January Cover Story - Qatar's Role on World Stage

Qatar today j a n u a r y 2 0 1 254

Qatar's role on the world stage:diplomatic gameplay

j a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 Qatar today 55

C o v e r s t o r y

pg: 54

holding centre stage

by sAlmAn shAikh director of the brookings doha center and fellow at the saban

center of middle east policy at the brookings institution,

washington d.c.

pg: 56

Qatar’s source of araB springs

by khAled hroub is the director of the media

programme at the gulf research centre -university of

cambridge.

pg: 58

Qatar’s prominent gloBal position widens circle of

stakeholders

by ghAnem nuseibehfounder, partner and director

of cornerstone global associates, london

pg: 60

Qatar’s role in liBya and Beyond

by sTrATfor, a leading publisher of

geopolitical news and analysis.

pg: 62

Qatar takes the opportunity

by zAchAry fillinghAm , managing editor of

geopoliticalmonitor.com and a geopolitical analyst

Qatar made the seemingly impossible possible when the country bagged the 2022 FiFa world cup. it was the attitude

that anything is possible iF you have the will and the money, that was the heart oF

this achievement, cnn had reported.

that was in 2010.2011 has been eQually eventFul.

Qatar was the First country to recognise the libyan rebels,

the First to close its syrian embassy, and also a country that came down hard

on the yemeni president to step down. it was also the

First gulF country that asked un member states to listen to the voice oF

reason and respond to the legitimate reQuest For a

palestinian state with Full membership at the un. moving From Football legacy to world peace,

Qatar has indeed carved its name on the regional stage taking a strong stand

on each oF the arab revolutions.Qatar today invited experts From around the world to say what they think about

the country and its steep rise to recognition?

is it accepted as a power player on the global peace agenda or is it merely the

clout oF resources that makes the coun-try take steps that are “seemingly impossible”?

* discLamer: the VieWs eXPressed inside the coVer story is that of the indiViduaL authors and the magazine is not resPonsibLe for the same.


Q a t a r ' s r o l e o n t h e w o r l d s t a g e :D i p l o m a t i c G a m e p l a y

By any measure, 2011 has Been a remarkaBle year for Qatar. not only has it seen rising economic growth and prosperity at a time when much of

the world faces economic downturn, But it has also risen to gloBal prominence By playing an important role in the changes that are

sweeping the region. its successful Bid to hold the footBall world cup in 2022 has Become Just one in an array of landmark events throughout

a year that has seen Qatar firmly estaBlish itself as an actor on the regional and gloBal stage.

holding Centre stage


C o v e r s t o r y

n a year when much of the Arab world, including its traditional leaders, has been in transition – with revolution in Egypt,

pending succession in Saudi Arabia, turmoil in Syria, and Iraq struggling to forge a new identity and state – Qatar has played an important leadership role in the regional affairs. The perception of a power vacuum in the region has been sharpened by a narrative of declining US influence, with many foreseeing the first cracks in the Pax Americana that has held sway since the first Gulf War.

Qatar quickly championed the cause of Libyans fighting to overthrow Muammar Ghadaffi after 41 years of dictatorial rule. If Qatar is used to taking risks in pursuit of its vision and ambitions – both at home and abroad – Libya certainly proved to be its riskiest venture yet.

Having previously played an important role in mediating conflicts across the region – whether in Lebanon, Sudan, or Yemen – Qatar worked with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League to galvanise the international response to an impending humanitarian disaster in Libya. Not only did it play a political role, but for the first time it deployed its military to assist in the protection of the Libyan people.

Looking ahead, Libya will need much more assistance and support from the international community as it builds a new state with strong democratic institutions and a capacity for economic growth. Supporting the state-builders and the institution-builders in the country after the devastation should be a key role for all Arab states to fill, alongside other international actors.

Nowhere is the challenge of regional security greater than with regard to Syria. Relations with President Bashar Al-Assad soured dramatically when he failed to heed the advice of close friends such as Qatar and Turkey. Qatar is now working with other key Gulf and Arab states - particularly Saudi Arabia – to coordinate an Arab-led response to the crisis. These efforts – which have been too slow to build – have now led to an unprecedented situation in which the Arab League has suspended a founding member and imposed economic and political sanctions.

The challenges in Syria are great, with frightening potential for further bloodshed and the killing of thousands of civilians. There will be an important role for the Arab

League to play in getting the international community – particularly UN Security Council members such as Russia, China and India – to take effective and decisive action to cripple the “killing machine” of Assad’s security forces, and persuade him and his regime to step down and leave a secure space in which a democratic Syria can emerge.

Another important development has been closer to home, in the role played by the GCC in the ongoing and deeply-troubling crisis in Bahrain. After ten months of struggle, with hundreds detained and many dead, it seems that the security approach adopted by Bahraini authorities and their GCC allies – especially Saudi Arabia – is not working. The attempt to forge a national dialogue has proved equally unsuccessful.

Looking ahead, there will be a need to establish a new political and social contract that rewrites the relationship between the monarchy and people of Bahrain. Where external mediation has been unsuccessful in encouraging the sort of dialogue that could achieve that end, there will have to be renewed efforts and greater perseverance. Qatar is well placed to play a role here.

As the Arab revolutions of 2011 continue to run their course, Qatar will likely continue to play an important role in regional and international affairs. Other pressing issues, such as the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations, will continue to provide a stage for Qatari statesmanship. (Qatar is chair of the Arab League’s follow-up committee on the issue.) On Iran, meanwhile, Qatar faces the challenge of engaging Tehran with regard to its nuclear programme, while tempering a growing sentiment in the US and Israel that sees military action, not containment, as the best way to counter associated threats. Importantly, in the fragile transitions underway in North Africa,

resource-rich Gulf states must play a role in stimulating the economic growth that will be necessary to underpin democratic gains. Nowhere is this more urgent than in Egypt, where a tourism-reliant economy has flounderedand foreign direct investments fallen nearly 100%. Qatar could play an important role in coordinating an international and multilateral effort in this regard.

The fluid scene set by the Arab Awakenings will demand that Qatar and others continue to adapt to the rapidly changing environment in the region. A track record of independent, bold and inclusive foreign policymaking has helped Qatar cope with this rapidly shifting landscape. Having pursued engagement with an array of actors irrespective of their ideological colour – from the US, to Iran, Hamas and other Islamist groups – Qatar is well equipped to play a role as a valued independent actor. As a new Middle East takes shape then, Qatar is set to remain centre stage, and must continue to bear the associated responsibilities

Salman Shaikhdirector of the brookings doha center

and fellow at the saban center of middle east policy at the brookings

institution, washington dc

ihaving previously played an important role in mediating conflicts across the region – whether in leBanon, sudan, or yemen – Qatar worked with the gulf cooperation council and the araB league to

galvanise the international response to an impending humanitarian disaster in liBya



there’s a Joke making the rounds in the middle east these days: three of egypt’s former presidents, gamal aBdel nasser, anwar sadat, and

hosni muBarak, meet in hell and ask each other how they fell. nasser replies “poison”; sadat says “assassination”; and muBarak answers

“al Jazeera”.

Qatar’s sourCe of arab springs


C o v e r s t o r y

uring the 15 years that it has broadcast from Qatar, Al Jazeera has served as far more than a traditional television station. With its fearless involvement

in Arab politics, it has created a new venue for political freedom, which has culminated in its unreserved support for Arab revolutions.

Al Jazeera has pushed the boundaries of information by providing live coverage of major developments in the Arab world and elsewhere. It is a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the Arab countries. It hosts Israeli spokespersons and embraces state-of-the-art broadcasting techniques. In short, it has become a global brand and a role model for other Arab media.

Success breeds confidence, but it also attracts envy. Al Jazeera has no shortage of enemies, from the most radical Islamic fundamentalists to American and Israeli intelligence gatherers. And, between these two extremes, there is fierce debate over whether Al Jazeera is friend or foe.

Liberals who welcome it as a beacon of freedom and progress in the Arab world confront those who accuse it of Islamism and religious radicalisation. Islamists who praise it as a platform for their own views must deal with the fact that it also offers a voice to Israelis. Al Jazeera journalists are household names; they also suffer more harassment, imprisonment and fatalities than their colleagues at other major news organisations.

Al Jazeera is not a tool of the CIA, Israel, or Al Qaeda. Rather, it is the sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious Emir, HH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Simply put, the Al Jazeera success story would not have been possible without Qatar’s backing. For the Emir, Al Jazeera is integral to the national “branding” of Qatar and its foreign-policy aspirations.

The motivation for these aspirations is unclear, but a number of ideas are worth pondering. After coming to power in 1995, the Emir, HH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, was suddenly confronted with a hostile Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose elites despised the ambitious young ruler and preferred his more timid father. Qatar was perceived as increasingly rebellious,

routinely defecting from the collective and mundane line of Gulf countries’ politics – inviting further pressures from the “big brothers”. In response, under the young Emir’s firm hand, Al Jazeera delivered a more assertive line of criticism against governments, such as those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that other Arab mainstream media would do their best to avoid alienating.

Having received carte blanche from Qatar’s political leadership to support the Arab revolutions, Al Jazeera became fully engaged in live coverage of events in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, by relying on socialmedia networks away from the eyes of local security officials. Its coverage was filled with Arab masses declaring their demands to the world. Banned from local media and mostly on the run, revolutionaries used Al Jazeera to reach – and mobilise – their own people. The channel cancelled its regular programmes, and was transformed into a round-the-clock workshop of live news and interviews, switching from one revolution to another.

So, while the Arab Spring has been a genuine popular uprising against decades of corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, its rapid spread, which caught almost everyone by surprise, was due in part to the influence of Al Jazeera, which became the voice of the voiceless throughout the Middle East. As for Qatar itself, the Emir provided various forms of support to all of the Arab revolutions, except in Bahrain, where the Saudis and, more pointedly, the Americans, drew a very sharp red line.

HH the Emir Sheikh Hamad’s political audacity stems partly from Qatar’s enormous gas resources, which have

allowed him to develop vigorous policies in all areas, especially in foreign affairs. Protecting himself and Qatar by hosting the largest American military base outside the United States, his strategy has been to wrest control from regional third parties who might otherwise dominate the smaller Gulf states.

It has been an aggressive and risky foreign policy, but the Qatari Emir clearly believes that he can fill a regional leadership vacuum. His support, via Al Jazeera, of the Arab Spring’s revolutions - and of the new generation of leaders that they have spawned – has only strengthened Qatar’s position.

The falling regimes consistently maintained that Al Jazeera wasn’t neutral. They were right

d

khaled hroub director of the media programme at

the gulf research centre -university of

cambridge.

having received carte Blanche from Qatar’s political leadership to support the araB revolutions, al Jazeera Became fully engaged in

live coverage of events in tunisia, and then in egypt, By relying on socialmedia networks away from the eyes of

local security officials.



less than two decades ago, most people in the world would not have even heard of Qatar. yet today it is associated with maJor players that

have Become integral to the contemporary gloBal citizen: Qatar airways, al Jazeera and the fifa 2022 world cup are But a few examples. the world would Be much poorer without these uniQuely

Qatari institutions.

Qatar’s prominent global position widens CirCle of stakeholders


C o v e r s t o r y

ew doubt that Qatar has come a long way from being a sleepy state in the Gulf to a force to be reckoned with. The rise of Qatar has

rapidly expanded its circle of stakeholders. It now answers to the needs of people from around the world, and pleasing everyone has not proven to be an easy task. Rapidly changing opinions about the country and what it stands for differ from region to region, sector to sector and from industry to industry.

Qatar is viewed by different regions of the world in terms of its public diplomacy, massive spendering and ambitions. Whilst those are mostly commendable traits most countries aspire to have, they also inadvertently invite scepticism and criticism.

Al Jazeera was the first window that opened Qatar to the Arab world, and soon afterwards to the rest of the world. Al Jazeera became the “gold standard” of Arab news media. It almost became the voice of the man on the street, delivering news items to a region that was accustomed to receiving heavily censored news items. Over the years however, and particularly after the launch of the English-language channel, it was increasingly felt that Al Jazeera was an arm of Qatari public diplomacy. What Al Jazeera showed is now perceived as semi-official Qatari policy, or at least having the support of the Qatari government. This was the main driver of how Qatar is perceived in the Arab World, and to a lesser extent in the West. Qatar was no longer seen as an apolitical, neutral, sleepy country, but one that had taken it upon itself to be the guardian of the Arab “renaissance”. The Qatari military involvement in Libya only helped to confirm this. However, the role the country played in the Arab Spring has also created many critics, both in the region and beyond. It was felt that Qatar was unfairly punching above its weight, and assuming the role of the Arab voice, without the political justification necessary.

The winning of the FIFA 2022 World Cup bid and subsequent allegations of corruption have caused serious reputational damage. Many, particularly in the West, felt that Qatar had been able to secure the hosting of the 2022 World Cup through commitments that required massive spending, both legitimately and

illegitimately. Few outside Qatar have seen the great strides the country has made in the world of football. Winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup has undoubtedly propelled the country to new levels of world recognition, but it has also set new challenges the country must contend with.

The country’s ability to embark on massive spending in countries around the world has exposed it to working with leading financial institutions around the world. The country’s sovereign investment vehicles have certainly been able to secure “trophy” assets around the world, with varying degrees of success. But this has also exposed it to even more stakeholders, often with competing requirements. The manner in which those funds are buying key assets is seen by some as a means to increase political influence in key countries or regions. This is even more exacerbated by the apparent very top-down way of decision-making, blurring the lines between political and financial investments. The perceived opaqueness of the investment strategies of the sovereign wealth funds and those close to the ruling family have made many in the West question the motives behind those investments. More openness and clearer delineation between private and state spending will go a long way in reassuring some sceptical but potentially key partners, that Qatar’s intentions are benign.

No one can doubt that Qatar has become a major regional player, on the political, economic and social fronts. And it is here to stay. The vision of the country’s leadership to venture out beyond the perceived limits its small size allows has made it a global household name. This rapid expansion has unsurprisingly created critics and sceptics.

Their fears of this rapidly rising star can be allayed with greater transparency, institutionalisation and decentralisation that allows for engaging the ever-expanding circle of stakeholders.

The progress the country has made trumps all the criticisms and scepticisms that come as “part of the deal”. Different regions of the world view Qatar differently, but almost all look at it with great admiration

f

Ghanem nuSeibeh is the founder of cornerstone global

associates, a high-end london-based

strategy and management consultancy.

ghanem specialises in political and

economic risk, and works with govern-

ments, investment banks and organiZa-

tions from around the world.

he regularly appears in regional and

international media commenting about

regional affairs, including reuters,

bloomberg, wall street journal and

others.

[email protected]

the country’s aBility to emBark on massive spending in countries around the world, has exposed it to working with leading financial institutions around the world. the country’s sovereign investment vehicles have certainly Been aBle to secure “trophy” assets around

the world, to varying degrees of success.



Qatar’s rise to a middle east power-Broker has taken many By surprise, and it’s not hard to see why. it’s not the

conventional considerations of land, military or economic power that are driving Qatar’s foreign policy successes. rather, it’s a case of

having the patience to wait for opportunities and the savvy to make the most of them.

Qatar takes the opportunity


C o v e r s t o r y

atar has been engaged in a slow process of expanding its soft and hard power strategic assets since 1995. Economically, it has attracted the foreign

investment necessary to develop its vast energy reserves (26.6 billion barrels of oil and 24,000 billion cubic metres of natural gas). This energy windfall has helped to create a prosperous population, negating the possibility of economically-motivated protests that plagued the Arab Spring countries.

It’s not just oil driving Qatar’s economy. Like other oil-rich Gulf states, Qatar has actively sought to diversify away from over-dependence on the energy industry. The government has built ‘Education City’ in Doha, a sprawling complex of think tanks and American university campuses. It has also been an active bidder on just about every international conference or sporting event that goes up for grabs. And of course, it recently landed the holy grail of international sports – the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

This impressive wealth is not being left unguarded, as Qatar’s affluence falls under the protective umbrella of American hard power. The Al Udeid Air Base looms just outside Doha, home to US and US Air Force Central Command. It also stands to reason that Al Udeid will be expanded as American military assets are withdrawn from Iraq.

And then there's Qatar’s impressive web of influence, its expanding soft power. Although Doha maintains close economic and military links to Washington, its foreign policy is far from one-dimensional in this regard. Qatar also maintains working relationships with the cast of Washington undesirables such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and it has proven unwilling to toe the American line in regards to the Palestinian Authority. It even allowed Israel briefly to open a trade office in Doha, an experiment that ended in the wake of Operation Cast Lead. In short, the Qatari government casts a very wide net in search of friends.

Of course, Al Jazeera is the jewel in the crown of Qatar`s global influence. Since the Arabic-language news station was founded in 1996, it has proved useful in leveraging opinion in the Muslim world in a way that`s favourable to Qatari interests. For example, Al-Jazeera used apologetic language in regards to NATO operations in Libya – a far cry from the ‘aggression’ and ‘invasion’

talk that characterised the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to 2009 diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, the government of Qatar has even gone so far as to offer favourable Al-Jazeera coverage as a bargaining chip in past diplomatic negotiations.

It's clear that Qatar does not suffer any shortage of strategic assets. But, the fact remains that it’s still a small country of only 350,000 citizens – hardly a regional powerhouse. So what allowed Qatar to step into the spotlight? The answer is simple: a golden opportunity presented itself to put these assets into play.

The opportunity came from a shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East. Specifically, the region’s former leaders are fading into the background. Egypt finds itself mired in domestic politics for the foreseeable future and Syria looks to be the next domino to fall, leaving Iran without its trusted ally. Other hopefuls like Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have proved unwilling or unable to fill the power vacuum in the region.

When the opportunity of the Arab Spring presented itself, Qatar quickly mobilised its strategic assets to fill this leadership vacuum. It was the first gulf state to recognise the Libyan rebels, the first gulf state to close its Syrian embassy, and it also came out hard and heavy for the Yemeni president to step down. It was also fundamental in transforming the Arab League from an archaic soapbox to a critical power-broker. These were high-risk, high-reward moves that were made possible by a lack of leadership from conventional regional powerhouses. They could have just as easily backfired, creating a market for a series of articles about where Qatar’s foreign policy went wrong.

Thankfully, they didn’t.It’s worth mentioning that Qatar’s foreign

policy has been guided by pragmatism, not ideological considerations. Doha is not committed to the expansion of political rights as an end in itself. Rather, the human rights angle provided a convenient rationalisation for a policy that was steeped in geopolitics.

Qatar will continue to pursue a practical foreign policy based on expanding its soft power throughout the region and beyond. Thus, nothing has changed, though it may seem that way because the policy is working so well

Q

Zachary FillinGham

managing editor of geopoliticalmoni-

tor.com and a geopolitical analyst

fillingham holds a ba in international

relations from york university in

toronto, ontario, canada and an ma

in chinese studies from the school of

oriental and african studies in london,

england.

geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-

source intelligence collection and

forecasting service.

when the opportunity of the araB spring presented itself, Qatar Quickly moBilised its strategic assets to fill this leadership vacu-um. it was the first gulf state to recognise the liByan reBels, the first gulf state to close its syrian emBassy, and it also came out

hard and heavy for the yemeni president to step down.



despite the fact that liBya is nowhere near the persian gulf, Qatar was the araB state which most ardently supported the reBels in eastern

liBya. Qatar has long had an active foreign policy, But its recent moves positioned it as a real player in the liByan crisis. however, it remains a

weak country militarily and relies on the us for its security, constantly reminded of its precarious geographic position Between

regional powers saudi araBia and iran as it tries to use foreign policy as a tool to present itself as a useful ally to any country.

Qatar’s role in libya and beyond


C o v e r s t o r y

his desire to create a perception of power explains Qatar’s recent moves in eastern Libya, where Doha has slowly

positioned itself as one of the main players in the diplomatic game being waged in various corners of the Muslim world.

Despite all of Qatar’s vast hydrocarbon reserves, it wouldn’t mean very much if it were unable to export it, which requires not only territorial security (on land and in its territorial waters that contain offshore oil and gas deposits) but also unimpeded access through the Strait of Hormuz. And this is one of the most important reasons why the ruling family in Doha tries to maintain good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, unlike Bahrain, which finds itself in a very similar geopolitical situation but with a 70% Shiite population.Qatar has better relations with Iran in part because only about 10% of its population is Shiite and it does not feel threatened by a Shiite majority acting as agents of Tehran. Qatar has extensive economic linkages with Iran and helps Tehran circumvent sanctions by acting as a shipping hub of illegal goods, much as the United Arab Emirates does. As for its relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar was a contributor to the Peninsula Shield Force that entered Bahrain on March 14, while Doha-based Al Jazeera has been nowhere near as dogged in its coverage of the protests in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province as it has been in several other Muslim countries that have experienced unrest.

The imperative of maintaining territorial security and unimpeded access through the Strait of Hormuz also creates the need for a foreign security guarantor. This forms the foundation of Qatar’s relationship with the United States.

Qatar did not exist as an independent nation until 1971, when the British completed the withdrawal of their naval assets from the Persian Gulf region. For decades before, Qatar existed under British suzerainty. It was London that first granted protection to the Al-Thani family against the rival Al-Khalifa family in nearby Bahrain. And the United States has stepped into the role of a foreign power able to guarantee Qatar’s continued territorial

integrity.The United States does not run Qatar’s

day-to-day affairs as the British had done; the United Kingdom largely controlled Qatar’s foreign policy in exchange for security guarantees. But the United States does have a large footprint in the country with two significant US military bases. Qatar volunteered to be the new host of the US Combined Air Operations Center after it was removed from Saudi Arabia in 2003 and set up at the existing Al Udeid U.S. air base south of Doha. Today Al Udeid serves as a key logistics hub for American operations in Afghanistan and as a command center for operations in Iraq. A second American base in Qatar, As-Sayliyah, is the largest pre-positioning facility for US military equipment in the world.

Doha benefits from its security alliance with Washington, but it also wants to maintain its independence and build a reputation (both in the Arab world and beyond) of being a significant actor in foreign affairs, more significant than geopolitical logic would suggest. Above all, it wants to be seen as acting in its own interests, even if it is operating according to a set of restraints that prevents it from pursing those interests too vigorously. Sometimes this brings Qatar in line with certain countries’ positions, only to find itself seemingly on the opposite end of an issue in short order. This is most aptly displayed by Al Jazeera, which first became known for its critical coverage of U.S. and Israeli activities in the region and is now widely attacked by Arab regimes for fomenting dissent within their own

countries. Despite what neighbouring governments may feel about the media outlet, Al Jazeera’s emergence has helped put Qatar on the map in the eyes of the Arab street, evidenced by the fact that in 2022 Qatar will become the first Muslim country to host the World Cup.

Qatar’s active diplomatic presence in recent years has often involved disputes that have very little to do with its own direct interests, such as working with Turkey in helping to form the Lebanese government and mediating between the Sudanese government and various rebels groups in the Darfur peace process. Qatar’s integral role in supporting the eastern Libyan rebels is only the latest example of this trend. Whether Doha is acting according to US directives is unknown, but it is certain that Qatar’s efforts are in line with US interests and will bolster Qatar’s image in Washington’s view as a leader in the Arab world.

Moves in LibyaDespite the fact that Libya is nowhere near the Persian Gulf, Qatar was the most ardent Arab state supporter of the eastern Libyan rebels from the beginning of the uprising. This was not an obvious decision for Qatar to make, since what happened in Libya did not affect the situation in Qatar’s backyard. Still, Qatar was the only Arab country to recognise the National Transitional Council as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people and was the second country to do so after France. Qatar was also one of just three Arab states that have contributed aircrafts for the enforcement of the UN-

tdoha Benefits from its security alliance with washington, But it also wants to maintain its independence and Build a reputation

(Both in the araB world and Beyond) of Being a significant actor in foreign affairs, more significant than geopolitical logic would

suggest



mandated no-fly zone, sending six Mirage fighter jets to perform largely ceremonial over-flights alongside French warplanes. Qatar flew humanitarian aid into Benghazi airport. Displaying a desire to lead the Arab world on issues occurring in the region, the Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, openly called for Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to step down and criticised other Arab states for not helping to enforce the no-fly zone, saying on March 31 that “the suffering of civilians in Libya led the international community to intervene because of the inaction of the Arab League, which was supposed to assume the role.”

Qatar’s most important contribution to the Libyan rebels, however, was maybe to help them market oil pumped from the Sarir oil field in eastern Libya, which would infuse the movement with much-needed cash to sustain its fight against Gaddafi. Doha also reportedly provided a small supply of weapons to the rebels in early March and sent free shipments of petroleum products into eastern ports when it was feared that supplies of gasoline, butane and kerosene were running out. But if the eastern Libyans were able to actually to make money off the oil, which one rebel council leader – Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni – vowed was ready to shipment, it would give Benghazi a more sustainable solution to its pressing economic problems than stopgap aid shipments.

Tarhouni, who returned to Libya from exile in the US in March, made a variety of claims regarding the oil-production

capability in the east, ranging from an immediate level of 130,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 300,000 bpd or more within a few weeks. According to Tarhouni, Qatar was on board with a plan to “facilitate” the export of oil from either the Sarir oil field or storage tanks around Tobruk, most likely for shipment to European customers wary of the political or security risks of doing business with the rebels.

Tarhouni’s claims were not confirmed or denied by the Qatari regime or by state-owned Qatar Petroleum (QP), which would most likely be the firm that would help facilitate exports of Libyan oil. One anonymous QP official said in March that the deal was “just a political move” and emphasised the difficulty in actually seeing it through, saying that the time frame would surely be longer than the week or so that Tarhouni was asserting. But in making such a statement, QP implicitly acknowledged that the deal was simply another case where Doha wanted to display its support for the uprising against Gaddafi.

By taking part in the no-fly zone, Qatar did exactly that, while also demonstrating its utility to the West. Doha’s support allowed leaders in Washington, Paris and London to claim that an air campaign against a Muslim country had “Arab support”. The statements made by Arab League chief Amr Moussa in March showed how politically sensitive perceived support for such a bombing campaign could be in the region, which only made Doha’s support that much more appreciated in Western capitals.

These measures, along with the critical role Al Jazeera played in bringing the world’s attention to the situation on the ground in eastern Libya, gave tiny Qatar the reputation as a player in the Libyan crisis. This was no small feat, considering how insignificant the country is in relation to traditional Middle Eastern powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar remains, in reality, a very weak country that relies on the United States for its security and on its dealings with other more powerful states, but presents itself as a country that can be a useful ally.

One of the main reasons Qatar was able to focus so much attention on eastern Libya was that it had not suffered the affliction that other Arab countries had since January, 2011. There was no Arab Spring in Doha, notwithstanding a few failed protests organised on Facebook calling for a “Day of Rage” in Qatar in early March. Should unrest flare up in Qatar as it has elsewhere in the region – which is unlikely due to its wealth and lack of sectarian divisions – but certainly not impossible – it will suddenly find itself much less concerned about the fate of eastern Libyans

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Qatar’s most important contriBution to the liByan reBels, however, was mayBe to help them market oil

pumped from the sarir oil field in eastern liBya, which would infuse the movement with much-needed cash to

sustain its fight against gaddafi.

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January Cover Story - Qatar's Role on World Stage