Japan Rearm Disadvantage - St. Louis Urban Web viewA U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike ... Military expansion means Japan takes Chinese ... along with a network of antiship and antiaircraft

Japan Rearm Disadvantage SLUDL/NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17 MS-I, JV, & Varsity Only

Japan Rearm DisadvantageJapan Rearm Disadvantage..............................................................................................................1

Summary......................................................................................................................................2

Glossary.......................................................................................................................................3

Japan Rearm Shell (1NC) (1/4)...................................................................................................4

Uniqueness: Alliance Strong Now...............................................................................................8

Uniqueness: Cooperation In the Region Now...........................................................................10

Answers To: Withdrawal Inevitable..........................................................................................11

Links: China US Cooperation/General......................................................................................12

Links: Tech Cooperation...........................................................................................................14

Links: Military Cooperation......................................................................................................15

Links: North Korea Sanctions...................................................................................................16

Links: Human Rights Cooperation............................................................................................17

Answers To: Plan Helps Alliance..............................................................................................18

Internal Link: Allies Key...........................................................................................................19

Impact: Asian Prolif...................................................................................................................20

Answers To: Japan Can’t Proliferate.........................................................................................22

Answers To: Proliferation Inevitable.........................................................................................23

Answers To: Japan Prolif Good.................................................................................................24

Disad Turns Case – China/SCS War.........................................................................................25

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Summary

The thesis of the disadvantage is that engagement with China jeopardizes the US’ alliance with Japan. Japan and China are adversaries, so increased engagement with China causes Japan to worry about the status of its relationship with the US. Right now, Japan relies on a US commitment to protect it for security in the region, but the plan is perceived as an indication that the US is no longer firmly committed to Japan. That causes Japan to begin the process of developing nuclear weapons, because they no longer feel as if they can rely on the US’ arsenal. Due to already existing tensions in the region, Japan nuclearizing could set off other countries and encourage them to develop weapons as well.

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Glossary

Assurance – (in IR) a strategy that creates confidence in an alliance or situation

Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) – a treaty (ratified by 191 countries) that creates restrictions on how member parties can develop weapons

Proliferation – the acquisition of nuclear weapons

Shinzō Abe – the current prime minister of Japan

Zero-Sum – whatever is gained by one side is lost by the other (i.e. the US’ alliance)

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Japan Rearm Shell (1NC) (1/4) A. Uniqueness- U.S-Japan Alliance is strong, but it’s on the brink

Glosserman et al 15 — Panel of Experts: Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu ("Reassurance: What Should Allies Expect?”, Carnegie Endowment, March 23rd, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/files/07-Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf, Accessed 06/26/2016)

On the operational level we’re seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South Koreans. We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like

Ambassador Ho-young this morning, the news today that there’s a deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out, so we’re seeing a stepping up of the presence. It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that that’s what the allies are looking for. We get the fact that there’s a demand for more. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need to be expecting, is a demand for the United States for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, the alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides, a receptiveness to the needs. Finally, I think, we’re seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the

legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic connection between the three countries.

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Japan Rearm Shell (1NC) (2/4)

B. Link- Increasing diplomatic ties with China perceptually signals US abandonment of security guarantees

Santoro and Warden, 15—senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS AND WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS (David and John, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The Washington Quarterly • 38:1 pp. 147–165)

China’s technological sophistication and vast resources ensure that “the combined strategic capabilities of the United States are not , and realistically cannot be , sufficiently numerous and reliable to deny China the ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the continental United States, no matter how much surprise the United States may achieve.”56 Moreover, while the United States retains a large absolute

conventional military advantage over China, the relative advantage is narrowing .57 Of particular worry to U.S. allies is China’s investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that will limit the U.S. ability to project power in Asia. According to a former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “the conventional superiority advantage is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about

whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los Angeles to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange.”58 At the same time, the economic and political costs of a war between the United States and China continue to grow . Unlike the

Soviet Union, China is a competitor and potential adversary of the United States, but also a critical partner. The U.S. and Chinese economies are more integrated than ever before , and China works with the United States to

solve global challenges such as climate change, infectious disease, and piracy. Together, China’s growing military power and political influence unnerve U.S. allies . They worry that because of the narrowing conventional military balance between the United States and China, the United States may prove unwilling to endure the costs of even a limited war with China, instead opting to concede on their core interests to prevent escalation. Tokyo in particular is concerned that the United States might begin to think that the U.S.–China relationship is more important than the U.S.–Japan alliance. As Ambassador Linton Brooks puts it, “a closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japan’s security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment .” 59 For the United States, there is no easy solution to these assurance challenges, but there are important steps that can help mitigate allied anxiety .

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Japan Rearm Shell (1NC) (2/4) C.Internal link- US Commitment is a key driver in Japan’s decision to nuclearize.

Saunders and Feary, 2015 (Emily Cura, PhD Candidate in International Security and Arms Control and Bryan L., Senior Science & Policy Advisor for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear

Deterrent or Not? Japan’s and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models” Chapter 3 From: Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges Editors: Samuel Apikyan, David Diamond Springer Link JJH)

Japan’s potential nuclear latency has been one of great debate and speculation since the end of the Second World War. There have been many theories as to why Japan would or would not pursue a weapons program, but the two variables identified in this paper, regional security and

confidence in the United States’ extended deterrent, have strongly influenced this issue. Having been the sole victim of a nuclear attack, Japanese politicians have always taken great care with regard to their rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons. This rhetoric should be carefully monitored by the United States. Many of Japan’s nuclear options can be measured in this highly nuanced political rhetoric. For example, in 1957 under Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi, the Cabinet Legal Affair Bureau “confirmed that nuclear

weapons were not unconstitutional.”40 Domestic pressure and outrage at this claim soon forced Prime Minister Kishi to resign; however, the taboo of talking about Japanese nuclear weapons had been broken.41 In the early 1960s Prime Minister Sato went so far as to explicitly tell President Johnson that he was not opposed to exploring a nuclear option for Japan, remarking that, “Japanese public opinion will not permit this at present, but I believe the public, especially the younger generation, can be ‘educated.’”42 Ironically, Prime Minister Sato ended up winning a Nobel Prize for what he deemed the Three NonNuclear Principles—no manufacturing, possessing, or presence

of nuclear weapons in Japan.43 While this change in rhetoric was important, it did not end nuclear exploration in Japan. Several Japanese administrations since Prime Minister Sato have commissioned reports on the feasibility, both scientifically and economically, of developing nuclear weapons. In the context of these administrations the idea of latent capability surfaced. In a memorandum written by the director of the Japanese Defense Policy Bureau, Kubo Takyua, he makes this option out to be an insurance plan to keep the United States commitment strong. The memorandum reads, If Japan prepares a latent nuclear capability which would enable Japan to develop significant nuclear armament at any time, the United States would be motivated to sustain the Japan-US security system by providing nuclear guarantee to Japan, because otherwise, the US would be afraid of the stability in the international relations triggered by

nuclear proliferation.44 The commitment of the United States is clearly an issue for Japan. They want to be assured that the commitments are strong, and if not, this memo suggests that they are willing to consider an independent deterrent if need be.

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Japan Rearm Shell (1NC) (3/4) D. Impact- Asia prolif outweighs—multiple nuclear war scenarios

Kroenig, 2016—Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council (Matthew, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58, June 2016)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used . To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic . The subject,

therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse , could result in large-scale death and destruction , and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers , each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14 First and

foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks

against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute. In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict . There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis . Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.

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Uniqueness: Alliance Strong Now [___] Japan-US alliance is strong and trying to stem China—new agreements and rhetoric Auslin 16 [In “Japan's New Realism: Abe Gets Tough,” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora95&div=39&g_sent=1&collection=journals, Foreign Affairs, Vol 95, issue 2, 2016. Michael Auslin is a resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues. Before joining AEI, Dr. Auslin was an associate professor of history at Yale University. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and a B.Sc. from Georgetown University.]

Above all, Abe has taken several moves to strengthen Japan's most important strategic relationship: its alliance with the United States. In April 2015, Tokyo and Washington upgraded their ties for the first time since 1997, announcing that they would start cooperating more closely on maritime security and regional stability. The two nations also agreed to work together to deal with ambiguous security situations that fall short of formal conflict and to jointly respond to threats in space and cyberthreats. REMAKING ASIA By slowly eliminating its restraints on security cooperation, by deepening its relationship with the United States, and by emphasizing more muscular, liberal rhetoric, Abe's Japan has positioned itself as a sort of anti-China in Asia and beyond. Yet many of the other restrictions on Japan's military remain in place, and these will not be revoked anytime soon. Japan's society would not allow its military to play a more normal role in dealing with foreign crises; the Japanese also remain highly wary of entangling alliances. Yet many of Japan's elites-who are worried about the threats from China and North Korea and who fear that the United States is distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine-have embraced the country's new realism. Leading thinkers, including the journalist Yoichi Funabashi, the former diplomat Kuni Miyake, the political scientist Koji Murata, and the former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto, are among those writing and speaking about the need for a more muscular Japanese posture. Indeed, there is a growing community of academics, policy analysts, and politicians who believe that Japan must do more to ensure its own security, as well as to help support the global system that has protected it since the end of World War II. As Abe expands Japan's global role, his policies will include new activities abroad and entail deeper security cooperation with existing partners. The more unstable the global environment becomes, the more Japan will need to play a global role commensurate with its size and economic strength. That role should take advantage of multilateral organizations, but it will, realistically, privilege Japan's security. After decades of stagnation in Japan's foreign and security policies, the new posture will contribute to the maintenance of Asia's liberal post-World War II order over the coming decade and beyond. Abe's policies, which build on some of those of his predecessors, are a series of small yet interlinked steps that will enhance Japan's security, diplomacy, and economy. In focusing primarily on stemming the growing threat from China, Abe is attempting a tricky balance: to prevent the souring of relations between Beijing and Tokyo but also to keep Asia's balance of power from tilting too far toward China.

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Uniqueness: Alliance Strong Now [___] Commitment to Japan is highFitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers pg 107-108)

In response to China’s A2AD challenges, the US Department of Defense developed the concept of “Air-Sea battle”, now labelled Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, which would entail strikes on the Chinese mainland early in a conflict to eliminate China’s “kill chain” of radars, command-and-control centres, and missile sites. Although the concept is controversial because of its escalatory potential, it helps to signal to both allies and potential adversaries that America’s extended deterrence will not be undermined . 155 Another way in which Washington has addressed Japanese deterrence concerns is by institutionalising dialogue on deterrence strategy and operations . Following up on useful consultations prior to US release of the NPR in 2010, the US and Japan that year established an Extended Deterrence Dialogue, similar to one the US also began with South Korea. According to Japanese officials it has significantly contributed to sustaining confidence in the credibility of the deterrence.156 US abandonment of Japan is unthinkable under current circumstances . The US-Japan alliance is as healthy as ever and is seen by the large majority of the Japanese public and policy community as central to Japanese security policy.157 According to polling, the credibility of the defence commitment is stronger than it was during the Cold War.158 In 2015, 75% of Japanese said they trust the US.159

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Uniqueness: Cooperation In the Region Now [___] Japan-US alliance is strong and contains China — new agreements and rhetoric Auslin 16 [In “Japan's New Realism: Abe Gets Tough,” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora95&div=39&g_sent=1&collection=journals, Foreign Affairs, Vol 95, issue 2, 2016. Michael Auslin is a resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues. Before joining AEI, Dr. Auslin was an associate professor of history at Yale University. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and a B.Sc. from Georgetown University.]

Above all, Abe has taken several moves to strengthen Japan's most important strategic relationship: its alliance with the United States. In April 2015, Tokyo and Washington upgraded their ties for the first time since 1997, announcing that they would start cooperating more closely on maritime security and regional stability. The two nations also agreed to work together to deal with ambiguous security situations that fall short of formal conflict and to jointly respond to threats in space and cyberthreats. REMAKING ASIA By slowly eliminating its restraints on security cooperation, by deepening its relationship with the United States, and by emphasizing more muscular, liberal rhetoric, Abe's Japan has positioned itself as a sort of anti-China in Asia and beyond. Yet many of the other restrictions on Japan's military remain in place, and these will not be revoked anytime soon. Japan's society would not allow its military to play a more normal role in dealing with foreign crises; the Japanese also remain highly wary of entangling alliances. Yet many of Japan's elites-who are worried about the threats from China and North Korea and who fear that the United States is distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine-have embraced the country's new realism. Leading thinkers, including the journalist Yoichi Funabashi, the former diplomat Kuni Miyake, the political scientist Koji Murata, and the former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto, are among those writing and speaking about the need for a more muscular Japanese posture. Indeed, there is a growing community of academics, policy analysts, and politicians who believe that Japan must do more to ensure its own security, as well as to help support the global system that has protected it since the end of World War II. As Abe expands Japan's global role, his policies will include new activities abroad and entail deeper security cooperation with existing partners. The more unstable the global environment becomes, the more Japan will need to play a global role commensurate with its size and economic strength. That role should take advantage of multilateral organizations, but it will, realistically, privilege Japan's security. After decades of stagnation in Japan's foreign and security policies, the new posture will contribute to the maintenance of Asia's liberal post-World War II order over the coming decade and beyond. Abe's policies, which build on some of those of his predecessors, are a series of small yet interlinked steps that will enhance Japan's security, diplomacy, and economy. In focusing primarily on stemming the growing threat from China, Abe is attempting a tricky balance: to prevent the souring of relations between Beijing and Tokyo but also to keep Asia's balance of power from tilting too far toward China.

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Answers To: Withdrawal Inevitable [___] No withdrawal – the US and Japan are cooperating in the regionFairclough 16 — Gordon Fairclough, South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, The Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 2016 (“U.S., India, Japan Begin to Shape New Order on Asia’s High Seas”, WSJ, June 15th, Available Online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas-1466005545, Accessed 06-29-2016)

NEW DELHI—From the waters of the Philippine Sea this week emerged a partial outline of Washington’s vision for a new Asian maritime-security order that unites democratic powers to contend with a more-assertive and well-armed China. A U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships from India and Japan jointly practiced anti-submarine warfare and air-defense and search-and-rescue drills in one of the largest and most complex exercises held by the three countries. The maneuvers were being tracked by a Chinese surveillance vessel, a U.S. Navy officer aboard the carrier USS John C. Stennis said on Wednesday. Last week, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing hoped the training “will be conducive to regional peace, security and stability.” Washington and Tokyo have long cooperated closely on defense. And the U.S. has been working to deepen strategic ties with India and to encourage New Delhi to play a more active role, not just in the Indian Ocean but also in the Pacific, as China’s rise shifts the regional balance of power. “Americans are looking for those who can share the burden,” said C. Raja Mohan, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s India center. A strengthened three-way partnership among the U.S., Japan and India is “an important strategic shift.” India, which is proud of its tradition as a nonaligned state, is unlikely to agree to any formal military alliance. But the countries already have a trilateral ministerial dialogue process that began last year.

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http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas-1466005545

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas-1466005545


Links: China US Cooperation/General [___] US-China engagement causes fear of abandonment and breaks Japanese self-restraint on regional activismZhu, 5/10/2010 (Feng, professor and director of the International Security Program at the School of International Studies @ Peking University, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” Foreign Policy In Focus Accessed 6/23/2016 http://fpif.org/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia/)

Japan faces both domestic and demographic constraints on its regional activism. Even if Japan becomes a “normal” power more engaged in international security affairs, its nationalism makes regional cooperation more difficult. Japan’s tradition of “mercantile realism”—or, more popularly, “reluctant realism”—remains very difficult to change and also constrains Japan’s emergence as an independent strategic power. In this context, Japan has focused its emerging international activism on support for the U.S.-Japan alliance rather than pursuit of an independent international role. This quite limited contribution to regional stability will eventually cause growing dissatisfaction among Japan’s strategic-military specialists, given the Barack Obama administration’s “nuclear twin commitments,” as they are inclined to believe that a better relationship between Washington and Beijing might make the United States less likely to risk an outright conflict with China to defend Japan. However, Japan’s international stance is not fixed and unchangeable. China’s growing international clout is beginning to transform Japan’s long-held self-restraint in defense thinking. China’s military spending surpassed Japan in 2006, and the gap between Tokyo and Japan will continue to grow as long as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains bent on rapid modernization. China’s military spending will, sooner or later, produce less tolerant behavior from Japan. At the same time, the constructive U.S.-China relationship calls into question the U.S. commitment to protect Japan if Tokyo comes into conflict with Beijing. There is a remarkable tendency in Tokyo to see U.S. efforts to engage China as detrimental to Japan. Many Japanese aligned with the Liberal Democratic Party mistakenly interpret efforts to engage China as hostility, or at least, the malign neglect of their own country .

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http://fpif.org/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia/


Links: China US Cooperation [___] Relations are Zero-Sum – engagement trades offGovella, 2007 (Kristi Elaine, MA in Political Science from Berkeley, “Accommodating the Rise of China: Toward a Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2017” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 16 pp. 15-18. Accessed 6/24/2016 http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57987/ichaptersection_singledocument/19b9c958-8d7a-4fd9-a6a2-f0b25006fef6/en/chap3.pdf)

Attitudes toward leadership in East Asia are permeated by a zero-sum mentality; according to this line of thought, either Japan or China can be the regional leader, and the U.S. will align itself with only one of the two countries to best pursue its interests. In reality, an exclusive alliance between the U.S. and either of these countries no longer makes sense in modern East Asia; instead, the task must be to build good relations between the U.S. and both countries. Consequently, the U.S. must strike a balance between supporting Japan through the U.S.-Japan alliance and facilitating China’s peaceful rise. The China portion of this equation is impossible to ignore, and indeed, giving China the incentives to progress down a path of peaceful integration and benign competition is a key part of a successful strategy in Asia. However, it is also vital that the U.S. avoid giving the impression (real or perceived) that Japan is being ignored or undermined by its long-time ally . In giving increased emphasis to relations with China, there is a natural danger that Japan might feel displaced. For example, in a 2007 report from the Japan Defense Research Center, Takayama Masaji cites Chinese “wish for a dissolution” of U.S.-Japan relations as a potential threat and cites the insult of President Bill Clinton’s failure to visit Japan after a 10-day visit to China in 1999. Takayama also mentions changes in American referents for China; he notes Clinton’s use of the term “strategic partner” and Bush’s movement from labeling the PRC a “strategic competitor” to recognizing it as a “stakeholder.” It is clear that Japan is highly sensitive to changes in its relative status, and consequently, the U.S. must tread carefully as it tries to accommodate the growing power of China.

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http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57987/ichaptersection_singledocument/19b9c958-8d7a-4fd9-a6a2-f0b25006fef6/en/chap3.pdf

http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57987/ichaptersection_singledocument/19b9c958-8d7a-4fd9-a6a2-f0b25006fef6/en/chap3.pdf


Links: Tech Cooperation [___] US-China cooperation on issues like climate change contribute to Japan crowd outEnnis ‘11, director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings (Peter, May, “Why Japan Still Matters,” Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/05/10-japan-ennis)

To a large extent, the dismissive attitude toward Japan in some policy circles worked in parallel with efforts by the Obama administration to develop a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” relationship with China on everything from currency and other global economic matters to climate change and North Korea. Some fear that this relationship could take the form of a “strategic partnership” which could crowd out some American allies. It took about a year in office for the administration to grudgingly accept that such a partnership was unlikely to develop any time soon. To the contrary, China has been decidedly uncooperative on currency and climate change. Beijing has continued to show great reluctance to pressure North Korea even about unprovoked aggressive actions against South Korea, much less Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, China’s huge, unexplained military buildup has continued, and Beijing has shown a disturbing tendency to try to bully neighboring East Asia neighbors, including Japan, over disputed territories.

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Links: Military Cooperation [___] Japan will feel abandoned by the plan, spurs even more militarismAuslin 2016 - Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute Michael, "Japan's New Realism," Foreign Affairs March/April Issue

Yet many of Japan’s elites—who are worried about the threats from China and North Korea and who fear that the United States is distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine—have embraced the country’s new realism. Leading thinkers, including the journalist Yoichi Funabashi, the former diplomat Kuni Miyake, the political scientist Koji Murata, and the former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto, are among those writing and speaking about the need for a more muscular Japanese posture. Indeed, there is a growing community of academics, policy analysts, and politicians who believe that Japan must do more to ensure its own security, as well as to help support the global system that has protected it since the end of World War II. As Abe expands Japan’s global role, his policies will include new activities abroad and entail deeper security cooperation with existing partners. The more unstable the global environment becomes, the more Japan will need to play a global role commensurate with its size and economic strength. That role should take advantage of multilateral organizations, but it will, realistically, privilege Japan’s security. After decades of stagnation in Japan’s foreign and security policies, the new posture will contribute to the maintenance of Asia’s liberal post–World War II order over the coming decade and beyond. Abe’s policies, which build on some of those of his predecessors, are a series of small yet interlinked steps that will enhance Japan’s security, diplomacy, and economy. In focusing primarily on stemming the growing threat from China, Abe is attempting a tricky balance: to prevent the souring of relations between Beijing and Tokyo but also to keep Asia’s balance of power from tilting too far toward China. Abe’s plans are controversial, but a healthy democratic tension between a largely pacifistic populace and an elite that worries about emerging threats to Japan’s security will likely help Tokyo avoid the extremes of isolation, on the one hand, and intervention, on the other. In openly advocating liberal values, Abe is making clear that he recognizes Japan’s responsibility to preserve stability. Japan’s new policies are particularly important in ensuring that the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which remains perhaps the key guarantor of regional peace, will remain a credible and robust instrument in the coming decades.

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Links: North Korea Sanctions [___] US-China cooperation over Korea results in Japanese fears of abandonment; destroys the US-japan allianceSwaine 15 [In "BEYOND AMERICAN PREDOMINANCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC: THE NEED FOR A STABLE U.S.-CHINA BALANCE OF POWER," m.chinausfocus.com/upload/file/2015/Swaine-US-CHINA.pdf. Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations]

In the Western Pacific in particular, with regard to both U.S. ISR activities along the Chinese coast and the larger U.S. military presence within the first island chain, the United States Navy and many U.S. decisionmakers are wedded to the notion that American power (and in particular naval power) must brook no limitation in areas beyond a nation’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace. This derives in part from the belief that any constraints on U.S. naval operations will lead to a cascade of coastal states challenging the principle of U.S. maritime freedom of action and to possible reductions in the level of resources and the scope of operations available to support U.S. naval power. Moreover, the specific U.S. desire to maintain a strong naval presence along China’s maritime periphery reflects a perceived need to acquire more accurate intelligence regarding Beijing’s growing o shore air and naval capabilities. Such a presence is also viewed as essential to sustaining U.S. credibility with Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and to the maintenance of deterrent capabilities against a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. This combination of service interests, intelligence needs, and perceived security requirements reinforces the general U.S. bias in favor of continued maritime predominance. However, an inevitable Chinese refusal to accept that predominance over the long term will be expressed first and foremost in opposition to the past level of U.S. naval activities along the Chinese coastline, that is, within China’s EEZ at the very least, and possibly within the entire first island chain. Second, and closely related to the prior point, U.S. decisionmakers are extremely loath to contemplate significant adjustments in the current status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. From the U.S. perspective, any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of the U.S. security commitment to these two actors (a U.S military ally and a de facto U.S. protectorate, respectively) could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms, and/or threats or attacks from North Korea or China. In addition, Japan might react to such movement by questioning Washington’s basic security commitment to Tokyo, which could result in a break in the U.S.-Japan alliance and/or Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms. These concerns are real, if no doubt exaggerated by some in Tokyo or Taipei in order to justify maintenance of the existing U.S. relationship, and in some cases to avoid undertaking costly defense improvements of their own.

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Links: Human Rights Cooperation [___] Shifting our attention to China creates Japanese resentmentChu 2008 (Shulong, Professor of Public Policy and Management @Tsinghua University and CNAPS China Fellow 2006-2007, “A MECHANISM TO STABILIZE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN ASIA“ THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES January, Accessed 6/22/2016 https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/2736/uploads )

Japan’s potential to become a greater military power has been noticed by certain Chinese, American, and Japanese observers. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Matthews wrote that the December 18, 2001, North Korean spy ship event demonstrated “that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force,” which suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense.… rising nationalism has taken hold in one of America’s closest allies. This development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan. … Japan is clearly moving in a different direction.2 Matthews argues that Japanese resentment over the United States’s shift of attention to China, coupled with Japan-China strategic tensions, has strengthened the hand of Japanese nationalists who think their country should once more possess military power to rival that of its neighbors . The lack of recognition of Japan in international institutions strikes many Japanese as profoundly unjust, and leads some to wonder whether military rearmament might be one way to help their country get the respect it deserves. In the words of Kitaoka Shinichi, a University of Tokyo law professor whom Matthews cites, “Remilitarization is indeed going on.”3 When Shinzo Abe was about to take office as Japan’s Prime Minister in September 2006, the New York Times and other news media published many articles and reports on the rise of Japanese nationalism, represented by Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. According to the Washington Post, Prime Minister Abe would encourage Japanese citizens “to take pride in their country…and promote the ideal of a proud and independent Japan.”4 Abe had a big vision for the future of Japan. “Rather than getting praised for wrestling a good round of sumo under the rules that foreign countries make, we should join in the making of the rules,” he said in televised debate in September 2006, “…I believe I can create a new Japan with a new vision.”5 The Post further reported that he would implement “a sweeping education bill, strengthening the notion of patriotism in public classrooms in a way not seen since the fall of Imperial Japan,” and would “rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow the country to again have an official and flexible military.” It claimed that “[t]he rise of Abe, an unabashed nationalist set to be Japan’s youngest post postwar prime minister and its first to be born after the conflict, underscores a profound shift in thinking that has been shaped by those threats.”6

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Answers To: Plan Helps Alliance [___] Military expansion means Japan takes Chinese encroachment seriouslyAuslin 2016 - Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute Michael, "Japan's New Realism," Foreign Affairs March/April Issue

Abe’s next move—pushing through laws to allow Japan’s military to mobilize abroad—sparked even more public outcry. Japan’s constitutional prohibition on collective self-defense had created various awkward problems for the country over the years; among other things, it required the Diet to pass a special law every time Japan wanted to deploy its forces overseas. Now, under Abe’s reform (which was passed by parliament last September), the government has the right to assist allies whose forces or territory are under attack and provide logistical support to countries engaged in military operations that do not directly concern Japan’s security. Abe has also begun to boost Japan’s military capabilities. After a decade of military stagnation, he has gradually increased the defense budget: by 2.9 percent in 2014 and 2.8 percent in 2015. In December 2015, the Diet passed an increase of 1.5 percent for 2016, which would bring Japan’s total annual defense spending to a record $42.4 billion. These additions pale in comparison to China’s $132 billion defense tab in 2014 and double-digit budget hikes in recent years. Yet they are nonetheless significant. Abe has reaffirmed Noda’s plan to buy 42 F-35 fighters and has announced his intention to purchase 17 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and 52 amphibious assault vehicles. He has also pledged to build two new destroyers and to increase Japan’s submarine force to 22 modern diesel boats. Japan’s Ministry of Defense also intends to buy three top-of-the-line surveillance drones and around 20 new maritime patrol planes to replace old models, as well as to upgrade Japan’s ballistic missile warning systems and satellites. Tokyo has already bolstered its defenses in the southwestern island chain, building radar sites on Yonaguni Island, near Taiwan, and constructing bases on three more key islands in the area. By 2020, Abe intends to place up to 550 troops on Amami Oshima, the largest island between Kyushu and Okinawa; he has also started setting up bases on Ishigaki and Miyako, near the Senkaku chain, to facilitate the quick deployment of military personnel in a crisis. All told, nearly 10,000 Japanese troops will be stationed on islands in the East China Sea, along with a network of antiship and antiaircraft missiles there. And in August 2015, Abe launched the country’s second Izumo-class helicopter carrier, which has dramatically strengthened Japan’s ability to project force in its territorial seas.

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Internal Link: Allies Key [___] No alliance thumpers—allied cred is the most influential factor on the likelihood of nonprolifFitzpatrick, 16—Executive Director, IISS-Americas (Mark, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers pg 165-167)

Non-proliferation in Northeast Asia depends foremost on the credibility of US deterrence . There is no reason for any of the three actors to entertain the risks associated with indigenous nuclear weapons as long as they can rely on the US for ultimate security. Even Taiwan, which does not enjoy an explicit US alliance relationship, can count on de facto US protection. To state the converse, a failure of the US to ensure effective deterrence would be the strongest stimulant to a proliferation cascade in Northeast Asia . Japan, for example, worries about China’s recent nuclear force modernisation. There is equal if not greater concern about China’s growing conventional anti-access/area-denial capabilities and whether they might someday preclude America’s ability to come to Japan’s defence. Combined with China-US mutual vulnerability at the strategic level, a perceived superiority of China’s conventional capabilities conceivably could cause Japan to consider a nuclear dimension of its own. In Taiwan, notwithstanding the trend against all forms of nuclear technology, resumed tensions with the mainland that appear on the horizon mean that nuclear hedging options cannot be ruled out, especially if the US were to become isolationist or its perceived commitment to defend Taiwan were to weaken. In the Korean Peninsula, a loss of credibility of the US extended deterrence could make the nuclear imbalance between North and South intolerable to Seoul. US retreat from Northeast Asia is unlikely . Successive US administrations have given high priority to extended deterrence, in both word and deed . Obama’s “pivot to East Asia” or rebalancing policy extended a similar posture of the George W. Bush administration. The Pentagon is developing countermeasures to China’s capabilities, and Obama has reassured Japan that the Security Treaty commitment applies to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the Japanese-administered territory that is most susceptible to Chinese “grey zone” provocations. The emphasis in the 2015 US-Japan defence guidelines on “seamless” bilateral responses provided additional reassurances. The unsurpassed current strength of the US alliances with both Japan and the ROK lends confidence to a prediction that neither country will go nuclear in the foreseeable future.

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Impact: Asian Prolif [___] Japan Rearmament Causes regional arms raceCesar Chelala 15, MD, PhD, is an international public health consultant for several UN agencies, 8/15/15, “Abe is wrong to rush toward militarization,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/15/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-wrong-rush-toward-militarization/#.Vc_HIrJViko

It is possible that originally the SDF was intended as something similar to what Mahatma Gandhi called the Shanti Sena, or soldiers of peace, or as a collective security police (peacekeeping) force, operating under the United Nations. However, in July 2014, the Abe Cabinet introduced a reinterpretation of this role, giving more power to the SDF and allowing it to defend Japan’s allies. This action, which potentially ends Japan’s long- standing pacifist policies, was supported by the U.S. but was heavily criticized by China and North Korea. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for a reinterpretation of those policies, asking that they allow for collective self-defense and for Japan to pursue a more active deterrence policy. Because of what many perceive as a decline in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan may want to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S. and play a more assertive role in regional security. To that effect, Japan has reached some military agreements with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam that are engaged in territorial disputes with China. At the same time, Abe wants to revitalize the economy and meet increasing social security demands. It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. In 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and this year hosted a trade show on military defense systems. Not everybody agrees with Abe’s push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from the Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe that the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something that absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan also carries the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences. Given the volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9.

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Impact: Asian Prolif [___] All impacts are vastly more probable in the world of the disadZarate, 14—Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (Robert, “America’s Allies and Nuclear Arms: Assessing the Geopolitics of Nonproliferation in Asia,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation)

U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and the Middle East would use America’s diminished military power and geopolitical influence as justification to pursue their own nuclear options . If Washington were perceived as acquiescing in any way to nuclear breakout by Tokyo or Seoul, then we should expect signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT),25 including some U.S. friends, to cite discriminatory doublestandards and even quit the NPT . Likely candidates in the Middle East would include Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf security partners who are already threatened by Iran’s drive to rapid nuclear weaponsmaking capability in violation of the NPT and numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In Asia, candidates would include the region’s many technologically-advanced and technologically-rising nations. Taiwan might be tempted to restart its reversed nuclear bomb-making efforts from the 1970s and 1980s. Australia, birthplace of the SILEX method of laser enrichment that General Electric hopes someday to commercialize,26 may see prudence in developing, at the very least, a latent nuclear weapons-making capability. So might partners like Singapore , Indonesia and Vietnam . China, Russia, North Korea and perhaps others would likely use Japanese and South Korean nuclear breakout—and any accompanying breakdown in the international nuclear order—as an excuse to proliferate, rather overtly , nuclear weapons-making technologies or nuclear weapons themselves to problematic states . Moreover, the United States could expect Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, if not also India and Pakistan, potentially to ramp up the size and capabilities of their respective nuclear arsenals . In terms of strategic nuclear forces, the regional and global distribution of military power would shift further against America’s advantage. Nuclear war would likely go from being in the background of interstate conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, to the immediate foreground. In turn, the worsening nuclear dimensions of the international security environment would gravely strain the formal security guarantees of America’s treaty-based bilateral alliances and informal guarantees of its bilateral security partnerships.

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http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation

http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation


Answers To: Japan Can’t Proliferate [___] There are no obstacles to a nuke weapon for Japan.Hunt 15 — Jonathan Hunt, Hunt is a postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand Corp, 2015 (“Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow”, Foreign Policy, August 5th, Available Online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result.

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http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/


Answers To: Proliferation Inevitable [___] Japan’s new defense guidelines still single reliance on U.S. for security—not a step towards militarismLind 2016 - associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard UniversityJennifer, “Japan’s Security Evolution,” Feb 25, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/japans-security-evolution#full

Japan’s constitution prohibits the country from having or using a military, but over the past several decades governments have passed laws to reinterpret constitutional restraints. The 2015 legislation, the most recent in this longtime evolution, enables Japan to participate in “collective security operations.” For the first time, Japanese personnel from its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can engage in combat to support the United States when it is defending Japan, or to support other security partners under attack. In such instances, the legislation stipulates that the situation must threaten Japan’s survival, that no other appropriate means of defense exist, and that the use of force will be restrained to what is minimally required. For example, according to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other proponents of security reforms, Japanese forces could defend an American ship that is attacked while evacuating Japanese citizens from a conflict. As news of the legislation spread around the world, headlines announced the end of Japanese pacifism. Before the vote, CNN declared, “Assertive Japan poised to abandon 70 years of pacifism.” The Japan Times said that the new legislation marked “a significant departure from Japan’s postwar pacifism.”2 Newsweek heralded it as “the most significant shift in Tokyo’s defense policy since World War II.”3 As Andrew Oros notes, “there is a palpable fear among many that Japan is on the verge of a major break from the past sixty years of peaceful security practice.”4 Such pronouncements, however, exaggerate both the extent of Japan’s previous pacifism and the magnitude of the changes. The legislation permitting engagement in collective security activities is indeed a significant moment in Japan’s 70-year evolution in national security. But it does not mark Year Zero of a new era in which Japan is becoming increasingly militarist. Japan’s reforms represent continuity, rather than change, in a pattern in which Japan relies upon the United States for its security, but contributes more to the alliance when its security environment worsens. From Washington’s standpoint, Japan’s greater activism and burden-sharing within the alliance is welcome news.

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http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/japans-security-evolution#full

http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/japans-security-evolution#full


Answers To: Japan Prolif Good [___] Japanese prolif doesn’t deter conflict – it increases the risk of escalation BMI Research 2015 Increasing Geopolitical Tensions across North East Asia, Apr 20, www.bmiresearch.com/news-and-views/increasing-geopolitical-tensions-across-north-east-asia

North Korea's refusal to denuclearise has raised the spectre of a nuclear arms race in the region. Although China and Russia have long been nuclear powers, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan remain non-nuclear. Seoul briefly had a nuclear programme in the 1970s but gave this up under US pressure. However, in the early 2000s its scientists conducted experiments with nuclear materials. Tokyo is believed to have had technical abilities to go nuclear for some time, but has refrained from doing so due to its strong commitment to its 'three non-nuclear principles' of not producing, possessing or introducing nuclear arms to Japanese territory. Nonetheless, as North Korea has become more aggressive, there have been growing calls in South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is no longer taboo for Japanese politicians to raise the subject. We believe that regional tensions will push South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals by the mid-2020s. However, this will probably be in a low-key fashion and not necessarily publicly confirmed, in a similar vein to Israel's nuclear policy. The governments in Seoul and Tokyo will probably conclude that Washington would not risk sacrificing Honolulu or Los Angeles to defend South Korea and Japan from a putative North Korean attack. Even if Seoul and Tokyo refrain from nuclearisation, they will retain the technical ability to go nuclear at short notice (ie months) should the security or political circumstances require this. A nuclear arms race, whether open or covert, would substantially raise regional tensions. China, which is suspicious of Japan's expanding military capabilities, does not wish to see a nuclear Japan that could become more assertive towards Beijing. Although China's relations with South Korea are cordial, Beijing would also be wary of a nuclear-armed government in Seoul, mindful that a reunified Korea could become a major regional power. However, China's biggest concern is that a nuclear South Korea and Japan might encourage Taiwan to build nuclear weapons. This would increase the island's confidence in declaring formal independence from the mainland, something Beijing has stated it would go to war to prevent.

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Disad Turns Case – China/SCS War

[___] Disad turns China rise—alliance breakup makes them hostileIlman ‘16—Pacivis (7/3/16, Global Civil Society Research Center) of University of Indonesia (Zidny, “Is the South China Sea the Stage for the Next World War?,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-the-stage-the-next-world-war-16833?page=show)

China seems to believe that the U.S.-led regional order is based on the U.S.-led political security regional order. This political security order in turn is based on the U.S. regional alliance system, which is known as hub-and-spoke system, encompassing Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. This alliance system grants the United States access to forward bases that ensures her ability to rapidly project her power throughout the region whenever crisis erupts. Without such bases, the United States won’t be able to effectively project forces and, therefore, will have only marginal influence in a crisis . Thus, curtailing the United States’ capability to respond to a regional crisis means much less U.S. influence upon regional order. So , as the logic goes, breaking this alliance system will lead to a breakup of the U.S.-led regional order . Thus, the question now becomes: how can China break up the U.S. alliance system? Alliance, by its nature, means an insurant. By inking an alliance, the United States has assured her allies that she will help defend them in times of crisis. Just like a commercial insurance company, the success of the business rests on the insurer’s credibility . As long as U.S. allies believe that Washington will fulfill her words , the alliance system will hold up . However, if U.S. allies do not believe her words —thereby doubting the credibility of her words—the alliance system will unravel . A new question emerges as a consequence: how can China damage U.S. credibility so much that it will lead to the unraveling of its regional alliance system? For sure, there is no better way to damage one’s credibility than proving that one is unable to fulfill one’s words . Put it another way, China must show U.S. allies that the United States will not come by their side when they need her. That means instigating a conflict with U.S. allies, making sure they will call for U.S. assistance and, at the same time, making sure that the United States will not fulfill her insurance policy .

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http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-the-stage-the-next-world-war-16833?page=show

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