Iranians at War under Turkish Domination: The Example of Pre-Mongol Isfahan

International Society for Iranian Studies

Iranians at War under Turkish Domination: The Example of Pre-Mongol IsfahanAuthor(s): David Durand-GuédySource: Iranian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 587-606Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4311765 .

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Iranian Studies, volume 38, number 4, December 2005

David Durand-Guedy

Iranians at War Under Turkish Domination: The Example of Pre-Mongol Isfahan

In the year 532/1137-8, Isfahan witnessed the arrival of various Turkish lords fighting for supremacy in western Iran: the emirs of the Saliuqid sultan during the winter; the mighty emir of Fars at the outset of spring; and finally, some weeks later, a rebellious Saljuq prince who was an ally of a deposed caliph. These Turks were followed by numerous cavalry, and inso far as the city was already affected by a shortage of food, successive occupations had catastrophic consequences for the local population. In his chronicle of the Saljuqids, the famous 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani remembers that "the inhabitants left the city without longing to return," and he was certain of this as he himself emigrated to the Arab world after these events.1 More than a century later, while the situation in Jibal province had only worsened, another Isfahani citizen known as Mahmud b. Muhammad recounts how he was forced to seek refufe in Shiraz because his native town had become "a paradise where pigs graze."

These two examples are very similar as in both cases flight appeared to be the only solution for the Iranian elite living under Turkish domination. However, local populations were not as defenseless as they initially seemed. Since the famous article of Cahen about the autonomy of oriental cities, we know that they did have military capability and did not hesitate to use it.3 For pre-Mongol Iran, the subject has been investigated by Jurgen Paul in various studies where he asked the fundamental questions: In which cases did the local population decide to fight? How did they fight? Who made the decision and who led the military operations? What was the justification of this kind of warfare? Paul provided

David Durand-Guedy is a researcher at the Institut Frangais de Recherche en Iran (IFRI) in Tehran.

'al-Bundari, Zubdat al-nu.sra, Recueil de textes relatifsd a bistoire des Seljoucides, ed. Th. Houtsma (Leyden, 1889), II:180, line 15, "kharaja min ahli Isfahina man lam yanwi ilayha ruji'an." I am indebted to Prof. Azartash Azarnoush, Univ. of Tehran, for checking my translations of Arabic and Persian sources-naturally, all the remaining mistakes are mine. I would also like to thank Shiva A. Shahidi and Deborah Tor for editing this article.

2Mahmuid al-Isfahani, Dastutr al-vu.Zard', ed. R. Enzabi-Nezhad (Tehran, 1985), 21, "jannatun tar'aha 1-khanAzir.''

3Cl. Cahen, "Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du Moyen- Age," Arabica vols. V&VI (1958-1959). The article has its own pagination and has been edited separately afterwards.

ISSN 0021-0862 print/ISSN 1475-4819 onlinc/05/040587-20 l Routledge ?D2005 The Intemational Society for Irnian Studies P

Taylor&Fr Grp DOI 10.1080/00210860500338382



588 Durand-Guidy

us answers for the Oriental part of the Iranian world-that is, Khurasan and Transoxiana.4 In this paper, I intend to focus on Isfahan, the largest city in western Iran at that time, whose history can help elucidate the matter.5

An Irrelevant and Illegitimate Subject

Our information about Isfahan during the pre-Mongol era is far more than that of any other city in western Iran. This is due to the city's remarkable size, its status as capital city under the Kakuyids (398-443/1008-1051) and most of the Great Saliuqids (429-552/1038-1157), and also the fact that many historical sources on the period were written by Isfahani authors, such as the K. Mahdsin Isfahdn of al-Mafarrukhi (written c. 470/1077), the Nu.srat al-fatra of 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahrni (written in 579/1183), or the numerous letters from the second half of the sixth/twelfth century brought together in the ins/d' book named al-Mukhtdrat min al-rasd'il. Nevertheless, material on the military role played by the Iranians is always very hard to come by, and Isfahan is no exception in this respect. The reason is that the subject itself was perceived as irrelevant and illegitimate by the authors of our sources. According to the state theory which prevailed at the time, subjects (ra'iyyat) were not supposed to fight as warfare was the prero- gative of the prince and the military (lashkar), that is, the Turks.6 Thus, even when the city-dwellers did engage in military operations, our authors were not inclined to report it. This is especially true for the texts which originate directly

4Above all, see J. Paul, Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler: Ostiran und Transoxanien in vormongoliscber Zeit (Stuttgart, 1996), 93-139, which amplifies the data and analysis displayed in his The State and The Military: The Samanid Case (Bloomington, 1994). Another article, "Histories of Herat," Iranian Studies 33, no. 1-2 (winter-spring 2000): 103-115, deals with the case of Herat, which is by many aspects similar to Isfahan.

5The examples and results I will provide in this article are essentialy drawn from my PhD thesis on pre-Mongol Isfahan. See D. Durand-GuEdy,jIfahdn, de la conquite saltsiqide d la conquete mongole. Les elites et le pouvoir dans la province iranienne du Gibdl (milieu Xl - de'but XIIi s.) (these dactylogra- phi&e, Universite de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 2004); publication is forthcoming. The main aim of this research was to define within a local framework the exact role of the Iranian elite facing the Turkish domination. Here I will limit myself more specifically to the military aspect of their action. Let us note that in this article, we have reserved the term "Iranian" for the local Persian-speaking (and, in our case, urban) populations; naturaly, this does not imply that the Turks, who took control in Iran from the end of the fourth/tenth century, could not have considered themselves as playing a major part in the Irano-Islamic civilization.

6See A.K.S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia (Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11tb-14tb Century) (New York, 1988), 224. The theoretical non-participation of the Iranians in military matters is best set forth in a well-known passage of Bayhaqi's chronicle of the Ghaznavids, concerning the situation of Nishapur threatened by the Saljuq army. On that occasion, if we are to believe Bayhaqi who claims to quote a report sent by a Ghaznavid spy, the qadi would have advised local notables not to resist the Saljuqs and justified his decision by saying, "what have the subjects to do with war?" (mardomdn-e ra'iyyat-rd bd jang-kardan che kir bdshad), see Bayhaqi, Tdrikh-e Bayhaqi, ed. 'A.A. Fayyad (Mashhad, 1996), 729, line 10. The whole passage has been translated by Cl. Bosworth, The GhaZnavids, 2nd ed., (Beirut, 1973), 252-7, and commented on by Paul, Herrscher, 117.



Iranians at War Under Turkish Domination 589

from the state administration. For example, none of the diplomatic documents written by the Atabegs of Azerbaijan to the notables of Isfahan and which had been kept in al-Mukhtdrdt min al-rasa'il deals with this matter. Likewise, the offi- cial declaration (fatk-ndme) announcing the capture of the Isma'ili fortress of Shahdiz in 500/1107 credits only sultan Muhammad and his Turkish emirs and does not even mention the intervention of the inhabitants of Isfahan.7

Refraining from speaking about the military role of the locals is also seen in the historiographical sources, which represent the bulk of our documentation. In dynastic chronicles, the authors wanted to glorify the deeds of the princes they served. Naturally, they were inclined to belittle as much as possible the role played by their subjects, in particular their military role. For example, in his Sira al-su/tdn Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, Nasawi says nothing about the victorious counter-attack led by his former master Jalal al-Din against the Mongols near Isfahan after he had first fled, maybe because he owed his success mainly to the very people he had come to protect.8 This also holds true for a source like the K. Mahdsin IFfahdn of al-Mdfarrukh1, which aimed to establish the superiority of Isfahan and its inhabitants. Among the numerous arguments used to back up the thesis, the alleged military valour of the Isfahanis is directly connected with our subject. Al-Mafarrfikhl reports with pride that Ardashir b. Babak (d. 221 AD), the founder of the Sassanid dynasty, "could not have defeated the kings of this world without the help of Isfahan's inhabitants." For his part, the legendary Anuishirvan is said to have "preferred the soldiers of Isfahan to all other soldiers in the world."9 Interestingly enough, these examples are drawn from a very distant past. Another anecdote is even more telling and deserves to be quoted in its entirety:

I have been told by our most trustworthy sheykhs that they had heard the ancestors say that at one time, a certain army of thirty thousand men came to Isfahan. The soldiers began to install themselves in the houses, to disgrace the women, to cause damage and destruction, and to inflict punishment and torture such as the inhabitants had never seen before. All of this led [the inhabitants] to exterminate them. They mutually warned one another and took oaths. When night fell, they rose against them openly (tandhad4 ilaybi mutaZdhirdn) and each of them, armed with whatever they could find, drove out those who were in their houses and neighborhoods. In one single night, every last one had been expelled. [The inhabitants] had been able to accomplish this only thanks to

7Thisfat4-ndme has been copied in its entirety by Ibn al-Qalanisi, Ta'rikb Dimashq, ed. Amedroz (Leyden, 1908), 152-7.

8See Nasawl, Sira al-sultdn Jaldl al-Din Mingburnu, ed. 0. Houdas (Paris, 1891), 140, and compare with Ibn al-Athir, XII:477 (quoted below note 51).

9al-Mafarrukhl, K. Mab4sin Isfahdn, ed. J. Tihrani (Tehran, 1933), 41-2. In the same vein, al-Mafarrikhi also tells that a general of the famous Umayyad governor al-Hajjaj b. Yusuif was from Isfahan.



590 Durand-Guidy

their extreme strength (quwwa), their large number, their infinite power (shawka), their great zeal (hamiyya), and their total unity ('asabiyya).10

What this passage says is that in case of aggression, the city-dwellers had not only the will, but also the military capability to defend themselves and to fight back with success.11 The story could evoke the massacre of the Ghaznavid soldiers left by Mas'uid of Ghazna after he took control of Isfahan in 420/1029.12 However it is significant that al-Mafarruikhi preferred not to refer directly to an historical event and chose instead to make his point in a legendary context.13 Had he wished to have spoken about popular resistance, he could also have described that made by his fellow citizens against Toghril Beg during the long siege of 442-3/1050-1; but he instead merely mentions their participation in a short and trivial circumlocution when he deplores their "bad behavior" (si' al- adab).14 The subject was all the less relevant since al-Mafarrukhi himself lived under the reign of the great-nephew of Toghril Beg and dedicated his book to the local Saljuqid governor. All of this brings us to the main question of our investigation: What concrete means did the people of Isfahan have at their disposal to play a military role?

Using the Ramparts

During the two centuries preceding the Mongol invasion, one of the main dis- tinguishing features of Isfahan was that the city was surrounded by a very efficient system of fortifications. The walls of Jayy, the old Sassanid city, had been partly demolished in the first centuries of Islam and, furthermore, they had become useless since Isfahan had grown around a new urban center located three kilometers northward. At the end of the fourth/tenth century, the Arab geographer al-Muqaddasi mentions the twelve gates of Isfahan, but if a wall did exist at that

10al-MAfarrakhi, 88. "This passage should be compared to a series of anecdotes where the only resort for the inhabi-

tants facing injustice and aggression was to rely on a divine intervention; see al-Mifarriakhi, 35-8. Paul, "Histories of Isfahan: Mafarrukhi's Kitib mahasin Isfahan," Iranian Studies 33 no. 1-2 (2000): 127, has studied this passage and concluded that "in the stories analyzed so far (. . .) there is no hint of military resistance."

12See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kdmil, ed. Tornberg (Beirut, 1968), IX:372, "istakhlafa [Mas'ud] biha [i.e. Isfahan] ba'da ashibihi fa-thira bihi ahluha fa-qataluhu" ("he left there some of his companions, then the local people took revenge against them and killed them"). The brutality of the Ghaznavids during their campaigns in Jibal is famous, and we know for sure that at that time the inhabitants were on their own.

13The vagueness of the time ("at one time") and the identity of the invaders ("a certain army") as opposed to the exactness of the total number of soldiers create a contrasting effect typical of legends. Moreover, the figure quoted reminds us of another anecdote told in the K. Mabdsin Irfabdn, 41, which also speaks about a brutal army of thirty thousand men. In that story, the army is reppeled by a certain Shahruye, introduced as a descendant of the famous mythological hero Gudarz.

14al-Mifarrakhi, 101.




time, it was merely a trade barrier of no military importance.15 Indeed, the con- struction of the fortifications took place in the third decade of the fifth/eleventh century when the Ghaznavids had just retreated from Jibal province and the Saljuqs had not yet taken control. Isfahan was then the capital of the most powerful dynasty in western Iran, the Kakuyids, and was directly exposed to the Turk- mens present in the region. As soon as the rampart was finished, it was admired by foreign travellers as well as by the city-dwellers. Nasir-e Khusraw, who saw it on his way back from Egypt, speaks of the crenels (kongere) and the platforms (jang-gah). Jurjani, who wrote his V6r-&-Rdmin in Isfahan at the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, compares the town to a pearl in its shell.17 As for al- Mafarrukhi, he goes into raptures about the height of its walls, the depth of its moat (khandaq) filled with water, and the size of its gates:

Among the most excellent things by which the territory of Isfahan dis- tinguishes itself are the walls that 'Ala' al-Dawla [Ibn Kkiikya (398-433/ 1008-1041)] built around the city. They attain fifteen thousand feet in length... The foundations of the rampart are firmly set into the ground (thard) and their summit rises up to the Pleiades (thurayyd). The most solid mountains measure themselves against their walls. Thanks to its towers, it can butt the stars which travel night. 0! these walls, the sky whispers at the top of them. 0! its moat, the oceans are almost as deep. They are like Abui 'Ubada al-Buhturi once said:

Its sides have filled the space, and its crenels catch fragments of rain clouds. And the Tigris flows beneath them, and the wide space ahead of them is covered with waves and green gardens.

[The walls] are also like the author of this book [i.e., al-Mafarruikhi] said:

It is a rampart whose top is higher than the star Capella, and whose sides exceed the constellation of Gemini.18 From its towers, one can see below how the planets move in the constellations of the sky. Its qualities would make impossible for the tribe of Gog, if they came one day, to open a gap. Around it, there is a moat like an abyss, comparable to no sea and no river.

15See al-Muqaddasi, K. Absan al-taqdsim, ed. M. de Goeje, 2nd ed. (Leyden, 1967), 389, lines 2-3. 16Nsir-e Khusraw, Safar-ndme, ed. M. Dabirsiyaqi (Tehran, 1977), 165-6. 17Jurjani, Vis-&-RImin, ed. M. Rowshan (Tehran, 1999), 30 (?5), "ch6 gowhar gerd-e shahr

andar hesarL." 18The constellation of Gemini symbolizes the summer solstice, and thus the highest point in the

zodiac.



592 Durand-Guidy

It has twelve iron gates, and each of them can accommodate an elephant bearing its litter and [soldiers carrying] banners.19

These walls, which could still be seen at the beginning of the twentieth century, rendered Isfahan the most fortified city of western Iran.20 As a matter of fact, no Turkish army, no matter what its size, was able to capture it by direct onslaught. In 442/1050, the Saljuq leader Toghril Beg had the support of all the Turkmens in Jibal. Nevertheless, he was unable to overcome the walls of Isfahan and was forced to lead the longest siege of his life. In the verses quoted above, al-Mafarriakhi refers to this failure by using a transparent metaphor when he speaks about the people of Gog.21 At the other end of the period, as we shall see, the Mongols could only enter Isfahan thanks to local complicity.

More importantly for our subject, Isfahan military history tells us that no army could exploit the military potential of the walls without the support of the local population. This is clearly shown by the events of the year 527/1132-3, when the sultan Toghril b. Mahmud, defeated on the battlefield by his brother Mas'ud, entered Isfahan and wanted to entrench himself behind the walls. "His brother Mas'ud," Ibn al-Athir relates, "came after him to besiege him; however,

Toghril learned that the inhabitants of Isfahan would not help him during the siege, so he left them and headed towards Fdrs."22 The control the Isfahanis had over the walls also appears clearly on the occasion of the rebellion of Buzabe, the great emir of Fars, against the Saljuqid sultan in 542/1147-8. At that time, Isfahan was not the capital of the Saljuq state anymore, and the sultan's authority was represented locally by a governor. According to 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, when Buzabe came to Isfahan, the governor was determined to resist him by all means, but the leading citizen of the town (the ra'fs) chose instead to join the rebel and opened the city gates for him.23 Another illustration

19al-Mlfarri-khl, 81. The current edition of the K. Mabdsin I.fabdn is not trustworthy. In the first paragraph, we have not taken into account the correction made by Tihrfni, hence we have read "fayalahu su-rin yunijl bi-qarnihi l-sama" instead of "...siurin yumasu bi-qarnihi l-sama;" besides, this meaning fits perfectly with the Persian version of the text given in the Ilkhanid period by al-Awl, Tarjome-ye Mahdsin IL.fabdn, ed. 'A. Iqbal (Tehran, 1949), 51, "birQ'V...bA gush-e aseman hamraz." Regarding the poem written by al-Mafarrikhl, we have counted four verses instead of three, and we have readyawman instead of nawman (third verse, second hemistiche).

2OThe line of the rampart and the location of the gates can be found in L. Golombek, "Urban Patterns in pre-Safavid Isfahan," Iranian Studies 7 no. 1 (1974): 25-6 and 43.

21The mythical tribes of Gog and Magog were commonly classed as Turkish tribes. See for example the sixth/twelfth century Iranian geographer al-Qazwini, K. Atbdr al-bikid, ed. F. Wustenfeld (Gottingen, 1848), 618: "Gog and Magog are two groups of Turks...settled in the eastern part of the seventh clime." The one-year long siege of Isfahan by the Saliuqs is best described by Ibn al-Athir, IX:562-3 and Jurjini, 30-3 (chapter "Goftar andar gereftan-e soltan shahr-e I?fahin-rV").

22Ibn al-Athir, X:687, "arada l-tahassuna biha [i.e. Isfahan], fa-sara ilayhi akhuhu Mas'fd li-yuhasirahu bihfa fa-ra'a Toghril anna ahla Isfahana la yutiwi'uinahu 'ala l-hisar.'

23See Bundari, 219, lines 10-11.



Iranians at Wlar Under Turkish Domination 593

of this power can be found during the last part of the sixth/twelfh century. During the Khwarizmi occupation of Jibal. Ibn al-Athir says that in 591/1195, the ra'is of Isfahan wrote to the Abbasid caliph and told him that "he would surrender the city to any army which would come to Isfahan."24 When the Abbasid army did arrive, the Khwarizmi troops chose to desert the city because they knew they lacked the indispensable local support to defend it.

On the other hand, sources show that on several occasions, locals themselves decided to close the city gates on a Turkish army. The most famous example is probably when Berk Yaruq tried to enter his capital after being defeated by Muhammad in 492/1009, but was confronted with the refusal of the inhabitants.25 These examples help us understand why al-Mafarreikhi is so apologetic when he describes the walls of Isfahan and counts them as one of the "virtues" (mahdsin) of Isfahan: the walls not only protected the inhabitants from hostile incursions, but they also gave them the possibility of choosing their allies.

Using the Militias

The urban militias were the second means that the Isfahanis had at their disposal to play a military role. To note the intervention of the locals, the chroniclers usually use the expression "ahl al-balad" (or ahl I.fabdn; in Persian: ahl-e shahr, Isfahdniydn), but even when we are certain that they meant the inhabitants and not the local garrison as is sometimes the case, this does not clarify the matter. It is all the more difficult to know exactly who was fighting since the historical sources do not mention any of the technical terms which designate the urban combatants in this part of the muslim world (a4ddth, fitydn and 'ayyarun).26 In the extract of the K. Ma4dsin Isfahdn quoted above, al-Mafarrikhi describes a spontaneous uprising of the whole (male) population, but as we have already

24Ibn al-Athir, XII:1 17, "kataba Sadr al-Din al-Khuiandi ra'isu l-shafi'iyyati bi-Isfahana 1-diwana bi-Baghdadi yabdhulu min nafsihi taslima 1-baladi ila man yasilu l-diwana min al-'asakir."

25See Ibn al-Athir, X:288, "fa-sara [Berk Yaruq] min al-Rayyi ila Isfahana fa-lam yaftah ahluha lahu al-abwaba." According to 'A. Iqbal, Ve.Zdrat dar abd-e saldtin-e bo.org-e saljfiqf (Tehran, 1959), 130, it was the governor of Isfahan-a Turk named Bulk! Beg Sarmaz-who decided not to open the city gates to Berk Yaruq. However this affirmation is contradicted by the fact that Sarmaz was at that time at Berk Yaruq's side (see Ibn al-Athir, X:290).

26To my knowledge, the terms a4ddth, fitydn and 'ayydruin are not used in the sources dealing with Isfahan in the two centuries before the Mongol invasion. The Buyid vizier al-Sahib Ibn 'Abbad (d. 385/995) does speak about the "tafatti of Isfahan,' which he claims to have crushed, but this source is more ancient, see Ibn 'Abbad, Rasd'il, ed. Sh. Dayf and I. "Azzam (Cairo, 1953), 239: "baib al-tafatti bi-Isfahana kuntu aghlaqtuhu." About the fitydn and the 'ayydrgn in Iran, see the pioneering works of Cl. Cahen ("Mouvements populaires," 27 ff. and the article "Futuwwa," Ency- clopedie de If Islam, 2nd ed.), and more recently, J. Paul, Herrscher, 123-131 and D. Tor, The 'Ayyars: A Study in Holy Warfare, Chivalry and Violence in the Medieval Islamic World (Istanbul, forthcoming). There is a more abundant bibliography about the urban militias of the Arab Middle East and especially of Syria; see in particular the works of P. von Sievers (on the Umayyad and Abbasid period), Th. Bianquis (on the Fatimid period) and A. Havemann (on the Saliuqid period).



594 Durand-Guidy

stated, this passage is more metaphorical than historical.27 In fact, despite the abundance of the documentation about Isfahan, urban combatants are described on only one occasion. The scene takes place in 625/1228 when the city was directly threatened by a Mongol army encamped a few kilometers north. The Turkish ruler of western Iran at that time was the Khwarizm-Shah Jalal al-Din, and he had come hastily from Azerbaijan to repel the invaders. His first task was to strengthen the morale of his own Turkish troops, but he also looked after the local population. Nasawi, who was present during these events, remembers:

[The Khwarizm-Shah] called the qadi of Isfahan and the ra'Ls, and ordered them to have their foot soldiers (al-rajjala) march past, their weapons unsheathed, amidst the clinking of the spears. From this point of view, the common people of Isfahan cannot be compared to that of any other city, because on the special days and on the New Year's day, they used to parade outside the walls, wearing cuirass of different colors.28

This passage is short, but it is based the testimony of an eyewitness. It proves two facts: first, there were in Isfahan troops recruited from among the 'dmma and organized on a military basis; second, these troops were independent of the local garrison and set up under the authority of the leading citizens (i.e., the qadi and the ra'Fs). Such troops can rightfully be called urban militias.29 Thus, two questions have to be asked: Did such militias exist before the Mongol conquest? What can be said about their efficacy on the ground?

The kind of formation described by Nasawi in Isfahan in the second decade of the seventh/thirteenth century reminds us of those described by Bayhaqi in Rayy

27Paul, Herrscher, 100-2, has already underlined that from the Turkish domination onwards, no case of levy en masse is to be found in the sources about Eastern Iran, as was the case for the Samanid period.

28Nasawl, 136, "amarahum bi-sti'ridi l-rajjalati fi l-silahin shikin wa fi ghulaliha 1-muzijati [or is it: muzajajati?] shikirin; wa 'immatu Isfahina la tuqisu bi-'immati sa'iri 1-bilidi fi hidhi 1-bibi idh kind yabrazana ila zihiriha fi l-a'yidi wa 1-nayirizi bi-qazaqandati min al-atlasi mukhtalifati l-asbigh." The last part of the first sentence ("fi ghulalihi. . .") is not clear. The seventh/thirteenth century Persian version, ed. M. Minovi (Tehran, 1966), 168, line 12, does not help, but obviously, the translation of Houdas ("tout fiers de prendre part a un divertissement de ce genre") strays too far from the original Arabic text.

29The fact that the word raj/dla refers to a military formation, and not to a spontaneous gathering of city-dwellers carrying weapons, is also confirmed by what we know about the situation in Baghdad at the same period. In 461/1069, the Baghdadi notable Ibn al-Banni' used the word rapiJla to speak of the soldiers under the control of the leading citizens, in this case the sheykh Ibn Ridwin, see G. Makdisi, "Autograph Diary of an eleventh-century historian of Baghdid," BSOAS, XIX (1957): 27 (?103). Likewise, for the year 552/1157, Ibn al-Jawzi speaks about an intervention of "al-rajjila wa l-shuttir, which indicates in all probability that the former was distinct from the latter (i.e., the riffraff, as it is usually translated), see Ibn al-Jawzi, K. al-M,ntazam, ed. Krenkow (Haydaribid, 1938-41), X:174, line 17. I am grateful to V. Van Renterghem for these references.




two centuries earlier. Indeed, Bayhaqi reports that in 421/1030, the Ghaznavid emir Mas'uid b. Mahmud stopped in Rayy on his way back to Khurasan after having campaigned against the Daylamis in Jibal province and called the local notables to his tent. Explicitly threatened, the notables had to declare that in case of a Daylami counterattack, they would mobilize their own troops to back up the Ghaznavid military governor.30 These troops are described afterwards on the occasion of a military parade, where we see the Turkish cavalry "followed by more than two thousand people, fully armed, most of them being foot soldiers (piydde) from the city and the surroundings.",31 The similarity between the statements of Bayhaqi and Nasawl are striking: two centuries apart, the leading citizens of the two major cities of western Iran were able to gather large contingents of infantry (piydde in Persian, rajj/ala in Arabic).

Why are these troops explicitly mentioned only by these two authors? Should we attribute it solely to their talent as historians? It is undeniable in both cases, but it is not the main factor. In fact, descriptions of the local troops fit a special kind of situation. Both the Ghaznavids and the Khwarizm-ShMhs por- trayed their struggle (respectively against the Daylamis and the Mongols) as a defense of Islam, i.e., a jihad.32 For that very reason, the urban combatants, whose existence had been perceived so far as illegitimate, could be recognized by the prince, and thus described by the historiographers (whether this justification was well-founded or not is of course not the point). If our hypothesis is correct, then we could revisit our sources on Isfahan to detect other cases where the existence of these combatants is implicit, for example, when the leader of the Shafi'is is said to have "gathered a large troop of men in arms" against the Isma'ilis in 494/1101.33 Or some years later on the occasion of the siege of the Isma'ili fortress of ShThdiz: Ibn al-Athir speaks about a "large number of people" helping the sultan, and Zahir al-Din-e Nishapuirl note the intervention of the 'avdmm (a rather pejorative term referring to the members

30Bayhaqi, 23, "agar kasi qasd-e fasadi kardi va inja !mad! va showkatash hezar ya do hezr ya kamtar-o-bishtar buidi ta dah hezar, albate javanan va deliran-e ma selaLh bar dashtandi va be shehne- ye khodavandi payvastandi..." ("if someone would come here to spread corruption, with a total strength of one, two and even ten thousand soldiers, our young and brave men will of course take their weapons and join the military governor of our lord...").

31 Bayhaqi, 45, lines 3-4, "bar athar-e vey mardom-e shahr ziyadat az do hezar mardom be-selah-e tamam bishtar piyade az mardom-e shahr va az navahii-ye nazdiktar." Unlike Paul, Herrscher, 98, we have chosen to take into account the variant concerning the total number of the foot soldiers (two thousand, instead of ten thousand). This figure is more in accordance with the size of Rayy and the total strength of the Turkish garrison.

32This point is well-known. Let us just remember that the "jihadist" speech of Mahmuid of Ghazna against the Daylami "heretics" is best visible in the letter he sent to the Abbasid caliph to justify his campaign in Jibal, see Ibn al-Jawzl, VIII:38. For the Khwarizm-Shahs, the religious justification of their struggle against the Mongols was all the easier because the invaders did threa- ten Islam with complete destruction; see for example the speech quoted by Nasawi, 152, before the execution of two treacherous emirs.

33Ibn al-Athir, X:315, "jama'a [Abui I-Qasim Mas'tid al-Khuiandi] al-jamma al-ghafira bi I-aslihati."



596 Durand-Guidy

of the 'dmma), but as the siege lasted for several months, a spontaneous popular participation is excluded.34 To take another case, we can quote the letter sent at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century by the Atabeg of Fars, Sa'd b. Zengi, to the ra'is of Isfahan advising him to treat well the Turkish emirs he had left inside the city. The Atabeg warned the ra'Fs against any rebellion on the part of those he called 'avdmm and owbdsh.35 It is all the more probable that the Atabeg had here in mind the very same people who made up the infantry since Nasawi himself had pointed out that this infantry was recruited from among the 'dmma; besides, we know that the pejorative term owbdsh could also refer to volunteers fighting alongside the urban militias.36 Therefore, the existence of infantry troops under the command of local leaders was not due to the extraordinary circumstances created by the arrival of the Mongols, but it is these extraordinary circumstances which enable in the texts the transmutation of 'avdmm and owbdsb (pejorative words which designate an urban category) into rajidla (a technical word which designates a military structure). These local militias did exist before, and the Mongol conquest-to quote the expression of Paul-has just "revealed" them. 37

No clear information specifies how the local foot soldiers were recruited. Given the structure of urban society at that time, one can assume that it was on the basis of the relations of clientelism, dominated by the same local leaders. This hypothesis is confirmed, a contrario, by the situation prevailing in Isfahan in the first four decades of Saljuqid rule, i.e., between its capture in 443/1051 and the death of Malik-Shah in 485/1092. When al-Mafarruikhi, who wrote under Malik-Shah, describes the activities that took place on the New Year's feast, he does not mention any kind of military parade and merely speaks about the amusements (a/-/ahw wa /-/a'b).38 Likewise, the sources do not report for that period any popular uprising during which the urban combatants could have intervened (as was the case in Baghdad). The fact is that the creation of the Saljuqid state- without doubt the most powerful political formation in the Middle East since the collapse of the Abbasid authority-and its gradual settling in Isfahan had a huge impact on the local urban society. As we have shown in our thesis, the

:ahir al-Din-e Nishiparli, Saljfiq-ndme, ed. A. H. Morton (2004), 47 (?6), "'addat-e lashkar va madad-e 'avimm-e shahr va velayat" (the sultan needed "a great number of soldiers and also the support of the inhabitants of the city and the province"). Ibn al-Athir, X:432, "ijtama'a lahu [i.e. Muhammad] min IsfahAna wa sawadiha li-harbihim al-umamu al-'azimatu li-l-dhuhuili al-lati yutilibuinahum biha" ("he was joined by large number of people from the city and its surroundings who asked for revenge upon those who were inside [the fortress]").

35al-Mumktdrdt min al-rasd'il, 199 (document no. 91), "masmul' va maqbiul farmayad disht va owbish va 'avamm-ra rih baz nadahad ke mokhalafat konand va taghallob namayand, va ella mowieb-e 'etab va ekrah bashad" ("do not let the owbdsb and the 'avdmm show opposition and take control [of the city], because it would be [for me] a reason to punish and hate [you]").

36See Paul, Herrscher, 125. 37See J. Paul, "L'invasion mongole comme (< revelateur >> de la societe iranienne," ed. D. Aigle,

L'Iran face d la domination mongole (Tehran, 1997): 37-53. 38See al-Mafarrukhi, 93.




old local elites formed during the previous centuries were marginalized and deprived of the networks that enabled them to play a role.39 On the contrary, the "gathering of a large troop of men in arms" by the leader of the Shafi'is at the end of the fifth/eleventh century shows that the new elite that we called "Khurasani" because it originates from Eastern Iran-had developed successfully its own networks in local society.

The number of combatants that could be mobilized is hard to assess. Al-Qazwini al-Mustawfi writes that in the middle of the sixth/twelfth century, the ra'is of Isfahan, 'Abd al-Lat-if al-Khujandi, "was feared by the sultans and followed by one hundred thousand men in arms."40 Naturally, such a figure should not be understood literally; it merely meant that after the collapse of the Saliuqid state, the Khuiandi family had become the main power on the local political scene. In real terms, we lack any indication concerning the total strength of the local troops, but obviously that figure depends on the size and wealth of the town. For this reason, there are good grounds for supposing that Isfahan, which in the sixth/twelfth century was by far the major city of western Iran, had also the most numerous troops.

The local fighters, who usually fought on foot, used swords and bows.4' They were protected by a very resistant cuirass, padded with raw silk, which was called "qazagand."42 Nasawi mentions it when he speaks about the military parades which took place on New Year's Day at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century and Ibn al-Athir also quotes the term when he describes the clothes of the

39Ibn al-Athir and Jurjini give us information about the fate of the Daylami garrison after the capture of Isfahan by the Saljuqs (they were moved out of the city and given iqt '), but no sources speak about the local troops. From a passage of the chronicle of 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahinl, we learn that at the end of the reign of Malik-Shah, the bureau of military affairs (diwdn al-'arj) controlled "al- 'asdkir wa I-ryjaI." This could mean that at that time, the urban infantry had been incorporated into the state military apparatus. However, this interpretation is uncertain because we do not know what the formula owes to the Persian source used by 'Imad al-Din (Saljuq vizier Anushirvan b. Kh?1id's memoirs). Moreover, it could also refer to the classical opposition between cavalry and infantry; see the remark of R. Amitai about the expression al-faris wa l-rajil, "Foot Soldiers, Militiamen and Volunteers in the Early Mamluk Army," Texts, Documents and Artefacts. Islamic Studies in Honour of D.S. Richards, ed. Ch. F. Robinson (Leyden-Boston, 2003): 237. The sentence appears in the passage about Taj al-Mulk, the arch-rival of Ni#m al-Mulk, in 'Imad al-Din al-I?fah1n!, Nusrat al-fatra, ms. arabe no. 2145, Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris), fol. 56 v, lines 19-20, "qarrabahu [i.e. al-'arld] aydan Taju al-Mulk... wa istawla bi-[l-'addld... 'ala istitba'i al-'asakiri wa I-rijal". I have edited this portion of the manuscript in D. Durand-Guedy, "Un fragment inedit de la chronique des Salguaqides de 'imad al-Din al-Ifahini: le chapitre sur Tag al-Mulk," Annales Islamologiques, 39 (2005).

4al-Qazwini, 198, "yuhibuhu al-salitinu wa yatba'uhu mi'atu alfi musallahin." 41See juwayni, quoted below note 50. Cahen, "Les changements techniques militaires dans le

Proche-Orient medieval et leur importance historique" (1975) reprinted in Les peuples musulmans dans l'Histoire midievale (Damascus, 1977), 486, reminds us that archery was a sport traditionally prac- tised by the Iranians, even among the urban population.

42The term literaly means "full of (agande) raw silk (qa.J." It can also be found under the forms kataghand, qa.dqand, ka.hdghand or qatdgband, see R. Dozy, Supplement aux dictionnaires arabes (Leyden, 1881), I1:470 and Borhan, Borhdn-e qdte' (Tehran, 1938-9), III:1528.



598 Durand-Guidy

Isma'ili soldiers inside the fortress of ShThdiz more than a century before.43 It was probably a local production, as the silk clothes of Isfahan ('attdbi, washi, saqIdtfini, etc.) were famous throughout the whole Islamic world.44

The military efficiency of these soldiers depended closely on the conditions under which they had to fight. They played an important part during the seizure of Shahdiz because, as this fortress could only be taken after a long blockade, they were as efficient as the Turkish riders, and maybe even more so-the latter were both less motivated and not at ease in mountainous and rocky terrain. The very fact that Zahir al-Din-e Nishapiri and Ibn al-Athir, whose aim it was to exalt the memory of the Great Saljuqids, even bothered to associate these local troops with the victory of the sultan proves their importance.45 On the contrary, before his battle against the Mongols, the Khwarizm-ShAh Jalal al-DIn decided to send back the local infantry behind the walls. Nasawl explains that the decision not to use his total military strength was, for Jalal al-Din, a way to show his scorn for his adversary.46 Having said that, it must be admitted that in open ground, the Isfahani foot soldiers would not have had a chance in front of such expert riders as the Mongols.

It was very different when they fought sheltered by the city walls. In 495/1102, for example, they distinguished themselves in the events that followed the long and harsh siege led by Berk Yaruq to capture his brother Muhammad b. Malik-Shah. Eventually, Muhammad fled the city, but for the locals, it did not mark the end of their suffering. Indeed, Ibn al-Athir tells of a large troop of "vile people (al-muf- sidun), country-side dwellers (al-sawddiyya) and looters (man yuridti l-nahb)" who launched an assault on the city, which was then considered easy prey:

They rushed towards the town with ladders and siege-towers (dabbdbat). They filled the moat with straw and reached the walls. They climbed up the ladders

43See Nasawl, 136 (quoted above, see note 28). Ibn al-Athir, X:434, recounts that one of the Isma'ili leaders changed sides and advised the Salijuqids to attack the fortress by the side that seemed the best protected. To those who objected saying that it was impossible, he replied, "the ones you see are weapons and cuirasses arranged as if there were real fighters" (inna 1-ladhi tarawna aslihatun wa kazaghandatun qad ja'aluha ka-hay'ati I-rijal). In the seventh/thirteenth century, the word qazdgand is also used by Sa'adi, Golestdn, bab-e dovvom, hekayit-e panjom, "dar qazagand mard bayad buid, bar mokhannath selah.-e jang che suid" ("Real men must wear cuirass, but what is the point in using war weapons against bents?"). The translation of the first of these two verses by G. M. Wickens, The Bustan of Sa'di (Toronto and Buffalo, 1974): "It is necess- ary to show manhood in the fight" is inexact.

"Nasawi, 136, himself says that the cuirass of the Isfahanis looks like a very fine "washi al-mirt" which is a special kind of silk clothes. About the silks of Isfahan, see the Arabic geographers Ibn al-Faqlh, al-Istakhri and Ibn Hawqal in the Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, ed. M. de Goeje,

nd 2 ed. (Leyde, 1967), respectively V:254, I:199 and II:362, and also Hud,id al-'dlam, ed. VI. Minorsky (London, 1937), 29a.

45See note 34 above. 46See Nasawi, 137, "wa amara l-sultinu, lama hadhahum, rajjalata Isfahana bi l-'awdI idh

a'jabathu kathratuhu wa bi l-'aduwwl istihqaran wa istid 'afan" ("when the Mongols came nearer, the sultan ordered the foot soldiers of Isfahan to move back, because he was surprised by the size of his own army and he despised the enemy, which was twice as less numerous as he was").




and the inhabitants fought them like those who fight to protect their women (hartm) and their wealth. [The assailants] turned back defeated.47

It is not clear whether the Turkish troops of Berk Yaruq themselves took part in the assault, but in return, the circumlocution used by Ibn al-Athir ("those who fight to protect their women and their wealth") does not leave any doubt about the identity of the defendants. In any case, inside the walls, the local fighters were just as able to fight the Turks because by then, the tactical advantage of their cavalry had been crushed. In 555/1160, after Malik-Shah b. Mahmuid died in the city, they expelled his emirs.48 In 583/1187, they expelled the emirs of the Atabeg of Azerbaijan Abui Bakr.49 A few decades later, after the leadership in the town had passed to the qadi, it was a Khwarizmi prince, Rukn al-Din Ghur-Sanji, who came under attack:

Upon his arrival in Isfahan, there collected around [Rukn al-DIn] scattered groups of soldiers and isolated commanders, and so he gathered strength. However, the qadi of Isfahan felt insecure and held aloof, behaving with caution and circumspection. Sultan Rukn al-Din for his part thought it best not to remain inside the town: he departed and pitched his tents outside. However, the troops were constantly coming and going, and the locals, on the qadi's orders, raised a tumult and rained down stones and arrows from the rooftops.50

Nevertheless, the most impressive fighting feat of the local forces remains the victorious resistance they put up against the Mongols for more than a decade. In 625/1228, after the rout of the Khwarizmi army, they prevented Isfahan from being captured and destroyed as Ibn al-Athir relates it:

When the Tatars saw that nobody was after them, they stopped and then turned back toward Isfahan and noboby stood in their way. They reached Isfahan and besieged it. The inhabitants thought that Jalal al-Din had just died. At that moment, a messenger from Jalal al-Din arrived and informed them that he was safe and that he told them: "I'm moving from place to place to rally what remains of my army, and after that, I will turn toward you and we will

47Ibn al-Athir, X:335. 48See Ibn al-Athir, X:263, "lamma mata [Malik-Shah] akhraja ahlu Isfahina ashabahu min

'indihim" ("when he died, the people of Isfahan expelled his companions"). 49See Rawandi, Rdhat al-sudur, ed. M. Iqbal (London, 1921), 345, "Isfahaniyan bar-ishin

ghowgha kardand va ishin-rd bejahanidand" ("the Isfahanis rebelled against them and forced them to leave").

50Juwayni ('Ata Malik), Tdrdkh-eJahdn-Goshd, ed. M. Qazwini (Leyden, 1912-1937), 11:209-210, translation of J. A. Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror (Manchester, 1958), 475. Transliteration of the last sentence is "ba esharat-e qazi ahl-e shahr ghowgha kardand va az bamha dast be tir va sang begoshadand."



600 Durand-Guddy

join our forces to repel the Tatars and drive them out." [The inhabitants] wrote to him to ask for help. They promised him victory, and that they would join him to attack the enemy and that their courage was great. [Jalal al-Din] went to meet them. The people of Isfahan came out with him, and together they fought the Tatars, who sustained the most ignominious defeat.51

In the following years, after the death of Jalal al-Din, the inhabitants of Isfahan kept defending their city while the rest of western Iran had already fallen into the hands of the Mongols. The presence of a Khwarizmi garrison in the town is not to be excluded, but it is not mentioned in the sources. On the other hand, the Baghdadi historian Ibn Abi l-Hadid points out the decisive part

52 played by the locals in this successful resistance.

Using the Chaos

The manner in which the Iranian elite could play a military role does not limit itself to the control of the city gates or the mobilization of the local infantry. During the Turkish domination, they could also exploit to the utmost the opportunities afforded by the entirely new political context.

As is well-known, the existence of two opposite factions was a distinctive feature of Iranian cities during the pre-modern era.53 The case of Nishap-ur, once the biggest town of Khurasan destroyed in the sixth/eleventh century because of internal strife, is famous but that of Isfahan is equally exemplary. The local political scene there had been dominated by various groups, structured into networks, which fought each other for supremacy: Hanbalis vs. Mu'tazilis in the Buyid era; "Khurasanis" vs. Isma'ilis in the second half of the fifth/eleventh century; Hanafis vs. Shafi'is in the sixth/twelfth century; and Sunnis vs. Shi'is under the Mongols. Each of these groups used all means possible to override the adversary, and from that perspective, the Saljuqid period offered them more possibilities than ever before. Why was this so? Because contrary to what the reign of the first three sultans (Toghril Beg, Alp Arslan, and Malik-Shah) would suggest, the bulk of this period is characterized by permanent political

51Ibn al-Athir, XII:477. 52Ibn Abi 1-Hadid, Sha4r Nabj al-baldgha (Beirut, 1963-4), I11:81, "lam yabqa lahum illa Isfahanu

fa'innahum nazali 'alayha miraran fi sanati 627 wa harabahum alhuha, wa qutila min al-fariqayni maqtalatun 'a7imatun" ("only Isfahan held out the Tatars and they attacked it repeatedly in the year 627/1229-30; the inhabitants resisted and great numbers perished on both sides"). This passage has been translated by J. E. Woods, "A Note on the Mongol Capture of Isfahan," Jomrnal of Near Eastern Studies 36 no.1 (1977): 50.

53This point has been discussed by a great number of scholars, among them Cahen, "Mouve- ments populaires," 27-31; Paul, Herrscber, 131-9; R. Bulliet, Patricians of Nishapur (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 78-81; J. Perry, "Toward a Theory of Iranian Urban Moieties: The Haydariyyah and Ni'matiyyah Revisited," Iranian Studies 32 no.1 (1999): 51-70.




unrest and nearly endemic warfare among the Turks. From the death of Malik- Shah and Nizam al-Mulk in 485/1092 up until the capture of Isfahan by the Mongols in 633/1235-6 (that is, over a period of a century and a half) no central power had been able to establish its authority in western Iran durably or to prevent the Turkish emirs from fighting among themselves. The attempts of sultan Muhammad b. Malik-Shah to restore order at the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century and those of the Atabegs of Azerbaijan half a century later were both short-lived. This permanent crisis situation was directly put to good use by Iranian factions within Isfahan. The weakness of the state enabled them to fight each other freely, but to also use the various Turkish forces to win the fight.

This phenomenon can be observed at the end of the fifth/eleventh century during the dynastic struggle between the relatives of the late sultan Malik-Shah, principally, his sons Berk Yaruq and Muhammad. In Isfahan, the power vacuum unleashed the long-restrained tensions between the Isma'ilis and the "Khurasani" elite established by the Saljuqids. The links the local Isma'ili movement had with Berk Yaruq are probable but cannot be proved with certainty. On the other hand, their local adversaries constantly supported the cause of Muhammad, counting on him to help them against the Isma'ilis. On two occasions, the "Khurasani" camp prevented Berk Yaruq from entering Isfahan, but as Muhammad preferred the struggle against his brother to that against the Isma'ilis, their plan did not bear fruit immediately.54 In 494/1101, they managed to win back control over the urban areas after a memorable massacre.55 However, they needed the Turkish military to seize the Isma'ili fortresses. It was only upon the death of Berk Yaruq and the return of Muhammad to Isfahan in 498/1105 that the "Khurasanis" could at last envisage a joint military action taking shape. True, the final assault was launched by the Turks, but it is no less true that it had been hastened by the "Khurasani" leaders of Isfahan.56 Significantly, when the Isma'ili leader Ibn 'Attash was paraded through the

54See Ibn al-Athir, X:288 (quoted above note 25) and X:297-8. Concerning the pro-Muhammad policy of the "Khurasanis," see Durand-Guedy, I4fabdn, 255-261.

55See above all Ibn al-Athir, X:315. Hodgson, followed by Lewis and Daftary, ascribes the initiative of this massacre to Berk Yaruq, who had just forced Muhammad to flee to Khurasan. It is true that the events of Isfahan occurred simultaneously with the anti-Isma'ili purge inaugurated by Berk Yaruq in his own army. Nonetheless, they cannot be linked to him, because Berk Yaruq did not exert any authority over Isfahan at that time, and on the other hand, the leader of the operation, Abu l-Qasim al-Khujandi, was one of the main characters of the Nizamiyya network and a strong supporter of Muhammad. See M.G.S. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nitari Ismd?lls against the Islamic World (La Haye, 1955), 88; B. Lewis, The Assassins. A radical Sect in Islam (Londres, 1967), 91; F. Daftary, The Ismd'lis: Their History and Doctrines (Cambridge, 1990), 354.

56The most accurate accounts of the maneuvers of the "Khurasani" leaders (i.e., the qadi 'Ubayd Allah al-Khatibi and the Shafi'i faqih Abua l-Qasim al-Khujandi) are given by ?'ahir al-Din-e Nishapfifi, 48-9, and 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, see Bundari, 91-3.



602 Durand-Guidy

streets of Isfahan in a very elaborate staging, the Turks did not appear at all; it was as if their role, merely instrumental, was now over.57

The instrumentalization of the Turkish forces is even more obvious during the sixth/twelfth century. After Isma'ilism was eliminated as a sizeable political force in Isfahan and the "Khurasani" elite had successfully integrated themselves into the urban society, a new fault line appeared within the victorious Sunni camp, between the Hanafis and the Shafl'is. As the Saljuqid state declined (and this decline was all the more apparent in Isfahan because from the second decade of the century it ceased to be the residence of the sultans), the followers of the two main madhhabs formed two antagonistic camps. Each one controlled its part of the city: on the one hand, the western district of Dardasht was under the control of the Shafi'is, headed by the Khujandi family (who monopolized the title of ra'is); on the other hand, the eastern district of Juibare was under the control of the Hanafis, headed by the $a'id family (who monopolized the title of qadi). Between them, tensions soon led to confrontations, which became permanent after the collapse of the Atabegs of Azerbaijan's state in 581/1186 and the disappearance of any substantial central authority. Internal strife was so violent that even a chronicler like Ibn al-Athir, who practically stopped reporting events concerning Iran for the period after 560/1164-5, mentioned them.58

Involving Turkish forces to crush the opposite camp was all the more tempt- ing, particularly since the multiplication of the protagonists (Khwarizm-Shahs, Atabegs of Azerbaijan, Atabegs of Fars, rebellious Khwarizmi emirs, Abbasid emirs, and local emirs the so-called "Iraqi" emirs) provided manifold possibilities of alliance. For example, in 621/1224, the Hanafis took advantage of the arrival in Isfahan of the last Khwarizm-Shah, Jalal al-Din, to strengthen their pos- ition. At that time, after three years of wandering in India, Jalal al-Din was a king without a kingdom and without resources, but the qadi of Isfahan welcomed him with open arms and provided him with food supplies, horses, clothes, and even war weapons.59 Three years earlier, the Shafi'is had allied with the Khwarizmi prince Rukn al-Din, while the Hanafis had become close to one of the most

57According to the well-known account of Zahir al-Din-e Nishipfri, 49-50, Ibn 'Attash was put on a camel, and the people of Isfahan threw garbage at him, while a band of male prostitutes (mokbannatb) walking in front mocked him in a song. Riwandl, 161, lines 11 -2, handed it down to us in its dialectical form: "'AttAsh-e 'ili, jan-e man, 'Attash-e 'Ili, miyan-e sar-e helili, tora bedez chekarui ?P" ('Attash the great, my dear friendl Atttsh the great, you have a crescent in the middle of the headl What did you want in the fortress?l).

58Ibn al-Athir, XI:525, "when [Atabeg Pahlavan b. Eldigiiz] died, the fighting, crimes, fires and looting which happened in Isfahan between the Shafi'is and Hanafis exceeded all possible descrip- tion." See also Yaqut, Mu'jam al-bulddn, ed. F. Wustenfeld (St Petersburg, 1866-1873), I:296, lines 7-8, "...kathratu 1-fitani wa l-ta'assubu bayna l-shLfi'iyyati wa l-Hanafiyyati wa 1-hurubu 1-mut- tasilati bayna al-hizbayn" (the edition bears barbayn, but I have read instead 4itbayn) ("the multiplication of the confrontations, the fanaticism between the Shafl'is and the Hanafis and the ongoing wars between the two camps").

59See Nasawi, 96.




powerful "Iraqi" emirs (i.e., from the Jibal province), a Turk by the name of Ibn Ay-Abe:

It so happened that in those days, the qadi of Isfahan was visited by Ibn Ay-Abe, who was anxious to become closer to him and who spoke about alliance. Rukn al-Din, with his soldiers and the followers of the ra'is, $adr al-Din al-Khuiandi, attacked the qadi's district known as Juibare. He ravaged it until he took control and ruled it. The qadi fled to Fars to seek refuge with the Atabeg of Fars.60

Nasawi passes harsh judgment on these alliances. He called the "Iraqi" Turks "opportunists and trouble-makers" and he denounced the fickleness of the Isfahanis.61 But from a local point of view, the only element that mattered was the antagonism with the opposite faction, as a result of which both camps tried to fully exploit the tactical opportunities afforded by the ongoing chaos.

Nevertheless, by involving the Turks in the local warfare, the Iranians took the risk of sustaining reprisals when the situation on the ground changed. For example, when the two sons of Malik-Shah agreed to put an end to their struggle in 497/1104, Isfahan fell to Berk Yaruq. The leaders of the "Khurasani" camp then paid the price for their alliance with Muhammad: instead of attacking the Isma'ilis, Berk Yaruq, on the contrary, set himself against those who had been constantly opposed to his ambitions to rule the city during the previous years.62 A century later, the Shafi'i faction also paid the price for its military involvement. They had formed an alliance with the Saljuq Toghril b. Arslan while the Hanafis supported the Atabeg of Azerbaijan. When the Atabeg defeated Toghril in 585/1189, he ordered the Shafi'i areas in Isfahan to be looted for three days. In a long letter kept in al-Mukhtdrdt min al-rasd'il, a local Shafi'i notable tries to convince a close counsellor of the Atabeg to have him reconsider his decision. "The people of Dardasht," he said plating with words, "are already more knocked than the knocker on the door." 3 Then he continues:

A way to express gratitude for this victory would be to assist us and not to loot us, to renew his help to us and not to slaughter us. This is the increase of gifts and the application of justice which holds the state together, not bringing damage and extermination on the subjects. Because God has granted what

60Nasawl, 70. 61 See Nasawl, 60, about the Turks ("al-atrak al-'iraqiyya tullab al-fursa masa'ir al-fitna") and 77-

8, about the Isfahanis ("ahwa'uhum al-mutaqalliba, ara'uhum al-munjadhiba"). 62See Ibn al-Athir, X:396, speaking about "al-aydi al-mutatarriqa ilayhim [i.e. ahl Isfahan] min

al-jundi wa ghayrihim" ("the extortions that soldiers and others imposed on the people of Isfahan"). 63al-Mukhtdrdt min al-rasdil, 159, "agar che az Dardasht-and, az halqe kufte-tar gashtand." The

name of Dardasht contains the word dar (door) and balqe designates the knocker used by visitors to announce their arrival.



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the king likes, and that is victory, the king shall do what God likes, and that is forgiveness.64

The argument is interesting because it aims to assess that the looting was not only useless but also unjustifiable. However, the Atabeg must have thought that the Shafi'is did deserve to pay the price for their involvement and the reprisals seem to have taken place.

One might well wonder how strifes leading to such situations could be justified. In regard to the struggle against the Isma'ilis of Isfahan, Ibn al-Athir quotes the bellicose speech of a "Khurasani" leader who merely "declared in front of everybody that [the Isma'ilis] should be fought and that it would not be suffered to allow them to remain where they were."65 In the following century, the increase in the frequency of combat and the escalation of the violence must have posed an obvious problem for a growing part of the inhabitants. When the author of the Dast,7r al-vuZard', Mahmiud b. Muhammad al-Isfahani, speaks about the people who had turned his beloved Isfahan into a hell, he called them "nd-ahldn-e sharrir."66 Literally, this expression means "vile and wicked people," but it also evokes very clearly the "ahi al-shirra," which is one of the cir- cumlocutions used to designate the urban militias at that time.67 Likewise, Kamal al-Din al-Isfahani expresses his disgust for the killings. In one of his qasidas, written after a Shafi'i raid against the Hanafi district, he shows how internal strife perverted to such a great extent what was supposed to protect the inhabitants: the moat had been turned into common graves and the walls into a podium to expose macabre trophies.68 He then questions openly the legitimacy of such warfare:

Is that not fanaticism (ta'assob), say it truly, to be Muslim and then to be happy with that? But is it only a matter of fanaticism, because even the Abkhazs do not allow such behavior!

6al-Mukhtdrdt min al-rasd'il, 159. 65Ibn al-Athir, X:432, "fa-qala bi-mahdarin min al-nisi: yajibu qitiluhum wa Ii yajuizu iqraru-

hum bi makinihim." 66Mahmad al-Isfahini, 21, "in da'1f chuin az tahammol-e in tahamol bi-tiqat shod...'omde-ye

4arekat-e khod sikht ti in shahr az ghose-ye na-ahlan-e sharrir.. tark kard." 67About the "ahl al-shirra," see A. Havemann, Ri'dsd mnd qada. Institutionen als Ausdraxck wecbseln-

der Krafteverbdltnisse in jyriscben Stadten vom 10. bis Zum 12 Jahrbundert (Freiburg, 1975), 79, 114. 68See Kamil al-Din al-Isfahini, Divan, ed. H. Bahr al-'Ulami (Tehran, 1970), verses 4348-9, "Be

birlay 6 khandaq negah kon bebin, ke chuLn bi sheguin-ast in majara. Ze khandaq tan-e zende dar zir- e khik, ze barti sar-e mordegan bar hava" ("Have a look upon the rampart and the moat, to understand how it happened: inside the moat are living bodies under the dust, on the walls, the heads of the dead float in the wind").




To have such customs and then boast about being the nation of the Prophet!69

The poet drew his own conclusion and eventually decided to retreat as a hermit to the outskirts of the city.

Neither the ever less defensible justification of the internal strife nor the ever higher risks of the alliance with the Turks were enough to put an end to them. Worse, it was the Iranian habit of using the Turkish forces for their own interests that led to the final disaster. Indeed, when the Mongols swept into Jibal and joined the ranks of the numerous protagonists, the Isfahanis tried to involve them in the same way they were used to doing with the other Turks. According to the contemporary testimony of Ibn Abi l-Hadid, the local Shafi'is called the Mongols in to help them against the Hanafis:

A group of Shafi'i leaders journeyed to the adjacent territories of the Tatars and told them, "come to the city immediately and we will surrender it to you"...Descending upon Isfahan, [the Mongols] surrounded the city in the year 633/1235-6... Meanwhile, within the city itself, the Shafi'is battled the Hanafis and many were killed. The gates of Isfahan were then thrown open by the Shafi'is in accordance with their pact with the Tatars, who had promised in return to slay the Hanafis and spare the Shafi'is.70

Far from falling in with this opportunist alliance, the Mongols simplified the local political scene by killing all its players, and as they often did in such cases, they began with those who had surrendered the city to them. In that point of view, the Mongol conquest not only added an unprecedented degree of violence to the chaotic situation that had started a century and a half before, but it also brought that situation to its end.

Conclusion

A very peculiar tale from the Arabian Nights called "The Adventures of Buluiqiya and the Queen of the Snakes" or "The Adventures of Jamasp" speaks about an old king of Kabul, Tighmiis, attacked by Kafid, the king of India. Tighmiis entrenched himself in his capital and could not count on the help of his son, who was too occupied chasing his lover. The enemy kept coming every month, but Tighmuis would take refuge inside the city. "As for the inhabitants of Tighmfis' capital," says the tale, "whenever the enemy pulled back, they

69Kamal al-Din al-Isfahani, 256, verses 4351-54, "Ta'assob-gari nist, ensaf kui, mosolmani o pas bedinha reda. Ta'assob che bashad ke in rasm-o-rah, nadarand Abkhaziyan ham rava. Chenin rasm- o-a'in o pas laf-e an, ke hastim ma ommat-e Mostafal" The Persian word "ta'assob-gari," which could seem modern, is attested elsewhere in the sixth/twelfth century with the sense of "fanaticism;" see Logbat-ndme-je Dekbodd: 769b.

70Ibn Abi 1-Hadid, 111:81 (translation of Woods).



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were busy repairing their weapons, fortifying the walls and preparing the ballista."'71 According to Garcin, this episode refers to an Iranian situation, probably that of the sixth-seventh/twelfth-thirteenth centuries. Indeed, the involvement of the city-dwellers in the fighting was frequent and of real military importance, and it is no surprise that it has reverberated as far as Egypt. Nonetheless, their military role did not limit itself to supporting (or resisting) the prince. The example of Isfahan shows two different levels of struggle-one among the Turks, the other among the Iranians between which connections existed in accordance with the respective interests of the various protagonists. The analysis of these connections demonstrates that the Iranians, far from being on the whole the victims of an historical process (the Turkish domination), did participate at their own level in these dramatic events. In that respect, it is the very sensitive issue of their role during the "Turkish period" that should be reassessed.

71AIfa Layla wa Layla, ed. Buliq, 1:694, "fa-amma ahlu madinati 1-maliki Tighmuxs fa-innahum 'inda intirlfi l-'aduwwi yashtaghiluna bi-isILihi I-silathi wa tahsini I-aswari wa tahy'ati 1-manjanlqat.'' On this tale, see N. Elisseeff, Thbmes ct motifs des mille ct une nhits (Damas, 1949), 198, no. 123. I am grateful to my professor, J.-Cl. Garcin, for having pointed out this reference to me.

