociological justification for his reforms in philosophy and education; at thesame time the work provides an example of his deductive methodology inaction. The book represents Ramus's new and programmatic definition of thenational identity and mentality. It is concerned with the supposed cultural originof the Gauls and their chronological precedence over the Greeks. This treatiseon morals is structured round the four virtues, already listed in classical treatises,which Christian writers adopted as the cardinal virtues, prudence, justice,fortitude and temperance. It is the first two which are of the greatest interest forRamus' ideology and indeed for argumentation. Desan sees prudence as centralto Ramus's views on education, because of its role in rendering pupils receptiveto the knowledge which is being transmitted to them; it is most in evidence inrhetoric, but also in logic, mathematics, physics and theology, or, moregenerally, in 'philosophy'. Prudence has its place in platonic dialogue, but isparticularly at home in the oral tradition of learning rather than in written texts.However, it is justice which binds a civilization together socially and politicallyand pervades cultural attitudes. By his analysis of these two qualities Desansuggests a new understanding of how Ramus saw his own society as well as thatof the ancient Gauls.

Guido Oldrini's article complements Desan's by describing the social andpolitical conditions which helped to fashion Ramus' theories about dialectic andargumentation, as well as about education. The author treats the questionhistorically and intertextually, moving from late scholasticism to earlyhumanism, and then beyond, to Ramus himself and the controversies which socoloured his own life-time and lasted for several decades after his death. Ramusand Ramism must be taken together for the two are inextricably linked. He wasabove all a teacher, educational theorist and professional communicator, whoseinsistence on the practical application of all learning was stronger even than thecommon Renaissance attitude, and his belief in the one and only method ofteaching all disciplines opened the way for specialists of very different subjectsto apply his principles in their work. His influence on the study of mathematics,law, historiography and theology was real and far-reaching. As Oldrini pointsout, his theory of method is a key-concept for understanding sixteenth-centuryapproaches to discourse and argumentation: it was in his life-time that methodunderwent a fundamental shift of meaning, from its origins in efficaciousmedical practice and, later, teaching, and in the teaching of rhetoric, to itsheuristic role in science (cf. also Ong, 1958a, pp. 226-7, 230-1). In a highlyoriginal concluding section Oldrini relates Ramus' methodology in theory andpractice to the changing social and professional status of the teacher.

Sylvain Matton writes about how Ramus' method was put into practice byscholars and writers of scientific works, especially in Germany. The concentra-tion here is on the pseudo-science of alchemy and the origins of modemchemistry. Ramus himself was not directly engaged in writing about chemistry,or any other science, but the writers here discussed usually acknowledged the

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influence of his dialectical method on their own method of exposition andappealed to his authority in their justification. In his Scholae physicae Ramuscriticised Aristotle on the grounds that his Physics were sophistical, abstract andnot based on the observation of heavenly bodies, minerals, plants, animals andmen, but this is as far as Ramus went. His philosophical approach purported toembrace nature, art and exercise, but his empiricism, such as it was, remainedtheoretical and literary, in which he resembled the Aristotelians he so oftenderided. Matton shows that the Ramists, with the exception of Alsted, weremore down to earth than the Paracelsians, and did not accept the symbolism,mysticism or gnosticism which often characterised them. The followers ofRamus shared his concern for language and realised the importance of the artessermocinales in the persuasive transmission of truth. Matton sees alchemy as alinking art, somewhere between Ramus' exoteric arts (the trivium) and esotericor acroamatic arts (mathematics and some applied sciences). This discussion ofthe classification of the sciences and their internal divisions (see in particularAlsted's elaborate schemes) is a pointer to different methodologies and kinds ofargumentation. The method of exposition is chosen, not just for clear demonstra-tion, but in order to persuade other scholars, and the consensus of philosophers,or 'right reason', is often the final court of appeal. Of great interest isGoclenius's Conciliator philosophicus (1609) with its attempt to reconcileconflicting arguments.

What all these writers have in common, in spite of their great differences, istheir acceptance of the Ramist method of exposition, with its dichotomies,divisions and subdivisions which became so familiar in the second half of thesixteenth century. It will be readily seen that this binary structure is furthersupported by reference to Ramus' classification of arguments (causes, effects,subjects, adjuncts and the rest). There is a substantial appendix to this article,taken from the works of Keckermann, which is an excellent example ad vivumof this sort of argumentation, with its syllogistic pattern of necessary arguments.Keckermann's concluding sentence is 'Ils se trompent ceux qui soutiennent quecela peut tre accompli par I'art seul'. Here is the crux of the whole Ramistdebate, since 'art' is synonymous with 'method' and with 'teaching', and we canthus see the value and also the limits of Ramism. In Matton's words, Ramism'loin de d6boucher sur une m6thode scientifique, d6g6ndra rapidement en unproc6d6 essentiellement p6dagogique et rh6torique'. It should be said, however,that he did help to alert men's minds to the problems involved and thus assist thetransition from the humanist mise-au-point of ancient science to the so-calledscientific revolution; his enthusiasm for optics and astronomy inspired his giftedpupils who carried the study of them further, and he helped to prosper theacademic development of these disciplines, establishing links between scientificcircles in Germany and France. His attempt to come to terms with the theoreticalprinciples of Aristotle's Physics and the logical structure of this book, hisinterest in the observation of nature (though not properly in experimentation)and his combination of deductive and inductive approaches (outlined byHooykaas) should all be seen in the light of his theory of method.

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Ramus did, of course, publish several works on mathematics, and they toowould be worth looking at from the point of view of argumentation. Verdonk'sstudy of Ramus' mathematics, written in Dutch, has still not reached the widerpublic which would be interested in it, and very few scholars have given theirattention to the subject. Jean-Claude Margolin has published an article whichsituates him in the mathematical world of Renaissance France (Margolin 1976)but there is still much more to be said on the application of his dialecticalmethod in mathematics. As Nicholas Jardine says, 'Both the content andfortunes of Ramus' epistemology of mathematics deserve further study' (inSchmitt and Skinner 1988, p. 706). A preliminary outline of the problem may befound in Bruyere 1984, 359-64.

The articles published in this number confirm the relevance of Ramus to thestudy of argumentation. In spite of his narrow view of rhetoric, his confusion oflogic and dialectic, and his lack of a clearly formulated and distinctive theory ofargumentation, there are several ways in which he reflects the interests ofstudents of argumentation. Firstly, Ramist logic is sometimes described as arhetoric-logic, or, in other words, his dialectic or logic is simply a kind ofrhetoric. Ramus often repeated that he thought all arts should be kept separate intheory (after the analogy of Solon's law which decreed that buildings in Athensshould be clearly detached from one another) but that since they have a commonultimate aim they should be united in practice. It is possible to argue as Meer-hoff does (1986, pp. 183, 188 and 206-7) that he is more interested in thetheoretical separation than in the joining together, but as far as rhetoric anddialectic are concerned he has succeeded in the spirit of the humanist age inwhich he lived, in making logic more rhetorical, transferring to it materialtraditionally studied in rhetoric (cf. Ong 1958a, pp. 106, 125, 281). The materialhas not disappeared and is still there for the study of argumentation. A parallelassimilation may be discerned in the work of Perelman himself as Frans vanEemeren has shown when he noted that it would have been possible to call thenew rhetoric a new dialectic, and commented that the authors 'place dialectic ina rhetorical framework' (van Eemeren 1987, pp. 211-2, 266). Secondly, hisattitude to the relation between logic and dialectic, and between a combinationof these and rhetoric, is ambivalent and changing, and one is never quite surewhether he is more concerned with achieving certainty or is content with opinonand probability. Dialectic is the art of discourse, but, ta2X/agct according toCicero's definition, which Ramus follows, means not only 'disserere', but also'disputare, disceptare, atque omnino ratione uti' and is concerned with distin-guishing what is true from what is false. As Ong says,

The statement that dialectic is concerned with resolving questions, with what isdoubtful, will occur again and again in Ramus' works. That dialectic, and indeed allscience, has somehow to do with what is doubtful, is a position commonly taken sinceantiquity and one with which even today everyone might agree. The more urgentproblem was not whether dialectic aimed at solving what was doubtful but whetherthe solution it gave was itself certain with the certainty of scientific logic, or onlyprobable - and to that extent still doubtful [...] Ramus agitates the matter enough to

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suggest that dialectic secures absolute certainty, but he never really shows that it does.(Ong 1958a, p. 176; cf. Bruyere 1984, pp. 212-22 and Vasoli 1968, p. 372)

Some of the ambiguity comes perhaps from Ramus' attitude to fides with itsdouble sense of rhetorical persuasion or conviction, and theological certainty (cf.Ong 1958a, p. 61 and p. 355). Thirdly, his account of rhetorical tropes andfigures, a Renaissance recasting of classical schemes (cf. Ong 1958a,pp. 270-92 and Meerhoff 1986, pp. 175-330), however traditional and unadven-turous, may profitably be compared with some modem accounts of persuasivearguments with which it overlaps, though as Ong says 'How one or anothertrope or figure is related to one or another rhetorical effect is not attended to'(p. 274), and his rhetoric, like his dialectic, is not concerned with dialogue: 'TheRamist arts of discourse are monologue arts' (p. 287). This means that nohierarchy of values is established among his rhetorical arguments, that there islittle on the techniques of argumentation, or on the role of the listener. Fourthly,one can observe the evolution of Ramus' thought on the invention of arguments,as he studies, first, the Aristotelian categories, then the dialectico-rhetoricalplaces or loci, before establishing his own classification, which he then con-tinues to perfect. (It is method, of course, gu0-o5o, which provides a waythrough the wood of the arguments - see Ong 1958a, 118-121.) The systemwhich results from this coincides at different points with some modem argumen-tational schemata. Ramus' schemes were carefully elaborated and altered fromone edition to the next, partly as a result of his own after-thoughts and hiscontinuing dialogue with his own text, and partly because of the persistentcriticism of his fellow-academics. This is not unlike the attempt to redefinedifferent kinds of arguments in relation to one another in order to establish asscientific a basis as possible for theories of argumentation. Although it isunlikely that anyone would want to return to Ramus' paradigms as an aid to thestudy of argumentation today, they are noteworthy as a solid and significantexample of an early treatment of the subject. Fifthly, it is worth consideringRamus as a practising orator, conscious of the particular audience he wasaddressing, whether schoolboys, his colleagues at the College Royal, or theuniversal reasonable public. He was temperamentally argumentative, bullyingeven, in this very polemical age. We may like to label him 'adversarius' as manyof his contemporaries did, or call this approach 'eristic' (Perelman) or'agonistic' (Ong). In spite of his rejection of the medieval practice of scholasticdisputation, he revelled in verbal confrontation; his written speeches are rich indifferent kinds of argument, containing examples of juridical, deliberative andepideictic writing, and his commentaries show him dialoguing in a lively andimaginative manner, either with the ancient authorities on his subject, orsometimes with himself. All in all Ramus was an extraordinarily versatilepractitioner of argumentation. Sixthly, his educational theories, based on ususand exercitatio highlighted the presence of argumentation in pedagogic practice,and also as an abiding accomplishment of the pupils who passed through hishands. He discusses this idea in his celebrated speech in defence of the univer-

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sity of Paris when he says that at the end of his studies a pupil will be able to puthis acquired knowledge to the test 'in forum, in Senatum, in concionem populi,in omnem hominum conventum' (Ramus 1551, p. 49). Ramus was interestedboth in the natural logic and rhetoric which he thought all mankind shared(though in differing degrees even from birth) and in the application of the studyof logic and rhetoric to legal and political discourse. If his pupil chooses to goon to further study in law he will be able to follow the example of ancientorators, politicians, judges and magistrates, and take an active part in ruling andgoverning. The links between law and rhetorical logic, already manifest in thetime of Agricola are best seen in the work of Ramus' follower, AbrahamFraunce, author of The Lawiers Logike (1588) (cf. Ong 1958a, p. 124 andpp. 309-11). If, however, the pupil wishes to go on to the study of theology,then the relevance of his earlier studies in rhetoric and logic is equally, if notmore, evident, as he tries to achieve the particular aims of explanation, instruc-tion, dissuasion from vice and impiety, exhortation, and inspiration to love, andalways with a precise person or audience in mind. Once again this is argumenta-tion in practice. Ramus also wrote a substantial work of Protestant theology, hisCommentarii de religione Christiana, published posthumously in 1576, in whichwe can see his theories on method at work in his systematic analysis of articlesof faith, relying on Sacred Scripture and the early Church Fathers, but alsocalling on poets and orators, not as authorities or to prove anything, but to showthe direct human appeal of theology. His aim is schematization and logicalordering, but the argumentative tone is sometimes directed at the emotions inorder to persuade. A final practical application of the study of the artes ser-mocinales is further study in mathematics, astronomy, optics and the art ofwarfare. Seventhly and finally, it is worth looking at what Ramus has to sayabout the method of prudence, an idea which is in evidence in the presentvolume. In spite of his much publicised theory about there being one and onlyone method in the teaching of all disciplines, when he comes to discuss methodin his work on dialectic, Ramus does see two aspects of it, the method of nature(or of doctrine or teaching) which proceeds analytically and scientifically fromwhat is clear and best known to what is less so, and by which the certainty ofuniversal, eternal principles may be achieved, and the method of prudencewhich is much less rigorous and takes account of persons and the circumstancesof time and place. The method of prudence is later called 'mdthode cryptique';its purpose is persuasion and it is more concerned with probability or accep-tability than with certainty. It is a technique used by poets and orators and has itsplace in political and legal texts rather than in scientific ones. Is it not possible tosee here the basis of an embryonic theory of argumentation? Prudence is to beused in 'quotidianae contentiones hominum in iudiciis, laudationibus, consiliis,caeterisque rerum similium disputationibus', as he says in his Dialecticaeinstitutiones (quoted in Vasoli 1968, p. 389). Ramus shows the application ofthis doctrine in his ethical thinking (as Desan argues here) and it recurs in hisposthumous theological work as well as in his posthumous notes on Aristotle'sPolitica (1601). This doctrine is so important in the present context that I think it

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is worth indicating some of the places in which it is treated: Ong 1958a,pp. 245-7, 252-3 and 363-4; Dassonville 1964, pp. 150-3; Vasoli 1968,pp. 433-44, 501-4; Bruyere 1984, pp. 99-101; Meerhoff 1986, pp. 185-8;Desan 1987, pp. 85-9. A full study of the idea of prudence in Ramus would bewelcome.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

There is no single very recent work on the life, thought and influence of Ramuswhich would serve as a general introduction to the subject. The reader istherefore obliged to find his or her own way through specialised monographs onindividual aspects. Some initial guidance may be obtained from my two criticalbibliographical articles (Sharratt 1972 and 1987).

For students of argumentation the work in English of Walter Ong (Ong1958a) remains essential reading because he is primarily concerned with logicand rhetoric, with Ramus' relation to the scholastic tradition, and with changingattitudes to oral and written discourse. This book has been a major formativeinfluence on Ramus studies over the last thirty years. Moreover, Ong's historicalapproach ensures that Ramism is given the attention it deserves: even in Ramus'own life-time the exact authorship of particular works is sometimes hard toestablish, because of the corporate scholarly effort involved in their composi-tion, and complex editorial procedures, especially in collaboration with OmerTalon, but also with his secretary Nicolas de Nancel, and with Antoine Fou-quelin and others. After his death Ramus and Ramism were often treated asthough they were synonymous.

Also of interest for argumentation is the work of Cesare Vasoli, in particularhis book in Italian on Renaissance dialectic and rhetoric (Vasoli 1968) and alsomany articles which may be traced in my bibliography (Sharratt 1987). NellyBruyere (Robinet) has written a substantial work in French on Ramus' dialectic(Bruyere 1984) and it, too, is indispensable, making out the best possible casefor the value of Ramist logic and method. Mme Robinet plots the evolution ofRamus' doctrine, noting its platonizing tendencies though not playing down theAristotelianism, through his many re-orderings of his own thought in repeatedrevised editions. The scientific basis for this new approach to Ramus is aperfected stemmatology of editions provided by computerised analysis. It is infact vital to realize that Ramus' thought is not a monolithic block but was in astate of perpetual change; his life's work was, as it were, one long 'traitement detexte' since he corrected himself ceaselessly, sometimes publishing radicallyaltered versions within a short space of time, sometimes reverting to publishingearlier versions without warning.

Also in French there is Kees Meerhoff's study of Ramus' rhetoric, but in itsown right and in relation to French humanist literary theory, and this bookshould be of direct interest for argumentation; Meerhoff is well aware of theintricacies of the Ramist canon and its evolution over thirty years in dialoguewith the ancient rhetoricians (Meerhoff 1986).

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The relation between Ramus' educational theories and his 'pragmatichumanism' has been studied by Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine and is ofinterest in the present context because it describes the application of a teachingprogramme to public life and government (Grafton and Jardine 1986); theseideas have been carried further in Adams 1990. From a more theoretical point ofview Philippe Desan's book gives a new angle on Ramus, and is useful forargumentation since its analysis of Ramus' Dialectique sets it in a wide culturaland intellectual context, discussing political theory, jurisprudence, mathematics,theology and Montaigne's exploration of the self (Desan 1987).

There is much of relevance, too, in a special number of the Revue desSciences philosophiques et thiologiques, 70 (1986): the details will be found inSharratt 1987, but I should like to single out the article by Wilhelm Risse, well-known for his earlier studies on Renaissance logic, who here contributes anaccount of 'Petrus Ramus und sein Verhiltnis zur Schultradition' (49-65) whichraises fundamental epistemological questions, and compares Ramus withAristotle on definition and division and the laws of demonstration.

For those interested in present and future lines of research on Ramus andargumentation there is much of great interest and value in The CambridgeHistory of Renaissance Philosophy (Schmitt and Skinner 1988): here I shouldlike to mention the following articles - Cesare Vasoli, 'The Renaissance conceptof philosophy' (55-74); E. J. Ashworth, 'Traditional logic' (143-72); LisaJardine, 'Humanistic logic' (173-198, especially 184-6); Nicholas Jardine,'Epistemology of the sciences' (685-711), and Brian Vickers, 'Rhetoric andpoetics' (715-45) with many other references to argumentation (dialectical,mathematical, rhetorical) passim.

Finally, it may be useful to give some information for those who wish toknow how to find the work of Ramus in print. It must be said at the outset thatthere has never been a complete edition of the works of Ramus and it is unlikelythat there ever will be one because of the editorial problems involved.

For those wishing to track down the original editions there are two very usefulinventories (Ong 1958b and Bruybre 1986). Ong's work covers all books byRamus and Talon and much supplementary material on the Ramist con-troversies: it indicates locations in European and American libraries; Bruybre-Robinet's work has the benefit of computerisation, and is therefore morecomplete, but only for works on logic, and only for French libraries.

It is possible to read some of the principal works of Ramus in modemfacsimile editions. There are two partial collective works: Scholae in liberatesartes (Basel, 1569), reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim/New York, 1970,with an introduction by Walter Ong; (some of these Scholae have also beenreprinted by Minerva, Frankfort); Collectaneae praefationes, epistolae,orationes (Marburg, 1599), Hildesheim, 1969, also with an introduction by Ong,containing works by Ramus and Talon. There is also a reprint of the 1577 Parisedition by Slatkine, Geneva, 1971. Ramus' first works on logic have also beenreprinted: Dialecticae institutiones and Aristotelicae animadversiones (Paris,1543), Frommann, Stuttgart, 1964, with an introduction by Wilhelm Risse.

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There have been three reprints of an English translation of Ramus' work onlogic by Roland Mac Ilmaine: The Logike of the Most Excellente Philosopher P.Ramus Martyr (1574), San Fernando State College, California, 1969; Da CapoPress, New York, 1969; Scolar Press, Menston, 1970. Reprints of AbrahamFraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorike, and The Lawier's Logike (1588) have alsobeen published by the Scolar Press. Further information about other facsimilesand various microform editions can be obtained from Sharratt 1987, for examplea microfilm version of Fouquelin's La Rhitorique frangaise. To these may beadded La Dialectique (1557) and Grammatica Latino-Francica (1583),published by Editions I.C.S., Paris.

There have so far been very few modern editions of Ramus. The earliest wasMichel Dassonville's edition of La Dialectique (1555), Droz, Geneva, 1964; it isperhaps useful to know that there is also a reprint of the original edition,Slatkine, Geneva, 1972; the same publishers brought out reprints of Ramus'French Grammar (1562 and 1572) in the same year. Edilia Traverso has editedan anthology of texts on education and the reform of the university. Proposteper una riforma degli studi e dell'universitd, Milella, Lecce, 1979. Finally, thereis a modem edition with an English translation of the Rhetoricae Distinctionesin Quintilianum, which is published under the title Arguments in Rhetoricagainst Quintilian, edited by James J.J. Murphy with a translation by CaroleNewlands, Dekalb, Illinois, Northern Illinois University Press, 1986. Of equalinterest for students of argumentation will be the forthcoming edition by thesame two authors of Ramus' Brutinae Quaestiones, to be published by TheLibrary of Renaissance Humanism and scheduled for late 1991.

University of Edinburgh PETER SHARRATT

REFERENCES

Adams, J.C.: 1990, 'Gabriel Harvey's Ciceronianus and the place of Peter Ramus'Dialecticae libri duo in the curriculum', Renaissance Quarterly 43, 551-568.

Bruyere, N.: 1984, Mgthode et dialectique dans l'oeuvre de La Ramee, Vrin, Paris.Bruyere, N.: 1986, 'Le fonds Pierre de La Rame des bibliotheques de France', Nouvelles

de la Rdpublique des Lettres', pp. 71-97.Dassonville, M. (ed.): 1964, Pierre de La Ramee. La dialectique (1555), Droz, Geneva.Desan, P.: 1987, Naissance de la methode (Machiavel, La Ramde, Bodin, Montaigne,

Descartes), Nizet, Paris.Grafton, A., and Jardine, L.: 1986, From Humanism to the Humanities. Education and

the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe, Duckworth, London.Hooykaas, R.: 1958, Humanisme, science et rforme. Pierre de La Ramte (1515-1572),

Brill, Leiden.Margolin, J.-C.: 1976, 'L'Enseignement des mathematiques en France (1540-1570);

Charles de Bovelles, Fine, Peletier, Ramus', in P. Sharratt (ed.), French RenaissanceStudies (1540-1570). Humanism and the Encyclopedia, Edinburgh University Press,Edinburgh.

Meerhoff, K.: 1986, Rhetorique et poetique au XVIe siecle en France. Du Bellay, Ramuset les autres, Brill, Leiden.

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Ong, W.J.: 1958a, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, Mass.; reprinted Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1974, 1979;Harvard University Press, 1983.

Ong, W.J.: 1958b, Ramus and Talon Inventory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Mass.; reprinted Folcroft Press, Folcroft, PA, 1970.

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