Islam, Muslim polities and democracy

This article was downloaded by: [GA Pfeiffer Library]On: 05 May 2014, At: 01:39Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Islam, Muslim polities anddemocracyAnoushiravan Ehteshami Professora Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies ,University of Durham , Durham, UKPublished online: 24 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Anoushiravan Ehteshami Professor (2004) Islam,Muslim polities and democracy, Democratization, 11:4, 90-110, DOI:10.1080/1351034042000234549

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351034042000234549

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/1351034042000234549

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351034042000234549

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy

ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI

Since 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) the international spotlight has been more firmly thanever on the Muslim world, and its Middle East heartland in particular. All aspects of lifein Muslim societies – history, educational system, attitudes towards the West, genderrelations, cultural underpinnings, political and economic systems, demography, foreignrelations – have been pored over by policy commentators and analysts in attempts tounearth the root causes of Islamist militancy against the West. Using the tools ofpolitical economy and social movement theories this analysis will debate the complexset of issues underlining many aspects of the ‘Islam and democracy’ debate, whichtoday is very much about the relationship between Islam and governance. Indeed, asthe debate itself since ‘9/11’ has been increasingly shaped by priorities of westernactors, whose traditional interests in the Muslim Middle East are now being driven byconcerns about international stability, Muslims have tended to adopt an even more scep-tical posture. Whether forced democratization can be effectively administered adds anew and interesting twist to the debates surrounding Islam and democracy, adding newdimensions to the already tangible impact of geopolitical factors on Muslim polities.

Key words: democracy; Islam; civil society

Introduction

Since the 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) attacks on the Word Trade Center the

international spotlight has been more firmly than ever on the Muslim world,

and its Middle East heartland in particular. All aspects of life in Muslim

societies – history, educational system, attitudes towards the West, gender rela-

tions, cultural underpinnings, political and economic systems, demography,

foreign relations – have been pored over by policy makers and analysts in

attempts to unearth the root causes of Islamist militancy against the West

and the Al Qaeda attacks on western targets. These efforts were intensified

after ‘9/11’. The operating assumption of most western policy analysts has

been that instability in the Middle East region (including North Africa)

poses a direct security challenge to international security. While in the past

policy makers might have been content to advocate a strategy of containing

Anoushiravan Ehteshami is Professor in the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,University of Durham, Durham, UK.

Democratization, Vol.11, No.4, August 2004, pp.90–110ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X online

DOI: 10.1080=1351034042000234549 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

the threat, the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have

compelled the United States and its closest allies to seek active intervention

in the Muslim world to effect real and qualitative change in these societies

through substantive political and economic reforms.

In search of answers to the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks some commentators

(Bernard Lewis amongst them) have developed the ‘what went wrong in the

Arab world’ approach, arguing that the problem has always lain within the

Muslim world itself and Islam’s inability to adapt to the modern age.1 This

approach has been setting the tenor of much of the policy debate in the

West about the complexities of Muslim societies, and their alleged short-

comings, in a globalized world. These societies, shackled by the teachings

and practices of Islam, are said to be so timid and unstable as to pose a

direct threat to international security; while their shortcomings mean that

they are ill prepared and ill equipped to manage the challenges of globaliza-

tion on their own. To paraphrase one analyst, left to themselves, Islamists

will continue to threaten international security by externalizing the internal

deep-rooted crises of Muslim societies.2 As they do so, it is argued, Muslims’

deep-seated suspicions of the West, and their ‘rage’, will inevitably make the

West their primary target of attack.

These discussions have tied into wider debates about Islam and governance,

and Islam and democracy.3 Are the principles of good governance fully compa-

tible with Islamic norms? Can Muslim states be encouraged or forced to democra-

tize, to follow the western model as it were, while retaining a public code based on

Islamic values and principles? How are they to attempt democratization while

also curtailing the activities of Islamist groups, and remain in the US-led anti-

terror international coalition? Can Islamist political forces be expected or encour-

aged to join a democratic coalition? Can democratization happen without the pre-

sence of the normative values associated with western liberal democracy? And

finally, is the West itself prepared to tolerate the presence of an Islamist political

elite in power today when it was not able to endure it in Algeria in 1992?

So, the already complex subject of ‘Islam and democracy’ is today being

further complicated by international developments beyond the control of Muslim

states. Indeed, as the debate itself since 9/11 has been increasingly shaped by the

priorities of western actors, whose traditional interests in the Muslim Middle

East are now being driven by concerns about international stability, Muslims

have tended to adopt an even more sceptical posture.4 Whether forced demo-

cratization can be effectively administered adds a new and interesting twist to

the debates surrounding Islam and democracy, adding new dimensions to the

already tangible impact of geopolitical factors on Muslim polities.

To address the complex set of issues embedded in the discussion about

Islam and democracy, the author will be guided by two sets of analytical

tools, those buried in the conceptual parameters of the political economy of

ISLAM, MUSLIM POLITIES AND DEMOCRACY 91

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

the state on the one hand,5 and the social movement theories which posit

Islamic political activism (the most powerful and influential organized

political force) in the Muslim world as more than just protest movements.6

Utilizing these tools one is better placed to analyze the current state of political

interaction – state power versus religion – in the Muslim world. It is also

more feasible within this context to explore the place of the Islamist forces

in the Muslim world, and the nature of power politics (in terms of institutional

politics) in general in Muslim societies. Social movement theory would tell us

that political upheavals tend to accompany serious social and economic pro-

blems; urban and environmental degradation, growing poverty and unemploy-

ment, corruption and nepotism, all mix into a cocktail of resentment,

often stirring the people in the heartland of Muslim-dominated territories

into action. The masses, feeling threatened by the march of international

capitalism and westernization of their cultures and ways of life, feel exposed

and, in response, criticize their own leaders for failing to deliver on their

promises, attack them for their lack of accountablity and transparency,

abuse of power, and for failing to follow the true teachings of Islam as the

best way of protecting Muslims against their western neo-colonial enemies

led by the United States (the ‘Great Satan’). In this context, Islam is for

some the liberator, for not only does it show the way of the struggle against

the ‘infidels’ but it also points to a way of reconstructing Muslim societies.

Islam is seen as the solution for many of the problems besetting the Muslim

world and also as the means of liberation from centuries of subservience.

Ranged against radicalized populations and the army of young people in

the Muslim world – who constitute the largest demographic grouping – is

the all-powerful autonomous state, dominated as it is by powerful and

unresponsive elites. The ‘bonapartist’ corporatist state in the heartland of

Islam – the Arab world – is now set over and against Islamist movements

which encourage protest and promote wider ranging social and political

agendas for change. In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 international order,

these forces are being set against each other in ways which create explosive

interactive dynamics. In the meanwhile, both sides are ambiguous about the

place of Islamic values in their programmes. For example, do Islamic

canons provide the way forward, or do they act as a barrier to democratiza-

tion? Islamic discourses on political organization are themselves now part

of a much wider debate about the reformability of the heartland of the

Muslim world – the Middle East and North Africa region – and beyond.

The Islamic Canons

Advocates of Islamic government argue that in Islam, perhaps more so than

any other organized religion, the rules of the political game are to some

92 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

extent prescribed in the basic texts and practices of early Islam. At the same

time, several commentators have suggested that through the reinterpretation

and modern application of divine texts one can envisage a situation in

which Islam could actually facilitate the process of democratization in

Muslim states.7 Theoretically, such institutions as Shura (a consultative

council) can provide the institutional basis for the establishment of accoun-

table authority.8 Although authority in Islam can be defined in ways that

could give perpetual control of the levers of power to unelected individuals

and councils of ‘wise men’, such bodies of knowledge as the Hadith (the

Prophet’s traditions) can be utilized to support the case for circulation of

power and its de-monopolization. Such doctrines as ijtihad (independent

reasoning) and ijma (consensus) form central planks of the faith and help in

the bolstering of consultation. Having said this, it should be noted that there

simply are no single set of canons which can be said to provide a ‘blueprint’

for Islamic government.9 There does not in fact exist a specific form of Islamic

state and the Quran and the Sunnah (the customs and practice of the Prophet

as enshrined in the Hadith) are inevitably open to interpretation. Nor does the

Sharia prescribe any definite pattern to which an Islamic state should conform,

or carry within it a constitutional theory for such a state. Islamic practices may

be driven by the canons and scriptures but they are dictated by cultural values

and practices, and historical experiences prevalent in different Muslim

countries. Most importantly of all, as Islamic practices are determined through

interpretation of the texts no one source can claim to have a monopoly on

the truth.10

Thus, a community of over 1.2 billion people, living in 50 or more

countries, across three continents, cannot draw their governmental model

from the Quran and the Sunnah, even though many will have been inspired

by the legacy of the ‘Golden Age of Islam’ and the Prophet Mohammad’s

own views on Islam and government. Most Islamists and radical activists

still look to the so-called golden age of the four caliphs for inspiration and

for guidance on the implementation of an ‘authentic’ and uniquely Islamic

form of popular government. The reference to the golden age of Islam also

conveniently helps to dilute the consequences of modernization on Muslim

societies and to reduce barriers which have emerged in modern Muslim

states between religion and government. While the radical Islamists’ insis-

tence on a return to the golden age is a reflection of the desire to emulate

the pure practices of that era, it is also as much the outcome of a strategy

which intends to place political power in the hands of the religious

community. Thus, the ‘ulama’ under such circumstances come to represent

a new (and largely immovable) political class, and one which, by virtue of

being deeply tied to the traditions of Islam, enjoy legitimacy for their authority

to interpret Islam. Examples now abound in the Muslim world of the ulama


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

using their spiritual authority for political gain. In Iran and Sudan they have

done so quite openly, as also in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In practice,

the search for the golden age resulted in a situation in which a strong

institutional advocate of a return to the golden age, the Islamist Haqqania

religious school (madressa) in Pakistan, evolved into a training academy for

a neighbouring country’s religious students – Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders

– who in turn used their control of Afghanistan in the second half of the

1990s to reject the modern state in its entirely and reduce that country’s

status to that of an ‘emirate’. It was inevitable then that in search of the

golden age, the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar (himself an honorary

graduate of the Haqqania madressa) should be declared as the Amir

al-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful), his state re-organized in pursuit

of only one goal: the strict imposition of narrowly defined Sharia law, and

his country’s fortunes tied to the promised land, the myth of a new Islamic

caliphate.

Islam and Democracy

Though the concept of democracy has been rejected by many Muslim activists

as a western import designed to destroy Islam and the Sharia, there are scores

of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars who vehemently argue that there is

no contradiction between Islam and democracy; that Muslim teachings and

practices of collective debate, consensus, accountability and transparency, if

followed properly, will produce Muslim versions of democratic rule.11

Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami has spoken extensively of the possibi-

lity of an ‘Islamic democracy’, even though such a conceptual link between

the two had been firmly rejected by the founder of the Islamic Republic in

Iran in 1979. Other democratic forces in the Muslim world may not fully

accept Khatami’s notion of Islamic democracy on the grounds that as the

proposed Islamic system would be inherently pluralistic it would not need

the democracy label added to it. But they would agree that the genesis of

liberalization is in Islam itself. Presenting his case in the context of ‘Islamic

liberalism’, Muhammad Faur argues that ‘Islam as interpreted by the liberals –

free and fair elections, universal suffrage, multi-party politics, minority rights,

equality of citizens – [is] all consistent with the thought of many Islamic

liberals’.12

Nonetheless, if we were to visualize Islam and democracy as two alter-

native political systems, then one of the clearest distinctions between the

two would be in the realm of sovereignty: while in the democratic system

sovereignty of the people is a central principle of the polity, in the Islamic

model sovereignty lies with God. While the difference between the two stand-

points is sometimes played down by Islamist intellectuals, there clearly is a

94 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

fundamental separation of ways in the process of conceptualization of demo-

cratic governance between the liberal democracies and Islamic teachings.13

The Syrian Islamist leader, Hawwa, has stated unambiguously that ‘demo-

cracy is a Greek term which signifies sovereignty of the people; the people

being the source of legitimacy. In other words, it is the people that legislate

and rule. In Islam the people do not govern themselves by laws they make

on their own as in democracy. Rather, the people are governed by a regime

and a set of laws imposed by God’.14 Such an imposed relationship

between state and civil society, derived from an acceptance of a divine

absolute truth, is seen by critics of Islamic politics as being inherently anti-

democratic, if not pre-modern.15 But Abootalebi would maintain that with

‘some deviation from the Western conception of democracy’ Islam can

deliver democracy.16

Overcoming such conceptual gridlock has been one of the key elements of

the intra-Islamist debate about political reform in the Muslim world. Modern

Islamist thinkers, from Tahtawi (1801–1873) and Mawdudi (1903–1979) to

Qutb (1906–1966) and Khomeini (1902–1989) have grappled with this

complex issue but have unfortunately ended up confusing an already compli-

cated picture by producing competing interpretations of the Islamic state and

its operational organization in relation to democracy. In practice, following

‘God’s law’ in matters of state has proved easier said than done, and Khomeini

was compelled to put the interests of his Islamic Republic above that of

even Islam, in an effort to make this his-worldly state function. In an

unprecedented move, he ultimately put the imperative of state authority,

even that of sovereignty, above religion. In response to the then president

Ali Khamenei’s pronouncement that religion governed state activities,

Ayatollah Khomeini publicly retorted that as the government of the Islamic

Republic was ‘a supreme vice-regency bestowed by God upon the Holy

Prophet’, serving it took precedence over all other duties. Addressing the

needs of the vice-regency government of the republic, he said,

is among the most important of divine laws and has priority over all peri-

pheral divine orders . . . has priority over . . . prayers, fasting, hajj . . . The

ruler is authorized to demolish a mosque or house which is in the path of a

road . . . The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke the Shari’a

agreements. . . when those agreements are contrary to the interest of the

country.17

In this unprecedented statement, Khomeini in effect suggested that in an

Islamic state, ‘bestowed by God’, matters of state override that of the faith,

even its most fundamental elements, largely because such a state, by virtue

of its existence, is already serving God’s will. Religious authority in Iran

was used by the Iranian clerics to acquire political power, and having got


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

that they then proceeded to reduce the main legitimizing basis of the state,

Islam, into a subservient support act for the ruling regime. It is partly for

this reason that some Sunni Islamists are openly critical of the currently

dominant Iranian characterization of an Islamic state.

Returning to the main theme of the debate, Choudhry points to the

Prophet’s own practices in claiming that the practice and concept of govern-

ment by and for the people were actually introduced by Islam:

The Prophet . . . regularly practised the cardinal principle of mutual

consultation in his dealings with public affairs. He conducted government

matters by following the principle of mutual consultation. Decisions

relating to public matters were made after due consultation with his

people, thus laying the foundation of the government of the people,

by the people and for the people, much earlier than this principle was

established in the West.18

Choudhry further asserts that the fundamentals of democracy are present in

Islam: Islam recognizes popular sovereignty, government is based on the

rule of law, political leaders are elected and accountable to the people, and

equality of citizens is assured in the Quran itself.19 There are others,

however, who believe that Islam and the realm of politics are worlds apart.

According to Sivan:

Islam has very little to offer in the realm of politics. The state of

Muhammad was prophetic, hence unique; not a model for future

emulation. After Muhammad’s death, political history was shaped by

circumstances . . . Islamic thinkers had very little to offer by way of

political doctrine. Islamic law had little to say on constitutional

matters. Political practice was mostly authoritarian if not despotic. An

Islamic state is a mirage, a figment of the radicals’ imagination.20

Between these two extreme interpretations sit a host of other perspectives

which either offer different ways of measuring the contribution of the

golden age of Islam to modern Muslim politics, or seek to compromise the

teachings of Islam with the imperatives of democracy.

In addressing this debate Fareed Zakaria has proposed that a clear distinc-

tion be made between democracy and what he calls ‘constitutional liberty’.

Although much of Zakaria’s analytical focus is on the United States, his

proposed conceptual refinements are helpful in clarifying the analytical lens

through which we explore aspects of the ‘Islam and democracy’ debate.21

Zakaria argues rather persuasively that the developing countries, particularly

in the Muslim world, are more in need of constitutional liberty than demo-

cracy, for while the former encourages the introduction of some wide-

ranging reforms, the latter can at best produce a system of electoral democracy

96 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

in which the destiny of the people can very easily remain in the hands of a

powerful few. In the same vein, it can be argued that democratic ‘arrange-

ments’ are not sufficient indicators of democracy or even democratic rule. A

clear distinction, then, needs to be drawn between procedural democracy

and democracy as an end-type. The existence of institutions of democracy,

therefore, without ‘good governance’ – the accompanying rule of law, an

active civil society, political culture of inclusivity, dialogue and peaceful

circulation of power – do not necessarily ensure democratic governance.

Constitutionalism is, in practice, a more important vehicle for the introduction

of political freedoms and democratization.22

The introduction of the institutions of democracy into an inhospitable

socio-political environment would probably be a pointless exercise. In this

context, Mayer’s argument that even the introduction of Islamic law can in

practice in fact become little more than ‘political law’ is particularly apt.23

She notes that in a country like Iran, which is still the only revolution-based

Islamic state in the world, the introduction of Islamic law, interpretable by a

small body of clerics, has led to the de-liberalization of the political system

as over time the body of law therein has become a pawn in the hands of an

unelected clerical elite in the country. In her words, the ‘disillusioning experi-

ence of clerical despotism, egregious corruption, gross mismanagement of

Iran’s faltering economy, harsh suppression of dissent, a savage version of

criminal justice, and pervasive human rights violations have provoked

increasing alienation and restiveness’.24 Similar damning reports could be

given of several of Iran’s near and distant Muslim neighbours as well!

Political Systems and Practices in the Muslim World

We need here be wary of discussing Muslim societies and polities in the

abstract and as part of an unitary system, called the Muslim world. The 54

countries notionally viewed as Muslim come in very different shapes, sizes

and cultures, with a wide variety of political systems. Furthermore, the

picture is complicated by the fact that very few Muslim countries actually

follow the teachings of Islam in legislation or even political organization.

While most declare themselves to be Muslim in character, most do not

formally adhere to Sharia law as the basis of their national laws. The six

Muslim states of the former Soviet Union and the majority of Muslim

countries in Africa declare themselves to be Muslim in character but tend

not to posit their political systems as Islamic. Nigeria may be Africa’s

largest Muslim country, but Sharia law forms the basis of law in just one pro-

vince. Similarly in Asia, while Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan may form

the continent’s most populous Muslim countries, they do not, in broad terms,

apply Islamic law at the national level, and despite the growing influence of


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

Islamist forces in Pakistan and Indonesia neither has applied the Sharia as

‘federal’ law. In Iran, while there exists Islamic law and an Islamic state, the

functions of which are dominated by a clerical elite, one still has a ‘republic’

whose institutional and organizational business is regulated through an

European-modelled written constitution, albeit with some exceptional differ-

ences.25 Here, elections are routinized and senior posts rotate on the basis of

their outcome.

Indeed, the remarkable fact is that most Muslim states have in fact adopted

western-style written constitutions and secular attitudes towards institutional

structures.26 Turkey goes furthest by declaring itself to be a secular republic

(Article 2 of the 1982 constitution), but in the vast majority of Muslim

countries secular and religious courts co-exist, generally in an uneasy partner-

ship. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, is one of a handful of Muslim countries whose

‘Basic Law of Government’ (1992) – the closest thing to a Saudi constitution –

expressly directs the courts to apply the provisions of the Sharia; Pakistan’s

1973 constitution, by comparison, contains a federal Sharia court whose

function it is to ensure compliance of legislation with Islamic injunctions,

and little more. In Libya, where religious courts were abolished in 1973, the

decisions of the secular courts must still comply with the Sharia. In the

majority of cases, Muslim states are governed by a constitutional framework

which is inspired by and wedded to European constitutional law. At the state

level, therefore, the constitutions of Muslim countries look very similar to

their European counterparts; it is in the provision of religious courts, parti-

cularly in personal status matters, that Islamic Sharia law makes an appearance,

as much as a means of underpinning the cultural identity of such states as

informing their institutional agenda.

As one looks around the Muslim region, therefore, one finds that there is

no one political or judicial system prevailing in the Muslim world, nor indeed

is there harmony amongst these states. One finds on the political map of

the Muslim world modernizing and fast-developing Muslim regimes (like

Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey) existing alongside Muslim states that are

part of the ‘fourth’ world (Chad, Senegal, Somalia). Authoritarian regimes

like Libya cohabit with secular (Central Asian states, Algeria, Egypt, Syria,

Tunisia and Turkey) and Islamist (Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan) republican

regimes. ‘Moderate’ regimes ruling over quite traditional societies (a republic

in the case of Pakistan and Islamic monarchies like Morocco, Saudi Arabia,

Jordan) conform to traditional Islamic norms but still manage to develop

close links with the West. Within each of these categories, moreover, one

can spot a range of differences, both amongst the traditionalist and modernist

regimes. They cohabit, and interact. But they do so first and foremost as

members of a much wider international community and not necessarily as a

result of a shared religion. For this reason, they themselves cannot develop

98 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

a common basis for an ideal-type Islamic state, let alone one which could be

presented to the world as an Islamic democracy.

The fact that such avowedly Muslim states as Iran and Saudi Arabia, both

of which are wedded to the application of the principles of Islam in public life,

are openly talking of pursuing reform of their political systems is itself indica-

tive of the reality that no timeless or absolutist model for an Islamic state

system exists. Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd has spoken of following a path of

political and administrative reform: ‘we will broaden the scope of popular

participation and open new horizons for women in the workplace’. More

telling still in the context of our discussion is his declaration that not even

Saudi Arabia – ‘[which is] at heart of the Muslim world and . . . the cradle

of Arab identity’ – can develop in isolation, ‘we are part of this world. We

cannot be disconnected from it’.27 In Iran in the meantime, the political

and institutional reforms which were introduced in 1997 have reached a

crossroads, with various factions struggling to keep the revolutionary

regime’s unique system of governance introduced in 1980 relevant to the

twenty-first century and the needs of Iran’s youthful and demanding

population.28 The existence of electoral politics has proved to be an inadequate

framework for broadening democratic politics in the only Muslim country to

have gone through a mass revolution to effect an Islamic government. Now,

the whole basis of the post-monarchy regime is in question, to the detriment

of the ruling Islamists.29

Democratization and Electoral Politics

In the Arab part of the Muslim world, democracy, as understood in the West,

is still probably no more than a mirage.30 However, in many corners of this

community of 22 states, the desirability of pluralism has begun to take root.

Popular elections, a necessary but of course insufficient condition for demo-

cracy, have become increasingly frequent since the late 1980s. They are

frequent and regular and a common feature of the regional landscape, and

as such are indicative of a slow but perceptible process of change. In the

ten years between 1989 and 1999 over 80 elections took place in the region,

more than the entire number in the previous half a century.31 Significant

elections now regularly take place in more than half of the Arab countries,

affecting the political lives of more than 150 million people from Morocco

to Oman. If we add Iran and Turkey to the equation, then the total number

of citizens affected by electoral politics will increase by another 130

million. Today then, elections regulate the political life of more than a

dozen Muslim Middle Eastern countries and their 280 million citizens.

Beyond the Middle East, elections shape the political landscape of virtually


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

every Muslim country.32 In three of the big four Asian countries (Bangladesh,

Indonesia and Malaysia) elections are commonplace, and in the fourth

country (Pakistan) they have made an unexpected come-back under the mili-

tary rule of General Perviz Musharraf.33 It is only in Brunei and the new

Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union that independent political

forces seem to be standing still.34 In sub-Saharan Africa also, such poor

countries as Senegal and Mali enjoy democratic benefits too, including

regular elections, which somewhat challenges the modernization theory’s

notions of economic prosperity underpinning political development.

Although many of these elections have had conditions placed upon them

and have not been ‘free’ elections as understood in the West, nonetheless

they have become a welcome fixture of the political landscape. Carothers

argues that elections have come to play such a role in shaping the context

of the debate for ‘democracy promoters’ that these pundits have come to

believe that

elections will serve to broaden and deepen political participation and the

democratic accountability of the state to its citizens . . . it has been

assumed that in attempted transitions to democracy, elections will be

not just a foundation stone, but a key generator over time of further

democratic reforms.35

Party politics have also taken root and political parties increasingly act as

vehicles for mobilization of the masses by both liberal and Islamist actors.36

In Morocco’s 2002 parliamentary elections, some 22 political parties parti-

cipated;37 in Algeria’s during the same year, 11 registered parties participated;

and in Jordan’s June 2003 parliamentary poll, key figures formed election

‘fronts’ as surrogate parties in order to organize their electoral campaigns.

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF ELECTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, 1989 – 1999

Year Number of elections

1989 61990 41991 31992 101993 61994 41995 71996 121997 91998 51999 15

100 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

In Morocco and Jordan Islamists were able to compete, but the regulatory

system prevented them from becoming dominant partners, leaving the space

open for other forces to emerge as well.

Political dynamism is also in evidence in some unexpected quarters. In the

traditional monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula today, one encounters a

growing momentum for political and social reform and a gradual opening

up of the political space.38 In Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, we now

have active participation in a deepening and broadening parliamentary

environment, and the leadership of all four states talk openly of the need for

broadening the political base through pluralism. In the two states of Bahrain

and Qatar the talk is of full democratization.39 As already noted, Saudi

Arabia is also openly debating the introduction of broad, but incremental,

reforms. Significantly, as a major first step, it announced the introduction of

direct municipal elections by late 2004 in order to increase ‘the people’s

participation in the administration of local affairs through direct elections

and activating the municipal council’.40

What is of particular interest in the context of institution building and

Islamic practices is that these Gulf Arab states deliberately use traditional plat-

forms of consultation as their vehicles for the introduction of institutional

reform.41 While Kuwait enjoys the benefits of a well-established national

assembly, in Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia the old practice of

consultation has become formalized in substantive consultative councils

(Majlis al-Shura) which act as the main vehicle for the introduction of poli-

tical reforms. In Bahrain and Qatar, constitutional changes have accompanied

the reform package, which in practice has produced a complementary frame-

work between the traditional and western forms of political organization and

association.

Therefore, as elections and party politics broaden so political forces in

the Muslim world learn to play by the given rules of the game, and when

irregularities arise they increasingly rely on the judicial system to investigate

their grievances. All parties seem to want to avoid a repeat of the Algerian

case, in which ‘electoral irregularities’ triggered a bloody and protracted

civil war between Islamist forces and the regime. Recourse to the judiciary

in turn encourages a recognition and application of the rule of law, no

matter how imperfect the laws may be or how badly they may be applied in

practice. However, elites and ruling regimes, who ultimately devise the

national rules of party and electoral politics, also learn to manipulate the

system to their own advantage. They apply the law to regulate access to

levers of power, and to control participation of political forces. They, in

effect, use the civil law to exert control of the political process. Unchecked,

such practices can easily transform a transitional step towards democracy


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

into an ‘elected authoritarian’ regime in which elections become no more than

a hollow shell for disguising de-liberalization.42

The regimes also use the same mechanisms to balance the competing

political forces in the political arena. In the words of Brumberg:

Liberalizing autocracies can sometimes reduce or contain conflict between

Islamists and non-Islamists through a process of partial and controlled

inclusion that allows mainstream Islamists, Arab nationalists, and liberals

to enter parliament as independents or as a formal political party.43

Their differences in legislative bodies can assist the regime to effectively

implement a policy of ‘divide and rule’, and when parliamentary political

groups manage to work more closely together the regime can take advantage

of their pragmatism, demonstrated by their ability to compromise, to push

through its own reform agenda. Jordan provides a classic example of this

process.44

The External Variable

In the polarized setting created by the 9/11 attacks, democratization and

Islamization have come to be posited at opposite ends of the spectrum of

choices in the Muslim world. The reason for this is not difficult to see, for it

can be argued that today

radical internationalist Islamic activism could present a major problem

to the international community, one that has two distinct but equally

important embodiments: direct security threats against Western demo-

cracies and indirect impediments to the process of democratisation

and liberalisation in the polities of the Muslim world.45

The international environment for the interaction between Islam and democ-

racy is a particularly important factor to note then, for in the twenty-first

century the United States’ agenda has graphically, and some would argue

dangerously,46 shifted from one of interaction and containment, towards

active diplomatic engagement and direct intervention in the Muslim world.

In the short period since 9/11 the American military has directly intervened

in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has also indirectly done so in another dozen

Muslim countries. But in conservative societies of the Arab world, which

are dominated by risk-averse elites, the wisdom of pursuing a policy of

enforced liberalization or democratization must be critically considered, for

this region has a long, enduring and bad memory of external intervention in

its affairs and has therefore developed a habit of opposing such pressures.

The Bush administration’s strategy of democratization of the Arab East as

a preventive measure in the ‘war on international terrorism’ is precisely the

102 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

kind of external pressure being resisted. As it takes root, this policy is creating

new and unpredictable pressures for change. It puts the onus of reform on the

very western-oriented elites who, in the eyes of their own people, are tainted

by their close association with the West. If they liberalize they are condemned

for appearing weak and vulnerable, or worse still lose their monopoly on

power. And if they do not, they will be subjected to American as well as

popular pressure. Also, as the US strategy raises expectations amongst the

disgruntled population about the extent and depth of reforms being proposed,

a gap is likely to appear between the reality of managed reforms being intro-

duced and the populations’ desire for extensive and unconditional change.

It is instructive that while many in the Muslim world have interpreted

Washington’s policy of regime change in Iraq as an act of aggression

against the Muslim world, others in the Middle East have seen in it the begin-

nings of a new opportunity for pushing the doors wide open and for seeking

wholesale reforms.47 In Iran and Syria, the two opponents of American

hegemony in the region, the population saw in America’s commitment to

‘regime change’ in Iraq the prospects of meaningful change in their own

countries. In Iran, the talk of the town was how American pressure would

soon lead to a loosening of the clerical grip on the levers of power, forcing

a transfer of power from the conservative forces to the elected representatives

of the people;48 and in Syria the expectation was that the Ba’athist regime

would soon collapse under its own weight and the pressure of the fundamental

contradictions in its economic and political power relations that the Iraq war

had exposed.49 Elsewhere in the Muslim world similar pressures were in

evidence, but they did not necessarily stimulate secular or even pro-western

forces into action. In Turkey and Pakistan, for example, Islamists took

advantage of constitutional opportunities and the opening up of the political

environment to score eye-catching electoral victories.50

The strategy of forced democratization carries several hidden dangers

then. As Muslim elites are pressured to open up their societies so American

policy makers may encounter the penetration of government institutions by

the best organized and most dedicated of political forces, the Islamist activists.

This has already happened in Pakistan, Morocco and Bahrain in their parlia-

mentary elections of 2002. Elsewhere, in such strategically important

Muslim countries as Turkey and Indonesia, Islamist-leaning parties and

personalities are already in government, increasingly painting the national

agenda in religious colours. In Indonesia, the Islamist penetration of the

parliament as a result of their general election victories in 1999 (in which

various Islamist parties won some 38 per cent of the vote) has cleared the

way for debates about the introduction of Islamic principles in public life,

including extensive debates about the introduction of Sharia law. Even

where the Islamists may have been jettisoned from power, as in Sudan and


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

Afghanistan, the leadership has tended to function within the discourse

introduced by the Islamists. In addition, in countries where the Islamists

have confronted the all-powerful state, one senses the steady rise of con-

servative forces in society and public life’s creeping Islamization. Egypt

and the countries of North Africa are all affected by this phenomenon.

Democratization and Governance

So, as the above survey of electoral politics shows, despite their many short-

comings, some Muslim elites are encouraging political reform. Reform is

evidently on the agenda of most Muslim countries, irrespective of regime

orientation, political traditions, geopolitical and economic imperatives, or

size. What may be missing from many of these efforts, however, is the full

package of democratization, particularly where the forces of ‘liberal Islam’

are at their weakest.51 The essence of the democratization process can suitably

be captured in the political economy debates about ‘good governance’.

Democratization, of course, which includes the extension of suffrage, the

breakdown of hierarchies and traditional authority, the opening up of closed

systems through deregulation, is at heart a device for improving governance.52

But even where good governance may be a scarce commodity initially, as has

undoubtedly been the case in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the departure of a

dictatorial regime can in itself enhance liberalization. One does not have to

accept the propaganda of the allies to appreciate that despite the country’s

many and considerable problems, Iraqi citizens today enjoy freedom of

debate, worship, association, organization and action in an unprecedented

way. The presence of over 150 newspapers has encouraged debate and, to

the dismay of the occupying forces, has galvanized the people into action.

Iraqi citizens now take a more active interest in local and national affairs.

Access to satellite television and the other technological advances are

helping in the restructuring of public space for the benefit of ordinary citizens.

Civil institutions, of both a religious and a secular nature, are emerging, and

under the nose of the occupying powers individuals are reacquiring the

skills of political association and organization. In Iraq’s case, the trauma of

unseating the ruling dictatorship has proved to be a positive catalyst for

reform, even in the absence of a liberal democratic framework, which

clearly is still missing. Iraq’s experience will therefore become a crucial

test case for the Muslim world. Its ability to make some form of democratic

transition in the aftermath of a costly and destructive war will be an important

indicator of the ‘reformability’ of Muslim polities under severe external

pressure. It will be a test case, moreover, for the impact of the external

variable in Muslim affairs.53

104 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

Democratic consolidation – the analysis of how democratization becomes

embedded – is the other issue to be considered. As already indicated, in the

absence of a combination of vertical and horizontal dimensions of democracy

elections tend to become meaningless, both as a qualitative yardstick and a

political tool for instigating and encouraging reform.54 But as in Muslim poli-

ties the balance between the two is proving hard to strike, the question still

needs to be asked, can Islamic principles and liberal democratic values be

reconciled? Before 9/11 conservative and left-leaning commentators might

have agreed that the two are in fact incompatible and that religion-based

government, particularly of the Islamic variety, would inevitably be intolerant

and illiberal. Today, however, with President Bush’s rational choice paradigm

deterministically expecting Muslim countries to become liberal democracies

once the yoke of authoritarianism has been lifted, a new model for effecting

political change in the heartland of the faith is on offer. It is true that the

rational choice doctrine was put into effect in Iraq in March 2003, albeit by

military force, but the likelihood of the United States being able to pursue

the strategy of forced democratization in the Arab world as its long-term

policy is still very much a matter for debate. To take just one indicator of

America’s political engagement strategy, the Bush administration’s $145

million budget for 2003 for ‘democracy, education and economic initiatives’

is a relatively small sum compared with the United States’ other commitments

in the region. But advocates of the initiative applaud it for pointing the way for

change.55 However, it has to be asked, if the American agenda was pursued to

its logical conclusion, and through the rule of law and a sound electoral system

the political structures did enjoy a broadening of their base, would the West

cope with the emergence of Islamist-leaning governments across the Arab

world? I am still not convinced that they would, given the imperatives of

the war on terrorism and the potency of the radical Islamist movements in

some key Muslim countries. Indeed, it is clear from the agenda in Iraq that

the United States is prepared to take every step necessary to ensure that the

Ba’athist regime is not succeeded by an Islamist one.

With mounting internal problems and increasingly direct external pressure

from the West, many Muslim states now find themselves in an unenviable

position. They must, on the one hand, find ways of implementing ‘a viable

economic development strategy, [creating] co-existence and tolerance between

different ethnic and confessional groups, [promoting] democracy and political

tolerance’,56 and on the other co-opt moderate Islamists. And all this at the

same time as clearing a path through the heightened militancy of Islamism

and its increasingly violent confrontation with the West! The West is set to

continue to play a key and possibly decisive role in the struggle for political

and socio-cultural reform in the Muslim world. Although the West’s military

footprint is already clearly visible on Muslim lands, it is far from clear how


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

its highly-publicized agenda of reform will manifest itself. If the US-led western

attitude is shaped by fear of Islam, or its strategy driven by the need for contain-

ment, it is unlikely that the tensions between Islam and the liberal democracies

will be reduced any time soon. Robin Wright’s cry of the early 1990s that it is

time to embrace ‘Islam’s expression in pluralist forms’57 may fall on deaf ears

both on the inside as well as on the outer parameters of the Muslim world.

We also need to note the possible consequences of democratization for

state–society relations in Muslim polities. One of the core issues for Muslims

and Islamists alike is how might pluralism, introduced in conjunction with

suitably accountable modern institutions, affect the role of religion in politics

and society. There is the danger that the plurality of political parties, societies

and movements could challenge the monopolizing tendency of the ‘Islam is

the solution’ argument. In doing so, pluralism could actually destabilize the

emerging democratic institutions themselves, as well as possibly result in the

weakening of the very basis of Islam in the political process. Many Islamists

already view pluralization as a ploy to weaken Islam, and even those Islamist

forces who have been able to take advantage of pluralistic structures in

various Muslim countries to gain access to levers of power have not always

agreed that they should respect diversity of political opinion, or accept its circu-

lation through democratic means once they take power. While one can imagine

circumstances under which Islam and Islamic institutions could contribute

towards liberalization and pluralization of Muslim polities, the entrenched

patrimonial structures of many Muslim societies, coupled with the potentially

dominant role that the ulama as an influential interest group can come to play

in those societies, could possibly lead to the unravelling of the entire process.

The influence of the Islamists as the most effective organized force on the

process should also not be underestimated. They have the capacity to derail,

or worse still subvert the process if they see fit. Another concern is whether

those political forces in Muslim societies who believe in the absoluteness of

Islamic teachings actually balance their strategies for engagement with the

political process against what Przeworski has called the ‘organized uncertainty’

of democracy.58 In a world of uncertainties, the Islamists’ main argument

(and their attraction to the electorate so far) has been that there exist absolute

truths and certainty about the complex world in which we live, and that these

certainties are to be found in the holy texts and traditions. The danger for

the Muslim reformist modernizers in particular, is that when the chips are

down the organized uncertainty of democratic rule could appear much less

palatable and attractive to a weary electorate than the certainty of familiar

religious-based messages about divine law and purity of religious leadership.

But as Pool notes, even before the organized uncertainty of democracy is

unveiled, Muslim states would need to find safe passage from the transitional

stage of liberalization to democratization – ‘a process involving the extension

106 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

of the liberalization process into a more stable and rooted political order’.59

As the process from liberalization/pluralization to democratization in the

Muslim world is riddled with contradictions the inherent tensions which mark

the boundaries between civil and religious power offer another unique but

important barrier yet to be overcome if Islam and democracy are to emerge

as complementary forces in modern Muslim societies. So, in this context, the

pursuit of the agenda of constitutionalism and good governance, which largely

avoid some of the ideological underpinnings of the western ‘democratic model’,

might still bear fruit, particularly if systematically pursed in Muslim polities

with pluralizing tendencies and embedded horizontal features of democracy.

NOTES

1. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (London:Phoenix, 2002).

2. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Age of Muslim Wars’, Newsweek, 17 December 2001.3. Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).4. Muqtedar Khan, ‘Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy’, Middle East

Policy, Fall 2003, pp.1–19.5. For the salient features of the political economy debates appropriate to the Muslim Middle

East and North Africa see Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Emma C. Murphy, ‘Transformationof the Corporatist State in the Middle East’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.17, No.4 (1996),pp.753–72; Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in theMiddle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

6. Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction forResearch’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.7, No.3 (2002), pp.187–211.

7. John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, Middle East Journal,Vol.45, No.3 (1991), pp.427–40.

8. Abubaker A. Bagader, ‘Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World’, in AkbarS. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity (London:Routledge, 1994), pp.114–26.

9. I am reminded of El-Awa’s remark that the ‘scholar of the political system of the Islamic stateis always surprised to find that most aspects of this subject are shrouded in vagueness,contradiction and conflicting views’. Muhamed S. El-Awa, On the Political System of theIslamic State (Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, 1980), p.iii.

10. Akbar S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (London: Routledge,1992).

11. Abdul Rashid Moten, ‘Democratic and Shura-Based Systems: A Comparative Analysis’,Encounters: Journal of Inter-Cultural Perspectives, Vol.3, No.1 (1997), pp.3–20; JohnL. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

12. Quoted in Timothy D. Sick, Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in theMiddle East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992), p.18. Such personali-ties as Rachid al-Ghannouchi of Tunisia, Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, and Abdel KarimSuroush of Iran can be regarded as vanguards of Islamic liberalism.

13. Elie Kedourie has been a strong proponent of this line of argument. See his Democracy andArab Political Culture (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

14. Said Hawwa is quoted in Azzam Tamimi, ‘Democracy in Islamic Political Thought’,Encounters: Journal of Inter-Cultural Perspectives, Vol.3, No.1 (1997), p.35.

15. Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York, NY: Basic Books,1983).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

16. Ali Reza Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries,1980–1994 (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 2000), p.221.

17. For the full text see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 January 1988.18. Golam W. Choudhury, Islam and the Modern Muslim World (London: Scorpion Publishing,

1993), p.47.19. Ibid, pp.50–52. But even he acknowledges that the same divine messages and the Prophet’s

brief period as leader of the faithful can be interpreted in ways that produce a rigid,authoritarian and closed political system.

20. Emmanuel Sivan, ‘The Clash within Islam’, Survival, Vol.45, No.1 (2003), p.38.21. See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). Zakaria argues

that a clear distinction should be drawn between constitutional liberty and democracy. Whilethe former includes such issues as protection of individual rights (of speech, property andreligion) through an independent judiciary and system of law which is free of governmentmanipulation, checks and balances in the political system, the latter is defined as a popularpolitical system based on open, free and fair elections. In the Muslim Middle East, heargues, the introduction of electoral democracy without the existence of constitutionalliberties will mean electoral victories for illiberal Islamists who would (ab)use their newinstitutionally-recognized political powers to destroy the most basic civil liberties, eveneliminating elections themselves.

22. Henkin’s list of elements of constitutionalism fits the bill rather well. His list comprises:sovereignty of the people, government and leaders subservient to the constitution and theparameters therein defined, governments to be formed through elections and accountableto the electorate, respect for and adherence to all human rights principles, existence of themechanisms for ensuring the implementation of the constitution, preclusion of extra-constitutional government. See Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism (New York:Columbia University Press, 1994).

23. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘Islamic Law as a Core for Political Law: The Withering of an IslamistIllusion’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.7, No.3 (2002), pp.117–42. She observes that in theMiddle East there is a ‘tendency for law to be subordinated to politics’ (p.120).

24. Ibid.25. The Iranian constitution and its peculiarities are expertly discussed in Asghar Schirazi, The

Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London: I.B. Tauris,1997). Schirazi notes that although the constitution provides for the separation of powers,in the wake of the revolution the clerical establishment systematically curtailed theconstitutional powers of the people in favour of the political clergy dominated by AyatollahKhomeini himself.

26. See Robert L. Maddex, Constitutions of the World (London: Routledge, 1996).27. Extracts from King Fahd’s speech at the inaugural ceremony of the country’s consultative

council in May 2003. Saudi Press Agency, 17 May 2003. It should be noted that the king’spronouncements have taken place in the context of agitation by prominent personalities forthe rapid introduction of ‘islahat’ (reforms). The first petition of note was presented tothe Saudi monarch in the throes of the Kuwait crisis of 1990/91, which resulted in theestablishment of the Majlis al-Shura in 1993. In more recent times, two significant petitionsfor democratization were presented to Crown Prince Abdullah in January and September2003, calling for the establishment of a constitutional system of government, an electedlegislature, working alongside an independent judiciary, respect for free speech, freedom ofassociation and an expanded role for women in public life. That these petitions are beingtaken seriously is reflected in the crown prince’s decision to meet with the petitioners todiscuss their demands. See also Jean-Francois Seznec, ‘Stirrings in Saudi Arabia’, Journalof Democracy, Vol.13, No.4 (2002), pp.33–40.

28. Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran at Crossroads’, Middle East Journal, Vol.57, No.1 (2003), pp.42–56.29. The following report captures the mood in Iran rather well: ‘On university campuses, in corner

shops, in tree-filled parks, and wherever else Iranians gather, a blistering cynicism infects theair. “All those mullahs are the same”, huffed one elderly shopkeeper in a small supermarket onTehran’s busy Shariati Street. “They are all corrupt thieves”. A shopper disagreed: “I don’t

108 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

think the reformists are thieves. I think they tried, but clearly the conservatives have all thepower and don’t want to give it up. So, why should we back the reformists?” Anothershopper pipes in: “This system needs to be uprooted entirely. We need an entirely newregime”. Such exchanges and talk of “regime change” have become common among apeople who are also frustrated by a stagnant economy, double-digit inflation, and chronicunemployment’. See Afshin Molavi, ‘Iran’s “Crisis of Legitimacy” could Prompt AuthoritarianPolitical Alternative’, Eurasianet.org, 29 August 2003. See also Mustafa El-Labbad ‘The BlackTurbans’ “Counterrevolution”’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 14–20 August 2003.

30. ‘Democratization in the Middle East: Solution or Mirage?’ Middle East Review of Inter-national Affairs Journal, Vol.7, No.1 (March 2003).

31. For a detailed analysis see Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Is the Middle East Democratizing?’,British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.26, No.2 (1999), pp.199–217.

32. For an interesting analysis of the ‘electoral gap’ in the Muslim world see Alfred Stepan(with Graeme B. Robertson), ‘An “Arab” More Than “Muslim” Electoral Gap’, Journal ofDemocracy, Vol.14, No.3 (July 2003), pp.30–44.

33. Regarding Pakistan’s October 2002 elections, see ‘Pakistan’s Election: Oh what a LovelyAlly’, The Economist, 19 October 2002.

34. Even here elections do take place in some countries, but are rarely free or fair. A case in pointis Azerbaijan’s presidential elections of October 2003. See Eurasia Insight, 21 October 2003.

35. Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13,No.1 (January 2002), p.8.

36. Daniel Brumberg, Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform,Working Paper No.37 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003).

37. As Sater notes, however, due to the peculiarities of the process the result was an increase inthe monarch’s position in the political process. His further cautionary observation that theSeptember 2002 elections showed ‘the increasing insignificance of political parties andthe whole electoral process’ should not be overlooked. James Sater, ‘Morocco after theParliamentary Elections of 2002’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.8, No.1 (2003), pp.135–42.

38. See Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Reform From Above: The Politics of Participation in the OilMonarchies’, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.1 (2003), pp.53–75.

39. James A. Russell, ‘Political and Economic Transition on the Arabian Peninsula: Perils andProspects’, GulfWire Perspectives, 15 May 2003.

40. Saudi Press Agency, 13 October 2003. An editorial in a leading Saudi newspaper noted that‘only the cynical or the naıve can fail to acknowledge that what is taking place in Saudi Arabiais a very radical assessment of the social contract’. Arab News, 14 October 2003.

41. Even the petition system in Saudi Arabia, discussed earlier, has its roots in Islamic traditions.42. Eberhard Kienle masterfully illustrates this point in a detailed study of Egypt. See A Grand

Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001).43. Brumberg (note 36) p.9.44. Scott Greenwood, ‘Jordan’s “New Bargain:” The Political Economy of Regime Security’,

Middle East Journal, Vol.57, No.2 (2003), pp.248–68; International Crisis Group, ‘TheChallenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability’,Middle East Briefing, 8 October 2003.

45. Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria (London: PlutoPress, 2003), p.15.

46. Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne and Daniel Brumberg, ‘DemocraticMirage in the Middle East’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief,No.20, October 2002, pp.1–8.

47. Nadim Kawach, ‘Change in Iraq may Lead to Reforms in Gulf’, Gulf News, 2 February 2003.48. International Crisis Group, ‘Iran: Discontent and Disarray’, Middle East Briefing, 15 October

2003.49. Al-Quds al-Arabi, 9 April 2003; Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 10 April 2003.50. In Turkey the Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) swept to power in the aftermath

of its victory in November 2002 general election, transforming the country’s political land-scape in ways that the previous rule of short-lived Refah Party had not. In securing 34.3


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

per cent of the vote it gained 363 of the 550 seats, forming the new parliament’s largest bloc.See Gareth Jenkins, ‘Muslim Democrats in Turkey?’, Survival, Vol.45, No.1 (2003), pp.45–66. In Pakistan’s October 2002 parliamentary and regional elections, the radical Islamistparty, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won 45 of the 272 contested seats. TheMMA’s control of the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan since the October 2002poll has led to rapid Islamization of civic and political life of the province.

51. For an enlightening debate about Liberal Islam see the articles in the special section on thistopic in the Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.2 (2003).

52. Emma C. Murphy, ‘Governance and Development’, Internationale Politik, Vol.3, No.2(2002), pp.69–76; Tom Pierre Najem, ‘Good Governance: The Definition and Applicationof the Concept’, in Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington (eds), Good Governance inthe Middle East Oil Monarchies (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp.1–28.

53. Although it is beyond the remit of this paper to discuss the domestic barriers to the introduc-tion of democracy in Iraq, it is quite obvious that much of the process will depend as much onthe local conditions as on the role and length of the occupation itself.

54. Here I am mindful of the fine distinctions that Sartori draws between vertical and horizontaldimensions of democracy. See Giovanni Sartori, Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham,NJ: Chatham House Publishing, 1987).

55. Joshua Muravchik, ‘Democracy for Arabs, Too’, Washington Post, 2 September 2003;‘America and the Middle East’, The Economist, 17 May 2003.

56. Fred Halliday, ‘The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the Challenge tothe Secular State’, in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam, Globalizationand Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1994), p.110.

57. Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy, and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.71, No.3 (1992),p.145.

58. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in EasternEurope and Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.13.

59. David Pool, ‘Staying at Home with the Wife: Democratization and its Limits in the MiddleEast’, in Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (eds), Democracy and Democratization(London: Routledge, 1994), p.197.

Accepted for publication March 2004.

Author’s address for correspondence: Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Institute for Middle Eastern andIslamic Studies, University of Durham, Elvet Hill Road, Durham, DH1 3TU, UK.

110 DEMOCRATIZATION

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

GA

Pfe

iffe

r L

ibra

ry]

at 0

1:39

05

May

201

4

Documents

Islam, Muslim polities and democracy