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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz] On: 25 November 2014, At: 19:49 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Contemporary African Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20 Is Zimbabwe the future of South Africa? The implications for land reform in Southern Africa Allison Goebel a a Women's Studies and Environmental Studies , Queen's University , Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada E-mail: Published online: 22 Jan 2007. To cite this article: Allison Goebel (2005) Is Zimbabwe the future of South Africa? The implications for land reform in Southern Africa, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23:3, 345-370, DOI: 10.1080/02589000500273979 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589000500273979 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]On: 25 November 2014, At: 19:49Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Contemporary African StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20

Is Zimbabwe the future of South Africa? Theimplications for land reform in Southern AfricaAllison Goebel aa Women's Studies and Environmental Studies , Queen's University , Kingston, ON K7L3N6, Canada E-mail:Published online: 22 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Allison Goebel (2005) Is Zimbabwe the future of South Africa? The implications for land reform inSouthern Africa, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23:3, 345-370, DOI: 10.1080/02589000500273979

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589000500273979

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Is Zimbabwe the Future of South Africa?The Implications for Land Reform inSouthern Africa

Allison Goebel

In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, a history of race-based colonial land dispos-

session led to the domination of white commercial farmers and rural underde-

velopment and impoverishment of black Africans. In both countries, the ques-

tion of land reform emerged in the post-independence contexts, linked to the

dual challenges of redistributive justice and economic development. The dra-

matic events in Zimbabwe since the year 2000 involving massive and often vi-

olent land occupations of white-owned commercial farms have sparked

concern about developments in South Africa (Human Rights Watch 2002). The

‘radical’ land reform in process in Zimbabwe is discredited by most analysts as

well as the development establishment of the World Bank, United Nations, the

Commonwealth and others, for the corruption, disregard of the rule of law,

marginalisation of the poor, anti-democratic political forms and violation of hu-

man rights that it has entailed. The process has also so far resulted in dramatic ag-

ricultural productivity declines, including massive food shortages and losses of

exports, and has failed to decongest in any significant way the Communal Areas

(the former Tribal Trust Lands) where the poorest farmers reside and practise

subsistence agriculture (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000; Briggs 2004;

Human Rights Watch 2002; Waeterloos and Rutherford 2004; Worby 2001).

Is it reasonable to suggest that South Africa could face a similar series of events?

More specifically, could South Africa face widespread, race-based,

state-endorsed occupations and expropriations of commercial agricultural

land? Or, from another perspective, will the revolution be completed, and land

returned to its rightful owners (Hansungule 2000; Thomas 2003)?

While literature has begun to emerge since 2000 addressing these questions, few

publications deal systematically or comprehensively with the details of the scenar-

ios in the two countries. To set the stage, the first section of this essay provides a

quick tour of concerns raised around land invasions in Zimbabwe as a threat to

South African processes by various camps, including the media, the far-right

whites in South Africa, and some academics on the left. The body of the essay then

systematically examines the ‘land question’ in each country, identifying both the

similarities and differences to provide clues to the question of the future of land

reform in South Africa. This essay argues that, despite many structural similarities,

Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23,3, Sept. 2005

ISSN 0258-9001 print / ISSN 1469-9397 online/05/030345-26 © 2005 Journal of Contemporary African StudiesDOI: 10.1080 / 02589000500273979

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the particularities of the two cases strongly suggest that South Africa is unlikelyto face a Zimbabwean-type future on the land question.

The Scare“A land-grab in South Africa raises the spectre of invasions, as in Zimbabwe”,suggested The Economist (July 14, 2001). The case reported was of 5000 squat-ters on ‘scrubland’ near Johannesburg airport. The group, many members ofwhom had been camping on the land for months, was reportedly led by one of thethe opposition parties, the Pan African Congress (PAC), who claimed “a newphase of our revolutionary actions”. Nearly three years later, however, The Econ-omist (January 17, 2004) assured its readers that “South Africa is not Zimbabwe”despite some incidences of squatting on white commercial farm land, some“loose talk by ruling-party politicians”, and South African inaction on theZimbabwe issue.

The South African media reportage reflects growing frustration among key actorssuch as the PAC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the main NGOactors (the Landless People’s Movement and the National Land Committee) re-garding the slow progress on land reform. The Landless People’s Movement, forexample, warned that “the people’s anger will break out” if the government targetof the transfer of 30 per cent of commercial land from white to black hands by2014 is not achieved (Mail & Guardian, October 5, 2004). This trend reflects, inpart, the increased mobilisation and organisation of grassroots movements forfaster land reform, supported by civil society players such as the National LandCommittee,1 and the building of academic research on the issues (for example,the extensive work of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) atthe University of the Western Cape).2 Reportage frequently frames concern overSouth Africa’s process with allusion to the Zimbabwe crisis. For example, theCape Times (November 22, 2002) reports: “In a bid to head off Zimbabwe-styleland invasions amid what the commission has acknowledged as ‘tremendousclaimant and public pressure to speed up the process’, President Thabo Mbeki seta 2005 deadline earlier this year for the completion of the land restitution process,a key component of South Africa’s broader land reform programme”.

In March 2003 the New African magazine reported: “Events in Zimbabwe haveput land reform at centre stage in southern Africa, particularly in South Africaand Namibia. Already land occupations are taking place all over South Africa,and there are indications that they will accelerate this year”.

The following year, commercial farmers represented by Graham Ebedes of Afgri(a leading South African agricultural-services business) raised alarm about foodsecurity, land reform and the Zimbabwe experience by stating: “Very impor-tantly, in big bold capital letters, the issue of land redistribution centres on foodsecurity. We must be absolutely sure that we don’t destroy our ability to produce

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sufficient amounts of food at the right quality for our people; we cannot afford aZimbabwe situation” (Sunday Times, August 22, 2004).

The next month, the Minister of Agriculture stepped up her rhetoric regarding thepossibility of expropriations:

Land Affairs and Agriculture Minister Thoko Didiza says that the gov-ernment will expropriate land from white farmers if an agreement on theprice of the farms cannot be reached. This comes amid reports that theproductiveness of farms under claim is declining as farmers await theoutcome of land cases. The minister’s comments, made at this week’sLimpopo agricultural summit, met with strong opposition from the whitefarming fraternity. Some farmers accused the government of making“ridiculous and unfortunate” demands. Didiza said: “In the case of [animpasse] in negotiations over prices, government will take legal steps toexpropriate land. Farmers can take us to court if they want. (SundayTimes, September 19, 2004)

Gert Rall, the vice-president of Agri Limpopo, responded with: “No farmer willtake this lying down. I have a lot of respect for the minister, but I say today thatshe must not make threats. She is threatening us at the time when we want solu-tions. Is this a land-grab or what?” (ibid).

While media tend to sensationalise stories, this chronicle does indicate growingconcern about land reform. However, the South African press remains basicallysupportive of government efforts on the issue, and tends not to be overly alarmist.The main critique, shared by land experts, is the slow pace of the process. As re-ported in the Mail & Guardian (September 10, 2004) land experts suggest that “itremains to be seen whether this [slowness] amounts to a crisis”.

On the other end of the spectrum is the alarmist, rightwing position representedby Philip du Toit’s best-selling book The Great South African Land Scandal re-leased in February 2004. The book details the alleged ruin of many farms takenover from white commercial farmers by blacks since 1994, and warns of impend-ing famine and falling employment on farms in South Africa if the destruction ofthe farms continues. The book also emphasises the murders of white farmers andother violent attacks against them since the early 1990s, and discusses the ‘bo-gus’ nature of many restitution claims and alleged corruption among governmentofficials in the land reform process. The Mail & Guardian (July 15, 2004) tookpains to discredit Du Toit by revealing that his doctorate, described on the dustjacket of the book, was an internet degree from an unaccredited United Statesuniversity, and that Du Toit collaborated with well-known far-right activists inthe researching of the book. However, the violent attacks against and deaths ofmore than 1500 white South African farmers since 1994 (exponentially morethan in Zimbabwe, where 15 deaths of white farmers have been recorded since2000) hangs uneasily over the country, and the number of white commercial

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farmers has declined from 57 980 in 1993 to 45 818 in 2002 (Statistics SouthAfrica 2005b).

Some scholars on the left also raise strong concerns. For example, Bernstein(2003:213) from a world-systems theory perspective, states that Zimbabwe andSouth Africa became independent states in roughly the same historical time ofpost-developmentalism, when the postwar investment in the development projectin Africa had come to an end, being replaced with accelerated globalisation andthe associated downsizing of states and their role. This context meant that the na-tionalist projects of the two states were unable to overcome legacies of racialisedsocial and land-related structural inequalities, in the Zimbabwe case leading tothe current crisis. From this perspective, persisting poverty, unemployment andlandlessness are cited as the cause of the hundreds of deaths of white farmers andtheir workers since 1994 in South Africa, as people express their frustration(Thomas 2003:691). These structural similarities are overlooked at the expenseof preventing widespread occupations and violence in South Africa. Furthermore,“It is worrying that the systematic failure of the media, Western governments andinternational agencies to grasp the structural basis of Zimbabwe’s conflict willleave them ill-prepared to react constructively to similar and imminent conflictselsewhere, especially in South Africa, with potentially tragic consequences”(ibid:692).

Overall, then, while the international and South African media do not predict a‘Zimbabwe crisis’ for South Africa, strong concerns are raised in various camps,and allusion to the Zimbabwe situation comes quickly to the lips of everyonefrom the Minister of Lands and Agriculture to white farmers, activists and aca-demics. Zimbabwe has become an important framing device for reading land re-form in South Africa: for some a haunting spectre of potential disaster, for othersa hopeful sign of the possibility of radical change. Analysing the likelihood of aZimbabwean future for South Africa is complex, especially given the SouthAfrican government’s reluctance to criticise Zimbabwe, either for land occu-pations and expropriations or election processes.

So what do we make of this? This paper addresses South Africa’s land questionby first outlining the most compelling similarities with the Zimbabwe case.Secondly, the paper outlines the major differences between the two cases.Finally, some tentative conclusions are reached.

The SimilaritiesDespite South Africa’s unique historical and contemporary characteristics, it hasstructural, social, political and policy aspects somewhat similar to Zimbabwewhich are relevant to the land question.

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Historical and Structural Contexts

The two cases share characteristics in relation to inequalities, land andpostcolonial development, meriting close consideration. These include unequaland racialised land distribution, compromised revolutions because of inter-national interference, and subsequent slow progress on land reform.

Scholars note the political instability that goes hand in hand with highly skewedland distribution patterns: “International experience clearly demonstrates thateconomies with a land distribution similar to South Africa’s, but that do not un-dertake a radical and rapid reform, are doomed to a debilitating power of civildisorder and violence” (Kirsten et al 1998:8).

In Zimbabwe at independence in 1980, 39 per cent of land was owned by around4500 white large-scale commercial farmers, mostly in the better agro-ecologicalregions in the country. Black Communal Areas took up 42 per cent. By 1997there was some limited change evident, with some shift from large-scale com-

mercial land going to resettlement farms (Table 1).

Table 1: Land Distribution in Zimbabwe: 1980 and 1997.

Land Category % in 1980 % in 1997

State Farms – 1

Resettlement Areas – 9

National Parks/Urban 15 15

Large-Scale Commercial Farms 39 28

Small-Scale Commercial Farms 4 4

Communal Areas 42 43

Source: Colin Stoneman (ed) 2000:51.

The situation was and continues to be even more extreme in South Africa. Inapartheid South Africa, blacks were allocated only 13 per cent of the land3 inthose areas defined as Native Reserves and later bantustans. The remaining landmade up urban areas, parks and other public lands, and white commercial farms.Black farmers were systematically undermined with inadequate access to inputs,markets and poor infrastructure, conditions which effectively destroyedsmall-scale black farming in the country (Kirsten et al 1998; Mbongwa et al

1996).

Despite an even worse land distribution situation, the land question has beenmore central to Zimbabwe’s struggle than South Africa’s since the 1960s(Bernstein 2003).4 Indeed, land reform seemed low on the political agenda of theAfrican National Congress (ANC) in the early 1990s (Cousins 2000:1).5 PatrickBond (2000) claims that the World Bank had tremendous influence on the devel-opment of policy in the transition period, including that on land reform, which

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ensured that despite the liberationist vision of the ANC, there would be no landexpropriations or nationalisation, and private property rights and commercial ag-riculture would be protected. This influence, Bond claims, endured throughoutthe 1990s, severely curtailing land reform options. It is important to remember,however, that World Bank and British influence also limited land reform optionsin the Zimbabwean case. Indeed both countries experienced independence andliberation processes that were vastly compromised by negotiation – Zimbabwewith the Lancaster House constitutional conference, which was in effect from1980 to 1990 – and South Africa with the 1990 to 1994 period of ‘historic com-promises’ of transition. In both cases this meant revolutions far less completethan proponents had envisioned. So while both countries won universal citizen-ship and suffrage, “the limits to national democratic revolution were registered incontinuities of historic relations of property, production and economic power”(Bernstein 2003:212). These “continuities” are especially noticeable in land dis-tribution and agricultural production in both post-independence contexts. Under-pinning these continuities is the protection of private property rights, an issueexplored further below.

The compromises and enduring structural inequalities meant that, in both coun-tries, post-independence redistribution to black farmers was extremely slow un-der the land reform programmes. In the Zimbabwean case, only around 5 to 6 percent of the Zimbabwean population had been resettled by the mid-1990s,6 and inSouth Africa only 3.1 per cent of commercial farmland had been transferred by2004 (Hall 2005). It is arguable that this slowness is a major reason for ground-swells of frustration over land reform among Zimbabwe’s war veterans and ruralfarmers, triggering widespread support for, and participation in, the land occupa-tions in Zimbabwe. South Africa’s similar history on this question could, argu-ably, trigger similar activities there. Lahiff (2000:58) emphasises that thedemonstration effect of the land occupations of Zimbabwe should not be under-estimated:

The previously unthinkable scenario of a forcible seizure of pri-vately-owned (and some state-owned) land ‘from below’, with full back-ing from the state, has occurred. This poses a fundamental challenge tohow land reform is perceived, both in Zimbabwe and throughout south-ern Africa. While some would argue that it has set back the cause of landreform, the message that alternatives to market-based approaches to landdo exist has not been lost on landless people (and others) in the region.The ramifications of such militancy are already clearly evident in SouthAfrica and, to a lesser extent, Namibia.

Lahiff points to the emergence and increasing militancy of the Landless People’sMovement in South Africa to support his case.

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Racialising the Land Question

Clearly the land issue is already ‘racialised’ through historical processes. In addi-tion to the stark racial character of land distribution as discussed above, agricul-ture is also historically racialised through the colonial and apartheid associationof white commercial agriculture with higher productivity, mechanisation, and ex-port-oriented production (with heavy state support for these elements), and blackagriculture with subsistence, low-productivity farming. (This debate is discussedbelow.) It is tragically ironic that, after the collapse of the economy and amidst adeepening food shortage crisis, the head of Zimbabwe’s central bank, GideonGono, is reported as inviting white farmers back to “boost production” (TheTimes, May 21, 2005). What are at stake at this juncture are contemporary socialprocesses that deepen or harden these racialised aspects of the land question, andwhether or not the state allows, or promotes the characterisation of the landquestion as predominantly or only partially a racial issue, as happened in theZimbabwe case. Perhaps the strongest contributor to the post-colonial dynamicin both cases is the stalling practices of white commercial farmers, a legacy of the“continuities of historic relations of property, production and economic power”noted by Bernstein (op cit). In Zimbabwe, white farmers resisted land redistribu-tion by various means in the 1980s and 1990s, including the selling of only themost unproductive pieces of land, court challenges against the gazetting of theirfarms, and conversion of farms to game-farming and conservancies, which werenot, in the 1990s, subject to gazetting (Goebel 2005a). This allowed PresidentMugabe to emphasise the racial aspects of the land issue in the late 1990s and on-wards. This was similar to the 1980s, when continued white economic controlwas blamed for government’s inability to change the lot of the black majority andalso used to justify government-supported ‘black empowerment’ programmes forthe rising black middle class and elites, further marginalising the poor (Mandaza1986).

In South Africa, farmers have been unwilling to sell land under restitution claims,causing claims to languish for years under arbitration (Cape Times, December24, 2003). In 2000, as the Zimbabwe land occupations gathered pace, Palmer(2000:16–17) reported on South Africa: “White farmers have evicted thousandsof people in anticipation of legislation designed to afford tenants andfarmworkers greater protection. They remain powerful, organised and fundamen-tally opposed to land reform. Unless [land reform] is speeded up, [the Minister ofLands and Agriculture] may face increasing pressures to go for a Mugabe-styleland grab”.

White farmer opposition to reform reinforces tensions between blacks andwhites, which are unfortunately found more broadly within South Africa. In ur-ban areas whites have retreated to their suburbs and social groups, and raciallysegregated urban geographies have changed very little since 1994 (Beall et al2002:24–5). The country remains deeply scarred by its history of racialised vio-lence. Former President F.W. de Klerk recently spoke out about race relations:

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There is very little frank debate.Manywhites publicly express politicallycorrect, but qualified, support for transformation while they privately ed-ucate their children to work overseas. The result is that too many whitesare emigrating, either overseas or inwardly into their own communities.They arewithdrawing behind their security fences and are notmaking thecontribution to the broader society that they couldmake. I amdeeply con-cerned by growing alienation between our communities. Recent researchbrings some disconcerting facts to the fore. Seventy-two per cent ofwhitemales now believe, rightly or wrongly, that affirmative action has turnedthem into second-class citizens in their own country. Seventy per cent ofblack South Africans believe that white farmers should be forced to selltheir land. Less than 25 per cent of black South Africans agree that land-owners should have the right to dispute land claims by going to court.(Sunday Times, October 17, 2004)

South Africa has even more at stake than Zimbabwe on the issue of racial har-mony. While Zimbabwean whites represented less than one per cent of the totalpopulation by the 1990s, in South Africa the 2001 census reports that the whitepopulation constitutes nearly 10 per cent of the total population, or more thanfour million out of more than 44 million. While some South African politiciansmay be leaning towards political grandstanding on this issue (see quotation fromMinister Didiza above), vehement political racialising of the land question hasnot yet come from the top in South Africa as it did for so long in Zimbabwe.

The Land Reform Programmes

There are further similarities between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the land is-sue, in terms of the nature and effects of state-sponsored land reform programmesin their post-independence periods. In both cases, after an initial period thatemphasised poverty alleviation and redistribution of land to the landless, theprogrammes shifted to support the emergence of a black commercial farmingclass (Alexander 1994; Bratton 1994; Jacobs et al 2003; Nkala 1996; Walker2003). This move further marginalised the rural poor. In the Zimbabwean case,the ‘fast track’ process following the land occupations of the year 2000 has disad-vantaged some of the poorest rural people, including many former commercialfarmworkers who lost their livelihoods in the process (Waeterloos andRutherford 2004; Sender and Johnston 2004). In South Africa it has been notedthat the poor are the least equipped to move into farming as they lack labour, cap-ital and skill and hence will require significant state support in order to benefitfrom land reform (Zimmerman 2000). In both countries, in cases where land wasredistributed to black small-scale farming schemes, there was and continues to beinadequate state support for infrastructural development, market access, inputsand other crucial supports to assist resource poor farmers to make a start (Rukuniand Eicher 1994; Zinyama 1991; Jacobs et al 2003:19). A detailed study of fiveCommunal Property Associations (formal group entities) that accessed redistrib-uted land in Limpopo Province through the land reform programme found that

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land had been abandoned or used less productively after redistribution, and theprocess had not made positive impacts on rural livelihoods (McCusker 2004).McCusker argues that so far the land reform programme in South Africa has de-livered disappointing results because of its failure to understand and incorporaterural people’s complex livelihood strategies and the constraints of resource poorfarmers. This is in fact a general note struck in the literature, which calls for theneed for land reform to be placed within a comprehensive rural developmentprogramme (Hall et al 2003:33). As of the end of 2004, post-transfer agriculturalsupport remains inadequate, land transfers continue to be very slow andunderfunded, and there is an absence of a proactive approach by government tomake land available in suitable sizes in appropriate areas.7

The problem of inadequate post-transfer support plagued Zimbabwe’sprogrammes of the 1980s and 1990s (Goebel 2005a), and has continued since the‘fast track’ land reform launched shortly after the occupations of 2000, creatinginstability in the farming and settlement processes in the new resettlement areas(Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer 2003).8 These problems make it difficult forstates to succeed in either the equity or productivity goals of their land reformprogrammes, hence adding to the discontent of rural populations. They also makeit difficult to settle the major debate in the land reform literature, that is, the rela-tive productivity and efficiency merits of small-scale peasant farming comparedto large-scale commercial farming. Some analysts argue vociferously that evi-dence points to the superior productivity and economic spin-offs of large-scaleagriculture and hence question the value of any significant land redistribution tosmall farmers (Sender and Johnston 2004; Bernstein 2003:213). Others argueequally strongly for the superior productivity and labour absorption ofsmall-scale production, and that small farms are more “socially efficient” as theycreate more non-farm livelihoods (for example, through transportation, market-ing and other service opportunities) (Deininger 1999; Levin and Weiner 1997;Lipton et al 1996:vii–x; Moyo 2000; Thomas 2003; Van Zyl et al 1996:4–10).

In the Zimbabwe case, there is significant evidence to suggest that the redistribu-tion of land to small-scale farmers that occurred in the 1980s alleviated poverty,improved agricultural productivity, and led to significant improvements in wel-fare outcomes such as income from farming and the acquiring of other productiveassets (Cusworth 2000; Kinsey 2000). Proponents of small-scale farming andland reform to support it also point out the gross inefficiencies of large-scalecommercial farming, especially in South Africa, which was heavily subsidised bythe apartheid state, causing irrational over-mechanisation in a context of abun-dant labour, excessive farm size, and lost Gross Domestic Product from the lop-sided farm economy (Van Zyl et al 1996:5–6). In both cases, then, states arerunning programmes that in some ways contradict state aims regarding rural pov-erty alleviation, undermined both by lack of follow-up support for poor farmersand an emphasis on emergent black commercial farmers. These dynamics fueldiscontent among the rural poor.

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Another similarity between the two programmes that has caused similar difficul-ties is the adherence to a willing-seller/willing-buyer approach to land transfer. Inthe Zimbabwean case, it was a requirement of the Lancaster House Agreementthat white farmers must be willing to sell their land to government, and receive afair market price for that land. As it turned out, many white farmers were unwill-ing to sell, and the Zimbabwean government was also hard-pressed to come upwith market rates for any land that came available. Much of the land used for theearly resettlement programme in the 1980s had been abandoned during the war.South Africa, too, has committed to a willing-seller/willing-buyer approach toland reform. Central to this is the protection of private property rights in the con-stitution, which makes it illegal for government to expropriate land except in ex-traordinary circumstances. The White Paper on South African Land Policy statesthat the government is committed to a land reform programme that will takeplace on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis where possible. However, where thisis not possible, the state must be able to expropriate land required in the public in-terest. The new Bill of Rights expressly recognises that the public interest in-cludes “the nation’s commitment to land reform”. Where land is acquired forland reform through purchase or expropriation, the state is obliged by the consti-tution to pay “just and equitable” compensation. The definition of “just and equi-table” compensation makes it clear that it will not permit profiteering or unduecapital gains at the expense of the public (Department of Land Affairs 1997).

The South African government, also as influenced by the World Bank, accordingto Bond (2000), protected the integrity of the land market by pursuing aprogramme built on the issuing of grants to land applicants, who could then as in-dividuals, or as members of groups (for example, Communal Property Associa-tions), enter the land market to purchase available land (Department of LandAffairs 1997:17–18). Overall, these aspects of the land reform programme inSouth Africa have contributed to the slow pace of land transfers, and limited op-portunities for poor people to access land because of high land prices (Hall 2005).If government rhetoric regarding the stalling tactics of white farmers heats up,pressure on these principles of willing-seller, protection of private property andthe land market will be areas to watch.

The Differences

In this next section some of the main differences in the land issue betweenZimbabwe and South Africa are considered. There are a number of significantdifferences with regard to agro-ecological conditions, small-scale black Afri-can farming history, the role of agriculture in the overall economy, and differ-ences in post-independence land reform policies and practices. These areconsidered in turn.

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Agro-Ecological Conditions and Conservation

Consideration of ecological limits is rarely central in discussion of land reform,even though concerns about environmental deterioration and the need for conser-vation have figured strongly in the history of land use and colonial policy in theregion (Beinart 1984; Drinkwater 1989; McGregor 1995). Indeed, colonial per-ceptions of black farming practices as environmentally ‘destructive’ were oftenused to justify the land allocation practices that produced such skewed racial pat-terns of land holdings in the region, and much colonial effort was spent on train-ing black farmers in farming techniques thought to be both more productive andless environmentally harmful (McGregor 1995; Beinart 1984). Apartheid and co-lonial policies, however, helped produce environmental degradation through re-stricting black farmers to inadequate land areas with poor agricultural potential.Commercial farmers also engaged in environmentally destructive practices in-cluding inappropriate irrigation, heavy dependence on chemicals, andmono-cropping (Hoffman et al 1999; Mohamed 2000). Nevertheless, the conflu-ence of poorer agro-ecological factors (especially steep slopes and higher temper-atures) with high rates of poverty (limiting inputs and conservation practices) inSouth Africa’s communal areas (formerly bantustans or tribal areas) means thatthese areas have three times worse soil degradation than large-scale commercialfarming areas (Hoffman and Todd 2000). This scenario is predicted to worsenwith climate change, with already severely degraded areas likely to be hit hardestby expected shifts in rainfall patterns (Meadows and Hoffman 2003).

The southern African region is extraordinarily fragile environmentally, prone todrought, and soil and vegetation loss. Agricultural productivity also has been fall-ing since 1989, particularly when measured per capita, so that where some coun-tries succeeded in increasing overall production (as in Zimbabwe up to 1998),this was not enough to keep pace with population growth (Briggs 2004). How-ever, in the case of ecological limits on agriculture, South Africa is much worseoff than better-watered Zimbabwe. Only 13 per cent of South African land is ara-ble. Around 35 per cent of Zimbabwe’s land is classified as natural region I, II orIII, which designates agro-ecological conditions suitable for intensive farm pro-duction although much of the remaining land is suitable for extensive livestockproduction (regions IV and V), and there is potential to extend irrigation as well(Nkala 1996:55). South Africa is very dry and infertile, mostly suited to live-stock-raising. Cowling (1991) argues that an ecological sustainable economy inthe region would leave agriculture to better-endowed countries like Zimbabwe,timber production to Mozambique, and industrialisation to South Africa. In bothZimbabwe and South Africa, land reform should embrace sustainable agriculturalpractices. However, in the Zimbabwean case, the top ecological concerns of de-forestation and soil loss were exacerbated by the land reform process of resettle-ment in the 1980s and 1990s. Deforestation occurred as a result of the clearanceof the often relatively well-wooded resettlement land for agricultural purposesand the areas also faced unsustainable forest and grazing land use from re-source-strapped neighbours in Communal Areas (Goebel 1999).

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In the South African case, the White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997)calls for the implementation of sustainable farming systems. It states that land re-form “should ameliorate the current levels of environmental destruction associ-ated with the crowding of large numbers of poor people on marginal, erodibleand often dangerous land” (Department of Land Affairs 1997:25). This sectiongoes on to state: “Nonetheless, the land redistribution programme is not withoutenvironmental risks. One of the challenges of land reform is to relieve land pres-sure without extending environmental degradation over a wider area. [Withoutproper planning] the programme could result in land being used unsustainably,and scarce, good quality arable land being converted to residential uses” (ibid).However, relevant research and concrete practices that would ensure sustainablefarming remain severely underdeveloped (Mohamed 2000).

In Zimbabwe, environmental concerns about land reform figured prominently inthe Land Tenure Commission of 1994 (Rukuni 1994) and had been an importantthread in earlier policy documents and commissions (see Chavunduka 1982). De-spite this, resettlement policies and practices have tended to reproduce colonialtechnical approaches to small-scale farming, including contour ridging, the use ofhybrid seeds, mono-cropping and artificial fertilisers, leading to ongoing concernregarding soil loss, deforestation and overall land degradation (Nkala 1996).South Africa, however, clearly faces more severe ecological limits than doesZimbabwe regarding agricultural potential, and the role this might play in landreform. In strictly agro-ecological terms, Zimbabwe has significant potential tosupport productive small-scale agricultural opportunities for a large proportion ofthe rural peasantry, whereas South Africa faces severe limitations in this regard.Ideally, of course, ecological limits should not be used as an excuse to avoid eco-nomic and social justice for the rural poor as in the colonial and apartheid past.South Africa, however, faces significant challenges in generating new processesof sustainable development that include living within ecological limits, and jus-tice, equity, and the eradication of poverty (Attfield et al 2004:405).

Another concern has to do with non-farming uses of land, especially as parks andconservancies. As in other countries throughout the region (Neumann 1998;Broch-Due and Schroeder 2000), post-independence has revealed strongly con-flicting interests and values between local indigenous people’s views and inter-ests in parklands and conservancies, and the conservationist and preservationistideologies upon which the parks were built in South Africa. There are numerousland claims involving protected areas being played out around the country. Kepe(2004:14) argues, however, that in South Africa “conservation receives preferen-tial treatment”, and the claims on protected areas are being dealt with in a piece-meal fashion that does not endorse a significant change from the pre-1994 era,especially if the areas (such as game parks) have high commercial value. We areunlikely to see, therefore, the kind of decimation that has become the fate of Zim-babwe’s wildlife and conservancies. The widespread slaughter of wild animals inZimbabwe is a result of the poaching by local people, and even more importantly,the state-sanctioned slaughter of animals to feed hungry rural people, and, alleg-

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edly, engage in illegal international trade in animal parts (Daily Telegraph,March 23, 2005; Pretoria News, April 27, 2005). This scenario is clearly part ofthe wholesale plunder of Zimbabwe’s assets for political gain and enrichment ofthe political elite, resulting from the collapse of democracy and its institutions, asituation that seems remote in South Africa for reasons developed further below.

Farming Skill of Rural Dwellers

Small-scale black farming in South Africa was virtually wiped out by govern-ment policies and practices of the Union of South Africa after 1910 which deter-minedly turned black farmers into labourers through subsidies to white farmers,closing down of markets to black farmers, and other tools (Mbongwa et al 1996).Figures from the World Bank (mid- to late-1990s) state that only 16 per cent ofthe male labour force, and 10 per cent of the female labour force are engaged inagriculture (World Bank 1999:56). This means that there is a huge task of train-ing as well as support in inputs, services and infrastructure that will be needed todevelop small-scale black agriculture in South Africa. It is also unclear howmuch demand there is for such activity in rural areas, given the typically minorrole subsistence agriculture plays in rural people’s livelihood strategies in con-temporary times. In KwaZulu–Natal, for example, agriculture is viewed as a pooroption to paid employment, and pensions, remittances from migrant family mem-bers, and informal sector employment are other more important sources of liveli-hoods (Lipton et al 1996:ix-xxvi). In rural South Africa, crop production incommunal areas is usually only one of many land-based livelihood strategies, in-cluding livestock holding and sale of harvested natural resource-based products.These activities are often particularly important for the survival of the very poor.However, proponents of land reform argue that the minor role played bysmall-scale agriculture should not be used to support arguments against landtransfers, but that such elements of land reform must be done with a thorough un-derstanding of people’s livelihood strategies and the barriers facing the poor toenhance these (Hall et al 2003:20–8). It is important to remember that SouthAfrica has a higher proportion of urbanised dwellers than elsewhere in Africa.South Africa’s urban population was estimated at 56.9 per cent for the year 2000,with its projected 2010 figure at 64.2 per cent. Zimbabwe remains predominantlyrural, with its urban population of 2000 estimated at 35.3 per cent and its pro-jected urban population for 2010 at 42.5 per cent (United Nations Centre forHuman Settlements (UNCHS) (Habitat) 2003:253).

Black farming in Zimbabwe is quite different. Historically, indigenous Africanscertainly did face punitive colonial policies that discouraged farming. These in-cluded evictions from prime farmland, restrictions on the participation of blacksin agricultural markets, the imposition of conservationist and technical practices,and pressures on black men to migrate for paid employment (Moyana 1984;Elliott 1991). While severely constrained, the widespread ability and willingnessto farm survived the colonial period. In the early post-independence period of the1980s, there were significant gains in small-scale black farm productivity in the

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Communal Areas, although these gains were made predominantly by the alreadyrelatively prosperous sector of the peasantry (Moyo 1986; Cliffe 1988). Therewere also significant levels of productivity recorded among new resettlementfarmers in the 1980s, particularly where the new farms were in good agro-eco-logical areas and where government had followed through on infrastructuraland other supports (Bratton 1994; Rukuni 1994).

Rural and urban Zimbabweans tend to share the views of South Africans that ac-cess to well-paid employment is the most important element of livelihoods andpoverty alleviation (Bowyer-Bower 2000). Also, most peasant farmers in Zimba-bwe use land for a range of purposes and are rarely engaged in agricultural pro-duction only (Palmer 2000). Indeed, reading the occupations of 2000 and beyondas ‘land hunger’ of potentially productive rural Zimbabwean peasants would bemisleading, as these occupations were largely spearheaded by war veterans,‘youths’ from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front(ZANU–PF), and politically powerful people who encouraged, sometimes byforce, the participation of ordinary rural people in the occupations (Marongwe2002). Nevertheless, Zimbabwe’s rural people are more prepared and able, over-all, to engage in successful small-scale production than their counterparts to thesouth. Indeed the latest available figures (mid- to late-1990s) from the WorldBank (1999:56) report that 58 per cent of the male labour force and 81 per cent ofthe female labour force are engaged in agriculture. This makes large-scale landreform for purposes of peasant production both more easily justified in produc-tivity terms and more clearly practical in livelihood terms from the point of viewof rural people themselves.

In post-2000 Zimbabwe, new opportunities for some small-scale farmers areopening up (Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer 2003). The redistribution processhas been chaotic, though, and while ZANU–PF continues to speak the rhetoric ofredistribution of land to the black peasantry, many critics claim that the elites arethe main beneficiaries of land redistribution (The Sunday Times, October 21,2002; Zimbabwe Independent, September 12, 2003). In cases where small farm-ers did begin new plots, lack of follow-up support and a series of devastatingdroughts since 2000 has meant little progress so far since 2000 in small-scaleproduction. Indeed, the rural population is on the brink of famine (Reuters NewsAgency, July 26, 2005). However, if and when the crisis passes, it is arguable thatthe farming skill exists to build a viable small-scale peasant sector in Zimbabwe.In the South African case it is harder to argue convincingly (although many advo-cates are trying) that land reform will be able to support the development ofsmall-scale peasant production on a significant scale, and/or significantly relieverural poverty.

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Relative Importance of Commercial Farming to the Economy

In Zimbabwe, agriculture has been arguably the most important element of theeconomy. In the early 1990s, as the country headed into the economic, politicaland social crisis that led up to the land occupations of 2000, agriculture and for-estry represented only 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1992(well behind manufacturing at 24.3 per cent, and slightly behind distribution, ho-tels and restaurants at 11.2 per cent). Nontheless, tobacco alone was the high-est-valued export by far at US$ 433 million (Lopes 1996:17), and throughout the1990s horticultural production became an increasingly important source of for-eign exchange (Briggs 2004). Overall, the category ‘food’9 accounted for 44 percent of Zimbabwe’s exports in 1990, dropping to 26 per cent by 2002 (WorldBank 2004:200). Figures from the World Development Report 2000 indicate thatagriculture was the only sector in Zimbabwe, besides services, which posted anincrease in its value-added as a percentage of GDP between 1980 and 1998 (from16 to 18 per cent), while industry and manufacturing both showed declines(World Bank 2000:253). While it has already been said that the majority of eco-nomically active men and women are involved in agriculture in Zimbabwe, dataon the Zimbabwean labour force by different agricultural sectors are hard tocome by. However, a Government of Zimbabwe 2001 report states that in 1997there were 339 012 employees on large-scale commercial farms and a total of1 382 706 people engaged as either self-employed or employed people onZimbabwe’s large- and small-scale commercial farms and resettlementschemes (Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 2001a:6). TheWorld Bank (2000:253) states that the total workforce in Zimbabwe in 2002numbered 6.1 million. Hence the commercial agricultural sector as a whole em-ployed more than 20 per cent of Zimbabwe’s workforce in the late 1990s. Thesector was and is crucial to the Zimbabwean economy, particularly in the contextof macro-economic crisis when foreign exchange earnings become crucial to eco-nomic survival. This is both why the land occupations represented an economiccrisis, and also why commercial farmland is so central to the capital accumula-tion of the new elite (Moore 2001).

In South Africa, on the other hand, agriculture plays an economically minor role.While middle-income countries such as South Africa typically have about 15 percent of their GDP from agriculture and employ about 25 per cent of the popula-tion in the sector, in the mid-1990s South Africa’s agricultural sector accountedfor only about 5 per cent of GDP and employed only 14 per cent of the labourforce (Lipton et al 1996:iii). Again in contrast to Zimbabwe, the value-added as apercentage of GDP fell between 1980 and 1998 in South Africa (from 7 to 4 percent), whereas manufacturing and services posted increases in the same period(manufacturing from 23 to 24 per cent and services from 43 to 57 per cent)(World Bank 2000:253). The latest figures available from Statistics South Africa(2005a:Table 5) indicate that agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed about5.6 per cent of the GDP in 2004. In terms of exports, in South Africa the category‘food’ accounted for only 7 per cent of exports in 1990, and 11 per cent in 2002

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(World Bank 2004:200). The number of workers in the agricultural sector de-clined 13 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (from 1 093 265 to 940 820), withnearly half of employees in 2002 employed as casual or seasonal workers (Statis-tics South Africa 2005b:2).

Commercial farmers clearly have political-lobbying clout way beyond this eco-nomic role, partly because of the historically important part they have played inensuring food security for the country. However, the minor economic importanceof the sector does provide one key reason why the land issue and rural develop-ment generally have not figured big on the ANC agenda, which has been focusedeconomically on industrial development, tourism and services (Cousins2000:1–2). These differences go far to explain why the land issue was so centralin Zimbabwe but remains peripheral in South Africa.

Early Focus on Restitution

South Africa’s land reform programme has three distinct elements: redistribution,restitution, and tenure reform.10 So far, the majority of effort and money has beenput into restitution activities. The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights(2003) expresses its mandate as follows: “One of the very first pieces of legisla-tion that the new government promulgated was the Restitution Act No 22 of 1994as amended. The main aim of the Act was to provide for the restitution of landrights to persons or communities dispossessed after 19 June 1913 as a result ofpast racial discriminatory laws or practices”.11

The restitution programme started out slowly, but after working out some admin-istrative hurdles, managed to settle 48 825 claims by March 2004.12 Most of theseare urban claims, and most have been settled through monetary compensation.By the end of the financial year 2003, more than R2 billion had been spent on theprogramme, with nearly half a million people as beneficiaries (Hall et al 2003).This impressive and hugely symbolic achievement is important in amelioratingthe sense of past injustices, even though the programme has had very little impacton land ownership and occupation patterns. Rural claims have not movedquickly. These are more likely to involve expropriation and redistribution of landand are much more difficult to do: “It is these claims that could potentially giverise to major conflict over land but also hold significant potential to contribute tothe broader aims of land reform – namely the reduction of rural poverty and ra-cially skewed control of land and rural resources ”(ibid:5).

In Zimbabwe, the issue of restitution in the sense of people making claims re-garding specific pieces of land that had been taken away from them in the pastwas not an aspect of the land reform process until late 1990s (Chironga 2000;Marongwe 2002). The original resettlement policies of the 1980s allocated landto people through an application process that prioritised people’s claims as warveterans, landless people and those with proven agricultural skill and equipment.Historical claims were not part of the selection of settlers for new resettlement

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lands. Restitution was addressed in a general way only, and always as mediatedthrough the state and its developmentalist priorities.

The focus on restitution in South Africa has clarified the land issue for manypeople, and in that sense intensified the emotions and certainties about claimsthat address historical dispossession and injustice. This could encourage adeepening politicisation of the issue, particularly if resistance to land transfers inrestitution cases by white farmers and other landowners continues. However, theproactive way that South Africa has dealt with restitution also strengthens its po-sition as committed to its constitutionally-based reform process, which includesthe protection of private property and negotiated land transfers. The state canclaim that it is addressing the issue as best it can in a difficult context, hencesomewhat deflating the potential for popular or grassroots protest to inflame theissue sufficiently to dislodge the state from its chosen path. In the Zimbabweancase, the state could not claim significant progress on the land issue, or even ahopeful programme moving towards change after 20 years of independence.While the state clearly incited popular unrest over the land issue for its own polit-ical purposes, the grassroots were also legitimately fed up with the lack of prog-ress, and hence participated in the large-scale occupations of 2000 and beyond(as well as many earlier occupations, especially in 1998) (Marongwe 2002).

South Africa, Neoliberalism and Position in the World

Zimbabwe has always maintained a critical position vis-à-vis the West and par-ticularly Britain as the former colonial power. The radical anti-colonial rhetoric,however, was partnered with an increasingly neoliberal economic policy, and theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been heavily involved inZimbabwe’s economy since the 1980s (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Dashwood2000; Lopes 1996). Indeed, the negative effects of neoliberal policies in the1990s (known as Economic Structural Adjustment Policies (ESAP) in Zimba-bwe), such as the removal of subsidies on basic food items, increased schooland healthcare fees, and skyrocketing urban unemployment significantly contrib-uted to growing civil unrest and support for opposition political movements(Bond and Manyanya 2002; Briggs 2004; Lopes 1996). ZANU–PF was alarmedby these political developments, and since the late 1990s and especially since theland occupations of 2000 Zimbabwe has taken clear steps to disengage politi-cally, and to a certain extent, economically, from the Western world and its poli-cies. After Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in March 2002,President Mugabe eventually withdrew the country from the body in December2003 (The Guardian, December 8, 2003). Most foreign governments withdrewtheir diplomats starting in 2000, and some have imposed bans on travel ofZimbabwean politicians to their countries. Many bilateral agencies and foreignNGOs left Zimbabwe, although some are returning but finding it a hostile envi-ronment. Aid organisations are also finding it difficult to fundraise for activitiesin Zimbabwe because of the perception in the West of corruption and bad gov-ernance since the land invasions (Reuters News Agency, May 11, 2005). The

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difficulty faced by the United Nations World Food Programme in its Zimbabweoperations is a particularly tragic example of the government’s oppositionalstance towards world bodies perceived to serve ‘Western’ interests (ibid, May 4,2005). At the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Rome in April 2005, Mugabe re-portedly tried courting former leaders of Eastern European countries, now mem-bers of the European Union (EU), in attempts to end Zimbabwe’s isolation (ZimOnline, April 8, 2005), such as the EU sanctions against the country (EuropeanBusiness News Online, February 10, 2005). Zimbabwe has entered into trade withChina, allegedly buying jets, tanks, rifles and other military hardware, and report-edly discussing the taking over of former white commercial farms by Chinesestate-owned companies (Zim Online, May 18, 2005). The International MonetaryFund (IMF) has reduced Zimbabwe’s credit rating to ‘junk status’, the country’slarge external debt has not yet been rescheduled, and the IMF threatened to expelZimbabwe from the Fund in February 2005 (Financial Gazette, April 28, 2005).Zimbabwe’s hostility is particularly strong on the land question, which has beenrepeatedly framed as a hated legacy of colonialism, finally overcome with theland occupations and evictions of white farmers (The New Zealand Herald,August 20, 2001).

South Africa, on the other hand, is firmly committed to the neoliberal agenda ofthe West and its institutions. This means protection of private property law, for-eign investment, and protecting its international reputation regarding good gover-nance. As leader of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),President Mbeki has earned the respect of powerful Western leaders in his callfor a new global economic deal for Africa, which in turn, through peer-reviewmechanisms, would move towards more democratic and accountable governance.In this context Mbeki has faced heavy Western pressure to condemn Zimbabwe’sfraudulent elections, illegal land grabs and state-sponsored violation of humanrights (Washington Post, April 4, 2005). The South African government, how-ever, is also very conscious of its leadership role in Africa, and hence is hesitantto criticise Zimbabwe or President Mugabe as a fellow African leader strugglingin an unequal and racist global order. The government is also conscious ofMugabe’s popularity among certain segments of South Africa’s population.Finally, press accounts allege that South African businesses are in a spree of‘cherry-picking’ in Zimbabwe, buying up Zimbabwean manufacturing operationsat bargain prices (The Zimbabwean, May 20, 2005). The South African govern-ment therefore has engaged in a balancing act on the Zimbabwe question, whichmeans refusing to ‘police’ Zimbabwe, but at the same time being very clear thatthere will be no such radical land reform in South Africa. NkosazanaDlamini-Zuma, the Foreign Minister, in a visit to the United Arab Emirates, re-cently demonstrated this balancing act very well: “Zimbabwe is correcting anhistoric injustice. We may not agree with the methods but we agree with the cor-rection of an injustice. This whole hullabaloo is about black people [sic] are tak-ing land from white people. There is an element of racism” (SABC News, May12, 2005). She stressed: “In South Africa we are going through a process of buy-

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ing back land. We believe these things must be done in this orderly fashion”(ibid). Although Africa would accept the support of the West to see NEPAD suc-ceed, it would not stoop to pressure to “police Zimbabwe” (ibid).

Conclusions: Politicisation of the Land Question?This commitment to economic partnership and the desire to be accepted as aworld player among the powerful Group of Eight countries are major reasons toargue that the state will not encourage an intensification of the politicisation ofthe land question in South Africa. It is also a reason that the South African gov-ernment is not externalising the responsibility of the land question in the way thatZimbabwe has. Of course, Zimbabwe’s transition was brokered by the UnitedKingdom as the former colonial power, which imposed heavy constraints on theresolution of the land question at the Lancaster House negotiations, such as will-ing seller/willing buyer stipulation, and the requirement for the Zimbabweangovernment to contribute half of the compensation to white farmers for farmssold before the other half would be available through UK funds. Flagging supportfor land reform from Britain and the broader donor community in the 1990s com-ing together with the fiscal crunch of structural adjustment effectively scupperedany chance Zimbabwe may have had at resolving the land question within thoseconstraints (Cusworth 2000). There is some merit, therefore, in Zimbabwe’s ar-gument that the problem lies at the door of the UK, especially in terms of financ-ing any compensation to white farmers whose land had been expropriated(Business Day, September 23, 2003). While the international community hasnever accepted this externalisation of blame, the Zimbabwean government waseffectively able to pass this off domestically, and use the land issue as a tool togarner political support, particularly in the rural areas.

If South Africa were to follow this path of externalising blame, it would risk iso-lation at a time when it is negotiating a privileged role for itself in the global or-der. Also, South Africa’s transition was not brokered by a formal colonial power,so the target of such blame would be harder to define. Since the blame is not be-ing externalised, this means that if the land issue were to heat up Zimba-bwe-style, then the blame for failures would fall on the government itself, not theformer colonials. Hence it is not in the interest of the South African government,for either its international relationships or its internal politics, to allow the landquestion to be overly politicised. It is also important to emphasise that ZANU–PFsanctioning of an illegal process of land occupations and evictions was the actionof a failed state, a state presiding over the country’s economic and political de-cline. ZANU–PF acted desperately in an effort to stave off growing civil dissentand political opposition as represented by burgeoning support for the oppositionMovement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the late 1990s (Hammar et al

2003). ZANU–PF also sought to bring the war veterans, who had become in-creasingly critical of the government’s neoliberal policies and failure to deliveron the land question, back on side. The category ‘war veterans’ was guaranteed

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20 per cent of new resettlement land under new policy in 2001 (Ministry of Land,Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 2001b).13 ZANU–PF also sought to co-optanother simmering disaffected group, the youth, who were recruited to specialyouth camps as a paramilitary force where they were (and still are) allegedly in-doctrinated in pro-ZANU–PF ideology, trained in military techniques, and de-ployed to terrorise suspected opposition supporters in rural and urban areas (TheGuardian, March 18, 2003). ZANU–PF has recently turned directly to attack theurban-based supporters of the MDC through its draconian “OperationMurambatsvina” (“Drive Out Trash”) through which urban informal-settlementdwellers and informal-sector traders have had their homes and livelihoods de-molished, bringing on strong United Nations censure (Associated Press, July 22,2005). This horrific and seemingly irrationally destructive operation shows aclear trajectory of policy focused primarily on political survival from the late1990s onwards. The South African government faces no such political uncer-tainty.

Overall then, this essay suggests that while there are significant structural simi-larities of history and land distribution, a racialised character of the land issue inboth contexts, and a powerful emotional and political impact of Zimbabwe’s‘radical’ land reform in South Africa, other factors argue against a conclusionthat South Africa will follow a similar path as Zimbabwe. These include the mi-nor economic role of agriculture, agro-ecological limitations, the uncertainties re-garding the benefits for rural people of land reform, and South Africa’ssensitivity to international approval. As a result, the South African government isdown-playing the land question. As this essay goes to press, a land summit is be-ing held in Johannesburg (July 2005), and the debate, as expected, is focusing onthe willing-seller/willing-buyer stipulation and the market-based approach to re-form. So far, the government appears to be considering changes to the will-ing-seller/willing-buyer approach, mainly as farmers are allegedly settingexploitatively high prices (Mail & Guardian Online (www.mg.co.za), July 27,2005). However, the process is likely to remain painfully slow and accompaniedby low-intensity violence and instability in rural areas rather than building up to aZimbabwe-style process.

AcknowledgementThis paper was presented at the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) annual confer-ence on May 1, 2005, Montreal, Quebec. The financial assistance from the Social Science and Hu-manities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Iwould like to thank Ruth Hall of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at theUniversity of the Western Cape who advised on an earlier draft of the essay, and shared her knowl-edge along with Edward Lahiff during my visit to PLAAS. I would also like to thank MarcApprecht and the editors and anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Contemporary African Studieswhose thoughtful comments were extremely helpful in revising this essay for publication.

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Notes1. http://www.nlc.co.za.

2. http://www.uwc.ac.za/plaas.

3. This figure is under dispute. It may have been increased in 1916 after the Report of the Na-

tive Lands (Beaumont Commission).

4. Zimbabwean revolutionary history emphasises the links between land, traditional religion

and anti-colonial struggle in ways not strongly articulated in the South African case (Lan

1985; Alexander et al 2000).

5. According to Ruth Hall (personal communication, May 24, 2005), land reform was a highly

contested aspect of the 1990–1994 negotiations, with concessions reluctantly being made by

the ANC.

6. There were numerous other reasons that land reform was stalled in the Zimbabwe case, in-

cluding corruption, bureaucratic confusion and macro-economic pressures (see

Bowyer-Bowyer and Stoneman 2000; Cliffe 1988; Goebel 2005a, Chapter One; Nkala

1996). For the sake of clarity, I confine the argument to a few main points here.

7. However, positive signs include the introduction of a Comprehensive Agricultural Support

Programme (including training, inputs, infrastructure, market access) and modest increases

in budgets for land reform (Hall 2005). Perhaps more positive results are on the horizon in

South Africa.

8. See also “New farmers appeal for food aid” from Zim Online, May 9, 2005, indicating that

new farmers continue to struggle in Zimbabwe without post-settlement state support.

9. ‘Food’ includes live animals, beverages, tobacco, animal and vegetable oils, fats and vegeta-

ble oils, fats and oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels.

10. See Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Land Restitution in South Africa: Our

Achievements and Challenges, Pretoria, May 2003 for details.

11. Ibid.

12. http://land.pwv.gov.za/restitution/Statistics/Settled_Claims-2003-04/settled_restitu-

tion_claims.htm.

13. There is much contention and negotiation over who counts as a `war veteran’ in contempo-

rary Zimbabwe, with many too young to have in the liberation war claiming membership as

the group successfully negotiates rewards from the state.

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