23º IPSA World Congress

SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF BIG IMPACT AND MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES: DIFFUSION AND TRANSFER PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA

Samira Kauchakje Graduate Program in Urban Management

Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná / PUCPR Graduate Program in Political Science

Federal University of Paraná / UFPR

Evelise Zampier da Silva

Graduate Program in Urban Management Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná / PUCPR

Huascar Pessalli

Graduate Programs in Public Policy and Political Science

Federal University of Paraná / UFPR

Montreal Jully 19-24

2014

   

1  

SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF BIG IMPACT AND MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES: DIFFUSION AND TRANSFER PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA 1

Samira Kauchakje2

Evelise Zampier da Silva 3

Huascar Pessali 4

Abstract Since the 1990s policies such as CCT – Conditional Cash Transfers – have been converging, especially in Latin America. The fact has been explained in terms of convergence inductors such as: common problems; geographical proximity; lesson-drawing processes; ideological position of parties in governments and; diffusion by international organizations - IOs. In this paper, we discuss some explanatory variables in the process of diffusion and transfer of CCTs in Latin America from the 1990s, in particular, on the role of IOs. In the process of decision-making and policy formulation, governments may be guided by international established goals and follow the tendency to adopt policies seen as successful by the international community. IOs such as the World Bank and the United Nations, for instance, have disseminated the positive impacts of CCTs in poverty reduction. In some cases, those IOs’ prescriptions may have a coercive character, but they also work as a political drive to obtain support and build domestic consensus about such policies. Having the Theory of Policy Transfer and the Theory of Policy Diffusion as our analytical framework and supported by official documents from governments and the IOs, we claim that the convergence of CCT policies in Latin America can be better explained by a combination of inducting factors. Not only incentives from IOs have played a role, but also the ideological proximity of parties in power and peculiarities of CCT policies themselves. Our preliminary results support the role of such a myriad of convergence inductors and we expect that further research developments may indicate whether their individual influences are significantly different.

Keywords: international organizations; political ideology; income transfer; Latin America; policy diffusion; policy transfer

                                                                                                               1 This article presents part of the theoretical discussion and research data of Samira Kauchakje (Project in progress, funded by CNPq in the form of research productivity) and also the Evelise Zampier da Silva’s research master, under the guidance of Samira Kauchakje. Contribute to the development of research Paloma Govaski Ingrid Portugal (student of scientific initiation). 2 Political scientist. Professor at the Graduate Program in Urban Management at the Catholic University of Paraná / PUCPR and Graduate Program in Political Science from the Federal University of Paraná / UFPR. 3 Graduated in Law. Master student of the Program Graduate in Urban Management at the Catholic University of Paraná / PUCPR 4 Economist. Professor of the Graduate Program in Public Policy and Political Science at the Federal University of Paraná / UFPR  

   

2  

I. Introduction The observation and discussion of the literature on policies to fight poverty 5

identify the adoption of a similar type of policy by both Latin American governments on the right and left sides of the partisan-ideological spectrum6. The implementation of CCTs 7 - Conditional Cash Transfer - as an element of central visibility of social policy led to a decrease in variation of this type of policy between territorial spaces, temporal and various political-institutional settings. We are facing the phenomenon of convergence of a policy in which there are similarities of goals, processes and institutional arrangements in societies, even when different economic, political and cultural.

In general, policy convergence is understood as:

any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time towards some common point, regardless of the causal processes. (Knill, 2005: 5)

Knill (2005) and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) question: a) why different

countries develop similar policies; b) what explains the adoption of these policies by countries in a given period; c) under which conditions domestic policies converge or distance; d) why do countries converge on some policies and not in others?

This article starts from these inquiries and is based on initial findings and reflections arising from ongoing research guided by the question of the explanatory variables in the process of diffusion and transfer of CCTs in Latin America from the 1990s, in particular, on the role of IOs. The text is divided into two sections which present and discuss, first, aspects of the research method and then some variables and data on incidence and spread of CCTs in the region.

II. Justification and method The basis of this article is the research on sites of government departments of

Latin American countries and international organizations such as the World Bank and ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America. The documents accessed                                                                                                                5  We chose the term "political tackling" or "fight against poverty", considering that this terminology covers policies for reduction, elimination, relief, etc ..  6  ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean - enrolls 20 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Source: Profiles ODM them countries of Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC – United Nations. Retrieved from: http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getprod.asp?xml=/MDG/noticias/paginas/2/43582/P43582.xml&xsl=/MDG/tpl/p18f-st.xsl&base=/MDG/tpl/top-bottom.xsl  7  CCTs are characterized by direct provision of monetary values for low-income families, priority attention to children and youth, and conditions associated with the use of educational and health services.  

   

3  

are, mainly, official plan policies for cash transfer (CCTs), documents on CCTs in Latin America published or developed by international organizations, and scientific texts on governments and political parties in Latin America.

We have considered only Latin American to molds of CCT programs nationwide, implemented since 19908. We have adopted the following definition of CCT:

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) provide cash to participants upon their fulfillment of a set of conditions or co-responsibilities. Examples include programs that combine one or more conditions such as ensuring a minimum level of school attendance by children, undertaking regular visits to health facilities, or attending skills training programs; conditional cash transfers also include school stipend programs. (Gentilini; Honorati; Yemtsov, 2014: 7)

The chosen region calls attention to the international highlight of countries like

Mexico, initially, and Brazil, nowadays, as centers of diffusion and successful examples of CCTs 9. Moreover, according to Gentilini and others (2014), in 2014 Latin America and the Caribbean concentrated 36.5% of CCTs reported worldwide, in other words, "conditional cash transfers are still a" trademark "of the Latin America region. .. "(Gentilini; Honorati; Yemtsov (2014: 9) (figure 1).10

                                                                                                               8 In the survey will be included in the analysis programs of parties, possession speeches of heads of government and their messages at the annual opening session of the legislature, in selected countries among representatives of governments with ideologically partisan positions to the right and left in Latin American countries. 9 Documents of the UN, World Bank and IMF have been disclosed in this sense, eg UN (2011) and Canuto (2013). 10 Data from our study differ from those presented by the mentioned authors and will be discussed in the next section.

   

4  

Fig 1: Number of Countries with Conditional Cash Transfers, by Region (2014) Fonte: Gentilini; Honorati; Yemtsov (2014, p. 10)

The selected period coincides with the central years of implementation and with the wave of diffusion of CCTs in Latin America

The analysis is driven by the hypothesis that considers the convergence of this policy in the region as a result not only of an inducing factor, but for some suitable conditions, such as the induction of International Organizations (IOs), the party-political ideology of governments, and certain characteristics of the policy itself of CCTs type.

III. CCTs in Latin America: explanatory factors of diffusion and

convergence Authors linked to theories about diffusion and transfer policies, such as Knill

(2005: 8) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) mention several explanatory factors or inducers of policy convergence. They are: a) geographic proximity; b) institutional similarities, of policies, cultural and economic among analyzed units; c) similar responses, but independent from different units to pressures and similar problems; d) harmonization of domestic policies on behalf of international and supranational documents agreed in multilateral negotiations; e) mutual adjustments and competition arising from economic integration; f) characteristics and content of public policies themselves; g) mechanisms for the dissemination and transfer of policies linked to processes of lesson-drawing, formation of an epistemic community and policy network, reinforce or imposition of international organizations and emulation of policy models and; h) standards and common ideology among political elites.

The studies of Gonnet (2012), Weyland (2006), and Stone (2004) on the diffusion of CCTs and other social policies in Latin America have been devoted more to analyze the role played by IOs. In fact, for the case of CCTs, there is evidence of

   

5  

the importance, above all, the international financial institutions in the dissemination and transfer of these policies. However, stimulation of IOs does not clarify the temporal coincidence of the ascension wave of leftist governments with the wave of diffusion of CCTs in the region. This also does not elucidate the specific ways in which this policy can be implemented by governments with different political party positions. Therefore, we examined some triggering factors or facilitators of policy convergence, understood here as a dependent variable.

Geographical proximity seems to be a facilitator in spreading and convergence of CCTs in Latin American regional bloc (map 1).

Map 1. Location of programs of CCTs type between 1997 and 2008. Source: Fiszbein (2009)

   

6  

In the Latin American region there is diversity in economic development, the position in the context of international relations and cultural specificity make it difficult to suppose that the shared general cultural traces and institutional would have strength to facilitate convergence.

In the region also there is a certain unit less due to the deliberate policy integration and more to the similar history of the formation of societies and some political institutions. for the case of this policy, a common element in the Latin American context that can be highlighted is the historical trajectory of social policies and legislation. According to Knill (2005: 7)

…converging policy developments are more likely for countries that are characterized by high institutional similarity. [...] Moreover, cultural similarity plays an important role in facilitating cross-national policy transfer. [...] similarity in socioeconomic structures and development has been identified as a factor that facilitates the transfer of policies across countries. However, this common institutional and cultural legacy within the social policy

system would not favor the dissemination of a policy with the characteristic and content of CCTs.

CCTs have aspects of redistributive policy (Lowi, 1964) and compensatory and focused characteristic with extensive, ongoing and personalized coverage of impoverished sectors. Policies with these characteristics carry a potential for conflict and, therefore, tend to encounter great difficulties to spread and to converge (Knill 2005: 7).

The content of the policy also would not be a facilitator in a region that traditionally rejects the idea of monetary gain dissociated from work or property and associated with the notion of law guaranteed by the state (particularly for the working class or lower/without income). In general, the rejection is not only in the social democratic welfare model with redistributive perspective of universality but also in the states of well-being stricter regarding the public provisions and the target groups.

The history and the social legislation, past and current, in most of these countries show that between models of welfare state treated by Esping-Anderson (1991), the largest rejection is by public social protection systems of universal coverage. However, even more protective limited systems - focusing on specific groups and reduced monetary values compared with the patterns of services and resources of citizenship achieved in a society - suffer resistance by a portion of the population who believes that the beneficiaries need intermittent charity or they are profiteers "abutting the State" as studies of Kings (2000) and Rego (2013), among others.

The Report of the United Nations Program for Development - UNDP (2004: 123) points out that "for the vast majority of Latin Americans, employment is the way to fight poverty and to leave it." The question, therefore, is concerned for the values, traditional beliefs and political culture in this region. In Brazil, for instance, social rights were included in the list of fundamental rights for the first time in the Federal Constitution of 1988.

In a contrasting way, in countries where redistributive and universal policies are part of the institutional, cultural and political trajectory movements emerge as the Basic Income Earth Network and the Global Basic Income Foundation. They advocate the establishment of cash transfer programs independent from income of beneficiaries and involving transfer of resources - disassociated from work - the

   

7  

expansion of individual freedom and a redistributive conception of social justice (PAREIJS, 2005).

Before the legal-institutional and cultural basis in the recent past and even today, the capacity of Latin American governments to implement CCTs due to, in a counter-intuitive way, just to its content. In the period when this program spreads two international consensus were built - not always encouraged by the same agents or in an articulated way, but, it seems, leveraging each other. On the one hand, there was a consensus on the fight against poverty (reduction or elimination) via active government policies and, secondly, about the "need" to limit the scope of public social protection. The content of this program meets these two consensus embodied to the right and to the left of the ideological spectrum. To the right, they are contemplated in the formulation of selective government policies and in regarding the targets of social provision with weakening of universal coverage. Although to the left they are met by the composition of state policies aiming to provide social citizenship via guaranteed income in countries that, until then, had happened prioritly through labor legislation and, more or less sufficiency and quality through access to social services (education, health and housing, basically).

This convergence process may cause less strangeness if we assume that the diffusion and transfer of a government policy from one location to another does not always result in the absorption of the policy in its entirety of the components.These components are filtered and shaped in the internal political process in each context. Roughly, these components are divided into two categories: i) hard - that is, content, tools and institutional arrangements of the policy and; ii) soft - goals, ideologies, ideas, norms, concepts and principles of politicy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone 2001). Thus, there may be transfer and convergence of design and institutions in various places, without the ideological principles be the same. It seems to be the case of spreading of CCTs and their implementation by governments on both to the left and to the right of partisan-ideological spectrum, as illustrated by the cases of Chile and Brazil. Pinochet’s Chile established the Single Family Allowance in 1981 and in 2005 the government to the left of Ricardo Lagos deployed Solidarity Chile. In Brazil, the National Policy School Grant (2001) was implemented by the center-right government of Cardoso and Lula government, to the left, initiated the Family Grant in 2003. In these two cases, policies of CCT types of to the left governments have gained greater scope in terms of policy design aimed to tackle poverty, as well as in terms of coverage and effectiveness in relation to the proposed objectives, as reported by international organizations whose documents are mentioned throughout the text. This appears to be a trend linked to their own ideologies and party programs, however, not a necessity, as demonstrated in Mexico by the Progresa program and its version of greater amplitude called Opportunities, which were implemented by governments to the right. In this sense, Lavinas (2014: 11) notes that "it was in Brazil [with the Family grant] and Mexico [with Opportunities] that income-support schemes were first extended on a large scale ..."

In this work, the starting point of policy implementation of CCTs type in each country is the date disclosed as such in documents cited as the source. There are differences in them, often, because of the understanding that what would be CCTs. Because of this, we did a few options using as criteria our understanding of this

   

8  

policy and the recurrence of the information in the documents11. For instance, it was considered as starting point for Brazil the School Grant (Bolsa Escola); for Chile, the Solidary Chile program (Chile Solidario) (Table 2) 12. Table 2 Examples of CCT policy type in Latin America since the 1990s Programs (starting and ending years) Country

School Grant /Bolsa Escola (2001-2003)

Food Grant /Bolsa alimentação (2001-2003)

Family Grant /Bolsa Família (2003)

Brazil

Progresa - Opportunities (1997) Mexico

Juancito Pinto Grant (2006)

Juana Azurduy de Padilla Mother-and-Child Grant (2009 -)

Bolivia

Solidary Chile /Chile Solidario (2002 -) Chile

Tekopora (2005 -)

Abrazo (2005 -)

Paraguay

Families in Action /Familias en Accion (2001 -)

Conditional Subsidies for School Attendance (2005 -)

Juntos Network /Juntos (2007)

Join for Social Prosperity / Ingreso para la Prosperidad Social (2011)

Colombia

Families for Social Inclusion; Unemployed Heads of Household /Programa Jefes e Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (2002-2005) Family plan /Plan Familias por la Inclusion Social (2005-2010)

Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection /Asignación Universal por Hijo para Proteccion Social (2009 - )

Argentina

Together /Juntos (2005 -) Peru

Solidarity Grant /Bono Solidario (1998-2002)

Human Development Grant (Bono de Desarrolo Humano) (2003 – )

Ecuador

Social protection network /Red de Proteción Social (2000-2006);

Crisis Response System (2005-2006)

Nicaragua

Family Allowance Programme /Asignación Famílias (1990 -)

Bonus 10.000 / Bono 10.000 (2010 -)

Honduras

Overcome/ Superémonos (2000-2006)

Advance/ Avancemos (2006 -)

Costa Rica

My Family Makes Progress /Mi Familia Progresa (2008 -)

My Secure Bond /Mi Bono Seguro (2012 -)

Guatemala

                                                                                                               11  Because of these criteria and knowledge on all the programs in this phase of the study, we excluded the Bolivariana Grant/ Bolsa Bolivariana in Venezuela, from 2001, for being related to food subsidy without conditionalities.  12 Tables and figures about CCTs in relation to the ideological-partisan position of rulers are temporary; data will be revised and supplemented. .

   

9  

Solidary network / Comunidades Solidarias (2005 -) El Salvador

Opportunity network /Red de Oportunidades (2006 -) Panama

Attendance card/ Tarjeta de Asistencia Escolar

Solidarity Program / Solidaridad (2005 - )

Dominican Republic

National Social Emergency Response Plan

/Plan de Atencion Nacional a la Emergencia Social (2005-2007)

Family Allowances /Asignaciones Familiares (2008 -)

Uruguay

Ti Manman Cheri (2012) Haiti

Source: the authors and Kauchakje (2014). Data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009)

The first modalities of CCTs nationwide were implemented in 18 of 20 countries of Latin America. In ten (55.61%) the program was initiated by governments to the right or center-right and in eight (44.4%) by to the left governments or center-left (Table 3 and Figure 3). Table 3. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990s (initial year of implementation and in 2014) Country/ CCT Year of implementation 2014

Partisan-ideological

position of governments

Partisan-ideological position of

governments

Honduras 1990 R R Mexico 1997 L L Ecuador 1998 R R Nicaragua 2000 L Disabled Costa Rica 2000 R R Colombia 2001 R R Dominican Republic 2001 R R

Brazil 2001 R L Chile 2002 L L Argentina 2002 L L Peru 2005 R L Uruguay 2005 L L El Salvador 2005 R L Paraguay 2005 R R Bolivia 2006 L L Panama 2006 L R Guatemala 2008 L L Haiti 2012 R R Total 8L-10R 9L-8R

Source: elaborated by the authors. Data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009)

   

10  

Figure 3. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990´s (initial year of implementation) Source: elaborated by the authors from data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009) (excludes ECLAC)

From the 2000s there is the rise of a wave of to the left governments in Latin America and jointly during this period, compared to the previous decade, there is a wave of CCTs diffusion in the region. The data presented do not demonstrate a causal connection of time. However, the rise to the left causes a quantitative inversion at the end of the period examined in relation to the initial years of CCTs implementation, because in 2014 from the seventeen13 Latin American countries that have implemented this policy, eight (47.1%) have governments to the right or center-right and nine (52.9%) to the left or center-left. The ideological-partisan position of most governments did not change when only observed the year of initial implementation of this policy and the current year. The change occurred in four countries with governments to the left: Brazil, El Salvador and Peru. There was also a change in Panama, however, the ideological position of the ruling party that implemented CCT was to the left and in 2014 it is to the right (Figure 4).

                                                                                                               13 Nicaragua has implemented two CCTs, one in 2000 and another in 2005 (both active until 2006).

0  

2  

4  

6  

8  

10  

12  

14  

16  

18  

20  

1990   1997   1998   2000   2001   2002   2005   2006   2008   2012   total  

Total  a  year  

Right/  Center-­‐right  (D-­‐CD)  

Left/  Center-­‐left  (E-­‐CE)  

   

11  

Figure 4. Partisan-ideological position of governments in Latin America that have implemented policies of CCT type nationwide from the 1990s (initial year of implementation and in 2014) Source: elaborated by the authors data of Cecchini; Madariaga (2011); Fiszbein (2009); ECLAC (2011)

Weyland (2011, 2010), Lanzaro (2013) and Silva (2009), among others, have

worked the differences and similarities of current Latin American to the left governments and their classification in moderate (or social democratic) and radical (or populist). This classification is based both on objective elements of trajectory of party, political preferences and policies implemented, as in normative elements.

The moderate left - Governments of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua and perhaps Argentina - is pragmatic, advocates gradual reforms, consents to economic liberalism and formulates economic and social policies stimulating the economy, focused on income security of impoverished groups to the reduction of inequality. Its ideas and practices can be inserted on the list of social democracy that is, seeking to introduce redistributive reform within the sociopolitical generator market of concentration of wealth system. They are institutionalized left parties that make adjustments of their programs to electoral strategies within institutionalized party and electoral systems, in other words, they have a duration, stability, legitimacy and strength of organization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

In turn, the radical left - governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador - question the representative liberal democracy and market economy, and also formulate social and economic policies that prioritize people who have paths of impoverishment assigned to the dynamics of economic relations, ethnic and social laws. The countries representatives of this left type have electoral and partisan systems with a comparatively lesser degree of institutionalization.

Honduras  

Mexico  

Ecuador  

Nicaragua  

Costa  Rica  

Colombia  

Dominican  Republic  

Brazil  

Argentina  

Chile  

Peru  

Uruguay  

El  Salvador  

Paraguay  

Bolivia  

Panama  

Guatem

ala  

E/CE  2014  

D/CD  2014  

Left/  Center-­‐Left        E/CE-­‐  Implementation  

Right/  Center-­‐Right  D/CD-­‐  Implementation    

   

12  

It is worth remembering that with more or less institutionalized and despite the ideological-partisan position, preferences and behavior of governments are structured for electoral and partisan systems. Government policies - within the decision-making process - can be seen as conduct that expresses preferences.

According to Przeworski (1995), the state capacity is the ability to formulate goals and to implement those goals. Skocpol (1985:9) for example, defines state capacity as its ability to "Implement goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances". Government policies thus, reflect the capacity of governments to convert the potential of a set of institutions, resources and political practices "in ability to define, implement and sustain policies" (Santos 1997: 5).

Evidence of preference based on ideological-partisan position of rulers may elucidate the capacity of governments to shape and implement policies (CCTs) according to formulated goals. In the processes that lead to the convergence of CCTs in Latin America the interests, preferences and multiple objectives seem to be absorbed in the formulation of the same type of policy. However, it is possible that different and conflicting conceptions regarding the role of the state, program purpose, target population and definition of poverty, for example, are wrapped in the same set of conditional cash transfer programs. These elements may be able to shape themselves variations in CCT.

In this sense, despite the apparent convergent homogeneity of CCTs in the region there would be differences in the way how the left and right governments compatibilize and incorporate the institutional components and principles of this policy. The disposition to the right to formulate CCTs may be linked to preference for implementing policies that require low investment and targeted coverage that minimizes universal principles of social policy. Paradoxically, these same aspects are appealing to the left, because on the one hand, the call for reduction or eradication of poverty is compatible with its political project and, secondly, the focus (rather than, for example, the universal income of citizenship) and low cost enable the government to implement the policy without increasing taxes that unpleased the economic sectors.

The adoption of CCTs by governments to the left (used as a comparison parameter) tends to be normatively and assumption justified in terms of i) social citizenship and strengthening of the capacity of the state to carry out economic and social policies (in order to articulate the economic policy under a social policy, and not the opposite), ensuring untied income from work and also change the pattern of the labor market and the distribution and appropriation of property; ii) poverty as a violation of rights and the effect of socioeconomic dynamics of long duration and no accountability or individual disability; iii) universality via articulation of targeted policies with universal principles policies and also the inclusion of CCTs in the system and in the legislation of social protection and; iv) political project, in some countries, to establish or strengthen social democrat institutions, and others to leverage steps toward structural change.

Such values and "soft" components of CCTs can have varying degrees of compatibility with various parties and governments to the left. It is assumed that the distance of this congruence is smaller within the set of these governments than those governments to the right, existing proximity when positioned around the center (following the general political behavior discussed in Downs, 1999 and Bobbio, 1995).

   

13  

Finally, the characteristics of CCTs - low cost and target group defined in the population in the range of poverty or misery, for example - have made such policies attractive to governments from right to left in a Latin American context. This context was marked, internally, by the consolidation of democratic procedures, and, externally, by the existence of a consensus sponsored by international financial institutions (Fagnani, 2005) about the supposed need for deconstruction of universal social policies combined with the deregulation of the economy and the alleviation of poverty. In other words, in a society with indicators of poverty and inequality compared accented, both the regularity of electoral competition and the possibility of alternation of power (which brings demand of responsiveness of rulers in the sense of rational calculation14) as the international incentive for targeted policies favored spreading the CCT policies type.

One form of pressure and stimulation to the diffusion and transfer of policy are international agreements on targets on poverty. 15 In particular, it highlights the dissemination by international financial institutions (IFIs) of information about positive impacts of CCTs and their suitability to the prospect of state with less comprehensive and less economic regulation social policies. Studies of Gonnet (2012), in line with what is argued here, indicate that, although in some cases the requirements of International Organizations may have had coercive character, they seem to have served more as a political force to build domestic support and consensus on cash transfer policies in this regional bloc.

Along with documents, material and personal disclosure from international organizations, the processes of lesson-drawing and emulation from countries taken as successful examples (such as Mexico and Brazil) seem to be important for the dissemination and transfer of CCTs.

International organizations - especially in this case for institutions of the United Nations system and the World Bank - can be inserted in what Kingdon (2003) calls the hidden clusters participants, communities that generate ideas and circulate (policy communities).

The IOs alter the structure of political decisions – configuring themselves as collective instances involving actors such as states and the pressure groups of international operations (Held, 1991:170). Some of these organizations have an "almost legislative power" (Mazzuoli, 2013) in a spectrum ranging from the suggestion to the coercion, the creation of guidelines, recommendations, guidelines or requirements to be met16. They also have a role in the exchange of information                                                                                                                14 The idea of responsiveness refers to the conditions and democratic institutions treated by Dahl (1997) and rational calculation is linked to the establishment of electoral connection, as the relationship between government policies and voting discussed by Downs (1999). The possible connection between CCTs and outcome of elections is questioned by Correa (2012). 15 It can be registered as landmarks the Washington Consensus 1989, whose protagonists are the World Bank and the IMF-International Monetary Funding- and the Millennium Goals declared in the UN. 16 Among the sources of International Law are the Treaties constituting international legal norms that have imperative nature and binding on the signatories (hard law) and statements (soft law) that originally are not cogent and have no binding force. The Treaty also called Convention, Pact, Protocol, Letter, Agreement, Trade Instruments, among others (Piovesan, 2013; Henkin, 1990; Rezek, 1996).“In order to speak of a "treaty" in the generic sense, an instrument has to meet various criteria. First of all, it has to be a binding instrument, which means that the contracting parties intended to create legal rights and duties. Secondly, the instrument must be concluded by states or international organizations with treaty-making power. Thirdly, it has to be governed by international law. Finally the engagement has to be in writing. Even before the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the word "treaty" in its generic sense had been generally reserved for engagements

   

14  

and experiences, establishment of requirements and recommendations, dissemination of good practices, provide technical assistance, support the action of States and other members of the international community, as demonstrated by studies on social security of Weyland (2006) and Stone (2004) and on CCTs of Gonnet (2012).

At this stage of research we observed that, in the region and period in focus, the first CCTs type policies were in the modalities school grant and food allowance in defined territories; later, the population coverage was expanded and expanded to the national territory without specifications of rural or urban medium (table 2).

This corresponds to the issues and recommendations found in documents17 such as Human Development Report (UNDP, 1990), issued by the UNDP - United Nations Development Program, which indicated the option for food stamps instead of cash transfers food. The report pointed out that "rather than disapprove of food subsidies across-the-board policy makers should devote their energy to designing food subsidy packages that redistribute income efficiently without hurting the efficiency of resource allocation" (UNDP, 1990:63). In subsequent document - Human Development Report (UNDP, 1997:112) – there was the following reservation on policies of the cash transfer type: "poverty can be eradicated only through pro-poor growth, not through transfers”.

Agenda 21 (document originated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Rio-92) explained the need to eradicate poverty and brought the idea of poverty as a multidimensional issue of national and international origin, as well as the recommendation of supported domestic policies by global initiatives such as programs to generate income.

The World Development Report - Poverty (World Bank, 1990) cites food subsidies as a way of support, but, unlike the documents mentioned above, highlights the monetary transfers to state that: "often cash transfers are more effective than rations "(World Bank, 1990: 103).

The World Bank intensified its stimulus for policies to deal with poverty in a period coinciding with its role in favor of social and economic policies that ascribe, less to the state and more to the market, the task of allocation and distribution of resources in society. In this double movement, the World Bank seems to have driven the spread of CCTs in Latin America. For example, the document called Evaluation of Assistance to Brazil (World Bank, 2003:5, 41) reports that in the period from 1990 to 2002, the institution served less in terms of funding and more as a source of knowledge and technical assistance in strategies such as tackling the poverty.

According to An Evaluation of World Bank Support - 2000-2010, Safety Nets of IEG - Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2011: 22), "In late 2006 client countries with the most developed CCT programs in the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico) asked the World Bank to act as a regional facilitator of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        concluded in written form.” According to the UN, the term "statement" is used for various international instruments, Its main feature is to not bind the parts. They are documents that indicate that the parts did not intend to establish binding obligations, but only declare certain aspirations. Statements can also be treaties, which aim to be binding under International Law, which implies a complex task, which is the analysis in casu, in order to verify the intent of the parts when the contract. Some statements although not originally intending to have binding force, became a source of International Law at a later time, and thus acquired the status of cogent instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml. 17  The documents checked so far are from ECLAC, UN and the World Bank cited as sources of data and references.  

   

15  

knowledge, learning, and innovation for CCT programs". In the document there is the evaluation that this initiative, implemented through the creation of a Learning Circle (CCT Learning Community), influenced the decision-making to implement or increment of CCTs in the participating countries, it influenced in the expansion of Opportunities (Mexico) to urban areas (the same occurred in El Salvador, based on the Mexican experience), in the integration of Solidary Chile to the Chilean system of social protection program, and improvements in the Family Grant program (Brazil) based on learning about the Chilean experience.

Comparatively, to the case of CCTs, the UN has played a diffuser role of consensus reasoned in principles anchored in treaties and declarations and the dissemination of good practices, especially; the World Bank, besides promoting conditions for these soft transfer processes, it acts through the transference of institutional arrangements and of implementation instruments, in other words, CCTs models (hard transfer). Anyway, with their specificities, these two organizations are relevant in the dynamics of spreading of CCTs in different realities.

These organizations have operated as facilitators of the transfer process and the dissemination of policies, through which their innovations have spread, wholly or partially, in a given context to other different realities (Rose, 1993; Mintron, 1997; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Stone, 1999). They have assumed the role of "transfers entrepreneurs" (Dolowitz, Marsh, 1996:345), transferring the content that sustains policies, promoting debate, building the intellectual infrastructure for transnational learning and creating justifications for the transfer.

VI. Conclusion The discussion presented in this paper was guided by theoretical approaches

on policy transfer and policy diffusion and the hypothesis that the spread of CCT programs in Latin America is due to a combination of inductors and facilitating factors, including, especially, the characteristics of the policy, ideological-political position of rulers and incentives of IOs.

The literature review and preliminary results suggest that it is not a simple combination or multicausality by the sum of elements, but a convergence of factors in the sense of mutual relationship and empowerment. The international consensus over the need to constrain the scope of public social protection and on tackling poverty through targeted public policies find resonance in the characteristics of CCTs. Meanwhile, governments to the left and to the right are receptive and feeders of that consensus and of the implementation of a policy considered internationally successful and that, despite the internal political culture that generates controversy, has low political and budgetary cost and, also, meets the motives and specific preferences of each position on the political spectrum.

Therefore, CCTs in Latin America are not only examples of the convergence of a policy but also the convergence of variables. The development of the research may indicate the explanatory weight of each one and possibly to strengthen the relationship of convergence meaning that one factor would be unable to propagate the policy if the other was not present in that specific context.

To move in this direction, we consider insufficient the theoretical fundaments and methodological supports that the theories of policy diffusion and policy transfer offer. Our choice will be to continue the investigation on the basis of the interpretive explanation method associated with the comparative method. This is equivalent to

   

16  

saying that the comprehensive perspective will be supplemented by causal and comparative analysis.

References BOBBIO, Norberto. Direita e Esquerda: razões e significados de uma distinção política. São Paulo, UNESP, 1995. CANUTO, Otaviano (2013). “Building consensus through transfers to the poor: lessons from Brazil.” IMF Conference “A High Level Conference on Kenya’s economic Successes, Prospects, and Challenges.” Nairobi, September 17-18, 2013. Disponível em http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/kenya/pdf/canuto.pdf CECCHINI, Simone; MADARIAGA, Aldo. Programas de Transferências Condicionadas: Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe. Naciones Unidas, junio de 2011. Disponível em: http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/6/44126/Programas-transferencias-Condicionadas-ALC-95.pdf CORREA, Diego Sanches. The effects of conditional cash transfer programs on Latin American presidential elections. Tese de doutorado (Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), 2012. DAHL, Robert. Poliarquia, São Paulo, Edusp, 1997. DOLOWITZ, D; MARSH, D. Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making, Governance, v.13, n.1, p.5–24, jan. 2000. DOLOWITZ, David and MARSH, David. Who Learns from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. Political Studies. n 44, 1996, pp. 343-357. DOWNS, Anthony. Uma teoria econômica da democracia. São Paulo: EDUSP. 1999. ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gosta. As três economias políticas do welfare state. Lua Nova, Set 1991, no.24, p.85-116. FAGNANI, Eduardo. Política social no Brasil (1964-2002): entre a cidadania e a caridade. 2005. Tese (Doutorado em Economia) – UNICAMP, Campinas, 2005. FISZBEIN, Ariel. Conditional cash transfers: reducing present and future poverty. Washington D. C.: The World Bank – USA. 2009. Disponível em: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf GENTILINI, Ugo; HONORATI, Maddalena; YEMTSOV, Ruslan. The state of social safety nets 2014. Washington, DC : World Bank Group. 2014. Disponível em: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/05/19487568/state-social-safety-nets-2014. GONNET, Cecilia Osorio. The role of international organizations in a policy diffusion process. Preliminary discussion about the Conditional Cash Transfers programs in Latin America. X Chilean Congress of Political Science, 2012. HELD, David. A democracia, o Estado Nação e o sistema global. Lua Nova, 23, março 1991, pp. 145-194. HENKIN, Louis (ed.) The age of rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. IEG - Independent Evaluation Group. Social Safety Nets: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000–2010. Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank Group. Disponível em: http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/ssn_full_evaluation.pdf, acesso em 15/06/2014.

   

17  

KAUCHAKJE, Samira. International Modeling and Brazilian Public Policies for Poverty Reduction. Latin American Policy. , v.5, p.157 - 168, 2014. KINGDON, John. Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies. Longman Publishing Group, 2ª ed., 273 pp, 2011. KNILL, Christoph. Introduction: Cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory factors. Journal of European Public Policy, 2005. LANZARO, Jorge. Social Democracy in Latin America: Uruguay compared to Brazil and Chile. Anais do LASA, 2013. LAVINAS, Lena. 21st Century Welfare. New Left Review, 84 nov dec 2013, pp 5-40. LOWI, Theodor. Theodore J. Lowi (1964). American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory. World Politics, 16, pp 677-715. MAINWARING, S. & SCULLY, T. R. (ed) Building democratic institutions - party systems in Latin America. Standard University Press, 1995. MAZZUOLI, Valério. Curso de Direito Internacional Público. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 7ª edição, 2013. MINTRON, Michael. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation. American Journal of Political Science, 41 (3), 1997, pp. 738-770. MOISÉS, José Álvaro. Cultura política, instituições e democracia. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. vol. 23 no. 66, 2008. PARIJS, Philippe Van. Basic Income: A simple and powerful idea for the twenty-first century. VIIIth Congress of the Basic Income European Network. Berlin, Germany, October, 2000. PIOVESAN, Flávia. Direitos Humanos e o Direito Constitucional Internacional. 14 ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2013, 678 p. PNUD. A democracia na América Latina: rumo a uma democracia de cidadãs e cidadãos. Nova York: PNUD, 2004, p. 123.. PRZEWORSKI, Adam. Estado e economia no capitalismo. Rio de Janeiro, Relume-Dumara, 1995. REGO, Walquiria. G.D. L. ; PINZANI, Alessandro . Vozes do Bolsa Família: autonomia, dinheiro e cidadania. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2013. REIS, Elisa P. Percepções da elite sobre pobreza e desigualdade. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 15(42), 2000, pp. 143-152. REIS, Fabio Wanderley. Governabilidade, instituições e partidos. Novos Estudos. São Paulo, Cebrap, n.41, março, 1995, p.40-59 REZEK, José F. Direito Internacional Público. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1996. ROCHA, Roberto e outros. Brasil – Avaliação de Assistência do Banco Mundial ao País. Banco Mundial: Departamento de Avaliação de Operações, 2003. Disponível em: https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/brazil_cae_portuguese.pdf Acesso em 12/08/2013 ROSE, Richard. Lesson  Drawing  in  Public  Policy:  A  Guide  to  Learning  Across  Time  and  Space.  Chatham,  N.J.:  Chatham  House,  1993. SANTOS, Maria Helena de Castro. Governabilidade, governança e democracia: criação de capacidade governativa e relações executivo-legislativo no Brasil pós-Constituinte. Dados, Rio de Janeiro , v. 40, n. 3, 1997. SILVA, Fabricio Pereira da. Esquerdas Latino-Americanas: uma tipologia é possível? XIV Congresso Brasileiro de Sociologia, 2009. SKOCPOL, Theda (1985). “Bringing the state back in: strategies of analysis in current research” in Evans et al. (eds) Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press. STONE, D. (2004) ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalization” of policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (3), 545–66

   

18  

STONE, Diane. Learning lessons, policy transfer and the international diffusion of policy ideas”. CSGR Working Paper No. 69/01 April 2001. STONE, Diane. Learning Lessons and Transferring policy across time, space and disciplines. Politics, Political Studies Association, 1999, pp. 51-59. United Nations Sustainable Development. Agenda 21. United Nations Conference on Environmental and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Disponível em : http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf Acesso em 01/06/2014. United Nations. “Poverty eradication. Report of the Secretary-General”. United Nations, 2011. Disponível em http://www.onu.org.br/programa-bolsa-familia-e-exemplo-de-erradicacao-de-pobreza-afirma-relatorio-da-onu/ UNDP – United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report - 1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. UNDP - United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report - 1997. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. WEYLAND, Kurt; MADRID, Raúl; HUNTER, Wendy (Ed.). Leftists Governments in Latin America: successes and shortcomings. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010. WEYLAND, Kurt. 2011. A ascensão das duas esquerdas da América Latina. Digesto Econômico, 451, 62-82. Disponível em http://issuu.com/diario_do_comercio/docs/digesto_451/63 WEYLAND, Kurt. Bounded rationality and policy diffusion: social sector reform in Latin America. Princeton University Press, 2006. WORLD BANK. World Development Report 1990 – Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.