Kant's Refutation of Realism

Kant’s Refutation of Realism

By Henry E. ALLISON

Summary This paper attempts to develop an interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism

which is based upon his critique of transcendental realism (understood as the view which systematically confuses appearances with things as they are in themselves). It is argued that given Kant’s transcendental distinction, all non- or pre-critical philosophies, even Berkeleian phenomenalism are transcendentally realistic. This paradoxical result is used as the basis for an analysis of Kant’s resolution of the mathematical antinomies, wherein this resolution is seen both as an “ indirect proof ” of transcendental idealism and as a refutation of transcendental realism. Finally, it is claimed that Kant’s idealism, at least insofar as it is established by means of a refutation of transcendental realism, is methodological rather than metaphysical, viz. it involves a claim about how the sensible world is to be considered in transcendental reflection, not a claim about the “real nature” of this world.

Rtsume Cet article essaye de dtvelopper une interpretation de l’idtalisme transcendental

de Kant, interpretation baste sur sa critique du realisme transcendental (entendu comme le point de vue qui confond systtmatiquement les apparences avec les choses telles qu’elles sont en elles-mcmes). L‘auteur montre que, si l‘on accepte la distinction transcendentale de Kant, toutes les philosophies non critiques et pricritiques sont trans- cendentalement rkalistes, y compris le phtnomtnalisme de Berkeley. A partir de ce rtsultat paradoxal, il analyse la manitre dont Kant rtsoud les antinomies m a t h h a - tiques: cette rtsolution apparait B la fois comme preuve indirecte de l’idtalisme transcendental et comme une rtfutation du rtalisme transcendental. L‘auteur est finalement d’avis que l’idtalisme de Kant, du moins lorsqu’il est justifit5 par une refutation du rtalisme transcendental, est plus mtthodologique que mttaphysique, c’est-8-dire qu’il dCclare comment le monde sensible doit itre considkri dans la reflexion transcendentale et non quelle est la (( vtritable nature I) de ce monde.

Zusammenfassung Es wird versucht, eine Interpretation von Kants transzendentalern Idealismus zu

entwickeln, die auf seiner Kritik am transzendentalen Realismus - verstanden als derjenige Standpunkt, der systematisch Erscheinung und Ding an sich verwechselt - beruht. Es wird argumentiert, dass - einmal Kants transzendentale Unterscheidung angenommen - alle fruheren, vorkritischen Systeme der Philosophie einschliesslich Berkeleys Phanomenalismus transzendental realistisch sind. Dieses paradoxale Ergebnis wird als Basis fur eine Analyse von Kants Auflosung der mathematischen Antinomien verwendet, wobei diese Auflosung sowohl als ein aindirekter Beweis, fur den transzendentalen Idealismus als auch als eine Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realisrnus gedeutet wird. Es wird schliesslich nahegelegt, dass Kants Idealismus, sofern wenig-

Dialectica Vol. 30, No 213 (1976)

224 Henry E. Allison

stens als er sich auf Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realismus abstiitzt, mehr ein rnethodologischer als ein metaphysischer Idealismus ist. Er statuiert eher iiber die Art, wie die Sinneswelt in einer transzendentalen Reflexion betrachtet werden soll, als iiber die Frage, wie die Welt awirklich, beschaffen sei.

One of the small ironies of Kant interpretation is that, while the famous refutations of idealism, which are really peripheral to Kant’s main transcendental concerns, have been the subject of endless discussion, the analysis and refutation of realism, which lies at the very heart of these concerns, has been generally neglected. Kant, to be sure, did not attempt to refute all realisms. Indeed, he regarded his own version of idealism as perfectly consonant with an “ empirical realism ”. Nevertheless, the great b2te noire of the critical philosophy is called “ transcendental realism ”, and its negative significance is reflected in Kant’s contention: “Were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, neither nature nor freedom would be possible. ” (A543D571)

Although this claim alone would seem to justify a detailed analysis of what Kant means by transcendental realism, the real importance of this conception lies in the light which it sheds on the transcendental idealism which he opposes to it. Frequently, the best way to understand what a philosophical theory asserts is to consider what it denies. This is especially true in the present case; for in the “ Antinomy of Pure Reason ”, Kant offers what amounts to a refutation of at least one prevalent strand of transcendental realism as an indirect proof of the truth of transcendental idealism. Taking this correlation as a point of departure, I shall here approach the contro- versial topic of the nature and significance of Kant’s ideali3m obliquely, by means of a consideration of his analysis and refutation of trancendental realism. This investigation falls naturally into three parts. The first discusses what transcendental realism means for Kant; the second analyzes his refutation of this realism; and the third deals with the question of what transcendental idealism entails, on the assumption that its truth has been established by this argument. I hope by these means to show: 1) that all non- critical philosophies can, from the Kantian standpoint, be seen as in one way or another transcendentally realistic; 2) that although it has important on- tological consequences, Kant’s idealism is ultimately methodological in nature.

Kant’s Refutation of Realism 225

I

Apart from the passage cited above, Kant only explicitly discusses transcendental realism in two places. Both are in the Dialectic, and in each case Kant contrasts it with transcendental idealism. In the first of these passages, which is in the First Edition version of the Fourth Paralogism, Kant writes:

By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things 111 themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. To this idealism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus inter- prets outer appearances (their reality being taken as granted) as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us - the phrase “ outside u s ” being interpreted in conformity with pure concepts of understanding. (A369)

The second passage is from the “Antinomy of Pure Reason”. After defining transcendental idealism as the doctrine that “all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations which in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts ”, Kant proceeds to state, “ . . . the realist, in the transcendental meaning of the term, treats these mere modifications of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere representations as things in themselves. ” (A490-49 1 /B518/5 19)

As both passages indicate, the defining characteristic of transcendental realism is its confusion of appearances or “ mere representations ’’ with things in themselves. More precisely, it erroneously treats what, from Kanfs transcendental standpoint, are mere appearances, as if they were things in themselves. The first passage limits this charge to objects of outer perceptions, although it does connect it with conceptions of both time and space as things in themselves. The second passage goes beyond this, presenting transcendental realism as the view which considers all appearances, those of inner as well as those of outer sense, as if they were things in themselves. Obviously, the second passage expresses Kant’s considered view on the


topic. He clearly maintains that objects of inner as well as of outer sense must be construed as appearances rather than things in themselves. Thus, transcendental realism can manifest itself as much in a confused conception of the former as of the latter.

Even these very preliminary suggestions suffice to show that the usual interpretation of transcendental realism as equivalent to the scientific realism of the Cartesians and Newtonians (basically what Berkeley meant by “ materialism ”) is far too narrow l. For while Kant only makes use of the expression “ transcendental realism ” in these few places, he does frequently accuse philosophers of a variety of stripes of treating appearances as things in themselves, or equivalently, granting “ absolute ” or “ transcendental ” reality to appearances2. Thus, at one place in the Critique he calls this confusion the “ common prejudice ’’ (A740D768) while at another he refers to the “ common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances. ’’ Moreover, in the uncompleted essay, “ On the Progress of Meta- physics ”, he goes so far as to claim that prior to the Critique this confusion was unavoidable 3.

Such passages indicate that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves functions as the great divide in the Kantian conception of the history of philosophy. Either one gets this distinction right or one does not. Unfortunately, only the critical philosophy has succeeded in get- ting it right. Consequently, despite their many interesting differences, all of the others are at bottom nothing more than variant expressions of the same underlying confusion4. To be sure, Kant does not express himself in just this way in the Critique, generally preferring to oppose criticism to both dogmatism and skepticism. Nevertheless, it remains a clear implication of his analysis. Thus, if transcendental realism be understood as the view which systematically regards appearances as things in themselves, it can be assigned precisely the same role in Kant’s theoretical philosophy as he explicitly

1 Two examples of this view are Colin Turbayne, “ Kant’s Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism ”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (1955), p. 228, and Sadik J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies, Oxford, 1972, p. 148.

2 In the Critique of Pure Reason (B53) Kant seems to equate “absolute” with “transcendental” reality. The notion of absolute reality goes back at least as far as the Dissertation where Kant criticizes the conception of time as something “ posited in itself and absolutely ” in se et absolute positurn. Kant’s gesamrnelte Schrijten, Preus- sische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin and Leipzig, 1902, Vol. 11, p. 401 and following. For a discussion of some of these terminological points see Norbert Hinske, Kant’s Weg zur Transzendental-philosophie: Der dreissigjahrige Kant, Stuttgart, Berlin, Koln, Mainz, 1970, esp. p. 49.

3 Kant’s gesarnrnelte Schriften, Vol. M, p. 287. 4 Cf. Ibid., p. 335 where Kant reflects: “ Alle Philosophien sind im Wesentlichen

nicht unterschieden bis auf die kritische. ”


attributes to the notion of heteronomy in his moral philosophy. That is, it serves to characterize the common assumption, prejudice, or confusion, which is shared by all philosophers who do not achieve the critical standpoint s.

If such a claim is to prove fruitful for the understanding of Kant’s own thought and of his views on the thought of his predecessors, it is obviously necessary to determine how Kant himself construed the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The second of the passages cited above affirms that appearances are taken by transcendental idealism to be “ mere representations ” while “ things in themselves ” refer to self-subsistent, extramental entities. This immediately suggests the Cartesian-Lockean theory of ideas, wherein ideas in the mind, rather than “ real ”, i. e. , material things, are held to be the direct objects of perception. Now Kant himself sometimes takes the distinction in this sense, calling the ideas in the mind of the percipient “ appearances ” and the material object the “ thing in itself ”. In so doing, however, Kant is careful to point out that he is using these terms in an empirical sense, and that this must be carefully distinguished from their transcendental sense, which is the main topic of his concern 6 .

Kant outlines the transcendental sense of this distinction in the Trans- cendental Aesthetic. It there confronts us as a consequence of the central argument of this section, viz., the contention that space and time are merely forms of human sensibility or intuition. Since it follows from Kant’s analysis that objects can only be given in experience through these forms, and since these forms allegedly reflect the structure of the human mind, Kant called the ,objects which are given in this manner “ appearances ”. Correla- tively, the same objects, considered apart from the subjective forms through which they appear, are termed “things in themselves”. Thus, unlike the empirical version of the distinction, when these terms are taken in their transcendental sense, they refer not to two classes of entity, one “ in the mind” and the other independent of it, but to two points of view or per-

5 After developing his formal principle of autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant proceeds to systematically group all previous moral philosophies under a number of labels which characterize the various asDects of heteronomv. Kant’s pe-

I

sammelte Schriffen, Vol. V, pp. 40-41. 6 Cf. Critiaue of Pure Reason. A29-30iB45. B70. A258/B313-314. The relation be-

tween the trankendkntal and empirical senses o f this distinction is touched upon by Rolf Meerbote, “ The Unknowability of Things in Themselves ” in Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, a collection of selected papers from the Third International Kant Congress, edited by Lewis White Beck, Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U. S. A., 1974. The issue is discussed in a detailed and systematic fashion by Gerold Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, Ein Problem der “ Kritik der reinen Vernunft ”, Berlin, 1971, esp. pp. 15-25.


spectives from which one and the same entity (the empirical object) can be considered. Indeed, as Gerold Prauss has pointed out, when Kant is concerned with articulating the transcendental sense of the distinction, he usu- ally does not use expressions such as “ Ding an sich ”, “ Ding an sich selbst ” or “ Sache an sich ”, but rather locutions of the form “ Ding ” or “ Sache an sich selbst betrachtet ” I .

Thus understood, the confusion of appearances with things in themselves, which is the defining characteristic of transcendental realism, is a confusion of two points of view from which empirical objects can be considered. It would be more accurate, however, to describe the transcendental realist as a philosopher who fails to recognize the very possibility of an epistemological, as opposed to a psychological “ consideration ” of the subjective forms or conditions in relation to which objects are experienced. Ins- tead, ignoring this relation, or perhaps transcending it, he naively (according to Kant) proposes to consider objects as they are in themselves, that is, as they “ really are ” apart from any relations to the human mind. As a result he fails to recognize the constitutive role of sensibility and its a priori f,orms, space and time, in human experience. He, therefore, inevitably misconstrues these forms either as things in themselves or as ideas abstracted from the relations between such things. This, in turn, leads him to hypostusize the objects in space and time, that is, to view them as “ self-subsistent things ”, which, as such, can be adequately described without any reference to the manner in which they are known by the human mind.

By way of clarification and illustration, let us briefly consider how such a confusion can be attributed to the most diverse strands of pre-critical philosophy, whether it be rationalistic or empiricistic, dogmatic or skeptical, realistic or idealistic. The most obvious example of this mode of thought is provided by the Newtonians or “mathematical students of nature”. The transcendental realism of Newtonian thought is expressed in its conception of an absolute space and time in which all material objects have a determinate location. As Kant depicts the views of the Newtonians, “ They have to admit two eternal and infinite self-subsistent non-entities (space and time), which are there (yet without there being anything real) only in order to contain in themselves all that is real. ” (A39B56) Not only, Kant argues, does such a position lead to embarassing theological consequences, forcing one to somehow locate God in space and time, but, as he suggests in the Prole-

7 Gerold Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, Bonn, 1974, p.20 ff. Prauss also points out that the short forms, such as we find in the Transcendental Aesthetic, can generally be seen as abbreviations of the long form.


gomena, it cannot even account for the synthetic a priori character of our geometrical knowledge of nature 8.

Yet not only Newton, but also his great opponent, Leibniz, is guilty of confusing appearances with things in themselves. To be sure, the Leibnizians, or “ metaphysical students of nature ”, do distinguish between appearances and things in themselves, and they do regard objects cognized through sense perception as appearances or phenomena. Moreover, they even consider space and time to be ideal or subjective. Nevertheless, they do not make this distiction in the correct way, and thus do not grant this kind of ideality to space and time. Kant expresses these criticisms by claiming, among other things, that Leibniz and his followers falsified the concept of sensibility and of appearance; (A43D60) that they misconstrued the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible by viewing it as “logical” rather than “ transcendental ”; that they “ intellectualized appearances ”; (A271B327) and even that they “ took appearances for things in themselves ”. (A264/ B320) These formulas all serve to indicate the radical difference between the Kantian and Leibnizian perspectives, a difference which is easily overlooked or minimized because of their common terminology. Kant’s basic complaint is that Leibniz failed to recognize that human sensibility has its own a priori forms (space and time) which positively determine the structure and relations of the objects of human experience, and which also serve to limit our knowledge to such objects. Instead, he tended to regard sensible knowledge of appearances as merely a confused version of the purely intel- lectual knowledge which we allegedly possess of things in themselves (monads). Similarly, while space and time are held to be “ ideal ”, they are likewise treated as merely confused representations. Conseqently, all of the sensible aspects of human experience, including the spatio-temporal relations between phenomena, are claimed to be ultimately reducible (for God) to the purely conceptual (logical) determinations which pertain to things in themselves (monads). This reducibility thesis is the real point of Kant’s contention that Leibniz “ took appearances for things in themselves ”. Moreover, as he suggests in his discussion of “ The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflec- tion ”, it also serves to explain the distinctive features and fallacies of the Leibnizian metaphysic 9.

8 Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, pp. 287-288. This seems to conflict with Kant’s statement in the Critique (A40/B57) with reference to the Newtonians that, in contradistinction to the Leibnizians, “ The former thinkers obtain at least this advantage, that they keep the field of appearances open for mathematical propositions. ”

9 I discuss the whole issue in some detail in The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, Bal- timore and London, 1973, esp. pp. 75-97.


Although Newton and Leibniz can thus both be said to have confused appearances with things in themselves, the only view to which Kant explicitly attaches the label “ transcendental realism ” is, ironically enough, “ empirical idealism ”. This is Kant’s term for the doctrine, held by Descartes and many others, that ideas rather than real things or material objects are the immediate objects of consciousness. The crucial consequence of this doctrine is that the existence of a world distinct from consciousness and its contents must be inferred rather than directly experienced. Kant’s strategy with empirical idealism is to show that it is logically connected with a version of transcendental realism, and that it entails a radical skepticism. In so doing, he likewise succeeds in showing how certain skeptical views are themselves transcendentally realistic. The connection between empirical idealism and transcendental realism is developed by pointing out that if by “ real things ’’ is meant things in themselves or self-subsistent entities, it then becomes obvious that the mind can have no access to such things. This, in turn, leads naturally to the assumption of Descartes and his followers that the only objects of which we are in fact immediately aware are ideas in the mind. This widely held form of idealism is thus seen by Kant as basically a reflex ac- tion, based upon an implicit commitment to transcendental realism. The connection between such a position and skepticism is readily apparent. In Kant’s own words, which express the ego-centric predicament and its presupposition in as sharp a form as it can be found:

If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us. (A328)

Finally, let us consider what would seem to be the most obvious counter- example to the thesis that the entire spectrum of pre-critical philosophy can, from Kant’s standpoint, be seen as transcendentally realistic. I am referring, of course, to Berkeley’s idealism. Since Kant himself accuses Berkeley of denying the existence of things in themselveslO, it is difficult to see how he could also accuse him of confusing such things with appearances, or of treating appearances as if they were self-subsistent things. Now Kant, in fact, did not make such an accusation, but the question remains whether he could have done so. In considering this question, it is crucial to keep in mind that the issue is not whether, from some independent standpoint, it is

10 Prolegomena, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, pp. 288-289.

Kant’s Refutation of Realism 23 1

possible to characterize Berkeley’s idealism as a curious form of realism, but rather, how this idealism must appear in connection with Kant’s own conceptual framework. We must therefore limit ourselves to two considera- tions: 1) What, from Kant’s standpoint, does Berkeley’s denial of matter and Newtonian absolute space amount to; and 2) what, again from Kant’s standpoint, is the status of Berkeley’s “ ideas ”?

The heart of the answer to the first question is contained in Kant’s much maligned contention that “ We cannot blame the good Berkeley for de- grading bodies to mere illusion ”. (B70) This has often been taken as evi- dence of Kant’s complete ignorance of Berkeley’s actual writings, and of his use of unreliable second hand accounts of his philosophy by commenta- tors such as Beattie ll. More recently, it has been held to be the result of a deliberate misrepresentation on Kant’s part 12. Nevertheless, as I have argued at length elsewhere, and can only reaffirm here, it can also be seen as the result of a legitimate, and reasonably informed criticism of Berkeley’s position from Kant’s own standpoint 13. Kant’s explicit references to Berke- ley in the second edition of the Critique and elsewhere emphasize Berkeley’s denial of the a priori status of our representation of space. Precisely because he failed to realize this status, and instead viewed space as a merely empirical representation, abstracted from “ outer experience ”, Berkeley’s fully justified repudiation of the Newtonian version of transcendental realism (“materialism” in Berkeley’s sense) left him no alternative but to reduce the entire realm of res extensa, the legitimate field of physical science, to a collection of ideas in an individual mind. To express the matter in Kantian terms, Berkeley’s entire polemic with “ materialism ” moved within the transcendentally real-empirically ideal framework. From within this framework, space, time and the objects contained therein must be viewed either as transcendentally real (a distinct substance, or collection thereof) or empirically ideal (a collection of ideas in an individual mind). Kant acknowledges that Berkeley saw quite clearly the absurdities of the former view, and thus that in one sense he anticipated the results of the Critique. In rejecting the former alternative, however, he fell into the even greater absurdity of affirming the latter, and this is the direct consequence of the failure to consider the third alternative offered by the Critique, namely, transcendental idealism. It is for this reason, according to Kant, that he was led to degrade

11 The most elaborate statement of this view is to be found in J . Janetsch, Kanr’s

12 Colin Turbayne, “ Kant’s Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism ”, p. 243. 13 Henry E. Allison, “ Kant’s Critique of Berkeley ”, Journal of rhe Hisrory of

Urteil iiber Berkeley, Dissertation, Strassburg, 1879.

Philosophy, January, 1973, Vol. XI, No. 1. pp. 43-63.


bodies to mere illusion. Berkeley’s doctrine can thus at the very least be viewed as an offshot of transcendental realism in the sense that it is grounded in an attempted criticism of this position which is not fully emancipated from its basic presuppositions 14.

But Berkeley’s position is more than an offshot of transcendental realism. It is itself directly realistic in the transcendental sense. This is because, when seen from the Kantian standpoint, Berkeleian ideas must be regarded as things in themselves. Although Kant himself never ventured such a paradoxical sounding charge with regard to the “ good Bishop ”, he did in connection with Hume. Moreover, he formulated it in such a way as to make it equally applicable to Berkeley. The relevant passage occurs in the Critique of Practical Reason, where, by way of summarizing the central tenets of the first Critique, Kant notes: “ I granted that when Hume took the objects of experience as things in themselves (as is almost always done), he was entirely correct in declaiming the concept of cause to be deceptive and an ‘ illusion’ ” ls.

Since Kant was certainly well aware of the fact that Hume characterized the objects of human experience as “ impressions ”, we are inevitably led to ask why Kant should describe such private, subjective objects as things in themselves. The obvious answer is that Hume treats those impressions as if they were given to the mind as they are in themselves. This can be seen as a consequence of his failure to recognize the existence of a priori forms of sensibility through which these impressions are received (even the private data of inner sense are, for Kant, given to the mind under the form of time and hence count as appearances). Since Hume did not recognize any a priori forms of sensibility, he was not in a position to acknowledge the possibility of any a priori rules of synthesis through which these impressions are brought to the unity of consciousness. In the absence of such rules, there is no reason why, given object (or impression) A, something else, object (or impression) B must likewise be given; and this, as Kant sees it, is the source of Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning causality 16. But clearly, Berkeleian ideas have, for the present purpose at least, precisely the same status as Humean impressions. They too are given to the mind as they are in themselves, a point which is evidenced by Berkeley’s denial of the a priori na-

14 Cf. Critique o f Pure Reason B70. Another interesting version of this claim, which refers to idealism in general rather than to Berkeley in particular is to be found in Reflexion 5642, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XVIII, pp. 281-282.

15 Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. V, p. 53. 16 The entire treatment of this passage is greately indebted to the analysis of Lewis

White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago, 1960, pp. 181-182.


ture of the representation of space. Such ideas, therefore, count as things in themselves in the Kantian sense.

The recognition of this seldom noticed fact is of tremendous significance for the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, especially his idealism l7. This is because it enables us to see that the question of whether objects of experience are appearances or things in themselves (in the trancendental sense) completely transcends the traditional debate as to whether these objects are “ in the mind ” in the manner of the Berkeleian idea or the Human impression, or whether they are external to it in the manner of the Cartesian res extensa, the Newtonian atom, or the Leibnizian monad. This, by itself, is enough to make it clear that those who interpret Kant’s transcendental idealism along the lines of traditional phenomenalism are radically mistaken.

In a more positive vein, this realization also makes it possible to put some of Kant’s scattered reflections on the subject of ideality in a more systematic form. The language of the Fourth Paralogism suggests that, par- allel to the transcendental and empirical versions of the distinctions between appearances and things in themselves, Kant was also prepared to distinguish between transcendental and empirical senses of being “ in the mind ” and external to it (in uns, ausser uns) (A369-373). In reconstructing Kant’s position, we can see that, on the empirical level, the question of whether or not an object is “ in the mind ” is equivalent to the question of whether it is a private datum of an individual consciousness, e. g., a sensation, or an intersubjectively recognizable object, with a determinate spatio-temporal location. If it is the former type, it is in uns in the empirical sense; if it is the latter it is ausser uns in the same sense. Kant himself referred these two types of empirical object to inner and outer sense respectively, and in the Prolegomena he drew the distinction between “judgments of perception ” which concern the former, and “ judgments of experience ” which concern the latter la.

On the transcendental level things look rather different. To ask here whether a given object is in uns or uusser uns is really not to ask what kind of an object it is, but how it is being considered. If it is being considered in

17 Aside from Beck, the only commentator that I know of who calls attention to this passage is Jonathan Bennet, Kant’s Dialectic, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 54-56. Although Bennctt likewise bases his account of this passage on Beck’s treatment, he comes to results which are diametrically opposed to those suggested here. Rather than seeing Kant’s remark about Hume, and the similar claim that Leibniz “ took appearances for things in themselves ” as expressions of a distinctively Kantian transcendental standpoint, he simply dismisses these “ wild claims ”, as expressions of an “ imposition theory ”, which is “ Kant at his worst ”. Much of what is said here as well as in the third part of this paper can be taken as an answer to this line of criticism.

18 Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, 298 ff.


relation to the subjective conditions through which it can be experienced, that is, as an " object of possible experience ", then it can be said to be in uns in the transcendental sense, and to be an appearance in the same sense. If, on the other hand, it is being considered apart from these conditions, as " an object in general ", then it is ausser uns in the transcendental sense, and counts as a thing in itself in this sense. Transcendental realism views all objects as ausser uns in the latter sense. It therefore treat all objects, whether or not they are in the mind in the empirical sense, as things in themselves. Since this, according to Kant, is the " common prejudice " of all non-critical philosophies, all such philosophies are transcendentally realistic.

Nevertheless, as can be surmised from the above sketch, not all non- or pre-critical philosophies are transcendentally realistic in precisely the same sense. In fact, it seems possible to make at least a rough division of transcendentally realistic philosophies into two main camps (which is not to deny that there are philosophies, e. g., Cartesianism, which could be placed in either camp). The division reflects the two basic and conflicting ways in which empirical objects can be treated as ausser uns in the transcendental sense, i. e. considered as if they were things in themselves 19. On the one hand, we have those philosophies which fail to recognize any a priori or necessary conditions of human experience. From the Kantian standpoint, they can therefore be said to assume that the human mind is in immediate contact in sense experience with the transcendentally real and that all our knowledge must be based upon this contact. The obvious consequence of this position is the denial of the possibility of any a priori knowledge of such objects. This group would naturally include empirical idealism and the phenomenalism of Berkeley and Hume. On the other hand, we have those philosophies which recognize that there are a priori or necessary conditions through which objects are given *, and thus affirm the possibility of a prior knowledge, but which fail to recognize that these are merely subjective conditions of human experience. Instead, they view them as conditions of reality itself; so that our purported a priori knowledge is of objects as they are in themselves, independent of any merely subjective conditions of human

19 The closest that Kant comes to making this explicit is in his comparison of Leibniz and Locke in " The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection " (A271/B327).

* The ambiguous expression " given " is deliberately chosen here precisely because the basic weakness of this type of transcendental realism lies in its failure to distinguish between conditions in virtue of which an object is given in thought as a thing in itself or nournenon (logical conditions of thought) and conditions in virtue of which it is given in experience as an appearance or phenomenon (real conditions or conditions of possible experience). Hopefully, this will become clear in the sequel.


knowledge. The views of Newton and Leibniz, each in its own way, reflect this tendency. In keeping with the well known Kantian dichotomy, one can characterize the members of the former camp as “ skeptics ” and of the latter as “ dogmatists ”. In so doing, however, it is important to keep in mind that skepticism for Kant is itself dogmatic and d,ogmatism necessarily leads to skepticism 20.

I1

Given this division within transcendental realism, one might expect that the Kantian refutation thereof would take two forms. Against the skeptical variety it is essential to establish the possibility of a priori knowledge. This is the central task of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although Kant does indeed constantly affirm that the limitation of knowledge to appearances, and thus the necessity of distinguishing between appearances and things in themselves, is a necessary consequence of his analysis, the main thrust of the argument is to establish the possibility rather than the limits of a priori knowledge. It is therefore only natural for Kant to attempt a separate refutation of the dogmatic version of transcendental realism. Such a refutation could best be conducted in an indirect fashion, showing the disastrous consequences that emerge from a failure to determine the limits of human knowledge. Moreover, since the outcome of such a refutation would be the recognition of the necessity of distinguishing between appearances and things in themselves, it could also function as an indirect proof of the truth of transcendental idealism. This is, of course, exactly what we find in the section of the Critique entitled the “ Antinomy of Pure Reason ”.

This helps us to understand why Kant placed such great importance on the “problem of the antinomy”, even going so far as to attribute to the discovery of this problem precisely the same significance which he granted to his famous “ recollection of David Hume ”, viz., an awakening from his “ dogmatic slumber ” 21. All of this suggests the need for an in depth treatment of this section of the Critique, something that is sadly lacking in the English language Kant literature 22. Our present treatment, however, must

20 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A389. 21 Prolegomena, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, p. 337, Kant’s letter to

Christian Garve, Sept. 21, 1978, Vol. XII, p. 258.


be extremely limited. First of all, it will be limited to the first two or “ mathematical antinomies ”; for it is only in relation to these that Kant presents his indirect proof of transcendental idealism. Secondly, it will not deal with the question of the validity of the specific proofs of the thesis and antithesis positions. These proofs have been the subject of much debate, and perhaps not a single one of them is completely immune from criticism. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, Kant’s refutation of transcendental realism and consequently his indirect proof of transcendental idealism do not depend upon the validity of these proofs.

The “ mathematical antinomies ” are concerned with the applications of the concept of infinity to the physical world. The first one addresses itself to the magnitude of this world. The thesis, which reflects the standpoint of Newton, maintains that the world is finite in both its temporal and spatial dimensions, i. e., that is has a beginning in time and an outer limit in space. The antithesis, which reflects the views of Leibniz, argues, on the contrary, that the world is infinite in both respects. The second is largely concerned with the question of the infinite divisibility of matter 23. The thesis, affirming the atomic theory of Newton, argues that all composite substances are composed of simple parts. The Antithesis, expressing the Leibnizian theory of the continuum, denies the existence of any ultimately simple parts. In each instance the proof is apagogic, with the position allegedly established by means of the refutation of its opposite.

These antinomies thus reflect the great cosmological debate between Newton and Leibniz; and since we have just seen how each of their theories is transcendentally realistic, we should be in a position to determine how this “ common prejudice ” underlies the dispute between them. First of all, it underlies their shared either/or approach to the issues. Both assume that the world must be either finite or infinite in the above respects. Both therefore assume that a demonstration that it is not the one is equivalent to a proof that it is the other. Kant’s position on the issue is clear: “ If the world

22 The only book devoted to this subject in the recent literature is Al-Azm’s The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies. Unfortunately, this short work does little more than show how the proofs of the thesis and antithesis positions reflect the arguments of the Leibniz-Clark debate. Interesting treatments of the Antinomies which attempt to deal with their relation to the Critique as a whole are provided by P. F. Strawson. The Bounds of Sense. London. 1966. DD. 175-236. and Jonathan Bennett. , * - Kant’s Djalectic, pp. 114-227. I

23 Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Metaphysics and Theory of Science, Eng. translation by P. C . Lucas, Manchester, 1955, p. 47, points out that the debate over the nature of matter is combined rather artifically with a consideration of arguments for the im- perishability of the soul.


is a whole existing in itself it is either finite or infinite. ” (A507B535) 24.

Since each side believes that it must be either one or the other, each side must be assuming that the world is a whole existing in itself. That is to say, each side construes the expression “ world ” as referring to a thing in itself in the transcendental sense.

In Kant’s own account the connection between the belief that the world must be either finite or infinite in the relevant respects and the conception of it as a thing in itself is a consequence of the application to the world of the logical principle: ‘‘ If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given.. . ” . (A497/B525) The “ conditioned ” here refers to the world and the “ conditions ” to its parts, properties of states. The point thus seems to be that if the world is “given”, i. e., assumed to exist, then the entire series of these “ conditions ” must likewise be assumed to be “ given ”, and this series must constitute either a finite or an infinite set. But logical principles can be applied merely to concepts (as opposed to things). To apply this principle to the world is therefore to consider it “ according to its mere concept”, in abstraction from the manner in which it is actually given to the mind in experience, and this is precisely what is meant by considering it as a thing in itself. As Kant puts it:

The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is here a synthesis 01 the mere understanding, which represents things as they are, without considering whether and how we can obtain knowledge of them. (A49U/B526-527)

The basic problem with this line of argument is the reliance upon the notion of the ‘I conditioned ” and its “ conditions ”. This notion fits in very well with Kant’s archtectonically inspired need to link the entire analysis to the idea oi the ‘. unconditioned ”, but it is not particularly well suited to the terms 01 the first two antinomies (in what sense is a region of space or a moment of time a * * condition ” of the physical world‘?). Fortunately, however, the argument can be reformulated so as to avoid these difficulties. This reformation involves the use of what Kant calls the “principle of complete determination ” 2s. According to this principle, “ If all the possible predicates of rhirigs be taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it. ” (A572B600)

24 As is clear from the context, Kant’s actual claim is that the world must be either finite or infinite if and only if it is a “ whole existing in itself ”. The claim shall be taken in this sense in what follows.

25 This was suggested by Stephen Barker, “ Appearing and Appearances in Kant ”, The Monist, July 1967, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 439.


Although Kant here presents this principle in connection with the concept of God as the ens realissimum, it can be easily applied to the concept of the world. The essential point is that this principle functions as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general, which Kant distinguishes both from a merely logical principle and from a principle of the possibility of experience. As such, it is an analytic principle, depicting what is contained in our concept of a thing in general 26. Applying this principle to the concept of the world, it follows analytically that it must contain either a finite or an infinite number of predicates, i. e., it must be completely determined in one way or the other. Once again, however, to conceive of the world in this way, as an ” object in general ”, that is “ according to its mere concept ”, and in abstraction from the conditions under which it can be experienced, is to consider it as a thing in itself. Thus, the belief that the world must be either finite or infinite in the relevant respects rests upon the conception of the world as a thing in itself.

Secondly, the conception of the world as a thing in itself is reflected in the particular arguments which purport to show that the world is finite, as well as in those which purport to show that it is infinite. In order to see this, one must keep in mind that while both sides are making claims about the physical world, neither side can support these claims by an appeal to experience. As Kant expresses the matter in the Prolegomena with reference to the first antinomy: “. . . neither assertion can be contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite space or of an infimte elapsed time, or again, of the boundary of the world by a void space or by an antecedent void tune, is impossible; these are mere Ideas ” 27. The reason why neither alternative can be given in experience, and why Kant characterizes them as “ mere Ideas ”, is that they violate the conditions of the possibility of experience. Nevertheless, the proponents of these Ideas persist in their beliel that an actual object corresponds to them. But since such an object would, ex hypothesi, not conform to the conditions of the possibility of experience, such an object would be a thing in itself.

The uncovering of this assumption provides the key to the resolution of the contradiction generated by the “ mathematical antinomies ” The contradiction vanishes as soon as one sees that it rests upon the transcendentally realistic conception of the world as a thing in itself. “Since the world does not exist in itself, independently of the regressive series of my representations ”, Kant writes, “ it exists in itself neither as an infinite nor as a

26 Cf. Reflexion 6381, Kanf gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XVIII, p. 699. 27 Kant’s gesammelte Schrijten, Vol. IV, p. 342.


finite whole. ” (A505B533) Moreover, as we have already seen, the repudiation of the illusory assumption of transcendental realism serves at the same time to establish the truth of transcendental idealism. Thus, after dis- missing the contradiction as “ merely dialectical ”, Kant proceeds to reflect:

From this antinomy we can, however, obtain, not indeed a dogmatic, but a critical and doctrinal advantage. I t affords indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of appearances - a proof which ought to convince any who may not be satisfied by the direct proof given in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This proof would consist in the following dilemma: If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite. But both alternatives are false (as shown in the proofs of the antithesis and thesis respectively). It is therefore also false that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in itself. From this is then follows that appearances in general are nothing outside our representations - which is just what is meant by their transcendental ideality. (A506-507/€3534-535)

The actual structure of this argument, which Kant casts in the form of a dilemma, is readily apparent and requires little comment. It is a rather straighforward example of rnodus tollens, combined with an immediate in- ference. The denial of the consequent (that the world is either finite or infinite) is used to deny the antecedent (that the world is a whole existang in itself). This denial is then taken to immediately entail the claim that “ appearances in general are nothing outside our representations ”, which is the thesis of transcendental idealism. Given the above analysis of the connection between the antecendent and the consequent, as well as the general reflections on the relationship between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, the only real difficulty with this argument seems to concern the denial of the consequent. As it stands, this denial rests entirely upon the validity of the proofs offered in support of the thesis and antithesis positions. If these be denied, then the entire argument collapses. It has been admitted, however, that these proofs are themselves far from unproblema- tic. Thus, if we still wish to save Kant’s argument, we have only two alternatives: either to defend these proofs against the multitide of objections that have been raised against them, or to reformulate the argument so that it no longer directly depends upon them.

As already indicated, I propose to opt for the latter alternative. This reformulation involves showing that the “ cosmological Idea ”, i. e., the conception of the physical world as a whole existing in itself, which is the common assumption in the cosmological dispute, is intrinsically incoherent. It


can therefore be denied in its own right, apart from any consideration of the contradictory consequences which it may engender. Such a move makes it possible to loosen the connection between the refutation of transcendental realism/demonstration of transcendental idealism and these problematic proofs. From this perspective, the proofs still have significance as the oc- casions for the recognition of this incoherence (they serve to awaken us from our “ dogmatic slumber ”), but they do not provide the actual grounds of its demonstration. Although this reformulation involves an abandonment of the neat structure which Kant gives to the argument in the Critique, it should be noted that much of what Kant says in the Critique strongly suggests the possibility of arguing in this way; and that in the Prolegomena and elsewhere he actually does make such a claim.

The suggestion in the Critique is found in connection with Kant’s bold claim that all metaphysical questions, that is, all questions concerning “ an object given to pure reason ”, (A477B505) are in principle answerable. Kant’s justification for this claim is that such questions only concern our Ideas, which are themselves “ mere creatures of reason ”. In other words, metaphysical disputes are held to be conceptual in nature, and thus resolv- able by conceptual analysis or ‘ I criticism”. Now at first glance, the cosmological claims, which generate the antinomies, would seem to be an ex- ception to this rule. Unlike transcendental conceptions such as God, the cosmological Ideas, on which these claims are based, seem to be empirical concepts of a higher order. In Kant’s own terms, “ The cosmological Ideas alone have the peculiarity that they can presuppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for its concept, as being given: (A479E3507) Further analysis, however, shows that this is precisely the problem with these Ideas (really with the single Idea of the world as a self-subsistent whole): for while they appear to involve an empirical reference, they in fact do not. They are, in effect, pseudo-empirical concepts, a point which Kant makes by noting that they involve “that amphiboly which transforms our Idea into a supposed representation of an object that is empirically given and therefore to be known according to the laws of experience ” 28. (A484/ B572) But if this is the case, then it follows that the Idea is itself incoherent, and this can be established apart from any consideration of its consequences.

In the Prolegomena Kant makes this more explicit. Presenting the cosmological Idea as equivalent to the concept of an “ absolutely existing world

28 The very characterization of the Idea as an “ amphiboly ” already points to the difficulty, and indicates the possibility of treating this Idea in the same manner as he treats the “ concepts of reflection ”.

Kant’s Refutation of Realism 24 1

of sense ”, he argues that this concept, like that of a round square to which he compares it, is self-contradictory. This, in turn, is used to explain how, as the proofs purportedly show, the contradictory consequences of this conception, i. e. the world is finite, the world is infinite, can both be falsez9. This result is alleged to follow from the definition of the “ world of sense ” as a “complex of the appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations, that is, in experience, since the latter is not an object in itself, but a mere mode of our representation^"^^. Obviously, a proposition which asserts that the world so defined exists absolutely contradicts itself; but equally obviously, this argument is blatantly circular, presup- posing the very idealism which it purports to establish.

Kant, however, suggests the same point in a somewhat more promising manner in On the Progress of Metaphysics. Using the notion of an “ absolute totality of conditions ” instead of “ absolute existence ”, he there maintains that the conception of a sensible, i. e. temporal, world which contains an absolute totality of conditions is self-contradictory; and that it is so whether one considers these conditions to be finite or infinite in number31. Unfortunately, Kant neglects to provide an argument for this claim: but by placing the contradiction between the conception of a temporal, sensible world, which is given in intuition, and the notion of an absolute totality of conditions, he at least leaves open the possibility of inferring the transcendental ideality of this sensible world from an analysis of the contradiction, without having to already presuppose it. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the conception of an “ absolute totality of conditions ” is really equivalent to that of “absolute existence”. This is because the assertion that the sensible world contains such an absolute totality is the result of applying to it the principle of complete determination. But, as we have already seen, this involves considering the world according to its “ mere concept ” or as an “ object in general ”, which, in turn, is equivalent to considering it as existing in itself or absolutely. Thus, in keeping with the formulation of the Prolegomena, let us see if it is possible to show that the conception of an “ absolutely existing world of sense ’’ is self-contradictory, without already assuming the truth of transcendental idealism.

29 Kant’s gesammelie Schriften, Vol. IV, p. 34. 30 Ibid., p. 342. 31 Ibid., Vol. X X , p. 328. In Kant’s actual words: “ Denn mit der absoluten Tota-

litat der Bedingungen in einer Sinneswelt, d. i. in der Zeit, widerspreche ich mir selbst, ich mag sie als unendlich, oder als begrenzt, in einer moglichen Anschauung gegeben mir vorstellen. ”


Such an argument obviously cannot avoid all presuppositions. In fact, it rests largely upon the objective validity of the “ Principles of Pure Under- standing ” or at least the “ Analogies of Experience ”. Nevertheless, this is not as problematic as it might appear; for we must keep in mind that it is directed against a type of transcendental realism which acknowledges the reality of a priori principles but denies their limitation to objects of possible experience or appearances. Indeed, these principles, and especially the principle of sufficient reason or causality, were freely used by the proponents of both the thesis and antithesis positions32. Thus, within the context of the argument Kant can perfectly well claim with regard to empirical objects that “ . . . even supposing they were given as things in themselves, without relation to possible experience, it still remains true that they are nothing to me, and therefore are not objects, save in so far as they are contained in the series of the empirical regress. ” (A496B524) Since, as we shall see, to be “contained in the series of the empirical regress” is equivalent to being subject to the principles, Kant is, in effect, claiming that even the transcendental realist, who treats appearances as if they were things in themselves, accepts the validity of these principles within experience. The problem only arises when, as with the cosmological Idea of an absolute whole, one end- eavors to extend these principles beyond the realm of possible experience. Only in such a situation, Kant notes:

. . . does distinction of the mode in which we view the reality of those objects of the senses become of importance, as serving to guard us against a deceptive error which is bound to arise if we misinterpret our empirical concepts. (A497D525)

Given these preliminaries, the reconstructed argument can best be ap- proached by noting that the concept of an “absolutely existing world of sense” which must be either finite or infinite is really a proposition. The proposition asserts that this concept has a referent or is objectively valid, and that the actual world to which the concept refers is either finite or infinite in the relevant respects. The proposition is therefore synthetic and involves and existential claim. Assuming the applicability to the concept of such a world of the principle of complete determination, there is no problem with the claim that it must be conceived of as either finite or infinite. That is to say, there is no contradiction in the concept of the world as a completely determined or unconditioned totality. The difficulty with the cosmological proposition only arises because, in addition to affirming this of the concept

32 Cf. AI-Azm, The Origins of Kant’s Arguments in the Antinomies, pp. 30-35.


of the world, it also maintains that the concept refers, that there is an actual empirical object corresponding to this concept. Kant suggests as much in the Critique when he characterizes the Idea as the “ supposed representation of an object that is empirically given ’,. In the Prolegomena it is implicit in the expression “ world of sense ”, which clearly means a world that can actually be encountered in experience. The problem is not simply that there is as a matter of fact no such object; this would suffice to make the proposition false but not incoherent. Rather the problem is that it is impossible for there to be one, and this impossibility is implied in the very concept of such a world.

It is here that the principles come into play. Their precise role in the argument can be made clear if, as seems legitimate, we treat these principles as rules of reference, that is, as a set of metalevel rules which prescribes the a priori conditions under which concepts can refer to possible empirical objects and thus count as empirical concepts. For example, the principle of causality prescribes the condition under which something can be characterized as an “event”, therefore the condition under which the concept of an event can have an empirical referent or function as a genuine empirical concept. A state of affairs which had no antecedent cause, e. g., an absolute beginning, could not be regarded as an event and would not be an item in a possible experience. Now, as we have just seen, the concept of an “ absolutely existing world of sense”, or its equivalent, a sensible world which contains an absolute totality of conditions, is purported to be empirical, that is, to refer to an actual empirical object or state of affairs. As such, the concept, like the ordinary empirical concept of an event must be subject to and presuppose the principles or rules of reference. But, as we have also seen, the problem with this concept is that it violates these rules; for the object to which it refers, whle purportedly empirical, violates the conditions oi a possible experience. Thus, contrary to the initial assumption, the concept cannot really refer to such an object, that is, it cannot really be an empirical concept. We are now in a position to determine more precisely the contradiction in the cosmological Idea of an “ absolutely existing world of sense ”. It lies in an inconsistent use of the rules of reference. Insofar as it is claimed to be empirical, it presupposes these rules. Insofar as its purported object is characterized as “ existing absolutely ” it violates, or at least sus- pends, these same rules. In this regard, it provides a nice theoretical ana- logue to the contradiction which, according to Kant, arises in the moral realm whenever one exempts oneself out of self-interest from what one otherwise recognizes to be a universal law.


Nor can the transcendental realist avoid this contradiction by denying the empirical nature of his conception of an absolutely existing world, and by locating it in a noumenal or purely intelligible realm, totally distinct from appearances 33. The problem with this solution, which Kant himself adopts with regard to the latter two or " dynamical antinomies ", is that it ignores the assumed homogeneity of the conditioned and its conditions in the " mathematical antinomies ". That is, it ignores the fact that the conditioned and its conditions are necessarily conceived of as parts of the same series (whether this series be spatial, temporal or causal. In point of fact however, the dogmatic transcendental realist treats his conception neither as an ordinary empirical concept, applicable to phenomena, nor as an " Idea of reason " which refers to a purely intelligible world. Instead, he grants it a kind of hybrid status which is designed to do justice both to its objective validity and its absoluteness. 'I'ypically, this is attempted either by grounding the conception of an absolute beginning in the will of God, which functions as the ultimate sufficient reason (Newton-Clarke), or by referring an actual infinity of conditions, which the human mind can only approach asymptotically and grasp confusedly, to the divine intellect wherein it is immediately apprehend- ed (Leibniz). For Kant, however, such a dogmatic appeal to a transcendent, super-empirical perspective, whether in the Newtonian or Leibnizian form, simply will not work. This is because the very concept of such a non-sensible object (the noumenon in the positive sense), as well as of a divine intellect or will for which it is an object, is completely problematic, and as such can hardly be brought to bear on questions concerning the sensible world (the realm of phenomena) 34.

It does, therefore, seem possible to provide a demonstration of the incoherence of the cosmological Idea which rests neither on the definition of a " world of sense " in terms of " representations " (the argument of the Pro- legomena) nor on the assumption of the validity or the proofs of the thesis and antithesis positions in the various antinonues (the argument of the Cri- tique). Moreover, such a procedure is thoroughly in accord with the " skeptical method " advocated by the Critique. Rather than dogmatically joining sides with one of the parties in the dispute, or proclaiming the problem in- soluble, which would involve a dogmatic skepticism, he uncovers and criticizes the common assumption which has generated the dispute in the first place. But since the argument offered in this section has of necessity been

33 Both this possible line of escape and the response to it were suggested to me

34 This is, of course, the central argument of the chapter: " The Ground of the by my colleague, Robert Pippin.

Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena ".


rather convoluted, it may help to briefly recapitulate what has been established.

1) The conception of the physical world as either finite or infinite in the relevant respects involves the conception of this world as “ absolutely existing” or as a thing in itself in the transcendental sense. It does so for two reasons: a) The claim that it must be either one or the other is the result of applying to it either the logical principle; if the conditioned is given, the totality of its conditions must likewise be given; or the transcendental principle of complete determination. In either case, the world is being considered “ according to its mere concept ”, in abstraction from the conditions under which it can be given in experience, and hence as it is “ in itself ”. b) The assertion that this world is finite (the thesis position in the antinomies) and the assertion that it is infinite (the antithesis position) involve claims which go beyond what can possibly be experienced. Therefore, each conceives of the world as it is apart from the conditions under which we can experience it, that is, as it is in itself.

2) But it is the “sensible world” that is assumed to exist in this manner and is considered as a thing in itself. The assertion of the cosmological Idea or proposition is therefore equivalent to the assertion of transcendental realism; for the proposition asserts, or at least implies, that objects of experience (appearances for Kant) are things in themselves.

3) This claim, however, is incoherent. It requires us to conceive of the physical or sensible world both as subject to and exempt from the conditions under which we can alone experience it, or, equivalently, both as an object of possible experience and as not such an object. In Kantian terms this means that we are required to conceive of this world as it is given to us in experience, both as an appearance and as a thing in itself.

From the incoherence of this concepti,on, we are now able to conclude: 1) that the sensible world cannot, without contradiction, be exempted from the conditions under which we can alone experience it, that is, it cannot be considered as if it were a thing in itself in the transcendental sense (this is the Kantian refutation of transcendental realism; 2) it therefore must be considered in relation to these conditions, that is, it must be considered as an appearance in the transcendental sense, or as transcendentally ideal (this is the Kantian demonstration of transcendental idealism).

Finally, let us keep in mind that the source of the difficulty with the cosmological Idea, and thus with transcendental realism, is that it ignores the distinction between the logical conditions required for the concept of an object and the transcendental or “ real ” conditions required for the possible


experience of an object corresponding to that concept. The recognition of this fact, and of the contradictions which it generates, leads one to distinguish between a consideration of an object as it is “ thought in its mere concept ” and a consideration of the same object as it is given in a possible experience 35, This, however: is precisely the transcendental distinction between things in themselves and appearances. Since the transcendental realist is, by definition, oblivious to this distinction, he can be said to take “the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts.. . for an objective necessity of things in themselves. ” (A297B353) We can therefore see that the “ illusion of transcendental realism ” is identical to transcendental illusion; and the Kant’s refutation of transcendental realism and demonstration of transcendental idealism is, at the same time, the repudiation of all such illusion.

I11

Even after assuming the validity of Kant’s refutation of transcendental realism, we are left with the nagging question of just what exactly has been established. This refutation, it will be recalled, was presented by Kant as equivalent to a demonstration of the truth of transcendental idealism. It therefore seems only natural to ask: what must be the nature of transcendental idealism, assuming with Kant that its truth is established by such a denial of transcendental realism?

We have just seen the refutation of transcendental realism turns on the demonstration of the incoherence of its conception of an “absolutely existing world of sense ”. This conception is incoherent because, while appearing to be empirical, and thus to refer to an actual object, it characterizes this object in such a way that it can never be encountered in any possible experience. Now it seems perfectly possible to reformulate this argument in terms of the notion of verification. Thus construed, the argument maintains that, although propositions which deal with the physical world as a whole (as “ unconditioned ” or as “ existing absolutely ”) seem, on the face of them, to be empirical (in point of grammatical form they involve factual claims), they really cannot be such because they are in principle unverifiable. Consequently, they must either be dismissed as meaningless, or at best treated as merely analytic claims about the meaning of the expression “ world ”.

Interpreted in this manner, however, the argument has an obvious and apparently fatal flaw. For while it may suffice to dissolve the antinomies

35 Critique of Pure Reason, A496-49IJB525.


by uncovering their illicit assumption, it hardly seems to entail any idealistic results. In fact, if it establishes anything at all of a positive nature, it can only be some form of the principle of verification. But clearly, Kant’s idealism is supposed to involve much more than this. As he explicitly tells us in his own formulation of the indirect argument, “ transcendental ideality ” means that “ appearances in general are nothing outside our representations ”. (A507iB535) One is therefore tempted to assume that, for some unexplained reason, Kant felt it necessary to combine his version of verification with a kind of phenomenalism which, for all that he says to the contrary, is really not very far removed from the views of Berkeley. But since this latter doctrine is not entailed by the former, it seems perfectly possible to simply dismiss it as so much metaphysical excess baggage, thereby allowing the actual structure of the argument to emerge more clearly.

The line of interpretation and criticism just sketched has been most fully developed by Strawson3‘j, but its general assumptions seem to be fairly widely shared3’. Given such an analysis, which admittedly is rendered at least plausible by some of what Kant says, the task of the sympathetic inter- preter of transcendental idealism can be described as to somehow navigate between the Scylla of mere verification and the Charybdis of a Berkeleian style phenomenalism. Fortunately, since we are by now well prepared for this journey, the trip will be rather brief and not particularly difficult.

First of all, with regard to Kant’s verificationism, it is clear that what Strawson calls the “ principle of significance ” and Bennett “ concept empiri- cism ” plays a crucial role in Kant’s refutation of transcendental realism. More- over, it is surely a central tenet of the Critique that a concept must have a sensible referent if it is to have objective validity (‘ sensible’ is used here instead of ‘empirical’ so as to include mathematical concepts which refer to pure intuition). As Kant says explicitly with regard to the cosmological Idea, “ Possible experience is that which can alone give reality to our concepts; in its absence a concept is a mere Idea, without truth, that is, without relation to an object.” (A489B519) Nevertheless, it remains the case that, unlike positivism, the Kantian appeal to possible experience is not to a possible state of affairs or set of data, but to a set of a priori conditions. Thus, any attempt to find elements of a verification theory in Kant must consider his constant reference to these a priori conditions.

36 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, esp. pp. 188-197. 37 Cf. Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, esp. pp. 119-125, and Moltke Gram,

“ Kant’s First Antinomy ”, The Monist, October, 1967, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 499-518.


Now, as has been already indicated in the first part of this paper, the appeal to a priori conditions of experience is the decisive feature of Kant’s idealism, enabling him to juxtapose his doctrine to all varieties of transcendental realism. At this point, however, it may prove helpful to distinguish between two claims which Kant makes in this regard. He affirms both the ideality of the conditions themselves and the ideality of the objects known in virtue of these conditions (objects of experience). The second claim is the thesis of transcendental idealism. The ideality of the conditions follows from Kant’s theory of the a priori, which we obviously cannot do justice to here38. The basic point it that it is their status as ultimate epistemic conditions that requires us to locate them in the human mind rather than in the objects known, that is, in the objects considered as they are “ in themselves ” apart from their relation to this mind. Kant’s refutation of transcendentally realistic epistemologies turns on this principle 39. The ideality of the objects known (empirical objects) follows from the ideality of the conditions in virtue of which they are known. Because they can only be known insofar as they conform to these conditions, they can only be known as they appear, not as they are in themselves.

This analysis of the connection between the role of a priori conditions and the transcendental conception of appearance enables us to deal with the question of Kant’s alleged phenomenalism. Part of the answer has already been given by means of the demonstration that Berkeleian ideas count as things in themselves in the Kantian sense. The heart of the problem, however, concerns the construction that is to be placed locutions to the effect that the objects of human experience are I‘ appearences ” or “ mere representations ”. As Kant indicates in the second passages cited at the beginning of this paper, the doctrine that “ all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations. . ” does not mean that, like Berkeleian ideas, these objects are nothing at all apart from their relation to the mind. Rather, it means only that “in the manner in which they are represented . . . ” they “ have no independent existence outside our thoughts ”. The emphasis here must be placed upon the phrase “ in the manner in which they are represented”. This clearly suggests that, if one abstracts from this “ manner ”, these objects do have an independent

38 I discuss this Droblem in “ Kant’s Transcendental Humanism ”. The Monisf. April, 1971, Vol. 55, Nb. 2, pp. 188-193.

39 Cf. Prolegomena 6 14. Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Vol. IV. D. 293. Kant there argues that if ‘<-nature ”-is taken to-refer to a realm of things in themselves, then knowledge thereof is impossible either a priori or a posteriori. This is a crucial dimen- sion of Kant’s overall critique of transcendental realism which I have only been able to touch upon in this paper.


existence. The point is not to deny this independent existence, but simply to deny it of them in the “ manner in which they are represented ”. It cannot, of course, be claimed that Kant is perfectly consistent on this score, and that he never lapses into phenomenalism. Nevertheless, it remains the case that, in the present passage as well as a vast majority of the places where he characterizes empirical objects as “ appearances ” or “ mere representations ”, this language can and must be construed in the non-phenomenalistic, transcendental sense.

In further clarification of this point, let us briefly compare Kant’s analysis of the problem of unperceived objects in the “ Antinomy of Pure Rea- son” with Berkeley’s treatment of the same problem. As is well known, Berkeley offers two interpretations of propositions of the form “ X exists ”, when X is not being perceived by oneself or by “ any other created spirit ”. On one of these interpretations, X can be said to exist because it is perceived by God (Principles 0 5) , on the other interpretation, which is obviously of much greater relevance to contemporary philosophical concerns, X can be said to exist because statements about X can be translated into hypotheticals of the form, “if one were there, he would perceive X”. (Principles Q 3 ) Common to both is the correlation between existence and perception, which is the hallmark of Berkeley’s esse est percipi principle.

At first glance Kant’s transcendentally idealistic account is similar to Berkeley’s second version. He readily admits that there may be inhabitants in the moon, even though no one has ever perceived them. As he goes on to explain, however, “ This. . . only means that in the possible advance of experience we may encounter them. For everything is real (wirklich) which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the laws of empirical advance. They are therefore real if they stand in an empirical connection with my present consciousness. . . ” And again, “TO call an appearance a real thing (ein wirkliches Ding) prior to our perceiving it, either means that in the advance of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing at all. ” (A493/B521)

Kant, like Berkeley, thus translates first order statements about unperceived entities and events into second order statements about possible perceptions. Nevertheless, this should not blind us to the radical difference between the two positions. This difference is reflected in the Kantian conceptions of “ empirical advance ” and “ possible perception ”. The “ laws of empirical advance ”, “ empirical synthesis ”, or “ empirical regress ” are equivalent to what Kant proceeds to call the “laws of the unity of experience ’,. (A494D522) These are nothing other than the principles of pos-


sible experience or rules of reference. As such they determine the conditions of “ empirical advance ’,. Consequently, to say with Kant that a certain entity or event is to be met with in the ‘b advance of experience ’’ is not to posit a hypothetical mental event, but rather to acknowledge the conformity of this entity or event with these principles, and to assert that, by means of them, it can be given a determinate spatio-temporal location relative to the appearances of our present experience. Thus, what Kant is really providing here is an analysis of the criteria in terms of which an entity or event can be judged to be part of the abiding publicly accessible “sensible world” and hence “ actual ” (wirklich).

The Kantian conception of possible perception is cut from a similar cloth, and can likewise be sharply distinguished from Berkeley’s conception. As is clear from the notorious example of the minimum visible, the latter’s account is essentially psychological in nature. To be possible on this account means to be sensible; so that whatever is too small to be sensed can be re- jected as impossible (A New Theory of Vision § 80-87). In contrast to this, Kant defines the possibility of a perception in terms of its conformity with the a priori principles. Thus, he can maintain:

All that the rule requires is that the advance from appearances be to appearances; for even if these latter yield no actual perceptions (as is the case when for our consciousness they are too weak in degree to become experience), as appearances they nonetheless still belong to a possible experience. (A522b.3550)

We therefore see once again that Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot be construed as phenomenalistic in any of the ordinary senses of the term 40.

The refutation of transcendental realism in the “ Antinomy of Pure Reason ” neither rests on phenomenalistic assumptions nor arrives at phenomenalistic results. It does not, as if often assumed, lead to the result that things are not “ really ” as they appear to be; that space, time and the physical world do not “ really ” exist. Rather, it provides an analysis of what must be meant by “ reality ”, or better “ actuality ” (Wirklichkeit) with reference to empirical objects, and determines how these objects must be considered if their actuality is to be understood. This confirms the results of the first part where, by means of the juxtaposition of transcendental idealism with transcendental realism, we saw that the thesis of transcendental ideality (the

40 This denial is not to include the special sense that Norman Kemp Smith gives to this term in A Commentary to Kant’s “ Critique of Pure Reason ”, Second Edition, New York, 1962. Kemp Smith contrasts his sense of “ phenomenalism ” with “ subjec- tivism ” which is equivalent to what is here being regarded as “ phenomenalism ”.


thesis that empirical objects are in uns in the transcendental sense) really reduces to a claim about how objects must be “ considered ” for the purpose of philosophical reflection. Combining both parts, we are led to the conclusion that Kant’s transcendental idealism can best be defined in the terms of Ernst Cassirer as a “ methodic idealism ” 41.

Insofar as Kant’s idealism is methodological in nature, the verification- ist interpretation is closer to the truth than the phenomenalist. Its weakness is that it totally fails to do justice to Kant’s method. This is the critical or transcendental method, and transcendental idealism is equivalent to the transcendental method itself. This can be gathered from a brief consideration of Kant’s own characterization of his procedure. According to his famous definition, by “ transcendental ’’ is meant “ all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects (Erkenntnisart von Gegenstiinden) insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori”. (B25) Now, as Kant proceeds to show in the Transcendental Analytic, a “ mode of knowledge ” is only “ possible a priori ” if it functions as a necessary condition of empirical knowledge. Con- sequently, our synthetic a priori knowledge is limited to the forms or conditions of a possible experience. The transcendental method is thus concerned with the determination of these conditions; and a transcendental claim is a claim to the effect that a certain concept or principle functions as such a condition. But the claim that a given concept or principle functions as such a condition implies that empirical objects must be “ considered ” as subject to it (otherwise it would not be a condition of empirical knowledge). This, however, is equivalent to the claim that these objects are in uns in the transcendental sense; and this is the claim of transcendental idealism. This idealism is, therefore, not a metaphysical thesis about the “ real nature ’’ of empirical objects which has been arrived at on the basis of the transcendental method. Rather, it is an assertion of the manner in which, according to this method, such objects must be considered, if the possibility of knowledge of them is to be made intelligible.

Although not itself a metaphysical thesis, the doctrine of the transcendental ideality of empirical objects certainly has important metaphysical implications, and in light of it we can see why Kant would describe the Cri- tique as containing the “ metaphysics of metaphysics ” 42. Among other things, it enabled Kant to show in the Transcendental Aesthetic that space

41 Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, Eng. translation by W. C. and M. C.

42 Kant‘s letter to Markus Hen, about May 11, 1781, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Swabey, New York, 1953, p. 300.

Vol. X, p. 269.


and time, which on transcendentally realistic assumptions must be conceived either as themselves things which exist independently of the cognitive structure of the human mind or as relations between things which exist in this manner, are really conditions of knowing things or “ sources of knowledge ” (Erkenntnisquellen) (A39B56). Similarly, in the “ Antinomy of Pure Rea- son ” it enabled him to show l) that what, on the same transcendentally realistic assumptions, appears to be an unresolvable metaphysical dispute, lead- ing to a radical skepticism, is in reality a pseudo-issue, generated by an incoherent assumption; and 2) that the apparent contradiction between the complete determinism demanded by the scientific conception of nature and the freedom demanded by the moral law is likewise based on this same incoherent assumption. In short, the method of transcendental idealism enabled Kant to show what the method of transcendental realism could not, viz., how both nature and freedom are possible.

These important metaphysical consequences, as well as Kant’s own tendency to construe transcendental idealism somewhat narrowly in terms of the theory of sensibility established in the Transcendental Aesthetic 43, are no doubt among the main reasons why the methodological nature of this idealism is so often overlooked. Nevertheless, Kant makes his position quite clear in his account of the Copernican revolution in philosophy which he provides in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique. “ Hitherto ”, he there notes, “ it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. ’’ This, as we have seen at length, is precisely the standpoint of all precritical philosophies. It includes, but is much broader than the so-called “ copy theory of knowledge ” 44, On the basis of this assumption, Kant reflects, all efforts to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge have failed. Because of this failure, he suggests, “ We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. ” (BXVI) This supposition is the standpoint of transcendental idealism; so that the shift from the first to the second supposition is clearly equivalent to the shift from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism. What kind of a shift is this? Well, Kant himself describes it as a change in the “way of thinking” (Denkart)45

43 This, however, is not always the case. See for instance, Critique of Pure Reason, A129, where the doctrine of transcendental ideality is linked specifically with the transcendental unity of apperception. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Gerold Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, p. 184 ff.

44 This is the manner in which it is put by Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, Ein Problem der “ Kritik der reinen Vernunft ”, pp. 58-70.

45 Kemp Smith translates th is as “ point of view ” which also captures the methodological flavor of this shift.

Kant's Refutation of Realism 253

(BXVI), and he proclaims that this " new way of thinking " " enables him to accomplish what the " previous procedure " (bisherigen Verfahrungsarl) could not. The Copernican revolution in philosophy, the shift from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism, is thus presented by Kant himself as a change in the " way of thinking ", that is, in the manner in which objects are to be considered46. Lest one conclude, however, that to characterize Kant's position in this way is to trivialize it, let us keep in mind that this change in the " way of thinking " is nothing other than the " transcendental turn ". Kant's refutation of realism is thus at the same time an argument for the necessity of making this turn.

Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego October, 1975

46 Similar language is also to be found in the two important notes in BXIX and BXXIII. In the former place he refers to the '' double point of view " (doppelten Ge- sichtspunkte) from which things must be considered, and in the latter place, while comparing his move to Copernicus, he again characterizes it as a " change in the manner of thinking '' (Umanderung der Denkart).

Dialectica Vol. 30, No 2i3 (1976)

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Kant's Refutation of Realism