Jomini and Clausewitz

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JOMINI AND CLAUSEWITZ:THEIR INTERACTION

by

Christopher Bassford

An edited version of a paperpresented to the 23rd Meeting of theConsortium on Revolutionary Europe

at Georgia State University26 February 1993. Copyright

Christopher Bassford.

Part ofThe Clausewitz HomepageIntroduction

Clausewitz

Jomini

Fundamental Differences Between the Two Theorists

Their Interaction

Conclusions: The Return of Jomini

Notes
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BibliographyAt least three important military theorists emerged from the experience of the wars of theFrench Revolution and Napoleon: The Austrian Archduke Charles; the Swiss writerAntoine-Henri Jomini; and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. The archduke has had verylittle influence in the United States or Great Britain, since his work was never translated

into English.*1 The military-theoretical traditions founded by Jomini and Clausewitz,however, have very definitely had an impact on our military thinking.

Most frequently, Jomini is treated as being somehow the opposite of Clausewitz: militaryeducators often hurl the epithets "Jominian" and "Clausewitzian" at one another as ifthose single words somehow summed up their opponents' fallacious world-views anddefects of personal character. On the other hand, a number of thoughtful observers haveconsidered the differences betweem Jomini and Clausewitz to be rather inconsequential.Alfred Thayer Mahan is a case in point. Mahan's father, military educator Dennis HartMahan, is generally considered to have been a devout Jominian, and so is his son (thoughin fact both were creative thinkers in their own right, and calling them "Jominians" is an

unfair characterization). The younger Mahan eventually became familiar withClausewitz,*2 calling him "one of the first of authorities." However, he found Clausewitzto be in essential agreement with Jomini in all significant respects,*3 so he continued toput forth his arguments in largely Jominian terminology.*4 The great BritishClausewitzian Spenser Wilkinson thought that Mahan and Clausewitz were in generalaccord.*5 In Germany, Albrecht von Boguslawski also argued that Jomini andClausewitz were saying the same thing. More recently, US Naval War College ProfessorMichael Handel has sought to reconcile the two theorists.*6

Thus Jomini and Clausewitz often appear either as opposites or as twins. As usual whenwe are given a choice between two such clear alternatives, neither really proves to be

very useful and the truth lies somewhere else. In reality, Jomini and Clausewitz sawmuch the same things in war, but saw them through very different eyes. The similaritiesin their military ideas, which are indeed very great, stem from three sources:

1. A common historical interest in the campaigns of Frederick the Great2. Long personal experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, albeit usually on different sides3. They read each other's books.

Despite having these things in common, their approaches to military theory werefundamentally different, and the source of these differences can be found in their verydifferent personalities.

This is not the place to delve terribly deeply into the arcane theoretical details of thesetwo men's work. Instead, I want to focus on the sources of our modern-day confusion:Why is it that Jomini and Clausewitz look so radically different to some observers, yet sovery similar to others? I will attribute this confusion to our frequent lack of sensitivity tothe differences in the two men's experiences and personalities, and to the way in whichthey interactedover time.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm#BIBLIOGRAPHYhttp://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm#BIBLIOGRAPHY


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CLAUSEWITZ

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a professional soldier from the age of 12 to hisdeath from Cholera--a disease he incurred on active duty--at the age of 51. He first sawcombat in 1794 when he was 13. He experienced first-hand Prussia's disastrous military

humiliation by Napoleon in 1806, was captured, and returned to Prussia a passionatemilitary reformer. As a junior staff officer, he worked closely with the great Prussianmilitary reformers Gerhard von Scharnhorst (who was his mentor) and August vonGneisenau (who became his friend and protector). In 1810, he was appointed militarytutor to the crown prince, for whom he wrote (in 1812) a military treatise we call ThePrinciples of War.*7 The same year, on a matter of high principle, he gave up hiscommission and joined the Russian army to fight Napoleon. He fought throughout theRussian campaign and on through the Wars of Liberation of 1813 and 1814. He wasPrussian III Corps chief of staff during the campaign of 1815. It was Clausewitz's corpswhich--outnumbered two-to-one--held Grouchy's forces at Wavre, contributingdecisively to Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo.

Clausewitz had a reputation in the Prussian army as both an idealist and a superb staffofficer, but he was considered temperamentally unsuitable for command. No hint ofpersonal scandal attaches to Clausewitz, and his intellectual integrity was the drivingforce behind the ruthless examination of military-theoretical ideas that we find in hisgreatest book, On War. However, while he rose very high in the King's service, he waswidely considered too open to liberal ideas to be altogether politically reliable. His ideason war are heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionaryperiod, and those ideas were uncomfortable to conservative aristocrats.

Clausewitz's relationship to Napoleon is often misunderstood. Although he is often called

the "high-priest of Napoleon" (Liddell Hart's and J.F.C. Fuller's term for him), it isimportant to note that, in fact, Clausewitz represents not the ideas of Napoleon but ratherthose of his most capable opponent, the Prussian military reformer Gerhard vonScharnhorst.

JOMINI

The man who did claim to interpret Napoleon to the military world was Antoine-HenriJomini, later Baron de Jomini, a French-speaking Swiss (1779-1869).*8 Originallyheaded for a career in banking, young Jomini got carried away by the excitement of the

French Revolution and joined the French army in 1798. He returned to business inSwitzerland after the Peace of Amiens (1802), where he began writing on militarysubjects. His Trait de grande tactique was first published in 1803. He continuallyrevised, enlarged, and reissued it into the 1850s.

Rejoining the army in 1804, Jomini was accepted as a volunteer staff member by MarshalNey (who had loaned him the money to publish his Trait de grande tactique).*9 Heserved in the Austerlitz and Prussian campaigns, then in Spain. He finally received an


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Prussian writer as his chief competitor. For Jomini, Clausewitz's death thirty-eight yearsprior to his own came as a piece of rare good fortune.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO THEORISTS

Aside from their differing relationships to Napoleon, the fundamental differencesbetween Clausewitz and Jomini are rooted in their differing concepts of the historicalprocess and of the nature and role of military theory.

Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, standards, andvalues. The past had to be accepted on its own terms. The historian must attempt to enterinto the mindsets and attitudes of any given period, the "spirit of the age." History was adynamic process of change, driven by forces beyond the control and often beyond thecomprehension of any individual or group. This historicism is particularly obvious in twokey themes ofOn Warthat are missing in the 1812Principles of War. These are thefamous notion that "War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means"

(i.e., organized violence) and the recognition that war can vary in its forms depending onthe changing nature of policy and of the society within which it is waged.

In contrast, Jomini's view of history and of war was static and simplistic. He saw war as a"great drama," a stage for heroes and military geniuses whose talents were beyond thecomprehension of mere mortals. He saw the revolutionary warfare in which he himselfhad participated as merely the technical near-perfection of a fundamentally unchangingphenomenon, to be modified only by superficial matters like the list ofdramatispersonae, technology, and transient political motivations. He drew his theoretical andpractical prescriptions from his experiences in the Napoleonic wars. The purpose of histheory was to teach practical lessons to "officers of a superior grade."

Accordingly, Jomini's aim was utilitarian and his tone didactic. His writing thus appealedmore readily to military educators. His later work, Summary of the Art of War(Precis del'Art de la Guerre, 1838), became, in various translations, popularizations, andcommentaries, the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century.*13

Much of the contrast between Jomini and Clausewitz*14 can be traced to suchphilosophical factors--and to the frequent abridgement ofOn War, which makes it appearmuch more abstract than Jomini's work when in fact they often discussed the samepractical subject matter. Despite his insistence that theory must be descriptive rather thanprescriptive in nature, Clausewitz frequently provides instructive discussions of common

military problems like contested river crossings, the defense of mountainous areas, etc.

THEIR INTERACTION

As the discussion so far has indicated, there were many parallels and many points ofdivergence in the personalities, military experiences, and underlying philosophies ofthese two men. There were also, however, some rather interesting points of intersection.Jomini and Clausewitz may have caught a glimpse of one another from opposite sides


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during the tragic crossing of the Beresina river during the French retreat from Moscow,but there is no evidence that they ever met. Nonetheless, they interacted intellectually,influencing one another's thinking over a long period of time.

When the young Clausewitz wrote hisPrinciples of War(1812) for his student the

Prussian crown prince, he seems to have been rather taken with Jomini and his argumentabout interior lines.

"In strategy,... the side that is surrounded by the enemy is better off than the sidewhich surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces....Colonel Jomini was right in this....*15He also used a great deal of Jomini's geometric vocabulary of bases, lines, and points,and was, like Jomini, positive about the usefulness of mountains as defensive lines. Later,in On War, he would be quite skeptical on all these matters. The young Clausewitz alsoaccepted Jomini's fundamental strategic theme: "The theory of warfare tries to discoverhow we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the

decisive point." Even this early in his evolution, he then went on to stress something wethink of as more typically Clausewitzian: "As this is not always possible, theory alsoteaches us to calculate moral factors: the likely mistakes of the enemy, the impressioncreated by a daring action,... yes, even our own desperation."*16

Given twenty years to think about such matters, however, Clausewitz became extremelyskeptical of Jomini. In On War, Clausewitz's sweeping critique of the state of militarytheory appears to have been aimed in large part at the Swiss:

It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in therealm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are

absolutely useless.They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations haveto be made with variable quantities.

They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all militaryaction is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.

They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuousinteraction of opposites.... Anything that could not be reached by the meagerwisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it

lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules.Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not goodenough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is thebest rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be thecase.*17


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These passages immediately follow Clausewitz's sneers at the "lopsided character" of thetheory of interior lines, comments unquestionably directed at Jomini. As a result of thesecomments, some writers have claimed that Clausewitz was an advocate of concentricattacks, in contrast to Jomini's advocacy of "interior lines." In fact, Clausewitz spent moretime discussing concentric operations in part simply because he felt that Jomini had

already done so good a job explaining the opposite approach. The choice of either woulddepend, as always in Clausewitz's reasoning, on the specific situation.*18

These critical comments by Clausewitz are a source of much confusion. Anyone whoreads Jomini's most famous work--and if you think few people actually read On War,there are even fewer who read the Summary--will notice quite readily that Clausewitz'sremarks seem unduly harsh and misleading. Jomini's prefatory comments seem quitereasonable and entirely compatible with a Clausewitzian understanding of war, despiteJomini's personal barbs at Clausewitz. The frequently forgotten reason for this confusionis that Clausewitz's comments are aimed at Jomini's Trait de grande tactique and otherearly works. The Summary was written afterJomini had read On War--and after

Clausewitz was safely dead. Clausewitz's comments therefore do not reflect Jomini'smodifications to his earlier arguments, for the Summary contains many adjustmentsclearly attributable to On War's arguments. These include Jomini's comments on theimportance of morale; the impossibility of fixed rules (save perhaps in tactics); the needto assign limits to the role of theory; skepticism of mathematical calculations (and adenial that Jomini's own work--despite all the geometrical terminology and diagrams--was based on math); the disclaimer of any belief that war is "a positive science"; and theclear differentiation between mere military knowledge and actual battlefield skill.*19

Jomini acknowledged the truth of Clausewitz's strong connection between politics andwar. The Summary is full of references to "politique"--the same term as Clausewitz's

Politik. However, this similarity is hidden by the standard English translation, whichsubstitutes the term "diplomacy"--i.e., only the politics that occurs between states, notthat within them as well. One example of a direct borrowing from On War: "[T]he firstcare of a commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character ofthe war." Compare this with Clausewitz: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reachingact of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... thekind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn itinto, something that is alien to its nature."*20

These direct but unacknowledged borrowings from On Warconvince many readers thatthe two theorists were thinking on parallel tracks. Simultaneously, the two writers' overtmutual insults tend to make other readers--those who are not familiar with both works--assume a basic contradiction in their views. However, Jomini's recognition of the validityof many of Clausewitz's points did not lead him to genuinely adopt Clausewitz'sphilosophy, for at least three reasons. First, he correctly distinguished his own work fromClausewitz's by pointing to its explicitly instructional (i.e., doctrinal) purposes. Despitehis agreement that war was essentially a political act, he pointed to the practicalimplications of this different focus: "History at once political and military offers more


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attractions, but is also much more difficult to treat and does not accord easily with thedidactic species...."

Second, and in common with a number of Clausewitz's later detractors, he found thePrussian's approach intellectually arrogant, overly metaphysical, and simply too damned

difficult to digest. Jomini stressed simplicity and clarity over a "pretentious" search fordeeper truths. Further, he objected to what he saw as Clausewitz's extreme skepticism("incrdulit") of all military theory--save that in On War. For Clausewitz to rejectJomini's approach to theory while defending his own seemed somehow hypocritical.

Third, there was a strong personal element in Jomini's critique of Clausewitz. Clearly, hedid on some level greatly admire Clausewitz's work. He regretted that the Prussian hadnot been able to read his own Summary, "persuaded that he would have rendered to itsome justice." He was thus deeply wounded by the criticisms in On War. He expressedhis bitterness in a number of sneers (e.g., "The works of Clausewitz have beenincontestably useful, although it is often less by the ideas of the author than by the

contrary ideas to which he gives birth") and in accusations of plagiarism ("There is notone of my reflections [on the campaign of 1799] which he has not repeated"). Theseinsults, because they refer to the Prussian by name, have more meaning to readersunfamiliar with On Warthan do the Summary's concessions on theoretical issues.

CONCLUSIONS: THE RETURN OF JOMINI

The significance of all this, aside from whatever antiquarian interest it may arouse, lies incertain recent attempts to revive Jomini. These attempts are part of a reaction against thepredominance of Clausewitzian theory in this country since the Vietnam war. Over theyears Clausewitz has periodically been declared obsolete, only to reemerge more

influential than ever. Such arguments often focus on the problem of nuclear war, but itseems increasingly likely that it is the nuclear theorists, not Clausewitz, who have beenrendered obsolescent.*21 There have also been complaints by military traditionalistsabout the excessive influence of "Clausewitz nuts" and by theoretical purists of the "theprostitution of Clausewitz since 1981, particularly in [the U.S. Army's] FM 1005 and itsvarious degenerate offspring."*22 Both complaints have some justification. Theeclecticism of Anglo-Saxon military thought is rooted in the same spirit as the Latinwarning, "Cave ab homine unius libri" ("Beware the man of one book"): a narrowreliance on Clausewitz is inconsistent with the philosopher's own teaching. On the otherhand, using On Waras a mere stockpile of juicy quotes in support of this doctrinalposition or that is also an abuse.

In large part, however, criticism of the new Clausewitzianism is simply reaction. Would-be competitors have little choice but to seek to dislodge the Prussian philosopher from hispost-Vietnam primacy. And, of course, some people are simply tired of hearing about thislong-dead genius. As David Chandler has put it, "Clausewitz's airy Kantiangeneralizations have held sway long enough."*23 It is also possible that in a worldseemingly freed of fundamental ideological (though obviously not nationalist) conflict, ina period in which some would seriously suppose an "end to History," Clausewitz's strife-


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driven world view might come to seem less relevant.*24 Chandler's suggestion that"Baron Antoine-Jomini's rival (and more prosaic) approach ... is under seriousreconsideration" may be a symptom of such a trend--though one may well ask, "bywhom?" Such a trend may be further encouraged by what seems to some--in forgetfulretrospect--to have been the un-Clausewitzian "simplicity" of the Persian Gulf War.

Perhaps the very Clausewitzian complexity of that war's aftermath will squelch the effortto renew Jomini's claim to Guru status.

My own argument is that most of what Jomini had to contribute that was of real value--which was a great deal--has long since been absorbed into the way we write practicaldoctrine. Clausewitz's contributions, on the other hand, have not.*25 Indeed, given thebrilliance and subtlety of many of Clausewitz's concepts, it is hard to see how they couldeverbecome the "conventional wisdom." Jomini is important in a purely historical sense.In cultivating our own understanding of war, past, present, and future, we must turn toClausewitz.

See also Christoph M.V. Abegglen, "The Influence of Clausewitz on Jomini'sPrcis del'Art de la Guerre," Dissertation for an MA in War Studies King's College London,2003. [Superviser: Dr. Jan Willem Honig]

NOTES

1. Lincoln's chief of staff General Henry W. Halleck is generally considered a Jominian.He was also definitely aware of Clausewitz and presumably had some notion as to hisideas. His greatest source of inspiration may, however, have been neither Jomini norClausewitz, but the Archduke Charles. See Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, ThePolitics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1973, 2728, 30, 104, 176. Russell F. Weigley adoptsthis view of the Archduke Charles's influence on Halleck in his article "AmericanStrategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers ofModern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1986), 41617; it did not appear in his earlier chapter on Halleck in Towards anAmerican Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall(New York: 1962), inwhich he saw Halleck as a more original thinker, albeit heavily influenced by Jomini.

2. Mahan had become familiar with at least the broad outlines of Clausewitz's thought bythe 1890s. This is the view of two naval historians, Captain (USN) William DillworthPuleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N. (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 295, and Spector,Professors of War, 121. Theeditor of Mahan's papers, however, is not sure that Mahan ever read Clausewitz, and if hedid, places it around 1910. See Robert Seager,Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and hisLetters (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1978), 552, 683,n.11. I am inclined to agreewith this assessment, although this does not eliminate the possibility that Mahan knew thebroad outlines ofOn Warat an earlier date. Mahan's interest is further evidenced by hismarginal notes in a copy of Major Stewart Murray's 1909 condensation ofOn War, TheReality of War(London: Hugh Rees, 1909). Mahan's own copy has been lost, but his
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marginal notes were transcribed into a copy donated to the Naval War College byPuleston, Mahan's biographer.

3. Alfred Thayer Mahan,Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principlesand Practice of Military Operations on Land: Lectures Delivered at the Naval War

College, Newport, R.I., between the Years 1887 and 1911 (Boston: Little, Brown, andCompany, 1911; reprinted Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), contains twoexplicit references to Clausewitz. One is a footnote reference (120) to Clausewitz'ssarcastic discussion of "keys," (Book VI, Chapter 23 ofOn War). The other (in whichMahan refers to Clausewitz as "one of the first of authorities") is a reference to Corbettciting On Waron the relative strengths of defense and offense (279). This is part of anextended discussion of some importance, in that Mahan is comparing the naval and landaspects of strategy, and he is clearly discussing the Clausewitzian interpretation withoutidentifying it as such. [He used virtually the same phrasing in his discussion of somenaval wargames in a letter to Raymond P. Rogers, 4 March 1911, in Alfred ThayerMahan, eds. Robert Seeger II and Doris D. Maguire, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer

Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975.)] Mahan also discusses "ends andmeans" at some length (esp. p5), in a manner strongly reminiscent of Clausewitz.

4. See Puleston, 295; Spector, 121.

5. While he thought that the equally great British Clausewitzian Julian Corbett was wildlywrong in his interpretations.

6. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini (London: FrankCass, 1992).

7. Carl von Clausewitz, trans. Hans W. Gatzke,Principles of War(Harrisburg, PA: TheMilitary Service Publishing Company, 1942); reprinted in Stackpole Books,Roots ofStrategy: Book 2, 3 Military Classics. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987.[Originally "Die wichtigsten Grundsatze des Kriegfuhrens zur Erganzung meinesUnterrichts bei Sr. Koniglichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen" (written in 1812; trans. fromthe 1936 German edition).] Another translation appears as an appendix to J.J. Graham's1873 translation ofOn War.

8. On Jomini, see Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," inEdward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavellito Hitler(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); Michael Howard, "Jomini and the

Classical Tradition," in Michael Howard, ed., The Theory and Practice of War(NewYork: Praeger, 1966); John Shy, "Jomini," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of ModernStrategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1986).

9. The best English-language discussion of Jomini's military career can be found in JohnR. Elting, "Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?" Military Affairs, Spring 1964, 17-26. Unlikemost biographical discussions of the Swiss, which are based on his own highly colored


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reminiscences to people he wished to impress, Elting's study is based on Xavier deCourville,Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon (Paris, 1935). "Written by Jomini'sdescendants, from his personal papers, it is the most impartial of his biographies."

10. Elting, "Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?"

11. [Francis Egerton, Lord Ellesmere], "Marmont, Siborne, and Alison," QuarterlyReview, v.LXXVI (June and September 1845), 204247, a joint venture of John Gurwood,Egerton, and Wellington himself. See Archives of the John Murray Company, manuscriptindex to v.LXXVI, Quarterly Review; J.H. Stocqueler (pseud.), The Life of FieldMarshal the Duke of Wellington (London: Ingram, Cooke, and Company, 1853), v.II,330.

12. See, for example, Articles XVIII-XXII of the Summary.

13.. For Jomini's theoretical writings in English translation, see AntoineHenri Jomini,

trans. Col. S.B. Holabird, U.S.A., Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Criticaland Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the ModernSystem, 2 vols. (New York: D. van Nostrand, 1865); Baron de Jomini, trans. Major O.F.Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean, The Art of War(New York: G.P. Putnam, 1854).Important derivative works include Dennis Hart Mahan's instructional works for WestPoint; Henry Wager Halleck,Elements of Military Art and Science (New York: D.Appleton and Company, 1846); Edward Bruce Hamley (182493), The Operations of WarExplained and Illustrated(London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1866).

14.. Most discussions of Jomini compare him to Clausewitz. For explicit efforts to do so,see Department of Military Art and Engineering, USMA, Clausewitz, Jomini, Schlieffen

(West Point, 1951 [rewritten, in part, by Colonel [USA] John R. Elting, 1964]); J.E.Edmonds, "Jomini and Clausewitz" [a treatment extremely hostile to the German],Canadian Army Journal, v.V, no.2 (May 1951), 6469; Joseph L. Harsh, "Battlesword andRapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War," Military Affairs, December1974, 133138; Major [USAF] Francis S. Jones, "Analysis and Comparison of the Ideasand Later Influences of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz," Paper, Maxwell AirForce Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1985; Colonel [USA] RichardM. Swain, "`The Hedgehog and the Fox': Jomini, Clausewitz, and History,"Naval WarCollege Review, Autumn 1990, 98-109.

15. Gatzke,Principles of War, 49 (p39 in Cochenhausen, Grundsatze).

16. Clausewitz, Gatzke ed.,Principles of War, 12; Cochenhausen, Grundsatze, 9. Seealso pp 22/17).

17.. On War, Book Two, Chapter 2.


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, , , . , , . , . , .... : , . , , , . , , .* 17 sneers " " , Jomini. , , Jomini " .", Jomini . , , .* 18 . Jomini - , , , - .Prefatory Jomini Clausewitzian , Jomini .


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Jomini Trait de grande tactique . Jomini - . Jomini , On . Jomini ;

( ); ; ( Jomini - - ); " "; .* 19Jomini . "politique" - Politik . , , "" - , , . :

"[T] ." : ",, ... , , . "* 20 , . , - - . , Jomini , . , (,) . , :" , ....", , , , . Jomini "" . , ("incrdulit") - . Jomini , ., Jomini . , . ", ."


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. sneers ( ," , , ") (" [ 1799] "). , ,

.________________________________________: JOMINI , , Jomini. Clausewitzian . , reemerge . , ,

.* 21 , " " " 1981 , [ ] FM100 5 . "* 22 . - ", AB homine unius libri"(" "): . , . , , Clausewitzianism .- -. , , . , " ." * 23 ( ), " ," .* 24 " -Jomini ( ) ... " - , " ?" - - -Clausewitzian "" . Clausewitzian Jomini . Jomini - - . , , .*25 ,


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, " ." Jomini . , , , .________________________________________

M.V. Abegglen, " Jomini L'Art de la " , 2003 . [Superviser: - Honig]________________________________________1. . Halleck Jominian. , , . , , Jomini , . . , : ( :. ,

1973, 27 28, 30, 104, 176 . Weigley Halleck " ", Paret, , :. (: UniversityPress, 1986), 416 17; Halleck , (: 1962), Halleck , Jomini.2. Mahan 1890- . , (USN) Dillworth Puleston, Mahan: Mahan, USN ( : , 1939), 295, , , 121. Mahan, , Mahan , , 1910 . Seager, Mahan: (: , 1978), 552, 683, n.11. , Mahan . Mahan 1909 , (: , 1909). Mahan , Puleston, Mahan .3. Mahan, : , , .., 1887 1911 (: , ,1911; Westport, : , 1975), . (120) "" ( VI, 23 ). ( Mahan " ")


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Corbett (279). , Mahan , Clausewitzian . [

wargames ., 4 1911 , Mahan, EDS. Seeger II . Maguire, Mahan (:. , 1975)] Mahan , " " ( P5), .4. Puleston, 295; , 121.5. Clausewitzian Corbett .6. I. , : , Jomini (: Cass, 1992).7. , . . Gatzke, (Harrisburg, :

, 1942); Stackpole , : 2, 3 . Harrisburg, : Stackpole , 1987. [Originally " wichtigsten Grundsatze des Kriegfuhrens Erganzungmeines Unterrichts Bei Koniglichen Hoheit Kronprinzen" ( 1812 ;. 1936 ).] JJ 1873 .8. Jomini, Brinton, . , , "Jomini", Earle, , : (: University Press, 1944);. ,"Jomini ", , , (: Praeger, 1966);.. , "Jomini", Paret, , : (: University Press, 1986).9. Jomini . Elting "Jomini: " , 1964, 17-26. , , Elting Courville, Jomini, (, 1935). " Jomini, , ."10. Elting "Jomini: ?"11. [ Egerton, Ellesmere], "Marmont, Siborne " , v.LXXVI ( 1845), 204 247, Gurwood, Egerton . , v.LXXVI, ; . . Stocqueler (pseud.), (: , , 1853), v.II, 330.12. , , XVIII-XXII .13 .. Jomini , Jomini,. S.B. Holabird, , :


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, 2 . (New York: D. , 1865); Jomini, . O.F. Winship Lieut. , (: GP Putnam, 1854). Mahan , Halleck, (: D. Appleton

, 1846); Hamley (1824 93), (: Blackwood , 1866).14 .. Jomini . , , USMA,, Jomini, Schlieffen ( , 1951 [ , [] . Elting, 1964]); JE , "Jomini " [ ], , , .2( 1951), 64 69; . , "Battlesword : , Jomini, , " , 1974 , 133 138; [USAF] . ," , Jomini , ",

, : , 1985 ; [] .Swain, "` ": Jomini, , ", , 1990, 98-109.15. Gatzke, , 49 (p39 Cochenhausen, Grundsatze).16. , Gatzke , , 12;. Cochenhausen, Grundsatze, 9. .. 22/17).17 .. , , 2.18. , Jomini , a la . (Holabird, 450-451).19 .. , ": Sur la thorie actuelle et sur utilit" (" "). ( ) , 1854 .20. Jomini, . Mendell Craighill, , 66; , , 88-89.21. . , , " : ?" . Nardulli " ", , 1982 , 494-510.22. Achenbach, " ," (,) Lykke, ; [. , ] , , 17,1989 .23. . , Weigley , , 1992 , 294-295.24. (: Free Press,1991) " , Clausewitzian , ." -


23/25

, , . 1945 "Clausewitzian ". , "Clausewitzian Universe" , warmaking "", ,, ,

.25. Brodie , , " ," 50, , , , .________________________________________

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brinton, Crane, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert. "Jomini." Edward Mead Earle, ed.Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1944.

Clausewitz, Carl von, trans. Colonel J.J. [James John] Graham. On War. London: N.Trhbner, 1873.

Clausewitz, Carl von, trans. Hans W. Gatzke.Principles of War. Harrisburg, PA: TheMilitary Service Publishing Company, 1942; reprinted in Stackpole Books,Roots ofStrategy: Book 2, 3 Military Classics. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987.[Originally written 1812: Carl von Clausewitz, General Friedrich von Cochenhausen, ed.

"Die wichtigsten Grundsatze des Kriegfuhrens zur Erganzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr.K`niglichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen. Berlin: Jhnker und Dhnnhaupt Verlag, 1936.]Another translation appears as an appendix to J.J. Graham's translation ofOn War.

Clausewitz, Carl von, eds./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976.

Courville, Xavier de.Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon. Paris, 1935.

Department of Military Art and Engineering, USMA. Clausewitz, Jomini, Schlieffen.West Point, 1951. [Rewritten, in part by Colonel [USA] John R. Elting, 1964.]

Elting, John R. "Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?" Military Affairs, Spring 1964, 17-26.

Edmonds, Brigadier General Sir J.E. "Jomini and Clausewitz." Canadian Army Journal,v.V, no.2 (May 1951), 6469.

Harsh, Joseph L. "Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American CivilWar." Military Affairs, December 1974, 133138.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htmhttp://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Principles/index.htmhttp://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htmhttp://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Principles/index.htm


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Shy, John. "Jomini." Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli tothe Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Swain, Colonel [USA] Richard M. "`The Hedgehog and the Fox': Jomini, Clausewitz,and History."Naval War College Review, Autumn 1990, 98-109.

Williams, T. Harry. "The Return of Jomini: Some Thoughts on Recent Civil WarWriting." Military Affairs, December 1975, 204206.

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Jomini and Clausewitz